Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

[shiv]

The frogfoots have all been withdrawn now from syria due to manpad threat and no defensive systems.

Platypus, flanker, fencer, hind, alligatr and havoc carry the work now.

The image below represents my mental picture of what weapons are used in war

The grey circle represents "state of the art -latest and greatest western weapons by multinational/western companies"
The blue circle is what western nations use
The purple circle is turd world non western nations

Western nations use only (or mostly) the latest and greatest and the most expensive and export them to those who can afford.

The rest of us make do with what we have. guns, dumb bombs, close in fighting, more combat losses

The grey circle is advertised as "the place to be", but the place to be is either too expensive or sanctioned for the likes of us. So what we use, how we use them and the losses we face will never be like western fought wars

[Singha]

Hmm harish nayani is the indigo pilot who acknowledged the kargil wounded soldier on his flight.

[shiv]

Here are more views about the LCA from the same article:
http://profprodyutdas.blogspot.in/2014/ ... eview.html

1. As things are going come 2020 the IAF will be forced to use the SU 30MKI or the Hawk for close support. Neither bears thinking, to my mind. The LCA, particularly given its small size will be better in this role.
2. The IAF is allergic about using transonic aircraft after having lost Hunters to MiG 19s and Mirages IIIs at Talhar and the gallant Sqn. Ldr. Mistri’s loss is still remembered. However these losses were also due to zeal which should on occasions have been restrained.
3. The IAF has to be persuaded to accept the LCA with minimal improvement confined to improving critical platform performance parameters. The LCA for close support with Su 30 MKIs as top cover could be source of envy and a model to follow for many countries.
4. To obtain that performance improvement the weight of the aircraft has to be reduced to the original target of 5500 kg. If necessary, some equipment has to be deleted. The first to go will be the Flight refueling. FR is an extremely expensive force multiplier and I cannot imagine using FR resources on a “puny” warplane such as a LCA. If the IAF is adamant in its sulk, keep only a small number of LCAs with this facility. I remember developing and producing a Soviet (very “Heath Robinson” but effective!) Arctic heating system for the T 72 (it thawed out the lubricant, fuel and the engine and used the remaining heat to warm the fighting compartment!) for the Army. They equipped only one third of their fleet and we lost a lot of business! There are no hard data on the efficacy of BVRs. The BVR issue has to be debated constructively with may be TACDE help.

Note that the air force wanting IFR is one cause of delay now and a cause of increased weight. The story behind that may be short legs. Let me be cruel and provocative here - why are all LCA test flights reported as lasting 25 minutes?

And his views on the creation of ADA

ISRO and ADA – a case study
When INCOSPAR –later ISRO -was set up, the “Essential Critical Technologies” for interplanetary flight were well known. The Guiding lights of the ISRO programme, with the humility of the truly wise ignored Critical Technologies and set about with humble programmes for people building - Range safety procedures, launch procedures, simple instrumentations, small programmes where failures trained people to take carefully calculated risks. The first ISRO rocket went up to 42000 feet launched from what looked like a footstool and some ironmongery. The Mentors of the programme did not shy away from risks and failures and kept a low profile. There was never any desire to “show” any one anything. In thirty years i.e. by the early Nineties, ISRO had exceeded its original mandate handsomely The recent Mangalyan has shown not only the skills but also any uniquely independent Indian approach, priorities and philosophy to spaceflight. ISRO is a world leader in low cost space flight and a triumph of Indian abilities.

The bureaucracy that created ADA had the mandate to create another ISRO. They could have. They could have created a thought leader. What they did was a paradox- a dependant rival- made worse by a monopoly. This was repeated with the GTRE. It is not surprising that the Tejas programme is just where the Kaveri is. Almost there but, like the frog in Xeno’s paradox, it will never get there. Indignation is one thing but is there anyone on the programme who can give a credible date by which the aircraft will be OK?

[Mihir]

There are no hard data on the efficacy of BVRs.

"When confronted with data I don't like, I shall ignore the data."

The Guiding lights of the ISRO programme, with the humility of the truly wise ignored Critical Technologies and set about with humble programmes for people building - Range safety procedures, launch procedures, simple instrumentations, small programmes where failures trained people to take carefully calculated risks.

The guiding lights of ISRO built rockets for themselves, basically. ADA set out to build a fighter for an Air Force that had access to advanced counterparts from the West as well Russia. They got derided for doing "khadi gramudyog" in spite of trying to develop a highly advanced aircraft; I wonder what the reaction of the brass would have been had they set out to do something simpler.

[Philip]

Pl ck the IN td and see what the IN is doing with the NLCA! They are far more committed it appears than the IAF and entered the LCA programme afterwards. From the details it is very likely that by 2018 the NLCA will be operating on the Vik-A and the Vikrant if that carrier has been commissioned by then. It has already carried R-73 AAMs in the test flights and undergone "hot refueling"..

[srai]

...

Note that the air force wanting IFR is one cause of delay now and a cause of increased weight. The story behind that may be short legs. Let me be cruel and provocative here - why are all LCA test flights reported as lasting 25 minutes?

...

The average hours per flight is around 40 minutes.

Tejas: The flight of freedom

Feb 9, 2016
...
Tejas has flown 3,061 sorties totalling 1,954 flight hours without a single accident.
...

[shiv]

The average hours per flight is around 40 minutes.

Tejas: The flight of freedom

Feb 9, 2016
...
Tejas has flown 3,061 sorties totalling 1,954 flight hours without a single accident.
...

38 minutes - but this could be unfair to Tejas. Obviously high altitude ferry flights - like Bangalore-Rajasthan would be longer and there may have been shorter ones. And early sorties may have been short and may have been on less fuel.

The MiG 21 is characterized by ~45 minute sorties and so the sortie time may be a ballpark estimate of range and fuel

[shiv]

There are no hard data on the efficacy of BVRs.

"When confronted with data I don't like, I shall ignore the data."

This is a double edged sword. The other tactic is "Don't like the data? Accuse the author of being biased/uneducated/etc". These things carry no serious weight.

Prodyut Das knows more and has read more than any one of us on here and that reflects in what he writes - although that is another data point that people may want to ignore or get worked up about.

Having said that Prodyut Das is right in pointing out that BVR is not there yet. I did some Googling for this and find a mixed picture but most agree with each other about the actual data - and the disagreement is over interpretation of the data. And that interpretation really does not give BVRAAMs the great great advantage that is often touted. Search for yourself. I am sure you can find the articles - or else I will post a couple of seminal ones.

But what i do want to post is an article that is friendly in its interpretation of BVRAAM efficacy (and not scathing and negative like some articles). I will just link it - it is actually easily available, but I am only interested in posting one table
http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/upload ... eport-.pdf

The table says that BVRAAMs are more likely to be useful in big aircraft. You meed to read the 76 page pdf to understand why he says that


Now what does that say about the LCA?

[nirav]

In that case what does it say about the catjet ?

[brar_w]

Contrary to past unknown territories that early generation BVR missiles charted through, there has been a ton of investment over the decades in training, development of higher end simulation, investment in an extensive BVR live firing program including investing in complicated ECM and ECCM systems for targets that cover a very vast spectrum of the RF counter to these systems. This has informed both training, but also technology development and has actually led to technology insertion to make BVR better. The US has a big lead here, given the scope of Combat Archer (see below) but others no doubt do also test as per their resource availability. Interestingly, Combat archer and other programs have even initiated full on test efforts for prototype systems simulating both the blue capability and the threat. For example, multiple DFRM jammers were prototyped and developed (including AESA EW systems) and tested against the EPIP ECCM capability of the AIm-120C7+ and the capability insert for the Aim-120D. So there may not be enough data out there for us to make a highly informed decisions, but that doesn't really mean there isn't very high level data out there for the Air-Forces around the world to make a decision on what to invest in and the path that the overwhelming majority are taking is towards heavy investment in BVR and net-centric warfare.

http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2011gunmissile ... Awards.pdf

At the end you have to test, test, and test more if you want to cover all threats, and develop an understanding of the capability of your systems and their limitations in addition to understanding what sort of counter capability is available, making sure your designers are developing those technologies and deploying those with the test and evaluation squadrons to test your latest weapons on. All that data informs the operator and goes into tactics development. It also gets funneled into requirements. You will never get to 100% but the goal is to get to the highest possible %age your technology and capability will allow you to achieve. The incentive is of course the higher survivability one achieves by restricting the opponent to BVR as opposed to the toss up that would result if large force deployments led to extremely large furballs. A case in point is the emergence of 5th generation adversary aircraft in the J-20, J-31, PAKFA etc. The Test and Evaluation (and perhaps even the operators) will get access to this quite soon to simulate that threat as well (initial contracts were awarded this year for the new target) -





So CSBA, DAS and others may only speculate what a 5th on 5th generation engagmenent may look like but the operator community actually gets to put theory to practice and shoot missiles at it under the various configuration of LO, LO+EW, etc etc . That would go a long way in actually explaining why at times the operator community takes decisions that the academic folks tend hard to justify through a quick lit review

Small fighters would naturally be at a disadvantage in BVR given the size of their sensors, and their payload capacity. However the CSBA paper was a look into the past in order to drive a discussion on requirements for the future. While small fighters currently flying are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis larger fighters they'd be at an even greater disadvantage if they don't pack the most BVR capability they could accommodate. Net Centricity and large degree of interoperability with larger fighters, AWACS etc would certainly help level the playing field. The paper you sight is a look out into the future, and attempts to predicts requirements of a future USAF fighter and advocates for a certain size and performance requirements.

[TSJones]

until weapons and target acquisition miniaturization takes hold on certain systems I don't think net-centric tactics will work without an air boss backing it up.

[shiv]

In that case what does it say about the catjet ?

Nothing. CATjet not planning BVR mijjiles.

But Das says this about LCA:

The LCA for close support with Su 30 MKIs as top cover could be source of envy and a model to follow for many countries.

[NRao]

From:

http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/upload ... eport-.pdf

this:



I have not read the whole paper yet.

But that data is very clear on the trend between a gun and a BVR.

[NRao]

Now what does that say about the LCA?

It says that the LCA cannot be used as widely as a larger platform with very good LO.

It certainly does not disqualify the LCA.

It is NOT a zero sum game that PD seems to allude to.

Certainly the LCA is NOT a lemon. The LCA will hold its own, perhaps to the dismay of PD.



Also, may post later, PD does have his own flaws. Major ones that would not be accepted in formal envs. It is OK to say something without backing in a blog and Vayu, but not in a formal paper.

[Mihir]

Having said that Prodyut Das is right in pointing out that BVR is not there yet.

This vague terminology causes unnecessary confusion, IMO. What exactly does Prof Das mean by "not there yet"? What is "there"?

If he intends to say that BVR hasn't reached a place where fighters will accurately snipe at each other from ranges exceeding 100 km and regularly achieve one shot kills, then he'd be right. BVR isn't very accurate when distances begin to approach the edge of the missiles' range. Advantages in BVR can be countered through the use of appropriate countermeasures (electronic or otherwise) and tactics.

However we have reached a point where a majority of air battles will be fought using BVR missiles. BVR might not get you a hard kill every time, but firing off a salvo of long-range missiles at an incoming strike package would certainly cause them to jettison their loads and scurry back to base. Virtual attrition. The missile platform would have accomplished its purpose of defending friendly airspace regardless of whether it shot down the enemy. It would break up enemy fighter formations by forcing them to carry out evasive maneuvers before firing off their own weapons. A formation that loses cohesion loses situational awareness and will be defeated in close combat by a formation that doesn’t. A BVR salvo could also nudge the enemy into a SAM trap – which could certainly kill it. It could force enemy AEW&C platforms and airborne refuelers deep inside their own airspace, which would at least partially negate the advantages they bring to the table

In this fight, guns have little utility. It would all be about networked platforms and a combination of BVR and highly maneuverable WVR missiles.

But what i do want to post is an article that is friendly in its interpretation of BVRAAM efficacy (and not scathing and negative like some articles). I will just link it - it is actually easily available, but I am only interested in posting one table
http://csbaonline.org/wp-content/upload ... eport-.pdf

The table says that BVRAAMs are more likely to be useful in big aircraft. You meed to read the 76 page pdf to understand why he says that

The report merely says that larger, heavier platforms are better suited to BVR warfare. At no point does it state that BVR itself doesn't confer an advantage or that gunfights still rule. Quite the opposite in fact.

"over the past five decades, advances in radar and other sensor technologies, missile capabilities, and communication technologies allowed pilots to search effectively much larger volumes of sky and engage targets at ever-increasing range. Most modern air combat engagements were initiated before the aircraft were within visual range with a commensurate decrease in the frequency of maneuvering combat. This means that aircrew SA is no longer primarily linked to what they can physically see through the cockpit canopy, but to what they glean from cockpit displays of sensor output and information passed from offboard sources such as nearby friendly aircraft."

[shiv]

But that data is very clear on the trend between a gun and a BVR.

The graph is very clear and I will give you another article that explains the data.

From memory, (and excluding the old Vietnam failures ) out of 33 BVR "kills" - 24 were detected by an AWACS at 50 nm and missiles launched within visual range. In only 6 cases were there BVR kills of which 4 were against non manoeuvring targets. That apart. IFF is not 100% effective - "friendly aircraft" with battle damage/malfunction will not respond to IFF and failure rate of IFF may be 5%. When high sortie rates are being undertake the chances of friendly fire kills is very high. And the chances of failure of BVR missile (fuse failure. miss distance etc) are also discussed

Ultimately the so called BVR kills are all WVR and/or assisted by AWACS. No AWACS - BVR more likely to fail. And this is
Read it all here in the best and most quoted and most argued about article on the internet about BVR missiles. 20 page pdf. Enjoy
Promise and Reality: BVR Air to Air Combat

Say what one might Prodyut Das has done his reading

[shiv]

However we have reached a point where a majority of air battles will be fought using BVR missiles. BVR might not get you a hard kill every time, but firing off a salvo of long-range missiles at an incoming strike package would certainly cause them to jettison their loads and scurry back to base. Virtual attrition.

The internet is full of arguments like this. Not convincing. Just an assumption. there is no data to say that this happens regularly. If there is please show me.

I saw this argument on multiple sites. I also saw ex servicemen arguing that many misses were because the pilots did not know how to use the weapon properly Pah. LOL

[shiv]

Let us assume that all future air battles will occur at BVR ranges. This is discussed at length in many articles.

The summary is:
For BVR detection you need large radars - so large aircraft. Large aircraft can carry more missiles as well and have the power for all their electronics. This capability is less likely on F-16 sized fighters because of smaller radar size - the latter will need AWACS assistance or they simply cannot manage BVR engagement on their own

This now needs to be applied to LCA and BVR. Small fighter - will need AWACS because radar simply not big enough to detect and engage an BVR range. BVRAAMs make sense in Su-30s, perhaps even MiG 29. But LCA - I am quoting articles that are gung ho about BVR.

[Mihir]

However we have reached a point where a majority of air battles will be fought using BVR missiles. BVR might not get you a hard kill every time, but firing off a salvo of long-range missiles at an incoming strike package would certainly cause them to jettison their loads and scurry back to base. Virtual attrition.

The internet is full of arguments like this. Not convincing. Just an assumption. there is no data to say that this happens regularly. If there is please show me.

I saw this argument on multiple sites. I also saw ex servicemen arguing that many misses were because the pilots did not know how to use the weapon properly Pah. LOL

It's standard operating procedure. What's not convincing about it?

Or are you now arguing that strike aircraft, when attacked by long-range missiles, will simply keep flying towards the target?

Small fighter - will need AWACS because radar simply not big enough to detect and engage an BVR range. BVRAAMs make sense in Su-30s, perhaps even MiG 29. But LCA - I am quoting article that are gung ho about BVR.

The LCA's nose cone is large enough to carry any radar that would fit in a MiG-29. And yes, the LCA would be an inferior BVR fighter to an Su-30MKI (assuming that the latter actually lives up to its full potential). Does this mean that the LCA can't hold its own in a BVR fight? Absolutely not! It's good enough to go up against the PAF's F-16s and the PLAAF's J-10s.

And if the LCA is flawed, I wonder where that leaves Prof Das' Gnat 125 with its four flak cannons and "Lightweight Radar or Laser ranger"?

[NRao]

But that data is very clear on the trend between a gun and a BVR.

The graph is very clear and I will give you another article that explains the data.

From memory, (and excluding the old Vietnam failures ) out of 33 BVR "kills" - 24 were detected by an AWACS at 50 nm and missiles launched within visual range. In only 6 cases were there BVR kills of which 4 were against non manoeuvring targets. That apart. IFF is not 100% effective - "friendly aircraft" with battle damage/malfunction will not respond to IFF and failure rate of IFF may be 5%. When high sortie rates are being undertake the chances of friendly fire kills is very high. And the chances of failure of BVR missile (fuse failure. miss distance etc) are also discussed

Ultimately the so called BVR kills are all WVR and/or assisted by AWACS. No AWACS - BVR more likely to fail. And this is
Read it all here in the best and most quoted and most argued about article on the internet about BVR missiles. 20 page pdf. Enjoy
Promise and Reality: BVR Air to Air Combat

Say what one might Prodyut Das has done his reading

Nope. PD's arg has been very diff than those proposed in the articles. He has arrived at similar (NOT same) conclusions, but from a totally (irrelevant) angle.

The graph I posted clearly shows the decline in the effectiveness of a gun in an aerial battle and the effectiveness of the BVR missile.


Comments on this post of yours: So, if there were that many duds for BVR, did the planes then engage in gun based battle? IF they did not, it does NOT add anything to the Gun vs. BVR discussion. It ONLY says that the BVR missiles need improvement. That is all - which is part of the development process. More funds, more testing, ............................. Better BVR missile + gun.

[brar_w]

Awacs and networks will obviously do a lot better, the latter obviously comming through in conditions where the former can't survive. The Lt col. makes a good argument but it would be worth looking into advances in BVR missiles, IFF , net centric warfare and data links post Gulf War that occurred 24 or so years ago using technology developed even earlier. A lot of his suggestions such as ARM modes are even rumored on the current variant US and even Chinese BVR missiles and kinematic capability has improved significantly through the C and D Amraams and the meteor. Additionally traditional WVR weapons are entering the BVR domain such as the Asraam, block 2 and the now paused block 3 sidewinder.. These (some) weapons are all data linked with LOAL modes for better pk at extreme envelopes.

[shiv]

Throwing more cold water on BVRAAM
https://defenseissues.wordpress.com/201 ... vr-combat/

It is often forgotten is that g forces in tracking turn are a square of speed. Thus, in WVR combat, if missile travels at Mach 3 and fighter aircraft travels at Mach 0,6 (corner speed of many modern fighters) and can pull 9 g maneuvers, then missile needs to pull 225 g to match turn radius, or 100 g if fighter is travelling at Mach 0,9. If missile is fired outside ideal position, it has to maneuver in order to point its nose towards the target, thus lowering probability of kill; there is also a danger of targeted aircraft simply flying out of missile’s field of view. This danger is also present with active-seeker BVR missiles. In BVR, AIM-120 travels at Mach 4, and can pull 30 g within its NEZ, yet it would need 400 Gs to reliably hit a modern fighter which is maneuvering at corner speed of Mach 0,6, or 178 Gs if target is still at standard cruise speed of Mach 0,9.

Further, even though BVR missiles have maximum range of over 100 kilometers, their effective range against aircraft in attack is 1/5 of that – around 20 kilometers – and target beyond 40 kilometers can feel free to maneuver without even taking any possible missile shots into account, as only way these would hit is luck. One of reasons is that BVR missiles follow ballistic trajectories – AIM-120C-5 allegedly has motor burn time of 8 seconds, which gives range of around 10 kilometers before motor burns out. At ranges greater than 8 kilometers, attacking fighter can still choose wether to outmaneuver or outrun the BVR missile; at distances less than that is missile’s no-escape zone, where aircraft cannot outrun the missile, it has to outmaneuver it, but such distances automatically mean that combat is not longer beyond visual range. Ranges stated are also only true at high altitude against aircraft in attack; at low altitude, effective range of BVR missile is reduced to 25% of its range at high altitude, and range against aircraft in flight is 1/4 of that against aircraft in attack.

Missiles in fact can achieve either maximum range or maximum maneuvering capability – missile that pulls 40 g at sea level will only pull 13 g at 10.000 meters and 2,85 g at 20.000 meters, unless 40 g is a structural limit. AIM-9 for example can pull 40 g at SL and at 10.000 ft, and 35 g at 20.000 ft. Thus, it can be expected to pull single-digit number of g’s at 40.000 ft. Meanwhile, F-16 for example can sustain 8,5 g at 15.000 ft, and Rafale can sustain 9 g at 40.000 ft.

Proximity fuses on missiles can trigger explosion of missile if anything (like a bird) flies nearby. Warhead itself has lethal radius of 10-12 meters for late AIM-120 variants.

Missiles are not the only problem with BVR combat. There are also questions of reliable IFF, penalties for using active sensors in combat, weight, cost and complexity penalties on weapons systems caused by systems required for BVR combat, as well as training penalties caused by aforementioned penalties on weapons system.

[brar_w]

I was wondering when a Picard reference would show up..

[shiv]

Awacs and networks will obviously do a lot better, the latter obviously comming through in conditions where the former can't survive. The Lt col. makes a good argument but it would be worth looking into advances in BVR missiles, IFF , net centric warfare and data links post Gulf War that occurred 24 or so years ago using technology developed even earlier. A lot of his suggestions such as ARM modes are even rumored on the current variant US and even Chinese BVR missiles and kinematic capability has improved significantly through the C and D Amraams and the meteor. Additionally traditional WVR weapons are entering the BVR domain such as the Amraams, block 2 and the now paused block 3 sidewinder.. These (some) weapons are all data linked with LOAL modes for better pk at extreme envelopes.

That CSBA article supports BVRAAMs and is actually a good one that makes a lot of points. I does not go into denial mode about BVR failures, but speaks of what needs to be done to make BVRAAMs more successful. Now all we need is for people to actually read articles without bias about authors and equipment

[brar_w]

I wasn't reffering to the CSBA research that I had myself shared when it was published included the video of the presentation. I was reffering to the war college article.

[NRao]

Ultimately the so called BVR kills are all WVR and/or assisted by AWACS. No AWACS - BVR more likely to fail. And this is
Read it all here in the best and most quoted and most argued about article on the internet about BVR missiles. 20 page pdf. Enjoy
Promise and Reality: BVR Air to Air Combat

Well, for one that paper was written in 2005, when things were very much diff.

Then he says:

The promise of beyond visual range (BVR)
air-to-air combat makes sense: kill
the enemy at long range—before he can harm
you. Developed throughout the Cold War,
BVR capabilities fit the US force structur
e framework which favored quality over
quantity. This framework envisioned a highly-
trained force (US or US client) equipped
with advanced weapons defeati
ng a numerically superior enemy
(USSR or Soviet client).
Unfortunately, the pursuit of costly BVR
capabilities during the Cold War was not
justified by actual BVR performance.
To prove this thesis, this paper wi
ll first review BVR theory and BVR
implementation. This is followed by a deta
iled analysis of BVR in practice—actual
combat results from the only four Cold War
era conflicts involving any documented BVR
air-to-air combat. The Desert Storm sec
tion shows BVR performance improved relative
to the Cold War era, although not for the
original reasons purported by BVR pundits.
The limited post-Desert Storm BVR data is reviewed in the Post-Desert Storm section.
Prior to offering conclusions and recommendations, the paper will also present relevant
counterarguments.

Sorry do not have the time to reformat. BUT, this is how PD should write a paper. I can follow what he says, find his data, coroborate his data + analysis. PD does NOTHING of this sort. So, you should forward such papers to PD.

His conclusions:

This paper has shown that the pursuit of
costly BVR capabilities during the Cold
War was not justified by actual BVR perf
ormance. Air-to-air combat has not
transformed into a long-range slugfest of technology wherei
n radar-guided missiles score
near-guaranteed kills. Human factors, such
as pilot skill—or the opponent’s ineptness—
still trump technology. Furthermore, BVR appears
to work best in situ
ations it is needed
16
©Adams Center
Virginia Military Institute.
least. In Desert Storm—unlike Vietnam,
Yom Kippur, and Bekáa Valley—the enemy
had no chance of establishing localized or te
mporary air superiority. This allowed a
persistent AWACS presence—coupled with
overwhelming numbers of Coalition
aircraft—permitting up to 16 BVR kills in
the least stressing BVR scenario.

Cool.

So, in the early part of the BVR dev the missiles needed a LOT of help.

PD put his thoughts, on the BVR, in 2013/14 and he perhaps read such papers, did not put a time-line (which is a common mistake), read what he wanted to read (mind projection) and went about claiming BVR is useless.

Look, I had stated this way up front, unless PD can write a proper paper - provide proper refs to his claim of 100,000 data points, etc - and someone else can recreate his analysis it is really useless.


Also, your citing articles will only go against PD. None of the articles you have cited support PD.

[NRao]

Throwing more cold water on BVRAAM
https://defenseissues.wordpress.com/201 ... vr-combat/

It is often forgotten is that g forces in tracking turn are a square of speed. Thus, in WVR combat, if missile travels at Mach 3 and fighter aircraft travels at Mach 0,6 (corner speed of many modern fighters) and can pull 9 g maneuvers, then missile needs to pull 225 g to match turn radius, or 100 g if fighter is travelling at Mach 0,9. If missile is fired outside ideal position, it has to maneuver in order to point its nose towards the target, thus lowering probability of kill; there is also a danger of targeted aircraft simply flying out of missile’s field of view. This danger is also present with active-seeker BVR missiles. In BVR, AIM-120 travels at Mach 4, and can pull 30 g within its NEZ, yet it would need 400 Gs to reliably hit a modern fighter which is maneuvering at corner speed of Mach 0,6, or 178 Gs if target is still at standard cruise speed of Mach 0,9.

Further, even though BVR missiles have maximum range of over 100 kilometers, their effective range against aircraft in attack is 1/5 of that – around 20 kilometers – and target beyond 40 kilometers can feel free to maneuver without even taking any possible missile shots into account, as only way these would hit is luck. One of reasons is that BVR missiles follow ballistic trajectories – AIM-120C-5 allegedly has motor burn time of 8 seconds, which gives range of around 10 kilometers before motor burns out. At ranges greater than 8 kilometers, attacking fighter can still choose wether to outmaneuver or outrun the BVR missile; at distances less than that is missile’s no-escape zone, where aircraft cannot outrun the missile, it has to outmaneuver it, but such distances automatically mean that combat is not longer beyond visual range. Ranges stated are also only true at high altitude against aircraft in attack; at low altitude, effective range of BVR missile is reduced to 25% of its range at high altitude, and range against aircraft in flight is 1/4 of that against aircraft in attack.

Missiles in fact can achieve either maximum range or maximum maneuvering capability – missile that pulls 40 g at sea level will only pull 13 g at 10.000 meters and 2,85 g at 20.000 meters, unless 40 g is a structural limit. AIM-9 for example can pull 40 g at SL and at 10.000 ft, and 35 g at 20.000 ft. Thus, it can be expected to pull single-digit number of g’s at 40.000 ft. Meanwhile, F-16 for example can sustain 8,5 g at 15.000 ft, and Rafale can sustain 9 g at 40.000 ft.

Proximity fuses on missiles can trigger explosion of missile if anything (like a bird) flies nearby. Warhead itself has lethal radius of 10-12 meters for late AIM-120 variants.

Missiles are not the only problem with BVR combat. There are also questions of reliable IFF, penalties for using active sensors in combat, weight, cost and complexity penalties on weapons systems caused by systems required for BVR combat, as well as training penalties caused by aforementioned penalties on weapons system.

This:

In air-to-air combat, BVR missiles fill the niche of old battle rifles and modern sniper rifles, WVR missiles fill the niche of modern assault rifles, while gun fills niche of combat knife. While gun is most versatile weapon of the lot – it can be used for air-to-air work, close air support, firing warning shots towards aircraft violating forbidden airspace – it is not often used in air-to-air combat and is treated purely as fallback weapon in case missiles have been expended.

PD take note. Please.

All the article is saying is that the missiles are not as mature as intended to be. But that is a given. They need further development.

[shiv]

Look, I had stated this way up front, unless PD can write a proper paper - provide proper refs to his claim of 100,000 data points, etc - and someone else can recreate his analysis it is really useless.


Also, your citing articles will only go against PD. None of the articles you have cited support PD.

NRaoji - you are free to hold your views. I will hold mine. If what I post of Prodyut Das is something that you don't like - it is not my problem and I am not here to worry if "they go against him". That may or may not be his problem - but it's certainly not mine. But I learn 1000 times more about military aviation from Prodyut Das than from thousands of rhetorical, angry and indignant posts on BRF and I haven't see anything to change that view yet.

I think I already know what you and others think of Das - that is a choice everyone makes for himself. But I do state what I think.

[Karan M]

Let us assume that all future air battles will occur at BVR ranges. This is discussed at length in many articles.

The summary is:
For BVR detection you need large radars - so large aircraft. Large aircraft can carry more missiles as well and have the power for all their electronics. This capability is less likely on F-16 sized fighters because of smaller radar size - the latter will need AWACS assistance or they simply cannot manage BVR engagement on their own

This now needs to be applied to LCA and BVR. Small fighter - will need AWACS because radar simply not big enough to detect and engage an BVR range. BVRAAMs make sense in Su-30s, perhaps even MiG 29. But LCA - I am quoting articles that are gung ho about BVR.

That summary, is to put it mildly, completely wrong thanks to being pulled from the likes of Das, who don't have the first clue about modern systems. I suspect if you had done your own reading rather than relying on his initial direction, you would have come to a far more informed assessment.

Saab Gripen. "Light fighter". Meteor, the most formidable long range all-up BVR missile in service today. Not merely targeted at bombers etc.

http://www.defensenews.com/story/defens ... /26692269/

"The addition of Meteor air-to-air capability makes Gripen the most formidable counter-air platform in service," Ahlqvist declared. The missile will become operational with Swedish Air Force Gripens in 2016.

And while a new active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar is being fielded with the E/F aircraft, Saab Defense Systems has developed a new Mark 4 version of its PS-05/A radar for the Cs and Ds.

The Mark 4 radar — discussed by Saab for the first time on April 27 — essentially doubles air-to-air and air-to-ground detection ranges, Ahlqvist said, and has improved abilities to detect very low-radar cross-section targets.

The system, he added, "offers significant functional growth through software upgrades, and offers full [advanced, medium-range, air-to-air missile] and Meteor missile integration." Impact on aircraft upgrading from Mark 3 radars to Mark 4 is "very small, an absolute minimum. You can easily switch between Mark 3 and Mark 4 configuration."

LCA, light fighter.
http://aviationweek.com/paris-air-show- ... formance-0

RAFAEL is unveiling a new, extended range version of its Beyond Visual Range (BVR) active radar-guided air-to-air missile – the I-Derby ER.

The new seeker is lighter and more compact than its predecessor, thus clearing valuable space which has been used by the missile designers to increase the propulsion system by adding a second mode (kick), accelerating the missile at the terminal phase of the flight. This new addition increases the range of the I-Derby ER beyond 100 km., significantly more than its current “short/medium” range capability.

This “second kick” greatly improves the missile’s performance. “This phase is not serial, but operates independently of the primary rocket propulsion as it is activated at any time during the fight, by the flight control system.” Yaniv explains. The second pulse would likely kick in when the missile is closing on its target, accelerating it and increasing its kinematic envelope, thus increasing its “no escape zone”.
....
RAFAEL claims it will be able to deliver 80% of the Meteor’s performance at a third of its cost. It is also superior to the AIM-120C7 and more affordable, the company claims. Already cleared on F-16 (Block 52), F-5E, Kfir and Sea Harrier, I-Derby ER integration tests are currently under way on the Indian Tejas LCA.

This capability is less likely on F-16 sized fighters because of smaller radar size - the latter will need AWACS assistance or they simply cannot manage BVR engagement on their own

AN/APG-80 on the F-16 Block 60. AW&ST, 70-80nm against a 1sq mtr target.

I suspect most AF would take that performance hand over foot if they could get it.

Long story short, state of the art systems even on "small fighters" can be very potent.

Physical dimensions especially on the LCA are not anything to sneeze at. It can fit in a radome the size of what is on the MiG-29. Aperture area matters for received power. If a state of the art AESA is put in, with high gain & reliability & the electrical systems from a Ge404 are adjusted to deliver the power (and no reason why they can't be to a decent extent), we are looking at credible performance.

Look at the topic a bit more please, before jumping to misleading conclusions.

The issue is basically one of who has the best tech. The US leads in compact packaging of TRMs, hence even their smallest radars can be very powerful and capable. The Israelis and Euros are also not very far behind. The Russians are catching up. In terms of software, experience all these nations have very credible backgrounds. India is catching up in GBAD. We have a ways to go in A2A systems but we will get there (if we show consistency).

One does not even need to always be active on radar for being adept at BVR. See:
http://www.livefistdefence.com/2009/07/ ... -test.html

While the first live firing of the Derby active-radar seeker missile was conducted using the aircraft's primary sensor, the next test will be from one of the Navy's upgraded Sea Harriers with its radar switched off. Guidance will be provided from another platform, either on the ground or in the air.

Which is pretty similar to what was talked about for platforms like the Gripen and F-22.

[Karan M]

Throwing more cold water on BVRAAM
https://defenseissues.wordpress.com/201 ... vr-combat/

It is often forgotten is that g forces in tracking turn are a square of speed. Thus, in WVR combat, if missile travels at Mach 3 and fighter aircraft travels at Mach 0,6 (corner speed of many modern fighters) and can pull 9 g maneuvers, then missile needs to pull 225 g to match turn radius, or 100 g if fighter is travelling at Mach 0,9. If missile is fired outside ideal position, it has to maneuver in order to point its nose towards the target, thus lowering probability of kill; there is also a danger of targeted aircraft simply flying out of missile’s field of view. This danger is also present with active-seeker BVR missiles. In BVR, AIM-120 travels at Mach 4, and can pull 30 g within its NEZ, yet it would need 400 Gs to reliably hit a modern fighter which is maneuvering at corner speed of Mach 0,6, or 178 Gs if target is still at standard cruise speed of Mach 0,9.

Further, even though BVR missiles have maximum range of over 100 kilometers, their effective range against aircraft in attack is 1/5 of that – around 20 kilometers – and target beyond 40 kilometers can feel free to maneuver without even taking any possible missile shots into account, as only way these would hit is luck. One of reasons is that BVR missiles follow ballistic trajectories – AIM-120C-5 allegedly has motor burn time of 8 seconds, which gives range of around 10 kilometers before motor burns out. At ranges greater than 8 kilometers, attacking fighter can still choose wether to outmaneuver or outrun the BVR missile; at distances less than that is missile’s no-escape zone, where aircraft cannot outrun the missile, it has to outmaneuver it, but such distances automatically mean that combat is not longer beyond visual range. Ranges stated are also only true at high altitude against aircraft in attack; at low altitude, effective range of BVR missile is reduced to 25% of its range at high altitude, and range against aircraft in flight is 1/4 of that against aircraft in attack.

Missiles in fact can achieve either maximum range or maximum maneuvering capability – missile that pulls 40 g at sea level will only pull 13 g at 10.000 meters and 2,85 g at 20.000 meters, unless 40 g is a structural limit. AIM-9 for example can pull 40 g at SL and at 10.000 ft, and 35 g at 20.000 ft. Thus, it can be expected to pull single-digit number of g’s at 40.000 ft. Meanwhile, F-16 for example can sustain 8,5 g at 15.000 ft, and Rafale can sustain 9 g at 40.000 ft.

Proximity fuses on missiles can trigger explosion of missile if anything (like a bird) flies nearby. Warhead itself has lethal radius of 10-12 meters for late AIM-120 variants.

Missiles are not the only problem with BVR combat. There are also questions of reliable IFF, penalties for using active sensors in combat, weight, cost and complexity penalties on weapons systems caused by systems required for BVR combat, as well as training penalties caused by aforementioned penalties on weapons system.

Copy pasting is all very well. But when what is copy pasted is wrong, then what?

BVRAAMs do NOT necessarily follow ballistic trajectories. They can follow a variety of trajectories.

Assumptions based on single burn, conventional motor missiles are also ridiculous. Meteor has a ramjet. Derby-ER (as does MRSAM) has a dual pulse motor (as will Astra Mk2).

Proximity fuses are designed to be insensitive to specific targets. You can have RPF or laser or both.

Ironically he has not mentioned the single weakness of most BVRAAMs today in that excerpt.. which the French have already mitigated to an extent.

[Karan M]

Small fighter - will need AWACS because radar simply not big enough to detect and engage an BVR range. BVRAAMs make sense in Su-30s, perhaps even MiG 29. But LCA - I am quoting article that are gung ho about BVR.

The LCA's nose cone is large enough to carry any radar that would fit in a MiG-29. And yes, the LCA would be an inferior BVR fighter to an Su-30MKI (assuming that the latter actually lives up to its full potential). Does this mean that the LCA can't hold its own in a BVR fight? Absolutely not! It's good enough to go up against the PAF's F-16s and the PLAAF's J-10s.

And if the LCA is flawed, I wonder where that leaves Prof Das' Gnat 125 with its four flak cannons and "Lightweight Radar or Laser ranger"?

The Gnat will just shoot down any missiles that come towards it, with its flak cannons.

[Karan M]

I thinks guns will always be a back up weapon/primary weapon to take out UAVs. Guns have been retained on all combat helicopters. And most aircraft still have guns and I see no major thrust towards removing them altogether despite major advances in BVR shoot downs.

UAVs will be targeted by AAA - MANPADS, AAA, SAMs until and unless you have targets of opportunity wherein a fighter is near to an UAV.

Lets see the chain of command. UAV is detected. Fighter has to be scrambled. Fighter has to dash to UAV, fighter shoots down UAV. Now, if you have the three above, you don't necessarily need a fighter.

IAF/IA have:

• SpyDer
• Akash
• Upgraded Schilka
• Upgraded ZSU-23
• Older missile systems

Now depending on height, RCS why would you need a fighter all the time - all the systems above can detect and shoot down UAVs, except some of the oldest systems which may struggle against very small UAVs like quadcopters etc.

For those, even fighters may not work optimally. Putting a gun pipper on such a small target for instance.

[nirav]

Shiv saar,

your admiration of PDs ideas is visible. Nothing wrong with that. Just that since he is a professor and he writes articles in vayu mag doesnt make his ideas automatically the holy grail.

On one hand you are talking about BVRAAMs and their pros and cons and Shri PD spoke about having a smallish radar in his CATjet, doing away with IR Flares and having armour on the thing and expecting it to dogfight like a hot rod.

Its all physics defying stuff. The LCA program shows how crucial weight issues are. That they are having trouble with 4th gen stuff in a 4th gen jet should tell the prof a thing or two about slapping on 4th gen stuff in a 2nd gen airframe. The Gnat !

The "idea" is that outlandish.

IF one were to take only the 'cons' of a BVRAAM, then it ought to be applied to jets across the whole inventory of the AF not just the LCA.
Current LCA capability allows it to go up with anything the bakis can throw at it. That cant be said for the CATjet, IF it ever comes to fruition.

I see you appreciate when folks read and write stuff without bias and an open mind. Think that really needs to be practiced by Shri PD.

A "professor" who publishes this,

First the bad news:
1. We have a fairly mediocre fighter somewhere between the Gnat F1 and the MiG 21 on our hands. Hence the IAF’s present reluctance with the Mk.1.
2. Both the F-16 and the FC-17 will give the LCA Mk.1 a hard time. The F-16 A will be particularly dangerous. Even against the FC-17 it would be a Mysteres vs Sabres kind of a situation. I don’t have much faith in the “great equalizer” capabilities of BVRs as of now. BVRs is not the weapon for a little LCA. Hence the FC-17 will also be a very dangerous opponent no matter how much we snigger about the Chinese aircraft.
3. As a MiG-21 bis replacement the LCA is a failure because the general rule of thumb is a 15 % increase in performance and capability. The LCA Mk1 does not measure up. The landing speed and the cockpit displays will be better than the early MiGs which will help reduce accidents but let us not fool ourselves of having developed a MiG-21 replacement particularly as an interceptor. So what do we do?

I feel for his students.

[NRao]

Look, I had stated this way up front, unless PD can write a proper paper - provide proper refs to his claim of 100,000 data points, etc - and someone else can recreate his analysis it is really useless.


Also, your citing articles will only go against PD. None of the articles you have cited support PD.

NRaoji - you are free to hold your views. I will hold mine. If what I post of Prodyut Das is something that you don't like - it is not my problem and I am not here to worry if "they go against him". That may or may not be his problem - but it's certainly not mine. But I learn 1000 times more about military aviation from Prodyut Das than from thousands of rhetorical, angry and indignant posts on BRF and I haven't see anything to change that view yet.

I think I already know what you and others think of Das - that is a choice everyone makes for himself. But I do state what I think.

That - "view" - is the problem.

There is "data" out there. There is nothing out there to hold a "view".

Look at the "data" and interpret it to the extent you can , without infusing your "view" into it.

Like you are trained to be a surgeon, I am trained to be data scientist. Done for eons.

So, this is NOT about PD. It is about how PD interprets "data". And, my contention, based on what I have read so far, is that he is a failure. It must be painful to be around him.

BUT, that can change. Because it has nothing to do with PD. He provides sources and does good interpretation, nothing more to ask from a scientist.


Just one more point. It is one thing to agree with the analysis - the process - and another to deal with the conclusion. I am looking for the process, not teh conclusion.

[nirav]

The Gnat will just shoot down any missiles that come towards it, with its flak cannons.

ALL CATjet fighter pilots will be given a mandatory religious training/conversion course.

If their "visual stealth" doesnt work and they see a heat seeking WVRAAM coming at it, they must crackle loudly on the RT, AoA and hope the mijjile misses.

IF a BVRAAM at the CATjet, shout AoA again and crackle on the RT, "But Shri PD thinks BVR still isnt there yet".

[shiv]

Shiv saar,

your admiration of PDs ideas is visible. Nothing wrong with that. Just that since he is a professor and he writes articles in vayu mag doesnt make his ideas automatically the holy grail.

The idea that any one single person's views can be a holy grail is silly. But Das makes technical points that no one seems to have actually read properly or managed to rebut. Time and again people cherry pick his views without reading the whole. If his students are that shoddy, no need to feel sorry for them - they deserve it. Frankly I have seen more anger at Das than any real substance in rebutting his claims. It is OK to disagree and hold a different opinion, but it is amusing to see anger accompanying an inability to match or rebut the technical arguments he makes.

[ShauryaT]

FGFA On — simplifies Parrikar’s aircraft choices

The word is the Modi government has informed Moscow it will soon sign the detailed long pending co-development agreement for the Su-50 FGFA (Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft). This simplifies the choices somewhat for defence minister Manohar Parrikar as regards the three large aircraft programmes on the IAF menu — other than FGFA, Rafale, and Tejas Mk-2.

[shiv]

[Karan M]

Gulf War occurred in 1990.

Its 2016 today.

No AESA fighter radars in Gulf War.

No AIM-7s as frontline missiles for USAF today.

But carry on.

Even the above shows how powerful fighter radars and BVR missiles had already been in 1990.

[Karan M]

BTW Admins, can we move all the above stuff to either Design your own Fighter or the newbie thread?

The Indian Military Aviation thread is getting cluttered up with such basic stuff which we all have to rebut or counter or explain to bask in the shadow of Shri Prodyut Das's greatness.