Deterrence

[krishna_krishna]

What we are talking is total deterrent not bits and pieces.

Indian deterrent is made up of three components : land , sea and air.

The controls would be delivery method specific. Controls on Air Force bomb seperate than mijjiles.

You are not answering the question. This whole discussion started with your claims that none of our warheads would be mated even after arihant inducted in the navy. Indian submarines would be kept in unready condition till your so called dc fish tank Baloon goes up, which is utter rubbish claim.

Regarding source see the url I
Posted from ex navy chief compares to fish tank analysts

[shiv]

shiv, they're ready and available to strike. SFC is fully operational. There's no reason to doubt it.

I am only partially reassured by your pot. For example krishna_krishna has linked an article by Arun Prakash that he has either not read or not understood. It's one thing to demand references but it a a totally different ball game to not read them at all Adm Prakash expresses many of the things I have said. I quote:
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uplo ... errent.pdf

many decision-makers have jumped to the facile
but erroneous conclusion that numbers have no
relevance and that a ‘handful of weapons’ should
suffice for deterrence.
This thought process has led to two
consequences. It has served to confirm, in the
politician’s mind, the notion that since nuclear
weapons are not meant for war fighting, there is
no need for the military to get involved with their
evolution or management. It has also helped
create, in the minds of Indian politicians, faith in
what is best described as ‘existential deterrence’.
First articulated by McGeorge Bundy, the concept
of ‘existential deterrence’ postulates that it is the
‘assurance of reprisal’ rather than its immediacy
that deters a nuclear first strike. It provides
the assurance that, as long as a country can
assemble some nuclear warheads, this alone
should serve as a credible deterrent, even if the
riposte takes hours or days to materialise after
the first strike.
For all its seductive appeal, existential deterrence
is premised on some very demanding conditions.
The main assumption is that although the
warheads may be disassembled or dispersed,
the other requirements – a targeting philosophy,
rugged command and control structure and
warheads/vectors in ‘sufficient’ numbers – are
available. It also presumes that warheads can
be safely assembled and transported under
conditions of turmoil and that they would detonate
accurately on target, generating the expected
yields. All these conditions constitute a tall order
and place a question mark on the efficacy of
existential deterrence in the Indian environment

However, since this concept appeared to offer
the benefits of deterrence without paying the
moral, political and economic price involved in
maintaining a credible nuclear arsenal, it seems
to have found resonance at the highest levels of
India’s political leadership. It is this subliminal
belief that lies at the root of the tentativeness
and diffidence that have marked India’s nuclear
deterrence and that has created the streak of
damaging ambivalence clearly discernible in its
policies as well as practices

Civil-military tensions
India’s unique policy of sequestering the military
from national security decision-making and
its inability to muster the resolve to undertake
long overdue security reforms is a well-known
debility. It not only invites incredulous comment
internationally, but has also taken a toll on the
credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent

Read the whole thing. I thank krishna_krishna for posting it because it deserves reading and discussion although he has not read it at all.

[shiv]

What we are talking is total deterrent not bits and pieces.

Indian deterrent is made up of three components : land , sea and air.

The controls would be delivery method specific. Controls on Air Force bomb seperate than mijjiles.

You are not answering the question. This whole discussion started with your claims that none of our warheads would be mated even after arihant inducted in the navy. Indian submarines would be kept in unready condition till your so called dc fish tank Baloon goes up, which is utter rubbish claim.

Regarding source see the url I
Posted from ex navy chief compares to fish tank analysts

Looks like you have neither read nor understood Arun Prakash's article. My questions are aimed precisely at blinkered people like you who imagine that al is vel when all may not be vel.

You are welcome to live in a dream world but please don't get upset if I don't join you in that dream world

[krishna_krishna]

You werenot asked to join nor will ever be , answer a simple question in your la la land what does cannestarized Agni and k series stuffed with then they are manufactured

Please read the whole article not bits and pieces see what he writes about sea based deterrent and regular operational deterrent patrols.

[NRao]

Not looked into deterrence matters for a long time, but

Shiv, Let me ask you a simple question: With Agni V onwards the plan is to have canasterized even land based maal what do you think happens for a canasterized mijjile ?, they can never be demated for practical operational use.

They can be electronically demated.

Furthermore, it is also possible for the various agencies to provide code prior to a launch. Do not know if this happens, but the AEC owns the core, DRDO the trigger, etc. So, it is possible that each may need to provide a code prior to a launch. PAL of sorts.

In fact I would argue that canasterizing should lead to greater checks and balances than the physical delayed weapons. This does not have to mean last second decision, like the delayed cycle it would mean a sequence of events that replace and mimic the delayed weapons.

[krishna_krishna]

NRao, electronic is fine. Shiv is claiming physically demated and not operationally ready,which was the reason for that question

[shiv]

Not looked into deterrence matters for a long time, but

In fact I would argue that canasterizing should lead to greater checks and balances than the physical delayed weapons. This does not have to mean last second decision, like the delayed cycle it would mean a sequence of events that replace and mimic the delayed weapons.

er I have been holding back, but could we please use the correct term - canister/canisterize? No big deal, but don't want this thing to persist

[shiv]

NRao, electronic is fine. Shiv is claiming physically demated and not operationally ready,which was the reason for that question

Time for you to rubbish Arun Prakash's article posted by you which you still have not read.

He must have been bluffing when he wrote of "disassembled" warheads which you can rubbish by saying that he did not mean physical disassembly but whatever your mind thinks it should be.

I quote again, but don't bother reading. Again.

The main assumption is that although the
warheads may be disassembled or dispersed,
the other requirements – a targeting philosophy,
rugged command and control structure and
warheads/vectors in ‘sufficient’ numbers – are
available. It also presumes that warheads can
be safely assembled and transported under
conditions of turmoil

Bah. Why must I deal with this kind of blindness?

[krishna_krishna]

Well it's you who has been rubbishing claims all along that even after arihant induction no warhead would be physically mated and they would be locked up in Shic jones dc locker till Baloon goes up.

Read it carefully all I can say. Why don't you answer on canisterized ( I'll mind me spell check humble SDRE online) A V , leave aside sea based ones.

[shiv]

Well it's you who has been rubbishing claims all along that even after arihant induction no warhead would be physically mated and they would be locked up in Shic jones dc locker till Baloon goes up.

Read it carefully all I can say. Why don't you answer on canisterized ( I'll mind me spell check humble SDRE online) A V , leave aside sea based ones.

Boss. As usual you have not read what I wrote. But then - I am no longer interested in informing a person who does not read the refs he posts and pretends that it says what his mind thinks it should say.

Please believe what you like - this will be my last response to you. I am sorry I responded , but I am glad you provided the opportunity to illustrate to others how people delude themselves about India's deterrent to the extent of misreading stuff simply to have faith that all is well

I am warning people against the very error that you have publicly exposed. But you are excluded.

[krishna_krishna]

No offense or warning taken. Thank god that reasonable members can go back to
Meaningful discussion on deterrence since you no longer be peddling wired logic that with canistrized mijjiles still warhead would be physically seperate till fish tank Baloon goes up

[hnair]

or maybe the pointy RVs will be kept in the torpedo rooms, with the DAE chappies sleeping in hammocks over it, during normal times. When a Swordfish sees some RVs arcing down towards Lootyens, the sub surfaces, hatches all open. The DAE chappies trickle out through the conning tower carrying the RVs, use some IKEA wrenches to mate them to the rakkits and voila...... badassery in a boat

But seriously, at some point, someone has to tell the khan to get over their fear of pakis too wanting to mate their warheads permanently to Bab-hoor et al.

[Singha]

Any delay in launch on impact is just a chance for USA to threaten sanction on India if we finally get to launching.
We might as well save yourself capex and retire all delivery systems.

We will have 12 hrs before pressure piles up to be a good boy and let it go. Not 10 days to call back subs , load weaponized missiles and sail out..if enemy SSN do not swarm known delivery docks and kill our paltry 3 subs first.

This DD doctrine is ridiculous for a serious n power..OK for bit players like noko and iran

[Singha]

If true it's a USA imposed CBM meekly accepted by our mice govts

[NRao]

er I have been holding back, but could we please use the correct term - canister/canisterize? No big deal, but don't want this thing to persist

Using my smartphone, which does not seem to have a good spellchecker. Need to live with it.

[Supratik]

X-post

The Adm Prakash article is from March, 2014. That posture is nothing new and has been in effect since the early 2000s. Usually Indian govt takes decision when they really have to or forced to. Now that Arihant has fired SLBMs they will have to take a decision on whether to deploy or not. There are two possibilities 1) they are carried on submarines but electronically demated, 2) they are stored near the submarine base and can be loaded on short notice. Similar decision needs to be taken on the phase 1 ABM deployment which I believe was scuppered by the UPA under US pressure. We may or may not know the exact status. The Indian nuclear program is very opaque e.g. no one knows how many warheads we have. So the level of deployment status may remain a secret.

[shiv]

If true it's a USA imposed CBM meekly accepted by our mice govts

This is exactly what Brahm Chellaney says. Yes - I did post an article above that suggests that attitudes are changing - but the poison may run deep. When we spent years discussing nukes, later missiles and still later Arihant, we paid scant attention to what was being said in a thousand articles. And rubbishing those articles can make one blind to the reality of a fcked up deterrence posture. Part of that was this rubbish about "recessed deterrence" and demated warheads. The other is what Arun Prakash also mentions in his article . He speaks of how politicos have become philosophical and imagine that nukes are not really for warfighting - they are "just there" to stop wars.

If this is frightening to me, what is even more frightening is the attitude of the general public (that is us) imagining that all is well. Arun Prakash and others have stated time and again that the opacity and vagueness of our doctrine is unacceptable. It could be fatal.

i urge people to take off their blinkers and not comfort themselves saying 'Oh now we have Canisterized missiles - they wil be mated and ready. In fact what tsarkar says in the Arihant thread is spot on. Canisterized missiles may be mated, but not carried on our nuke subs. In fact Adm Prakash refers to this issue when he says in the article

It also presumes that warheads can be safely assembled and transported under conditions of turmoil

We the educated pubic have a duty not to take anything for granted. That Arun Prakash article says it all. He calls for openness. Openness is what we must ask for in discussions such as these and not remain comfortably numb saying "We have bum/our time has cum"

[member_22733]

I agree. Deterrence to me would be something like:

1) Here is what we have.
2) If you try xyz on us, here is how it can be used to make sure you meet your maker

What should be hidden is the locations of the delivery mechanisms. What should not be hidden is the capability, the means and their readiness.

[shiv]

Cross post from Arihant thread

My point is; having submarine missiles and warheads in demated state will first require a decision to mate them, which will be a political decision and thus another layer of delays, dithering and uncertainity will be introduced.

Absolutely correct, and here is the point I want to make.

On BRF we spent years wondering if nukes worked. then we spent years asking for longer ranged missiles. Then more years asking for solid fuelled missiles which could be canisterized. And then even more years waiting for a nuke sub for a sea-based deterrent.

Even today, if you do a Google search - you will find articles from 1999 right up to 2015 where people, many of them retired armed forces officers, telling us that all this is completely useless if the political set up thinks that nukes are some kind of lucky charm that we just need to possess for others to be deterred. Although some BRF stalwarts (ShauryaT?) I think have been pointing this out for years - our demand on BRF to get the technical side pukka overshadowed our need to accept and swallow the hard reality of a phenomenally stupid nuclear posture. Using nukes is not going to be a one-man decision. They will be used in consultation and if a large number of blinkered decision makers are involved, we will get nuked and not nuke others back. Part of the problem is even we on BRF, who consider ourselves extra aware and extra knowledgeable have tended to assume that once the technical aspects are in place, the decision making chain will work perfectly. That is a serious mistake. Article after article after article has appeared pointing out the the decision making chain is less than robust.

The idea that Arihant will be out on patrol with ready to use nukes is simply something we imagine to be true without spending even ten minutes looking at what the civilian decision making set-up in India thinks of our nuclear doctrine and deterrent posture. Just because canisterized missiles need to be mated does not mean that they will be carried. If they are not loaded at all they are not ready to be used.

I am going to cross post this in the deterrence thread and then post further thoughts which are more relevant there. But I do request BRFites to open their minds and not make assumptions that go contary to what a series of military experts have been pointing out
1. Lack of transparency
2. Lack of plan
3. Mistrust of military - as if they will simply use nukes
4. Cloud cuckoo land posture where possession of demated nukes and unarmed missiles are considered good enough for deterrence

These are all "clear and present" dangers that could result in our getting nuked and we on BRF have no business cheering and walking around with our fingers crossed. And sure enough - we have so many people who are comfortable that al iz vel that I have been attacked by at least one guy who got angry with me for saying things that conflict with the comfortable security feeling he has looking at all the technical advances.. Cognitive dissonance anyone? If this happens on BRF imagine how political decision makers will behave when they are told that they are living in cloud cuckoo land?

[shiv]

Here is another quote from Adm Arun Prakash's 2014 article that was posted but not read
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uplo ... errent.pdf

However, since this concept appeared to offer
the benefits of deterrence without paying the
moral, political and economic price involved in
maintaining a credible nuclear arsenal, it seems
to have found resonance at the highest levels of
India’s political leadership. It is this subliminal
belief that lies at the root of the tentativeness
and diffidence that have marked India’s nuclear
deterrence and that has created the streak of
damaging ambivalence clearly discernible in its
policies as well as practices.

India’s unique policy of sequestering the military
from national security decision-making and
its inability to muster the resolve to undertake
long overdue security reforms is a well-known
debility. It not only invites incredulous comment
internationally, but has also taken a toll on the
credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent

Compared to its articulate Pakistani counterpart,
the Indian nuclear establishment is faceless and
reticent. As far as public discourse is concerned,
barring a handful of knowledgeable and perceptive
Indian analysts, most of it is generally led by U.S.
commentators

The time is, perhaps, ripe for a nuclear ‘glasnost’
in India, whereby the cloak of needless opacity
around the nuclear deterrent is lifted and as
much unclassified information as possible about
our nuclear capabilities made available to the
tax-paying public. This would achieve three
objectives. Firstly, it would convey reassurance
to Indians that they are well protected by an
effective nuclear deterrent which will obviate
adventurism on the part of nuclear-armed
adversaries. Secondly, it would send a clear
message to Pakistan that brandishing tactical
nuclear weapons is a dangerous ploy, discredited
and discarded by the nuclear powers during the
Cold War. Lastly, transparency, accompanied
by sustained dialogue and confidence-building
measures, would convince Pakistan of the need
for stable deterrence on the sub-continent and
lead to a substantive reduction in tension

[member_28108]

Let us also not forget that there is also a planned disinformation with such information. In the cat and mouse game there is always controlled leaks and disinformation. The simple truth is the truth is never out there.

[shiv]

In the Arihant thread I had posted a link to this 1 hour 20minute video that was suggested to me by a BRF lurker.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OZpIrZvP0Co

The video itself is a talk by Adm Vijay Shankar - and it typifies exactly what Arun Prakash (quoted by me in my post above). All talk about our nuclear posture is coming out of America. they are paying attention and subtly guiding our politicos by directing the debate while we sit here thinking "we have bum".

But Adm Vijay Shankar Makes some pertinent points:
1. He points out that China is playing a game that is designed to screw us royally. On the one hand they indulge in confidence building measures and promise NFU. On the other hand they have provided Pakistan with four Plutonium producing reactors whose only purpose is weapons
2. He makes another point that I had never looked at before the way he looks at it. War calculus is based on capability and intention. We all know on BRF that Pakistan says about India "We don't care if your intentions are good. We are arming ourselves against your capability" Adm Shankar points out that with tactical nuclear weapons no one can doubt the capability. We can argue and say battle tanks are better than combat helos or that helos are better than tanks. But once you introduce nukes into a battlefield, the capability is not in question. So when we cannot question the capability of nukes - it is "a given", the intention becomes important. What is Pakistan's intention? Even BRF newbies know Pakistan's intention with regard to India.

Adm Shankar points out to Americans that some civilizations take a really long term view - centuries. China looks at the west that way. How do you think radical Islam views India?

Do not assume that our deterrent is effective and safe as long was we have politicians whose main purpose is to bring down their opponents and who assume that panchsheel will rule the world.

[Prem]

https://news.yahoo.com/kim-jong-un-says ... 36113.html
Kim Jong-Un says North Korea has miniaturised nuclear warheads
( Korean Pakistan to South Asian Paki Road Via Peking still Running ?)

Seoul (AFP) - North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un says his scientists have successfully miniaturised thermo-nuclear warheads to place on a ballistic missile and create a "true" deterrent, state media said Wednesday.While Pyongyang has boasted of mastering miniaturisation before, this is the first time Kim has so explicitly claimed a breakthrough that experts see as a game-changing step for the North's nuclear capabilities.Kim also stressed that the warheads were "thermo-nuclear" devices, echoing the North's claim that the fourth nuclear test it conducted in January was of a more powerful hydrogen bomb."The nuclear warheads have been standardised to be fit for ballistic missiles by miniaturising them," Kim noted during a visit with nuclear technicians, the North's official KCNA news agency said."This can be called a true nuclear deterrent," Kim was quoted as saying.The North Korean ruling party's newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, carried a large front-page picture of Kim standing in front of a spherical metal object. The picture carried no caption and the paper did not explicitly claim this was part of the miniaturised warhead in question."Enough time has passed with North Korea's nuclear programme to make it distinctly possible it has miniaturised a device that can fit on a ballistic missile," said Melissa Hanham, an expert on North Korea's WMD programme at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies."I don't know that they could target that missile very well, or what it's range might be, but the claim cannot be dismissed as bluster," Hanham said.Experts have been divided on just how far North Korea may have gone with miniaturisation, although several US and South Korean intelligence reports and military officials have briefed on its apparent rapid progress.The issue is key as, while North Korea is known to have a small stockpile of nuclear weapons, its ability to deliver them accurately to a chosen target has been in doubt.It is also unclear whether any miniaturised device the North has designed would be robust enough to survive the shock, vibration and temperature change associated with ballistic flight.Most experts rule out the prospect of North Korea launching any sort of nuclear strike with a largely untested system, saying it would be tantamount to suicide given overwhelming US technical superiority."His comments and the photos are making the message very explicit: 'We have a nuclear weapon and you have to respect us'," she added.North Korea's claim to have successfully tested an H-bomb in January was greeted with scepticism at the time as the estimated yield was seen as far too low for a full-fledged thermo-nuclear device.However, numerous weapons experts have suggested it may have been a "boosted" fission device, which makes more efficient use of nuclear material and can be made smaller without sacrificing yield.

[shiv]

Interesting commonality of thought. Every one of the three gentlemen I have quoted below are demanding pretty much the same thing. But no government has done it yet. The opacity and vagueness need not be reassuring. It could mean confusion, indecision and internal disagreements. I believe that we cannot keep on assuming that everything is fine unless the government gets its act together. All three people quoted below cannot be dismissed as peaceniks or lefties. This is the reason for me to push ahead with this discussion
1. Rear Adm Raja Menon

Nuclear signalling from the Indian government is hugely overdue, so much so that it will take some effort to restore stability to South Asian deterrence. The first target should be the Indian strategic community and there are enough discussions and conferences where officers from the SFC and nuclear staff could provide discrete assurances that things are not anarchic with India’s nuclear command and control.

2. Gen Nagal

A deliberate and well-thought out nuclear signalling policy should be put in place to communicate with the nation and send the desired message to the adversary(s). The political leadership must speak on select occasions on India’s nuclear policy to display the resolve and credibility without conveying an aggressive posture. An open paper on national security including nuclear policy should be issued periodically. This will invite debate and suggestions and enrich the policy.

3. Admiral Arun Prakash:

The time is, perhaps, ripe for a nuclear ‘glasnost’
in India, whereby the cloak of needless opacity
around the nuclear deterrent is lifted and as
much unclassified information as possible about
our nuclear capabilities made available to the
tax-paying public. This would achieve three
objectives. Firstly, it would convey reassurance
to Indians that they are well protected by an
effective nuclear deterrent which will obviate
adventurism on the part of nuclear-armed
adversaries. Secondly, it would send a clear
message to Pakistan that brandishing tactical
nuclear weapons is a dangerous ploy, discredited
and discarded by the nuclear powers during the
Cold War. Lastly, transparency, accompanied
by sustained dialogue and confidence-building
measures, would convince Pakistan of the need
for stable deterrence on the sub-continent and
lead to a substantive reduction in tension

[shiv]

Adm Prakash, Rear Admiral Raja Menon and Gen Nagal are not to be take lightly. Why are they saying what they are saying? How can we reassure ourselves that the decision making apparatus in the country is well up with all the new and changing scenarios without a chirp from them - or at least updates as stressed by all three men quoted above?

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a ... 602609.ece
Rear Adm Raja Menon said in 2014 in the article linked above:

The command and control of nuclear forces are another area of criticism, and not surprisingly so, since India is the only nuclear weapon country without a Chief of Defence Staff to act as the interface between the Prime Minister, the National Command Authority and the military who ‘own’ the weapons — at least most of it. In the guise of safety, India’s nuclear weapons are not only ‘de-mated’ and the core and ignition device separated from the warhead, but the separate components are under different departmental control. The actual reason for this bizarre arrangement is quite obvious. There is a petty turf war, and neither the Department of Atomic Energy nor the DRDO is willing to let go of the controlling part of the bomb, even if it means a cumbersome and unnecessary loss of control. Needless to say, between the military, the DAE and the DRDO, none of them has any hierarchical control over the other two.

[shiv]

How much have our C&C evolved in the realm of "bum" use ?? there is chain of command with SFC and NCA being the main players , the babus and netas which constitute the "political class" needs inputs from "executive class" ie NSA , he too being civvy dilutes the decision making process. when the SFC command gets the go ahead from NCA ,the CJSOC along with DAE and DRDO mates the warhead with air and missile-delivery platforms held by the three armed forces.

But the problem is, the CJSOC position now goes to the senior-most of the three service chiefs, leading to changes in just a few months sometimes. We need CDS who along with NSA constitute the Executive council advising the netas . CDS can also be of immense help to SFC as they will have eyes and ears in the decision making process.

Nuclear weapons have immense deterrent values , but it can also be used strategically to end a war. The present decision making process is all with the netas and babus, military only being the executioners. We know the nexus between these babus and netas , how they work with inflated egos and turf wars which resulted in 1962. CDS is the need of the hour , it will iron out many issues.

[SaiK]

We can't deviate from the nominated choice of babus and netas dealing with mating the device. so what do we do? we can go for additional body to represent the doctrine independently which can press their buttons and come to a conclusion real quick on the necessary to counter. Remember, this is a decision that comes with forces from both internal and external who will deceive us to not do the second strike even if we have lost 50% population and all A class cities are decimated. There would be JNU class brains to prevent us striking back. Hence, it is needed that we maintain a separate body that represents all sections and on a regular basis. A vote to launch can be automated as well from a mobile device, as these are just votes by members who are part of the decision-making process.

this way, the deterrence value goes way up.. people who are nominated are driven out of policy-centric votes, where people can participate. do you like this politician be part of this joint team, etc. when we move our democracy itself towards policy-centric, things will and must happen per policies, that satisfies conditions set by general citizens.

any nation will get scared just looking at the policy itself

[ramana]

shiv, all 3 officers are asking for more say for military in the NCA loop as warheads get deployed on ships. Rationale is like this:
- Early NCA had de-mated warheads for various reasons: Reduce instability, authenticate strike, slow response to prevent global nuclear war, chalta hain.
- However when submarines are the preferred mode of response, the option of de-mating goes away for subs have to come back to shore for such mating process. In a war the shore base could be vaporised.

So think of subs on patrol like those bombers on sortie with mated warheads to ensure retaliation, only the sub patrol is longer.

Further once K4 with its MIRV, needs mated warheads for no other way.

So one era or yuga of recessed deterrence is coming to an end.

And a new one beginning.

--RAdm. Menon was part of original group that came up with the doctrine. So his asking for change is important.

INS Arihant is a yuganta.

* KS garu as chief of the group. Lt Gen Sunderji, AM Johnny Green, RAdm Raja Menon, R. Chidambaram and APJ Kalam in mid 80s.

[krishna_krishna]

^+1 Ramana

[shaun]

Ramana saab , the question was and is always with the decision making ,not about the executioners . I guess our present "bum authority" is more than happy with the ambiguity . But it is only increasing the threat spectrum , with the bakis planning with TNW on land and subs and the lizard putting nuclear tipped IRBMs in mountain silos.

Those "mooh tor jawabs" is of no help , our ultimate deterrence is only if our bums and their delivery mechanism are advertised in a way , to the baki army "you radiate any of our asset and you will be nuked to oblivion" and double assure MAD with the lizards. The rest are talk talk and more talk.

[shiv]

- However when submarines are the preferred mode of response, the option of de-mating goes away for subs have to come back to shore for such mating process. In a war the shore base could be vaporised.

So think of subs on patrol like those bombers on sortie with mated warheads vo ensure retaliation only Vhe sub patrol is longer.

Ramana - this is perfectly logical from the point of view of deterrence.

It is illogical from the point of view of India's stated wimp-like view on nuclear weapons as not being weapons of warfighting which means that nuclear weapons should never be ready for use.

How many of our babus and politicians subscribe to this viewpoint? What clout do they have?

When you have people questioning the rationale for massive retaliation, and calling for a change or modification of doctrine in view of Pakistan's "Tactical Nuclear Weapons" it appears to me like someone is saying "Pakistan does not intend to use a massive nuclear attack on India. They are just protecting themselves. As long as we don't attack them, they are not going to attack us. So if it comes to a war-like situation, it is not good to have hot heads holding ready to use nuclear weapons"

Now you know and I know that the sentence I have posted above is bullshit. We cannot trust Pakistan to be kind to us. A decapitating strike is quite possible given the depth of hatred. This obviously means that weapons must be kept ready and mated. But do you see what I am trying to say. The fact that weapons must be kept "ready and mated" is obvious to us.

It has been obvious to us for over a decade now, but for over a decade we have never asked if nukes are mated or not in our Agni, Prithvis and air bases. In the last decade we never asked if nukes are mated. This thread is now 7 years old. Not in a single page has this question come up. We have all been sitting pretty and not paying attention to the fact that none of our nuclear weapons to date may be mated and ready. We have simply assumed that they must be ready or will be made ready soon enough. Now, after all these years we have got an Arihant and we are saying that we are now "really really ready".

If someone posts the argument "Hey the nukes have been demated all these years and deterrence has held perectly well. What makes you think that it is necessary for Arihant to carry mated missiles all the time? You were not worried for the last 10-15 years? Why are you suddenly so concerned?". What is the answer to that?

Are we really ready? Who says we are? All of us have been content to think that the decision making apparatus has got its act together all these years. The question boils down to this:

1. If our nuclear doctrine has been unaffected by the doubting Thomases then we already have a mechanism to keep our land based nukes nearly ready. That is, the Army and Air Force already have procedures in place to rapidly use nuclear weapons should the need arise. The doubtful nonsense about keeping cores away from warheads has already been dispensed with. All that remains is for the Navy to join the group with their own ready to use nuclear weapon.

2. If, on the other hand we still have a policy of keeping cores separate, then it means that a new policy will have to be made for Navy alone, enabling Navy to have access to ready to fire "mated" nukes with the same old lethargy and diffidence affects the question of warheads for Army and Air Force delivered weapons? Will that have to be changed in future. Suddenly, with the coming of Arihant, are we going to see a new posture of greater readiness?

There is a huge difference and for this it is best to ignore the navy for now - because the nuke sub is only now coming online.

Imagine that we have ready to fire Prithvis, Agnis and Air dropped nuclear weapons. These must be stored securely and I assume that they are stored in places where they can be attended to by both the concerned armed force and the nuclear engineers. In case of hostilities - say something like Kargil there will be set procedures to move out these ready to use weapons to areas of deployment where they can be used. There is no question of "mating" them

If on the other hand the warheads are not mated then we still have the same secure storage, but one extra step is added - in fact many steps probably. In case of a national emergency and a political decision made to deploy nukes, the nuclear engineers have to mate the fissile cores with the warheads and the warheads have to be loaded on to the delivery vehicles. If this is the existing system it would be absurd not to change once the Arihant gets deployed with nuclear missiles.

Right now we only have hints and suggestions that tell both stories. One story is that we have ready to use nukes. The other story is that they are still de-mated. I have posted articles that say both things. I understand the argument that says, "It is better to be ambiguous and keep our opponents guessing. Why should they know anything more than the fact that they will be vaporized if they cross our nuclear red lines"

But my argument is surely, if our nuclear doctrine is massive retaliation then there is no harm in openly admitting that we will have ready to use nukes. There is no harm in pointing out that we have ready to use nukes even when there is no crisis. Giving the impression that our nukes may not be ready because there is no crisis at the moment is a bad idea. It actually degrades deterrence. But that idea is out there doing the rounds in a thousand conferences, meetings and articles. if that idea is wrong then someone in authority must say it out loud and not simply give vague hint-hint wink-wink from which we are supposed to understand and feel reassured.

[member_28108]

^ There is an actual advantage by keeping the actual information secret. This adds to the confusion for the enemy when they do not know exactly what our status is. Why should we spell out everything in public.

Incidentally what is public posturing (including the Santhanam statement) by some chaiwalla to a chaiwalla is supposed to be all a part of a great disinformation campaign for what it is worth !! We are not supposed to be as toothless as one where to think both on the Eastern and Western front.

At the end of the day as far as the lay public is concerned - the simple and honest statement despite all the quips made above is no persons actually in the loop has given an open statement which is correct or honest. It is all a part of the concerted campaign to keep our actual position a secret. Remember that even when the parliamentary attack occurred some Jaguars took to air and where in the air continuously. We are not as spineless as what we may project.

[shiv]

^ There is an actual advantage by keeping the actual information secret. This adds to the confusion for the enemy when they do not know exactly what our status is. Why should we spell out everything in public.

Incidentally what is public posturing (including the Santhanam statement) by some chaiwalla to a chaiwalla is supposed to be all a part of a great disinformation campaign for what it is worth !! We are not supposed to be as toothless as one where to think both on the Eastern and Western front.

At the end of the day as far as the lay public is concerned - the simple and honest statement despite all the quips made above is no persons actually in the loop has given an open statement which is correct or honest. It is all a part of the concerted campaign to keep our actual position a secret. Remember that even when the parliamentary attack occurred some Jaguars took to air and where in the air continuously. We are not as spineless as what we may project.

prasannasimha I am not arguing about spinelessness.

In fact your argument about advantages of secrecy fails when you consider that when India secretly kept nuclear weapons from about 1988 to 1999 - we still received at least 3 nuclear threats. All those nuclear threats stopped after the 1999 tests - so openness about a deterrent has definite advantages.

I am asking a question that no one on this forum can answer. And I am asking it so the question is known and will perhaps one day reach some people who matter. My question is:

If it is "obvious" that nuclear weapons must be mated are ready to use on Arihant or in canisterized missiles, then how is deterrence helped by a policy of secrecy. Deterrence can only be aided by openly declaring that we have a ready to use nuclear deterrent and let there be no fog or confusion about this. All I have seen so far is forum arguments that tell me

1. Don't worry we are ready
2. Obviously we must be ready because canisterized missiles need to be mated
3. Obviously missiles will be carried
4. Deception is sometimes better

These are all simply "rationalizations" made by forum members. They are not facts corroborated by any authority. What is lost if an authority confirms this? Our deterrent posture can only become stronger and more robust by saying "Yes we have ready to use nukes and a robust nuclear doctrine"

How will deterrence become weaker by an open statement of readiness?

[shiv]

India's "place" on the nuclear weapon map of the world has been stymied by India's "neither here nor there", ambiguous policies.

We started with a posture that said "We believe that all nuclear weapons should be eliminated, so we will not have nuclear weapons but we do not support an unequal world order where some countries can legitimately have weapons while others do not"

Then the world stuck a square rod up India's backside and twisted it for its faltu-weak viewpoint of "morality is stronger than the sword"

Then we got nuclear bombs but did not test or declare. We were then blamed for being frauds and still threatened and Pakistan was merrily given nukes because of big, bad insincere, moralizing, lying India

So we tested nukes. Even after that we continued this utterly faltu business of "no more tests", "Nuclear weapons are not for warfighting" etc But on the side we continued making Agni 1,2,3,4,5, etc and Arihant. So no one took out statements seriously. The word is saying 'India is second class" "Reluctant nuclear power". They say they oppose nukes but do things on the sly. Ball to India. No NSG membership. No Uranium. Let Pakistan also have nukes because of "genuine threat" from India.

We are an insincere and hypocritical nation if we carry on blabbering our usual rubbish of "Nuclear weapons makes the world unsafe." Balls. they have made our security better. That is why we have them. If we did not believe that our security was not improved by nukes why the fuk do we have them? How much more chicanery can we display by showing an erect penis and saying we believe in total celibacy?

This bullshit needs to change. India needs to say "We were wrong. A world without nuclear weapons is a stupid and impossible to implement theoretical ideal like a world without Kalashnikovs. Nuclear weapons have added to our own security and we intend to ensure that our own security is further strengthened by our nuclear weapons. We are increasing our readiness"

Instead of this kind of openness, India is still being wishy washy and not making the firm statements about nuclear weapons that are necessary from a mature nuclear power. And on this forum I am only seeing people supporting this goofy policy of being neither here nor there. That is a policy of weakness. No one believes us. Everyone suspects us.

Enough of this. We need to come clean and open about nuclear weapons

[shaun]

^^^
+1
our adversaries are thriving in this ambiguity , making them more innovative . Why are the porkis developing TNW ?? one part is because of the supposed cold doctrine and the other is because we don't have a clear policy for weapon use. Some statements here , some there. I must say our nuclear diplomacy is pathetic , its hollow. To start with NFU , what the hell is that ??? who gives a damn about it ?? not even the bakis !!

[shiv]

To start with NFU , what the hell is that ??? who gives a damn about it ?? not even the bakis !!

Admial Vijay Shankar, whose video talk was posted earlier makes a very interesting point.

China has played a very interesting game with India. On the one hand it has promised NFU. On the other hand it has ensured that Pakistan has plenty of nukes and weapons and a first use policy.

So, in effect China has ensured that India is faced with the dilemma of being threatened with first use by Chinese actions while China is showing itself to be reasonable.

India can very well claim the moral high ground and blabber saying NFU etc, but unless we have a reassessment of doctrine to reflect changes our doctrine itself becomes old news, overtaken by events. For example the "non mated" business has become outdated with canisterization and Arihant.

But we need to respond to China's double game and acknowledge that Pakistani weapons are an extension of Chinese weapons and Pakistani nuclear actions are a direct consequence of Chinese policy. So or posture must not only be of readiness, but also the threat of striking if a nuclear strike against us looks imminent. This can be worded in all sorts of rhetorical language that we are experts at doing.

Does this make nuclear war more likely? Bullshit. The entire goddam world is arming itself and arming our foes and we end up blaming ourselves for making the world unsafe. How much more suicidally hypocritical can India be?

[Aditya G]

Some comments were made about how secrecy and ambiguity is helpful. Especially in nuclear matters.

True. Israel has always been secretive about it. For all we know they don't even have any nukes - but the world believes they do. They also believe that Israel will use it.

China made a Nine Dash Line in the South China Sea but never clarified what the nine dash line meant. Did it mean China was claiming the sea (not allowed in international law)? But they took benefit of the ambiguity and now we all know the current situation.

We have been very transparent by publishing a doctrine unlike Pakis. It promises MR if somebody nukes our troops in the field. Still Pakis came about bragging and advertising their Nasrs and TNWs and how they believe it will be below our redlines. Taking their statements at face value, they are going ahead and deploying these weapons at the corps level. How ironical as they did not take our published word seriously enough. Why?

We have been secretive and reluctant to deploy to our own detriment. As it showed lack of confidence in our abilities, capabilities and confidence in own doctrine. There were reports that we did not display Agni missiles on R-Day when Obama was chief guest as it would have sent the wrong message! Un-f*ing-believable. Pakis on the other hand brandished Nasr even though it is highly doubtful that they can actually create such small warheads.

How do I use ambiguity to my advantage? Suppose I say "In case of nuclear exchange with Pakistan the countries which have supplied the delivery mechanism or technology to deliver those nukes will also be considered legitimate targets and they may suffer from MR as well". I don't name any country. Now when US congress votes for F-16 sale I can bet they will have something to ponder on. Or when China builds Pu reactors they may have a think as well. Maybe not. But what have I lost from this posturing?

There is near absence of debate in Pakistan when their Army brandishes Nasr because there was no immediate and public retort from our side. The kind Gen Paddy gave in Jan 2016. Pakis never had concerns as they felt that Pak Army knew what it was doing. Had we been proactive there was an iota of chance that PA was questioned by their own people.

[shiv]

We have been secretive and reluctant to deploy to our own detriment. As it showed lack of confidence in our abilities, capabilities and confidence in own doctrine. There were reports that we did not display Agni missiles on R-Day when Obama was chief guest as it would have sent the wrong message! Un-f*ing-believable. Pakis on the other hand brandished Nasr even though it is highly doubtful that they can actually create such small warheads.

How do I use ambiguity to my advantage? Suppose I say "In case of nuclear exchange with Pakistan the countries which have supplied the delivery mechanism or technology to deliver those nukes will also be considered legitimate targets and they may suffer from MR as well". I don't name any country. Now when US congress votes for F-16 sale I can bet they will have something to ponder on. Or when China builds Pu reactors they may have a think as well. Maybe not. But what have I lost from this posturing?

In fact it is entirely possible to declare a state of readiness, reiterate NFU but put riders that add ambiguity where we say that in all cases supreme national interest will dictate our actions.

India has erred badly in saying that "Nuclear weapons make the world an unsafe place". That specious statement is exactly like Pakistan saying "The whole world is suffering from terrorism". Nuclear weapons with China and Pakistan made India unsafe and our weapons make us safer. So if we are to be honest, it is our nukes that have deterred others. They have made us safer. We must not continue this hypocritical charade any longer. I am not sure why we persist in making out of date Gandhian declarations about "world being unsafe" WTF? We are safer now because we have a deterrent. We really need to be open about why we have that deterrent. No more "recessed" hinthint nudgenudge winkwink.

In fact with a depleting air force size and no hope of its reaching acceptable numbers for 10 years - we will have to depend on our nukes to deter the mofos who have been screwing us from north and west. And we don't even have to do anything different. Just make the statement and be open about our intent.

[ShauryaT]

Well this is the best information I could get - it is better than I thought but not much information to suggest that we are ready for a massive first strike. Sounds like some may be mated, some "nearly mated" and some demated.

That is my read too. The last authoritative read on the issue that I know of is from Koithara's book circa 2012. He is critical of the de-mated stance but things have been changing. Apart from canisters, some birds say Agni III has been deployed under mountain tunnels in the NE. A 30 minute process is in place to "arm" the warheads. Do not recall, where I read this. The separate locations for warhead and missile storages has been abandoned, in favor of colocation. In some cases the warhead arming is indeed an electronic process now. My working presumption is the demated stance only is a myth by now.

Are we ready to withstand a first strike? SFC has been going from strength to strength, to build redundancies both in physical aspects and in command, communications and control. There is even an alternative command hierarchy in place, if the political council is compromised and these are themselves hierarchies of mostly CCS members. The working presumption on the numbers in our arsenals now forces such planning. Are we ready is a matter of subjective debate. What we still do not have is a more dedicated SFC cadre, they rotate out after three years. The role of DRDO/BARC in all this is highly inefficient. Our command architecture is like a tunnel into the bureaucracy of the military, DRDO and BARC through the NSA. It is the doctrine that gave the NSA this key role to play and made this position an all important one.

The change we ought to seek is to have the SFC report to a single CDS with a fixed tenure, with the CDS reporting to the RM. The NSA should be the point person in the PMO for coordination across ministries on all matters of security. The NSA should have NO formal role to play in the decision making chain of the NCA, which is from the PM down with redundancies created at least a dozen levels down.

I will try to validate Rear Adm. Raja Menon's view as of 2014 that we still have a de-mated only stance. BTW: As ramana indicate above the Admiral has been thinking on this for a long time. There are only two persons (him and BK) who have articulated numbers, which approximate to the "realistic" needs to maintain nuclear weapon numbers and types. The Admirals book on a nuclear strategy for India - out since pre-pokhran days is a great read. Obviously, he is partial to his own arm as being the most efficacious in these matters. One key point to note - He does subscribe to a "proportional" response doctrine and wants the MR part of the doctrine to be changed. Please do not forget the first NSAB had "punitive" response as the recommended stance by the first NSAB where the admiral was a member. The words punitive was changed to massive, through a mysterious babu led process under NSA BK Mishra. On that point, it is a shame that NSA Doval has not instituted a new NSAB, who's term runs two years, with the last one led by Shyam Saran ending in Jan 2015.

[NRao]

The last authoritative read on the issue that I know of is from Koithara's book circa 2012. He is critical of the de-mated stance but things have been changing. Apart from canisters, some birds say Agni III has been deployed under mountain tunnels in the NE. A 30 minute process is in place to "arm" the warheads. Do not recall, where I read this. The separate locations for warhead and missile storages has been abandoned, in favor of colocation. In some cases the warhead arming is indeed an electronic process now. My working presumption is the demated stance only is a myth by now.

And, that is how it should be - reactive, flexible policies.

I have not read every post here, but is there a view that someone in the chain will either not deliver or refuse to deliver? That has been a concern in *every* nation without an exception. In fact, in the case of Pakis the fear is that some yahoos will go around the chain of command!!!!

There were reports that we did not display Agni missiles on R-Day when Obama was chief guest as it would have sent the wrong message!

The R-Day parade is about messages. Right? Much like the International Review that the IN just held. In fact inviting a "guest" is about messages too. So, what am I missing? It has always been that a way. India and China tested while their FMs were in town or about to fly out - msg. Silly as it sounds. What has any of these things - especially displaying or not displaying a missile at an R-day parade - to do with deterrence?

Dunno. most posts here read much like a scripts for a sequel to Red October. Nothing wrong with it, but just that they are based on fears.