India-US Relations : News and Discussion- II

Vayutuvan · Post by **Vayutuvan** » 15 Apr 2016 09:28

TSJones wrote:^^^^^ Arshyam +1

.....nothing rewarding or productive is easy to do......

Unless one is Pakistan. Then we Americans would bend over ... Err ... Backwards to make it easy for them TFTA gregarious army folks, no?

Mort Walker · Post by **Mort Walker** » 15 Apr 2016 09:38

Austin wrote: Not by 100 meters but by 40-50 km according to Pitor Butwoski in his book Russian AirPower , I can check the book for exact phrase but he mentioned like Russian Airforce was surprised to find the GPS signal error was introduced by 40- 50 km , Another time he mentioned this happened was when Tu-160 was landing in Venezuela and they found the GPS was way off mark by many km.

GPS signals are very weak and can easily be spoofed. Being drastically off in time and distance is not at all surprising. If the Russians or anyone else were relying on GPS for navigation for their air force, then it is a mistake. Similarly, the Russians can spoof GLONASS and none of these navigation systems are reliable. The IRNSS by ISRO is the best option for India. To get accurate navigation you need at least 3 satellites. Right now IRNSS has 6 sats operational and 1 more coming on-line soon for a total of 7 planned.

TSJones · Post by **TSJones** » 15 Apr 2016 09:40

vayu tuvan wrote:
TSJones wrote:^^^^^ Arshyam +1

.....nothing rewarding or productive is easy to do......
Unless one is Pakistan. Then we Americans Luke bend over ... Err ... Backwards to make it easy for them TFTA gregarious army folks, no?

stop projecting your desires on others....speak for yourself about how you like your weird sex. leave me and my country ot of it,,,,,,,

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 15 Apr 2016 10:11

Mort You need minimum of four sats to fix the position not 3.
V_Raman good. Thanks for thinking. Will comment tomorrow.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 15 Apr 2016 10:13

V_Raman wrote:Ramana - I will bite - I hope this comes across as analysis

As for Rudradev's statement: "India as a nation that should be dissuaded from becoming an empire at all"

India is already an empire whether USA wants it or not!

We are probably the first in the history of mankind where a substantial unified territory was left behind by another fading empire with the expectation that it will collapse. Look like we will not and hence the heartburn.

Good points
The other posts are cacophony

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 15 Apr 2016 10:18

The LEMOA is an agreement between the Indian MoD and the US DoD. Neither of them are cultural bodies. Neither of them are social organisations. They're concerned only with military affairs.

Despite being couched in PR-speak of 'trust', 'shared destinies' and other such metaphysical hoo-haa, the core objective of their collaboration is quite straightforward, to level the playing field versus China as far as possible.

For the US, China is a strategic rival that's well on its way to achieving regional dominance in East/SE Asia, achieving parity over the medium term and gaining net military superiority over the long term.

For India, China is a foe with whom i) its fought a war in the past (with a humiliating result), ii) has outstanding territorial disputes with, and iii) is slowly losing ground against, even within its own neighborhood (South Asia & the IOR).

China militarily outspends India five-to-one and thanks to 25 years of sustained investment in building/borrowing/stealing to create domestic capabilities, it gets a better return on each dollar it spends. The result - the military disparity between the two countries will continue to expand over the next decade (before hopefully starting to narrow again), regardless of the reforms Parrikar & Modi implement (which will take time to properly bear fruit).

______________________________________________________________________

Every time I ask our senior members, who're so big picture that they see things at a civilizational level, how exactly we ought to manage that military threat (the scale of which, many simply don't recognize), I get one of three responses. Either a prediction of China's impending collapse ("hope for the best, plan for the ~~worst~~ best"?), or a response that goes off on a tangent, or just plain silence.

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 15 Apr 2016 10:19

sudeepj wrote:...

I have heard this story of how the US 'switched off GPS over Kashmir' during the Kargil crisis multiple times. But no first hand, authoritative source.. So if Chetak saab can provide one, itll be illuminating.

...

First hand account? Chetak ji, will write his stuff but here is mine and it is good three - four years after Kargil.

My own first hand account is of 2002-05 vintage from J&K. GPS was unreliable anywhere north of Banihal (including but not limited to Glacier). GPS feed would go haywire (and I have experienced the exacts moments when they conked off to Southern Hemisphere) approaching places West or North West of Rajouri. By this time we were flying helicopters with cockpit fitted GPS. I have flown with hand held GPS in NEastern parts where we would never use them in Op areas.

Also, GPS signals did not provide steady locks (not degradation) in hills or in heavy weather.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 15 Apr 2016 10:22

Also we need to be wary of op-eds from chatterati and Ind Americans who stand to benefit from US making deals with.India. we saw a lot during nuke deal. Amazing amount of pressure tactics.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 15 Apr 2016 10:43

ramana wrote:Also we need to be wary of op-eds from chatterati and Ind Americans who stand to benefit from US making deals with.India. we saw a lot during nuke deal. Amazing amount of pressure tactics.

How many people will benefit personally from these kind of deals

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 15 Apr 2016 10:46

arshyam wrote:Riding on the US's shoulders won't cut it - unless we are content to be like Japan or Korea. I repeat this, I am not content to see India in that level. I think most of this board will agree with me on this point.

There's plenty of middle ground between a cordial hands-off relationship and a tight military alliance. (Given that India isn't constrained by Japan's insitutionalized pacifism, nor doesn't it have South Korea's limitation in terms of sheer size, even a military alliance wouldn't be of the lopsided 'protectorate' kind that they share.)

The China-Pakistan axis is an apt example. They aren't allies. China is under no treaty obligation to come to Pakistan's defence, if the latter were threatened by India. Nor is Pakistan required to jump into the fray were an Indo-China war to break out. Their deeper than/higher than/sweeter than <> 'friendship' emerged out of a fighting closely spaced wars with India, 1962 & 1965 (just a few years before that, in 1959, Ayub Khan was the one approaching India with a proposal for 'joint defence' against China).

During Op Parakram, the Chinese govt did not officially commit themselves to supporting Pakistan. But supplies of F-7PGs and munitions were still rushed in, and the PLA still initiated probing actions all along the LAC (in the Aksai Chin region they created an motorable road, albeit unmetalled, running along the boundary, 20 km deep on our side, when our focus was on the Western flank).

Unfortunately, fact remains despite the absence of a treaty between the two, India still has to cater for the possibility of a two front war breaking out. That means dedicating resources to both fronts and thus reducing the net military capability available even in a single front war.

Fortunately... we aren't the only ones with two fronts to cater to.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 15 Apr 2016 11:33

arshyam wrote:What are the US bases we will get access to, and which of ours will they get access to. . . . We will on-paper get access to their mainland bases, but since we have no legitimate business there, it won't amount to anything. I can't help but see a disparity there, and if folks say that's all right, that's a different story altogether . . .

arshyam, I agree with your analysis and conclusion. On the question of US bases around the region Bahrain is the most important as the USN Fifth Fleet is based there. And, we cannot access any of those bases under LEMOA because they are not US sovereign bases.

Apart from keeping an eye on our assets, developments etc., the US may also be scouting for future eventualities which include vacating the bases in West Asia. In that case, Indian bases, especially on the west coast would be most useful. Also, such agreements incrementally push us into US fold, a prospect to the liking of the US Administration.

At the same time, the Chinese behaviour is such that it leaves us with not much option either. You suggest that we up our engagement with Vietnam, Philippines,Malaysia,Thailand & Indonesia in the Indo-China Sea (ICS) region. Out of these countries, Thailand and Indonesia have no disputes with China (though Chinese fishing vessels intrude Indonesian waters and Natuna island could develop into a dispute later on). China does have a dispute with Malaysia over James Shoal, about 80 km off the Malaysian state of Sarawak in the southern end of the South China Sea. But, it has not seen much flare-up as the dispute is dormant. Vietnam & Philippines have major problems. Our engagement with these two nations is rising. Of course, we go a long way back with Vietnam and multi-faceted. We are training their submariners & fighter pilots. Vietnam will purchase from us OPVs for patrolling the Indo-China Sea. In c. 2014, India offered Vietnam a line of credit of USD 100 million for purchase of defence equipment. It was meant to be used for the purchase of BrahMos though neither side confirmed it. We will launch Vietnam's satellite and we have commissioned a satellite earth station there recently. In January 2015, the two countries upgraded their strategic defence dialogue from the secretaries level to that of the level of Defence Ministers. The Indian Army Chief, Gen. Dalbir Suhag, visited Vietnam in December 2014 to strengthen the army-to-army relationship between the two countries. In late May 2015, the Vietnamese Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh visited India once again (second visit within 4 months), when the two countries signed a Joint Vision Statement on Defence Cooperation for the period 2015-2020. With the Philippines, we have just started. For almost five or six years now, our IN assets have been regularly & frequently calling on ports in the Philippines. Last October, Ms. Swaraj and her Philippino counterpart chaired a joint commission meeting where India unambiguously backed the Philippino position of law-based maritime dispute resolution.

To be fair to the Americans, they have in fact been urging us to take a more active role in the affairs of the East. In a speech delivered at Chennai during her official visit to India, Ms. Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State, asked India to assume ‘leadership role’ in the region as “India straddling the waters from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean is, with us, a steward of these waterways. We are both deeply invested in shaping the future of the region that they connect. In all of these areas, India's leadership will help to shape positively the future of the Asia Pacific” Indian government sources later explained that what Ms. Clinton was alluding to was for a closer maritime partnership with the Indian Navy in the South China Sea, the Straits of Malacca and finally the Pacific Ocean. In a “Foreign Policy’ commentary, she later spoke of three Asia-Pacific giants namely the US, China and India. The influential American think-tank, Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), in its report ‘The United States and India: A Shared Strategic Future’, said that India “is a force for stability, prosperity, democracy, and the rule of law in a very dangerous neighbourhood.” The report, prepared by a group of eminent analysts, even suggested that India and the US “Hold classified exchanges on multiple Pakistan contingencies, including the collapse of the Pakistan state and the specter of the Pakistan military losing control of its nuclear arsenal”. In its circa 2010 report, the US Quadrennial Defence Review described India "as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond". The joint communiqué at the end of the c. 2011 annual US-Australia strategic review meeting called Ausmin , called for, “deeper strategic ties between Australia, the US and India, welcomed India's engagement in East Asia and called for greater co-operation with India in providing for maritime security.”

At the same time, we have a real problem, and that is China. It is not a question of IF but WHEN a war will break out with them. The border is only deceptively calm. We cannot forget the lessons of 1962. The Chinese continue to probe all over the place. They are into POK as POK is literally leased out to them. The String of Pearls is not to be dismissed derisively as 'feverish imagination' as a few do. It is being chiselled out every passing day. Xi Jinping and his coterie which is what rules the CPC, the CMC etc. have determined that the 'peaceful rise' of four decades is over and it is time to flex the muscle especially as the economic situation looks grimmer and grimmer. We cannot take China head on and this is a fact, however much it riles us. The only meaningful support to us in an eventual conflict can come from the US. Let's make no mistake about that. This is where we have a problem. The US knows that and is pushing us around, keeping a tight leash on us by also arming the Pakistanis sufficiently. For our part, we have to sell our strength which is that simply no other country, except us, in the region can be a match to China. The US Pivot will not succeed without INDIA. Japan, Philippines and Australia are all right but it will be India that matters in the end. If the US is serious about China, it has to stop playing any game with us. The US negotiates hard and we have to be ruthless as well and under no delusion that the relationship is a 'defining moment of the 21st century', that 'we are natural allies' etc nonsense trotted out by Obama administration. For the time being, it is transactional and that is all there is to it.

A series of transactions could build up trust (which is non existent today) and lead to a more durable relationship. But, that decision has to be made by the US and in a demonstrable way.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 15 Apr 2016 11:50

SSridhar wrote: Xi Jinping and his coterie which is what rules the CPC, the CMC etc. have determined that the 'peaceful rise' of four decades is over and it is time to flex the muscle especially as the economic situation looks grimmer and grimmer. We cannot take China head on and this is a fact, however much it riles us. The only meaningful support to us in an eventual conflict can come from the US. Let's make no mistake about that. This is where we have a problem. The US knows that and is pushing us around, keeping a tight leash on us by also arming the Pakistanis sufficiently. For our part, we have to sell our strength which is that simply no other country, except us, in the region can be a match to China.

Can you Explain a little more on the above point.

V_Raman · Post by **V_Raman** » 15 Apr 2016 12:10

Continuing from previous post...

India is trying to deal for territorial status quo by following actions

Friendship with Afghanistan and Iran.
Warnings about Chinese activity in disputed territory.
Supporting Tibetian government in exile

No response from P5. Looking at Iran-US reproachment from an Indian prism is just an ego trip.

India tried what it thought as asymmetric action - grand show by modi for security council expansion

No response from P5.

Any punitive measures on Pak through UN - nothing material - like what happened with Masood Azhar. P5 has too many tricks up its sleeve.
Independent Balochistan talk - We have no levers
Look east policy - Not much in it as India cannot offer the countries anything material to withstand china
Bridge to Sri Lanka - Nah, nothing material

AFAIK the only action(s) that got a response from P5 were asymmetric military actions

1971
Either P5 did not allow annexing east pakistan to India or we were stupid to not do it

1998 tests.
Response from P5 was the 1-2-3 agreement with CRE goals from their side
Our dream of NSG entry etc. to gain on indigenous MIC rebuffed
Our dream of having enough maal for bombs - not useful - as we cannot test TNWs anyway
IMHO, even Arihant does not matter anymore

So the only way to get any response seems to be asymmetric military actions. What are our options? What are our options? ......

kit · Post by **kit** » 15 Apr 2016 12:11

I would still say the best way to contain China is to open at least two new fronts on china borders away from India.. an obvious one being Vietnam .. a nuclear armed Vietnam will change the whole geopolitics in the region !.. its cheaper for India too .. and will of course promote peace and stability in South Asia as the Americans say !

Austin · Post by **Austin** » 15 Apr 2016 12:14

Mort Walker wrote:GPS signals are very weak and can easily be spoofed. Being drastically off in time and distance is not at all surprising. If the Russians or anyone else were relying on GPS for navigation for their air force, then it is a mistake. Similarly, the Russians can spoof GLONASS and none of these navigation systems are reliable. The IRNSS by ISRO is the best option for India. To get accurate navigation you need at least 3 satellites. Right now IRNSS has 6 sats operational and 1 more coming on-line soon for a total of 7 planned.

The Russians were not relying on GPS but the point that came out was Jamming was deliberate to prevent the use of Wepons and Navigation relying on GPS , Atleast thats the lesson learnt by them in both instances.

The Georgians were likely using the Mil Grade Signals hence not subject to same problems , But you are right we must not depend on any external means , IIRC there was also a case of GPS Blink during Brahmos test in Rajasthan that CEO mentioned

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 15 Apr 2016 12:17

, the US may also be scouting for future eventualities which includes vacating the bases in West Asia. In that case, Indian bases, especially on the west coast would be most useful.

How did you conclude this?

You do realize that, if at all an Indian base is used on a fairly permanent basis, it can be *only* at the invitation of the Indian government.

Also, if and when the US vacates a base in ME, that base will be occupied by either the UK or France.

It I'd a very huge leap to say that the US will actually occupy a base on Indian territory. Not even close.

Also, on the topic of which IS based India could be interested in, more than likely in the Asia-Pacific region.

kit · Post by **kit** » 15 Apr 2016 12:18

there are asymmetric options ..obvious ones being military .. being not in NSG doesn't constrain India in any way ..shed off that pacifist mindset and grow a spine

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 15 Apr 2016 12:50

The discussion seems to be on the basis of some document signed (LEMOA or whatever)... I've looked through the thread to any link which directs to this, or a draft ...since it is to be done only in the next few months. I'm curious because much of the discussion on access to bases seems to know the contents of it. Is there a draft linked anywhere?

Not looking for the standard BECA, CISMOA etc. Anything with India is going to be pretty extensively redrafted.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 15 Apr 2016 13:13

kit wrote:I would still say the best way to contain China is to open at least two new fronts on china borders away from India.. an obvious one being Vietnam .. a nuclear armed Vietnam will change the whole geopolitics in the region !.. its cheaper for India too .. and will of course promote peace and stability in South Asia as the Americans say !

That'll be a long expensive (possibly sanction-prone) process. They'll also need to start a ballistic missile program in parallel. And in the end, nuclear capability will only secure the Vietnamese mainland. They still won't be able to lock-in enough of the PLA's conventional strength.

The VPAF for example has an effective combat strength is 12 Su-27s plus about 30 Su-30MKs. The VPN's main strength is concentrated in 4 Gepard-class corvettes and 6 Kilo-class subs. The army's strength in defence is substantial, but has limited offensive capability. Militarily it isn't going worry the PLA much more say... Bangladesh vis a vis India.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 15 Apr 2016 13:22

JE Menon wrote:The discussion seems to be on the basis of some document signed (LEMOA or whatever)... I've looked through the thread to any link which directs to this, or a draft ...since it is to be done only in the next few months. I'm curious because much of the discussion on access to bases seems to know the contents of it. Is there a draft linked anywhere?

Haven't disclosed it publicly. I doubt they'll release it to the general public, even after its signed. Although given how risk-averse our mandarins in South Block (and North Block, for that matter) are, and the govt's understandable desire to avoid being raked over coals on topic, I don't think one need be too worried about giving away too much.

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 15 Apr 2016 13:54

NRao wrote:
, the US may also be scouting for future eventualities which includes vacating the bases in West Asia. In that case, Indian bases, especially on the west coast would be most useful.
How did you conclude this?

You do realize that, if at all an Indian base is used on a fairly permanent basis, it can be *only* at the invitation of the Indian government.

Also, if and when the US vacates a base in ME, that base will be occupied by either the UK or France.

It I'd a very huge leap to say that the US will actually occupy a base on Indian territory. Not even close.

NRao, a request. Do not remove the author's name when quoting because it helps the context and the reply to be made.

I think you are imagining more than what I said regarding bases. I simply said west coast Indian bases would be 'helpful' [under LEMOA] if the US has to vacate. We are still debating LEMOA and not permanent bases.

My scenario of the US vacating a base in the ME is when Islamists take over and drive away the Westerners, so, in my scenario I was not expecting another Western substitute. Even if the UK & France fill the vacuum, the US gains nothing because it has lost its prime property and geostrategic edge.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 15 Apr 2016 15:08

SSridhar wrote:The US knows that and is pushing us around, keeping a tight leash on us by also arming the Pakistanis sufficiently. For our part, we have to sell our strength which is that simply no other country, except us, in the region can be a match to China. The US Pivot will not succeed without INDIA. Japan, Philippines and Australia are all right but it will be India that matters in the end. If the US is serious about China, it has to stop playing any game with us. The US negotiates hard and we have to be ruthless as well and under no delusion that the relationship is a 'defining moment of the 21st century', that 'we are natural allies' etc nonsense trotted out by Obama administration. For the time being, it is transactional and that is all there is to it.

There's little love lost between the US and Pakistan at this point. Indeed within the US military sphere, the Pakistanis are pretty much despised*, even before OBL was found enjoying a pleasant retirement in a Pakistani cantonment. I've heard this from at least two (Indian) officers returning from exchange visits to the US.

But fact remains, that ISAF's lines of communication run through Pakistan. ("Death to America" is still the official motto of Iran and with the ongoing tensions with Russia, the Northern Distribution Network isn't an option anymore.) As the troops withdraw, the military aid to Pakistan has been steeply scaled back (its less than 20% of what was in 2011). But until the withdrawal concludes, they can't cut Pakistan loose. Its not an option. Not yet.

While publicly it may express disappointment, this is something the GoI recognizes.. and tacitly accepts. The prospect of a hasty US withdrawal from Afghanistan is not something it'd welcome. Especially since the amount of military support isn't particularly daunting at this point. The 9 AH-1s in the news, for example, are being bought on commercial terms. The DSCA clearance was for 15 helicopters, with the balance 6 aircraft presumably to be funded through (now blocked) FMF aid. Same for the 8 F-16s cleared. To be sold full price, which means they'd practically be able to afford only about 4 aircraft for the same budget (the Chinese are inducting that number every two weeks).

*To quote from an excerpt posted by Karan M from the Outlaw Platoon by Sean Parnell

Lieutenant Colonel Toner ordered, “Hit them now.”

The satellite-guided bombs, dropped from the strategic bomber, struck first. Before the smoke had even cleared, the A-10s rolled in and unleashed all their fearsome firepower. The Predator launched its Hellfires, and the Apache batted clean up.

Around us, the night sky was rent asunder. We watched in awe as bombs burst, tracers flared, and rockets sizzled. When the AC-130 opened up, its battery of weapons only rearranged the bodies.

The strafing runs continued. Nothing that moved survived. Not a single enemy fighter got within a mile of Combat Outpost Margah that night. We stood on our makeshift ramparts and cheered wildly with every blast. Perhaps some of the men were celebrating the destruction of our enemy. I screamed for joy at our survival.

At dawn, we ventured out to conduct a “sensitive site exploitation.” This was army-speak for policing up weapons, documents, and any other intelligence we could glean from the night’s holocaust of fire, lead, and steel.

To the east, we found the blackened ground carpeted with human remains. We dismounted and picked our way through hundreds of meters of arms and legs, ragged half torsos, severed heads with flat-brimmed hats still covering blood-encrusted hair. The stench of death hung in the air. In places, patches of snow that had somehow survived the night had been stained red. In others, small fires still burned and sent palls of grayish smoke wisping across the battlefield.

Broken trees littered the landscape, their barren limbs decorated with ghastly pieces of human beings. From one, a web of intestines dangled from the branches, dripping gore onto the snow below.

We’d seen death’s many faces before this morning. We’d grown hard carrying the dead enemy to our Humvees and dumping them at the local mosques. But even for the most cynical and steeled among us, this charnel house had an effect. Nobody who walks among such things is ever the same again.

We focused on our job. The AKs and machine guns we gathered looked brand new. We stacked them in our rigs alongside RPG launchers that looked factory fresh. The boots scattered about were of better quality than ours. The enemy carried sophisticated radios and military-issue compasses. On dismembered legs we saw kneepads. Torn clothing—the remains of desert camouflage uniforms—fluttered in the morning breeze.

Farther east, we began to encounter more intact corpses. To our astonishment, they wore body armor. Some even had World War I–style helmets still strapped to their heads.

Suppressing our horror was no easy task that morning. But we had to do the job right. At each corpse, the men cleared it for booby traps or unexploded ordnance. They found hand grenades and hundreds of AK magazines. In the pockets of the dead were documents—visas, passports, and notebooks that we knew would be of value. And then we made a startling discovery. Some of these enemy fighters were not Haqqani or Al Qaida at all.

They were Pakistan Army Frontier Corps soldiers, Pakistan’s ragtag border militia. We found their identity cards.

In the spring, we had discovered how Pakistan was allowing our enemy to use its sovereign territory as a rest and refit area. The Haqqani Network trained in Pakistan and received logistical and medical support from our ally’s hospitals.

In the summer, at the Alamo, we had watched helplessly as our enemy used the Pakistan Army troops stationed along the border as willing human shields to prevent us from launching counterbattery fires.

In September, the president of Pakistan had made peace with Taliban representatives, freeing our enemy to throw their full weight against us.

In December, we had been sent out north of the Alamo to escort an Afghan infantry company as it conducted a site survey for a proposed border fence. The Pakistani troops on the slopes overlooking Angoor Ada opened fire on the ANA and pinned them down with those ZSU-4 quad machine guns. Afraid we would fire back and create an even more serious international incident, my platoon was ordered to fall back to FOB Shkin while a Special Forces unit sortied out to rescue the ANA. Greeson and I thought that for sure the episode would become headline news around the globe. We feared that it would spark an open war between the United States and Pakistan. But the incident was never reported.

Now, in January, miles inside Afghanistan, we had discovered that Pakistani Frontier Corps troops had launched a joint offensive with Al Qaida and Haqqani Network fighters against a U.S. combat outpost.

kit · Post by **kit** » 15 Apr 2016 15:41

Viv S wrote:
SSridhar wrote:The US knows that and is pushing us around, keeping a tight leash on us by also arming the Pakistanis sufficiently. For our part, we have to sell our strength which is that simply no other country, except us, in the region can be a match to China. The US Pivot will not succeed without INDIA. Japan, Philippines and Australia are all right but it will be India that matters in the end. If the US is serious about China, it has to stop playing any game with us. The US negotiates hard and we have to be ruthless as well and under no delusion that the relationship is a 'defining moment of the 21st century', that 'we are natural allies' etc nonsense trotted out by Obama administration. For the time being, it is transactional and that is all there is to it.
There's little love lost between the US and Pakistan at this point. Indeed within the US military sphere, the Pakistanis are pretty much despised*, even before OBL was found enjoyed a pleasant retirement in a Pakistani cantonment. I've heard this from at least two (Indian) officers returning from exchange visits to the US.

But fact remains, that ISAF's lines of communication run through Pakistan. ("Death to America" is still the official motto of Iran and with the ongoing tensions with Russia, the Northern Distribution Network isn't an option anymore.) As the troops withdraw, the military aid to Pakistan has been steeply scaled back (its less than 20% of what was in 2011). But until the withdrawal concludes, they can't cut Pakistan loose. Its not an option. Not yet.

While publicly it may express disappointment, this is something the GoI recognizes.. and tacitly accepts. The prospect of a hasty US withdrawal from Afghanistan is not something it'd welcome. Especially since the amount of military support isn't particularly daunting at this point. The 9 AH-1s in the news, for example, are being bought on commercial terms. The DSCA clearance was for 15 helicopters, with the balance 6 aircraft presumably to be funded through (now blocked) FMF aid. Same for the 8 F-16s cleared. To be sold full price, which means they'd practically be able to afford only about 4 aircraft for the same budget (the Chinese are inducting that number every two weeks).

*To quote from an excerpt posted by Karan M from the Outlaw Platoon by Sean Parnell

Lieutenant Colonel Toner ordered, “Hit them now.”

The satellite-guided bombs, dropped from the strategic bomber, struck first. Before the smoke had even cleared, the A-10s rolled in and unleashed all their fearsome firepower. The Predator launched its Hellfires, and the Apache batted clean up.

Around us, the night sky was rent asunder. We watched in awe as bombs burst, tracers flared, and rockets sizzled. When the AC-130 opened up, its battery of weapons only rearranged the bodies.

The strafing runs continued. Nothing that moved survived. Not a single enemy fighter got within a mile of Combat Outpost Margah that night. We stood on our makeshift ramparts and cheered wildly with every blast. Perhaps some of the men were celebrating the destruction of our enemy. I screamed for joy at our survival.

At dawn, we ventured out to conduct a “sensitive site exploitation.” This was army-speak for policing up weapons, documents, and any other intelligence we could glean from the night’s holocaust of fire, lead, and steel.

To the east, we found the blackened ground carpeted with human remains. We dismounted and picked our way through hundreds of meters of arms and legs, ragged half torsos, severed heads with flat-brimmed hats still covering blood-encrusted hair. The stench of death hung in the air. In places, patches of snow that had somehow survived the night had been stained red. In others, small fires still burned and sent palls of grayish smoke wisping across the battlefield.

Broken trees littered the landscape, their barren limbs decorated with ghastly pieces of human beings. From one, a web of intestines dangled from the branches, dripping gore onto the snow below.

We’d seen death’s many faces before this morning. We’d grown hard carrying the dead enemy to our Humvees and dumping them at the local mosques. But even for the most cynical and steeled among us, this charnel house had an effect. Nobody who walks among such things is ever the same again.

We focused on our job. The AKs and machine guns we gathered looked brand new. We stacked them in our rigs alongside RPG launchers that looked factory fresh. The boots scattered about were of better quality than ours. The enemy carried sophisticated radios and military-issue compasses. On dismembered legs we saw kneepads. Torn clothing—the remains of desert camouflage uniforms—fluttered in the morning breeze.

Farther east, we began to encounter more intact corpses. To our astonishment, they wore body armor. Some even had World War I–style helmets still strapped to their heads.

Suppressing our horror was no easy task that morning. But we had to do the job right. At each corpse, the men cleared it for booby traps or unexploded ordnance. They found hand grenades and hundreds of AK magazines. In the pockets of the dead were documents—visas, passports, and notebooks that we knew would be of value. And then we made a startling discovery. Some of these enemy fighters were not Haqqani or Al Qaida at all.

They were Pakistan Army Frontier Corps soldiers, Pakistan’s ragtag border militia. We found their identity cards.

In the spring, we had discovered how Pakistan was allowing our enemy to use its sovereign territory as a rest and refit area. The Haqqani Network trained in Pakistan and received logistical and medical support from our ally’s hospitals.

In the summer, at the Alamo, we had watched helplessly as our enemy used the Pakistan Army troops stationed along the border as willing human shields to prevent us from launching counterbattery fires.

In September, the president of Pakistan had made peace with Taliban representatives, freeing our enemy to throw their full weight against us.

In December, we had been sent out north of the Alamo to escort an Afghan infantry company as it conducted a site survey for a proposed border fence. The Pakistani troops on the slopes overlooking Angoor Ada opened fire on the ANA and pinned them down with those ZSU-4 quad machine guns. Afraid we would fire back and create an even more serious international incident, my platoon was ordered to fall back to FOB Shkin while a Special Forces unit sortied out to rescue the ANA. Greeson and I thought that for sure the episode would become headline news around the globe. We feared that it would spark an open war between the United States and Pakistan. But the incident was never reported.

Now, in January, miles inside Afghanistan, we had discovered that Pakistani Frontier Corps troops had launched a joint offensive with Al Qaida and Haqqani Network fighters against a U.S. combat outpost.

but certainly the one who holds the gun to ones head (pakistan) takes precedence over any friendship offers !!

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 15 Apr 2016 15:56

Viv S wrote:There's little love lost between the US and Pakistan at this point. Indeed within the US military sphere, the Pakistanis are pretty much despised*, even before OBL was found enjoyed a pleasant retirement in a Pakistani cantonment. I've heard this from at least two (Indian) officers returning from exchange visits to the US.

But fact remains, that ISAF's lines of communication run through Pakistan. ("Death to America" is still the official motto of Iran and with the ongoing tensions with Russia, the Northern Distribution Network isn't an option anymore.) As the troops withdraw, the military aid to Pakistan has been steeply scaled back (its less than 20% of what was in 2011). But until the withdrawal concludes, they can't cut Pakistan loose. Its not an option. Not yet.

While publicly it may express disappointment, this is something the GoI recognizes.. and tacitly accepts. The prospect of a hasty US withdrawal from Afghanistan is not something it'd welcome. Especially since the amount of military support isn't particularly daunting at this point. The 9 AH-1s in the news, for example, are being bought on commercial terms. The DSCA clearance was for 15 helicopters, with the balance 6 aircraft presumably to be funded through (now blocked) FMF aid. Same for the 8 F-16s cleared. To be sold full price, which means they'd practically be able to afford only about 4 aircraft for the same budget (the Chinese are inducting that number every two weeks).

Viv S, the US enjoys little credibility anywhere (except possibly with the UK, Canada & Australia), leave alone India. We have enormous experience with the US to accept them as a stable, reliable partner. I am not claiming that India had been a saint either, but the unreliability of the US is on a vastly different orbit. It is going to take a very long time for that trust deficit to be bridged.

For long, I have said that it is ironic that situations naturally developed, which Pakistan exploited for its anti-India stance, or sometimes were even contrived and then exploited by Pakistan to keep itself on the side of the Western powers to enjoy the benefits of the generous economic and military doles, which it then used against India. 1971, 1979 & 2002 are prime examples. So, while military transfers might appear to be dwindling, there is already an enormous transfer and there is no guarantee that it won't happen again. My other contention is that if Pakistan can extract so much over five decades, India must be able to do much more given its economic and strategic positioning. F/16, F/18 manufacturing will be peanuts as Gen. Zia-ul-Haq said in a different context with the US and made the point tellingly that led to Pakistan become a de jure nuclear power.

Of course, India has been saying that the US should not leave Afghanistan in a hurry because that was not only in Indian interests but also in regional interests and even the US interests. But, that does not mean that India should not seriously protest the huge India-centric arms transfer under the blatant lie of 'counter-terrorism activities'. I don't want to give that long list of arms transfer once again here. We have debated that many times before. In the end, India has to be also mindful of its own security knowing how Pakistan had earlier misused the arms given to fight the Communists. The feelings of officers participating in Shatrujeet, Yudh Abhyas or Vajra Prahar or Op Malabar etc are no indication of how governments behave. No EUA is going to stop Pakistan from using these hardware, assets, and platforms against us if it so decides.

Of course, we do not know what kind of conclusions have been arrived at, if at all, between GoI & GoTUS regarding Pakistan and if we can trust that given our experience. We are speculating when we say India's protests are "While publicly it may express disappointment, this is something the GoI recognizes.. and tacitly accepts".

Cosmo_R · Post by **Cosmo_R** » 15 Apr 2016 16:05

"kit wrote:
I would still say the best way to contain China is to open at least two new fronts on china borders away from India.. an obvious one being Vietnam .. a nuclear armed Vietnam will change the whole geopolitics in the region !.. its cheaper for India too .. and will of course promote peace and stability in South Asia as the Americans say !"

Arming VN is symmetric. And as, VivS has pointed out, a bit like setting Bangladesh vs India. The real asymmetric option is a long game (Assassin's Mace): religion. Think Tibet-Buddhism, Islam in in Sinkiang. Christianity in the rest of PRC. Fan the flames, create fault lines in a 92% Han-dominated monolith. Create a divide between faith-based groups and the CPC (easy because of corruption). As growth slows, religion finds a fertile soil. The party overreacts and you get them to east themselves: all plausibly deniable anyway.

Find the fuse and all it takes is a spark

JMT

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 15 Apr 2016 17:12

SSridhar wrote:Viv S, the US enjoys little credibility anywhere (except possibly with the UK, Canada & Australia), leave alone India. We have enormous experience with the US to accept them as a stable, reliable partner. I am not claiming that India had been a saint either, but the unreliability of the US is on a vastly different orbit. It is going to take a very long time for that trust deficit to be bridged.

This isn't about them looking out for us. We just need to trust that they'll look out for their own interests. And as you rightly put it, over the long term the US cannot sustain its 'pivot' without Indian support. China is growing into a threat far more formidable than the USSR ever was.

For long, I have said that it is ironic that situations naturally developed, which Pakistan exploited for its anti-India stance, or sometimes were even contrived and then exploited by Pakistan to keep itself on the side of the Western powers to enjoy the benefits of the generous economic and military doles, which it then used against India. 1971, 1979 & 2002 are prime examples.

Again the point with all three cases was the US looking out for its own interests. As part of its strategy of 'containment' in the 50s & 60s (followed by sanctions), to assist in co-opting the PRC in 1970s (followed by sanctions), and then to fight the Soviets (followed by sanctions - within 12 months of the Soviet retreat).

Once the US withdraws from Afghanistan, their policy vis a vis Pakistan reverts to normal. Maybe no sanctions this time round, but unless Pakistan can be of some practical use, no support either. Of course, the big difference this time round is that China is well on its way to emerging as a superpower; the Pakistanis already have a new benefactor lined up. One that they're quite comfortable with.

Of course, India has been saying that the US should not leave Afghanistan in a hurry because that was not only in Indian interests but also in regional interests and even the US interests.

It'll be a bad hit to US credibility if Afghanistan rapidly collapses in the wake of their withdrawal. But aside from that, its shaping up to be something of a lost cause. Core US interests will not be threatened by an expedited retreat. Before 2001, Afghanistan wasn't on anyone's radar aside from an occasional airstrike to kill jihadists. At this point, given the state of the world, there are enough sanctuaries for radical Islamists, to not be overly concerned with one isolated country.

But, that does not mean that India should not seriously protest the huge India-centric arms transfer under the blatant lie of 'counter-terrorism activities'. I don't want to give that long list of arms transfer once again here. We have debated that many times before. In the end, India has to be also mindful of its own security knowing how Pakistan had earlier misused the arms given to fight the Communists. The feelings of officers participating in Shatrujeet, Yudh Abhyas or Vajra Prahar or Op Malabar etc are no indication of how governments behave. No EUA is going to stop Pakistan from using these hardware, assets, and platforms against us if it so decides.

Fighting the Communist (and now jihadists) was always a fig leaf really. It was understood that they were primarily to threaten/deter India, and accepted as the cost of doing business.

There was a massive arms sale in 2005, subsidized with FMF aid no less (the one where they got couple of F-16 squadrons, MLUs, AMRAAMs, P-3 upgrades, M109s and plenty more). But over the last five years, there's been nothing very major sold to Pakistan that I can recall. Bell 412s, MRAPs, one OHP frigate (stripped of air defences) and now a few AH-1Zs.

Edit: http://www.dsca.mil/search/node/pakistan?page=1

Of course, we do not know what kind of conclusions have been arrived at, if at all, between GoI & GoTUS regarding Pakistan and if we can trust that given our experience. We are speculating when we say India's protests are "While publicly it may express disappointment, this is something the GoI recognizes.. and tacitly accepts".

The GoI is bound to recognize the reality that NATO forces cannot continue to operate in Afghanistan unless their supply line is open (also being used to withdraw equipment). We could treat it as a matter of principle and defer further engagement until the US actually pulls out and washes its hands off Pakistan, but the China factor is going to continue to grow in the interim.

Viv S · Post by **Viv S** » 15 Apr 2016 17:20

kit wrote:but certainly the one who holds the gun to ones head (pakistan) takes precedence over any friendship offers !!

Are you referring to the US? Because its not really holding a gun to Pakistan's head; if it did, it wouldn't have taken them 10 years, $1.5 trillion and 25,000 casualties to get OBL. (Unless you meant Pakistan holding a gun to India's head; cause it'd have squeezed the trigger at the first opportunity.)

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 15 Apr 2016 17:56

The real reason for LEMOA - Suhasini Haidar, The Hindu

In particular, a senior official said the need for the LSA was felt during humanitarian rescue efforts such as Operation Raahat that evacuated Indian citizens from Yemen last year.

Christopher Sidor · Post by **Christopher Sidor** » 15 Apr 2016 18:07

Viv S wrote: ....
....
....
*To quote from an excerpt posted by Karan M from the Outlaw Platoon by Sean Parnell

Lieutenant Colonel Toner ordered, “Hit them now.”

The satellite-guided bombs, dropped from the strategic bomber, struck first. Before the smoke had even cleared, the A-10s rolled in and unleashed all their fearsome firepower. The Predator launched its Hellfires, and the Apache batted clean up.

Around us, the night sky was rent asunder. We watched in awe as bombs burst, tracers flared, and rockets sizzled. When the AC-130 opened up, its battery of weapons only rearranged the bodies.

The strafing runs continued. Nothing that moved survived. Not a single enemy fighter got within a mile of Combat Outpost Margah that night. We stood on our makeshift ramparts and cheered wildly with every blast. Perhaps some of the men were celebrating the destruction of our enemy. I screamed for joy at our survival.

At dawn, we ventured out to conduct a “sensitive site exploitation.” This was army-speak for policing up weapons, documents, and any other intelligence we could glean from the night’s holocaust of fire, lead, and steel.

To the east, we found the blackened ground carpeted with human remains. We dismounted and picked our way through hundreds of meters of arms and legs, ragged half torsos, severed heads with flat-brimmed hats still covering blood-encrusted hair. The stench of death hung in the air. In places, patches of snow that had somehow survived the night had been stained red. In others, small fires still burned and sent palls of grayish smoke wisping across the battlefield.

Broken trees littered the landscape, their barren limbs decorated with ghastly pieces of human beings. From one, a web of intestines dangled from the branches, dripping gore onto the snow below.

We’d seen death’s many faces before this morning. We’d grown hard carrying the dead enemy to our Humvees and dumping them at the local mosques. But even for the most cynical and steeled among us, this charnel house had an effect. Nobody who walks among such things is ever the same again.

We focused on our job. The AKs and machine guns we gathered looked brand new. We stacked them in our rigs alongside RPG launchers that looked factory fresh. The boots scattered about were of better quality than ours. The enemy carried sophisticated radios and military-issue compasses. On dismembered legs we saw kneepads. Torn clothing—the remains of desert camouflage uniforms—fluttered in the morning breeze.

Farther east, we began to encounter more intact corpses. To our astonishment, they wore body armor. Some even had World War I–style helmets still strapped to their heads.

Suppressing our horror was no easy task that morning. But we had to do the job right. At each corpse, the men cleared it for booby traps or unexploded ordnance. They found hand grenades and hundreds of AK magazines. In the pockets of the dead were documents—visas, passports, and notebooks that we knew would be of value. And then we made a startling discovery. Some of these enemy fighters were not Haqqani or Al Qaida at all.

They were Pakistan Army Frontier Corps soldiers, Pakistan’s ragtag border militia. We found their identity cards.

In the spring, we had discovered how Pakistan was allowing our enemy to use its sovereign territory as a rest and refit area. The Haqqani Network trained in Pakistan and received logistical and medical support from our ally’s hospitals.

In the summer, at the Alamo, we had watched helplessly as our enemy used the Pakistan Army troops stationed along the border as willing human shields to prevent us from launching counterbattery fires.

In September, the president of Pakistan had made peace with Taliban representatives, freeing our enemy to throw their full weight against us.

In December, we had been sent out north of the Alamo to escort an Afghan infantry company as it conducted a site survey for a proposed border fence. The Pakistani troops on the slopes overlooking Angoor Ada opened fire on the ANA and pinned them down with those ZSU-4 quad machine guns. Afraid we would fire back and create an even more serious international incident, my platoon was ordered to fall back to FOB Shkin while a Special Forces unit sortied out to rescue the ANA. Greeson and I thought that for sure the episode would become headline news around the globe. We feared that it would spark an open war between the United States and Pakistan. But the incident was never reported.

Now, in January, miles inside Afghanistan, we had discovered that Pakistani Frontier Corps troops had launched a joint offensive with Al Qaida and Haqqani Network fighters against a U.S. combat outpost.

Fascinating. Let us do some math.
Iraq 2003, Population = 18 million. Occupation period by USA about 8-10 years. Money spent on Iraq by USA 1.1 Trillion USD. Figures courtesy Wikipedia.
Cost per Iraqi citizen = 61K USD.

Pakistan 2003. Population = 150 million (approx). If USA had occupied Pakistan and ruled over it for 8 years, then approximate cost of occupation = USD 9.15 Trillion. (Considering the fact that Pakistan's population is about 8.3 time Iraq's population)
GDP of America in 2003 = USD 11.51 Trillion.

The figures do not add up. USA is not going to do anything to Pakistan.

Another aspect. How does an outside power threaten India in the most effective manner? Two ways, one via Indian Ocean and second via planes of Punjab or desert of Sindhi-Rajasthan-Gujarat.

Geopolitics and Geo-economies are bitches. They do not change. They force one to change.

UlanBatori · Post by **UlanBatori** » 15 Apr 2016 18:26

Pakistan holds a gun to a head all right - its own. That has always been the threat as articulated by . Oooooo! If the Moderate Secular Dictatorial Democratic Guvrmand falls, the Extremists Will Take Over!

saip · Post by **saip** » 15 Apr 2016 18:33

Viv S wrote:
kit wrote:but certainly the one who holds the gun to ones head (pakistan) takes precedence over any friendship offers !!
Are you referring to the US? Because its not really holding a gun to Pakistan's head; if it did, it wouldn't have taken them 10 years, $1.5 trillion and 25,000 casualties to get OBL. (Unless you meant Pakistan holding a gun to India's head; cause it'd have squeezed the trigger at the first opportunity.)

You mis-read kit's comment. He means Pakistan is holding the gun to ITS OWN head when it makes demands of the US and the US complies.

SaiK · Post by **SaiK** » 15 Apr 2016 19:03

I started listing a bunch of questions from various online info...

I think many of the core problems are information availability to discuss, and hence we see many vents getting opened at random with unknown agendas. It is a good metrics collection BTW.

Questions by category:-

Access:
1. Is this a permanent blanket right to access any facility or a case by case scenario based access/support control agreement?
2. Is this an agreement that equates my enemy is your enemy and my friend is your friend for mil conflicts?

---->so, join me in attacking my enemy. we should be dumb enough to sign on like that. even still, comes another elections, it would be thrown away then. denial of service can happen both ways.

Purpose:
1. Why do we think India will be tied up to US policies and their legal system?
2. Who drafts joint operations? does it become mandatory alliance?
3. Where is our multi-lateral dharmic policies defined?
4. Do we have counter-laws within our own governance model to initiate an agreement with global aspirations in mind? Whatever that may be - yoga to miltiary power. How do we want to play?
5. In what ways the agreement impede our goals in establishing military independence?
---> same goes with Russia too. Albeit, a different kind of nexus.
6. Do we have enough requirements in equality drafted to exchange in cost, kind or scratchbacks?
7. Where is our master plan? give me bullet points

We have gone thru many joint ops, exercises mainly. There are non-military ops needs where billions or even trilions needs investment. I see this is largely for post-military ops (like in afghan), where India's profile fits to help recover, gain business deals and establish to gain on the new markets.. A point to chew more than we can
but to swallow slowly, is a problem of not sizing this market. I think it is a big post-ops business.

Ops:
1. What are our strategies that doesn't coincide with them?
2. If we have no union of interests, why have we conduted so many joint exercises?
3. Are we saying, we are a small country to be dictated by US ops?
4. Is it mutually benefitial or only US strategy on the menu list?
5. Do we need to build inter-operable systems?
6. Do we need American equipments, LRUs, engines, products? why?
7. How many operational systems have direct dependencies?

Balance of interests: [are we there yet? where do we lack? what we need? have we drafted our reqs?]
1. Is it one sided US logistical operational requirements or do we have any thing in our plans for bigO-ops?
2. Do we have enemy at all? What is our plan on a joint war with both Pakis and Chips?
3. Do we need to match capabilities to some level to beat an enemy?
4. Are we in a level playing state to begin with?
5. Where are our gaps, whitelist them and counter attack to get the bang for the buck! do we want to?
6. Do we want to play any role? If yes, and on our own interests, do we need anyone else support? be realistic as there are places you can't just cross without repurcussions.
7. Whose interests are we satisfying? we can't be abstract.. be specific and draw out that as requirement if missing.
8. Dont we want to spread our wings greater than Asia to Pacific? what are the road blocks? there is a huge defence market we have in south america.
9. MakeInIndia need not be for our own consumption. Agree to shift goals?

Technology cooperation:
It is known to everyone here, this is one large drawback we have.. we have our own funding to politics to blame to keep this as a stumbling block. IAF and IN had to seek out American equipments and arms because we failed on many fronts to be independent. We can't ignore that failure to calculate, as our mil folks wants to put a stop on wild imaginations, and non-collaborative approaches to various indegnizastion issues. I think, this is one of the big rider to get closer to US.

1. Do we really need US engines or equipments?
2. Why did we keep LCA and other engine department sourced from America?
3. We were so close to EF200, why did we not take it? American fault or influence?
4. Deficiency of tech stuffs are hampering our mil growth. DRDO and Forces are not behaving like stakeholders, and their timelines and goals are shifting. Kaveri engines are no where to be seen.

Amercia sees this as our weakness, even if we can surge ahead on guided ballistics. So,
5. What is our plan to be independent from any nation on technology?
6. or, Can we be the integration leader? It is a market enabler and first mover be India?

Politics and Trusts:
1. We have a big lacuna here. Can we get that documented as well in agreements to fix that?
2. How do we deal with Sanctions regime?
3. No blanket approval works in any agreement so to speak. So, why this feel we have lost or sided with America losing our existing dependence?
4. How do we overcome trust barriers? what things US must do to regain trusts? list them out in agreements

Regulatories
1. India is treated differently by both policies and on end-user licenses. We are differently colored. Have we addressed this issue?
2. Not just India, many NATO countries have problems with USA on end-user monitorings. Dont we need to go to specifics?
3. Is US willing to remove strings on regulatory preferences? list them

Projections:
1. Ally of US? how do we look by such agreements? what is in the agreement that points to this?
2. Does any of our existing agreements with other nations is affected by these documents with US? what are they?
3. What changes are made to EUMA, CISMOA, MLSA etc,, that is tied up to our plans?
4. How is it affecting our balanced relationship profile for the rest of the world we want to influence?
5. Do we have deep hand counter-proxy with US, so that we can face it with a service oriented nature with the Americans. IOW, leave us alone what we do, but here are the things you need to do. what are those?

If we answer these, then we have pretty much covered.

ShauryaT · Post by **ShauryaT** » 15 Apr 2016 19:03

Has PM Modi Developed Cold Feet Over The Logistics Agreement with the US? BHARAT KARNAD

But then, virtually at the last minute, Prime Minister Modi had second thoughts and stopped the proceedings in their track, leaving Parrikar to lamely announce at the end of the delegation-level talks that LEMOA was only “a concept” of logistics support. Moreover, seeking an escape route for the BJP government, he added, that this agreement could be “signed in months, if not weeks”. What was left unstated was that, if it meets with hostile reception and turns into a political liability, the timeline could well stretch to never. Like the impetuous announcement by Modi in Paris to buy 36 Rafale fighter aircraft and peremptorily bury the medium multi-role combat aircraft procurement process, the decision on LEMOA, initiated with much enthusiasm, too could become a bilateral issue without closure.

Parrikar has made much of the fact that LEMOA is limited in its ambit, and is not a license for stationing US troops and military wherewithal in this country. This is to miss the larger point that the mere fact of India’s agreeing to aiding and abetting the US in its military objectives is to compromise India, its national interest, and to introduce a foreign extraneous element into India’s strategic calculus and military decision-making. There will be no getting around the objective reality of US forces staging out of Indian bases and ports in military ventures India will have no say in. Absent Indian expeditionary policies, only the US will resupply in India – making this arrangement completely one-sided. The financial reimbursement for Indian supply of fuel, victuals, and other support, and for military infrastructure use, will do more to re-hyphenate India with Pakistan in US’ reckoning than almost anything else. Look at the hoops Islamabad has to jump through by way of US Congressional scrutiny to get the money legitimately owed it to understand the humiliations awaiting India.

While the response of the Leftist parties was along expected lines and the Congress party’s criticism a bit rich considering it was responsible for the 2008 civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the US that has stymied the country’s nuclear weapons capabilities, such reaction is precisely what the Modi government fears will allow the opposition parties to mock BJP’s “nationalist” credentials, make light of its patriotic effusions, and undermine its pretensions to militant guardianship of the national interest. This is no small political risk for the ruling dispensation to take because of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’s somewhat cautious attitude to its America-friendly overtures, but more worrisome still, of the Obama Administration’s actions, in the traditional US policy mould that are guaranteed to rile Indian public opinion – Washington’s transfer of F-16 combat aircraft and Viper attack helicopters to Pakistan even as it talks up friendship with India. With friends like the US, who needs enemies?

The foundational agreements also fail to address the core issue of whether and how political and military intimacy with the United States serves India’s national interest. Yes, it is a strategic imperative for India to counter and neutralize China. Yes, it helps for India to join the rimland or littoral states in Southeast and Northeast Asia in configuring a strategically effective collective security system designed to crimp Beijing’s room for military and diplomatic maneuver. Yes, the emerging scenario demands that India more proactively use and deploy its military forces and strategic fighting assets in concert with the other affected countries on China’s periphery, who singly cannot offer resistance to China but together can firm up a strong front against China. This much is basic geostrategics. Should the US want to join in such an organically Asian security enterprise, India should have no objection.

But it is definitely detrimental to India’s vital national interests, its reputation as a would-be great power and, not least, its amor propre, for the Modi government to reduce the country to another cog in the American military machine and accept legally binding agreements that will compel India to provide assistance to American forces in the Asian theatre on missions now and in the future that may directly imperil friendly regimes, such as in Iran, undermine Indian interest, and undermine long term Indian political goals and strategy. But of far greater significance is the potential harm that will be caused to relations India has nurtured over time with putative foes of the US – in the main Russia.

One had so desperately hoped – and this analyst was amongst the first to voice this hope as far back as 2011 -- that the advent of Modi, a plucky provincial politician, who had pulled himself up by his own bootstraps, would root a liberal rightwing Edmund Burke-ian type of conservatism in the country, an ideology based on liberty and small government, and one that put a premium on the individual’s desire to better his lot by the dint of his own effort, and in so doing improve society and country. Most of all, one fervently prayed for the articulation of a grand national vision and the injection of commonsensical precepts into foreign and strategic policies. Instead, the BJP regime has not deviated an iota from the Congress government’s pusillanimous approach and outlook. India continues to acquiesce in security schemes on terms dictated by extra-territorial powers -- US and China. For this to happen, rulers in New Delhi have had to be compliant and/or complicit, otherwise a country India’s size and potential simply cannot be manipulated.

UlanBatori · Post by **UlanBatori** » 15 Apr 2016 20:08

SaiK wrote:I started listing a bunch of questions from various online info...
If we answer these, then we have pretty much covered.

The second part of what I was going to write is that it may be time to learn from the Northern Neighbor:

Confucius say Wise Reader Sign Many Agleements In Princilpre, Fool Follows Them In Practice

The important thing is to have Agreements. Each follows those parts that suit them.

sudeepj · Post by **sudeepj** » 15 Apr 2016 20:52

deejay wrote:
sudeepj wrote:...

I have heard this story of how the US 'switched off GPS over Kashmir' during the Kargil crisis multiple times. But no first hand, authoritative source.. So if Chetak saab can provide one, itll be illuminating.

...
First hand account? Chetak ji, will write his stuff but here is mine and it is good three - four years after Kargil.

My own first hand account is of 2002-05 vintage from J&K. GPS was unreliable anywhere north of Banihal (including but not limited to Glacier). GPS feed would go haywire (and I have experienced the exacts moments when they conked off to Southern Hemisphere) approaching places West or North West of Rajouri. By this time we were flying helicopters with cockpit fitted GPS. I have flown with hand held GPS in NEastern parts where we would never use them in Op areas.

Also, GPS signals did not provide steady locks (not degradation) in hills or in heavy weather.

Thanks Deejay ji! This is very interesting indeed..

For some casual debugging:

What were the kind of GPS receivers that were fitted in the cockpits? Were these certified for use as Nav aids in airplanes? Or more of a jugaad using devices that were handheld type?

Was this consistent in specific areas? As in, you go to place XYZ, and GPS just would not work. Was it that all fixes produced were garbage or fixes had occasional outliers? Did these bad fixes appear at specific altitudes? (closer to the ground? higher up?) Was there a gradual degradation in the fix quality over, say 10-50 kms or it was more sudden.. As in, you cross this lat-lon and bam, your receiver goes for a toss.

Asking some really specific questions, did you (or someone in Signals) try to figure out what was going wrong with the receivers? (For instance, Inability to see Satellites, inability to track, signal strength dropping by several dbHz in specific areas? Lots of jammer signals?)

Thanks again! And pranams for your service to mother India!

sudeepj · Post by **sudeepj** » 15 Apr 2016 20:58

Austin wrote:
Mort Walker wrote:GPS signals are very weak and can easily be spoofed. Being drastically off in time and distance is not at all surprising. If the Russians or anyone else were relying on GPS for navigation for their air force, then it is a mistake. Similarly, the Russians can spoof GLONASS and none of these navigation systems are reliable. The IRNSS by ISRO is the best option for India. To get accurate navigation you need at least 3 satellites. Right now IRNSS has 6 sats operational and 1 more coming on-line soon for a total of 7 planned.
The Russians were not relying on GPS but the point that came out was Jamming was deliberate to prevent the use of Wepons and Navigation relying on GPS , Atleast thats the lesson learnt by them in both instances.

The Georgians were likely using the Mil Grade Signals hence not subject to same problems , But you are right we must not depend on any external means , IIRC there was also a case of GPS Blink during Brahmos test in Rajasthan that CEO mentioned

If you are using civilian GPS receivers, jamming can be done by many sources and is fairly easy. Georgians may have been able to procure these jammers from any number of sources and could have been operating them. That GPS signals were jammed does not imply that it was the US govt. or CIA that did the jamming. Even IRNSS signals will be susceptible to the same kind of jamming. The only solution is to develop technologies to locate the jammers effectively and destroy them.

*Btw. Even the technology to detect at least some types of jammers is fairly easy.

V_Raman · Post by **V_Raman** » 15 Apr 2016 21:08

For asymmetric options, I can think of couple
Treaty with SriLanka along the lines of what we have with Bhutan/Nepal and take over their defence - if this can be pulled off. This will make P5 sit up and take action. We could work with USA to give them access to bases in SL to make this go through.

Clandestine collaboration with China on engines using Kaveri technology. I have not thought this through though. This will make P5 sit up and take action. USA especially. What can they do?

deejay · Post by **deejay** » 15 Apr 2016 21:31

sudeepj wrote:...

Thanks Deejay ji! This is very interesting indeed.. For some casual debugging:

What were the kind of GPS receivers that were fitted in the cockpits? Were these certified for use as Nav aids in airplanes? Or more of a jugaad using devices that were handheld type?

Was this consistent in specific areas? As in, you go to place XYZ, and GPS just would not work. Was it that all fixes produced were garbage or fixes had occasional outliers? Did these bad fixes appear at specific altitudes? (closer to the ground? higher up?)

Asking some really specific questions, did you (or someone in Signals) try to figure out what was going wrong with the receivers? (For instance, Inability to see Satellites, inability to track, signal strength dropping by several dbHz in specific areas? Lots of jammer signals?)

Thanks again! And pranams for your service to mother India!

OT here so briefly.

These devices were not Jugaad but properly fabricated and mated devices with regular data updates for coverage area received from wherever they were subscribed. It is fairly long back hence my memory fails me on the exact name of the device.

They were usually consistent except in high hills and extreme bad weather (big multi cell CB buid up in the area). Back then GPS were not even considered as authorised NavAids by DGCA or IAF hence we could not use them for airfield approaches. Though, more and more folks were relying a lot on GPS wherever it worked for direction finding / route plotting. It saved a lot of time.

GPS is/was excellent for Ground Speed and Time to destination (ETA) etc. Specially when trying to make Time Over Target (TOT). TOT leeway was usually +/- 3 secs so a high degree of accuracy was required. General brief to all crew was to keep map handy at all times, GPS to be avoided close to border and/or have multi mode navigation as in Map, VOR/DME, Doppler Nav and GPS.

Altitude vs accuracy correlation is not a very relevant question for a helicopter pilot since we are low and slow

and happy about it.

We did not have expertise available to determine the reasons for signal drop off. IAF was specific that GPS were an add on and not the main navigation aid.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 15 Apr 2016 21:51

So LEMOA is for disaster relief operations from Indian perspective!

What a fall.

Cosmo_R · Post by **Cosmo_R** » 15 Apr 2016 21:59

svinayak wrote:[
China! China! China!

Why India need to buy X-xx planes from another country - Because of China
Why India need to sign the SLA - because of China
Why India need to patrol the seas with another country - because of China.

It is all about China which makes India take action. What about Indian needs!
Will India's border problem be solved with this.- Nobody can answer

The last time I heard something like this was in the late 1950s where JLN watched as PRC devoured Tibet despite entreaties from the US to be allowed to intervene . China! China! the alarmists cried. The navel gazers of the time responded with "Not a blade of grass grows there, why needle our Asian comrades, Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai."

Then came 1962 and we sent our unprepared/unequipped soldiers to their deaths and JLN pleaded in his letters for help from the US.

PRC is currently attempting to devour the SCS zone and pick off countries one by one. Finally, they will turn their attention to us.

The India-PRC border 'problem' gets solved when they dare not cross it in anger. That's how states work. What absolutely does not work is hand wringing, doing nothing and importuning. We let them get away with land grabs in the 1950s and 1960s and did nothing. GoI even did nothing to build infrastructure near the border fearing it would 'needle' China and hurt border resolution until very recently.

If want to continue to paralyze ourselves by giving PRC a de facto veto over our relationships (e.g. LEMOA) with other states, we might as well preparing for the next Durbar.

All in all, Obama is an idiot when it comes to dealing with India and Pakistan. But foreign relations in the US are institutionalized. There is broad consensus that there is significant convergence of strategic interest between India/US and Japan. There is also broad consensus that GoI has no clue at a strategic level of what its real geopolitical interests and goals are other than a Garboesque "I vant to be alone." refrain.