Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Aditya G » 27 Jan 2016 15:03

UndieTV gets access to the official report of all

http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pathanko ... picks=true

NEW DELHI: How the six Pakistani terrorists divided among themselves the deadly task of attacking the Pathankot air force base earlier this month has now been reconstructed by experts from the military, who have shared their findings exclusively with NDTV.

Their report - submitted to the government recently - concludes that two of the terrorists were assigned to act as "guides" for the other four. It was their job to lead the larger group to the technical area where fighter jets and helicopters were parked. This pair of attackers were not armed with machine guns. They had Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs, highly flammable incendiary gels, and ammonium nitrate. The plan was to destroy as many high-value military assets as possible.

Seven military personnel were martyred in the attack.

The four terrorists referred to as Group 1 entered the air force base early on the morning of January 2 by scaling a 10-foot high wall topped with barbed wire. They were detected by thermal devices on surveillance aircraft only the next day, on January 3. Group 2 (the pair of gunmen) had arrived earlier on January 1 - it's still not clear how they breached the base.

The fact that the thermal devices never spotted the six men moving together confirms earlier reports that the men operated in separate teams.

As security forces responded, it was the group of four terrorists moving together that was killed first on January 2, approximately six hours after they opened fire indiscriminately in a cafeteria before moving out. Before they were shot dead, since they were unable to move either to the technical area where aircraft are parked, or to the residential area - nearly 1,600 people live on the massive base which is 2,000 acres - the terrorists blew up several motorcycles and parked cars. A senior officer in the operation told NDTV, "The manner in which they blew up the civilian vehicles showed that they were frustrated in not being able to get into the technical area." :?:

By now on January 3, the remaining two terrorists had taken shelter on the ground floor of a residential building. There were at least five air force officers were on the first floor; they had locked themselves into rooms and placed furniture against the doors as a bulwark. They were evacuated by commandos from the National Security Guard or NSG before security forces began the final effort to shoot the terrorists.

...
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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 28 Jan 2016 01:24

So operation was over six hours after first contact.
The other two terrorshits hid till later and were killed after the IAF personnel were evacuated. These couldn't shoot back and got fried when the explosives they carried caught fire.

Truly foisted on own petard as the saying goes.

Hope Lt Gen Panag reads and ruminates.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby member_23370 » 28 Jan 2016 02:25

Good to know the analysis but I am still waiting for a few F-16's and Eyeries to be blown up in sargodha.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby chetak » 28 Jan 2016 02:28

^^^^^^^

Time for a pause

Time for a pause

- Reflections on Pathankot
Brijesh D. Jayal

Now that the tsunami that swept through newsrooms and electronic channels during and after the recent terrorist attack on the Indian air force station in Pathankot has blown over, it offers an opportunity to pause and reflect on the deeper ramifications of the entire event and, indeed, the national response to it. At one level, it would appear that this was in line with a series of such storms that continue to buffet the national scene at an alarmingly regular frequency. While debates on these can be considered part of an ongoing political turf war or a healthy democracy at play with an inquisitive media playing its rightful role, the Pathankot episode concerns not just national security, but how we, as a society, respond to a new and still evolving threat of terrorist violence unfolding across international frontiers. Such an event should be considered beyond the pale of partisan politics, media hype and ill-informed debate and discussion. This is all the more important since this is not going to be the last of such happenings and just as the armed forces will hold incisive debriefs and learn lessons, other institutions of our democracy would also be well advised to do so.

One understands the fierce competition that prevails in newsrooms of the electronic media for viewership, so that some of the debates tend to be dramatic and even hysterical. While this may be of good entertainment or viewer-rating value it would be fair to accept a degree of seriousness when covering the national security domain. More so when operations are ongoing and minders of terrorists are monitoring the media to glean information and guide their foot soldiers in real time. Getting hold of veterans and others eager to face the camera and calling them "defence experts" when some were not even considered so by their peers when they were in service, is to be unfair to a subject as serious as national security.

There has been much criticism on how terrorists could make an entry into a military airfield little appreciating that military airfields are spread over large areas and while all have security perimeter fencing/walls and so on, these can measure up to 20-30 kilometres in length and are by no means impenetrable in warlike situations unless secured by the army. That is why passive air defence and ground defence of airfields (as indeed many other pre-designated civil and military vital areas and vital points) during a state of war is the responsibility given to army formations who along with the IAF or other concerned authorities carry out routine exercises to ensure seamless and coordinated action in the event of a cautionary for hostilities being declared. During peace time a plethora of intelligence, police and paramilitary forces are expected to ensure that war-like threats are unable to rear their head.

Within the airfield, forest and green cover is extensive as this provides natural camouflage from aerial attacks for strategic assets, which include not just airborne platforms, but fuel-storage depots, bomb and ammunition dumps, missile storage sites, engineering and support hangars and many others. Even within the airfield perimeter these assets have further individual security. In addition, there are domestic camps housing personnel and their families. So, if a few terrorists are able to enter this vast area, it is not difficult for them to take advantage of this camouflage and hold on for some days.

The media were at great pains to dissect an operation that was not only ongoing, but of which very little precise information was available because it was sensitive. We had critics complaining of multiplicity of command and control, questioning why the NSG had been sent, why the operation was taking unduly long and a host of other sensational issues conveying the general impression of chaos and incompetence on the part of the security response. It needed the army chief to finally put to rest this misinformation when, in a press meet on the eve of the army day, he clearly stated that the entire operation was under the command of the army commander western command and there was no lack of coordination. This is exactly how it is planned to be in the service war plans.

As to the role of the NSG, which is a specialized force, it is ironic that the very voices criticizing delay in deploying the force during the Mumbai attacks are now questioning its pre-emptive positioning. Indeed, so negative was the general perception that an editorial in this daily wondered whether honouring an undeserving dead officer was part of a larger scheme of covering of lapses from defence minister downwards.

One series of questions that barely found mention was whether in view of the escalating terrorist threats, when we are faced with a proxy-war situation, we should upgrade the threat level to all or some designated vital areas and vital point to a higher security level, which would then mean handing the security over to the army. A natural question to follow would be whether the army has adequate resources for the task. Or to go a step further, should not border security in Punjab be handed over to the army, as is the case in Jammu and Kashmir?

But these questions will then beg further questions as to what are the five central armed police forces doing to earn their bread? Just to take the example of the BSF whose website boasts of a strength of 186 battalions with 2.4 lakh personnel and an expanding air wing, artillery regiments and commando units. It further claims to be the world's largest border-guarding force being termed as the first wall of defence of Indian territories. Yet it is through this wall that heavily armed terrorists carrying a huge cache of weapons walked through undetected to target the Pathankot airfield.

In the context of the Pathankot attack and the many lapses that the security forces are being charged with, it is worth looking at three major terrorist attacks on military airfields in the recent past. In October, 2007, 21 LTTE commandos attacked the Sri Lankan air force base at Anuradhapura. Whilst 20 of the terrorists were killed, the SLAF suffered 14 dead, 22 wounded with 9 aircraft/helicopters destroyed and another 10 damaged. At the time, the late B. Raman, an erstwhile additional secretary in the Research and Analysis Wing and an expert in counter-terrorism, said about the attack that it "had been preceded by painstaking intelligence collection, planning and rehearsal".

In May, 2011, 15 terrorists of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and al Qaeda attacked PNS Mehran, the headquarters of Pakistan's naval air arm located near the Pakistan air force base in Karachi, killing 18 military personnel, wounding another 16 and destroying two high-value P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft built by the United States. Finally, in September, 2012, the international security assistance force base of Camp Bastion in the Helmand province of Afghanistan was attacked by a suicide assault team of 15 terrorists. During the attack, 14 terrorists were killed and one captured while two ISAF soldiers were killed with eight others and one civilian contractor injured. A total of 6 US Harrier Strike aircraft were destroyed and another 2 significantly damaged. In comparison, the loss in Pathankot was of seven lives (of which four were in the domestic area) and no damage to valuable assets at all. If, in the eyes of our people, this constitutes failure that needs cover up, there is not much one can say about national self-confidence.

If there is unanimity on one issue it is that the attack on IAF station Pathankot was an act of terrorists who are operating from across the border. Terrorists plan their attack to obtain the greatest publicity and the effectiveness of the terrorist act lies not in the act itself, but in the public or government's reaction to the act.

Viewed in this background and without attempting to pre-judge the results of investigations and analyses that each of the elements involved in this operation will undoubtedly undertake, a few points are worth noting. First, this was an operation that had been meticulously planned and rehearsed and not a reaction to prime minister's Lahore visit. Christine Fair, the author of Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War, writing a column, Pakistan's Terror Game, says that it is a serious misunderstanding to judge the Pathankot attack as an attempt to derail the nascent peace process. Instead, "the attack on the Pathankot Air Base is the latest manifestation of a Pakistani national security strategy that addresses its own internal challenges while also pursuing its revisionist agenda against India".

Second, and more significantly, the fact that not an iota of damage could be done to the material assets points to an exceptionally professional response by the security forces and a complete failure of the terrorists' objective of wide publicity through spectacular damage to vital air force assets. Third, those in uniform who sacrificed their lives did so in the true tradition of their commitment of unlimited liability to the nation. Errors, if made, in the fog of battle are those of judgment and not neglect. The military treats even the enemy dead with respect, so let us not grudge a military funeral to our dead or else we risk breeding a risk- averse soldiery.

Finally, if the perpetrators of this attack have to draw any satisfaction from their mission, it is the public criticism and humiliation of the Indian security system that was heaped on itself by none other than India's own self-proclaimed upholders of national interest. This is one success that their Pakistani handlers must be truly relishing.

The author is a retired air marshal of the Indian Air Force
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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 28 Jan 2016 02:50

In retrospect the media and the thugs were kolavari this or that and outraging over everything.

BTW, I&B ministry has served NDTV show cause notice for broadcasting video while ops were underway. Late but never.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Rudradev » 28 Jan 2016 03:11

First, this was an operation that had been meticulously planned and rehearsed and not a reaction to prime minister's Lahore visit.


No doubt there was a lot of meticulous planning behind setting the pieces in place for such an operation. Rehearsals, training, placement of dead-drop caches, recruitment and maintenance of sleeper networks in Punjab to facilitate infiltration and ingress (many of whom may have been simply part of the ISI's heroin smuggling/dealing infrastructure with no prior utilization in direct terrorist activity).

But I'm not seeing any big-picture alignment of circumstances that answer the question "why was the op green-lighted NOW?" other than that TSPA/ISI were rattled by the Lahore visit.

e.g. If this was an attempt to release pressure accumulated under Zarb-e-azb by diverting Deobandi tanzeem terrorists (JeM) into the India-terror valve, they chose a particularly hard target to try and achieve that. The average TTP strike against Paki defence installations (let alone Paki bazaars or schools or universities) produces far more in terms of propaganda value by achieving a spectacular body count. In contrast, the Pathankot op has simply reiterated to their tanzeems that suicide attacks against Indian defence installations are guaranteed to be rapidly suicidal with a forbidding cost-benefit ratio.

Another explanation is that it was an attempt to test security readiness at our defence installations, and humiliate the Indian armed forces if possible by destroying expensive hardware... but again, why now? The only possible motive is that if successful, the op could potentially have hardened opinions in the Indian security establishment against the Modi govt's attempts at rapprochement with Pakistan (which, again, points to a reaction against the Lahore visit).

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby chetak » 28 Jan 2016 03:33

^^^^^^^

If it was actually a reaction against the lahore visit, it simply means that there are already existing multiple teams, with different predetermined targets, that are trained, ready and waiting to go, depending on the occasion or a specific affront that the paki army feels the need to address.

This point could well be made to the paki civilian govt side or to the Indian side with such messages being clearly understood by the specific entity to which it was covertly but unmistakably addressed in a public way that could be seen by all concerned as a warning or even threat of larger operation if certain positions not reversed.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby shiv » 28 Jan 2016 04:33

I don't think there is any doubt that there are a lot of well trained teams waiting to get in - except that most of them simply get eliminated. When they get caught late we get Pathankot. When they don't get caught we get Mumbai.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Sid » 28 Jan 2016 05:51

IMHO Pakis reacted to -

1> contd Afgan tilt towards India
2> helo supply
3> military training

Attack could have following goals -

1> loss of military h/w
2> loss of foreign nationals in military facility
3> loss of military outposts in foreign land

All this happening even when they have their point man, Ghani, in office. Coordinated strikes in India and Afgan all points towards this angle. Modi/Sharif meeting got nothing to do with it.

Pakis must have been in a pickle because it was too late to pull the plug once Modi showed up unannounced.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Aditya G » 28 Jan 2016 11:47

chetak wrote:^^^^^^^

Time for a pause

Time for a pause

- Reflections on Pathankot
Brijesh D. Jayal

...

The media were at great pains to dissect an operation that was not only ongoing, but of which very little precise information was available because it was sensitive. We had critics complaining of multiplicity of command and control, questioning why the NSG had been sent, why the operation was taking unduly long and a host of other sensational issues conveying the general impression of chaos and incompetence on the part of the security response. It needed the army chief to finally put to rest this misinformation when, in a press meet on the eve of the army day, he clearly stated that the entire operation was under the command of the army commander western command and there was no lack of coordination. This is exactly how it is planned to be in the service war plans.

As to the role of the NSG, which is a specialized force, it is ironic that the very voices criticizing delay in deploying the force during the Mumbai attacks are now questioning its pre-emptive positioning. Indeed, so negative was the general perception that an editorial in this daily wondered whether honouring an undeserving dead officer was part of a larger scheme of covering of lapses from defence minister downwards.

...

In comparison, the loss in Pathankot was of seven lives (of which four were in the domestic area) and no damage to valuable assets at all. If, in the eyes of our people, this constitutes failure that needs cover up, there is not much one can say about national self-confidence.

If there is unanimity on one issue it is that the attack on IAF station Pathankot was an act of terrorists who are operating from across the border. Terrorists plan their attack to obtain the greatest publicity and the effectiveness of the terrorist act lies not in the act itself, but in the public or government's reaction to the act.

...

Second, and more significantly, the fact that not an iota of damage could be done to the material assets points to an exceptionally professional response by the security forces and a complete failure of the terrorists' objective of wide publicity through spectacular damage to vital air force assets. Third, those in uniform who sacrificed their lives did so in the true tradition of their commitment of unlimited liability to the nation. Errors, if made, in the fog of battle are those of judgment and not neglect. The military treats even the enemy dead with respect, so let us not grudge a military funeral to our dead or else we risk breeding a risk- averse soldiery.

Finally, if the perpetrators of this attack have to draw any satisfaction from their mission, it is the public criticism and humiliation of the Indian security system that was heaped on itself by none other than India's own self-proclaimed upholders of national interest. This is one success that their Pakistani handlers must be truly relishing.

The author is a retired air marshal of the Indian Air Force


The air marshal makes some pertinent points above.

Indian Media is like a problem child - and GoI and all stakeholders need to accept this problem and develop mechanisms to deal with it. There is no limit to the level or extent of criticism and hai-tauba these people create. Secondly, a lot of the "reporting" by the Indian media is fit for "opinions" but is not delineated as such.

This time, they crossed a "red line" of criticizing our officer who died in the line of duty - without knowing the facts and not having the competence to analyze the facts even if they were available. This is unacceptable. Tragedy is that there is no evidence of self regulation and introspection by the media at large on how they have to improve the quality, depth and responsibility of their reporting.

During the attacks, that there should have been 1 daily news conference, with representation by Army, IAF, NSG and Home Ministry on the tactical situation of the event. And another one with political representation say Mrs. Swaraj, Mr. Rajnath Singh or at least their secys. There was one by Home Secy which was a disaster. This conference could then have been chewed upon and analyzed for next 24 hours by journos .... in the abscence of that they were left scratching for whatever they could find.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Aditya G » 28 Jan 2016 12:01

Some thoughts on the strategic results of this operation by Pakis, if I may.

1. The jehadis failed to cause material impact to India at a strategic level, as no strategic asset was damaged or destroyed (P-3s, Erieye etc).

2. They gave more ammo for India to attack Pakistan at the political engagement level. Already there is an element of Paki establishment attempting to bring to justice 26/11 attackers, now they will have to deal with India's demands around Pathankot attacks. Yes, the response by Pak is not sufficient or an eyewash, but NaMo government has successfully engaged their establishment to talk a different line.

3. The advanced tactics and training of the attackers will lead to an equal effort by our counter terror forces including NSG, Punjab Police, BSF, Garuds, DSC, Army and IAF.

4. Flourishing drug trade in punjab border has come under scanner and it is likely to be hit.

5. The attack has resulted in security audit of all airbases, which will lead to overall improvements and perhaps illegal squatters and encroachment issues will be addressed. Thus improving the overall security and steeling the facilities for the next attack, which will become more difficult.

Both NIA and Garuds were created in response to terror attacks, and both got their chance to be a part of this one. Good for both. Further, 77 sqn got a chance to be part of a live op as well. Good for all of these units.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Lalmohan » 28 Jan 2016 14:56

it seems fairly clear that the TSPA and ISI (so-called intelligence service, like so-called ijlamik ishtate) has permanent raid teams on standby and a network of infiltration and supply nodes inside india. the punjab drug menace is part of the latter. now, unless the standby teams are regular TSPA troops, they will be fervent mujjies burning with the desire for jeehard continuously on alert and full of the desire to strike kaffirs... surely, without regular steam venting, these groups are going to go rogue?

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 28 Jan 2016 23:05

All, Thanks for the inputs and comments.

As for why now and by whom? SSridhar has provide an insight into this in the Strat forum by way of discussing the AlQIS formation and field of operations.

http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 9#p1971999

Essentially TSP/IAI has different terrorist non-state actors to use as needed by circumstances: pressure, plausible deniability etc.

Basically they have changed the number plates on LeT and JeM to hoodwink US and could be with their consent.


My take is they were trying out these new outfits to do small unit attacks outside Kashmir, even if infiltration is through J&K.

To enable these attacks they have built up an extensive spy infrastructure in Indian military forces. E.g. the large number of spies being arrested all over the country. In addition we don't see yet, a large terrorist shelter/enabling network vias smugglers/pliable police etc.

The first attack by LeT on Gurdaspur Police station was a failure. However it has hallmarks used later Pathankot: small unit, infiltration via smuggler route, suicide terrorist squad, attack on Indian state symbols outside Kashmir so on.

The second attack was by JeM to show they could do what LeT failed. So this is competitive terrorist attacks to gain primacy in ISI terrorist networks. The competition is from ISI handlers and the terrorist chiefs.
The battle is for leadership of AQIS.

Also why two squads? The first one with guns was to distract the defenders while the second squad was to destroy assets in technical area. They had more explosives and no guns at all. Shows their mission.


So what lessons?

Next attack will be two to three large groups (about ten each) as Indian forces are able to confine and kill small units. PAFB attack shows TSP is able to infiltrate terrorists in different head count and assemble at attack point.

If BSF and Punjab Police are not hauled over the coals we can expect next one to be a disaster.

------
Reading the report again both squads managed to infiltrate and remain hidden till attacks happened. All this reflects on base security which is last line of defense against intrusion.
So expect some changes in this area at the base.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Rudradev » 29 Jan 2016 01:02

Ramana, thanks. As always, that exquisitely detailed analysis by SSridhar guru sheds an entirely new light on things!

So the TSPA/ISI now finds itself a ringside participant in what is essentially a recruitment war between two Islamist mahagatbandhans to enlist roving groups of local jihadis: AQIS vs. IS-IS (Al Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent vs. Islamic State in Indian Subcontinent).

Between the two, TSPA/ISI favors AQIS. They are afraid that IS-IS, growing too powerful in the region, will subsume the Pakistani deep state in a way that AQ/TTP was never quite able to. So they have launched two parallel drives:
One: bring the Punjabi Taliban (who had in 2007 deserted their Sarkari loyalties to align with TTP) back into the ISI's orbit... groups like JeM etc.
Two: for those members of TTP who chose to remain defiantly outside the Sarkari orbit, launch Zarb-e-azb to neutralize them (leveraging the new Ghani regime in Afghanistan, which is much more inclined than the Karzai govt. to cooperate with Pakistan in denying the TTP operating space north of the Durand line).

Meanwhile AQIS was to be not only tolerated, but "rehabilitated" by the TSPA/ISI. This is because their flagship Sarkari terrorist Tanzeem... LeT... had come under international pressure and a law of diminishing (potentially explosive) returns was beginning to prohibit the continued use of LeT against India. To increase plausible deniability the new attacks against India would take place under the overall banner of AQIS, and hence Pakistan's 3.5 friends could conveniently ascribe culpability to "global jihad" rather than Islamabad. That's at the strategic level. It neatly dovetailed with the TSPA/ISI's operational intentions... bring back Punjabi Taliban tanzeems like JeM into the Sarkari orbit (de facto) while maintaining the fiction that these tanzeems were functioning under the orders of AQIS (in name).

All this is merely a summary in my own words of SSridhar's insight. So how does it relate to the PAFB attack?

Sending JeM type terrorist squads into India (such as the PAFB attack) serves three purposes.
One, it causes harm to India (the ultimate purpose of all Paki terrorism).
Two, it does so in a manner that can be ascribed to JeM as an "organ of AQIS" rather than LeT as an organ of the Pakistani state... and helps the TSPA/ISI maintain plausible deniability while increasing the jihadi-cred of AQIS vis-a-vis IS-IS.
Three, it gives bored Punjabi Taliban jihadis (who have only recently been returned to the Sarkari orbit) something glorious and martyrdom-worthy to do; if they did not get such opportunities they would "go rogue" as Lalmullah says, and possibly join IS-IS.

All three win-win for TSPA/ISI and AQIS.

So, yes, it is possible that none of this had anything to do with the visit of Modi to Lahore at all. However, as Jayal observes, the spectacle of PAAPi/Congi "experts" pouring scorn over the Indian defence establishment's handling of PAFB, out of sheer spite against Modi and Doval, must be a nice bonus for the TSPA/ISI to enjoy.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 29 Jan 2016 01:19

Good summary.

My only addition is JeM was allowed for PAFB attack as LeT failed in Gurdaspur.
That is the competition I am suggesting.
Now JeM also failed in PAFB attack is besides the point.

No raisins for the last two who got combusted.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby rajatmisra » 29 Jan 2016 03:20

Postings here say that there were 5 air force men trapped in the higher floor of a building while there were two terrorists on the ground floor. They had to be rescued before the two could be eliminated. Why didn't the five try to fight out the two. The two were not carrying any guns and there would have not been any firing.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby saip » 29 Jan 2016 03:51

rajatmisra wrote:Postings here say that there were 5 air force men trapped in the higher floor of a building while there were two terrorists on the ground floor. They had to be rescued before the two could be eliminated. Why didn't the five try to fight out the two. The two were not carrying any guns and there would have not been any firing.


The five hiding may not have known whether the two terrorists were armed or not.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 29 Jan 2016 04:26

Besides they were not issued side arms most likely.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby krishna_krishna » 29 Jan 2016 06:57

A small observation to add to what all have said, they seem to have already pre-planned list of targets identified through their espy network. This was definitely in response to afghan donations ,if you see the timings PM went with plane full of helicopters with him. They were shown in media glare.

In na paki mentality that was a message and this was response to show we can destroy your gifts, the helicopters are based at this base secondly there was also an simultaneous attempt at consulate in Afghanistan. So I totally back that theory.

The paki visit had no bearing on this as it was primary to response to afghan moves by India because that is where it hurts.

Lastly I remember ey es ayeh chief pasha claiming that if India does attack like OBL Raid we can do more damage as targets have already been identified. This statement did hold merit.

Now if you see chain of event , some trained guys were picked and given a mission. If it was practiced it would be more devasting to me they are not practiced its just a "turn key solution" given by ey es ayeh (read mission) including modus operandi and trained guys (from whatever tanzeem) just execute it , and the planning also includes their network logistics through agents in desh. Sophistication is that everyone know one piece not the puzzle

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Lalmohan » 29 Jan 2016 15:22

krishna - some merit to your point about crude rehearsal. maybe TSPA/So-Called-Intel-service has enough info to create googlemaps and maybe even 3D imagery of targets. we know from the mumbai attacks that they are capable of this, perhaps even more sophisticated now. i suppose that the eager jeehardies after a generic training can be quickly appraised of a fresh target (dictated by political necessity) and then quickly deployed. since they are on a one way mission, some of the task is simplified.
need to see what the US spec forces have been teaching the TSPA for the 'afghan front' and how that knowledge sharing is spreading across the TSPA

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby chetak » 29 Jan 2016 19:11

A terrorist's way of masking pain and deriving chemical courage


A terrorist's way of masking pain and deriving chemical courage

Posted by: Vicky Nanjappa

Published: Friday, January 29, 2016,

Bengaluru, Jan 29:

While in Pathankot, we found that the terrorists had used Mefenamic Acid to beat the pain and battle security forces for over 50 hours, a report from Syria states that the banned amphetamine is a big hit.

Amphetamine is being produced in huge quantity in Syria and the ISIS is said to be one the leading traffickers of the drug. While the drug generates a lot of money that makes it to the coffers of the ISIS, it also helps its fighters mask fear, pain and hunger as a result of which they are able to sustain longer in a battle.

Terrorists and the use of drugs:

Any fidayeen who comes in for a long haul is packed with drugs. While during the Pathankot attack investigators had found the 500 MG Mefenamic Acid, in Syria a big hit with the fighters is the Amphetamine. This drug has been put on the list of controlled substance by the World Health Organisation in 1986 according to a report in the Times London. Further investigations that were conducted in the aftermath of the Paris attack had found that the terrorists had used the same drug. The drug is becoming a big hit with the ISIS due to its powerful properties. It masks fear, pain and also hunger. Terrorists cannot sustain such a long haul without the help of such drugs. Experts have termed this syndrome as "chemical courage."

In the recent past there have been huge seizures of this drug. The Times, London reports that Jordan seized 16,768,684 tablets coming from Syria last year. Seizures increased by only 11 in 2012 to 185 last year. Turkey reported seizing 11 million pills, nearly two tonnes of the drug, near the Syrian border in November. Lebanon seized 15 million pills in April and five tonnes in December. The latter seizure also uncovered a production facility in a remote area close to the Syrian border.

ramana
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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 29 Jan 2016 23:27

Vicky Nanjappa Stop calling them 'fidayeen'. they are 'drug crazed terrorists'.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ShauryaT » 30 Jan 2016 00:19

I am coming down to the view that this attack was either the direct handiwork of the PA/ISI, I mean just plain out right directed by them or a group, which wants to trigger a war between India and Pakistan.

Assume for a minute, if this act of war was successful in its objectives, the Indian government would have been under a massive scanner to respond. This would be the case if the PA desires such an escalation, in the belief and hope that its nuclear threat would deter a conventional response along with the support of its Fathers and the lack of Indian strategic objectives vis-a-vis Pakistan or a combination of these factors.

IF this act was independent of direction from the PA, then it ought to find the perpetrators on a war footing for such an act is nothing but an act of war in the name of the PA. The ball is in the PA's court and the Modi government is best advised to keep the PA on a tight leash and if the desired outcomes are not forthcoming - we need public retribution for this act of war. If this act of war is deemed to be independent of direction of the PA/ISI then Pakistan should be looked upon as a failed state and the long overdue covert actions, needed to eliminate such persons and groups needs to be put into action.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 30 Jan 2016 00:35

Shauryat, Normalizing with India is their perestroika.

Lets pursue this line of thought in 'New way of Looking at Pak' thread.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Lalmohan » 30 Jan 2016 00:57

ramana wrote:Vicky Nanjappa Stop calling them 'fidayeen'. they are 'drug crazed terrorists'.



the hashishans were the first fedayeen no?

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 30 Jan 2016 03:23

Hashhashins were also drug crazed murderers.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Lalmohan » 30 Jan 2016 16:18

ramana wrote:Hashhashins were also drug crazed murderers.


exactly my point sirjee

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby ramana » 30 Jan 2016 22:00

Wow. Pak is now breeding a new Hashhashins :Let, JeM et al!!!

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Aditya G » 30 Jan 2016 22:24

Reference to previous discussions viz robots:

Image

Army displaying the sophisticated mine defusing machine in Tosa Maidan firing range in Budgam district.
-Excelsior/Amin War
Aug 2014

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby tsarkar » 31 Jan 2016 01:19

^^ Everything is hunky dory in a maidan.

But imagine deploying the thingy in a terrain with -

1. elephant grass, shrubs, small trees, big trees
2. pebbles, small stones, big stones, boulders
3. Nullah, Marsh, Swamp

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Karan M » 31 Jan 2016 02:46

Good find Aditya. That's the Daksh alright.

It is designed to be deployable across most IA conditions, including climbing staircases and can even cross small ditches.

Good pictures here of all the mobility conditions. (Irritating music apart) - 1:41 and ahead
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9CL92nhN5E4

This is Mk1. Mk2 had improved mobility IIRC. The chassis is fairly small for that huge gripper and assembly for a variety of ops. Hence designed for small places.

The issue was/is NSG tendering was slow and Daksh procurement was in discussions as of September 2015.

In the DRDO thread, there is a larger UGV prototype also shown with an even bigger gripper (sourced from Canada's Robotiq in the prototype version); Daksh is nearly completely local. That UGV will have much better mobility in open spaces but will be limited in CQB or within buildings confined areas.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Shameek » 31 Jan 2016 03:58

Sharif Comments

Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Saturday said that his government will go to any lengths to uncover the alleged use of its soil in the January 2 attack on the air base in Pathankot by suspected Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorists. This is the clearest signal yet from Pakistan
:roll:

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Karan M » 31 Jan 2016 04:09

Sharif Comments

Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Saturday said that his government will go to any lengths to uncover the alleged use of its soil in the January 2 attack on the air base in Pathankot by suspected Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorists. This is the clearest signal yet from Pakistan


Image

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Gyan » 31 Jan 2016 07:13

Indian Military has super massive shortage of thermal imagers and night vision devices. The capability of our infantry or even Ghatak, Garud, SF, Paras to fight at Night time is very very limited. We need to provide seed money of Rs. 2000 crores to BEL to set up production line for IR sensors and initial contract of Rs. 20,000 crores (Roughly one lakh thermal imagers) to meet this demand.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Sid » 31 Jan 2016 08:59

tsarkar wrote:^^ Everything is hunky dory in a maidan.

But imagine deploying the thingy in a terrain with -

1. elephant grass, shrubs, small trees, big trees
2. pebbles, small stones, big stones, boulders
3. Nullah, Marsh, Swamp


Why do we need to defuse/contain IEDs in all these terrains and locations?

Contain them only in urban or locations where there is a risk of material damage. everywhere else they should be destroyed.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Aditya G » 31 Jan 2016 12:17

Gyan wrote:Indian Military has super massive shortage of thermal imagers and night vision devices. The capability of our infantry or even Ghatak, Garud, SF, Paras to fight at Night time is very very limited. We need to provide seed money of Rs. 2000 crores to BEL to set up production line for IR sensors and initial contract of Rs. 20,000 crores (Roughly one lakh thermal imagers) to meet this demand.


You are probably right, but lets be clear that these capabilities are not absent. Probably the kit is distributed to few troops per battalion, so capability at the unit level does exist.

These are troops from 28 RR during the encounter in Lolabl last couple of days:

Image

I want to counter the general perception that our forces not well equipped. Our buys do have advanced equipment and weapons, maybe not in every formation or maybe not with every sipahi. Things are not as bad and fatalistic as we perceive from media.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Austin » 31 Jan 2016 12:26

Karan M wrote:
Sharif Comments

Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on Saturday said that his government will go to any lengths to uncover the alleged use of its soil in the January 2 attack on the air base in Pathankot by suspected Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorists. This is the clearest signal yet from Pakistan


Image


Oh yes Sure they would do that like how they arrested these people for 26/11 and how they arrested OBL who was their state guest.

Sharif has to state this Maan Ki Baat so that talks can go on while Paki keeps uncovering these terrorist.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Karan M » 31 Jan 2016 18:58

Aditya, holding is 1 NVG per section. Its clearly not sufficient.

Our bureaucrats have decided that swarming with manpower is a good answer. It also fits into the idea of some chaps in IA who prefer big ticket acquisitions and new formations is more opportunities for advancement. Before folks get upset, that's exactly what one IA chap said referring to the numbers of new formation raisings proposed and how they were draining the IA of funds for capability enhancement.

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby shaun » 31 Jan 2016 19:17

Aditya G wrote:Reference to previous discussions viz robots:

Image

Army displaying the sophisticated mine defusing machine in Tosa Maidan firing range in Budgam district.
-Excelsior/Amin War
Aug 2014


DRDO logo on it ...still in "eternal testing" phase ??

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Re: Pathankot AFB terrorist Attack After Action Analysis-I

Postby Karan M » 31 Jan 2016 22:36

Its been purchased Shaun, read the previous pages.


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