Postby JE Menon » 21 Apr 2016 13:58
>>JEM, one problem with that statement - strategy is shaped to protect business and the direction of military engagement follows.
I don't necessarily agree with that statement, but let's say it does not matter to this particular discussion and you're right.
>>The US defended Western Europe during the Cold war to keep those economies and their productive capabilities from being added to the Soviets basket. Same with Japan. As a result of giving them free access to its own markets, those economies and their fortunes (a substantial sum) are intertwined with those of the US. The US cannot let Japan and the other economies of SE Asia be dominated and coerced into an alliance with China for the want of another option.
So far I cannot see anything to contradict what I have said above.
>>The broad gist of US expectations of India is for it to take a committed stance far as that theater is concerned. Whether the US supports Pakistan, or it's past behaviour elsewhere in the world is completely irrelevant to our interest in keeping China in check.
Here there is a clear difference. Frankly, my position on this (as described above) cares only minimally if at all for "US expectations of India" - whether it is to take a "committed stance" or any thing else. Hence my stress on having a transactional relationship. Maybe you misunderstood what I meant by transactional. What I envisage is this. We have "Scenario A". In that scenario, both India and the US will look at how far our interests converge and come to a deal on that particular scenario based on give and take. The LEMOA will create a foundation within which the deal can be executed within the legal frameworks of the US and India without having to negotiate certain fundamentals every time. We can look at Scenario A and tell them, this time no deal. You got yourself into this mess which we (probably) advised against. Kindly extract yourself. Or they can tell us the same.
>>Just like it is China's core interests to keep India bogged down with Pakistan, it is ours to keep China hemmed in, in its own backyard. On that score, our interests lie entirely with the US camp. No other country is capable of shaping an alliance to moderate China's behaviour.
My sense is that this is incorrect on several levels. First of all, I start with the assumption that every country, and I mean EVERY country (including Tonga) is operating on this fundamental principle: "India should be reduced in territorial size, cut up into parts, and those parts should be further subdivided and ruled by me alone or by me with in an alliance with others. To this end, I will work to attack it on all fronts in order to weaken it, to exploit its internal differences, to undermine its sense of itself, its identity and civilisational heritage, and its sense of hope for itself and the future of its people". Broadly speaking. In short, we have zero friends, zero allies, zero well wishers. Everything that contradicts the above assumption is a bonus, with an uncertain time limit.
All that we do, everything in terms of advancement of strategic interest, is aimed at minimising the possibility of the above quoted passage coming to fruition, and to the contrary, increasing our wealth, our territorial space, our ability to act with autonomy, and our position on this planet as a civilisation of prominence and strength. To this end, we will use sama, dhana, bheda, danda to the best of our ability.
So, yes, it is in our interest to ensure that China does not circumscribe our ability to do the above, but that does not mean our "interests lie entirely in the US camp". We also have an interest in moderating US behaviour, Russian behaviour, German behaviour, British behaviour and French behaviour, etc. For this, we will work with the others where possible. Nor does it mean that the US is the only power that can moderate Chinese behaviour. Others can do so in different ways. What it does mean is that what we do has to be well informed, well calibrated in terms of our objectives, and therefore considered not just with the tactical exigency in mind, but also the long view. An India that is roiling is not good for the world, but neither is a China in that position or a US, or an EU. We have to be dharmic in our worldview, and let it sink over time that greater intervals between violent globalised confrontations is part of what that entails. That can only be assured by having consummate wealth, and military power that matches our worldview.
>>If our business interests become heavily intertwined with Japan's, which is the direction in which we're heading, it is not possible to have a transactional relationship with Japan on a military level anymore. Their security interests are ours. We can still choose to take different stances on Pakistan, our immediately neighbourhood excluding Pakistan, the middle east or anywhere else.
I think Secretary Jaishankar has stated our view clearly: "leverage the dominant, collaborate with the convergent, and manage the competition". Too clearly in my view...but I'm paranoid.