Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
^Touched by their concern for our real interests.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Debt-ridden Sri Lanka snuggles up to China again at India’s expense - Sachin Parashar, ToI
Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles,Mauritius, Djibouti & Pakistan are gone cases where Chinese money has made them debt-ridden without any possibility of wriggling out of Chinese clutches.India is hoping to host Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena this month for a multi-religious event at Ujjain which will be inaugurated by PM Narendra Modi. The visit by Sirisena, if it happens, will come at a time when India's strategic gains in the island nation over the past 15 months, or since the ouster of Sirisena's predecessor Mahinda Rajapaksa, seem to be fast petering out.
India was looking to sign an Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement (ETCA) with Sri Lanka, which the two countries decided to negotiate after Lanka backed out of CEPA, but the proposal has run into resistance from the Rajapaksa-led Joint Opposition. China has managed to not just revive its flagship $1.4 billion Colombo Port City project, but it is now also engaged in expansion of major infrastructure projects it built in the past and which were seen as impracticable until recently.
These projects include expansion of the Hambantota port and the Mattala airport which were built by the Chinese under Rajapaksa and whose commercial viability was always suspect. China and Sri Lanka, in fact, are now also considering setting up an SEZ in what is also Rajapaksa's home district.
While Sri Lanka has assured India that it won't allow China any outright ownership of land as part of the Colombo Port project, its revival of Chinese projects, according to strategic affairs expert Brahma Chellaney, is likely to have a long-term geopolitical significance.
"Lanka, under Maithripala Sirisena's government, has reversed course and is returning into China's embrace, in part because of its precarious balance-of-payments situation and in part because Indian diplomacy still lacks teeth," says Chellaney.
Sri Lanka owes $8 billion as debt to China and it announced recently that it was looking to convert a portion of this debt into equity for infrastructure investment by Chinese companies.
As India implores China to distance itself from terrorists operating out of Pakistan, Chellaney says Sirisena's government knows that India will impose no strategic costs for reviving the very Chinese projects that Sirisena had put on hold after coming to power. {This is why there must be visible costs imposed on Pakistan for its terrorism against us. Nobody could be faulted for us being toothless} "It now appears that Rajapaksa's ouster only temporarily represented a setback for China's 'string of pearls' strategy in the Indian Ocean," he says.
In fact, after PM Ranil Wickremesinghe's visit to China last month during which he reiterated Lanka's endorsement of Beijing's Maritime Silk Road, Rajapaksa was quoted as saying that he stood vindicated by the Lankan government's recent actions.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
western MSM finally gets it about China and Pakistan.....
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/gward ... ay-n558236
I think Gwardar will make a great Chinese city........
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/gward ... ay-n558236
I think Gwardar will make a great Chinese city........
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
India has let its economic potential decline by chaotic policies and idiotic, corrupt politicians! Industrialists are treated like common criminals while they operate under one of the harshest business climate in the world. India has criminals for tax officials. If these chaps (customs, sales, excise, income tax) were audited in Saudi Arabia, they would all be hung!! Instead we set the country's enforcement apparatuses after industrialists.
Without a solid industrial base, how can India oppose China? Sri Lanka and Bangladesh will slip away to China. What can India offer her neighbors? We import all military hardware from Russia, Israel, US, France and UK. In economic terms, Indians seem to prefer importing even bananas from overseas.
Modiji has shown no ability to spark domestic industry. The Make in India though a noble, lofty ideal, its implementation is laughable. We need a long term plan to correct the industrial decline and freedom for industries from political interference. Shutting down Kingfisher is easy. Keeping it running is more difficult.
Without a solid industrial base, how can India oppose China? Sri Lanka and Bangladesh will slip away to China. What can India offer her neighbors? We import all military hardware from Russia, Israel, US, France and UK. In economic terms, Indians seem to prefer importing even bananas from overseas.
Modiji has shown no ability to spark domestic industry. The Make in India though a noble, lofty ideal, its implementation is laughable. We need a long term plan to correct the industrial decline and freedom for industries from political interference. Shutting down Kingfisher is easy. Keeping it running is more difficult.
Last edited by Vivek K on 30 Apr 2016 22:19, edited 2 times in total.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
the packees think the chinese are going to hire local abduls.
it won't happen. it'll be all chinese workers.
just like in the US. no chinese business hires US workers, they will import their labor illegally.......and we let them get by with it,
I hate globalists and all their ilk.
it won't happen. it'll be all chinese workers.
just like in the US. no chinese business hires US workers, they will import their labor illegally.......and we let them get by with it,
I hate globalists and all their ilk.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
India's myopic vision that thinks overcoming current challenges (Pakistan and China) are its ultimate end game is the problem. Indians need to determine their role in the world and then aim to accomplish that role. Otherwise, everyone needs to learn Mandarin.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
you can't get people on this forum to even agree on doing business w/o endless rants about ToT, recriminations of colonialism, or even agree that China should be challenged in SE Asia. It's all Packee centric and of course India's greatest enemy, America. never mind the fact that the US is India's greatest positive balance trading partner.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Well TS - honestly you must admit that US is a friend of only Israel, England and perhaps Australia! For the rest of the world, if US interests coincide with your world view and circumstance, then you can be a US ally. However when these interests change, the partner needs to fend for themselves.
This policy in itself is not bad. It is the good times rhetoric, that most people remember after iUS interests move on elsewhere. US is not India's enemy,but it isn't an all weather friend yet. And perhaps that is how democracies should interact!
This policy in itself is not bad. It is the good times rhetoric, that most people remember after iUS interests move on elsewhere. US is not India's enemy,but it isn't an all weather friend yet. And perhaps that is how democracies should interact!
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Look at it from the reverse logic. USA allows trade in those items that are beneficial to it. There is no way USA can produce low cost goods/services that India sells to the USA.TSJones wrote:you can't get people on this forum to even agree on doing business w/o endless rants about ToT, recriminations of colonialism, or even agree that China should be challenged in SE Asia. It's all Packee centric and of course India's greatest enemy, America. never mind the fact that the US is India's greatest positive balance trading partner.
Following link should give you the trading reality from Indian standpoint:
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms ... ntry-chart
Items marked with "X" require licensing/not permitted for trade. This export chart is for anything related to electronics, technology, IT etc. As previous post mentions, the list of trading partner(s) is very clear from the chart. Canada seems brotherly. Western Europe and Australia are friends.
The reality is USA makes a lot of items that we ( India ) wants to buy. So the relationship is sweet as of now.
The right analogy would be: If I want to buy a DELL PC, I am the customer(buyer) and DELL is seller. The relationship is buyer-seller ( not a strategic partnership, at least not yet ).
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
The relationship can only be buyer and seller. Our interests do not align and will never align since we are not even in the same continent. That said there is nothing wrong in collaborating in matters if mutual interest.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
SSridhar wrote:Now, India denies visa to Chinese dissident Lu Jinguh, activist Ra Wong - PTIIncreasingly becoming inexplicable & ridiculous, unless the following has any bearing.After cancelling Chinese dissident Dolkun Isa's visa, India has denied visas to another Chinese dissident Lu Jinguh and activist Ra Wong who were coming to attend a conference in Dharamshala on democracy and China.
"As fas as Lu Jinghua's visa is concerned, her documents were illegible and there was inconsistency with the purpose of her visit. Insofar as Ray Wong is concerned, there was data inconsistency in his documents. As such visas were not issued to both these individuals so question of revocation does not arise," a government source said here.
Lu is a well-known Tiananmen activist, while Ra is a Hong Kong-based activist.
According to reports, Lu claimed that she was told that her visa was cancelled and was stopped from boarding an Air India flight from New York. She also claimed that she had received am email confirmation for an electronic visa.
Earlier this week, the visa to Isa, a leader of World Uyghur Congress (WUC) who lives in Germany and had been invited for the conference this week being organised by US-based 'Initiatives for China', was cancelled. The Indian action was seen by many as buckling under Chinese pressure.
Meanwhile, India defended its decision to revoke the visa of Dolkun Isa, saying that he had "suppressed" facts while obtaining it but admitted that China had made its position clear to New Delhi that it should honour the Interpol Red Corner notice against him.
"Isa applied for a tourist visa under the electronic travel authorisation system. He was accordingly granted the visa. After obtaining the visa, Isa stated publicly that he was coming to attend a conference in India. A fact which was suppressed in the visa form and something that a tourist visa does not permit.
"Further more it came to the notice of authorities that Isa was subject of a Interpol Red Corner notice," external affairs ministry spokesperson Vikas Swarup said.
X Posted from the “Indian Foreign Policy” thread.ManSingh wrote:http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/ind ... P1kpJ.html
Seem to be favoring one group over another.
In the end the BJP led Government of our Prime Minister Narendra Modi has shown some cojones and supported the legitimate aspirations of freedom for Peoples Republic of China occupied Xinjiang not to mention the Maoist oppressed people of the PRC as well.
India allows Uyghur, 8 Chinese dissidents to attend Dharamsala meeting
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
The referenced Global Times article titled "India’s Sino-US hedging sticks to old balance " by Shi Lancha who is described as "a visiting scholar at Tsinghua University":SSridhar wrote:'India's self-contradictory actions may land it in trouble' - PTIIndia's efforts to manoeuvre nimbly to forge closer ties with the US while stepping up dialogue with China and its "self-contradictory actions" in the foreign policy front may land it in a "difficult position", Chinese media warned today.
"While the lack of political leadership and ideological self-doubt regarding non-alignment hindered previous Indian governments, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is better positioned to manoeuvre nimbly and therefore take seemingly self-contradictory actions in his foreign policymaking," an article in the website of the state-run Global Times said.
"In mid-February, a US military official revealed that the Indian Navy would join the US in patrolling South China Sea. Although the Indian side soon denied such joint patrols, Modi's government has clearly taken a bolder stance on China- related issues in the region than its predecessors," it said.
"Not only did the Indian ambassador publicly articulate support for the Philippine's claims in the South China Sea arbitration case, Indian decision-makers also echoed the US, Japan, and Australia in hardening its position against China on the maritime disputes there," the article said.
While India announced plans to sign Logistic Supply Agreement (LSA) getting access to the US bases, it also ramped up contacts with China, it said.
"Against the backdrop of a series of preceding ominous events, the Modi administration's newly staged three-way dialogue with the Chinese leadership involving the foreign minister, defence minister and national security advisor is actually revealing," it said, referring to recent meetings of the top Indian officials with their Chinese counterparts.
"While the previous UPA government led by Manmohan Singh was bogged down by rampant internal divisions and unable to act decisively, the Modi administration can now nimbly manoeuvre and pursue a more dramatic policy vis-a-vis China, even though sometimes such policies may appear self-contradictory or even paradoxical," it said.
Despite the Indian government's dramatic postures concerning major power relations, Modi actually maintains the old-school "balance of power" strategy, the article said.
"That's why Sino-Indian relations have seen a cascade of of tensions that were unconventionally followed by another series of warm diplomatic exchanges," it added.
"In New Delhi's calculation vis-a-vis China, swinging back and forth may well create strategic leverage that can be more effective than simply deferring to China's presumed opposition against India's interaction with a third party on the sensitive issues.
"For example, India might use the unsigned draft LSA with the US to create some unconventional leverage in the three forthcoming meetings with Chinese leadership," it said.
"However, New Delhi also has to remember that such flip-flops on major power relations may also put itself in a difficult position. Considering that the low-hanging fruit, if there was any, has already been plucked, such strategy may amount to little at the end of the day," it said.
India’s Sino-US hedging sticks to old balance
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
By cancelling Dolkun Isa's visa, India has unwittingly sanctified the Chinese definition of who is a terrorist - Sunil Fernandes, Economic Times
If the Chinese were to declare the Dalai Lama a terrorist and issue a red corner notice against him, will the Indian government throw him out of the country? Just when I was getting ready to compliment the Centre for displaying some rare foreign policy steel in dealing with the Chinese and bravely issuing a visa for human rights activist Dolkun Isa to visit India for a conference on Uyghurs (an ethnic minority, native to Xinjiang in northern China, and whose problems with mainland China are startlingly similar to those of Kashmir with the rest of India {This is a patently wrong, and stupid comparison though he explains it unconvincingly later on. Apart from that, the article is a good read}), the government does an embarrassing volte-face and cancels the visa that it had issued barely a day ago.
If the intent behind issuing the visa in the first place was to administer a diplomatic tit-for tat to China for its recent blocking of Masood Azhar's designation as a global terrorist in the UN, then we have managed to score a spectacular own goal. This visa-cancellation saga has several ramifications that go beyond the usual capitulation to Chinese threats by India. By cancelling Isa's visa, India has unwittingly accepted and sanctified the Chinese definition of who a "terrorist" is and what constitutes "terrorism".
In China, anyone who does not promptly proclaim the Chinese version of "Lal salaam" is a "terrorist". Is this the definition India and the democratic nations of the world are keen to adopt?
Rather than succumbing to the Chinese pressure, India should have resolutely refused to accept the definition of a "terrorist" by a totalitarian, oligarchic, undemocratic regime which denies basic human and political rights to its citizens. Several human and political rights that are considered par in any country practising the basic form of democracy are outlawed in China. Attempting to form a political party; holding a public rally and seeking a redress of grievances in a non-violent, peaceful manner; and demanding separation of powers between the various arms of the government can result in your being branded as a "criminal" or "terrorist", or both by the Chinese state. If you are caught within its borders, you land up in jail and suffer interminable incarceration after a quick farcial (sic) trial. If you are abroad, like Dolkun Isa is, you are an international pariah and live in perpetual fear of being arrested and deported to China, courtesy of the red corner notice and the attendant diplomatic arm-twisting of countries that dare to host the "terrorist".
Beware of Coercion
The ostensible reason offered for revocation of Isa's visa was that India should not be seen as going back on its stand that there aren't good or bad terrorists; and that one mustn't differentiate between terrorists as is presumably done by Pakistan and China, and treat them all alike. All terrorists are bad. Period.
This is a deeply flawed argument. It is preposterous to place Dolkun Isa and Masood Azhar in the same scales. Unlike Azhar, Isa does not run terrorist training camps in mountainous hideouts. He doesn't send trained, armed insurgents across borders to infiltrate foreign nations and cause killings and mayhem. He doesn't hijack planes or promise eternal heaven to suicide bombers. Isa has always articulated his opposition to Chinese repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang in the most peaceful and civil manner. There is simply no comparison and the Indian government ought to firmly reject any Chinese attempt to coerce it to adhere to its warped definition of who constitutes a terrorist. In the diplomatic world inhabited by the Chinese, Masood Azhar isn't a terrorist but Dolkun Isa is: this is as perverse and self-serving as it can get.
If it is Dolkun Isa today, it may very well be the Dalai Lama tomorrow. How far will the Indian government bend to accommodate "Chinese concerns"? The bad news is that this bullying is going to get worse in the coming years. China is well on its way to overtake the US, as world's largest economic and military power and, when that happens, China will seek to fully capitalise on its pre-eminent military might and economic heft. One only needs to observe the carefully calibrated yet unmistakably hostile Chinese strategic pursuits via-a-vis India — be it the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passing through PoK territories historically claimed by India), the OBOR (One Belt One Road Initiative), or the String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean — to understand that if India fails to stand up to the Chinese now, while it still can, it may forever surrender the possibility of resisting Chinese armtwisting in the future.
There are some interesting parallels between the Uyghurs and Kashmiri separatists. The differences that the Uyghurs of Xinjiang have with mainland China are — ethnic (Central Asian vs Han), religious (Islam vs Communism), linguistic (Turkic vs Chinese), cultural and geographic. These are similar to what is claimed by Kashmiri separatists vis-a-vis India. But China doesn't have a proto-Article 370 and other special laws for Xinjiang and Uighyurs as India has for Kashmir.
Consequently, today, under a decades old, deliberate, state-sponsored policy, the Han Chinese, and not the Uighyurs, are almost in a majority in Xinjiang province. This is how Pakistan's "all-weather friend" treats its minorities. Not to speak of the equally cavalier manner in which it treats dissidents.
After Isa, India has cancelled visas to two other Chinese dissidents: Lu Jinghua, known for her role in the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, and Ray Wong, who advocates greater autonomy for Hong Kong. Both were to attend a conference in Dharamshala and meet the exiled Tibetan leader Dalai Lama.
Is democratic, freedom-loving India going to hold its silence, forever, rather than take on a bullying communist dictatorship?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
India, China Armies’ meet cordial - PTI
The Armies of India and China on Sunday expressed resolve to maintain peace along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with their senior commanders holding two border meets in Chinese and Ladakh region as part of efforts to build cordial ties.
To uphold treaties
Both the Armies, which met on the occasion of the International Labour Day, agreed to uphold the treaties and agreements signed between the governments of the two sides, during two ceremonial Border Personnel Meetings (BPMs) on the Chinese and the Indian sides on Sunday, a defence spokesman said here.
The meetings took place at Chinese BPM Hut of Moldo and TWD Garrison in Eastern Ladakh, the spokesman said.
“The delegation parted amidst feeling of friendship and commitment towards enhancing the existing cordial relations and maintaining peace along the LAC.
“Both sides also sought to build on the mutual feeling to uphold the treaties and agreement signed between the governments of the two sides to maintain peace and tranquillity along the LAC,” he said.
At Moldo, the Indian delegation was led by Major General Sudhakar Jee and the Chinese delegation by senior Col Zhan Peng Zhung and at TWD, Lt. Col. RC Barthwal, SM and Col. Song Zhan Li led the Indian and Chinese delegations respectively.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
I sometimes doubt if this is actually true -India has let its economic potential decline by chaotic policies and idiotic, corrupt politicians! Many, including me have at times become annoyed with the fossilised Indian bureaucracy and its wanton promotion of vested interests, perhaps at the detriment of the common populace. Though there might be some element of truth, perhaps there might be more to it. Its claimed our GDP grew less than 2% pa from independence to 1991 and then it took off. Though the 2% growth era was bad there is no evidence than from 1991 to now the things have got an awful lot better. If you measure the economy based on the dated western models of Milton Friedman i.e. things that can be measured, we can say China is an industrial power house. But Chinese produce things for foreign markets. They do not do it for their local markets, though they are trying to reverse this policy, there is no guarantee that it will work. While Modi might be trying foolishly to promote the failed Chinese model of manufacturing, at least he is doing the correct things of making the basic living standards for common Indians better. Without giving the common man an ability to earn, there perhaps will not be much of future. Irrespective of whether he succeeds or not, there is a perceptible annoyance shown by aam abduls towards Modi's inability to bridge the gap between increasing national productivity and improving the quality of life at the same time.Vivek K wrote:India has let its economic potential decline by chaotic policies and idiotic, corrupt politicians! Industrialists are treated like common criminals while they operate under one of the harshest business climate in the world. India has criminals for tax officials. If these chaps (customs, sales, excise, income tax) were audited in Saudi Arabia, they would all be hung!! Instead we set the country's enforcement apparatuses after industrialists.
Without a solid industrial base, how can India oppose China? Sri Lanka and Bangladesh will slip away to China. What can India offer her neighbors? We import all military hardware from Russia, Israel, US, France and UK. In economic terms, Indians seem to prefer importing even bananas from overseas.
Modiji has shown no ability to spark domestic industry. The Make in India though a noble, lofty ideal, its implementation is laughable. We need a long term plan to correct the industrial decline and freedom for industries from political interference. Shutting down Kingfisher is easy. Keeping it running is more difficult.
Its better we understand that the western model of doing business i.e. crony=capitalism is dead. The supply side and demand side should be balanced out for any model to work. And that's what Modi is trying. In Britain they are asking should they shut down Port Talbot steel plant which Tata decided to give up or should government bail them out. No government bailout is in sight. In US, after 2008 crash, there was no similar discussion if they should allow big banks to fail or should they be bailed out. Of course they were bailed out. Are you suggesting the government should bail out KIngfisher? Just like they are bailing out the nationalised banks by making whole their losses incurred on account of poor business practices which lead to 18% NPA's?
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 6#p1425646
While Vilayat ji can expand on his perspective, the underlying point is - Government should not interfere in businesses. What EIC did and what congis did is not what Modi should do. Even if that means current entrenched businesses fail. And in the coming years, many like Infosys will fail.Vilayat wrote:As EIC's zone of influence increased drastically (post 1803), the empire of business houses such as these increase as well. The hold of British on India became absolute after 1858 and many business houses jumped in British wagon saluting the rising sun (this includes the Marwadi business houses which are at forefront now - The Birlaa, Mittal etc. One has to understand that the family names is not the correct way of tracing the capital. Many families today were known by different names in 18th century. The marital alliances and other things (including royal favors) shift the equilibrium of capital flow. One pointer from Topé's book shows Sindhia faction of marathas owning most of the capital and banking networks of Central India (which includes Khandesh-malwa-Mewad-Marwad-Bundelkhand-Nimad region - Basically today's MP, Rajasthan, G ujaratand Northern Maharashtra). This entire network shifted to EIC after 1858. (this means basically all Marwadi and Mewadi business houses and their predecessors which we see today).
8. This hindu vaishya network did not venture (or was it that it was not allowed to venture?) in basic industries like Iron&steel, Shipbuilding and others. Hindu Business houses were kept limited to banking and financial sector. Slowly after 1857, other Non-Hindu business houses too were eased out of heavy industry (Wadia included) and they made a shift in textile and other industries. Wadias, however, still retain some of their hold on Ship-Breaking industry in Gujarat. Tatas were first who were allowed to venture in Iron&Steel manufacturing sector. No Hindu Business house actually ventured here until rise of Mittals and Jindals post independence....
Reliance gatecrashing first into the entrenched elite club of traditional industrialists of India and then in the petroleum industry is one of the turning points in India's history. Who backs them, how could they pull this off are questions that can be answered by the means of speculations alone. The conspiracy theorists have named everyone from Rockefellers to Rothchilds behind rise of Ambanis, but it is really irrelevant.
13. This gate-crashing coupled with geopolitics of late 80s and liberalization policies of PVNR forced Indian vaishya community (both Hindu and non-Hindu) to shift their outlooks.
14. The shipbuilding industry is still not in hands of Indian OR hindu vaishya house. Something is not allowing them to exploit the complete potential of Indian Iron&Steel Industry and Chemical Industry. (this is topic of one other post I am planning to make - Rise of European chemical giants after debacle of India in 1858). Someone made a similar post on BRF few months ago (perhaps Ramana).
15. India needs thousands of Dhirubhais gatecrashing the party. This is how Hindus can reclaim their right on the lost capital and decide its fate as they have since eternity until 1858.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Wary of China's Indian Ocean activities, US and India discuss anti-submarine warfare - Reuters, Economic Times
India and the United States are in talks to help each other track submarines in the Indian Ocean, military officials say, a move that could further tighten defense ties between New Delhi and Washington as China steps up its undersea activities.
Both the United States and India are growing concerned at the reach and ambition of the Chinese navy, which is taking an increasingly assertive stance in the South China Sea and is challenging India's domination in the Indian Ocean.
New Delhi, shedding its decades-old reluctance to be drawn into America's embrace, agreed last month to open up its military bases to the United States in exchange for access to weapons technology to help it narrow the gap with China.
The two sides also said their navies will hold talks on anti submarine warfare (ASW), an area of sensitive military technology and closely held tactics that only allies share. {That's why the US wants CISMOA to be signed}
"These types of basic engagements will be the building blocks for an enduring Navy-to-Navy relationship that we hope will grow over time into a shared ASW capability," one US official familiar with India-US military cooperation said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Indian naval officials say Chinese submarines have been sighted on an average four times every three months. Some are seen near India's Andamans and Nicobar islands that lie near the Malacca Straits, the entry to the South China Sea through which more than 80 percent of China's fuel supplies pass.
India and the United States, which already conduct joint naval exercises, both fly the new version of the P-8 aircraft, making information sharing easier on highly sensitive submarine tracking activities.
The P-8 is Washington's most advanced submarine hunting weapon, equipped with sensors that can track and identify submarines by sonar and other means.
An Indian naval spokesman declined to comment on the proposed anti-submarine warfare cooperation with the United States.
But an Indian naval source, briefed on the discussions, said the focus of the next set of joint exercises to take place in the northern Philippine Sea in June will be on anti-submarine warfare.
Japan, a close US ally whose submarines are believed to track Chinese submarines in the western Pacific, will also be a participant in the exercises.
INTENSE SURVEILLANCE
Two linked factors are driving the co-operation, say regional military attaches and security experts.
The prospect of active patrols by nuclear-armed Chinese submarines has sparked intense surveillance activity around the China's southern submarine base on Hainan Island, and nearby waters.
India, meanwhile, is preparing to launch its first locally-built submarine armed with nuclear tipped missiles.
So just as US attack submarines are seeking to track the Chinese nuclear armed submarines in the Pacific, the Chinese are expected to send their own attack submarines to the Indian Ocean in greater numbers to scrutinize the Indian patrols.
Collin Koh, a submarine expert at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said increased US submarine and surveillance activity was being seen across the region.
"We will see the Indian Ocean grow in importance, too, particularly around traditional chokeholds, such as the approaches to the Malacca Straits and the Nicobar islands, so an improved US relationship with the major submarine player in the area, India, is very significant," Koh said.
BOLSTERING INDIAN CAPABILITIES
Initially, the United States as the world leader in anti-submarine warfare is likely to be bolstering Indian capabilities in the field.
But in time, experts say each country could be covering stretches of the Indian Ocean through which two-thirds of the world's trade moves.
David Brewster, an expert on the strategic rivalry in Indian Ocean at the Australian National University, said anti submarine warfare collaboration may eventually include Australia, another US ally which just ordered 12 new submarines.
"We are likely to ultimately see a division of responsibilities in the Indian Ocean between those three countries, and with the potential to also share facilities."
China for its part is seeking to secure its energy and trade transportation links by building ports and other infrastructure for countries such as Sri Lanka that lie along the vital shipping route.
Asked about collaboration between India and the United States on submarine warfare, Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for China's Foreign Ministry, said China had noted countries in the region engaging in military cooperation.
"We hope that the relevant cooperation is normal, and that it can be meaningful to the peace and stability of the region," she said.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
....don't worry, India will turn down anti sub cooperation. too provocative......
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
There is a price for everything, something that the US understands very well. . .
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China unveils new security doctrine to counter U.S. ‘Pivot to Asia’ - Atul Aneja, The Hindu
China has announced the failure of the “Rebalance” strategy of the United States, and has invited Asian countries to join Beijing in framing a security governance model with “Asian features”.
China’s formal invite to neighbours to pursue a regional security doctrine that is led by Beijing, and not the United States, came during last week’s foreign ministerial Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in the Chinese capital.
Xi’s call to step up dialogue
A commentary in the People’s Daily, China’s official newspaper, pointed out that at the welcome ceremony of the CICA conference, President Xi Jiniping urged participants “to build consensus and step up dialogue” to foster “a security governance model with Asian features.” The write-up said that the “new model” is the latest contribution China has made to regional governance.
Details about what could emerge as China-centric collective security architecture in the Asia-Pacific is still a work-in-progress. The People’s Daily commentary, for instance, only mentioned that, “‘Asian features’ include openness and inclusiveness, and China strongly opposes exclusivity.”
“As ‘Pivot to Asia’ failed”
The write-up grounded the rationale for its new initiative, on the failure of the “Pivot to Asia” or “rebalance” doctrine of the Obama administration. It asserted that “the launch of the Asia-Pacific Rebalance strategy by the U.S. in recent years did not bring Asia peace, but only uncertainty.” It added: “It proved that a U.S.-led alliance system is not the right option to safeguard the peace and stability of Asia. Instead, a system of security governance with Asian features, as suggested by China, will be best for Asian development.”
But stiffness in ties vis-à-vis SCS
Yet, the stiffness in ties with some of its Asian neighbours, especially Vietnam and the Philippines over rival territorial claims in the South China Sea (SCS), suggests that the Chinese may have flagged a new initiative, but they must now be prepared for the long haul, in order to achieve tangible results.
Tensions between the U.S and China have spiked, after the Chinese responded to the “Pivot to Asia” with fresh activism in the SCS, including construction of artificial islands within waters claimed and controlled by Beijing. Washington has dubbed the growing Chinese assertion as a danger to “freedom of navigation” which could hamper the 5.3-trillion dollar trade that passes through the SCS — a charge that Beijing hotly denies.
‘Frank talk on SCS issue’
Aware of the linkage between the SCS disputes and the acceptance of its doctrinal counter to the U.S. “Rebalance”, the commentary points out that Chinese leaders, during the CICA conference, had “ a frank talk about the South China Sea issue and reiterated China's ‘dual-track approach,’ calling for relevant countries to work together with China to safeguard peace and stability.” {The Chinese are trying to split the opposition. Can the Chinese be believed is the question in front of Vietnam & Philippines. Besides, the Chinese have been telling the ASEAN that it cannot treat with China as a block, but individual countries must have separate dealing with China. How can the poor Philippines or even Vietnam or Brunei for that matter deal with China's might? That is China's tactic and that is why it is refusing to accept the UNCLOS jurisdiction as well as agreeing to a Code of Conduct in the Indo-China Sea}
The write-up also stressed that China’s regional security model, will continue to strive for the integration of the Chinese Dream — China’s aspirational goal for energising “national rejuvenation” — and the Asian Dream “to create a brighter future for Asia.”
Regional diplomatic offensive
In the run-up to the espousal of its new doctrine, the Chinese have launched a regional diplomatic offensive to reinforce that an Asian homegrown solution was the best way to resolve SCS disputes, rather than interference by “outside” powers.
Last month Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi embarked on a whirlwind visit to Cambodia, Laos and Brunei, to cull out, what the Chinese Foreign Ministry described is “an important consensus” on the SCS issue, which would be relevant to the 10-member Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Ministry said that China has agreed with Brunei, Cambodia and Laos that the South China Sea territorial dispute should not impact on Beijing’s ties with the ASEAN.
Russia too kept in the loop
China’s diplomatic exertions have also paid off well with Russia, whose Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov stressed in Beijing on Friday that the SCS issue should not be “internationalized.”
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
I do not think either have an option. They both have to cooperate.TSJones wrote:....don't worry, India will turn down anti sub cooperation. too provocative......
And, China is not rolling back.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
No, I think India should define its own area denial doctrine and ADIZ and defend them. Use our assets to escort the sub all the way to Hainan. Let the US assist, outside the IOR. Only a fitting independent muscular response will send the message to the dragon. No dependency on the US at ANY costs in our core areas of interest.TSJones wrote:....don't worry, India will turn down anti sub cooperation. too provocative......
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
One Diplomat said - If India moves closer to China, India will get more goodies and candies India from US and others.SSridhar wrote:There is a price for everything, something that the US understands very well. . .
China thinks that by working on peace , CBM and talks on border with India, China has kept India away from US and weakened the US strategic policy in Asia. India is the center point of the US defense strategy in Asia.
China has announced the failure of the “Rebalance” strategy of the United States, and has invited Asian countries to join Beijing in framing a security governance model with “Asian features”.
China strategy of keeping India, South east asian countries and US separate is to remove the containment.
China thinks that keeping CBM and talks with India,
and calling for a asian security architecture with ASEAN
and threatening US defense it can eliminate the threat towards PRC
China could not stop India and Japan coming together and supported by US to form a large coalition
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Pakistan is the weak link in the China policy in Asia
When Pak starts a war China has to support it.
When it supports Pak China was lose in asia and other countries will come together to form anti China alliance.
House of cards built by China is going to fall down
China knows that it is the end of its free ride for more than 40 years
When Pak starts a war China has to support it.
When it supports Pak China was lose in asia and other countries will come together to form anti China alliance.
House of cards built by China is going to fall down
China knows that it is the end of its free ride for more than 40 years
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China is as strong as its weakest link Pakistan. Emperor Hu have his favourite monkey as bodyguard. and sooner or latter mad Monkey gonna do what monkey do with sword / knife.svinayak wrote:Pakistan is the weak link in the China policy in Asia
When Pak starts a war China has to support it.When it supports Pak China was lose in asia and other countries will come together to form anti China alliance.House of cards built by China is going to fall down.China knows that it is the end of its free ride for more than 40 years
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
You sometimes doubt this?? Really and on other times you see industrial growth? Not sure of your take on this.panduranghari wrote: I sometimes doubt if this is actually true -India has let its economic potential decline by chaotic policies and idiotic, corrupt politicians!
Again, it is difficult to catch your perspective. Are you saying that India was a bigger economy growing at 2% than at the present day 7% or so?..... Its claimed our GDP grew less than 2% pa from independence to 1991 and then it took off. Though the 2% growth era was bad there is no evidence than from 1991 to now the things have got an awful lot better.
If you measure the economy based on the dated western models of Milton Friedman i.e. things that can be measured, we can say China is an industrial power house. But Chinese produce things for foreign markets. They do not do it for their local markets, though they are trying to reverse this policy, there is no guarantee that it will work.
Staying in denial about Chinese manufacturing capabilities does not do any good other than a dangerous "feel good" factor for Indians that could be its downfall.
While Modi might be trying foolishly to promote the failed Chinese model of manufacturing,
Failed? My friend, it is not wise to under-estimate your opponent to justify your own tardiness.
Perhaps if you would give examples of the NaMo administration's accomplishments in doing that better than other governments, that would help us understand you better. Namoji has said good things, but how has he improved the "basic living standards for common Indians better"? I think you need to provide solid information to back this up.at least he is doing the correct things of making the basic living standards for common Indians better. Without giving the common man an ability to earn, there perhaps will not be much of future.
It is difficult to understand which side you're on. Are you for the bailouts of the US Banks? Are you for the British Talbot Steel Plant being bailed out or against it? But you will accept that the US Bailouts of 2008 of banks and large businesses (GM for example) worked and the companies are today running on their own steam providing employment and taxation and the government has received most of its bailout funds back. You will also find that the Chinese have similarly re-capitalized their banks in the early 2000s........The supply side and demand side should be balanced out for any model to work. ...In Britain they are asking should they shut down Port Talbot steel plant which Tata decided to give up or should government bail them out. No government bailout is in sight. In US, after 2008 crash, there was no similar discussion if they should allow big banks to fail or should they be bailed out. Of course they were bailed out.
Yes. I am stating that the government should have kept Kingfisher running. If necessary, options to sell it to another operator or merging with someone should have been looked at. The US gave bigger bailouts to its airlines and they seem to be doing well.Are you suggesting the government should bail out KIngfisher? Just like they are bailing out the nationalised banks by making whole their losses incurred on account of poor business practices which lead to 18% NPA's?
You can either keep NPAs low or have manufacturing and employment. It is a tough choice to make. The Chinese seem to have gone after manufacturing and recapitalizing banks rather than run after industries and close them down. They have provided their industries with the right operational climate so that they can have a level playing field and today look at the reach of their industry. Each manufacturing unit provides 100s of jobs - direct impact and taxation, purchasing power, money circulation - indirect impact. You can keep NPAs low by tightening money supply and raising credit norms and where do they get you - to recession. Keeping Kingfisher flying would have been the better outcome than to imprison Mallya. What we saw in the US in 2008 was that barring Bernie Madoff, no one was arrested in spite of the loss of trillions of dollars.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Exactly!! IN should not require anybody's assistant in IOR. In the far near like SCS we can cooperate with allies. Be it Vietnam, Russia or USA.ShauryaT wrote:No, I think India should define its own area denial doctrine and ADIZ and defend them. Use our assets to escort the sub all the way to Hainan. Let the US assist, outside the IOR. Only a fitting independent muscular response will send the message to the dragon. No dependency on the US at ANY costs in our core areas of interest.TSJones wrote:....don't worry, India will turn down anti sub cooperation. too provocative......
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
^^^China has announced the failure of the “Rebalance” strategy of the United States, and has invited Asian countries to join Beijing in framing a security governance model with “Asian features”.
Ha! we eat you now yes?
Ha! we eat you now yes?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
from looking the chinese navic beidou system you get to essentially knowing how they want to be watched.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BeiDou_Na ... ite_System
iow, our future where we want to go with navic after few years of vikas, can be re-chartered.
just saying
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BeiDou_Na ... ite_System
iow, our future where we want to go with navic after few years of vikas, can be re-chartered.
just saying
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Wasn't Australia kowtowing to China? Or has this changed?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
ramana, Australia kowtows to the US. The US uses Australia as its paw. Hence, we saw aggressive Aussie behaviour vis-a-vis India in the 90s, its fear of rapid modernization of the Indian Navy, aggressive tailing of Indian subs (which it does even today), its articulation that Indian Ocean is not India's Ocean (which it continues to say) etc. Australia is very careful about not offending China, but its actions are clear where it lays centered.
The joint communiqué at the end of the c. 2011 annual US-Australia strategic review meeting called Ausmin , called for, “deeper strategic ties between Australia, the US and India, welcomed India's engagement in East Asia, and called for greater co-operation with India in providing for maritime security.” It was in this meeting that Australia formally requested the US to replace the term 'Asis-Pacific' with 'Indo-Pacific' and to consider Indian Ocean Region and the Pacific as one unified theatre of maritime operation. Of course, Oz had taken part in the one-of-a-kind multilateral Malabar exercise in c. 2007, but then withdrew in the face of shrill Chinese opposition. During his visit to Australia in June 2013, the Indian Defence Minister, A.K.Antony and his Australian counterpart issued a joint statement stating that a bilateral maritime exercise between the two navies will be held in 2015. Both sides acknowledged that maritime security and freedom of navigation in accordance with principles of international law were critical for the growth and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. This was a direct reference to China and its posture in the Indo-China Sea.
In c. 2013, Australia released a Country Strategy Document on India which identified the Indian Navy as possessing the most potential for a close maritime partnership. The Framework for Security Cooperation Agreement that Modi signed in Canberra in November 2014 which called for "advancing regional peace and stability" was referred to explicitly in the Australian Defence White Paper 2016. For the first time a trilateral dialogue involving India, Japan and Australia was held in June 2015 wherein maritime security, including freedom of navigation in the 'South China Sea' and trilateral maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean were primarily discussed.
In March 2013, India and Australia, under the aegis of the Australia-India Institute (AII), launched a taskforce in Canberra “to discuss, debate and report on policy directions that both may consider for the future enhancement of regional security”. The taskforce’s report has also examined the issues related to sea lanes of communication (SLOC) security along the long Indo-Pacific littoral, with particular focus on Indian and Australian perspective on SLOC security between the Red Sea and 'South China Sea' and to consider the roles of India and Australia in Indo-Pacific security, including discussion of Indian and Australian perspectives on their (and each other’s) future roles in Indo-Pacific security.
In September, 2015 the Indian and Australian navies conducted the first joint exercise, AUSINDEX, off Vishakapatnam.
Of course, the facilities offered by Australia to the US as part of its 'Pivot', is quite another matter.
The joint communiqué at the end of the c. 2011 annual US-Australia strategic review meeting called Ausmin , called for, “deeper strategic ties between Australia, the US and India, welcomed India's engagement in East Asia, and called for greater co-operation with India in providing for maritime security.” It was in this meeting that Australia formally requested the US to replace the term 'Asis-Pacific' with 'Indo-Pacific' and to consider Indian Ocean Region and the Pacific as one unified theatre of maritime operation. Of course, Oz had taken part in the one-of-a-kind multilateral Malabar exercise in c. 2007, but then withdrew in the face of shrill Chinese opposition. During his visit to Australia in June 2013, the Indian Defence Minister, A.K.Antony and his Australian counterpart issued a joint statement stating that a bilateral maritime exercise between the two navies will be held in 2015. Both sides acknowledged that maritime security and freedom of navigation in accordance with principles of international law were critical for the growth and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. This was a direct reference to China and its posture in the Indo-China Sea.
In c. 2013, Australia released a Country Strategy Document on India which identified the Indian Navy as possessing the most potential for a close maritime partnership. The Framework for Security Cooperation Agreement that Modi signed in Canberra in November 2014 which called for "advancing regional peace and stability" was referred to explicitly in the Australian Defence White Paper 2016. For the first time a trilateral dialogue involving India, Japan and Australia was held in June 2015 wherein maritime security, including freedom of navigation in the 'South China Sea' and trilateral maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean were primarily discussed.
In March 2013, India and Australia, under the aegis of the Australia-India Institute (AII), launched a taskforce in Canberra “to discuss, debate and report on policy directions that both may consider for the future enhancement of regional security”. The taskforce’s report has also examined the issues related to sea lanes of communication (SLOC) security along the long Indo-Pacific littoral, with particular focus on Indian and Australian perspective on SLOC security between the Red Sea and 'South China Sea' and to consider the roles of India and Australia in Indo-Pacific security, including discussion of Indian and Australian perspectives on their (and each other’s) future roles in Indo-Pacific security.
In September, 2015 the Indian and Australian navies conducted the first joint exercise, AUSINDEX, off Vishakapatnam.
Of course, the facilities offered by Australia to the US as part of its 'Pivot', is quite another matter.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Peace meet attendees say India bowing to ‘bullying’ by China - Narayan Lakshman, The Hindu
Participants at a prominent anti-Beijing conference expressed “dismay” at India’s decision to cancel or deny visas to members of China’s Uyghur minority community and noted that India “seems to be trying to accommodate the bullying behaviour of China,” according to an attendee, who is also a representative of a major human rights group in the U.S.
Speaking to The Hindu via telephone Katrina Lantos Swett, founder of the Tom Lantos Foundation, however, added that while things were not perfect in India, the strength of its democratic institutions meant that it was even possible to hold such a conference in the country and “such a conference could never take place in China.”
The conference “Strengthening Our Alliance to Advance the Peoples' Dream: Freedom, Justice, Equality and Peace” was held in Dharmasala last week.
Abusive practices
Dr. Lantos Swett emphasised that China had engaged in “abusive practices towards religious and ethnic minorities” and used external propaganda to this end. In this context, the conference had discussed India’s decision to cancel the e-visa granted to Dolkun Isa, a Uyghur and German national, and also deny visas to two other Uyghurs.
Mr. Isa had told The Hindu that since the 9/11 terror attacks, “China has used the War on Terror as a justification for repressive measures in East Turkestan and tries to get the international community to see all Uyghurs as violent — a claim that clearly does not hold up to scrutiny if reliable information is available.”
In this case Beijing got Interpol to issue a Red Notice against Mr. Isa and this was cited by Indian authorities to cancel the e-visa.
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
I have answered you here http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 5#p2013505Vivek K wrote: What we saw in the US in 2008 was that barring Bernie Madoff, no one was arrested in spite of the loss of trillions of dollars.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
India's stands on South China Sea lead to confusion - Indrani Bagchi, ToI
On the difference between Indian stands, I do not see anything. In the RIC statement, the only additional articulation is that "disputes should be addressed through negotiations and agreements between the parties concerned" which doesn't negate Indian stand calling for "safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region" and "support for a rules-based order and regional security architecture conducive to peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean". Resorting to arbitration under UNCLOS comes only after concerned parties have exhausted negotiations. ASEAN & PRC have agreed on a Code of Conduct in the Indo-China Sea, which China endorses but doesn't take any steps to implement and move forward.
China has always had weak positions in disputes with its neighbours and its explanations are ridiculous and laughable.What exactly is India's position on the South China Sea? In two recent international joint statements, India has taken slightly different positions on the biggest point of international conflict that is about to come to a head in the coming days, leading to some confusion.
On April 18, foreign ministers of India, China and Russia stated after an RIC meeting in Moscow that "Russia, India and China are committed to maintaining a legal order for the seas and oceans based on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS).All related disputes should be addressed through negotiations and agreements between the parties concerned. In this regard, the Ministers called for full respect of all provisions of UNCLOS, as well as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the Guidelines for the implementation of the DOC."
But just about a week earlier, when US defence secretary Ashton Carter was in Delhi, a joint statement between him and Manohar Parrikar had this to say: US and India "reaffirmed the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region, including in the South China Sea.They vowed their support for a rules-based order and regional security architecture conducive to peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean, and emphasized their commitment to working together and with other nations to ensure the security and stability that have been beneficial to the Asia-Pacific for decades."
Both affirmations are slightly different, raising questions about what India's actual position is. Sources said the RIC statement was in the context of a multilateral forum, but India's sovereign position will be clarified on the day the permanent court of arbitration pronounces its verdict.
China has declared in its state media outlets that India is sympathetic to China's view, and the RIC statement affirms it. Meanwhile, US Pacific Command chief, Admiral Harris indicated India and US may soon be sailing together for joint patrols, as part of a roadmap of the Strategic Vision document signed when Barack Obama visited India in 2015.
The official Chinese position was clarified by the charge d'affairs at the Chinese embassy here. Speaking to TOI, Liu Jinsong said, "We do not accept the jurisdiction in the South China Sea arbitration at the request of Philippines.The matter concerns China's territorial sovereignty, which is beyond the scope of UNCLOS.{but, not when somebody else is also claiming the same area as belonging to them too. That's why arbitration is needed and that's why UNCLOS has jurisdiction} We can settle and manage the issue bilaterally through peaceful means based on international law, including UNCLOS."
On the difference between Indian stands, I do not see anything. In the RIC statement, the only additional articulation is that "disputes should be addressed through negotiations and agreements between the parties concerned" which doesn't negate Indian stand calling for "safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight throughout the region" and "support for a rules-based order and regional security architecture conducive to peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean". Resorting to arbitration under UNCLOS comes only after concerned parties have exhausted negotiations. ASEAN & PRC have agreed on a Code of Conduct in the Indo-China Sea, which China endorses but doesn't take any steps to implement and move forward.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
U.S. envoy’s ‘Arunachal is part of India’ remark irks China - PTI
Taking exception to a U.S. diplomat’s recent remarks that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India, China on Wednesday said it planned to seek a clarification from Washington as any “irresponsible” third party intervention in Sino-Indian border dispute “will complicate” the issue.
“The Chinese side has noted the report and will ask the U.S. side for verification and clarification,” Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a written response to a question from PTI here about U.S. Consul General in Kolkata Craig L. Hall’s comments that Washington regards Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as Southern Tibet, as part of India. “But clearly the statement by the U.S. side is completely inconsistent with the fact,” it said.
U.S. sees Arunachal as part of India
Mr. Hall during his meeting with Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Kalikho Pul on April 28 in Itanagar said that the U.S. government was absolutely clear that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India.
In its rejoinder, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said:
“China and India are wise and capable enough to deal with their own issue and safeguard the fundamental and long-term interests of the two peoples. The intervention of any third party will only complicate the issue and is highly irresponsible.”
The two countries last month completed the 19th round of border talks here by the Special Representatives — National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi.
China sees Arunachal as part of Tibet
The Line of Actual Control (LAC) covers the 3,488 km-long border. While China says that the boundary dispute is confined to 2,000 km, mainly in Arunachal Pradesh in eastern sector which it claims as part of southern Tibet, India asserts that the dispute covered the whole of the LAC including the Aksai Chin occupied by China during the 1962 war.
In its response to Mr. Hall’s remarks, the Chinese Ministry said: “The boundary question between China and India bears on China’s territorial sovereignty and Chinese people’s sentiment.
“All the third parties must respect the history and reality concerning the boundary question, respect efforts by China and India to solve territorial disputes through negotiations, not get involved in the disputes or take sides on issues relating to the ownership of disputed territory.”
‘Boundary is yet to be drawn’
“As is known to all, the boundary between China and India is yet to be officially drawn. The two countries are striving to reach a fair, equitable and mutually acceptable settlement on the boundary question through negotiations.
“The two still have major disputes over the eastern section of the boundary, which is the reason why China and India negotiate with each other,” said the Ministry.
‘Scope for growth in bilateral ties’
It further added: “Sound negotiations between China and India on the boundary question as well as peace and tranquillity in the border areas over recent years have created favourable conditions for the growth of bilateral relations and their respective development.”
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
An unswerving zeal to contain India - G.Parthasarathy, Business Line
Pakistan’s prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, has described his country’s relations with China as “sweeter than the sweetest honey”, Pakistan’s ambassador to China has gushingly described the Sino-Pakistan relationship as “deeper than the ocean, higher than the mountains and stronger than steel”.
In the meantime, we are learning more about the real implications of this relationship, which is based on “strategic containment” of India. The China-Pakistan relationship has no parallel anywhere in the world, as nowhere has any country transferred nuclear weapons designs, nuclear enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, ballistic missile designs and manufacturing facilities, the way China has done to Pakistan.
These details been described in detail in the book authored by the Washington-based scholar Andrew Small, titled The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics.
The Panama revelations
The recent revelation of the names of those involved in holding ‘offshore’ accounts in Panama included relatives of both Nawaz Sharif and Xi Jinping, China’s all-powerful president, who is also head of the Communist Party’s apex military commission. Following domestic political pressure, evidently backed by the army chief, Raheel Sharif, Nawaz Sharif’s influence has been further eroded.
He has, however, hit back at the army, drawing attention to the protection from prosecution it has provided to General Pervez Musharraf, who has acquired valuable properties in London and Dubai. The Panama revelations have also drawn attention to the offshore accounts of the family/relatives of Xi Jinping and other top Chinese leaders. At least eight current and former members of the standing committee of the Communist Party politburo find distinguished mention in the Panama Documents, as does Deng Jingui, who is Xi’s brother-in-law. Deng has reportedly set up two companies in the British Virgin Islands.
While Sharif is showing signs that he is feeling the heat, Xi has reacted defiantly, enhancing his already extensive powers. He is the first leader since Deng Xiao Ping to head the party’s powerful military commission. He has gone a step further by nominating himself as the commander-in-chief of the country’s armed forces, while unprecedentedly clad in army camouflage uniform. This has predictably led to speculation that Xi wants to make sure that the army remains directly under his command.
While Xi has taken a tough position on corruption, it is well-known that members of his family have wide-ranging business connections and interests. It was also no secret that family members of former prime minister, Wen Jiabao, led by his mother, had business assets exceeding $2 billion.
Economic transition
All this is taking place when China is going through a painful economic transition. Its export-driven economic growth over the past three decades is unparalleled in contemporary history, with growth rates of around 10 per cent over the past two decades. While its present growth rate of around 6.9 per cent may appear problematic for China, they are still among the highest in the world.
But the days of China being the sole exporting hub for manufactured goods are slowly declining. As China moves towards becoming a consumption-based economy, huge capacities built for manufacturing will have to be shut down, though some relief can be obtained from supplies to ventures abroad, such as its Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road. In light of the prospects of growing unemployment as surplus capacities in manufacturing are shut down, we will likely be staring at a jingoistic China ready to divert attention by becoming more aggressive on its maritime and land border claims.
While China would remain primarily focused on its maritime boundaries, it will also be unlikely to agree on issues such as demarcating the Line of Actual Control {That's why the recent offer of settling the boundary issue was a bit for India to back down on the Masood Azhar issue} along its borders with India. But both countries will gain by moving ahead with confidence-building measures and better communications between border forces. Xi Jinping has restructured the command of the PLA along the Indian border with a unified command now established in Chengdu. China appears unlikely to embark on a large-scale military adventure, though pressure will be maintained for keeping us unsettled along our borders.
Nothing, however, can be taken for granted. New Delhi would be well advised to hasten the establishment of a mountain strike corps and modernisation of its air power. Beijing’s ‘one belt one road’ initiative across Pakistan, involving an investment of $46 billion, and its virtual takeover of the Gwadar port in Baluchistan, will require new initiatives by India involving regional and extra-regional powers, to balance Chinese maritime power across the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean, which will be reinforced by continuing supplies of submarines and frigates to Pakistan.
Biased treatment
We should have no illusions of how China views India. Beijing has built Pakistan’s nuclear, missile and conventional arsenals. It welcomes political leaders and visitors from POK and Gilgit-Baluchistan {sic, Baltistan}, while treating visitors from Jammu and Kashmir on an entirely different footing. It denies normal visas to Indian nationals from Arunachal Pradesh. Beijing aids and trains members of north-eastern insurgent groups such as ULFA, along the Myanmar-China border. It seeks to constantly undermine Indian influence and promotes anti-Indian forces in all the Saarc countries. It blocks India’s membership in multilateral forums such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Finally, in the UN, it protects Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as the LeT and JeM from international sanctions.
Given China’s domestic economic and political problems, and its aggressiveness with neighbours on its maritime and land boundaries, there has to be a sustained dialogue to address tensions that will arise periodically along the Sino-Indian border. The trade, economic and investment relationship with China should be expanded. New Delhi should continue cooperation with China in forums such as BRICS, the Asian Infrastructure Bank and G-20.
China’s policies of undermining India’s relations with its South Asian neighbours should be countered by a robust relationship with China’s maritime neighbours such as Vietnam, Japan and the Philippines. Military exercises with the US, Japan, Australia and Indonesia in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean should be expanded. Military cooperation with Vietnam must include supplies of Brahmos Cruise missiles, which will serve as a deterrent to Chinese maritime adventurism.
Given China’s links with armed separatist groups in its northeast, India need not be apologetic about the Dalai Lama’s presence in India, or about carefully nuanced support for democratic and religious freedoms.{That was why backing down on Dolkun Isa was a strategic failure} India must adopt a policy of cooperation combined with containment, in partnership with like-minded powers, in dealing with China.
The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China dissidents didn’t meet in India: MEA - Suhasini Haidar &Kallol Bhattacharjee, The Hindu
In yet another turnaround, the government on Thursday said that the controversial conference of Chinese dissidents held in Dharamshala last week had not taken place.
“Let me make it clear that there was no conference,” the MEA spokesperson told journalists on Thursday.
“Certain individuals had come to India to meet the Dalai Lama. As you are aware, the Dalai Lama is a respected spiritual leader and there is absolutely no bar on foreigners coming to India to meet him. So that is what I have to say about this so-called meeting,” the spokesperson added.
The government’s stand on the gathering in Dharamshala between April 28 and May 1, indicates a decision to play down the impact of the conference, which came into the limelight when a Uighur activist based in Germany, Dolkun Isa, announced that he would be attending it, following which, the government informed him that his visa was cancelled. Two others were restrained from boarding their flights to India. The MEA had said that they had been stopped because they had all received e-visas which are not available for conference delegates, and they should have applied through the Indian Embassy.
“Conflicting statements”
Several attendees to the conference countered the government’s actions, and criticised what they called “conflicting statements.”
“The conference was certainly held,” said Jayadeva Ranade, former senior official and President of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy who is associated with the Vivekananda international foundation (VIF).
Former Congress MP Mani Shankar Aiyar accused the government of shifting positions on visas it issued because it was “embarrassed”, after initially wanting to allow the conference “in retaliation for China’s actions at the UNSC on Masood Azhar.” Mr. Aiyar, who spoke at the conference, said it included about 50-60 international attendees, who had also met with the Dalai Lama in Dharamshala.
The invitation to international participants of the conference, a copy of which is with The Hindu, said its theme was “Strengthening our alliance to advance the people’s dream: Freedom Justice Equality and Peace”.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China Remains a Proliferation Concern in the Indian Subcontinent - Reshmi Kazi, IDSA
The Chinese threat is manifold. Apart from its aggressive military, economic, proliferation threats and its propensity to violate all international agreements & conventions that it even signs, it also threatens the rest of the world with its greediness to loot the natural resources of other countries.Recently, a mineral smuggling operation involving export of several tonnes of beryl1 — an atomic mineral ore of beryllium2 — reportedly to China, was jointly thwarted by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Rajasthan Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) in Kanakpura, Rajasthan.3 By the end of January this year, Rajasthan ATS had reportedly arrested six men. This incident highlighted two important issues. {Sands from Kanyakumari & Kerala areas have been exported abroad, probably to China.}
First, that an illicit racket involved in smuggling of valuable minerals like berylllium with atomic applications is flourishing in the region. The prime beneficiary of this racket is reportedly China and it could possibly involve Pakistan too, given the history of clandestine nuclear trade between the two “all weather friends”.
Second, though India has a robust nuclear security system in place, capable of providing effective physical protection to sensitive materials housed at its nuclear facilities, still the security system needs to be constantly evaluated and upgraded at various levels. The mining department too needs to be more vigilant against any illegal movement of regulated items from within the country. To that extent, India has already established a national-level institutional mechanism in the form of a Counter Nuclear Smuggling Team, basically part of “a coordinated multi-agency approach to deal with the threat of individuals or group of individuals acquiring nuclear or radioactive material for malicious purposes.”4
It is said that China, apart from the US, Canada, Russia and Brazil, is known to extract beryllium from the mineral ore for use in nuclear power plants, space technology and scanning purposes.5 Hence, it can be assumed that China has a steady demand for beryllium. But what is worrisome is China’s resort to illegal means for acquiring beryllium. China’s proliferation trends have remained a source of concern for the international community. Despite being a member of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), China remains a proliferator, and is known for exporting sensitive items that could be used for malicious purposes.
As regards the recent smuggling incident, it is known that beryllium and its alloys fall under Category II Item 4 of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines, which include “a wide range of equipment, material and technologies, most of which have uses other than for missiles capable of delivering WMD.” Though there is greater flexibility in the treatment of Category II transfer applications of the MTCR Guidelines (as against Category I), the “member countries and those adhering unilaterally to the Guidelines” have unanimously agreed to exercise utmost restraint in the import and export of these items.6 The objective is to limit the risk of proliferation of controlled items or their technology falling into the hands of terrorist networks.
However, China has consistently fallen short on its commitments and continues to remain a proliferation concern given the assistance it has rendered to countries such as Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. China’s continued proliferation by way of missile technology transfer has imparted Pakistan with know-how to develop its domestic missile programme. China has been a “key supplier” of technology, with entities providing nuclear and missile-related technology to Pakistan and Iran.7
The United States Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in its Section 721 Report for 2011, had noted that Chinese “entities,” including state-owned defence industrial corporations, were reported to be “associated” with Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes as well as Iran’s missile programmes.8 China is also suspected of providing North Korea with sensitive items for its ballistic missile programme. China’s serial proliferation acts were also evident from its export of sensitive materials to Iran.
Recently, China has accelerated its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan that involves setting up of at least six nuclear power projects in Islamabad.9 The China-Pakistan nuclear commerce is alleged to have been arranged without the sanction of the NSG. China’s argument that its actions are in compliance with NSG guidelines is far from credible as the agreement lacks adequate transparency. China’s export policies too have intensified apprehensions over proliferation trends that encourage illegal commerce in sensitive materials and technologies to countries of concern.
The interception of the illegal beryl exports, reportedly destined for China, avers that there are loopholes that constitute serious weak links within the global nuclear security system. These weak links are also being used for malicious purposes by terrorists and other elements posing serious security threat to India and the rest of the global community.10 Thus, it is important that the international community reinforces its efforts aimed at mitigating the threat to nuclear security. Greater international cooperation would make the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) more effective in unravelling nuclear black markets and smuggling networks. It is equally important that nuclear weapon states like China act responsibly in preventing unlawful nuclear trade activities. As a state with advanced nuclear technology, India too would have to make consistent efforts to constantly upgrade its nuclear security system.
The successful recovery of the illicitly diverted beryl also reflects on certain aspects of India’s approach to nuclear security. Undoubtedly, India has a very elaborate nuclear security system as it enmeshes various elements of nuclear security. This includes India’s consistent cooperation with the IAEA that prescribes international safeguards against misuse of nuclear materials and technology, and encourages nuclear safety and security criterions, and their implementation too. Besides, India being a party to the IAEA Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and its 2005 Amendment, is committed to maintaining highest standards of security for its nuclear materials.
In addition, India has taken important measures to maintain and uphold an effective security system for transport of sensitive materials, nuclear material control and accounting mechanisms, and a highly rigorous personnel vetting method that reports any suspicious behaviour or activity of any individual who could be a potential insider threat. India’s personnel vetting involves extremely stringent measures and is believed to be much more rigorous than other personnel reliability systems functioning elsewhere in the world. The existing acts and rules implemented in India like the Atomic Energy Act, 1962; Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Amendment Act, 2010; Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act, 2005; and the Customs Act, 1962 constitute powerful tools in preventing proliferation.
As part of its ongoing effort at strengthening the national implementation of physical protection, India adheres to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Series, which provides guidance on ensuring highest physical protection standards. Additionally, IAEA had conducted the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) Mission to review India's nuclear regulatory agency, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), in March 2015.11 The IRRS in its report had acknowledged that India has “an experienced, knowledgeable and dedicated regulatory body for the protection of the public and the environment”, and had identified several ‘good practices’ in India’s nuclear regulatory framework.12 Furthermore, the IRRS team had also suggested “certain issues warranting attention or in need of improvement” and was of the view that “consideration of these would enhance the overall performance of the regulatory system.”13 Some of these issues are already in consideration like creating a network of 23 Emergency Response Centres for detecting and responding to any extreme nuclear or radiological incident, anywhere in India.
Efforts to transform the de facto independence of AERB into de jure autonomy, through a Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA), are under process and for which a bill is being finalised for introduction in the Indian Parliament. India is also set to propose a workshop on IAEA’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) during the year 2016.14 In a recent international conference on “India’s role in Global Nuclear Governance,” held at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in New Delhi, several officials from the DAE had confirmed that India’s nuclear security architecture constitutes a robust system capable of thwarting any potential threat to its nuclear assets from any illicit diversion.15
However, despite such credible assurances from DAE officials, India cannot afford to be complacent on this issue. The flourishing beryllium smuggling racket indicates the urgent need to further intensify physical protection of mines housing sensitive materials. The government must and with immediate effect scrutinise the mining activities, and implement measures to monitor the transportation security of minerals unearthed from the mines.
Since threat to nuclear security is an ongoing issue, the process of improvisation and upgradation of physical protection measures too has to be continuous. This should remain the primary essence of India’s nuclear security culture and should permeate through all the agencies of its nuclear security establishment. The setting up of the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP), near Bahadurgarh in Haryana, is reflective of India’s nuclear security culture and also its rising nuclear security standards. It is this strong and effective nuclear security culture that made quick collaboration between the DAE, IB and the Rajasthan ATS possible.
Nuclear security is a highly complex issue, which gets further convoluted with the complicity of countries in illicit diversion networks. China’s future plans to process spent nuclear fuel into plutonium for weapons purpose have already raised proliferation concerns worldwide. China’s continuing complicity in nuclear proliferation networks would weaken the global nuclear security regime. Hence, China must renew efforts and cooperate with the international community including India for reinvesting the benefits achieved by the Nuclear Security Summit process, and help develop stronger nuclear security architecture in the Indian subcontinent.
Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China’s financial system
The coming debt bust
It is a question of when, not if, real trouble will hit in China
CHINA was right to turn on the credit taps to prop up growth after the global financial crisis. It was wrong not to turn them off again. The country’s debt has increased just as quickly over the past two years as in the two years after the 2008 crunch. Its debt-to-GDP ratio has soared from 150% to nearly 260% over a decade, the kind of surge that is usually followed by a financial bust or an abrupt slowdown.
China will not be an exception to that rule. Problem loans have doubled in two years and, officially, are already 5.5% of banks’ total lending. The reality is grimmer. Roughly two-fifths of new debt is swallowed by interest on existing loans; in 2014, 16% of the 1,000 biggest Chinese firms owed more in interest than they earned before tax. China requires more and more credit to generate less and less growth: it now takes nearly four yuan of new borrowing to generate one yuan of additional GDP, up from just over one yuan of credit before the financial crisis. With the government’s connivance, debt levels can probably keep climbing for a while, perhaps even for a few more years. But not for ever.
When the debt cycle turns, both asset prices and the real economy will be in for a shock. That won’t be fun for anyone. It is true that China has been fastidious in capping its external liabilities (it is a net creditor). Its dangers are home-made. But the damage from a big Chinese credit blow-up would still be immense. China is the world’s second-biggest economy; its banking sector is the biggest, with assets equivalent to 40% of global GDP. Its stockmarkets, even after last year’s crash, are together worth $6 trillion, second only to America’s. And its bond market, at $7.5 trillion, is the world’s third-biggest and growing fast. A mere 2% devaluation of the yuan last summer sent global stockmarkets crashing; a bigger bust would do far worse. A mild economic slowdown caused trouble for commodity exporters around the world; a hard landing would be painful for all those who benefit from Chinese demand.
Brace, brace
Optimists have drawn comfort from two ideas. First, over three-plus decades of reform, China’s officials have consistently shown that once they identified problems, they had the will and skill to fix them. Second, control of the financial system—the state owns the major banks and most of their biggest debtors—gave them time to clean things up.
Both these sources of comfort are fading away. This is a government not so much guiding events as struggling to keep up with them. In the past year alone, China has spent nearly $200 billion to prop up the stockmarket; $65 billion of bank loans have gone bad; financial frauds have cost investors at least $20 billion; and $600 billion of capital has left the country. To help pump up growth, officials have inflated a property bubble. Debt is still expanding twice as fast as the economy.
At the same time, as our special report this week shows, the government’s grip on finance is slipping. Despite repeated efforts to restrain them, loosely regulated forms of lending are growing quickly: such “shadow assets” have increased by more than 30% annually over the past three years. In theory, shadow banks diversify sources of credit and spread risk away from the regular banks. In practice, the lines between the shadow and formal banking systems are badly blurred.
That creates two risks. The first is higher-than-expected losses for the banks. Hungry for profits in a slowing economy, plenty of Chinese banks have mis-categorised risky loans as investments to dodge scrutiny and lessen capital requirements. These shadow loans were worth roughly 16% of standard loans in mid-2015, up from just 4% in 2012. The second risk is liquidity. The banks have become ever more reliant on “wealth management products”, whereby they pay higher rates for what are, in effect, short-term deposits and put them into longer-term assets. For years China restricted bank loans to less than 75% of their deposit base, ensuring that they had plenty of cash in reserve. Now the real level is nearing 100%, a threshold where a sudden shortage in funding—the classic precursor to banking crises—is well within the realm of possibility. Midsized banks have been the most active in expanding; they are the place to look for sudden trouble.
Pandamonium
The end to China’s debt build-up would not look exactly like past financial blow-ups. China’s shadow-banking system is big, but it has not spawned any products nearly as complex or international in reach as America’s bundles of subprime mortgages in 2008. Its relatively insulated financial system means that parallels with the 1997-98 Asian crisis, in which countries from Thailand to South Korea borrowed too much from abroad, are thin. Some worry that China will look like Japan in the 1990s, slowly grinding towards stagnation. But its financial system is more chaotic, with more pressure for capital outflows, than was Japan’s; a Chinese crisis is likely to be sharper and more sudden than Japan’s chronic malaise.
One thing is certain. The longer China delays a reckoning with its problems, the more severe the eventual consequences will be. For a start, it should plan for turmoil. Policy co-ordination was appalling during last year’s stockmarket crash; regulators must work out in advance who monitors what and prepare emergency responses. Rather than deploying both fiscal and monetary stimulus to keep growth above the official target of at least 6.5% this year (which is, in any event, unnecessarily fast), the government should save its firepower for a real calamity. The central bank should also put on ice its plans to internationalise the yuan; a premature opening of the capital account would lead only to big outflows and bigger trouble, when the financial system is already on shaky ground.
Most important, China must start to curb the relentless rise of debt. The assumption that the government of Xi Jinping will keep bailing out its banks, borrowers and depositors is pervasive—and not just in China itself. It must tolerate more defaults, close failed companies and let growth sag. This will be tough, but it is too late for China to avoid pain. The task now is to avert something far worse.
Cheers
The coming debt bust
It is a question of when, not if, real trouble will hit in China
CHINA was right to turn on the credit taps to prop up growth after the global financial crisis. It was wrong not to turn them off again. The country’s debt has increased just as quickly over the past two years as in the two years after the 2008 crunch. Its debt-to-GDP ratio has soared from 150% to nearly 260% over a decade, the kind of surge that is usually followed by a financial bust or an abrupt slowdown.
China will not be an exception to that rule. Problem loans have doubled in two years and, officially, are already 5.5% of banks’ total lending. The reality is grimmer. Roughly two-fifths of new debt is swallowed by interest on existing loans; in 2014, 16% of the 1,000 biggest Chinese firms owed more in interest than they earned before tax. China requires more and more credit to generate less and less growth: it now takes nearly four yuan of new borrowing to generate one yuan of additional GDP, up from just over one yuan of credit before the financial crisis. With the government’s connivance, debt levels can probably keep climbing for a while, perhaps even for a few more years. But not for ever.
When the debt cycle turns, both asset prices and the real economy will be in for a shock. That won’t be fun for anyone. It is true that China has been fastidious in capping its external liabilities (it is a net creditor). Its dangers are home-made. But the damage from a big Chinese credit blow-up would still be immense. China is the world’s second-biggest economy; its banking sector is the biggest, with assets equivalent to 40% of global GDP. Its stockmarkets, even after last year’s crash, are together worth $6 trillion, second only to America’s. And its bond market, at $7.5 trillion, is the world’s third-biggest and growing fast. A mere 2% devaluation of the yuan last summer sent global stockmarkets crashing; a bigger bust would do far worse. A mild economic slowdown caused trouble for commodity exporters around the world; a hard landing would be painful for all those who benefit from Chinese demand.
Brace, brace
Optimists have drawn comfort from two ideas. First, over three-plus decades of reform, China’s officials have consistently shown that once they identified problems, they had the will and skill to fix them. Second, control of the financial system—the state owns the major banks and most of their biggest debtors—gave them time to clean things up.
Both these sources of comfort are fading away. This is a government not so much guiding events as struggling to keep up with them. In the past year alone, China has spent nearly $200 billion to prop up the stockmarket; $65 billion of bank loans have gone bad; financial frauds have cost investors at least $20 billion; and $600 billion of capital has left the country. To help pump up growth, officials have inflated a property bubble. Debt is still expanding twice as fast as the economy.
At the same time, as our special report this week shows, the government’s grip on finance is slipping. Despite repeated efforts to restrain them, loosely regulated forms of lending are growing quickly: such “shadow assets” have increased by more than 30% annually over the past three years. In theory, shadow banks diversify sources of credit and spread risk away from the regular banks. In practice, the lines between the shadow and formal banking systems are badly blurred.
That creates two risks. The first is higher-than-expected losses for the banks. Hungry for profits in a slowing economy, plenty of Chinese banks have mis-categorised risky loans as investments to dodge scrutiny and lessen capital requirements. These shadow loans were worth roughly 16% of standard loans in mid-2015, up from just 4% in 2012. The second risk is liquidity. The banks have become ever more reliant on “wealth management products”, whereby they pay higher rates for what are, in effect, short-term deposits and put them into longer-term assets. For years China restricted bank loans to less than 75% of their deposit base, ensuring that they had plenty of cash in reserve. Now the real level is nearing 100%, a threshold where a sudden shortage in funding—the classic precursor to banking crises—is well within the realm of possibility. Midsized banks have been the most active in expanding; they are the place to look for sudden trouble.
Pandamonium
The end to China’s debt build-up would not look exactly like past financial blow-ups. China’s shadow-banking system is big, but it has not spawned any products nearly as complex or international in reach as America’s bundles of subprime mortgages in 2008. Its relatively insulated financial system means that parallels with the 1997-98 Asian crisis, in which countries from Thailand to South Korea borrowed too much from abroad, are thin. Some worry that China will look like Japan in the 1990s, slowly grinding towards stagnation. But its financial system is more chaotic, with more pressure for capital outflows, than was Japan’s; a Chinese crisis is likely to be sharper and more sudden than Japan’s chronic malaise.
One thing is certain. The longer China delays a reckoning with its problems, the more severe the eventual consequences will be. For a start, it should plan for turmoil. Policy co-ordination was appalling during last year’s stockmarket crash; regulators must work out in advance who monitors what and prepare emergency responses. Rather than deploying both fiscal and monetary stimulus to keep growth above the official target of at least 6.5% this year (which is, in any event, unnecessarily fast), the government should save its firepower for a real calamity. The central bank should also put on ice its plans to internationalise the yuan; a premature opening of the capital account would lead only to big outflows and bigger trouble, when the financial system is already on shaky ground.
Most important, China must start to curb the relentless rise of debt. The assumption that the government of Xi Jinping will keep bailing out its banks, borrowers and depositors is pervasive—and not just in China itself. It must tolerate more defaults, close failed companies and let growth sag. This will be tough, but it is too late for China to avoid pain. The task now is to avert something far worse.
Cheers

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Havent read this article in detail but seems to have the right prescription in place, more so after the launch of CPEC:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/07052016-i ... -analysis/
http://www.eurasiareview.com/07052016-i ... -analysis/
Strategically, India must view China and Pakistan, that is the deep state and its acolytes as a conjoined whole.