Hit by the economic slowdown, profits of China’s mighty state-owned enterprises (SOEs) nose-dived by 14.2 per cent to USD 34.2 billion in the first two months of this year, according to official data released here [Beijing] today.
SOEs saw combined profits decelerated to 14.2 per cent year-on-year in the Jan-Feb period to 222.6 billion yuan (USD 34.2 billion), a much sharper drop than the 6.7 per cent fall recorded for 2015, data from the Ministry of Finance showed.
The state sector continued to face great downward pressure, the ministry said in a statement.
SOEs administered by local governments were the worst hit, with their profits plunging 40.9 per cent from a year earlier.
Centrally-administered SOEs saw profits slip 8.2 per cent year-on-year.
Total business revenue of Chinese SOEs dipped 5.8 per cent year-on-year to 6.2 trillion yuan in the first two months, the ministry said.
By the end of February, combined debts of the state firms swelled by 17.9 per cent to 79.7 trillion yuan, while their total assets expanded 15.6 per cent to 120.3 trillion yuan.
State firms in medical and machinery sectors posted relatively high profit growth, while oil, coal, steel and non-ferrous metals continued to suffer losses, state-run Xinhua news agency reported.
The figures, which exclude financial firms, were collected from SOEs in 36 provincial-level regions and those administered by the central government.
China has about 150,000 SOEs, and some have become ossified by declining profitability due to a lack of competition and an industrial glut.
The government is trying to improve their fortunes through reform, moving toward mixed ownership and market-oriented management in the hope that this will improve their efficiency.
The Chinese economy, the world’s second-largest, last year slowed down to 6.9 per cent, the lowest in 26 years.
Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Chinese state firms’ profits slump due to economic slowdown - PTI
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Xi’s visit set to draw Central Europe in Belt and Road plan - Atul Aneja, The Hindu
China is set to unveil another offshoot of its One Belt One Road (OBOR) connectivity network by investing in a Grand Canal that would link landlocked countries of Central Europe with the sea.
If everything goes according to plans, Chinese President Xi Jinping will push for the construction of the Danube-Oder-Elbe Canal, during his visit next week to the Czech Republic. The strategic canal -- a pet project of Czech President Milos Zeman -- would connect three major European rivers and provide ships, an outlet to the sea. The Y-shaped canal would link with the North Sea at Hamburg. The Black Sea would be accessed at the Romanian port of Constanta, and Poland’s Szczecin port would provide an outreach to the Baltic Sea.
OBOR gathering pace in Eurasia
The construction of the Grand Canal would see the merger of the land and the maritime hubs of OBOR, which is rapidly advancing in Eurasia.
In comments attributed to Vojtech Filip, vice-chairman of the Czech parliament, the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported that China and the Czech Republic would be involved in joint funding, pooling in 1 billion Euros for the phase-1 of the project.
‘Will help revive ancient Silk Road’
A write-up in the China’s state-run People’s Daily had earlier acknowledged that President Xi’s visit, which begins on Monday, would yield more opportunities to implement the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) — both integral parts of China’s OBOR for the revival of the ancient Silk Road.
The daily pointed out that Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are docking their development strategies with the OBOR, covered by a jointly developed mid-term cooperation plan. China has targeted infrastructure development in the CEE countries — its intent evident from its focus on constructing the flagship Belgrade-to-Budapest high speed railway.
Piraeus as China’s trade hub
Once completed, the rail upgrade will dovetail with the Chinese plan to refurbish Greece's main port of Piraeus. Linked with the CEE railway, Piraeus would become the hub of China’s trade with Europe, along a land-cum-sea corridor.
China’s foray in CEE countries is part of a Beijing-centered exercise to draw the economies of Europe into the OBOR framework. Already, top European icons, including Germany, France and Britain, defying pressures from the United States, have become members of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The 57-nation lender is primed to fund infrastructure projects in Asia, which can easily integrate with the OBOR plan.
‘Starved Europe needs the investment’
“Economically unstable, Europe is struggling for recovery. Therefore it has a strong need of the Chinese market and investment,” says Cui Hongjian, head of the Institute of European Studies of Chinese Academy of Social Science.
With the CEE countries in focus, China has joined the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) — a lender that was established primarily to fund the Eastern Europe economies after the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991.
People’s Daily is pointing out that after his visit to the Czech Republic, Mr. Xi would have already covered “new” and “old” Europe, having already visited Britain, France, Germany Netherlands, Belgium as well as the European Union headquarters, over the past two years.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Over 100 Chinese boats spotted off Sarawak, says KL - Straits Times
Malaysia has said that more than 100 Chinese fishing boats have been spotted within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off Sarawak and it planned to take action against them.
The boats were sighted near Beting Patinggi Ali, also known as Luconia Shoals, about 100km off the coast of Miri in Sarawak.
The shoals are near the southern extreme of China's so-called nine- dash line, according to previous media reports. China is claiming territories inside the nine-dash line which spans 90 per cent of the 3.5 million sq km South China Sea.
Malaysia's Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Shahidan Kassim disclosed on Thursday that the government had dispatched three Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) vessels to the area. He did not specify what action would be taken. "Our Bombardier aircraft has also been sent to fly to that area where they saw a group of fishermen from China conducting activities in our waters," Datuk Seri Shahidan told reporters.
He could not be reached yesterday, while a senior MMEA official declined to comment.
The incident comes on the heels of another near Indonesia's Natuna Islands last Saturday. Jakarta said a Chinese patrol boat forcibly prevented Indonesian maritime authorities from detaining a Chinese fishing boat allegedly poaching in Indonesian waters. Eight crew members of the Chinese fishing boat were detained by Indonesia.
China maintained that the fishing boat was "in traditional Chinese fishing grounds".
Asked about the Malaysian report at a regular briefing yesterday, China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said he did not "understand the details" of what the Malaysian government had said on the matter. "What I want to point out is that now is the fishing season in the South China Sea... At this time of year, every year, Chinese trawlers are in the relevant waters carrying out normal fishing activities," Reuters quoted him as saying. He did not elaborate.
Malaysia has for years kept a low profile despite being a claimant in the dispute over contested territory in the South China Sea. But it can no longer afford to downplay incidents at sea involving Chinese vessels, according to Mr Ian Storey, a specialist in regional maritime security issues at Singapore's Iseas-Yusof Ishak Institute.
"Over the past few years, Kuala Lumpur has become increasingly irritated with China's growing military and commercial presence in the country's EEZ," he said. He believed the number of incidents between the Chinese Coast Guard and Malaysian and Indonesian maritime authorities would increase as fish stocks get depleted in northern areas of the South China Sea.
"Beijing and the provincial authorities have encouraged fishing fleets to operate much farther south than before in order to satisfy the growing demand for seafood in China," he said. Mr Storey said port facilities that China is building in the Spratlys will enable its Coast Guard to enforce Beijing's jurisdictional claims.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Perilous fishing in troubled waters - Straits Times
The spat between Indonesia and China over the South-east Asian nation's actions to intercept a Chinese fishing vessel poaching in its exclusive economic zone, and Malaysia's startling announcement yesterday that it was monitoring the intrusion of 100 Chinese fishing boats in its waters guarded by two Chinese coast guard ships, have again raised worry over the behaviour of Asia's dominant power.
On March 19, when the Indonesian vessel detained the Chinese trawler and was towing it towards land, a Chinese coast guard ship appeared and sought to reclaim the boat. However, Indonesia succeeded in bringing in the eight poachers and has vowed to prosecute them.
For the moment, Indonesia, after going public with the spat, is reining in its reaction even as it is incensed by China saying its boat was operating in "traditional fishing grounds". Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has emphasised the good ties between her country and China. She also has clarified, after initial rumblings of taking China to international tribunals, that "Indonesia is not a party to the South China Sea dispute, so we are asking for a clarification about the incident". Those words, however, do not preclude future steps that the archipelagic nation may take to defend its interests. Malaysia, on the other hand, has hinted at possible legal action.
China should ponder what sort of relationship it seeks with South-east Asia. Having upset an arc of Asean states in its periphery - Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia - with its island-building on territory it controversially occupies, it is now at risk of roiling ties with Asean's largest nation. Beijing's clarification last November that it had no claim on Indonesia's Natuna Islands had appeared to soothe nerves in Jakarta, but last weekend's actions off the Natunas, and the presence of its boats in Malaysia's economic zone, seem to suggest that it does not recognise exclusive economic zones where they overlap with China's claimed nine-dash line. Asean states have also noted that Chinese trawlers have been caught as far afield as in Argentinian waters, raising tensions there too.
Indonesian President Joko Widodo's maritime fulcrum vision is centred on the upholding of national sovereignty. Wiping out the poaching of ocean stock is a core domestic element of that policy, hence the high-profile sinking of poaching vessels, which raised some eyebrows around the region. China's actions embarrass a leader who has been studiously neutral on the South China Sea dispute and compel him to adopt a more forceful line, or risk looking weak.
Mr Joko would doubtless be aware that in Malaysia, the Defence Minister spoke recently of the need to start "pushing back" at China. Chinese President Xi Jinping should know he is not the only leader who has to counter nationalist forces at home. These same groups would be the first to lament if the hope of a rising Asian century is blown out of the water.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
It is not surprising that China has been caught poaching in the EEZ waters of Indonesia and when challenged by the Indonesian Coast Guard, sent in a PLAN patrol boat to threaten the Indonesians.
The MSR initiative has to be seen in a larger context. For long, the Chinese strategic thinkers had given greater emphasis on a blue-water navy as the most important weapon, even above the possession of nuclear weapons. With the rapid building up of their naval force with such platforms as the Jin-class SSBNs with their 12000 KM range JL-2 ballistic missiles which have just started patrolling the seas, the conclusion of building the aircraft carrier, and the incremental presence of the PLAN in the Indian and Pacific oceans, the Chinese feel that they now have the muscle to exploit the navy for economic, diplomatic, strategic and military purposes. The MSR is a well-disguised attempt to achieve these objectives. In October 2013, during Xi Jinping’s visit to Indonesia, he invited that country to be part of MSR. If the US talks of Indo-Pacific, the Chinese want to demonstrate that they have a larger presence in both these oceans. It is on the basis if this new-found maritime strength that the Chinese leadership led by Xi Jinping is pursuing an ‘active foreign policy’. China wants to be able to dominate in the sea in the area it calls as the ‘First Island Chain’, a chain stretching from Japan to Indonesia. In c. 2014, PLAN conducted naval exercises close to Indonesia in eastern Indian Ocean quietly.
The MSR initiative has to be seen in a larger context. For long, the Chinese strategic thinkers had given greater emphasis on a blue-water navy as the most important weapon, even above the possession of nuclear weapons. With the rapid building up of their naval force with such platforms as the Jin-class SSBNs with their 12000 KM range JL-2 ballistic missiles which have just started patrolling the seas, the conclusion of building the aircraft carrier, and the incremental presence of the PLAN in the Indian and Pacific oceans, the Chinese feel that they now have the muscle to exploit the navy for economic, diplomatic, strategic and military purposes. The MSR is a well-disguised attempt to achieve these objectives. In October 2013, during Xi Jinping’s visit to Indonesia, he invited that country to be part of MSR. If the US talks of Indo-Pacific, the Chinese want to demonstrate that they have a larger presence in both these oceans. It is on the basis if this new-found maritime strength that the Chinese leadership led by Xi Jinping is pursuing an ‘active foreign policy’. China wants to be able to dominate in the sea in the area it calls as the ‘First Island Chain’, a chain stretching from Japan to Indonesia. In c. 2014, PLAN conducted naval exercises close to Indonesia in eastern Indian Ocean quietly.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Donald Trump says Japan and South Korea could have their own nuclear weapons
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/worl ... 568293.cms
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/worl ... 568293.cms
Donald Trump has said he is open to the idea of both Japan and South Korea developing their own nuclear deterrents and would like to withdraw US troops from their soil.
In perhaps his most detailed explanation yet about his foreign policy plans if he were to be elected president, Mr Trump told a US newspaper that allowing the two countries to do this would reduce pressure on the US to come to their defence every time North Korea acted aggressively. He also said he would consider stopping oil purchases from Saudi Arabia unless the Saudi government provided troops to fight Isis.There'll be a point at which we're just not going to be able to do it any more. Now, does that mean nuclear? It could mean nuclear," Mr Trump, the front-runner for the Republican presidential nomination, told the New York Times.Mr Trump said the US "cannot be the policeman of the world" and suggested that Tokyo and Seoul would move to develop their own weapons regardless, if the US continued along what he described as a path of "weakness"."Would I rather have North Korea have [nuclear weapons] with Japan sitting there having them also? You may very well be better off if that's the case," Mr Trump said. "If Japan had that nuclear threat, I'm not sure that would be a bad thing for us."During the extensive interview, Mr Trump was asked about halting oil purchases from US allies unless they provided on-the-ground forces against Isis. "The answer is, probably yes," he said.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
http://scroll.in/article/805735/is-nepa ... t-dream-on
Will China risk India investments by overplaying its hand in Nepal?
Will China risk India investments by overplaying its hand in Nepal?
Unsurprisingly, Kathmandu press is rife with speculation that Delhi is preparing for another phase of confrontation and is priming up the Madhesi leaders.Indeed, South Block’s reaction to the hugely successful visit by Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli to China suggests that Delhi is in a punishing mood. When asked about Oli’s visit to China and the growing Sino-Nepali ties, the South Block spokesman snapped back:“Nepal as a land-locked country is free to explore any practical option it wants. But our (India’s) relations with Nepal have their own natural logic. Now, we are not in the comparison business. And even if you are, do ask yourself, is there any other country in the world which can have the kind of relationship that Nepal has with India?”The spokesman is spot on. Nepal is critically dependent on Delhi’s goodwill. But where he possibly misses the point is that the “comparison business” is not so irrelevant. The point is, what is it that draws comparison? If it is about trade or economic linkages, who can indeed compete with India on the Nepali turf? The facts speak for themselves. To quote the spokesman:“
Suffice it to say, if Delhi edges closer to the United States-led containment strategy against China, it had better expect a reciprocal Chinese reaction in India’s neighbourhood. So far China has been single-mindedly pursuing self-interests. But that may be changing.China may make the enterprise profitable for itself in business or commercial terms but the political objective will still be to bring about a new strategic balance whereby Nepal would have the resilience to stand up to Indian “bullying”.Nepal understands what China is trying to do – not to pit it against India but instead strengthen its capacity to safeguard its sovereignty and stand up to India. That is why Oli called China an “all-weather friend”, invoking for the first time a loaded expression that is characteristic of the China-Pakistan alliance.Oli signalled a subtle geopolitical shift. Significantly, Nepal’s army chief Gen. Rajendra Chhetri is going on a week-long trip to China next week no sooner than Oli returns to Kathmandu.China is unlikely to push the envelope too far too fast and risk a backlash from India. Nepal’s stability and development is very important for Beijing, since it impacts Tibet’s security. But then, China doesn’t have to be in a hurry. Time works in China’s favour.
Below the radar China has also established contacts with the Madhesis, consistent with its approach to cultivate all political constituencies in the country. China’s influence among the power brokers in Nepali politics today is such that it becomes a factor of stability for the uneasy coalition that Oli heads.To be sure, China has astutely exploited to its advantage the recent tensions in India-Nepal relations but that is only part of the story. But the conclusion becomes unavoidable that the animus that is appearing lately in China’s Nepal policies is a signal of its displeasure over India’s own unfriendly policies toward China during the past one-year period.A combative edge has appeared in the India’s China policies since the beginning of last year. Delhi has not bothered to maintain the careful balance between competition and cooperation in the relations with China, which the United Progressive Alliance government managed to keep.There is much greater willingness on the part of the present government to identify with the USA’s rebalancing act in Asia-Pacific, so much so that senior Pentagon officials voice confidence that in a near future the US and India will undertake joint patrols of the disputed South China Sea, in areas over which China claims sovereignty.Meanwhile, the upgrade of the US-Japan-India trilateral format, the strengthening of India’s military ties with Vietnam, and likelihood of the signing of the ‘foundational agreements’ between the US and India – all these reflect a new openness on the part of India to identify with the US’ containment strategy against China.On the other hand, there is no visible interest in Delhi to promote cooperation with China. Trade and investment with China is not a priority for Delhi. India has blindly copied Japan’s negativism toward China’s “One Belt One Road” initiatives instead of testing them or using them as means to stimulate investment and improve connectivity or strengthen regional security and stability.Simply put, the present government is simply uninterested in exploring the potentials of cooperation with China. However, there is precious little Washington (or Japan) can do to help Delhi if the competition between India and China degenerates into rivalry. Therefore, Nepal becomes a crucial test case where India’s diplomatic skills come under severe challenge.Interestingly, China has ensured that Nepal was admitted last week as a “Dialogue Partner” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation just before India’s formal accession as a full member is complete. A commentary on Oli’s visit in the Chinese communist party tabloid Global Times pointed out that Nepal is “subsumed” by the Indian economy, which has become “a small economy closest to the dominant power in the South Asian economic circle”, whereas the ties between China and Nepal “do not belong to the India-dominated South Asian economic circle”.Beyond a point, the argument that Nepal is too small a fry for Beijing to antagonise Delhi and jeopardise its stakes in the Indian market does not hold water. The bottom line is that India’s pivot to the South China Sea affects China’s core interests. And China will get the message across to Delhi that such a course is extremely unwise and will not serve India’s vital interests.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Japan opens radar station close to disputed East China Sea islands
http://in.reuters.com/article/japan-chi ... NKCN0WU05M
http://in.reuters.com/article/japan-chi ... NKCN0WU05M
Japan on Monday will switch on a radar station in the East China Sea, giving it a permanent intelligence gathering post close to Taiwan and a group of disputed islands claimed by both Tokyo and Beijing.The new Self Defence Force base on Yonaguni is at the western extreme of a string of Japanese islands in the East China Sea, 150 km (93 miles) south of the disputed islands known as the Senkaku islands in Japan and the Diaoyu in China."This radar station is going to irritate China," said Nozomu Yoshitomi, a professor at Nihon University and a former major general in the Self Defence Force.In addition to being a listening post, the facility could be used a base for military operations in the region, he added.Policy makers last year told Reuters it was part of a strategy to keep China at bay in the Western Pacific as Beijing gains control of the neighbouring South China Sea.Toshi Yoshihara, a U.S. Naval War College professor, said Yonaguni sits next to two potential flash points in Asia - Taiwan and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands."A network of overlapping radar sites along the island chain would boost Japan's ability to monitor the East China Sea," he added.Yonaguni is only around 100 km (62 miles) east of Taiwan, near the edge of a controversial air defence identification zone set up by China in 2013.Over the next five years, Japan will increase its Self-Defense Forces in the East China Sea by about a fifth to almost 10,000 personnel, including missile batteries that will help Japan draw a defensive curtain along the island chain.Chinese ships sailing from their eastern seaboard must pass through this barrier to reach the Western Pacific, access to which Beijing needs both as a supply line to the rest of the world's oceans and for naval power projection.To mark the start of operations, Japan's military will hold an opening ceremony on Monday. The 30 sq km (11 sq mile) outcrop is home to 1,500 people, who mostly raise cattle and grow sugar cane. The SDF contingent and their families will increase the population by a fifth.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China's activities in South China Sea may pose threat to trade routes: US - PTI
China's activities in the disputed South China Sea are "destabilising" and may pose a threat to commercial trade routes in the region, a top US military general has said, asserting that such developments could erode America's "competitive advantage" in Asia.
"In the South China Sea, Chinese activity is destabilising and could pose a threat to commercial trade routes," General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said before the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a top American think-tank.
"While our exercise of freedom of navigation provides some assurance to our allies and partners, it hasn't stopped the Chinese from developing military capabilities in the South China Sea, to include on territories where there is a contested claim of sovereignty," Dunford said yesterday.
Noting that the US policy emphasises on opportunities to cooperate with regard to China, Dunford said the Pentagon was closely tracking China's rapid military modernisation, its expanded presence in Asia and increased military presence outside of Asia.
"While Chinese military investments, capability development and intentions are opaque, it's clear they're investing in a manner that balances requirements for large conventional forces, a growing navy, an increasingly sophisticated air force and advancements in nuclear, space and cyberspace," Dunford said.
"These developments, over time could erode our competitive advantage in Asia and they certainly will challenge our ability to assure access in a fight," he said.
Dunford said the US is now confronted with simultaneous challenges from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and violent extremism.
"The threat from the Islamic violent extremism is certainly the most pressing challenge we face right now," he said,adding that the Russian military presents the greatest array of threats to US interest.
"Despite declining population, shrinking economy, Russia has made a significant investment in military capabilities," he said.
Dunford said the dreaded ISIS is clearly a transregional threat and the US was looking for an opportunity to address the wider challenge.
"While the fight against ISIL dominates the headlines, we also continue to face an extremist challenge in the homeland and our interest in South Asia," he said.
"From my perspective, the constant pressure we put on al Qaeda in that region over the past 14 years has prevented another 9/11, but the threat has not been eliminated - and of course, I'm talking about largely the Afghanistan-Pakistan region," Dunford said.
Pitching for an effective counterterrorism partner and platform in Afghanistan," Dunford said while the focus had been on al Qaeda, the recent rise of the IS in the Khorasan has further complicated the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
India has become a key player in Indo-Pacific region: US - PTI
India has become a key player and an important partner in advancing maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region and there was an "unprecedented" US-India cooperation to protect freedom of navigation for all nations, a top American diplomat has said.
"As a regional power that is committed to advancing the rules-based international order, India has become a key player and an important partner in advancing maritime security in the Indo-Pacific," Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Nisha Desai Biswal told a Washington audience.
"As such, our bilateral cooperation is increasingly taking on trilateral and multilateral aspects," Biswal said yesterday at the Centre for a New American Security, a US think-tank.
Biswal's remarks come just ahead of the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's to the US this week. Modi will lead the Indian delegation at the Nuclear Security Summit hosted by President Barack Obama on March 31 and April 1.
"The high-level engagements between our two countries since May of 2014 include six at the leader-level, including the Nuclear Security Summit this week, and we could well see more before the end of the administration," Biswal said.
The area of greatest potential, however, is in maritime security, especially as the US engage in an unprecedented cooperation with India, the region's largest maritime power.
Nearly 90 per cent of global trade relies on maritime shipping and the Indian Ocean is the super-highway for much of this commerce. From 1992 to 2012, the average ships in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea jumped by over 300 per cent.
She said as the Asian economies continue to rise, so will the need for greater maritime security in Indo-Pacific region.
"We have seen in other maritime areas that tensions emerge when countries seek to advance competing territorial claims through unilateral actions. But the Bay of Bengal presents a more optimistic example, one where a dominant power worked with its neighbors to amicably resolve claims through international arbitration," Biswal said. Last year, US's annual naval exercise with India, MALABAR, included ships from Japan's world-class navy, and maritime security was a central focus of inaugural US-India-Japan ministerial in New York last September, she said.
And last summer, for the first time Indian vessels joined the US, China, and 20 other nations in the RIMPAC exercise, the world's largest international maritime exercise.
"Through the US-India Defence Technology and Trade Initiative, for the first time ever we're working together with another country on its indigenous aircraft carrier development programme. In the not-too-distant future, we hope to see the day when the US and Indian navies, including our aircraft carriers, are cooperating on the high seas, protecting freedom of navigation for all nations," she said.
The top US diplomat said there is no question that a rising India, now the world's fastest-growing large economy, is and will continue to be the engine of South Asia's growth.
"But India is certainly not the only game in town," she noted.
Bangladesh, with its two decades-long streak of about 6 per cent growth per year, is on track to become a top-thirty economy by 2030. Sri Lanka may benefit as it is a strategic maritime gateway to some of the largest markets in Asia.
"Much of the focus has been on the economic partnership, and while there continue to be challenges, we have seen a dramatic rise in US investment in India, which today outpaces US investment in China. In parallel, we have elevated our commercial relationship with India by inaugurating a Strategic and Commercial Dialogue and revitalizing the CEO Forum," she said.
Defence trade between the two nations has increased substantially, from USD 300 million over a decade ago to close to USD 14 billion.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/doe ... lies-15634
Does China Need Allies?
It may be time for Beijing to rethink its reluctant partnerships
Does China Need Allies?
It may be time for Beijing to rethink its reluctant partnerships
At a conference in China recently, a Chinese scholar seated next to me made the following ominous comment: “The United States is building up its alliances to surround and contain China. But China can also build up alliances to counter the United States.Further evidence of an intensifying debate in Beijing foreign policy circles is a December 2015 article in the important Chinese journal Chinese Foreign Policy.Xu begins his argument with the bold statement that “Looking around the world since 1648, there has never been another single great power that pursued a policy of rejecting alliances” (不结盟). He admits that this policy frequently affords Beijing greater flexibility, but he also believes that China may be viewed by certain countries as “evading responsibility” and “unreliable.” He then proceeds to outline several misconceptions that he claims are held by the Chinese foreign policy elite with respect to alliances.
A fourth assumption that Xu attributes to the conventional rejection in Chinese foreign policy of alliances is the notion that seeking out alliances represents a weakening of national sovereignty, with a commensurate loss of flexibility. He suggests that even in the close alliance between Tokyo and Washington, the United States has retained significant flexibility, as demonstrated by Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to China in 1971 or by Washington’s somewhat “murky strategy” (模糊战略) toward defending the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu islets. Xu ultimately concedes, however, that a price may indeed have to be paid in terms of flexibility and sovereignty. He argues that sometimes circumstances are such that “two countries understand that if each depends only on their own capacities, there would be no possibility for them to realize the goal of seeking gain and avoiding harm. He then states emphatically that Russia and Pakistan have a certain friendly and helpful disposition toward China, while Japan and Philippines certainly do not. He then warns: “Countries that are engaged in strategic confrontation with China should not be treated with kindness.” An implication of this argument may well be a more realist, hard-headed disposition in Beijing, which could even entail the formation of new, countervailing alliances.In a final demonstration of intellectual boldness, this Chinese scholar calls on Chinese foreign policy elites to study Western practice with respect to alliance formation. He observes: “From now on, China has to study how to lead other people. Leading the world, however, is no easy feat. In that respect, we had better study the experience of the British and the Americans.” He further states that “as an alliance leader, the United States was quite a bit more lenient than the Soviet Union, and its leadership practice proved wiser.”
Re: China blocking yet again India's efforts on counterterro
China again blocks India's bid at UN to ban JeM chief Masood Azhar - PTI
During Home Minister Rajnath Singh's visit to China last November, the emphasis was on counter-terror. The below was posted on November 20, 2015. Even then, one wondered whether it was one-way with China demanding India to target the Tibetan exiles in India. China's true intentions have been made known yet again now. The Chinese words would always ring hollow.In a dramatic move, China has once again blocked India' bid at the UN to ban JeM chief Masood Azhar, the mastermind of the Pathankot terror attack.
According to highly placed sources here, just hours before the deadline earlier on Thursday, China requested the UN Committee, which is considering a ban on the chief of the Pakistan-based terror outfit Jaish-e-Mohammad(JeM), to keep on hold the designation.
After the attack on the IAF base at Pathankot on January 2, India in February wrote to the UN calling for immediate action to list Azhar under the al-Qaida Sanctions Committee.
The submission was armed with strong evidence of the outfit's terror activities and its role in the Pathankot attack that killed seven Indian military personnel.
India also told the UN Sanctions Committee that not listing Azhar would expose it and other countries in South Asia to threats from the terror group and its leader.
The India submission was considered by the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED) for technical aspects of the evidence provided. The technical team then with the support of the US, UK and France had sent it to all the members, sources said.
All were told that if there are no objections the designation will be announced after the expiry of the deadline, the sources said.
"However, hours before the deadline, China requested the Committee to hold up the banning of the JeM chief," the sources said.
According to other government sources, the Chinese action was in "consultation" with Pakistan, which is not on the UN Committee.
The UN had banned JeM in 2001 but India's efforts to ban Azhar after the Mumbai terror attack also did not fructify as China, one of the five permanent members of the UN group with veto powers, didn't allow the ban apparently at the behest of Pakistan again.
SSridhar wrote:India and China link Home Ministries to counter terror - Atul Aneja, The HinduIndia and China have decided to establish a ministerial mechanism that would, for the first time, link the two home ministries, filling a vital gap in the overall institutional architecture of the bilateral ties. . . . Mr. Singh also called upon Prime Minister Li Keqiang, and both leaders agreed that there was a need to “upgrade” the security collaboration between New Delhi and Beijing to the next level. . . The two sides also discussed counter-terror collaboration at length, in the backdrop of the Paris attacks, and other events, including the killing of a Chinese hostage in Syria by the Islamic State. Briefing the resident Indian media, in the presence of Mr. Singh, India’s Ambassador to China Ashok Kantha said a decision was taken on “an exchange of information on terrorist activities, terrorist groups and linkages” — widely seen as an agreement on “intelligence sharing” by the security authorities of the two countries. . . .“We will [also] coordinate our positions in regional and multilateral forums.” . . . Mr. Kantha later told The Hindu that both sides “agreed that the terrorism had now to be combated at the international level, and both sides would be working in that direction.” At the media conference, he pointed out that a two-tier structure has been established to steer ties between the Home Ministry and the Ministry of Public Security of China.
The two ministers — Mr. Singh and Mr. Guo — will head this mechanism. They will be assisted by a “working-level group”, led by a Joint Secretary from the Ministry of Home Affairs, and an officer of the rank of Director General from the Ministry of Public Security.
The new mechanism will provide an institutional platform that will cover all issues that impact on the “internal security” of the two countries.
Mr. Singh’s talks on Thursday also yielded consensus on a “framework agreement” as the basis for upgrading security ties.
“We have agreed to work towards a new bilateral agreement which will provide contours of cooperation in counter-terrorism, security, and related trans-border crimes,” Mr. Kantha said.
The tempo on counter-terrorism between the two countries has been growing since the Paris attacks, as the high-level interaction between India and China gets its second wind. At a meeting in New Delhi on Monday between Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and China’s Vice-Chairman of the powerful Central Military Commission, Fan Changlong, the two sides called “for cooperation in fighting terrorism,” China Military Online, a website run by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reported, citing the Paris attacks.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/ ... HiDpK.html
India must join the US, Japan and Australia to contain China’s adventurism
India must join the US, Japan and Australia to contain China’s adventurism
Harris also announced that the next set of naval exercises in the trilateral annual Malabar series, comprising India, Japan and the US, will be held in the northern Philippine Sea, close to the South China Sea. The Chinese perceive such efforts as attempts to gang up on them and, therefore, their reaction was fast and furious. A spokesperson of China’s foreign ministry said, “We urge the US government to put some restraint on them (US commanders) and stop them from irresponsible sensationalism and hyping up so as to avoid undermining regional peace and stability.”China senses the emergence of a security vacuum in the Indo-Pacific and is rushing to fill it. Beijing has discarded Deng Xiaoping’s 24-character strategy to “hide our capacity and bide our time”. It has dropped the phrase “peaceful rise” while referring to its economic growth and military assertiveness.China has deep internal fault lines. Its rapid economic growth, now slowing, has been uneven and non-inclusive. There is a deep sense of resentment of the Communist Party for the denial of basic freedoms. The discontent could boil over and lead to an uncontrollable spontaneous implosion. David Shambaugh, a well-known China scholar, is among those in the China-may-implode school. The recent crash of Chinese stock markets and their continuing volatility point to the possibility of a meltdown.Most Asian leaders are apprehensive of China’s intentions and worry that it may behave irresponsibly somewhere in the Indo-Pacific. It could decide to intervene militarily in the South China Sea, or to occupy one or more of the disputed Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands or decide to resolve the remaining territorial disputes, like that with India, by using military force. Though President Xi Jinping has denied plans to ‘militarise’ the South China Sea, surely China is not building air strips there to fly in Japanese tourists.
India must join the US and other strategic partners, such as Australia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam, to establish a cooperative security framework for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and for the security of the global commons — air space, space, cyber space and the sea-lanes of communication — to enable freedom of navigation and free flow of trade. If China is willing to join this security architecture it should be welcomed. However, it is unlikely to do so as it believes that ‘one mountain cannot contain two tigers’ and sees itself as the lone tiger on the Asian mountain.
US leaders have expressed their support for India’s emergence as a major power several times. They have said the US is committed “to help India become a major world power in the 21st century”. President Barack Obama declared in 2010 that “India is not just a rising power, it has already risen”.
The US hopes India will soon become a “net provider of security” in the region. The expectations include India joining international counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation efforts; sharing intelligence; upholding the rules and norms governing maritime trade; providing help to the littoral states to meet their security needs; helping to counter piracy and narcotics trafficking; and, continuing to taking the lead in humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) operations in the region. All of these expectations are unexceptionable and India has been contributing extensively to achieving these common goals.
India must not hesitate to intervene militarily in conjunction with its strategic partners if its vital national interests are threatened in its area of strategic interest. This extends from the South China Sea in the east to the Horn of Africa in the west. India would prefer to intervene under a UN flag but may join a coalition of the willing in case consensus is difficult to achieve in the UN Security Council. India must develop robust tri-Service capabilities for military intervention.[/b]Indo-US defence cooperation, a key component of the strategic partnership, must be enhanced to take it to the next higher trajectory to enable the two countries to undertake joint threat assessment; contingency planning for joint operations; sharing of intelligence; simulations and table-top exercises — besides training exercises with troops; coordination of command, control and communications; and, planning for operational deployment and logistics support. All of these activities must be undertaken in concert with India’s other strategic partners in Asia.Only when a cooperative security framework is in place will the India-US strategic partnership realise its true potential as a force for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Kiren Rijiju slams China for blocking India's bid to ban Masood Azhar - PTI
Union Minister Kiren Rijiju today slammed China for blocking India's bid at the UN for a ban on Pakistan-based terror group Jaish-e-Mohammud chief Masood Azhar, saying the government will take appropriate action.
"What China has done (in the UN), was not good. Ministry of External Affairs will take an appropriate action. Whatever action is required, we will take," he told reporters here [New Delhi] when asked about yesterday's development at the United Nations.
The Union Minister of State for Home hails from Arunachal Pradesh bordering China.
Yesterday, China had requested the UN Committee, which is considering a ban on the JeM chief, to keep on hold the designation.
After the terror attack on the Pathankot airbase on January 2, India in February wrote to the UN calling for immediate action to list Azhar under the Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee.
The submission was armed with strong evidence of the outfit's terror activities and its role in the Pathankot attack that killed seven Indian military personnel.
India also told the UN Sanctions Committee that not listing Azhar would expose it and other countries in South Asia to threats from the terror group and its leader.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Pavlovian conditioning and 'correct thinking' on the South China Sea - Bilahari Kausikan, Straits Times
This is an excerpt of a speech by veteran diplomat Bilahari Kausikan organised by the Institute of Policy Studies on Wednesday. This is his third lecture in the IPS-Nathan Lecture series. In the lecture, he examines the impact of US-China competition on Asean. In the extract below, he gives his reading of what has spurred China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea in recent years.
This is an excerpt of a speech by veteran diplomat Bilahari Kausikan organised by the Institute of Policy Studies on Wednesday. This is his third lecture in the IPS-Nathan Lecture series. In the lecture, he examines the impact of US-China competition on Asean. In the extract below, he gives his reading of what has spurred China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea in recent years.
On a global scale, China is not a clearly revisionist power. But Beijing wants to reclaim something of its historical centrality in East Asia. The United States has emphasised that it intends to remain an East Asian power.
The strategic challenge for China is therefore how to shift the US from the very centre of the East Asian strategic equation and occupy that space, but without provoking responses from the US and Japan that could jeopardise Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule. For the US the strategic challenge is how to accommodate China, while reassuring friends and allies that it intends to hold its position without stumbling into conflict.
The South China Sea (SCS) is not the only issue in US-China relations; it is perhaps not even the most important issue in their relationship. But the SCS is today the issue where the parameters of US-China competition and their interests are most clearly defined. Like it or not, the region will draw conclusions about American resolve {There was some serious concern about that last year which probably prompted the American Navy to to intensify operations in the Indo-China Sea} and Chinese intentions from the SCS issue, which will also shape perceptions of Asean.
It would be tedious to recount every instance of China's use of force or unilateral assertions of sovereignty backed by the threat of force in the SCS. In 2012, China established Sansha City under Hainan Province, with jurisdiction over the disputed Paracels and Spratly Islands as well as Macclesfield Bank. The following year, it promulgated the Hainan Fishing Regulations, which were an assertion of domestic law over contested areas. China has since become more aggressive in enforcing what it considers its domestic rights in the SCS.
Since 2013, China has begun an ambitious programme of land reclamation in the SCS, has constructed various kinds of structures on the new artificial islands and deployed military assets on some of them. China has argued that it was not the first to reclaim land or deploy military assets in the SCS. This may be true but is irrelevant.
The speed and scope of China's reclamation dwarf anything any other claimant has done and the actions of a major power will always convey a different signature than those of small countries. China's argument that the infrastructure it has built is a common good for the benefit of all users of the SCS hardly seems intended to be believed.
China continues to engage Asean on a code of conduct (COC) for the SCS but in a barely convincing way. Progress has been glacial and Chinese diplomats often hold discussions on the COC hostage to Asean refraining from taking positions on the SCS that displease China. On occasion, Chinese diplomats even seem to have perversely gone out of their way to accentuate rather than assuage anxieties.
Once, after our Prime Minister spoke on the SCS at an Asean Summit, a senior Chinese diplomat told one of my younger colleagues that "silence is golden". If he meant to suggest that we were not entitled to a view on an important issue that affects our interests, he only undermined the credibility of China's claim to "peaceful development".
This was not an isolated incident nor has Singapore been particularly singled out. China routinely attempts to pressure Asean members, with varying degrees of success, not to raise the SCS in Asean-led forums or not to support other countries which do so.
DIPLOMACY, CHINESE STYLE
The general attitude that such attempts illustrate is not confined to the SCS issue but sometimes is on display even in seemingly trivial matters. Some years before I retired, one of my counterparts from an Asean country that was then holding the Asean chair told me that the Chinese ambassador to his country had forced him to shift an Asean leader attending a summit out of a hotel that had already been allocated to that Asean delegation so that then Premier Wen Jiabao could stay there. The ambassador insisted on this although the hotel allocated to Premier Wen was of equal quality. Did Premier Wen know where he was staying?
Would he have cared if he had known? But the episode certainly left a deep impression on my counterpart and no doubt on the Asean delegation that was forced to move as well.
Chinese diplomats often profess bewilderment that China's generosity towards Asean has not evoked gratitude or assuaged mistrust, and they pretend to ascribe this to malignant external influences. I do not think that Chinese diplomats are more inept or disingenuous than the diplomats of other countries. Their behaviour is, I think, better understood as illustrating the passive-aggressive style and the positing of false dilemmas to force acceptance of China's inherent superiority as the natural normative order of East Asian international relations - or at least South-east Asian international relations because I doubt that Japan will ever accept the Chinese notion of regional order characteristic of Chinese diplomacy.
Chinese diplomacy constantly hammers home the idea that if bilateral ties or Asean-China relations suffer because Asean stubbornly insists on speaking up on the SCS even when our mouths are stuffed with delicious Chinese cake, or because the Chinese Premier has to stay in one hotel rather than another, or if some date they propose for a meeting cannot be agreed on because it is inconvenient for Asean, it is our fault and ours alone.
China does not merely want consideration of its interests. China expects deference to its interests to be internalised by Asean members as a mode of thought; as not just a correct calculation of Asean interests vis-a-vis China but "correct thinking: which leads to "correct behaviour". Foreign policy calculations are subject to continual revision; correct thinking is a permanent part of the sub-conscious. This differentiates Chinese diplomacy from the diplomacy of other major powers and represents a melding of Westphalian diplomatic practice with ancient Chinese statecraft.
The very triviality of the behaviour China sometimes tries to impose underscores the cast of mind it seeks to embed in Asean through an almost Pavlovian process of conditioning. It does not always work. It can be counterproductive. But it works often enough and well enough with at least some Asean members for China to persist.
ASEAN PUSHES BACK
Asean has begun to push back against China's assertiveness. Some Asean claimants, including Vietnam, have moved closer to the US and Japan to balance China. At its last summit with Asean, two out of three of China's proposals - the cookies that China regularly doles out at such events - failed to gain acceptance and one was accepted only after a delay. Indonesia, a non-claimant state, has expressed concern over the impact of China's claims on its exclusive economic zone in the Natunas and signalled its intention to deploy some of its most advanced military assets there. But whatever their concerns, there is a limit to which an Asean member can tilt towards the US.
No one can ignore or shun China. Vietnam is the prime example. Quite apart from the SCS disputes, Vietnam has a long and troubled history with China, but a senior Vietnamese official once told me: "Every Vietnamese leader must be able to stand up to China and get along with China. If anyone thinks this cannot be done at the same time, he doesn't deserve to be a leader." That China and Vietnam are two out of only five remaining communist systems is an additional link.
The current muddle in Malaysia over whether or not Chinese vessels had intruded into its waters - one minister said yes, but another contradicted him - perhaps illustrates the multiple and contradictory forces at play in Asean. In any case, whatever costs in relations with Asean that China may have to pay for its assertiveness in the SCS may not be considered unbearably high by Beijing as compared to the interests at stake.
CORE INTEREST: SHORING UP CCP'S LEGITIMACY
What are those interests? I doubt that control over resources of any kind figures very prominently in China's calculations on the SCS. Resources could be shared without prejudice to claims of sovereignty as China has itself suggested, although its own actions do not make any such agreement likely in the immediate future.
We can dismiss too the possibility that China is trying to strengthen its legal case. China does not even acknowledge that many areas contested by Asean claimants are in dispute. In his Singapore lecture, President Xi Jinping categorically asserted that "the South China Sea islands have been China's territory since ancient times". Uncertainty over what China's "nine-dash line" signifies has added to regional and international concerns. But China has said that it will not recognise the decisions of the arbitral tribunal on the case the Philippines brought against it under Unclos (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea), even though that would at least clarify the legal status of the "nine-dash line". Chinese diplomats have on occasion even argued that it is not in Asean's interest that China should clarify its claims.
I do not think that China considers the SCS disputes a legal matter, although it has on occasion employed the vocabulary of international law in support of its position. But that is not the same thing as recognising a legal dispute and it has not been consistent in doing so. As I pointed out in the last lecture, China has recently relied more on history to justify its claims.
Military planners must prepare for all contingencies but I doubt that China's actions in the SCS are primarily intended to gain military advantage vis-a-vis the US. In the event of a war with the US, the artificial islands and the military assets on them will be vaporised within minutes and will not affect the outcome in any significant way. In any case, as I argued in my last lecture, war between the US and China is highly improbable. Beijing has carefully kept each of its actions in the SCS below a threshold that would compel even the most reluctant of US administrations to respond kinetically. The US has made clear that while its alliance with Japan covers disputed islands in the East China Sea, the same does not apply to its alliance with the Philippines and disputed territories in the SCS.{this nuance must not be missed} War in support of America's principal East Asian ally, Japan, is credible even if unlikely; war over tiny islands, reefs and atolls would be absurd.
Even in scenarios short of war, I doubt that China really considers the deployment of military assets on these artificial islands a serious deterrent to freedom of navigation operations of the kind the US conducted last year and earlier this year. The US may become a little more cautious - it has never been reckless - but it will not stop operating in the SCS. Military assets that are unlikely to be used are at best a weak deterrent. If, for example, the People's Liberation Army sinks a US naval vessel or shoots down a US military aircraft, the US will certainly retaliate. This will confront the Chinese leadership with a very invidious choice: a token or ineffectual response will expose the hollowness of the CCP's legitimating narrative of having led the "Great Rejuvenation" of China, which will at least complicate, if not jeopardise, the CCP's hold on power; but escalation risks being forced to follow the highly jingoistic Chinese public opinion the CCP has cultivated down a path that Beijing does not really want to travel because it leads to the same outcome as the first choice. The Chinese leadership will strenuously avoid being placed in such a situation.
China's use of history to legitimise CCP rule and justify sovereignty claims gets us, I think, to the crux of the matter. For the past century, the legitimacy of any Chinese government has depended on its ability to defend China's sovereignty and preserve its borders. But what are those borders? Can the CCP meekly accept the borders imposed on a weak China that has now, to use Mao Zedong's phrase, "stood up" under communist leadership? China is not reckless but the CCP must at least give the appearance of recovering lost territory. Revanchism is an intrinsic part of the story of China's "Great Rejuvenation".
The lands lost to a weak China include what are now parts of Siberia and the Russian Far East, Mongolia, Hong Kong and Macau, and Taiwan, as well as the Paracels and Spratlys in the SCS. Siberia and the Russian Far East and Mongolia are now beyond recovery. Hong Kong and Macau reverted to Beijing's rule almost 30 years ago. The US has made clear it will not support independence for Taiwan. Without US support, independence is impossible. With that core concern assuaged, Beijing can multiply the economic threads binding Taiwan to the mainland and bide its time, confident that irrespective of internal changes and how the people of Taiwan regard themselves, Taiwan's long-term trajectory cannot run counter to China's interest. Changing the status quo is not an immediate possibility but is no longer an urgent issue, although China still eyes Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party distrustfully and will never entirely forgo the option of forceful reunification.
That leaves the SCS territories to put some credible shreds of meat on the bare bones of the CCP's version of history as it navigates a second and more difficult phase of reforms and tries to manage social and labour unrest at a time of moderating growth and a future when slower growth will be China's "new normal". The very insignificance of the territories in dispute in the SCS may well be part of their attraction to Beijing for this essentially domestic political purpose.
The costs and consequences of chest-thumping and acting tough in the SCS are minimal. Deterrence or its lack works both ways. If the Chinese cannot deter the US from operating in the SCS because the risks of doing so are too high to be credible, by the same token, neither can the US deter or reverse Chinese activities in the SCS. China is not going to dig up the artificial islands it has constructed and throw the sand back into the sea or give up what it says was Chinese territory since "ancient times". Critical statements by the US, Europe or other countries from around the world calling on China to respect international law - even Botswana has issued a statement on the SCS- can be brushed aside. On the SCS, the only opinion that really matters to the CCP is that of its own people. In the SCS, the CCP can declare victory without taking unacceptable risks.
It was also no accident that the deployment of surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island in the Paracels was revealed shortly after the conclusion of the US-Asean Sunnylands Summit. While the artificial islands are inconsequential in military terms, they are a potent reminder to Asean that China is a geographic fact, whereas the US presence in the SCS is the consequence of a geopolitical calculation. This is an idea that China never tires of seeding in ways subtle or direct.
The implications of this idea should not be exaggerated; nor can they be shrugged off as entirely invalid either. Until relatively recently, the US took a somewhat hands-off approach to disputes in the SCS. When China first clashed with Asean over Mischief Reef in 1995, it took some persuading to get the US to declare a position of principle. Moreover, it is, I think, a geopolitical calculation that, despite all the media hullabaloo and tough talk including by the President himself, engages no US interest that is fundamentally irreconcilable with Chinese interests.
American and Chinese interests are not symmetrical. The SCS is more important to China than to the US. If I am correct that the SCS issue is ultimately connected to the legitimacy of CCP rule, it is an existential issue for China; a "core interest", although China now denies it has applied that term to the SCS, no doubt in order to avoid unduly exciting us natives.
The US takes no position on the merits of the various claims of sovereignty but defines its interests in terms of upholding international law and freedom of navigation (FON). These are important interests but not on the same level as the basic underlying Chinese interest. FON and the integrity of international law are certainly not existential interests threatening the survival of the American system. I doubt that they are even interests that the US must defend at all costs.
LIVING WITH CHINA
Modern South-east Asian history can be understood as a quest for autonomy in which process the formation of Asean was a crucial step. But so can modern Chinese history also be understood as a search to restore the autonomy lost in the 19th century and early 20th century. Asean and China have no choice but to live with each other. We are not enemies, but relations between big and small neighbours cannot but be uneasy. Where the balance of autonomies will be eventually struck between Asean and China is the central issue in the relationship that will in turn determine the extent to which the regional architecture remains open and inclusive.
This is one aspect of the uncertainty and ambiguity that my first lecture argued are the most salient characteristics of the post-Cold War world. To reach and maintain an acceptable balance requires Asean to meet what I described in that lecture as the basic strategic challenge of our times: avoiding being forced into invidious choices and keeping open the maximum range of options.
•Bilahari Kausikan is ambassador- at-large and policy adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. He is also the Institute of Policy Studies' 2015/16 S R Nathan Fellow for the Study of Singapore.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China ducks question on sanctions against Masood Azhar - Atul Aneja, The Hindu
China on Friday sidestepped a direct response to queries about its alleged role in blocking sanctions at the UN against the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) chief, Masood Azhar, who is accused by India of plotting the January attack on the Pathankot air force base.
“China opposes all forms of terrorism, supports the UN playing a central and coordinating role in global counter-terrorism cooperation, and plays an active part in this area,” said Hong Lei, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, in response to a question.
Pakistan consulted
Earlier, media reports had said China requested the UN Committee, which was considering a ban on Azhar, to hold the decision of listing the JEM chief under the al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee, hours before the inclusion deadline expired.
China had apparently taken the decision in “consultation” with Pakistan.
“China deals with the listing matter of the 1267 Committee on the basis of facts and in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions and relevant rules of procedure,” Mr. Hong said.
“China remains in contact with all relevant parties on this matter.”
The 1267 Committee, also known as the al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee, is one of three Security Council committees dealing with counter-terrorism.
Meanwhile, in New Delhi, Union Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju warned on Friday that the government would take appropriate action in view of China’s move.
‘Not a good move’
“What China has done [in the UN] was not good. The Ministry of External Affairs will take an appropriate action. Whatever action is required, we will take it,” he said.
The Hindu had earlier reported that Pakistan’s Joint Investigation Team probing the Pathankot terror attack told India’s National Investigation Agency that it had not found any evidence against Azhar linking him to the January 2 attack.
India has accused Masood Azhar and his brother Abdul Asghar Rauf of being directly linked to the attack, planned at the JeM’s Bahawalpur headquarters. It has sought the voice samples of the brothers from Pakistan.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China is going to be the stumbling block. Somehow, China has been more steadfast in the case of Maulana Masood Azhar than it was with Hafeez Saeed. It is for over 7 years now that China has stood like a rock in the case of Masood Azhar. Is it because it is beholden to Masood Azhar for some significant services he rendered, perhaps against the Uyghurs? Is it because the Pakistani Army/ISI/GoP are more 'protective' of Masood Azhar for some reason? Among the sarkari jihadists, he was the only one who tried to assassinate Musharraf thrice! It will be interesting to know what is it about Masood Azhar that makes him escape successfully the noose yet again.
For its part, China used to articulate earlier that 'terrorism' was not well-defined whenever India brought up the issue in the UNSC or in talks. What it meant was that what was terrorism for us might be 'freedom-fighting' for somebody else, the Barkha Dutt proclamation. However, that position changed after the Uyghur separatism hit home very hard. Nowadays, its articulation is 'lack of evidence'. It will support Pakistan to the hilt. Unfortunately for us, we have no counter-pressure leverage with us against it. But, we must remember this and a time will come when we should return the favour with compound interest.
At the same time, let us look at how China's behaviour has been harmful to us for over a decade now.
China has at least on two earlier (2006 & 2008) occasions blocked the UNSC’s Taliban-Al Qaeda group from declaring Jama’at-ud-Dawah (JuD) and its Emir, Hafeez Saeed from being included in the list of entities and persons proscribed under Resolution 1267. It put a technical hold on all these occasions demanding to see ‘more evidence’. In May 2009, after JuD and Hafeez Saeed were eventually placed on the list in Dec. 2008, China blocked Indian move to place Maulana Masood Azhar of Jaish-e-Mohammed on the same UN 1267 Committee list. Later, when India engaged China in counter-terrorism talks in July, 2011 and presented evidence about JeM and Maulana Masood Azhar, it summarily refused to re-visit that issue. It also rejected Indian requests to place Azzam Cheema and Abdul Rehman Makki of the LeT under the Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions list. In the UNSC, China remained the only country not to accede to this Indian request. The usual Chinese excuse has been “there is no single definition of terrorism” and hence China has avoided taking a clarified stand on it. Because of its close proximity to Pakistan, China has been non-cooperating in counter terrorism issues even though the dialogue has been going on annually since c. 2002. It was during the Indian Foreign Minister Ms. Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Beijing in February 2015 that some change was visible in the Chinese stand. A joint statement issued by the three foreign ministers of Russia, India and China (RIC meeting) “underlined the need to bring to justice perpetrators, organizers, financiers and sponsors of terrorist acts. The ministers reiterated that there can be no ideological, religious, political, racial, ethnic, or any other justification for acts of terrorism,”. China and Russia also decided to back India for moving a proposal at the United Nations that essentially goes against Pakistan on the issue of terrorism. The three foreign ministers called for early conclusion of negotiations on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, a resolution passed by India in 1986 but which has been languishing. However, the Chinese once again put a ‘technical hold’ in April 2015 on the Indian request to the UNSC’s UN Committee on al-Qaeda and associated entities, (also called the ‘1267 Committee’ ) to list Hizbul Mujahideen chief and head of the ‘United Jihad Council’, Syed Salahuddin. As the UN Sanctions Committee met in June 2015 at India’s request demanding action against the release of the 26/11 Mumbai attack mastermind by the Pakistani courts, China blocked the move by citing insufficient information. The Indian Prime Minister seemed to have spoken to his Chinese counterpart after that and the Indian Foreign Minister, Ms. Sushma Swaraj also took up the matter with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in the sidelines of the donor conference in Kathmandu where she emphasized that the Chinese action was ‘at variance’ with progress in bilateral ties. Within a few days, China again stood by Pakistan at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) meet at Brisbane where New Delhi had strongly raised non-compliance by Islamabad on freezing assets of Lashkar-e-Taiba and its affiliates. China, however, felt that Pakistan was doing all it could and had been submitting reports to the Asia Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering that collaborates closely with the FATF. China also objected to India raising the issue at the FATF on the grounds that Pakistan was not member of the grouping. In Ufa (Russia) where Prime Minister Modi met the Chinese President Xi Jinping on July 8, 2015, he raised the Lakhvi issue and spoke very candidly about India’s concern. Later, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson in Beijing said that “As a permanent member of the UN security council China always deals with the 1267 committee matters based on facts and in the spirit of objectiveness and fairness”, thus defending its own position. In November 2015, during the Indian Home Minister, Rajnath Singh’s state visit to China, India and China decided to establish a ministerial mechanism that would, for the first time, link the two home ministries as there was a need to “upgrade” the security collaboration between New Delhi and Beijing to the next level. The ministers will be assisted by a “working-level group”, led by a Joint Secretary from the Ministry of Home Affairs, and an officer of the rank of Director General from the Ministry of Public Security.The two sides also discussed counter-terror collaboration at length, in the backdrop of the Paris attacks, and other events, including the killing of a Chinese hostage in Syria by the Islamic State. But, all that has come to a nought in the Masood Azhar case.
Similarly, China also firmly rejected looking into details of Chinese arms suppliers provided by Anthony Shimray of the NSCN (IM). The Chinese officials insisted the information was still insufficient. The Indian side passed on information provided by Shimray in his statements before the court that the NSCN (IM) had arranged arms and ammunition worth nearly $2 million from TCL, a subsidiary of Chinese arms company China Xinshidai. However, even names of individuals, the agents in Bangkok and other such details did not seem to impress the Chinese side. The Chinese interlocutors are believed to have told their Indian counterparts that they could not act on a mere “confessional statement” — regardless of whether it had been admitted in a court of law. However, while addressing the UNSC’s Counter Terrorism Committee on September 28, 2011, China appealed to the international committee to discard double standards in the fight against terrorism, so that the UNSC Resolution 1373 could be implemented in full.
For its part, China used to articulate earlier that 'terrorism' was not well-defined whenever India brought up the issue in the UNSC or in talks. What it meant was that what was terrorism for us might be 'freedom-fighting' for somebody else, the Barkha Dutt proclamation. However, that position changed after the Uyghur separatism hit home very hard. Nowadays, its articulation is 'lack of evidence'. It will support Pakistan to the hilt. Unfortunately for us, we have no counter-pressure leverage with us against it. But, we must remember this and a time will come when we should return the favour with compound interest.
At the same time, let us look at how China's behaviour has been harmful to us for over a decade now.
China has at least on two earlier (2006 & 2008) occasions blocked the UNSC’s Taliban-Al Qaeda group from declaring Jama’at-ud-Dawah (JuD) and its Emir, Hafeez Saeed from being included in the list of entities and persons proscribed under Resolution 1267. It put a technical hold on all these occasions demanding to see ‘more evidence’. In May 2009, after JuD and Hafeez Saeed were eventually placed on the list in Dec. 2008, China blocked Indian move to place Maulana Masood Azhar of Jaish-e-Mohammed on the same UN 1267 Committee list. Later, when India engaged China in counter-terrorism talks in July, 2011 and presented evidence about JeM and Maulana Masood Azhar, it summarily refused to re-visit that issue. It also rejected Indian requests to place Azzam Cheema and Abdul Rehman Makki of the LeT under the Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanctions list. In the UNSC, China remained the only country not to accede to this Indian request. The usual Chinese excuse has been “there is no single definition of terrorism” and hence China has avoided taking a clarified stand on it. Because of its close proximity to Pakistan, China has been non-cooperating in counter terrorism issues even though the dialogue has been going on annually since c. 2002. It was during the Indian Foreign Minister Ms. Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Beijing in February 2015 that some change was visible in the Chinese stand. A joint statement issued by the three foreign ministers of Russia, India and China (RIC meeting) “underlined the need to bring to justice perpetrators, organizers, financiers and sponsors of terrorist acts. The ministers reiterated that there can be no ideological, religious, political, racial, ethnic, or any other justification for acts of terrorism,”. China and Russia also decided to back India for moving a proposal at the United Nations that essentially goes against Pakistan on the issue of terrorism. The three foreign ministers called for early conclusion of negotiations on the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, a resolution passed by India in 1986 but which has been languishing. However, the Chinese once again put a ‘technical hold’ in April 2015 on the Indian request to the UNSC’s UN Committee on al-Qaeda and associated entities, (also called the ‘1267 Committee’ ) to list Hizbul Mujahideen chief and head of the ‘United Jihad Council’, Syed Salahuddin. As the UN Sanctions Committee met in June 2015 at India’s request demanding action against the release of the 26/11 Mumbai attack mastermind by the Pakistani courts, China blocked the move by citing insufficient information. The Indian Prime Minister seemed to have spoken to his Chinese counterpart after that and the Indian Foreign Minister, Ms. Sushma Swaraj also took up the matter with his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in the sidelines of the donor conference in Kathmandu where she emphasized that the Chinese action was ‘at variance’ with progress in bilateral ties. Within a few days, China again stood by Pakistan at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) meet at Brisbane where New Delhi had strongly raised non-compliance by Islamabad on freezing assets of Lashkar-e-Taiba and its affiliates. China, however, felt that Pakistan was doing all it could and had been submitting reports to the Asia Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering that collaborates closely with the FATF. China also objected to India raising the issue at the FATF on the grounds that Pakistan was not member of the grouping. In Ufa (Russia) where Prime Minister Modi met the Chinese President Xi Jinping on July 8, 2015, he raised the Lakhvi issue and spoke very candidly about India’s concern. Later, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson in Beijing said that “As a permanent member of the UN security council China always deals with the 1267 committee matters based on facts and in the spirit of objectiveness and fairness”, thus defending its own position. In November 2015, during the Indian Home Minister, Rajnath Singh’s state visit to China, India and China decided to establish a ministerial mechanism that would, for the first time, link the two home ministries as there was a need to “upgrade” the security collaboration between New Delhi and Beijing to the next level. The ministers will be assisted by a “working-level group”, led by a Joint Secretary from the Ministry of Home Affairs, and an officer of the rank of Director General from the Ministry of Public Security.The two sides also discussed counter-terror collaboration at length, in the backdrop of the Paris attacks, and other events, including the killing of a Chinese hostage in Syria by the Islamic State. But, all that has come to a nought in the Masood Azhar case.
Similarly, China also firmly rejected looking into details of Chinese arms suppliers provided by Anthony Shimray of the NSCN (IM). The Chinese officials insisted the information was still insufficient. The Indian side passed on information provided by Shimray in his statements before the court that the NSCN (IM) had arranged arms and ammunition worth nearly $2 million from TCL, a subsidiary of Chinese arms company China Xinshidai. However, even names of individuals, the agents in Bangkok and other such details did not seem to impress the Chinese side. The Chinese interlocutors are believed to have told their Indian counterparts that they could not act on a mere “confessional statement” — regardless of whether it had been admitted in a court of law. However, while addressing the UNSC’s Counter Terrorism Committee on September 28, 2011, China appealed to the international committee to discard double standards in the fight against terrorism, so that the UNSC Resolution 1373 could be implemented in full.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Masood Azhar doesn't meet UN criteria to be banned as terrorist: China - PTI
Clinging to its pro-Pakistan stance, China has asserted that JeM chief and Pathankot terror attack mastermind Masood Azhar does not qualify to be nailed as a "terrorist" to face UN sanctions as his case "did not meet" the Security Council's requirements.
"Any listing would have to meet the requirements" for blacklisting, Chinese Permanent Representative to the UN Liu Jieyi told reporters yesterday in response to questions over China's decision to place a 'technical hold' on designating Azhar in the UN Sanctions Committee.
"It is the responsibility of all members of the council to make sure that these requirements are followed," he said, but gave no further details.
Liu's comments came on a day when China, one of the five permanent members of the 15-nation Council, assumed the rotating presidency of the UNSC for April.
India has reacted strongly to China's blocking of its bid at the UN to ban the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) chief, saying that the sanctions committee was taking a "selective approach" in tackling terrorism.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China's move to block ban against Azhar came just before deadline - Suhasini Haidar, The Hindu
The Chinese intervention to stop Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) chief Masood Azhar from being put on the UN list of proscribed terrorists came just hours before the UN 1267 Taliban/al-Qaeda sanction committee’s deadline was due to expire, The Hindu has learnt. Under the rules, the Committee is bound not to divulge the details of which country has blocked the proposal. However, UN sources have confirmed that it was China that raised objections to it.
“The case against Masood Azhar for proscription under the Taliban/al-Qaeda committee was so strong that the U.S., U.K., and France had even decided to co-sponsor the request,” a senior diplomat told The Hindu, adding that according to procedure if none of the ten countries on the committee (Members of the security council) issued any objection, it would have gone through. “Just about 2-3 hours before the deadline to reply would run out, a bland two-line communication was received from the Chinese Permanent Mission at the UN referencing the document, saying they would like to place a technical hold,” the official said.
In Washington, MEA spokesperson Vikas Swarup put out a strong condemnation of the development, calling on the UN 1267 regime against Taliban and al-Qaeda entities, named after the UN resolution passed in 1989 against the groups, to “protect all member states and their citizens from the activities of terror groups like JeM and its leader Azhar.”
“Its working methods, based on the principles of unanimity and anonymity, is leading the Committee to adopt a selective approach to combating terrorism. This does not reflect well on the determination that the international community needs to display to decisively defeat the menace of terrorism,” the MEA statement added.
MEA officials in Beijing, Delhi and New York confirmed that the move had been discussed for several weeks, and India had been in touch with the Chinese government as well as other Security council members to make the case to ban Masood Azhar after the Pathankot airbase attack of January 2nd.
Sources tell The Hindu the case consisted of three arguments: firstly that Masood Azhar is the leader of the JeM associated with the Taliban that had been banned in 2001. Secondly, that India believes the JeM and Masood Azhar are responsible for the Pathankot attack and continuing terror activities, and that the acknowledgement of Azhar’s involvement had come from the Pakistani government when it took him into custody.
India had specifically made a mention of Pakistan Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz’s visit to Washington in February 2016, where in his joint statement with US Secretary of State John Kerry, a mention was made of the action against the JeM and that Masood Azhar had been taken into “protective custody” for their involvement in the airforce base attack, to bolster its case.
When asked about China’s decision, the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hong Lei said that it was “on the basis of facts and in accordance with UNSC resolutions and relevant rules of procedure,” and even called on all parties to “enhance communication and coordination to combat terrorism as one”. In particular, the MFA’s description of “double standards on the counter-terrorism issue”, are indicative that China intends a much more strong defence of Pakistan at the UN committee.
However, officials point out that this is the fourth time China has blocked India’s moves to proscribe Masood Azhar and other’s at the UN 1267 committee since September 2014. Previous attempts to ban Masood Azhar, United Jehad Council chief Syed Salahuddin, and a move for action against Pakistan for contravening the 1267 rules when LeT commander, and 26/11 accused Zaki Ur Rehman Lakhvi was granted bail in 2015.
In December 2014, India had also issued several letters both to the UN and to the Pakistani government asking how LeT and JuD chief Hafiz Saeed, who is on the 1267 list, was able to fund massive rallies in Lahore and Karachi.
On each occasion, say officials, China has placed a “technical hold” on the decisions, or intervened to ensure the proposals have not been taken up.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
X Posted from the Islamism thread.
The US does unto France what China did to India.
US censors comment of French President François Hollande on Mohammadden Terrorism made during a Nuclear Security Summit meeting with US President Obama and advisers. Video released by Whitehouse purges reference to Mohammadden Terrorism. Reference to Mohammadden Terrorism was purged from Hollande’s comment that “the roots of terrorism, Islamist terrorism, is in Syria and in Iraq”:
White House censors video to remove ‘Islamic terrorism’ quote
Our Prime Minister Modi’s message has certainly not got through:
End attitude of ‘his terrorist not mine’, PM Narendra Modi says in US
The US does unto France what China did to India.
US censors comment of French President François Hollande on Mohammadden Terrorism made during a Nuclear Security Summit meeting with US President Obama and advisers. Video released by Whitehouse purges reference to Mohammadden Terrorism. Reference to Mohammadden Terrorism was purged from Hollande’s comment that “the roots of terrorism, Islamist terrorism, is in Syria and in Iraq”:
White House censors video to remove ‘Islamic terrorism’ quote
Our Prime Minister Modi’s message has certainly not got through:
End attitude of ‘his terrorist not mine’, PM Narendra Modi says in US
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Japan, India leaders voice concern over China’s maritime assertiveness - JIJI, Kyodo
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Indian counterpart, Narendra Modi, shared their concerns Friday over China’s increasingly assertive maritime moves.
At their meeting on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, Abe told Modi that Japan is seriously concerned about China’s unilateral attempts to alter the status quo in the East and South China seas, which have raised regional tensions.
Modi supported the Japanese stance, saying that actions need to be taken in line with international law in the international community, where interdependence is deepening, Japanese officials said.
Abe said Japan is willing to cooperate with India to realize a world without nuclear weapons. India’s efforts toward nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation are important to promote the cooperation, he said.
Last December, the two leaders reached a basic agreement to conclude a bilateral nuclear cooperation treaty that would allow Japan to export nuclear power plants to India.
Abe said that he feels shock and strong resentment over the recent terrorist attacks in Pakistan and Belgium, resolutely condemning such despicable acts.
Abe indicated his intention to make the fight against terrorism a key topic of discussions at the summit of the Group of Seven industrialized nations Mie Prefecture next month.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
US plans third patrol near South China Sea islands - Reuters
The US Navy plans to conduct another passage near disputed islands in the South China Sea in early April, a source familiar with the plan said, the third in series of challenges that have drawn sharps rebukes from China.
The exact timing of the exercise and which ship would travel inside a 12-nautical mile limit around a disputed island was not immediately clear.
The United States has conducted what it calls "freedom of navigation" exercises in recent months, sailing near disputed islands to underscore its right to navigate the seas. U.S. Navy officials have said they plan to conduct more and increasingly complex exercises in the future.
The USS Stennis carrier strike group is currently operating in the South China Sea. The next freedom of navigation exercise is unlikely to be conducted by a carrier like the Stennis, but rather by a smaller ship, the source said.
Experts predict the next US challenge to the various claims in the South China Sea could occur near Mischief Reef, a feature claimed by the Philippines and which was submerged at high tide before China began a dredging project to turn it into an island in 2014.
Mischief Reef is now the site of one of three military-length airfields China has built on man-made islands in the Spratly Islands archipelago.
US Navy ships regularly patrol the South China Sea, through which more than $5 trillion of world trade travels every year. China claims most of the area, and Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Taiwan have rival claims.
In recent months, with tensions rising around China's reclamation activities, U.S. ships have been frequently and routinely shadowed by Chinese ships and regular communications with Chinese vessels have often been tense.
News of the planned exercise comes a day after U.S. President Barack Obama met with Chinese President Xi Jinping at a nuclear summit in Washington.
During the meetings, Xi told Obama that China would not accept any behavior in the disguise of freedom of navigation that violates its sovereignty, in a clear warning to the United States.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told Reuters on Saturday that China opposed any such exercise.
"China consistently respects and supports the freedom of navigation and fly over that all countries' enjoy in the South China Sea under international law, but resolutely opposes any country using so-called 'freedom of navigation' as an excuse to damage China's sovereignty, security and maritime rights," Hong said.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Vietnam seizes Chinese vessel for intruding in its waters - AP
This is better than the Indonesian Coast Guard capturing a Chinese trawler which a PLAN patrol boat intercepted while being towed to an Indonesian port and freed a few days back. Indonesia is asking China to surrender that trawler to their CG !Vietnam's coast guard in a rare move has seized a Chinese vessel for allegedly intruding in its waters, state media reported on Monday.
The newspaper Thanh Nien said that the vessel has been towed to the northern port city of Hai Phong, and that the ship, its captain and two sailors, all Chinese, are under the supervision of Vietnamese authorities {Vietnam does not want to use the 'arrested' word !}.
The vessel, disguised as a fishing boat, was carrying 100,000 liters of diesel oil and was intercepted by Vietnamese coast guard near Bach Long Vi island in the Gulf of Tonkin on Thursday, it said.
The captain told authorities the fuel was to be sold to Chinese fishing boats operating in the area, it said.
Hai Phong coast guard officails declined to comment on Monday.
The newspaper said that in the last two weeks of March the coast guard had chased 110 Chinese fishing boats out of Vietnamese waters.
Vietnam's coast guard often warns and chases Chinese fishing boats out of its waters but rarely seizes them.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
After Beijing's veto on Masood Azhar, questions raised on liberalized regime for Chinese investments - Bharti Jain, ToI
Miffed with China for blocking India's efforts to have Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Maulana Masood Azhar put in the UN list of proscribed terrorists, a section of the security establishment has started debating the returns from its liberalized regime for Chinese investments, including the big decision to remove China from the list of "countries of concern".
A senior officer of the Indian security establishment indicated that a view is emerging that the friendlier regime vis a vis Chinese FDI, which has resulted in clearances to around 25 investment proposals cutting across sectors like telecom and power etc, over the past two years, needs to be revisited in view of Beijing refusing to "cooperate on issues of prime concern to us regarding national security". As many as four proposals of Chinese companies looking to invest in India are currently pending for security clearance.
"It cannot be a one-way affair. If Beijing is blocking our efforts on the international fora aimed at addressing our security concerns, may be we should review the security clearances to Chinese investment proposals by citing "national security" clause, or at least rethink on future cases put up for security clearance," said the officer.
The Modi government, over the past couple of years, has taken some key initiatives to promote better ties with China. One such initiative was to review its status as a "country of concern", which had earlier led to many investment proposals by Chinese firms being rejected on national security grounds. Besides, it expedited security clearances for Chinese FDI proposals that would earlier take anything between 3 and 6 months.
"Both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and home minister Rajnath Singh have visited China, and India has also hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping. In fact, Modi had during his visit to China last year announced visa on arrival for Chinese tourists. We had expected China to reciprocate by cooperating with us on security matters and strengthening our hand in pushing for tough action against Pakistan-sponsored terror on the international fora. But it has done exactly the opposite by supporting Pakistan and shielding a terrorist operating from its soil by vetoing sanctions against him {Welcome to the world of realpolitik, officer. Now that we have been caught napping yet again, let's do something about this now}," said an officer of the security establishment.
"Its time we rethink our policy for encouraging Chinese investments," said the officer. While Chinese firms from all sectors have been granted clearance over the past few months, one of the major beneficiaries was Huawei Telecommunications with the home ministry in mid-2015 okaying its proposal to set up a manufacturing unit in Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu.
According to Department Of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP), India had received Rs 3,066.24 crore investment from China in 2014-15 and Rs 2,196.11 crore in 2015-16 (up to September 2015).
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China will realise once it gets hit by Pakistan-backed terror: V K Singh - PTI
With Beijing scuttling India's latest bid to have JeM chief Masood Azhar designated as a terrorist by the UN, Union minister V K Singh has warned that the day is not far when China would have to pay a heavy price once it gets hit by Pakistan-backed terrorism.
"The friendship between China and Pakistan appears to be very strong but the day is not far when China too gets affected by Pakistan-backed terrorism," Singh, who is here to take part in a function at the Gorakhnath temple, told told reporters last night.
"When such a situation arises, China will have to pay a heavy price," the Minister of State for External Affairs said, adding, "Pakistan has an important place in Chinese diplomacy...China's intervention in that case must be seen in this context."
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Government to soon take a view on putting China back on 'country of concern' list - PTI
GoI must do it immediately. India must show no timidity in such matters. It must act quickly and decisively. For all intents & purposes, China is an enemy country as its behaviour has been doubtlessly so. We relaxed the policy too soon without extracting sufficient returns for us hoping that such a gesture would make China mend its behaviour. We should change policies only when behaviour has actually changed, not with fond & pious hopes.The government is likely to take a view soon on whether to put China again in the list of 'country of concern' as it blocked India's bid to have JeM chief Masood Azhar designated terrorist by the UN for his involvement in the terror strike at the Pathankot airbase.
Upset over the action by China, a meeting will soon be convened to examine the possibility of revisiting the decision to remove China from the list of 'country of concern', official sources said on Tuesday.
The removal of China from the list led to faster security clearance to Chinese investments in India. Pakistan is another country which is in the list of 'country of concern'.
The security establishment is considering a review of the liberalized investment regime being offered to Chinese investors after Beijing snubbed India by blocking its latest bid to have Masood designated terrorist by the United Nations.
Official sources said the view in the security establishment is that security clearances given to Chinese companies should be reviewed after China's action in the UN on India's bid in the wake of terror strike at the Pathankot airbase.
The Indian security establishment feels that China has shown insensitivity as far as core security issues relating to India are concerned.
Around 25 Chinese companies were given security clearance by the government in the past two years for setting up industrial projects mostly in power, telecom, railways and infrastructure sectors.
As per DIPP records, the Chinese companies which have invested in India in last 15 years were Saic General Motors Investment Ltd, Beiqi Foton Motors Co Ltd, Tbea Sheyang Transformer Group Ltd, Cina Steel Corporation, Boasteel Resources Co Ltd, Gaungxi Liugong Machinery Co Ltd, Shanghai Hitachi Electrical Appliances C, Xiangfen County Hongda Group Cement & BL, Dongfang Electric Corporation Ltd and ZTE Corporation.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Expectations high from Ranil’s China visit - Atul Aneja, The Hindu
Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe arrives in Beijing on Wednesday on an upbeat note after his government cleared the stalled $1.4 billion Colombo Port City, which had become an irritant in the ties between the two countries after a change of guard in Sri Lanka.
The Sri Lankan Cabinet had formally cleared the project last month, paving the way for Mr. Wickremesinghe’s visit. The decks were cleared after Sri Lanka’s International Trade and Strategic Development Minister Malik Samarawickrama visited China and held talks with the Chinese authorities on a cluster of issues, including the Port City Project.
The signals that Sri Lanka was set to resume the project were loud and clear when in Davos, Mr. Wickremesinghe announced that impediments to big-ticket China-funded infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka had been removed. “So, we are going ahead with many of those projects, including the Port City,” he said. But going beyond infrastructure, the Sri Lankans are seeking Chinese investments in their capital-starved country.
“We are looking at the Chinese participation in the logistics hub of Sri Lanka as well as further investments in the real-estate sector”, Mr. Wickremesinghe said.
Mood upbeat in Beijing
In Beijing, the mood was upbeat ahead of the Prime Minister’s arrival. “We commend the Sri Lankan government’s positive policies towards China and are ready to jointly consolidate the traditional friendship, and deepen pragmatic cooperation through this visit, pushing the China-Sri Lanka strategic cooperative partnership to new heights”, said Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei, ahead of the visit.
Analysts say that the doors are now wide open to deepen Colombo-Beijing ties in all fields, including defence. Mr. Wickremasinghe arrives soon after Beijing hosted Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli of Nepal, a visit that has signed a major transit agreement as part of Beijing’s Belt and Road connectivity initiative.
China also attaches centrality to Sri Lanka to amplify its Maritime Silk Road — an oceanic connectivity initiative that covers the Indian Ocean. In a bid to anchor their presence in the Indian Ocean, the Chinese have also been engaged in developing Pakistan’s Gwadar Port. China is also establishing Djibouti in the Horn of Africa as a military base to service logistical needs of Chinese warships.
The expansion of the Hambantota Port, to which Mr. Wickremasinghe alluded, is expected to cement China-funded infrastructure along a string of Indian Ocean ports, starting from Myanmar’s port of Kyaukphyu, within the ambit of the Maritime Silk Road.
Observers say that China’s growing influence in South Asia poses a challenge to New Delhi, which could do well to revamp of its neighbourhood policy.
Xinhua had earlier reported that Sri Lanka hopes to strengthen its defence ties with China this year. It had paraphrased remarks by Sri Lankan defence secretary Karunasena Hettiarachchi that “China supported Sri Lanka to end the war against Tamil Tiger rebels and the government is in discussions to further strengthen the defence relations between the two countries”.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Security checks on Chinese firms to hurt India: China media - PTI
China's official media today cautioned India that it will "lose more than gain" if it went ahead with its reported move to tighten security checks on Chinese firms in the country after Beiijng scuttled India's bid at the UN to ban JeM chief Masood Azhar. {Oh, yeah? Let's lose then}
"India stands to lose more than gain if it tightens its security checks on Chinese firms or if it scrapped security clearance to Chinese companies," an article in the state-run Global Times said.
The article came days after official sources in India said the view in the security establishment is that security clearances given to Chinese companies should be reviewed after China's action in the UN in the wake of terror strike at the Pathankot airbase.
"Chinese companies may think twice about their expansion plans in India over the possible security clearance review. Thus, India's development, which relies on China to improve its poor infrastructure, will be hindered," Hu Zhiyong a research fellow with the Institute of International Relations at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences told the daily.
Though Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to India in 2014 announced USD 20 billion Chinese investments in India in the next five years, Indian officials and business organisations say the flow of investments remained low despite India liberalising visa regime and removing security clearances for Chinese firms.
A Chinese embassy official in India familiar with China's overseas investments acknowledged to the Global Times that India's security clearance of Chinese firms has been showing signs of relaxing in recent years, especially after Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister in 2014 and Minister of Home Affairs Rajnath Singh's visit to China November last year.
"Although India conducted a security review of Chinese firms, Chinese companies in India say the general business environment is is improving, and the Chinese companies' feedback is positive," the official said.
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Bhurishrava
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
We can do wihout `scroll .in` articles.Jhujar wrote:http://scroll.in/article/805735/is-nepa ... t-dream-on
Will China risk India investments by overplaying its hand in Nepal?
This is a pure 1962 `communists are coming toliberate us article`. Its all India`s fault only.
And of course needlessly nonsensical anti-BJP bakwaas to add.
Here -
So what has the Modi govt done in last one year that is anti China and that was not being done earlier.China’s Nepal policies is a signal of its displeasure over India’s own unfriendly policies toward China during the past one-year period.
There arent no snakes like the ones at scroll.in
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
India takes up Masood Azhar veto case with China - ToI
New Delhi has taken up with Beijing at a high level te issue of China vetoing a UN bid to declare Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad's leader Masood Azhar a terrorist
"We have taken it up with the Chinese at a fairly high level," foreign secretary S Jaishankar said at the launch of Carnegie India, the sixth international centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
"It's an issue that has to be pursued in the UN context," he said.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Manohar Parrikar to visit China on April 18 to shore up defence ties - PTI, Economic Times
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar will visit China later this month to strengthen military ties despite strains in bilateral relations over Beijing's move to block India's attempts in the UN to clamp a ban on Pakistan- based terror group JeM chief Masood Azhar.
Parrikar, the first Indian defence minister to visit China since 2013, will pay a three-day visit starting from April 18 during which he is expected to hold talks with top Chinese political and defence leaders, official sources here said.
His predecessor A K Antony visited China in 2013.
No agreements were expected during Parrikar's visit which is being regarded as bilateral visit aimed at firming up ties, officials said.
His trip follows high-level visits by top Chinese defence officials including Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman General Fan Changlong to India last year.
CMC headed by President Xi Jinping is the highest commanding authority of the 2.3-million strong People's Liberation Army.
While the two sides had set up a dialogue mechanism under Special Representatives of both the countries to find a solution to the vexed boundary dispute spanning 3,488 kms, they also operationalised a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination to address tensions arising out of aggressive patrolling of the disputed boundary.
The Special Representatives have held 18 rounds of talks so far. The two sides also opened more border points for regular interactions between their officers and men to build friendly rapport between them.
Chinese officials say the border situation is generally stable and the two militaries should take concrete actions to implement the consensus reached by their leaders on the issue.
Parrikar's visit also comes as concerns were rising in India about China's move to block its bid to have JeM chief Azhar designated as terrorist by the UN in the aftermath of the terror attack on an air base in Pathankot in January.
While Indian officials say that strains resulting out of this controversy will not affect Parrikar's visit as both sides attached importance to improving military ties, reports say India mulled to re-clamp security checks on Chinese firms investing in India to show its concern over the issue.
India is also concerned by reports of presence of Chinese troops in the forward positions in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. China has termed such reports as baseless.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
India, China argue over Masood Azhar - Kallol Bhattacharjee, The Hindu
Mr. Jaishankar, however, added that the issue will remain limited between India and China at the UN and will not “overflow into other areas”.
Mr. Jaishankar’s statement received quick response from officials at the Chinese Embassy. “We agree with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s idea that there should be no discrimination when dealing with terrorists. But when it comes to naming who is a terrorist, we need more discussion at the international level,” said Liu Jinsong of the Chinese embassy at an event in the University of Delhi.
Chinese Ambassador Le Yucheng said on Tuesday that Beijing had not dismissed India’s move to bring a ban on Azhar. “We felt that the information provided by India to the UN was inadequate, that is why we placed a ‘technical hold’—a temporary measure,” Mr. Le said.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China-funded Colombo Port City project continues to face protests - T.Ramakrishnan, The Hindu
Chinese projects elsewhere have been great destroyers of environment. Sri Lankans must beware.Even as the Sri Lankan government is inching towards an agreement to revive the Colombo Port City Project, its critics have renewed their campaign against the project, funded by a Chinese company.
The issue has again come to the fore in the wake of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s current visit to China. The project promoter, CHEC Port City Colombo (Pvt.) Ltd, is a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company, an entity listed in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
Herman Kumara, convener of the National Fisheries Solidarity Movement and one of the co-conveners of the People’s Movement Against the Port City, said the Sri Lankan government was going ahead without considering various factors such as “adverse impact” that would be caused to marine ecology, environment and fishermen’s livelihood.
The Movement had conducted a demonstration against the project early this week. Mr. Kumara added that no consultations were held with those who opposed it. He said “We will not give up our opposition. We will carry on the campaign further. “
An official says that during the latest review of the project from environmental angle, the project promoter gave a detailed response to various issues which the authorities found satisfactory. Ravi Karuanayake, Finance Minister, linked the revival of the project to compliance with all the norms and regulations.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China could adopt different approach to deal with India: Rand
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/art ... aign=cppst
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/art ... aign=cppst
WASHINGTON: China could consider adopting a "different approach" to deal with India as a nuclear rival as it does not want the Indian military on par with its own, a top US think tank today said.
Even as India has embarked on modernisation of its armed forces to meet its national security needs, China currently sees the US as its main potential adversary in determining its nuclear force structure and other strategic-deterrence requirements, the Rand Corporation said in a report on China. "It is possible, however, that China could become more concerned about the nuclear capabilities of India, which could result in changes such as a larger arsenal of theatre nuclear missiles," Rand Corporation said. "Indeed, China could consider adopting a different approach to deal with India as a nuclear rival, one that could diverge from China's longstanding focus on deploying a secure second-strike capability without matching the numbers o of weapons in the arsenals of the nuclear superpowers," it said. whereas China accepts an asymmetric nuclear relationship with the US and Russia, so long as it can maintain a secure second-strike capability, it could very well choose a different approach to dealing with India, Rand said. For example, if India increased the size of its nuclear forces to a level that rivalled China's, Beijing might feel a need to build a larger arsenal than India's, it addedChina may do this even if only because it judged that, for reasons of status, it must avoid the perception -- whether domestically or internationally -- that the two countries are on an equal footing as far as military power is concerned," Rand said "This concern about avoiding the appearance of failing to stay ahead of India's military technology developments could also influence China's thinking about its requirements for the deployment of strategic missile-defence capabili ..Also, China's growing nuclear deterrence, conventional precision strike, space and counter-space, and network-warfare capabilities will create some new options for Chinese strategists and decision makers, which will probably lead to debates about many aspects of China's approach to strategic deterrence, it said. In its report, 'China's Evolving Approach to Integrated Strategic Deterrence' Rand said that China's evolving approach to strategic deterrence may prove challenging ..to the US and its regional allies. The US will need to invest in maintaining its own strategic deterrence capabilities, enhance the survivability and resilience of its forces in the region, and reduce its dependence on space and information systems that are potentially vulnerable to disruption, the report said. China is rapidly closing what was once a substantial gap between the People's Liberation Army's strategic weapons capabilities and its strategic deterrence concepts, it said
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
“Beijing’s ties in South Asia will not harm India” - Atul Aneja, The Hindu
India’s ties with Colombo are casting a shadow on the visit of Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, who arrived in the Chinese capital on Wednesday to reboot a longstanding relationship with Beijing.
Within hours of Mr. Wickremasinghe’s arrival, the state-run Global Times ran an op-ed article that focused on India as a factor in the Beijing-Colombo ties. Analysts say that the $1.4 billion Colombo Port City Project in Colombo, which has faced protests at home, has become a litmus test for Colombo’s ability to balance ties between the two Asian powerhouse neighbours.
The article addressed concerns regarding the mega project that is being undertaken by China’s CHEC Port City Colombo (Pvt.) Ltd., alleging that apart from Sri Lanka’s partisan politics, “pressure from India has [played] a crucial role in suspending the project”.
It said: “New Delhi is often biased when viewing Chinese investment in South Asia. New Delhi’s anxiety stems from its suspicion that China is making an attempt to contain India.
Despite the fact that neither Beijing’s investment to Sri Lanka, nor the latter’s economic development will do any harm to India, New Delhi is still obsessed with the idea that China might create a military encirclement around India”.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Hambantota project talks with Sri Lanka should be speeded up: China - Economic Times
China has called for fast-tracking negotiations with Sri Lanka over the USD 750 million second phase of the Hambantota port which in the past caused unease in India over concerns that the project is part Beijing's 'string of pearls' strategy to contain it.
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, during talks with his Sri Lankan counterpart Ranil Wickremesinghe, said both sides should speed up the negotiations on the second phase operation of the Hambantota Port in the southern part of Sri Lanka. The first phase was completed in 2014 at a cost of USD 361 million.
Li said the port will give Sri Lanka full play to its geological advantage to become an important international logistic hub. The second phase of construction is expected to cost over USD 750 million.
Hambantota, the home of former Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa, aims to service ships travelling along one of world's busiest shipping lines -- the east-west shipping route.
When the three phase project is completed, it will become the biggest port on South Asia with 4,000 acres of service area with provision to accommodate 33 vessels at a time.
The scale of the project evoked concerns in India that it could be part of China's 'string of pearls' strategy to corner India.
China, which has been building various ports in different countries including Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan, has denied having such a strategy.
During their meeting yesterday, Wickremesinghe and Li also discussed the construction of an industrial park in Hambantota.
Li also welcomed Sri Lanka's decision to lift ban on the construction of the Chinese funded USD 1.5 billion Colombo Port City Project.
China will work together with Sri Lanka to push forward resumption of the delayed construction of the port city project in Colombo, Li told Wickremesinghe here yesterday.
"We welcome the resumption of the Colombo Port City Project and stand ready to work with Sri Lanka to push forward the construction steadily," Li said.
The Sri Lankan government officially informed the Chinese investors of resuming the construction of the multi-billion dollar port city project last month, one year after its suspension.
Wickremesinghe also assured Li to "speed up" the construction of the controversial China-funded Colombo Port City Project which his government stalled for an year over environmental concerns.
China has been setting up a series of ports across the Indian Ocean rim referred to experts as 'string of pearls' which many see as an attempt to contain India.
Both sides agreed to speed up the construction of the 583 acre the Colombo Port City (CPC) project to be built by a Chinese state owned company on reclaimed land which was stalled after the Maithripala Sirisena government came to power last year.
It was halted over concerns relating to its environmental impact. The project was finalised during the Rajapaksa regime.
"On CPC, both sides agreed to further speed up over all and comprehensive resumption of the work at this project," Xiao Qian, Director General of the Asia Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry told the media while briefing over the outcome of the meeting between the two Prime Ministers.
He said Sri Lanka has already made the announcement to resume work.
"Now we will go into further technical details," Xiao said.
While there is no clarity on the technical details, reports from Colombo quoted Sri Lankan officials as saying that the China Communication Construction Company (CCCC), which undertook the project is demanding USD 125 million penalties (USD 3.80 lakh penalty a day) as damages for stalling the project.
Sri Lankan officials also said Colombo wants relief as it is struggling to service USD eight billions obtained during the Rajapaksa regime for various projects. {That's the trick by which China gets concessions. It happened in Djibouto, Maldives, Seychelles and Sri Lanka}
Reports said Wickremesinghe, who before his election had threatened to scrap the CPC for adverse environmental impact, is due to negotiate the penalty payment in his talks with Li.
The Sirisena government had earlier expressed serious reservations over the clause in the agreement to hand over 20 hectares of land to the CCCC on freehold basis with complete rights.
The project had created disquiet in India over the growing Chinese presence in Sri Lanka. India has also not yet endorsed the Maritime Silk Road proposal because of its strategic concerns over the Chinese domination in the Indian Ocean - often regarded as India's backyard.
Elaborating further on the talks on CPC, Xiao said, "this is an important project and both the countries have strong desire to further enhance and advance this project. On the Chinese side we hope to see earlier possible resumption. We believe it will come up very fast."
Before embarking on his visit to Beijing, Wickremesinghe told the Chinese media in an interview that CPC will be given a special status as a unique financial and business district with laws of its own.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China thinks India is blind. By interfering inside Pak with nuke and mil China has changed its future permanently.SSridhar wrote:“Beijing’s ties in South Asia will not harm India” - Atul Aneja, The HinduIndia’s ties with Colombo are casting a shadow on the visit of Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, who arrived in the Chinese capital on Wednesday to reboot a longstanding relationship with Beijing.
Within hours of Mr. Wickremasinghe’s arrival, the state-run Global Times ran an op-ed article that focused on India as a factor in the Beijing-Colombo ties. Analysts say that the $1.4 billion Colombo Port City Project in Colombo, which has faced protests at home, has become a litmus test for Colombo’s ability to balance ties between the two Asian powerhouse neighbours.
The article addressed concerns regarding the mega project that is being undertaken by China’s CHEC Port City Colombo (Pvt.) Ltd., alleging that apart from Sri Lanka’s partisan politics, “pressure from India has [played] a crucial role in suspending the project”.
It said: “New Delhi is often biased when viewing Chinese investment in South Asia. New Delhi’s anxiety stems from its suspicion that China is making an attempt to contain India.
Despite the fact that neither Beijing’s investment to Sri Lanka, nor the latter’s economic development will do any harm to India, New Delhi is still obsessed with the idea that China might create a military encirclement around India”.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
[quote="svinayak-in-south-asia-will-not-harm-india/article8448743.ece]“Beijing’s ties in South AAsia. New Delhi’s anxiety stems from its suspicion that China is making an attempt to contain India.
New Delhi is still obsessed with the idea that China might create a military encirclement around India[/b]”.China thinks India is blind. By interfering inside Pak with nuke and mil China has changed its future permanently.[/quote]
China is nothing but bigger version of Pakistan. By virtual vile nature and short sighted diplomatic and military actions,China has reduced its century to couple of decades and even that time line shrinking by the month. The present economic and coming demographic bump capable of sending them back to their legendary sleep. Chinese leadership confusing cleverness with wisdom.
New Delhi is still obsessed with the idea that China might create a military encirclement around India[/b]”.China thinks India is blind. By interfering inside Pak with nuke and mil China has changed its future permanently.[/quote]
China is nothing but bigger version of Pakistan. By virtual vile nature and short sighted diplomatic and military actions,China has reduced its century to couple of decades and even that time line shrinking by the month. The present economic and coming demographic bump capable of sending them back to their legendary sleep. Chinese leadership confusing cleverness with wisdom.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
why does chinese "investments" in Sri lanka and Pakistan have special statuses and laws of their own ..in addition to separate protection forces inside those countries