Indeed I met a double PhD from egypt here in the US , well read and aware of the world dynamics. was objective and persuasive in his arguments most of the times, but throughout our 2 hour chat, he kept referring to pakistan's bomb as 'our' bomb. all the two hours, I thought he was a pakistani and was appreciative that he was talking logically about the AAA nexus in pakistan etc. only at the end, knew he was from egypt and was very surprised to see the possessive feeling about the 'islamic' bomb.Originally posted by John Umrao:
"You can go to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and they are very proud Pakistan has this capability," said Shireen Mazari,
Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
http://www.aufbauonline.com/2003/issue22/10.html
(remember the aufbau principle No more than two electrons with ....
)
Interesting indeed.
(remember the aufbau principle No more than two electrons with ....
)Interesting indeed.
How Pakistan will react is anyone’s guess. As <u>Timothy Hoyt,</u> author of "Pakistani Doctrine and the Dangers of Strategic Myopia," has pointed out, Pakistan is not exactly a predictable state. President Pervez Musharraf’s government is seen by many critics as having a tenuous grip on power in Islamabad. Numerous reports assert that the Taliban-friendly army and Interservice Intelligence, known as the ISI, is deeply entrenched within the supposedly reformist government. Tribal provinces in the country’s northwest, meanwhile, are said to be teeming with terrorist activity. Given this fractured state of Pakistani politics, the true intentions of Musharraf’s government are difficult to infer.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
And while all these energies are being expended on controlling the Pakistanis and the US is running around collecting the Pakistani sh*t from Libya and trying to control the North Koreans and the Iranians and trying to outwit the Pakistanis, the GREAT PROLIFERATOR - CHINA sits back and watches all the fun and concentrates on its economy and plans for a day of reckoning, some 50 years in the future.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
JUmrao Garu,
Please post links. I cannot use something unless I know where it is taken from.
Thanks
Please post links. I cannot use something unless I know where it is taken from.
Thanks
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/2002/01/political_intel.html
*************
Political Intelligence
What happens when U.S. spies get the goods-- and the government won't listen?
By Ken Silverstein & David Isenberg
January/February 2002 Issue
In 1989, an intelligence analyst working for then-Secretary of Defense **** Cheney issued a startling report. After reviewing classified information from field agents, he had determined that Pakistan, despite official denials, had built a nuclear bomb. "I was not out there alone," the analyst, Richard Barlow, recalls. "This was the same conclusion that had been reached by many people in the intelligence community."
But Barlow's conclusion was politically inconvenient. A finding that Pakistan possessed a nuclear bomb would have triggered a congressionally mandated cutoff of aid to the country, a key ally in the CIA's efforts to support Afghan rebels fighting a pro-Soviet government. It also would have killed a $1.4-billion sale of F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad.
Barlow's report was dismissed as alarmist. A few months later, a Pentagon official downplayed Pakistan's nuclear capabilities in testimony to Congress. When Barlow protested to his superiors, he was fired.
Three years later, in 1992, a high-ranking Pakistani official admitted that the country had developed the ability to assemble a nuclear weapon by 1987. In 1998, Islamabad detonated its first bomb. "This was not a failure of intelligence," says Barlow. "The intelligence was in the system."
Barlow's case points to an issue that has largely been overlooked in the post-September 11 debate about how to "fix" the nation's spy networks: Sometimes, the problem with intelligence is not a lack of information, but a failure to use it.
In the early days of the Vietnam War, a CIA analyst named Sam Adams discovered that the United States was seriously underestimating the strength of the Vietcong. The agency squelched his findings and he left in frustration. During the Reagan years, Melvin Goodman, then a top Soviet analyst at the agency, reported that the "Evil Empire" was undergoing a severe economic and military decline. Goodman was pressured to revise his findings--because, he says, then-CIA director William Casey wanted to portray a Soviet Union "that was 10 feet tall" in order to justify bigger military budgets. (Reagan's Secretary of State, George Shultz, put it more delicately in his memoirs: Reports from Casey's CIA, he wrote, were "distorted by strong views about policy.")
At about the same time Barlow issued his warnings about Pakistan, an Energy Department analyst named Bryan Siebert was investigating Saddam Hussein's nuclear program. His report concluded that "Iraq has a major effort under way to produce nuclear weapons," and recommended that the National Security Council look into the matter. But the Bush administration--which had been supporting Iraq as a counterweight to the Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran--ignored the report. It was only in 1990, after Saddam invaded Kuwait, that clear-eyed intelligence reporting on Iraq came into fashion.
More recently, the Clinton administration went to great lengths to protect Boris Yeltsin, who was viewed as a critical partner in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. One former intelligence analyst says that Al Gore and his national security adviser, Leon Fuerth, would "bury their heads in the sand" if presented with any derogatory report about Yeltsin. "Taking unpopular positions means that you get bad reviews and don't get promoted," he says. "Some analysts simply stop pursuing information because they know that it can get them into trouble."
A different type of political filtering takes place when the CIA relies on "liaison relationships" with foreign intelligence agencies, whose reports are often colored by the biases of the local elite. One notorious example came in Iran in the 1970s, when despite decades of cooperation with the secret police, the U.S. government failed to grasp the extent of public opposition to the Shah. Less than four months before Khomeini's revolution toppled the Iranian monarchy in early 1979, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that the Shah was "expected to remain actively in power over the next 10 years."
In Pakistan, the CIA has worked closely with the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) ever since the two institutions teamed up in the 1980s to fund and direct the Afghan guerrillas. After the Taliban took power in 1996, the CIA relied on the Pakistanis for help in monitoring the regime. But the agency reportedly got little support or information from its ally in Islamabad--probably because isi was also one of the Taliban's primary backers. "We have consistently misled ourselves because we don't have our own sources of information," warns Burton Hersh, author of The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA. "If we had had people working the bazaars in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, we would have seen that there is a lot of unhappiness and that even upper-middle-class people were thinking about joining up with bin Laden."
*************
Political Intelligence
What happens when U.S. spies get the goods-- and the government won't listen?
By Ken Silverstein & David Isenberg
January/February 2002 Issue
In 1989, an intelligence analyst working for then-Secretary of Defense **** Cheney issued a startling report. After reviewing classified information from field agents, he had determined that Pakistan, despite official denials, had built a nuclear bomb. "I was not out there alone," the analyst, Richard Barlow, recalls. "This was the same conclusion that had been reached by many people in the intelligence community."
But Barlow's conclusion was politically inconvenient. A finding that Pakistan possessed a nuclear bomb would have triggered a congressionally mandated cutoff of aid to the country, a key ally in the CIA's efforts to support Afghan rebels fighting a pro-Soviet government. It also would have killed a $1.4-billion sale of F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad.
Barlow's report was dismissed as alarmist. A few months later, a Pentagon official downplayed Pakistan's nuclear capabilities in testimony to Congress. When Barlow protested to his superiors, he was fired.
Three years later, in 1992, a high-ranking Pakistani official admitted that the country had developed the ability to assemble a nuclear weapon by 1987. In 1998, Islamabad detonated its first bomb. "This was not a failure of intelligence," says Barlow. "The intelligence was in the system."
Barlow's case points to an issue that has largely been overlooked in the post-September 11 debate about how to "fix" the nation's spy networks: Sometimes, the problem with intelligence is not a lack of information, but a failure to use it.
In the early days of the Vietnam War, a CIA analyst named Sam Adams discovered that the United States was seriously underestimating the strength of the Vietcong. The agency squelched his findings and he left in frustration. During the Reagan years, Melvin Goodman, then a top Soviet analyst at the agency, reported that the "Evil Empire" was undergoing a severe economic and military decline. Goodman was pressured to revise his findings--because, he says, then-CIA director William Casey wanted to portray a Soviet Union "that was 10 feet tall" in order to justify bigger military budgets. (Reagan's Secretary of State, George Shultz, put it more delicately in his memoirs: Reports from Casey's CIA, he wrote, were "distorted by strong views about policy.")
At about the same time Barlow issued his warnings about Pakistan, an Energy Department analyst named Bryan Siebert was investigating Saddam Hussein's nuclear program. His report concluded that "Iraq has a major effort under way to produce nuclear weapons," and recommended that the National Security Council look into the matter. But the Bush administration--which had been supporting Iraq as a counterweight to the Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran--ignored the report. It was only in 1990, after Saddam invaded Kuwait, that clear-eyed intelligence reporting on Iraq came into fashion.
More recently, the Clinton administration went to great lengths to protect Boris Yeltsin, who was viewed as a critical partner in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. One former intelligence analyst says that Al Gore and his national security adviser, Leon Fuerth, would "bury their heads in the sand" if presented with any derogatory report about Yeltsin. "Taking unpopular positions means that you get bad reviews and don't get promoted," he says. "Some analysts simply stop pursuing information because they know that it can get them into trouble."
A different type of political filtering takes place when the CIA relies on "liaison relationships" with foreign intelligence agencies, whose reports are often colored by the biases of the local elite. One notorious example came in Iran in the 1970s, when despite decades of cooperation with the secret police, the U.S. government failed to grasp the extent of public opposition to the Shah. Less than four months before Khomeini's revolution toppled the Iranian monarchy in early 1979, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that the Shah was "expected to remain actively in power over the next 10 years."
In Pakistan, the CIA has worked closely with the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) ever since the two institutions teamed up in the 1980s to fund and direct the Afghan guerrillas. After the Taliban took power in 1996, the CIA relied on the Pakistanis for help in monitoring the regime. But the agency reportedly got little support or information from its ally in Islamabad--probably because isi was also one of the Taliban's primary backers. "We have consistently misled ourselves because we don't have our own sources of information," warns Burton Hersh, author of The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA. "If we had had people working the bazaars in Saudi Arabia or Egypt, we would have seen that there is a lot of unhappiness and that even upper-middle-class people were thinking about joining up with bin Laden."
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Is it possible that the great proliferator is itself a puppet in the hands of the grand 'Bhishma' proliferator ( Atoms for peace ).Originally posted by L Dev:
And while all these energies are being expended on controlling the Pakistanis and the US is running around collecting the Pakistani sh*t from Libya and trying to control the North Koreans and the Iranians and trying to outwit the Pakistanis, the GREAT PROLIFERATOR - CHINA sits back and watches all the fun and concentrates on its economy and plans for a day of reckoning, some 50 years in the future.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Rungudu>>
Look at the gold Mine of clustered NP Jihadis and psyops wallahs.
Note that the material is dated 2001, this will help in contrasting to what the wise men profess and the reality is.
Do find a familiar name there Dr. Tim
http://www.catchword.com/ucp/00044687/v41n6/contp1-1.htm
Happy NP Jihadhi hunting.
Look at the gold Mine of clustered NP Jihadis and psyops wallahs.
Note that the material is dated 2001, this will help in contrasting to what the wise men profess and the reality is.
Do find a familiar name there Dr. Tim
http://www.catchword.com/ucp/00044687/v41n6/contp1-1.htm
Happy NP Jihadhi hunting.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
P - 5 members can do what they wantOriginally posted by L Dev:
And while all these energies are being expended on controlling the Pakistanis and the US is running around collecting the Pakistani sh*t from Libya and trying to control the North Koreans and the Iranians and trying to outwit the Pakistanis, the GREAT PROLIFERATOR - CHINA sits back and watches all the fun and concentrates on its economy and plans for a day of reckoning, some 50 years in the future.
But not the same for the rest ... Pakis didn't understand that fact. They thought nukes are golden gooses which not only can keep India away, but also can pay $$ handsomely. Now they will pay for their sins.
The west .. sorry correction.. The P5 will try to use the opportunity to disarm both India and pakistan. They may not succeed, but eventually they might succeed in making both India and Pakis fight with each other. A lot depends on GOI and their leadership. The future GOI's need a very strong and astute leadership. The inexperienced leadership can only lend India the defeat and perhaps their worst nightmares can come true. time for every Indians to get involved.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Jumrao Garu,
I have access to all those articles. Thanks. Now all I need is some time to read them in peace.
I have access to all those articles. Thanks.
Now all I need is some time to read them in peace.Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
PakNation's Niazi fellow hypothesizes
Further still:Internationally, this statement has potentially earth-shattering ramifications. If Pakistan is now to cooperate with the international community, the Iranian statement has just established a Pakistani scientist as an expert on the international nuclear black market, or at least a frequent customer. Is he supposed now to cooperate with the IAEA and disclose all the underground sources from which much equipment was obtained? Now this might well compromise certain aspects of the programme. But putting aside that, it would also mean that no one in that market would ever trust Pakistan enough to deal with it. Even though much of the secrecy shrouding the nuclear programme has been lifted (since Chaghai we at least now admit it is a weapons programme), it still must rely considerably on shady sources. Both the PAEC and KRL are under sanctions, and cannot legitimately import anything from the USA and many other countries. Obviously, they must be turning to third parties and countries. Is that route now to be permanently cut off for the nuclear programme? <u>Are we heading for slow strangulation rather than mere rollback and freezing? </font></u>
Can the government save the national nuclear programme by joining the front line in the War against the Nuclear Black Market? The American claim that only in recent months has the full extent of this black market emerged is ingenuous. However, it is a cause of prime concern, because non-state actors (that is, terrorists; in other words, Al-Qaeda) can gain access to it. A radiological weapon is a US nightmare. Pakistan has been involved in this market for some time, and therefore can be very helpful in providing information about it. If names and addresses can be provided to the Iranians, surely they can be provided to the Americans?
Is there a Chinese angle? If answering questions is the limit of Pakistan's proliferating to Iran, China is then guilty as well. China adheres to the NPT, unlike Pakistan, but it has sailed as close to the line as possible in helping the Pakistani programme. One might describe it more as technology osmosis than technology transfer. However, under the emerging Pak-Iranian precedent, it is enough. It is unlikely that China is going to come under much more than the sort of mild US pressure it did when it was suspected of nuclear espionage.
However, Pakistan's reaction seems miscalculated somehow. The government clearly would like to get at Dr Qadeer Khan, but it equally clearly doesn't dare. AQ has certainly done well in life materially. But if he is suspected of skimming off the cream, of misusing his financial autonomy, then why was action not taken earlier? It is unseemly to take advantage of a spy scare to get him for other sins. Especially when it seems clear that he and his subordinates lacked any motive to sell out the country. If they wanted to make money, there was more money in purchases than Iran could have paid for used centrifuges.
So why make out Pakistan as a country so inefficient and irresponsible, that its nuclear scientists could sell secrets with impunity? It also implies that other scientists may have also sold out other secrets. Pakistan also possesses sensitive missile technology. Could some of that have been sold out? The missile market is bigger than the nuclear, after all. If it took an Iranian confession and IAEA notification for us to find out about the dastardly deeds of AQ and Dr Farooq and the other greedy dyed-in-the-wool saboteurs of the national interest, who knows what parts of the nuclear and missile programmes are being hawked around the world even now as you read these words?
In a way, it would be better to admit that Pakistan was for a time a 'rogue state.' Apart from the very strong probability that this is the truth (and it is important to tell the truth internationally), it would be possible to put the episode behind us. It would suit the regime more. At present, it cuts a foolish figure as a dupe, a Keystone Kop. It does not suit the USA at the moment to disturb the War on Terror, but if ever it does, it has this handle against even the present regime. This would not apply if Pakistan admitted to state authorisation for past proliferation. True, some succeeding regime could be targeted for being a rogue or a potential rogue, but not this one. </font>
However, that admission would involve bringing retired Army Chiefs like Generals Beg and Karamat, and perhaps ex-President Ishaq Khan, out into the open. That too is not seemly. The government has certainly had a tough call to make, and it is possible to sympathise with President Pervez Musharraf personally, because here at least he is being saddled with a crisis in which he had absolutely no personal contribution. The only silver lining is that the government has taken a proactive approach. Hopefully for the country, the luck of the brave will help it take the country through the crisis.</font>
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
classic case of Testing of Hypothesis
set H<sub>0</sub> Pakistan does not proliferate
set H<sub> a </sub> Pakistan adheres to non proliferation..
If your sampling data fails H<sub> 0</sub> then it means rejected the hypothesis but it does not mean alternative Hypothesis is confirmed.
set H<sub>0</sub> Pakistan does not proliferate
set H<sub> a </sub> Pakistan adheres to non proliferation..
If your sampling data fails H<sub> 0</sub> then it means rejected the hypothesis but it does not mean alternative Hypothesis is confirmed.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Naizi's sophistry is the sign of someone who has been caught at a lie. He is making up meaningless gibberish to fill space in the psywar and is fumbling with words.
The image of a strong military leadership in control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons no longer fits facts as we know them today but the admission of the fact that Pakistan was and is a rogue state isn't something the Pakistanis can live with either. The discord between these points of views in the Pakistani press is going to be amusing to watch.
The image of a strong military leadership in control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons no longer fits facts as we know them today but the admission of the fact that Pakistan was and is a rogue state isn't something the Pakistanis can live with either. The discord between these points of views in the Pakistani press is going to be amusing to watch.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Note the the of pervert(ed) Logic of Pakistan, Unkil SA experts who advise SD.
Pakistan needs Bomb as India is a bigger country.
Pakistan needs Bomb because India is superior in conventional weapons
Pakistan had to procure by stealing, because west would not give the bomb to it.
Pakistan had to smuggle drugs because it is a poor country it cant afford the expense of making the bomb.
Pakistan lacks strategic depth therefore Taliban made up of ISI is needed to control Afghanistan.
Pakistan needs a strong leader to control the country and prevent Jihadis getting the bomb.
Pakistan has to swap Bombs to missiles from N Korea because it does not have the missiles to deliver the bomb into India.
Pakistan needs to proliferate the Nukes to get funds to sustain itself because its population is impoverished.
Pakistan needs India to de nuclearize to stop proliferating Nukes.
finally the US experts
Pakistan needs billions of dollars to stop imploding with Nukes.
India has to denuclearize to foster confidence in Pakistanis.
India has to concede Kashmir and any territory of India to prevent Nuclear disaster.
and on and on it goes.
Pakistan needs Bomb as India is a bigger country.
Pakistan needs Bomb because India is superior in conventional weapons
Pakistan had to procure by stealing, because west would not give the bomb to it.
Pakistan had to smuggle drugs because it is a poor country it cant afford the expense of making the bomb.
Pakistan lacks strategic depth therefore Taliban made up of ISI is needed to control Afghanistan.
Pakistan needs a strong leader to control the country and prevent Jihadis getting the bomb.
Pakistan has to swap Bombs to missiles from N Korea because it does not have the missiles to deliver the bomb into India.
Pakistan needs to proliferate the Nukes to get funds to sustain itself because its population is impoverished.
Pakistan needs India to de nuclearize to stop proliferating Nukes.
finally the US experts
Pakistan needs billions of dollars to stop imploding with Nukes.
India has to denuclearize to foster confidence in Pakistanis.
India has to concede Kashmir and any territory of India to prevent Nuclear disaster.
and on and on it goes.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Rangudu,
Send me an e-mail at hoytt at georgetown dot edu with your e-mail and snail mail. I'll send you a copy.
John,
I'm amused - you've spent six years taking periodic shots at me, but you've never run across the article that almost got me PNG'd? Dude, you need to look at stuff that isn't on the internet.
Tim
Send me an e-mail at hoytt at georgetown dot edu with your e-mail and snail mail. I'll send you a copy.
John,
I'm amused - you've spent six years taking periodic shots at me, but you've never run across the article that almost got me PNG'd? Dude, you need to look at stuff that isn't on the internet.
Tim
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Paki Nuke Proliferation is RED Herring ...!!!
Look at the Proliferation Time-Line ....
1972
Bhutto, says "We'll eat Grass, but we'll get Nukes" ...
1973
Pakis, Libya & Iran & KSA sign on the dotted line and provide MULLAH ....
1984
Pakis get Chinese HEU nukes after HEU generation succeeds, yet HEU bomb cold test fail ....
Proliferation Begins .....
1987 ----> 1992
Iran gets PAK 2 & assorted gear
1988 -----> 1994
Libya get's Pak 2 & original Pak HEU design, that failed .. ...
1996 ------>Now
Xerox Khan acquires NK ... ] & Dr XXXX get trapped for NUKE Proliferation to UET (ummah-e-xxxxxx)
Colin Powell knows that Al keeda's have had access to "nuke tech..."
Fast Forward to 2004
Look at the Mufti Cops in 2004 carrying Radiation Detectors for New Year Celeb..
Did Paki's face any Shawk'n'Awe ------> Nope
So what happened
Like N^3 Guru said ----> Pakis shipped their HEU and PU Chini Bums off to Knoxwille
Price Paid By Pakis for being 400 % Safe & Secure
2002 ---- 2003 NKorea
Kim Jong Il has a Epileptic Fit .....
[ Starts spewing out HEU and PU Bums .....
But Why ??? US was not going to take him out ???]
What if this was a Deliberate PRC stunt created to hide the PRC Tactical/Mini Stolen Nuke Design Proliferation
PRC, knew with Uncle Sam getting access to all PAKI PU and HEU Bums ....their "Ar...se was Grass"
Note how quickly PRC was able to "Defuse and De-flower" Kim Jong Il ......
Now Kim is playing the Fiddle ....!!!
Oct'2003 -----
Iran finally realizes, Paki HEU designs are Fake ....
Coughs Up Pak 2's & assorted documentation to IAEA .... Fingers more PAKIS .....
Dec-Jan'04 --->
Gaddafi feels relief from Nuclear Constipation suffered from Years of "Pak 2 and Pak 1" Paki Laxatives.
He mysteriously ship 55000 lbs or Paki Sh****t to
Knoxwille for a Spectral Anal-sis ....
Now .....Pakis suddenly start having very WET Diapers ..........!!!
a. NY Times .....Pakis Proliferate Nukes ......
b. Was. Compost ....Pakis Proliferate Nukes ......
c. Wash. Times ....Pakis Proliferate Nukes ......
d. Chicago Tribune ...Pakis Proliferate Nukes ......
Why Now, after this has been happening for the last 30 years ???????
VOILA .....!!!
U.S. plans Al Qaeda offensive
Sources say military is mapping operation to strike inside Pakistan
U.S. plans Al Qaeda offensive (Getty/AFP photo by Farooq Naeem)
January 28, 2004
By Christine Spolar
Tribune foreign correspondent
Published January 28, 2004
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-0401280334jan28,1,1724348.story
U.S. eyes move into Pakistan to chase al-Qaida
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2001845426_qaida28.html
Note Musharraf & Corpse Commanders now have very very WET Diapers ..... They have Group Hugs and decide when all else fails , Ski-Down Hill
a. They were notified about FATA and Ops in POK last year .....!!!!
b. Now, Time's Up .....
Suddenly there is a LOC Ceasefire, and Cross-Border Terrorism Exists ....
No more POK or any Paki Territory being used for Terrorism ...
LOC is more than a Movie, it is the BORDER ....
c. OBL and Mullah OMar will Sing like Most Paki Pansies and Corpse Commanders are .........sh....tting bricks .....!!!!
Look at the Proliferation Time-Line ....
1972
Bhutto, says "We'll eat Grass, but we'll get Nukes" ...
1973
Pakis, Libya & Iran & KSA sign on the dotted line and provide MULLAH ....
1984
Pakis get Chinese HEU nukes after HEU generation succeeds, yet HEU bomb cold test fail ....
Proliferation Begins .....
1987 ----> 1992
Iran gets PAK 2 & assorted gear
1988 -----> 1994
Libya get's Pak 2 & original Pak HEU design, that failed .. ...
1996 ------>Now
Xerox Khan acquires NK ...
] & Dr XXXX get trapped for NUKE Proliferation to UET (ummah-e-xxxxxx) Colin Powell knows that Al keeda's have had access to "nuke tech..."
Fast Forward to 2004
Look at the Mufti Cops in 2004 carrying Radiation Detectors for New Year Celeb..
Did Paki's face any Shawk'n'Awe ------> Nope
So what happened
Like N^3 Guru said ----> Pakis shipped their HEU and PU Chini Bums off to Knoxwille
Price Paid By Pakis for being 400 % Safe & Secure
2002 ---- 2003 NKorea
Kim Jong Il has a Epileptic Fit .....
[ Starts spewing out HEU and PU Bums .....
But Why ??? US was not going to take him out ???]
What if this was a Deliberate PRC stunt created to hide the PRC Tactical/Mini Stolen Nuke Design Proliferation
PRC, knew with Uncle Sam getting access to all PAKI PU and HEU Bums ....their "Ar...se was Grass"
Note how quickly PRC was able to "Defuse and De-flower" Kim Jong Il ......
Now Kim is playing the Fiddle ....!!!
Oct'2003 -----
Iran finally realizes, Paki HEU designs are Fake ....
Coughs Up Pak 2's & assorted documentation to IAEA .... Fingers more PAKIS .....
Dec-Jan'04 --->
Gaddafi feels relief from Nuclear Constipation suffered from Years of "Pak 2 and Pak 1" Paki Laxatives.
He mysteriously ship 55000 lbs or Paki Sh****t to
Knoxwille for a Spectral Anal-sis ....
Now .....Pakis suddenly start having very WET Diapers ..........!!!
a. NY Times .....Pakis Proliferate Nukes ......
b. Was. Compost ....Pakis Proliferate Nukes ......
c. Wash. Times ....Pakis Proliferate Nukes ......
d. Chicago Tribune ...Pakis Proliferate Nukes ......
Why Now, after this has been happening for the last 30 years ???????
VOILA .....!!!
U.S. plans Al Qaeda offensive
Sources say military is mapping operation to strike inside Pakistan
U.S. plans Al Qaeda offensive (Getty/AFP photo by Farooq Naeem)
January 28, 2004
By Christine Spolar
Tribune foreign correspondent
Published January 28, 2004
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-0401280334jan28,1,1724348.story
U.S. eyes move into Pakistan to chase al-Qaida
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2001845426_qaida28.html
Note Musharraf & Corpse Commanders now have very very WET Diapers ..... They have Group Hugs and decide when all else fails , Ski-Down Hill
a. They were notified about FATA and Ops in POK last year .....!!!!
b. Now, Time's Up .....
Suddenly there is a LOC Ceasefire, and Cross-Border Terrorism Exists ....
No more POK or any Paki Territory being used for Terrorism ...
LOC is more than a Movie, it is the BORDER ....
c. OBL and Mullah OMar will Sing like Most Paki Pansies and Corpse Commanders are .........sh....tting bricks .....!!!!
-
Prof Raghu
- BRFite -Trainee
- Posts: 61
- Joined: 24 Mar 1999 12:31
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Tim, what was the article that got you almost PNGd, and PNGd by who?Originally posted by Tim:
John,
I'm amused - you've spent six years taking periodic shots at me, but you've never run across the article that almost got me PNG'd? Dude, you need to look at stuff that isn't on the internet.
Tim
[Also, perhaps PNG by one = PVeryG by another?]
Also, seriously, how could "South Asia" or proliferation experts fail to note the significance of Gaddafi Stadium or Faisalabad? Heck, even when I was still in school there were newspaper articles about the significance of these moves. (Note also that there was nothing named after any Iranian - of course, when Bhutto was alive it was the Shah in Iran, and we know who he depended on; it is like the dog that did not bark).
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Leonard:
After the nook-nooding of June 2002, the Pakis had no further need for centrifuges and other pretenses to a nook program. Wasn't fooling anyone any more - George F. and Lt. Gen. Vij were trying to stay out of hospital with aching ribs.
Check out Mush's strange statements of that period to the Pakinook commoonity and you'll see what I mean: highly sentimental declarations of how the time for weapon development was over, now it was time to turn a new leaf, use nookulear technology for peaceful purposes (dirty bums).
So the Pakis tried to make a quick $ by palming off useless centrifuges to North Korea so that they could suddenly claim to have developed nukes - and get baksheesh.
PRC role - no arguments there. What you say is entirely consistent.
Unkil's brave SD experts were in a rage against Yindoos - and this showed in so many of their articles of that period.
After the nook-nooding of June 2002, the Pakis had no further need for centrifuges and other pretenses to a nook program. Wasn't fooling anyone any more - George F. and Lt. Gen. Vij were trying to stay out of hospital with aching ribs.
Check out Mush's strange statements of that period to the Pakinook commoonity and you'll see what I mean: highly sentimental declarations of how the time for weapon development was over, now it was time to turn a new leaf, use nookulear technology for peaceful purposes (dirty bums).
So the Pakis tried to make a quick $ by palming off useless centrifuges to North Korea so that they could suddenly claim to have developed nukes - and get baksheesh.
PRC role - no arguments there. What you say is entirely consistent.
Unkil's brave SD experts were in a rage against Yindoos - and this showed in so many of their articles of that period.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Narayanan,Originally posted by narayanan:
Unkil's brave SD experts were in a rage against Yindoos - and this showed in so many of their articles of that period.
I believe, and I think it was obvious from the vicious barking noises made by Halfbright and her cronies during the clinton admin., that India's nuke test completely blew apart all the fancy little strategies of these SD worthies, who imagined a world with a limited number of countries having nukes, wherein they could play their little games....they had a the whole future sorted out, and then these yindoos flush all their fancy little ideas down the drain. Oh, the horror. :p
If pakis are nood and the whole "we are a nuke power" scam gets exposed, then the paki army has to basically accept defeat, and will indeed have to suck it up with a straw. I think my tubelight finally blinking into a warm glow about why the GoI feels the paki army is a changed and reformed addict that no longer needs to shoot up its jugular vein. All the jihadis being pushed into PoK seems to be met with increasing resistance by the citizens of the independent nations of Gilgit and Baltistan. If Unkil is going to be chasing jihadis in Pok, and the paki army has already sold out its jihadi "commanders" and "generals" in J&K, these jihadis better start grooming themselves for their upcoming dates with their houris.
This is what comes of being tactically brilliant but being strategically stupid, as someone should point out to Mushy and his tight-assed brigade.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
leonard,Thats probably what really happened.If you polishit it would be the mosr candid account.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Rye,
You got it right. POK-II put a patakha under the State Department house of cards and blasted it. And worse, it took them by surprise
It's like catching an aging film actress without make up on camera
You got it right. POK-II put a patakha under the State Department house of cards and blasted it. And worse, it took them by surprise
It's like catching an aging film actress without make up on camera
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Sriman,
To be honest, this is the first I've ever heard of either.
That's one big difference between Americans who study the region and people who live there and study the region. There are lots of things that Indian "America experts" understand very differently (or miss entirely) for similar reasons.
The article in question is the one on Pakistani nuclear doctrine and strategic myopia.
Tim
To be honest, this is the first I've ever heard of either.
That's one big difference between Americans who study the region and people who live there and study the region. There are lots of things that Indian "America experts" understand very differently (or miss entirely) for similar reasons.
The article in question is the one on Pakistani nuclear doctrine and strategic myopia.
Tim
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Rangudu,Originally posted by Rangudu:
It's like catching an aging film actress without make up on camera
And to think that I used to actually get worked up about the kind of language used by the SD cronies in that time. I should have been laughing my guts out instead...would have reduced my blood pressure at the very least
Also, I think the switching of the portfolios of Jaswant Singh and Yashwant Sinha happened after the talbott-jaswant talks had concluded. I still wonder about the reason behind that. Did the GoI again turn the tables on the assumption made by the american side about Indian policy being personality-based? Any ideas?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Ramana:
High time for a follow-up on nook-nood - from someone else. When I wrote, all we had was pointers from TSP, consistent with the occurrence of what looked inevitable, given the compelling national security imperatives faced by the US and PRC governments.
Today, the preponderance of evidence is present for all to see.
Its more interesting now, to mention that the noodity occured as of June 2002 - and the junta has been hiding that fact from the gentle Paki public.
High time for a follow-up on nook-nood - from someone else. When I wrote, all we had was pointers from TSP, consistent with the occurrence of what looked inevitable, given the compelling national security imperatives faced by the US and PRC governments.
Today, the preponderance of evidence is present for all to see.
Its more interesting now, to mention that the noodity occured as of June 2002 - and the junta has been hiding that fact from the gentle Paki public.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Talbot was Clinton admin guy and India needed someone different to tackle pro Pakistan Powell. Pakistan and India Need To Start Direct Dialogue and six months later Jaswant Singh is new FM; Sinha moves to MEA. Sinha might have given Powell a few things to think about. Remarks made by External Affairs Minister Shri Yashwant Sinha and US Secretary of State Mr. Colin Powell after their meeting at WashingtonOriginally posted by Rye: Also, I think the switching of the portfolios of Jaswant Singh and Yashwant Sinha happened after the talbott-jaswant talks had concluded. I still wonder about the reason behind that. Did the GoI again turn the tables on the assumption made by the american side about Indian policy being personality-based? Any ideas?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Why change the guard?? The best theory I have is that there were unwritten commitments made by both sides to each other, and when Talbott was out of the picture, it made sense to take Jaswant sing out, so that all such commitments were out the window. Now both sides would have the standard "but that was my predecessor, and I am not aware" excuse.Originally posted by Sam:
Talbot was Clinton admin guy and India needed someone different to tackle pro Pakistan Powell.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
No mention of China at all -- Is this the dog that did not bark case?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/30/international/asia/30NUKE.htmlNuclear Inquiry Skips Pakistani Army
By DAVID ROHDE
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, Jan. 29 — For the past week, senior government and intelligence officials, speaking anonymously, have steadily disclosed details of a deepening inquiry into what seems to have been the sale of Pakistan's nuclear technology to Iran and other countries in the late 1980's and early 1990's.
Their version of events — expected to be released publicly this weekend — blames the country's nuclear scientists, including Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, for selling technology for personal gain.
One issue rarely addressed by government officials, however, is the extent to which the inquiry has examined the role Pakistan's powerful military — which had broad control over the nuclear program — may have played in the sale or sharing of nuclear technology.
In interviews this week, retired Pakistani civilian and military officials, former American diplomats and proliferation experts said the country's military-led government appeared to be glossing over evidence that senior military officials might have approved the sales.
More recent reports of proliferation — including allegations that the governments of the current president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto shared nuclear technology with North Korea — are also being given short shrift, they said.
The officials and analysts emphasized that they had no proof that the army was involved, but wondered why Pakistani investigators had not questioned any senior army officials.
George Perkovich, a proliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in Washington, said General Musharraf, who seized power in 1999, was trying to appease American demands for an investigation while not betraying the army, his base of support.
"The problem for Musharraf is that people in the army would know about this," Mr. Perkovich said in a telephone interview. "And he wants to protect his club."
One focus of suspicion is Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, the commander of the Pakistani Army from 1988 to 1991, American analysts said. Robert B. Oakley, who served as the American ambassador in Islamabad at the time, said in a telephone interview that General Beg told him in 1991 that he was discussing nuclear and conventional military cooperation with Iran's Revolutionary Guards.
"He said he had a good conversation with the Revolutionary Guards about nuclear cooperation and conventional military assistance," Mr. Oakley said. "Iran was going to support Pakistan with conventional military aid and petroleum and the Pakistanis would provide them with nuclear technology."
Mr. Oakley said General Beg made the same statement to Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of American forces in the region at the time. General Schwarzkopf's office said he was traveling overseas this week and could not be reached for comment.
In an interview this week, General Beg denied ever sharing nuclear technology with Iran. But he did confirm that he proposed that Pakistan adopt a doctrine of "strategic defiance" involving an alliance between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.
General Beg said such an alliance would thwart an American invasion of all three countries that he expected after the United States defeated Iraq in the Persian Gulf war of 1991. This week, he predicted that history would prove him right and that an alliance similar to the European Union would form and the three countries would become "the core of the Muslim world, to emulate."
Mr. Oakley said he was so concerned by General Beg's statements in 1991 that he went to Pakistan's prime minister at the time, Nawaz Sharif, and urged him to quash any such arrangement. Mr. Oakley said that Mr. Sharif agreed to speak to Iran's civilian leaders and block any nuclear cooperation.
Mr. Sharif, who now lives in exile in Saudi Arabia, declined a request for an interview this week.
Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan, a special assistant to Mr. Sharif, said he remembered that General Beg proposed an alliance with Iran and Afghanistan. But Mr. Khan said senior civilian officials did not take General Beg's proposals seriously.
Gen. Hamid Gul, who at the time was the director of Pakistan's military intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, said he remembered that General Beg argued for the alliance. He said some officers joked that the country, which at the time was on the verge of defaulting on loan payments, should sell its nuclear technology. But he said none of the proposals were taken seriously.
Asked if he turned a blind eye to nuclear shipments, General Beg said no reports of proliferation came to him during his tenure.
Lt. Gen. Assad Durrani, who served as director of military intelligence from 1988 to 1990 and intelligence director from 1990 to 1992, said he received no reports of proliferation. General Durrani, now retired, said the agency only tracked efforts by foreign intelligence operatives to penetrate the nuclear program.
He said a separate branch of the nuclear program run by both civilians and military officials monitored the scientists. "The security of Dr. A. Q. Khan was not our responsibility," he said. "The I.S.I. is not a security-providing agency."
General Durrani and a close aide to General Musharraf both suggested that the intelligence service and the army were not the invulnerable, all-knowing institutions Pakistanis perceived.
"I have seen the workings of the I.S.I. and I have seen the workings of the military mind-set," said the aide, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. Military and intelligence officials probably saw the scientists as "national heroes," he said.
"They must not be suspecting they are doing anything wrong," he added.
But more recent allegations of proliferation involving North Korea, if true, are more likely to involve direct army involvement, said Mr. Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment. American officials believe that Pakistan traded nuclear technology for ballistic missile technology with North Korea in the mid-1990's. Pakistani officials vehemently deny it.
In 1993, Benazir Bhutto, then prime minister of Pakistan, visited North Korea and was given the plans for a ballistic missile, current and former Pakistani officials said.
In an e-mail response to written questions this week, Ms. Bhutto, who lives in exile in London, declined to comment on specific details of the nuclear program. But she said she consistently opposed the proliferation of Pakistani nuclear technology during her two terms in office.
She said that during her first term, from 1988 to 1990, she tightened security after concern grew that a foreign country might arrest a visiting Pakistani scientist to slow the country's clandestine nuclear program.
"I therefore directed that no scientist should leave the country without written government permission," she wrote, "and without being accompanied by a security detail."
There are also questions about General Musharraf's tenure. As recently as July 2002, American satellites tracked a Pakistani cargo plane as it picked up ballistic missile parts at a North Korean airfield, American officials have said. American intelligence officials also believe that within the last two years Pakistani centrifuge designs helped Libya make major strides in its effort to build nuclear weapons.
But none of the accounts prove that the army, or Pakistan's government, approved the transfer of nuclear technology. American and Pakistani analysts said the evidence that could prove the military approved the transfer would be the discovery of Pakistani nuclear hardware in Libya, North Korea or Iran.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
So - starting with July 2002, its been all downhill for mush, hasn't it? Its been GUBO, GUBO all the way ever since then. The "debriefing" was dragged out over a long time, because they had to keep the noodity away from the public eye.
For the first time I am beginning to suspect that the "cbt", though it is as horrible as ever for the Indian innocents being murdered by the Pakis, is indeed the result of the Pakis pushing all possible jehadis across the LOC while they can - knowing that the window of opportunity is closing permanently.
The pressure has steadily increased on the mushba**s, as the onion-peeling progressed over the months.
Now his nuke establishment is well and truly exposed and taken apart, his Xerox machine operators all arrested and de-briefed.
Its simple logic that this sort of thorough humiliation of their top nuke establishment had a pre-requisite - removal of all their nuke assets. It would have been top priority to remove the warheads and then the fissionable material from angry, desperate hands - and the hands of their loyal subordinates - before clamping the handcuffs on those hands.
What next? I predict that second-tier junta members will start getting named as nuke proliferation scandal participants. People at Colonel to Brigadier level.
Nutcases like "Beg" and "Gul" are still strutting around saying "They wouldn't dare!" But its only a matter of time. Sounds like the bluster of the French Colonel whose execution is described at the beginning of The Day of The Jackal.
Ten little Pakis went to Kargil in '99..
One ate grass at Drass
and then there were nine.
Nine little Pakis went to Kabul to fight
One went in a container and then there were eight..
Eight little Pakis planned nine-eleven
One got sent to Guantanamo
And then there were seven
Seven little Pakis got unkil to pay baksheesh
One gave nukes to the Taliban
And then there were six
...Its coming down, as we see..
For the first time I am beginning to suspect that the "cbt", though it is as horrible as ever for the Indian innocents being murdered by the Pakis, is indeed the result of the Pakis pushing all possible jehadis across the LOC while they can - knowing that the window of opportunity is closing permanently.
The pressure has steadily increased on the mushba**s, as the onion-peeling progressed over the months.
Now his nuke establishment is well and truly exposed and taken apart, his Xerox machine operators all arrested and de-briefed.
Its simple logic that this sort of thorough humiliation of their top nuke establishment had a pre-requisite - removal of all their nuke assets. It would have been top priority to remove the warheads and then the fissionable material from angry, desperate hands - and the hands of their loyal subordinates - before clamping the handcuffs on those hands.
What next? I predict that second-tier junta members will start getting named as nuke proliferation scandal participants. People at Colonel to Brigadier level.
Nutcases like "Beg" and "Gul" are still strutting around saying "They wouldn't dare!" But its only a matter of time. Sounds like the bluster of the French Colonel whose execution is described at the beginning of The Day of The Jackal.
Ten little Pakis went to Kargil in '99..
One ate grass at Drass
and then there were nine.
Nine little Pakis went to Kabul to fight
One went in a container and then there were eight..
Eight little Pakis planned nine-eleven
One got sent to Guantanamo
And then there were seven
Seven little Pakis got unkil to pay baksheesh
One gave nukes to the Taliban
And then there were six
...Its coming down, as we see..
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Six little Pakis gave Unkil nuke grief
But Unkil removed one guy's brief
And then there were five
But Unkil removed one guy's brief
And then there were five
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Five little Pakis tried to bum Mush
One lit a fuse
And then four were alive..
One lit a fuse
And then four were alive..
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Sun Tzu and the art of diplomacyOriginally posted by Rye: Now both sides would have the standard "but that was my predecessor, and I am not aware" excuse.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
I believe the reference is about Shah of Iran the American pet poodle who should have barked about Bhutto's nuke program across the Pakistan-Iran border.Originally posted by Sarma: No mention of China at all -- Is this the dog that did not bark case?
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
N^3 and Rangudu, that was priceless
You had me in splits
You had me in splits
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Very interesting alliance being pushed.Originally posted by Rangudu:
Nuclear Inquiry Skips Pakistani Army
By DAVID ROHDE
But he did confirm that he proposed that Pakistan adopt a doctrine of "strategic defiance" involving an alliance between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan.
General Beg said such an alliance would thwart an American invasion of all three countries that he expected after the United States defeated Iraq in the Persian Gulf war of 1991.
This week, he predicted that history would prove him right and that an alliance similar to the European Union would form and the three countries would become "the core of the Muslim world, to emulate."
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Nuclear Shenanigans by Najam Sethi in TFT.
Dr A Q Khan has been at the heart of our nuclear programme. His secret “successes” made Kahuta Research Laboratories an unaccountable state institution within the larger, unaccountable praetorian state of Pakistan. Dr Khan has accumulated extraordinary wealth in pursuit of his nuclear dream. He has funded self-serving seminars and books. With the help of pliant journalists, he has bankrolled his image as “the father of the Islamic bomb” so that no one can dare accuse him of any wrongdoing. When colleagues like Dr Munir Ahmad Khan and others in the atomic energy establishment protested his dubious “dealings”, he connived to have them shunted aside as “American agents”. Those in the media who wondered about his newfound wealth and questionable ways were accused of being “unpatriotic”. Every army chief and every general who headed the strategic nuclear establishment knew much was amiss but preferred to turn a blind eye “in the national interest” to Dr Khan’s comings and goings. But when the national interest changed, efforts were speeded up to quietly wean KRL away from critical elements of the programme and hand these over to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
op-ed in LA Times today by Kathy Gannon:
Explosive Secrets From Pakistan
Explosive Secrets From Pakistan
The secret is out: The know-how and perhaps even the equipment to make nuclear weapons has been leaked from Pakistan to countries like Iran and Libya. The question now is: Who dunnit? Greedy scientists or the Pakistani military?
Greedy scientists is the explanation being offered by Pakistan's military rulers. What's more, they say, they weren't aware that such sales were going on until just a few weeks ago, when Libya and Iran began spilling the beans. They're shocked.
But that seems a bit of a stretch. After all, the weapons or the knowledge to make them would sell for billions of dollars, an amount that would have surely raised eyebrows in Islamabad, where corruption by politicians, money skimming and Swiss bank accounts are routinely investigated and published — often as a result of leaks by Pakistani intelligence.
The truth is, the military itself is a more likely culprit in the sales. The military has ruled Pakistan for most of its history, either outright or by pulling the strings of weak and often corrupt governments. The military controls the intelligence agency and its nuclear weapons program.
Perhaps even more relevant, the military was strapped for cash during the 1990s after Washington ended military and humanitarian aid to Pakistan because of concerns about the country's nuclear program.
The cutoff was a case of "too little, too late," coming as it did after a decade-long spending spree by the U.S. in Pakistan. During that time, Washington knew that Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons technology but chose to ignore it. Why? The U.S. needed Pakistan, which had become the front-line state against the spread of communism. Pakistan was the staging arena for the U.S.-funded insurgency, which included Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, to defeat the Soviet Red Army after it invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
Washington's ally in the 1980s during the war to oust the Soviet invaders from Afghanistan was Pakistan's military dictator, Mohammed Zia ul-Haq. This was despite the fact that in 1977 Zia had overthrown and later hanged Pakistan's civilian leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
By the early 1980s, Zia's Pakistan was the third-largest recipient of U.S. aid after Israel and Egypt. Despite widespread knowledge that Zia, who was a hard-line Islamist, was developing nuclear weapons, U.S. presidents signed waivers year after year certifying that Pakistan was not defying a U.S. law that banned giving aid to nations developing nuclear weapons.
The U.S. ignored Pakistan's nuclear weapons program until 1990, when Washington finally cut all military and humanitarian aid, ostensibly to punish Islamabad for its nuclear ambitions. What had changed? The Soviet Union had collapsed, the Cold War had just ended, Russia had left Afghanistan and, most significant, Pakistan was no longer needed.
But by then Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was humming along. With no U.S. aid money coming in, what was the military to do? According to Mirza Aslam Beg, who was army chief at the time, Iran approached him, offering upward of $10 billion for nuclear arms technology. Beg told me in 2003 that Iranian emissaries contacted him and then-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. According to Beg, but never confirmed by Bhutto, the two played a game with the emissaries, sending them between the military chief's house and the prime minister's. One would say the other had the authority to decide whether to share the technology, but neither would give the Iranians an outright refusal.
When Bhutto's successor, Nawaz Sharif, came to power, Beg was still talking to the Iranians, according to a former senior Cabinet minister who is now back in government with the opposition. The minister recalled a conversation in which Beg told him, "Iran is willing to give whatever it takes, $6 billion, $10 billion. We can sell the bomb to Iran at any price."
Beg said no deal was cut, but he also said that no one ever said "no" to Iran. According to Beg, the offer was never rejected outright because no one in the military or the government wanted to be rude to their Iranian interlocutors. Now there's an explanation to strain credulity.
Despite all this, the U.S. consistently has made the military its ally — even though it is generally the military that brings the most grief to Washington.</font> The U.S. ban on aid was again lifted after 9/11 in exchange for Pakistan's help against the Taliban in Afghanistan and in the hunt for Al Qaeda suspects.
It was Zia who encouraged Islamists like Bin Laden and others to go to Afghanistan, while convincing Washington that they were its best bet to defeat the Soviets. Zia also imposed harsh Islamic rules on Pakistan. Yet Washington supported the military. Now, hard-line Islamic groups rule in two provinces, and madrasas — religious schools that often preach hate of the West — operate freely without government constraints.
Today, the military wants to keep Washington a friend while also helping militants in the Indian-controlled part of Kashmir. This situation is becoming increasingly dangerous for Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, who came to power in a military coup.
The only real guarantee for Pakistan's future as a stable partner in the region is to invest in Pakistan's civil society, which is neither militant in its Islamic belief nor a supporter of hard-line Islam. But the military has prevented its development to keep civil institutions weak, thereby keeping the military the most powerful institution in Pakistan. While many, if not the majority, of Pakistan's soldiers are ideologically motivated, most Pakistanis are moderate in their beliefs.
The nuclear controversy could be an unexpected benefit for Pakistan if it persuaded Islamabad's Western allies to focus on strengthening the civil society by investing heavily in the dilapidated public education system and not in madrasas, and by distancing themselves from the military.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Along with the investigation into TSP's nuclear affairs, there should be investigation into the US governments that knowingly let this happen.
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Especially since the Iranians and Afghans hate pakistan.Originally posted by acharya:
Very interesting alliance being pushed.
-
Prof Raghu
- BRFite -Trainee
- Posts: 61
- Joined: 24 Mar 1999 12:31
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
Read this carefully:
Now, what are the odds that there will soon be "discovery of Pakistani nuclear hardware" from the cargo load that was brought by a couple of C-130s from Libya to McGhee airport near Oakridge, TN?
Drip, drip, drip ...
This is interesting.Originally posted by Rangudu:
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/30/international/asia/30NUKE.htmlNuclear Inquiry Skips Pakistani Army
By DAVID ROHDE
But none of the accounts prove that the army, or Pakistan's government, approved the transfer of nuclear technology. American and Pakistani analysts said the evidence that could prove the military approved the transfer would be the discovery of Pakistani nuclear hardware in Libya, North Korea or Iran.
Now, what are the odds that there will soon be "discovery of Pakistani nuclear hardware" from the cargo load that was brought by a couple of C-130s from Libya to McGhee airport near Oakridge, TN?
Drip, drip, drip ...
Re: Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 22 Jan 2004
It would depend on whether Mushy cooperates or not, I believe.Originally posted by Sriman:
Now, what are the odds that there will soon be "discovery of Pakistani nuclear hardware" from the cargo load that was brought by a couple of C-130s from Libya to McGhee airport near Oakridge, TN?