Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

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brar_w
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by brar_w »

More than one source of radiation for the adversary to detect passively?
What will you do about it? AWACS give away Radiation, but they also operate in the lower frequency bands (newer ones mostly L, with even UHF options available) and as such get massive ranges for their early-warning role. If you invest in developing ARM's to counter that (Chinese and Russians have) you have to outrange the Stand Off Early Warning ranges and if that happens you end up pushing them back. Networks, on the other hand can field LPI/LPD directional data-links that will be nearly impossible to intercept or actually use to target that particular aircraft. A low intensity ping isn't the type of emission you'll be able to focus your ARM's on provided you have them. Cooperative engagements actually reduce the NET RF emission because it allows a large proportion of your fleet to practice EMCON since Situational Awareness is obtained through collaboration rather than the 'brute-force' approach of blasting away sensors. It would seem that Network reliance would put an end to EMCON, but the ground reality points to the exact opposite, i.e. the operator community saw this disadvantage and quickly developed different DL solutions to counter different threats and support varying requirements - From large force all aspect LOW-THREAT (Stand OFF) Data-Link solutions, to more sophisticated, highly agile, software defined directional data-links for shorter range, SA sharing among Low Observable Platforms. That is a part of stealth - Its not just RCS, and IR its sensors EMCON, and the creation of LPI/LPD data links with robust, resilient wideband coverage that is easily upgradable. One needs to spend 10 minutes on Qorvo's site to see what some of the GaN HPA applications are for DL's currently available and under production - And these are just some components that they are willing to sell commercially with ITAR terms. The real cutting edge stuff won't have their specification pasted on the internet quick turn around times for sample delivery.

Meanwhile, passive techniques have evolved and so has the capability. There are staring EW sensors currently being developed that cover huge ranges in frequency (current prototypes will show 550 MHZ to 110GHZ in a staring passive receivers - this is different from the current scanning types in that it is constantly sucking in data 24x7 , 360 degrees). The F-22 and its EW systems have already demonstrated the ability to shoot down targets using the AMRAAM while exercising extreme EMCON and this will only get better when you field newer systems and more advanced weapons. There is a reason the F-35 is designed to support up to half a dozen different waveforms and not just one single multi-directional 'blast away L16" - from the non LPI/LPD Link-16, to the semi LPI (data dependent) TTNT manipulation, to the highest EMCON/LPI-D MADL and eventually the Advanced Common Data Link (L16 replacement).
Last edited by brar_w on 14 May 2016 18:45, edited 1 time in total.
Karan M
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

http://forum.keypublishing.com/archive/ ... -5659.html

1. AWACS deployment
There are many additional variations of defensive tactics based on EMCON. Usually, at least one E-2C will cruise some 200nm away from the carrier up the threat axis. But, what if the E-2C is placed 270 or 320nm away from the carrier and off the threat axis? Considering the "usuall/standard" tactics of USN's CVBGs, any opponent will automatically search for the carrier somewhere else, i.e. under that E-2C. But, where "under"? To port or to starboard? Making a wrong decision at that stage can mean that defending interceptors will cut to pieces a regiment or two of Backfires....
S.O.P procedure was for the E-2's to takeoff and transit out to a certain point a fair distance away before climbing out to egin their patrols. This climbout point was plotted to be staggered with the rough direction of travel of the battlegroup - the idea being that the opposition, if it could detect the E-2, would see its "launch point" progressing along a certain course. They'd therefore assume that that was the line of advance of the battlegroup when in reality the CVBG was many miles offset.
2. Datalink
http://www.iai.co.il/sip_storage/FILES/8/38678.pdf
http://www.iai.co.il/2013/34257-22830-e ... eness.aspx

3.http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 749_1.html
Illustrating Israeli capabilities, the Tejas Mark I was already armed with an all-Israeli combination of the Elta EL/M-2032 radar, the Derby and Python air-to-air missiles, and a data link that digitally interconnected these. Indian test pilots say this was a "world-class" air-to-air combat configuration. But now, the Elta-HAL AESA radar could make Tejas a more capable air-defence fighter.
Su-30MKI
POLYOT Research and Production Company produces the communications system for the Su-30 MKI, comprising:Simultaneous voice and data communication between air and ground, using HF, VHF and UHF frequencies. Automatic data transfer of targeting data. Anti-jamming capabilities. Two-position control of communications and intercommunication functions. Emergency frequency monitoring. Automated BITE.
IAF ODL
2008
http://www.idsa.in/jds/2_1_2008_IndianA ... ry_FHMajor
Force-multipliers, air dominance fighters and a converged, secure ‘Combat Communications Network’ – including the IACCS and later the ODL – will fundamentally alter the IAF’s Air Defence doctrine. For effective command & control, extended reach and to reduce the sensors-to-shooter loop, we are laying due emphasis on Networks and Space, which are essential ‘next steps’.
2009
ODL pilot
http://www.domain-b.com/defence/air_spa ... tract.html

2013
*ODL: RFP to be issued shortly. First phase already completed last month through a pilot project for the operational data link (ODL).
shiv
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by shiv »

brar_w wrote:
More than one source of radiation for the adversary to detect passively?
What will you do about it? AWACS give away Radiation,
The "unknowns" of BVR combat is the capability of an adversary to make use of this. I suspect that exercises like Red Flag do simulate such scenarios (aside from intra country practice such as that done by TACDE)

The importance of real combat data is to compare with the simulation to see what went wrong. If that data is absent it is absent. That's all. Might as well accept that combat plans developed are the best possible under simulated conditions. How many pilots (and hot warfighters in general) have commented that pre-existing plans are the first to collapse under real war conditions.

But any claim that all is fine and all problems have been solved with the latest and greatest in BVR developments is something that I view with some scepticism. Just my viewpoint - one among many.

I apologize for making rhetorical arguments. Will try and stop..
brar_w
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by brar_w »

The "unknowns" of BVR combat is the capability of an adversary to make use of this.
AWACS Survivability in the very high end threat environment isn't being taken for granted. In fact they are planning to not have AWACS presence and are counting on distributed SA to compensate with AEW pushed further back to ensure survivability.

Image
The importance of real combat data is to compare with the simulation to see what went wrong.
The problem with that is that this just isn't simulation in the virtual domain. But granted, its not actual combat though one could say the very same thing on the counter-measures. When have they been tested in any operationally relevant environment? And when was Mr. Das's claims actually tested in real world environment? Or his conclusions for that matter. One one side you have open-source analysis based on incomplete historical data, on the other you an analysis driving acquisition decisions based on FULL INFORMATION historical data, Virtual simulation of capability, and LIVE demonstration against higher end systems you design for your own T&E efforts. Given the choices, it doesn't really take a genius to figure out which side the majority of the folks would take as being the best representative of what is actually likely to happen with a decent probability of success. In the absence of cold hard data in the open source (you won't find it for damn obvious reasons) I'd rather trust the decisions made by folks that are actually shooting dozens of weapons at supersonic full up 3 and 4th gen fighters armed to the teeth with EA/EW payloads when compared to a literature review that relies entirely on incomplete, historical data based on open source research. Additionally, one can't rely on post GW debrief and analysis of what the technology level was in the early 90's when compared to the advances made in the two dozen years since. Its ok if you have concluded something and are just looking for references to back it up, but one really has to make an effort to IGNORE the advances in technology and capability that has occurred since..that go a very long way in overcoming some of the shortcomings identified then. Organizations tend to learn over time.
But any claim that all is fine and all problems have been solved with the latest and greatest in BVR developments is something that I view with some scepticism. Just my viewpoint - one among many.
Its not about solving ALL problems. Its about solving problems that were system shortcomings in their early phases. New problems will obviously come up even in testing - that is why there is a thing called SHOT DOCTRINE even in SAM engagements. You are dealing with probability of interceptions, and that probability goes up and down with capability and counter-capability cycles. The Hundreds of Millions invested to develop a very extensive T&E and future technology development program goes a long way in understanding the capability and the challenges that will have to confront, and then developing tactics to exist in that space.

This isn't a zero sum game..it never is hence the oversimplification in conclusions like - BVR is dead, DRFM killed RF seekers, or VHF radar killed Stealth etc is extreme oversimplification and the arguments that are generally made by those pushing a pre-set conclusion down people's throats. Details matter and organizations spend a lot of money, and put a lot of very smart people on going about finding those pesky little details.
Last edited by brar_w on 14 May 2016 19:08, edited 2 times in total.
Karan M
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

All problems can never be solved. That is theoretically and practically impossible. However, if one side has many tools in the toolbox, then the other is at a disadvantage.

Kargil, 1999. Pakistan Air Force view on the conflict.

http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.in/2009 ... force.html
To prevent the mission from being seen as an escalatory step in the already charged atmosphere, PAF had to lure Indian fighters into its own territory, ie Azad Kashmir or the Northern Areas. That done, a number of issues had to be tackled. What if the enemy aircraft were hit in our territory but fell across, providing a pretext to India as a doubly aggrieved party? What if one of our own aircraft fell, no matter if the exchange was one-to-one (or better)? Finally, even if we were able to pull off a surprise, would it not be a one-off incident, with the IAF becoming wiser in quick time? The over-arching consideration was the BVR missile capability of IAF fighters which impinged unfavourably on the mission success probability. The conclusion was that a replication of the famous four-Vampire rout of 1st September 1965 by two Sabres might not be possible. The idea of a fighter sweep thus fizzled out as quickly as it came up for discussion.
Karan M
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

PAF pilot called Caesar who briefly posted on the interwebz.
Caesar wrote:This is my first visit to this site- and it is indeed a superlative one. Will definitely be here a lot more- including this forum. I did see this IAF/PAF thread, and was very pleasantly surprised to see a balanced and informed discussion v.s the vitriol and abuse which I sometimes saw on AFM.

I have been out of the PAF for a few years now- and in some respects have as much access to sources now as some civvie aviation fanatics- but still do retain contacts which give me the inside scoop sometimes. Here's my unbiased opinion on what happened in this incident. First some disclaimers- the IAF NEVER gave Chibber a big gallantry award- this was a routine award for a job well done- like an Air Medal in the USAF- not an award in the league of a Medal of Honor or DFC!

Secondly, in this particular occasion, the PAF was bested- there, I said it- there's no shame in it- there have been many occasions in the past conflicts of 1965 and 1971 when it was the other way around- any professional pilot will tell you that success and failure are two sides of the same coin- anyone who claims to be invincible is lying or an adolescent amatuer masquerading as a professional. To lay this story to rest- and though the PAF is understandably not keen to trumpet it around town- those in the know know- lets keep it at that, so I'm not exactly revealing any state secrets.

The PAF in Kargil was NEVER tasked to aggressively counter the IAF (forget the crap about them being scared)- it was very much an Army (read Musharraf) show- with even the civilian leadership in the dark about some aspects. Our friendly neighborhood tinpot dictator (Musharraf) then looked for scrapegoats- so he got rid of Nawaz and then turned on the PAF for not doing its job (bullshit!!!) by firing much of its top brass recently. Forgive me for digressing, but as someone who dedicated his life to the service of Pakistan, I hate to see it falling back into dictatorship. But the key message is- the PAF was never under orders to engage the IAF, unless they crossed the LOC.

On this occasion, I gather the Indian MiG-27s did cross the LOC briefly and the local NLI commander who was having the crap bombed out of him called in desparately for support- the PAF, which had been frustrated at having to sit it out till now, saw an opportunity to bloody the IAF nose as they were reported to have crossed the LOC. Two Falcons on alert were vectored into the MiGs, but received the jolt of their lives when an IAF MiG-29 locked onto BOTH of them (to answer the ongoing debate I see on this aspect of the IAF Mig-29s capability).

They tried to break lock- but the MiG persisted, and while I do agree they could have pressed home- there were some controlling factors:
1) strict orders not to cross the LOC
2) Hell, they thought they were about to get a salvo of R-27s up their noses...as an aside, one of the Falcon pilots was a greenhorn and was pretty shaken by this experience- got razzed to death for weeks afterwards.

What would have happened if the Falcons had pressed home- who knows???? The MiG had a definite BVR edge and in close combat with the R-73/HMS, all bets are off. Plus, if the Falcons did cross the LOC, they would have been fair game to any other MiG-29s lurking about as they would no longer be over friendly terriotory- sometimes discretion is the better part of valour, n'est c'est pas?
BTW, later it emerged Chibber's flight leader was the one who locked onto the PAF F-16s.

Gaurav Chibber was tragically lost in a flight accident post Kargil.
Karan M
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

FWIW, Paul Overscan, who ran the secretprojects site specializing on Soviet electronics wrote:
N019M is an updated version, developed as a response to the compromise of the N-019 radar by a US spy. Tested from 1986, it entered limited production in 1991. Slightly lighter than the N-019 at 350kg. N019 has increased ECM resistance, new software, and a more advanced built-in monitoring system. A new Ts101M computer relieves the processor overload problems of the N019, more than doubling capacity to 400,000 operations per second whilst weighing less, just 19kg, and with doubled MTBF of 1000h compared to the 500h of the Ts100. N019M allows two targets to be engaged by active radar homing missiles simultaneously. Range increased slightly to 80km. Originally intended to be fitted to the existing MiG-29 fleet as an upgrade, about 22 aircraft with N019M are thought to have entered service with the VVS.

N019ME Topaz Export version of Topaz, slightly downgraded. All Indian MiG-29s have been upgraded to this standard.
Current IAF Upgrade replaces the N019ME with N010 M2E, which is a step up from the original IN MiG-29K radar in that it incorporates further raid assessment and other modes.
Guskov said that Phazotron is already working on the next modification of its slot array radars, the Zhuk M2E. This version will have a faster processor, allowing it to classify targets by type (for instance, fighters, bombers and helicopters) and to break-out formation targets flying at 20-30 meters apart. The radar can also be programmed to identify aircraft by type in the case of a new type, it can record its reflected signal and later use it for identification.

The Zhuk M2E should start flight testing this year. The modernized radar will equip 62 Indian Air Force MiG-29s that MiG is modifying to the MiG-29UPG configuration under contract to the IAF. MiG design bureau chief designer Vladimir Barkovsky said here that the first six aircraft have already been shipped to Russia. The Indian Air Force is expected to receive its first MiG-29UPG in 2010.
Lets see what software build these units are at and their overall capabilities. If they do meet IAF ASR, they will be very capable systems.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

As to the human factor, in 1991.
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/arc ... ce/307291/
Today, of course, electronic systems extend a fighter’s vision well beyond the range of the most acute eyeball. Aerial combat is no longer a matter of fixing your sights on a dodging enemy. Most of the maneuvering in air-to-air combat today takes place BVR, or beyond visual range. The modern fighter pilot flies strapped into the center of a moving electronic cocoon. His speeding jet emits a field of photons* that can find, identify, and target an enemy long before he will ever see it. At the same time, his electromagnetic aura defends him by thwarting the enemy’s radar.
Why BVR
American pilots strive to find and shoot down enemy aircraft from outside what they call the WEZ, or “weapons engagement zone,” which means safely beyond range of the enemy’s missiles. Traveling faster than sound, the fighter pilot is part of a network that can spot an enemy over the horizon, sometimes before he even leaves the ground; that can attack multiple targets simultaneously; and that in an emergency can react to an incoming threat before the pilot is even aware of it. Today’s jet is a machine so powerful, so smart, and so fast that the fighter jock’s biggest challenge is to safely fly and land it.
The same gentleman who went overboard on the Red Flag briefing but explains why war isn't meant to be fair.
“When cavemen fought they had their fists, first of all,” F‑15 pilot Colonel Terrence “Skins” Fornof explained to me last year in Alaska. “Then someone came up with the sling, which meant he could attack his enemy before he could get close enough to take a swing. The history of warfare technology has all boiled down to increasing the distance between you and your enemy’s fist. Distance means time, and you gain the advantage by extending that timeline. Our goal is the same as it ever was: to kill the enemy before he even has a chance to employ his weapon. War is not fair. You don’t want him to even get close enough to fight.”
The modern day system
Being the best means learning to fully inhabit that screaming node, high above the slow curve of the Earth, strapped down in a bubble where the only real things are the sound of your own breathing and the feel of sweat rolling down the center of your back. You are alone but not alone. You cope with constant, multiple streams of data, everything from basic flight information—airspeed, altitude, attitude, fuel levels—to incoming radar images displayed on small, glowing green screens stacked in rows before you and to both sides. In your helmet are three or four radio links, with the AWACS, with the ground, with your wingman, and with your flight leader. It is a little bit like trying to navigate at high speed with four or five different people talking to you at once, each with a slightly different set of directions. It is not for amateurs. By the time Rodriguez flew into combat for the first time, he had hundreds of hours of training behind him, and being in the jet was second nature. With him were his wingman, his formation, and the superhuman reach of America’s technological eyes and ears.

Hurling a few dozen jets into the sky against this, as Saddam did in 1991, was most unwise.
Yet
But given all the other advantages enjoyed by the allied pilots, the brave, outnumbered Iraqi pilots launching themselves at the approaching juggernaut might as well have been committing suicide.

“From Western eyes, it’s a suicide mission,” Rodriguez told me. “From the eyes of the guy being invaded, he’s protecting the homeland.”
The human factor
Even greatly disadvantaged, the Iraqi fighters were dangerous, and as it happened the large American force made a potentially fatal mistake that Saturday morning. The incoming MiGs were spotted, of course, but in the confusion of the moment either tactical errors were made by the strikers, or the Iraqi pilots exploited a seam in the American defenses. The AWACS command had spotted the MiGs immediately when they took off, and had handed them off to a Navy formation of F‑14s, which failed to intercept them. When Rodriguez and Underhill were alerted to the approaching threat, it came as a jolting surprise. The MiGs were just 13 miles out and closing at a speed of more than 1,000 nautical mph. Both pilots immediately began evasive maneuvers.
Trying to go by mission briefing, that there was a chance that clutter could reduce the Missile/Radar performance
Rodriguez dove steeply, getting below the lead MiG, where he would be harder to find on its radar—pointing down, the radar’s signal can get confused by all the signals* bouncing back up from the ground. Then Rodriguez began flying in a low arc, keeping the MiG on his wing line, making himself “skinny,” presenting as small a radar target as possible. Within minutes the two fighters would be in a visual turning fight, a situation familiar to many experienced pilots from earlier wars, but one that is not supposed to happen in modern air warfare.
Matter of seconds. Now think of how more lethal missiles & systems have become.
A cockpit alarm warned him when the MiG’s radar locked on him. The threat was still just a blip on his screen; he hadn’t actually seen it yet. He was frightened and thinking furiously when in his headset he heard Underhill shout, “Fox!”—the code word for I have just fired a missile.

Rodriguez looked back over his shoulder, following the smoke trail of Underhill’s missile, and then, looking out ahead of it, caught his first and only glimpse of the MiG. This is the precise instant captured from the Iraqi pilot’s perspective in the photo on Rodriguez’s wall. It turns out that the picture does not preserve a moment of personal triumph for him, as I had originally supposed, but one of intense fear and vulnerability. Rodriguez’s little F‑15 in the distance was not predator but prey, trapped and awaiting a kill shot that would never come, because in the next instant the MiG became a huge fireball in the sky. The whole encounter lasted a little more than 10 seconds.

“Mole saves my bacon because he kills this guy before he can take a shot at me,” Rodriguez said as we sat in his office.
Next set of tactics.
The second of his aerial kills was what he called “more routine,” more typical of modern aerial combat. A week after the first episode, he was flying in what the Air Force calls a “wall of Eagles,” a formation of four F‑15s spread out in the sky over roughly five to eight miles at 33,000 feet to maximize their visibility and radar range.

At that point, the remaining Iraqi air force was so vulnerable that the AWACS plane assisting the F‑15s picked up the enemy jets the minute they started their engines, while they were still on the ground. Rodriguez and the other pilots watched three radar blips form on their screens as the MiGs took off and climbed. Rodriguez assumed that the planes were, like the rest of Saddam’s air force, escaping into Iran.

“They were basically running scared,” he says. “Extremely scared.”

It took a few moments to identify the jets as MiG‑23s, and then the wall of Eagles began preparing to launch missiles at them.

“We think we’re going to have to stay above the clouds and we’re never going to see the missiles do their job, and all of a sudden there’s a big sucker hole, an opening in the clouds below,” he says. “The F‑15s dove to about 13,000 feet. The fleeing MiGs were hugging the terrain, flying just 300 to 400 feet above the ground, when we started launching AIM-7 missiles at them.

“And, sure enough, the missiles did their job.”

The Iraqi flight leader took the first hit. An American missile sliced through his plane, taking out the engine but leaving the shell of the plane intact. Trailing a thick cloud of smoke, the pilot began turning to the north, apparently trying to return to his base. Rodriguez’s flight leader fired a Sidewinder, a heat-seeking missile that lit up the sky when it hit, turning the unfortunate Iraqi pilot and his plane into an enormous fireball.

Rodriguez’s missile ripped straight through his target. The MiG apparently flew right into it. There was no large explosion. The missile just tore the jet to pieces, turning it into what Rodriguez called “a ground-level sparkler,” scattering debris across a wide swath of desert.
Sound familiar?

Cope India 2004.
AWST on Cope India wrote:The U.S. pilots used no active missiles, and the AIM-120 Amraam capability was limited to a 20-naut.-mi. range while keeping the target illuminated when attacking and 18 naut. mi. when defending, as were all the missiles in the exercise.

"When we saw that they were a more professional air force, we realized that within the constraints of the exercise we were going to have a very difficult time," Snowden says. "In general, it looked like they ran a broad spectrum of tactics and they were adaptive. They would analyze what we were doing and then try something else. They weren't afraid to bring the strikers in high or low. They would move them around so that we could never anticipate from day to day what we were going to see."

The IAF did not fly its top-end Su-30MKI aircrafts, instead the older un-upgraded Su-30MKs and Su-30Ks of the 24 Sqn, such as these. Compare the relative size of the aircraft!

By comparison, the U.S. pilots don't think they offered the Indians any surprises. The initial tactic is to run a wall with all four F-15s up front. That plays well when the long-range missiles and AESA radar are in play.

"You know we're there and we're not hiding," Snowden says. "But we didn't have the beyond-visual-range shot or the numerical advantage. Eventually we were just worn down by the numbers. They were very smart about it. Their goal was to get to a target area, engage the target and then withdraw without prolonging the fight. If there were a couple of Eagles still alive away from the target area, they would keep them pinned in, get done with the target and then egress with all their forces.
Now, back to the USAF & BVR.
The American planes began to conduct the standard series of checks to identify the plane. The F‑15 is equipped with a full range of instruments to, in effect, interrogate an unidentified plane in the air. They were coordinating with an AWACS, working through some language difficulties (the controllers spoke accented English). A process that would normally take 20 seconds took three times as long, which is a huge difference when you’re traveling hundreds of miles per hour. Rodriguez and his wingman were rapidly approaching the weapons engagement zone, where they would lose the advantage of their longer-range missiles.

They were on the edge of the WEZ as the ID was completed, and Rodriguez launched an AMRAAM, or “advanced medium-range air-to-air missile,” a new element of his arsenal added after the Gulf War. In the Air Force, they call it the Slammer. One advantage it affords is a “fire and forget” feature; because the missile has its own homing and guidance system, the pilot need not stay pointed at the target. He is free to turn and evade the incoming jet in case his shot for some reason misses. Rodriguez stayed with his missile for as long as he could.

“It all went into slow motion, and I felt like the missile and I were kind of flying in formation for a while,” he recalls. “It just seemed to stay there for a couple of seconds and then, whoosh! It disappears. You see that glow [the missile’s exhaust], and that becomes just a little ember, and then it’s gone. And of course at night you can’t follow it anymore. The smoke trail goes away. But I could see it start to curve, and I go, ‘Okay, it looks like it’s doing the right lead-pursuit tracking.’ And the missile did everything it was advertised to do. We have a little counter display inside the cockpit that ticks down the time to intercept, and when the counter said zero, I looked outside through my canopy to the general vicinity of where I knew the target was going to be. I mean, that fireball was huge.”
He shot down a MiG-29 without a SPJ & malfunctioning systems BTW as it later emerged.

But the above should show how tactics, systems all evolve.

And how the IAF was practising as well. Larger number of mixed formation type aircraft against fewer opponents.

All in all, the IAF is constantly evolving and improving its BVR tactics.

Range and its importance. Speed and its importance. Why supercruise etc etc.

Why AESA & more modern radars.
“If the enemy has radar-guided missiles, now we’re shooting at each other,” Lieutenant Colonel Chuck “Corky” Corcoran told me last year at Elmendorf. Corcoran is a former F‑15 pilot who now commands the 525th Fighter Squadron, the Bulldogs, one of the three F‑22 squadrons just now getting planes. “If those enemy weapons have similar capabilities to ours, I’ve got to employ some sort of tactic to gain an advantage, whether it’s getting higher and faster so I can shoot first, or checking away [shifting slightly off course] to increase his missile’s time of flight.”

Drawing out that time, even by a split second, can mean everything, because it allows your missile to strike first. Once the enemy’s plane is destroyed, its radar can no longer steer his missile.

“His missile is looking for reflected radar energy that he’s pointing at you, so if your missile gets to him and blows him up and kills his radar before his missile gets to you, then you are going to live,” Corcoran explained.

An AMRAAM missile like the one Rodriguez used over Kosovo was a major step forward because it frees the attacking plane from having to keep its radar pointed at the target. The American plane can launch a missile from outside the WEZ, turn, and kick on its afterburners before the target has a chance to even shoot.

These tools rely, of course, on radar, which can be jammed.

“If you can’t match your enemy’s technology, you can always subtract from it,” says Wayne Waller, a Virginia contractor who designs radar systems for the F‑15. “You may invent something that gives you an advantage, but you can’t hang on to it for very long. Our radar used to be difficult to jam, but the capability to do that has improved geometrically. That knowledge is out there. And the jamming advances cost a lot less than improving the radar.”

Countries that cannot afford to build fleets of the most advanced supersonic fighters can afford to build pods with clever software to mount on older airframes. This was brought home dramatically in Cope India 2004, a large aerial-combat training exercise that pitted F‑15 pilots from Elmendorf against India’s air force, which is made up of the MiG‑21 and MiG‑29, and the newer Mirage 2000 and Russian-built Su‑30. The exercises were conducted high over north-central India, near the city of Gwalior.

“We came rolling in, like, ‘Beep-beep, superpower coming through,’” Colonel Fornof told me. “And we had our eyes opened. We learned a lot. By the third week, we were facing a threat that we weren’t prepared to face, because we had underestimated them. They had figured out how to take Russian-built equipment and improve upon it.”
Why sensor fusion. We have that on the Phalcon, AEW&C and planned for LCA Mk2. Rafale has it.
“It is really two big steps ahead of anything else out there,” Corcoran told me. “All of the data from all the different sensors in the aircraft are fused. The F‑22 has one big display in the middle of the cockpit, so you are kind of sitting in the middle of that display, and all of the sensors run on their own. And tracks show up all around you, 360 degrees, and all of it in color. So the red guys are bad, the green guys are good, and the yellow guys—we don’t know who the yellow guys are yet. So without the pilot doing anything, you have this 360-degree picture of the battle space around you. With the F‑15, after a couple of years of training, you might be able to achieve that level of awareness.”
Why IAF is insisting that the engines on the FGFA be better to allow true supercruise. Why it wants 360 degree avionics, maximum stealth etc.
“The F‑22 avionics allow me to be a better battle-space manager and efficient killer,” Tinsley explained. “I have stealth, so I have the surprise piece. And then on top of all that, I can do it at supercruise. I can climb higher than other fighters, I can go faster with lower fuel consumption, so I can cover a larger space. And no one can see me. Now we’re getting that 8-to-1 kill ratio I need to maintain superiority.”
How IAF can use its PAK-FAs to help its Su-30s or how Rafales with Meteor can help LCAs
“When the F‑15s are up doing their tactics, we’re kind of back behind them a little bit and helping them out if they have trouble,” Colonel Jim Hecker, the operations-group commander at Elmendorf, told me. “If an F‑15 is having some trouble dealing with electronic countermeasures where he can’t shoot, that’s when we’ll go in and get rid of that guy for him. I think the synergistic effect of having a couple of F‑22s in with those fourth-generation fighters is great. Based on the buy, I think we’re going to have to do that if we stay at the same number of F‑22s. We simply don’t have enough, so we have to find ways to integrate like this to optimize our capability.”
Last edited by Karan M on 14 May 2016 19:43, edited 3 times in total.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Gyan »

Re Karan:-

The problem with ballistic profile of conventional missiles is that "theoretically" they show a long range for brochures but practically they have much much shorter range. Even a dual pulse missile at the end of trajectory is "falling" at low speed normally below Mach 1.25, which means it has practically no maneuvering capability (in the last 1/2-1/3rd of its max range) to intercept a target which is maneuvering even very marginally or has flown out of prediction/kill box calculated at the time of firing the missile. Hence, Ramjet missiles have 3 times better probability to actually intercept a target which was in a kill box at the time of firing compared to conventional missile.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by NRao »

shiv wrote:Here is a post that was made earlier
Mihir wrote: "When confronted with data I don't like, I shall ignore the data."
..just sayin'
That is a self-goal.

Poured cold water on self.

And, full marks to Mihir.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by NRao »

shiv wrote:
NRao wrote: Assistance is the key in modern (today's) warfare. They just call it by another name - networks. It is a positive, not a negative. It is OK if a plane hits a target using data from another source - in this case an AWACS. In fact, it is great to use more than one source. Just do it - get the enemy off the board without loss at your end.
More than one source of radiation for the adversary to detect passively?
Sure.

IF they can get to it.

But, as MANY have stated, IF the AWACS' side can see and get to you first and you still detect "radiation" what does it matter? You are toast.






This is something I have been complaining about for along time (but not posting often enough). People LOVE one-on-one. You know LCA vs. Some paki yahoo or Su_30 MKI vs. Rafale or EF or whatever. Where does that happen? Seriously.

Silly.

So, let them see my AWCAS, what does it matter? As long as I see them and get to them FIRST.



BUT, self-goals are always welcome. My read is that PD dealt himself one. I will wait for the Vayu spread, hoping there he would produce the source of his Market Research that lead to his ideal plane.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

Gyan wrote:Re Karan:-

The problem with ballistic profile of conventional missiles is that "theoretically" they show a long range for brochures but practically they have much much shorter range. Even a dual pulse missile at the end of trajectory is "falling" at low speed normally below Mach 1.25, which means it has practically no maneuvering capability (in the last 1/2-1/3rd of its max range) to intercept a target which is maneuvering even very marginally or has flown out of prediction/kill box calculated at the time of firing the missile. Hence, Ramjet missiles have 3 times better probability to actually intercept a target which was in a kill box at the time of firing compared to conventional missile.
I have posted the profile vs target vs alt figures on the previous page.

The point is to add maximum speed at launch (eg high alt & speed) to give your missile that extra boost. But you need to mitigate against radar look down range decreasing.

Anyhow if both sides have equivalent missiles, a ramjet chaser like Akash or Meteor has an advantage. Otherwise, limitations apply to both sides.

And the side with more discrete "unjammable" missiles has the edge. Range is one thing, but being unable to spoof the missile IMHO is more valuable.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by manjgu »

Karan - "Read the technical literature, do an informed assessment of what is possible with current technology and what has been achieved with similar systems. Your guns analogy is meaningless without context.".... a) so u have arrived at 99% kill probability after reading literature b) can you prove that 99% kill ratios have been achieved with similar systems..data please, some hard figures. c) Has any manufacturer claimed 99% kill probability? Pointwise reply will be appreciated.

Karan..u did not get my gun analogy. What was i was saying that both missiles and guns have a certain envelope in which there is a high kill probability ( we will not argue abt %'s). When guns were predominant the idea of the combatants was to stay out of this guns high probabilty kill zone/envelope. same is the idea today as well for both the combatants... to stay out of enemy missile high kill probability zone.

with such sophisticated missiles and electronics , automation at ones disposal has only increased pilots workload and demands on his skill and not decreased the pilot skill factor in combat. I am not arguing against the increased sophistication of modern day missiles of whatever range/type but all of them have limitations vs as advertised in their sales brochures.

Their true worth or actual kill probablity can only be determined in actual combat if indeed any of us have access to such classified information..like how many missiles fired..how many kills..etc etc. Unless u can provide hard data of the type requested , ur kill % will be only theoritical at best.

Needless to say i am enjoying ur technical poweress on matters related to missiles/ other aspect of air combat.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by NRao »

Unless u can provide hard data of the type requested , ur kill % will be only theoritical at best.
It is NOT theoretical.

Open source data is a subset of the real data (unless someone is really falsifying stuff for whatever purpose - that happens too).





Let me just say this. In the recent past "systems" have had sensors embedded in them to their gills. To the civie this is known as IoT (GE is very, very good at this this. Their engines provide them real-time data on ANY GE engine in flight, 24x7).

Today (recent past), during productions, EACH part is tested and the results saved. So, when something does not perform as per design, they get to the root cause pretty damn quickly - no brownie points for why.

Vendors have similar data (of course the further back you go, the cruder it gets) for EVERY system they have created since Adam and Eve.

They can - today - tell you which system has which part and if a failure occurred, why and where - in a jiffy.



And, I can sure you, even if they commission a cheap CAS platform, if the area is saturated with manpads, they are not going to send that platform in there to deal with the yahoos. You see they created an alternative called "stand-off".
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by manjgu »

NRao... sure open source data is a subset of real data... lets see the open source data please. which shows 99% kill probability.

And mind u this is military data not civilian data. i dont think even manufacturers claim 99% kill probability. nobody is arguing against the sophistication of modern day missiles but to make astounding claims abt kill probabilites of missiles which iMHO is a closely guarded secret is stretching the point a bit too far.

also will kill probabilities of a missile in USAF hands be same as that in hands of less capable AF? curious...
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by NRao »

My contention was it is not theoretical. I do not track tech details. Too fast moving for my age (and there are far better people at it than me).

However:

Arrow @ 99%: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jso ... fense.html
Mistral @ 92-95%: http://www.military-today.com/missiles/mistral.htm (that is pretty good)

These are from recent pubs. There are a few others (CUDA, which is still rather nebulous)

Maverick @ 93%: http://www.airforce-technology.com/proj ... sile2.html

There are more.

But, here s a thought to chew on: http://aviationweek.com/awin/lockheed-r ... e-concepts
The Supersonic Testbed Risk Reduction (SSTRR) represents work on a future weapon in the same size class as the AIM-120 Amraam. The company is carrying out trade studies involving air-breathing and rocket propulsion, including multi-pulse motors, hit-to-kill technology and different guidance technologies. “Everyone wants everything,” a Lockheed Martin engineer explains. “If everyone in the room is crying, we’ve got it about right.” { :rotfl: That is perhaps the most powerful statement.}

On show for the first time at AFA is a model of Lockheed Martin’s Cuda, a so-called “Halfraam” weapon about half as long as an Amraam and compact enough to fit six missiles into each bay of the F-35 or F-22. Cuda draws on the hit-to-kill technology used on the PAC-3 missile, is designed to have a radar seeker and has both movable tails and forward attitude control motors for high agility. The company is not disclosing Cuda’s design range, but one variation of the concept is a two-stage missile with a similar total length to Amraam, presumably with the goal of covering a wide range envelope with a single missile design.
Old stuff, do not know where it stands, but ............ HTK needs to have a preeeeety good KR. Also note the one-size-fits-all thinking. These things are getting expensive to say the least.

You know, my feel (has always been) is sensors. The better they get, the smaller they get, the more they pack into a nose (recall the Russian design, with small cones?), faster computing, etc, they will reach 99% in adverts at least. Ground reality will be diff - training, who has more guts, tactics, etc.

Said something else along teh way: The US plays her game away from natural boundaries. The Russians have never really ventured too far from their comfort zone of radars (in any serious way - not Syria), China is about to venture, but not clear how comfortable they are with being away from their comfort zone around their country. The rest are somewhere in between, but tend towards the US model. So, you will see that "kill rate" has a diff meaning between them.

Anyways I am wandering away from teh topic at hand I guess.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by NRao »

BTW folks, while all this stuff on techs, is great, I would like to draw attention to those among us who get the DTI (AWST) (the 100th aniv version). In the DTI there is an interview with Vice Adm. Robert Thomas and it deals primarily with China and Pacific (since the VAdm is from the Pacific Command). In it he talks about the future of the USN vis a vis China (and he also mentions India at the tail end). His emphasis: better training. His arg: likes of China will catch up with techs because China is willing to take huge risks to catch up (he offers their carriers as an example, the very short time in which China is fielding carriers, without much experience). It is structure and training that will provide the edge. He also mentions that China is already following the US model and may catch up there too - he says all those guys that the PLArmy let go, all went to the PLAN.

Worth a read. It is way off what the traditional thinking is. People are moving on and we are still hacking away at Gnat 2.0. May be?
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by NRao »

Oh. That same DTI issue has two articles on .................................. new missiles. Aptly titled "Lock". One of the missiles talked about .......... B-8 ("Return Fire"). Deals with the sudden change in adversaries in the region.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

manjgu wrote:Karan..u did not get my gun analogy. What was i was saying that both missiles and guns have a certain envelope in which there is a high kill probability ( we will not argue abt %'s). When guns were predominant the idea of the combatants was to stay out of this guns high probabilty kill zone/envelope. same is the idea today as well for both the combatants... to stay out of enemy missile high kill probability zone.
Problem is Manjgu, you may not have that option. Once you enter into the merge, all bets are off.

Again, a gun kill depends on the platform's performance and pilot skill both.

Here, technology has advanced to the point, where a 1000 hours on the type pilot, can be gunned down by a relative novice, because he has HMS & wide field of view missile.

Therein lies the issue.

But the actual point is that in modern day missile combat you have two successful approaches - slash & strike, turn & burn. The LCA is well optimized for the former & with HMS & Python-V's, it will be literally a killer in that arena. Because, as of yet, IIR seekers cannot be jammed or countered effectively.

People keep comparing the LCA to some completely different system, claiming the other will "turn better". The issue is the LCA (or the Mirage) won't do that. The pilots would be trained to their platforms unique strengths since with modern day missiles, ITR (instantaneous nose pointing) is the key factor & by either luck, perspicacity or both, the LCA has managed this.

The best way to look at this is Greek AF Mirage 2000s vs Turkish AF F-16s. Frequent intercepts and dogfights. The Mirage 2000's have had the better of F-16s several times.
Here's a cocky Mirage 2000 view.
Greek AF pilot wrote:Interviewer : Would you agree with these statements of a former HAF fighter pilot?

Statement 1 : To conclude, the Mirage 2000 is slicker than the Viper but less powerful.
Statement 2 : With good pilots on both sides, they are probably equal in dogfight.

Answer : Statement 1 is true.
Statement 2 is wrong. A good pilot in an M2K (Mirage 2000) will kill a good pilot in an F-16 9 out of 10 times (1 provided for launch failure).

I served in an M2K fighter squadron in HAF. We analyzed tactics and combat scores against HAF F-16 squadrons all the time.

The M2Ks higher INSTANTANEOUS turn rate gives it an advantage during the first pass. The F-16 cannot outturn the Mirage. It has to climb in hopes of avoiding the lock. A good M2K pilot will end it right there (the Magic 2 is a better IR weapon than the AIM-9L/M).

A rookie in the M2K, however, will probably lose the F-16's climb. The more powerful viper will escape and will then gain the advantage because of 1) Altitude 2) Higher SUSTAINABLE turn rate.


Interviewer : As for turn rates, altitude differences are purely theoretical and in practice make no difference EXCEPT for sea level manuevers where the more powerful Viper starts gaining the advantage. Would you agree with the statement that F-16 is a better choice for multi role missions than Mirage 2000 ?

Absolutely. The M2K is a multi-role fighter also, but its performance varies greatly among roles - whereas the Viper performs almost all missions at a very satisfactory level.

HAF M2Ks are specialized. 331's (where I served) primary role is now TASMO (naval strike with AM-39 Exocet) and 332's primary role will become Deep Strike (with SCALP EG). CAP & Air Supremacy are their secondary roles.

The F-16 sqdns OTOH undertake a number of roles such as SEAD, CAP, CAS, and numerous specialized strike missions (enemy AFBs, enemy C&C centers etc). The Viper is a much more volatile weapons system.​
So this is why the Python-V, Dash sight & & long range AESA & datalink all make a difference to the LCA, which is why IAF Test pilots note:

http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 734_1.html
The Tejas' avionics - radar, laser and inertial navigation system - enhances the accuracy of these weapons. Its highly rated Elta EL/M-2032 multi-mode radar provides multi-role capability, allowing the pilot to fire air-to-air missiles at enemy aircraft; and also bomb ground targets with a highly accurate navigation-attack system. The pilot operates his weapons through a head-up display (HUD), or through a helmet-mounted sighting system (HMSS) by merely looking at a target. Experienced fighter pilots say the Tejas is the IAF's most "pilot friendly" fighter.
The Tejas' likely adversary, the Pakistan Air Force's F-16 fighter, has a slightly larger flight envelope, but the Tejas' superior avionics give it a combat edge over the PAF's older F-16A/Bs (currently being upgraded in Turkey); and superior to their new JF-17 Thunder light fighter, co-developed with China. Only the PAF's 18 new F-16C/D Block 52 fighters, flying since 2010-11 from Jacobabad, may be a match for the Tejas.

Said an NFTC test pilot during the IOC ceremony on December 20: "As a multi-role fighter, the Tejas is at least the equal of the IAF's upgraded Mirage-2000. It can more than hold its own in our operational scenario."
So, if the LCA does get into a close in fight & the pilot does use the Python-5 within its NEZ (unless there is a technical failure), the opponent is very very likely to be toast.
manjgu wrote:with such sophisticated missiles and electronics , automation at ones disposal has only increased pilots workload and demands on his skill and not decreased the pilot skill factor in combat. I am not arguing against the increased sophistication of modern day missiles of whatever range/type but all of them have limitations vs as advertised in their sales brochures.
Limitations yes, but those limitations are marginal & the systems have increased the lethality of platforms manifold.

This was what happened to USAF and NATO pilots when they first went against R73E & HMS. Remember, this is relatively "old" stuff.

Interview with Johann Koeck, a NATO trained pilot and Leader of the 1. Staffel / Jagdgesschwader 73 of German Luftwaffe which took over the Mig-29 of the former GDR air force.
"But when all that is said and done, the MiG-29 is a superb fighter for close-in combat, even compared with aircraft like the F-15, F-16 and F/A-18. This is due to the aircraft’s superb aerodynamics and helmet mounted sight. Inside ten nautical miles I’m hard to defeat, and with the IRST, helmet sight and ‘Archer’ I can’t be beaten. Period. Even against the latest Block 50 F-16s the MiG-29 is virtually invulnerable in the close-in scenario. On one occasion I remember the F-16s did score some kills eventually, but only after taking 18 ‘Archers’. We didn’t operate kill removal (forcing ‘killed’ aircraft to leave the fight) since they’d have got no training value, we killed them too quickly. (Just as we might seldom have got close-in if they used their AMRAAMs BVR!) They couldn’t believe it at the debrief, they got up and left the room!
Guess what the NATO/USAF did - they non stop trained against the Archer threat. To the point that:
The most impressive aspect of the Fulcrum's performance for the American pilots was its low-speed maneuverability. "In a low-speed fight, fighting the Fulcrum is similar to fighting an F-18 Hornet," explained Capt. Mike McCoy of the 510th. "But the Fulcrum has a thrust advantage over the Hornet. An F-18 can really crank its nose around if you get into a slow-speed fight, but it has to lose altitude to regain the energy, which allows us to get on top of them. The MiG has about the same nose authority at slow speeds, but it can regain energy much faster. Plus the MiG pilots have that forty-five-degree cone in front of them into which they can fire an Archer and eat you up."

The off-boresight missile, as described in the opening scenario, proved to be a formidable threat, though not an insurmountable one. "Some of their capabilities were more wicked than we originally thought," said McCoy. "We had to respect the helmet-mounted sight, which made our decisions to anchor more difficult. In other words, when I got close in, I had to consider that helmet-mounted sight. Every time I got near a Fulcrum's nose, I was releasing flares to defeat an Archer coming off his rail."

"Before coming here, some of our pilots may have thought of the MiG's helmet-mounted sight as an end-all to a BFM fight," explained Lt. Col. Gary West, commander of the 510th. "We have found that it is not as lethal as we had expected.

We encountered some positions-particularly in an across-the-circle shot or a high-low shot and in a slow-speed fight-where a Fulcrum pilot can look up forty-five degrees and take a shot while his nose is still off. That capability has changed some of the pilots' ideas on how they should approach a MiG-29 in a neutral fight. Below 200 knots, the MiG-29 has incredible nose-pointing capability down to below 100 knots. The F-16, however, enjoys an advantage in the 200 knot-plus regime. At higher speeds, we can power above them to go to the vertical. And our turn rate is significantly better. By being patient and by keeping airspeed up around 325 knots, an F-16 can bring the MiG-29 to its nose. But the pilot must still be careful of the across-the-circle shot with that helmet-mounted sight.
So by spending a ton load of resources, NATO pilots finally started understanding the MiG-29 and the Archer threat.

Then they introduced their equivalents. By memory, R73E was 24G, ASRAAM, Mica, IRIS-T, AIM-9x all started appearing with HMS thereafter & neutralizing that "advantage". These are all missiles which are more capable than the R73E.

Guess what happened then, the Russians have introduced TVC. Now, with TVC, the instantaneous rate of turn (or nose pointing if you prefer), of the Su-30 climbs up rapidly. In the meanwhile, either the pilot or the WSO is busy lining up Archer shots.

So while NATO fixed the missile & HMS, the Russians improved the launching platform to the point that again, they had the edge in taking shots. This is why NATO forces are so eager to train vs IAF and RMAF.

The Su-30 MKI thanks to TVC is very effective at guns - eg 1vs1s at Red Flag Mountain Home
Erstwhile Dewline blog on IAF response about Red Flag wrote:it is understood that the kill ratio (at Mountain Home AFB) was 21 : 1, in favour of the Su-30MKIs).
With R73E & HOBS this goes up even more. (All depends then on whether flares work against R73E).

While we won't display all our cards, what we do show them is invaluable from their perspective.

Consider now what the LCA is capable of. It's a high ITR (delta wing) aircraft with a Dash helmet & Python-V combination.

Has Pakistan or China trained to such a threat? Has the LCA been exported? Are they even aware of what it can bring to the table?

The US (and to some extent the IAF) trains WW against every possible threat. They learn, learn, and implement. Hitherto, before Cope India (11 years back) they had training restrictions in Red Air. Those went within a year (that's the speed at which they operate).

Yet, countermeasures against IIR CCM are yet to appear. Now lets stop and think for a moment. Why is this?

The answer lies in BVR. The US has realized that countermeasures in the CCM game is a mugs game. Of course they are working on it & will deploy as much as possible. But the aim is to not to be forced into the merge at all!!

Of what use is your CCM & HMS if you can't detect an opponent like the F-35 who will fire AMRAAMs at you from 50km, trying to get you within the NEZ & you don't get any indication till the seeker goes active at some 10 odd km?

To counter this, the world over, AF's are introducing LPI Digital RWRs, DRFM equipped SPJs, MAWS & automated defensive suites - the aim is to somehow break that kill chain. Force the opponent into the knife fight.

But the IAF does not have that luxury (yet) of sticking only to BVR. The Su-30 MKI, LCA will all be great at BVR. But missiles are limited & RF seekers can be jammed & techniques already do exist.

Hence, manufacturers are even introducing non RF options to cue & fire near BVR missiles - CCM missiles are not really that C anymore.

The EF for instance has the Passive Pirate IRST & the near BVR ASRAAM with its IIR seeker. If memory serves, the same one as on the Aim-9X or a variant. Ranging may require a radar spot if a single EF or an offboard feed.

The Rafale has sensor fusion, and uses a variety of sensors including the OSF-IT for passive acquisition & the Mica IR.

So they don't have airframe stealth or radar LPI but have worked out different ways to attack.

Our MKI has a feature wherein it makes one look & then flies into the WEZ to attack with AA-10s.

The point though here is that CCM/Knife fight systems have become very very lethal. No options exist but to avoid this as far as possible.

Which is where the LCA's ITR + HOBS + Python-5 + datalink is so deadly.

Remember the 45 degree off boresight angle for the R-73E? So basically, a cone in front of the fighter, which you have to avoid. Don't cross the nose guys - you will be fired at.

Python-5.

http://www.army-technology.com/projects/spyder/
The PYthon 5 missile is Rafael's new very high agility dogfight air-to-air missile. PYthon 5 is a development of the PYthon 4 with a dual-band focal plane array and imaging infrared (IIR) seeker which gives a very wide field of view.

PYthon 5 retains the same airframe - with pitch and yaw control, delta-shaped canards and two roll control swept fins and the same rocket motor, warhead and fuse - as the PYthon 4 missile. The wide field of view allows LOAL at an angle of more than 100° off boresight. The dual-band seeker gives increased detection range, improved target discrimination against background clutter and a lower false target acquisition rate.

In LOAL mode, the target data is transferred from the command and control unit via the launcher to the missile. The missile's guidance and control systems are active for a three times longer period than for the earlier PYthon, enabling the missile to counter targets making evasive manoeuvres. The high explosive fragmentation warhead is fitted with an active laser proximity fuse.
So, that's 100 degrees off the front of the aircraft nose, on either side. The Dash helmet sight can literally allow you to look sideways & fire the missile.

Why would you stick around? If you are a well drilled LCA pilot who goes up against aircraft superior to the JF-17 (in the IAF) & F-16s (RSAF visits KKD regularly), what do you think you will pick up?

Does the PAF or PLAAF have the same benefit? Can they find opponents (NATO ones) who regularly train against them with such capabilities? The Turkish AF is the only one & they can host only a few PAF pilots a year. Red Flag is so expensive, we go once in 5 years. PAF will have similar limitations.

This is why I said the LCA HOBS+Python-5 combo (when considered with IAF standards & LCA design is a sure shot). Once it enters widespread service, we will see many many surprised MiG/Sukhoi and other drivers who struggle to pick up small LCAs & discover in post mission briefing that the ACMI shows firing solutions generated repeatedly.
Their true worth or actual kill probablity can only be determined in actual combat if indeed any of us have access to such classified information..like how many missiles fired..how many kills..etc etc. Unless u can provide hard data of the type requested , ur kill % will be only theoritical at best.
These missiles are tested against representative targets utilizing a variety of countermeasures & against a variety of targets firing mission profiles. Again, search for Aim-9x testing & you'll get a very good idea of what's done. The US is generally far ahead of the rest of the world & hence is ok with sharing a plethora of details on test profiles and capabilities.
DRDO too does this (which IMO is more a function of them having to prove themselves to a wary customer).

Coupled with hard tests (physical), the simulations are run over countless iterations mimicking a range of profiles. The tests are then done at extreme points of the performance envelope (to prove as many complex test points as possible, because each missile round can cost up to a million $).

For instance, Python-V is a development of the Python-4 with a new seeker and more improvements. The Python-4:
Kopp wrote:The intent of the designers was to produce a missile which can not only be shot from a wider range of angles than earlier missiles, but which can also maintain track on a highly manoeuvrable high G target engaged during the merge or opening phase of an engagement. A passing target on a reciprocal heading can be engaged in most of the forward hemisphere, if the Python fails its first opportunity to hit, it will maintain track on the target and continue a tail chase geometry pursuit on a reciprocal heading to the launch aircraft, running down the target for a tail-aspect hit. The missile is claimed to have sufficient turning performance to defeat high G evasive manoeuvre by any existing fighter aircraft. Existing ACM experience with the missile suggests a typical engagement duration of much less than 30 seconds.
Now, the best way to avoid such a missile is to hit your opponent first (which is where TVC on Su-30 MKI comes in when mixed with HOBS missiles and HMS) or BVR & then scram.

Otherwise, you have Python-5. Other guy has Aim-9X. It all comes down to training, luck, airframe performance & such a myriad mix of factors that the attrition rates will zoom.

Until & unless effective countermeasures are found (eg DIRCM, Flares, automated cues all in combo), the risks are just very high.

In fact - our TVC equipped Su-30s are probably the only fighters which can probably try and engage in extreme position changes to frustrate seeker & algorithm geometries. Again, the pilots need to be able to detect the launch though (which is where MAWS comes in) and the IAF needs to then implement these protocols based on technical data they have.
Needless to say i am enjoying ur technical poweress on matters related to missiles/ other aspect of air combat.
Thank you.

One interesting thing. IAF will be the one AF in the world with the most varied kind of advanced CMs in service.

ASRAAM, Mica-IR, Python-V and R-73E.

That should hopefully help them in devising countermeasures as well.
Karan M
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

So I went looking for IAF roadmap.
http://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploa ... r-2016.pdf

Where we have programs or capabilities, I have marked in bold. Where we are yet to (IMO) progress are left unmarked.
IAF wrote:12.
Some of the other technologies which IAF requires in the next ten years are:
-
(a)Development of AESA Radar technology for Air to Air or Air to Ground.
(b)Active and Passive {Radio Frequency (RF) and Imaging Infra red(IIR)} Seeker and
Sensor Technology for missiles.

(c)Electro Optical (EO)/ Infra-red (IR) payload for Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR).
(d)Smart materials.
(e) On board prognostic and real time health monitoring technologies.
(f)Low Observable Technology.


New Weapon System Capabilities
13.In addition to the above, some of the future technologies that IAF is seeking, either
embedded in a weapon system or as a standalone system are given in succeeding
paragraphs.

Indigenisation Roadmap : Indian Air Force (2016-2025)

14.
Airborne Platforms and Pods
(a)Advance Multi Role Combat Aircraft (AMCA) Programme/ Fighter aircraft.
(b)Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV).

(c)Navigation and Targeting pods.

15.
Surface to Air Guided Weapons
(a)Short Range Surface to Air Missile (SRSAM).
(b)Medium Range Surface to Air Missile (MRSAM).
(c)Close in Weapon System (CIWS).
(d)Long Range Surface to Air Missile (LRSAM)

16.
Weapons
(a)Stand Off Long Range (SOLR) Homing (H) Anti-Radiation Missile (ARM).
(b)Runway Penetration Bomb (RPB).
(c)Long Range Glide Bomb (LRGB).
(d)Smart Anti-Airfield Weapons (SAAW).
(e)Anti-Ballistic Missile
(f)New Gen Beyond Visual Range (NGBVR) Missile

(g)New-Gen Within Visual Range (NGWVR) Missile
(h)Air to Ground Stand -off Weapons (including PGMs)
(i)Air Launched Missiles
(j)Fuzes for Air Launched weapons
(k)Smart weapons
(l)Directed Energy Weapons

17.
EW Systems
(a)Airborne Self Protection Jammers
(b)Directed IR Counter Measure (DIRCM)
(c)Multi Sensor Warning System (MSWS) for Transport and Heptrs
(d)Towed decoy
(e)Tactical Air Launched Decoy
(f)Missile Approach and Warning System (MAWS)

18.
Radars and Sensors
(a)Long Range Surveillance Radar (LRSR)
(b)High Power Radar (HPR)
(c)Passive Surveillance System (PSS)

(d)Aerostats
(e)Elevated Radar Network
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by shiv »

NRao wrote: But, as MANY have stated, IF the AWACS' side can see and get to you first and you still detect "radiation" what does it matter? Yo" are toast.
Fine.

So let me repeat an argument made earlier. Larger aircraft are more capable of carrying all the avionics for useful BVR. Both the articles that I posted agree on this. But once you introduce an AWACS, smaller aircraft carrying BVR missiles become just as effective for the reasons you have stated, apart from being inherently more stealthy than larger aircraft. The AWACS detects and identifies, passes data to the smaller aircraft which actually carries the BVR missile and which may not even have detected the target.

Another way of looking at this is to point out that the small aircraft is not as effective for BVR shootdowns on its own and needs AWACS assistance. Both articles that I posted, (nothing to do with Prodyut Das) agree on this. Don't know why anyone should feel upset when Prodyut Das says that a small aircraft like the LCA would be ineffective for BVR on its own. He is merely parroting what the analyses of BVR shootdowns say.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

Shiv wrote:Another way of looking at this is to point out that the small aircraft is not as effective for BVR shootdowns on its own and needs AWACS assistance. Both articles that I posted, (nothing to do with Prodyut Das) agree on this. Don't know why anyone should feel upset when Prodyut Das says that a small aircraft like the LCA would be ineffective for BVR on its own. He is merely parroting what the analyses of BVR shootdowns say.
Because, you and he, are both wrong.

The Gripen, LCA et al, all field radars and missiles perfectly capable of engaging in BVR on their own.

RDY-2 on the Mirage 2000-V can range upto 130km for a small target.
Uttam AESA planned for the LCA (and other platforms) has a 150km range.

Astra on the LCA & Derby ER are both 100km class missiles.

You are just deliberately ignoring the data that exists of current generation missiles and systems.

Tactics are another matter altogether.

In an ideal world, even the Su-30 MKI or F-15 would not activate their radars & depend on AWACS to maximize their surprise.

So does that mean the Su-30 MKI and F-15 cannot do BVR on their own?

The Rafale tactics are all about minimizing radar usage & using offboard sensors plus passive targeting to engage in BVR wherever possible. So does that mean that it's bad at BVR?

The Eurofighter uses Pirate IRST, offboard Link-16 cues for precise cueing for long range ASRAAM shots. So, does that mean its bad at BVR?

AWACS is great because opponents can only detect the AWACS on their RWR. They don't know where their opponents are. Hiding in the weeds ready to fire at them.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by shiv »

The Chinese are far from stupid. The J-20 has all the requirements for a truly effective BVR AAM platform
  • The plane is large enough to have the power to feed large radar antennas and avionics for real long distance detection and identification
    The stealthy design reduces the issue of large planes being inherently less stealthy
    I assume it can carry a respectably large internal load of BVRAAMs
    Manoeuvrability and speed are no longer considered as vital as they were in the dogfight era
A small aircraft will not only need AWACS support - but it carries fewer missiles and has less fuel for range/loiter.

A mixed aircraft attack mission of J 20s with two configured for defence/escort and two for attack would not need separate AWACS support especially for an attack into enemy territory because AWACS will have to remain 2-300 km away from hostile airspace

However, large size and large radars are irrelevant for CAS missions in uncontested airspace.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

How a "light fighter" does BVR.
Bill Sweetman wrote: Bill Sweetman

The TIDLS can connect up to four aircraft in a full-time two-way link. It has a range of 500 km and is highly resistant to jamming; almost the only way to jam the system is to position a jammer aircraft directly between the two communicating Gripens. Its basic modes include the ability to display the position, bearing, and speed of all four aircraft in a formation, including basic status information such as fuel and weapons state. The TIDLS is fundamentally different from broadcast-style links like Link 16. It serves fewer users but links them more closely together, exchanging much more data, and operating much closer to real time.

TIDLS information, along with radar, EW, and mapping data, appears on the central MFD. The display reflects complete sensor fusion: a target that is being tracked by multiple sources is one target on the screen. Detailed symbols distinguish between friendlies, hostiles, and unidentified targets and show who has targeted whom.

Today, Sweden is the only country that is flying with a link of this kind, and will retain that status until the F-22 enters service. The Flygvapnet has already proven some of the tactical advantages of the link, including the ability to spread the formation over a much wider area. Visual contact between the fighters is no longer necessary, because the datalink shows the position of each aircraft. Leader and wingman roles are different: the pilot in the best position makes the attack, and the fact that he has targeted the enemy is immediately communicated to the three other aircraft.

A basic use of the datalink is "silent attack." An adversary may be aware that he is being tracked by a fighter radar that is outside missile range. He may not be aware that another, closer fighter is receiving that tracking data and is preparing for a missile launch without using its own radar. After launch, the shooter can break and escape, while the other fighter continues to pass tracking data to the missile. In tests, Gripen pilots have learned that this makes it possible to delay using the AMRAAM's active seeker until it is too late for the target to respond.

But the use of the link goes beyond this, towards what the Swedish Air Force calls "samverkan," or close-cooperation. One example is the use of the Ericsson PS-05/A radar with TIDLS. An Ericsson paper compares its application, with identical sensors and precise knowledge of the location of both platforms, to human twins: "Communication is possible without explaining everything."

"Radar-samverkan," the Ericsson paper suggests, equips the formation with a super-radar of extraordinary capabilities. The PS-05/A can operate in passive mode, as a sensitive receiver with high directional accuracy (due to its large antenna). Two PS-05/As can exchange information by datalink and locate the target by triangulation. The target's signals will often identify it as well.

The datalink results in better tracking. Usually, three plots (echoes) are needed to track a target in track-while-scan mode. The datalink allows the radars to share plots, not just tracks, so even if none of the aircraft in a formation gets enough plots on its own to track the target, they may do so collectively.

Each radar plot includes Doppler velocity, which provides the individual aircraft with range-rate data. However, this data on its own does not yield the velocity of the target. Using the TIDLS, two fighters can take simultaneous range-rate readings and thereby determine the target's track instantly, reducing the need for radar transmission.

In ECM applications, one fighter can search, while the wingman simultaneously focuses jamming on the same target, using the radar. This makes it very difficult for the target to intercept or jam the radar that is tracking him. Another anti-jamming technique is for all four radars to illuminate the same target simultaneously at different frequencies.
Indian Navy with a "light fighter", the Harrier.
http://www.livefistdefence.com/2009/07/ ... -test.html
EXCLUSIVE: Navy to network-target test Derby AAM from upgraded Sea Harrier

As part of the Limited Upgrade Sea Harrier (LUSH), the Indian Navy will shortly conduct its second live firing test of the Israeli Derby beyond visual range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM), a weapon system that has been integrated to the last of the Navy's Sea Harriers as part of the upgrade programme. While the first live firing of the Derby active-radar seeker missile was conducted using the aircraft's primary sensor, the next test will be from one of the Navy's upgraded Sea Harriers with its radar switched off. Guidance will be provided from another platform, either on the ground or in the air.

According to Navy sources in South Block, the LUSH programme has made the Sea Harriers fully new aircraft. The heart of the upgrade is of course the replacement of the venerable old Ferranti Blue Fox monopulse airborne intercept radar with the time-tested EL/M-2032 multimode advanced pulse doppler radar. The new radar, in the words of one of the pilots, has put the aircraft in "a different league". While sea clutter proved to be the bane of look-down missions with the Blue Fox radar (the sweep would be swamped), the Elta sensor has none of those issues.

Of the nine Sea Harriers involved in the LUSH programme, seven have been upgraded and delivered back to the Navy, while two are currently being upgraded by HAL. The INS Viraat, currently undergoing a mini-refit in Kochi, will be back in service by September-October, and will have the LUSH Harriers on board.
LCA has a variant of the same radar, the same missiles & a (hush hush) datalink.

Then lets think about what it can do in BVR or not.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by shiv »

Karan M wrote: Because, you and he, are both wrong.

The Gripen, LCA et al, all field radars and missiles perfectly capable of engaging in BVR on their own.

RDY-2 on the Mirage 2000-V can range upto 130km for a small target.
Uttam AESA planned for the LCA (and other platforms) has a 150km range.
.
Karan we are going to disagree on this until I see data that you are right. You might be wrong. I can only see the theory. The capability you speak of has been available since 1990 but has not worked as advertised. I am not going to ignore the available data
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

shiv wrote:The Chinese are far from stupid. The J-20 has all the requirements for a truly effective BVR AAM platform
  • The plane is large enough to have the power to feed large radar antennas and avionics for real long distance detection and identification
    The stealthy design reduces the issue of large planes being inherently less stealthy
    I assume it can carry a respectably large internal load of BVRAAMs
    Manoeuvrability and speed are no longer considered as vital as they were in the dogfight era
Yes, a very valid list but please look at "why". Is it to range farther and farther into enemy airspace? Or for closer range missions. The Chinese want to contest US airpower at range.

An airforce has to have a mix of all types. Even the savvy Chinese (which you are correct about) field a mix of J-10s and Flankers (and J-20s), not just Flankers.
A small aircraft will not only need AWACS support - but it carries fewer missiles and has less fuel for range/loiter.
Correct.

But it also has much lower operational costs, can be deployed faster & sortie more. Maintenance man hours per complex fighter are higher.

Employed savvily and mixed with heavier types they will be a very powerful force.
A mixed aircraft attack mission of J 20s with two configured for defence/escort and two for attack would not need separate AWACS support especially for an attack into enemy territory because AWACS will have to remain 2-300 km away from hostile airspace
They would still prefer AWACS support because the nose cone of any fighter can never really equal that of an AWACS. Its look angles are limited to front (usually 120 degrees). An AWACS will look the entire 360 degrees and also make sure the pilots are not overwhelmed.
However, large size and large radars are irrelevant for CAS missions in uncontested airspace.
Well, radars are necessary for SAR & A2G modes.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by shiv »

One the effects of a robust air defence system will be to force AWACS aircraft to stay well away.

Indian AWACS aircraft will never be able to make any "deep penetration" into hostile airspace and will therefore never be able to give BVR support to small fighters like the LCA which will then have to depend on its own capability and 2 BVR missiles. The data available so far suggests that such capability has never worked as advertised.

Harriers have been extraordinarily effective in WVR combat, not BVR
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

shiv wrote:
Karan M wrote: Because, you and he, are both wrong.

The Gripen, LCA et al, all field radars and missiles perfectly capable of engaging in BVR on their own.

RDY-2 on the Mirage 2000-V can range upto 130km for a small target.
Uttam AESA planned for the LCA (and other platforms) has a 150km range.
.
Karan we are going to disagree on this until I see data that you are right. You might be wrong. I can only see the theory. The capability you speak of has been available since 1990 but has not worked as advertised. I am not going to ignore the available data
How do you know that it has not worked as advertised?

Your statements ignore all real world cases wherein active exercises prove the capabilities of these systems repeatedly.

Do you mean to say none of these systems work as advertised because there have been no shooting wars?

This is the IAF at Red Flag.

http://www.livefistdefence.com/2008/11/ ... -hand.html
Considering the fact that the central sensor of the Sukhoi, its radar … held up just fine in training mode …despite the barrage of electronic jamming augurs well for the Indian Air Force.
So will you now state that the Bars cannot work because there is no war wherein it actually shot down other aircraft?

The IAF and other AF exercise round the clock year after year (unlike the limited data you cite).

They routinely test and validate systems. Will you ignore all that as well because it goes against your arguments?

Image
Last edited by Karan M on 15 May 2016 06:25, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

shiv wrote:One the effects of a robust air defence system will be to force AWACS aircraft to stay well away.
How far away? The Phalcons public cited range is 400km. Its non active sensors can see further.
Indian AWACS aircraft will never be able to make any "deep penetration" into hostile airspace and will therefore never be able to give BVR support to small fighters like the LCA which will then have to depend on its own capability and 2 BVR missiles. The data available so far suggests that such capability has never worked as advertised.
What data what data? The one that ignores the cumulative impact of all the developments so far & quotes stuff from two decades back? Lets talk about Spitfires and BF-109s then.

Small fighters have never worked as advertised. That would be news to the French. Whose nuclear deterrent relies on the Mirage 2000-N.
Harriers have been extraordinarily effective in WVR combat, not BVR
Yes, lets ignore the impact of the Blue Vixen on the Sea Harrier & its AMRAAMs. Which routinely beat F-15s and other advanced platforms at BVR & which radar served as the basis of the Captor-M on the EF.

https://books.google.co.in/books?id=dPD ... rs&f=false

Image

Lets ask the developer.
The Post-War Development of Fighter Radar in Europe – A British Perspective
John Roulston

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp. ... er=4653881
After the Falklands war, the U.K. Navy, driven by the fighting record of the Sea Harrier, decided to upgrade its
weapons system. At FRS-1 standard the aircraft carried two AIM 9L missiles and the Blue Fox radar was competent only
for engagements over sea where the clutter situation was fairly benign. The navy’s ambition stretched to four AMRAAM and
full look-down, shoot-down targeting performance.
Ferranti won the contract against competition in the U.K. and the U.S.
and the result was Blue Vixen, a compact, multi-mode air interception radar with a range of new features, previously
untried in this type of radar. In Blue Vixen, high, medium and low PRF modes were scheduled automatically in track-while-
search, the radar deciding on which waveform would give the tracker the most useful information on an instant by instant
basis.

The design held many breakthrough features, among them constant mean power on the three PRF modes, extremely
high levels of automation, high clutter rejection and the ability to launch and provide accurate mid-course guidance to
AMRAAM with high covertness.


The Harrier (designated now, F.A. 2) with Blue Vixen and AMRAAM can out-
perform much more modern platforms as shown by trials against the Australian navy F-18 fleet. One Sea Harrier pilot
has commented that with Blue Vixen performing an intercept was "down to selecting 'air to air', pointing the aircraft in
roughly the right direction, and leaving the radar to it." It is regarded as state of the art among fighter radars.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

So the Indian Navy was denied the AMRAAM (US) and hence could not procure the Blue Vixen, AMRAAM combo.

It created its own with the superb LUSH. EL/M-2032, Derby & datalink.

Tested it, under advanced conditions.

But lets ignore that since the last time the SHAR shot down fighters was in the Falklands or 1847 or whenever.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

What is the purpose of Red Flag and exercises like the one the IAF holds within India again? Clearly, they are not about shooting wars, so lets ignore them. No ordinance is dropped, no lessons are learnt, nothing of value is determined to improve equipment.

Light fighters shouldn't do BVR. MiG-21 Bison, radar- Kopyo, only 57km, equipped with RVV-AE missile & EL-8222 SPJ.

US experience in Cope India, 12 years back.
http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/exercise-co ... cle02.html
These same U.S. participants say the Indian pilots showed innovation and flexibility in their tactics. They also admit that they came into the exercise underrating the training and tactics of the pilots they faced. Instead of typical Cold War-style, ground-controlled interceptions, the Indians varied aircraft mixes, altitudes and formations. Indian air force planners never reinforced failure or repeated tactics that the U.S. easily repelled. Moreover, the IAF's airborne commanders changed tactics as opportunities arose. Nor did U.S. pilots believe they faced only India's top guns. Instead, they said that at least in some units they faced a mix of experienced and relatively new Indian fighter and strike pilots.
"They could come up with a game plan, but if it wasn't working they would call an audible and change [tactics in flight]," he says. "They made good decisions about when to bring their strikers in. The MiG-21s would be embedded with a Flogger for integral protection. There was a data link between the Flankers that was used to pass information. [Using all their assets,] they built a very good [radar] picture of what we were doing and were able to make good decisions about when to roll [their aircraft] in and out."
"When we saw that they were a more professional air force, we realized that within the constraints of the exercise we were going to have a very difficult time," Snowden says. "In general, it looked like they ran a broad spectrum of tactics and they were adaptive. They would analyze what we were doing and then try something else. They weren't afraid to bring the strikers in high or low. They would move them around so that we could never anticipate from day to day what we were going to see."
"All their aircraft seemed to be capable of breaking out [targets] and shooting at the ranges the exercise allowed," he says. "We generally don't train to an active missile threat [like the Mirage's Mica or the AA-12 for the Russian-built aircraft], and that was one of the things that caused us some problems."
The Indians flew a number of different fighters, including the French-made Mirage 2000 and the Russian-made MIG-27 and MIG-29, but the two most formidable IAF aircraft proved to be the MIG-21 Bison, an upgraded version of the Russian-made baseline MIG-21, and the SU-30K Flanker, also made in Russia, Neubeck said. He emphasized the fact that U.S. forces were always outnumbered in these scenarios, but said the missions proved more difficult than expected.
http://vayu-sena.tripod.com/exercise-ia ... cle01.html

Looks like the IAF didn't get the missive light fighters shouldn't really bother with BVR.

PAF JF-17 radar. 105km range, double that on the Bisons.

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-69dBwHQQ3xg/V ... 2BMRCA.jpg

Currently being integrated with the SD-10 missile.
Please see: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-PLA-AAM.html

For more details. Basically R77 class.
Last edited by Karan M on 15 May 2016 06:40, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by shiv »

Karan M wrote:
However, large size and large radars are irrelevant for CAS missions in uncontested airspace.
Well, radars are necessary for SAR & A2G modes.
I did not say "no radar". LCA and F-16 radars will do. A radar with the ability to detect targets at 200 km would not be needed

Having said that modern targeting pods are extremely capable - IR, visible spectrum with insane zoom as well as laser designation and tracking. Pakis are using just that and not the sort of A-A/A-G AESA capability that US F-216s have
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by manjgu »

Karan : Problem is Manjgu, you may not have that option. Once you enter into the merge, all bets are off. ( the idea of a good pilot is to stay away from such a merge in the missile age or enter into a merge on terms favourable to urself .. just as it was not to be at a enemy' s plane 12o clock in the time of guns ? ).

this is why countries collect intelligence on enemy's weapon systems, electronics, radars etc so as to train effectively , devise suitable tactics and stay out of harms way as much as possible.

I am not contesting ur arguments about increased sophistication of missiles. The point i am making is that the Air forces are constantly devising countermeasures, tactics to nullify the increased sophistication. a bit like cat and mouse game. One advancement in missile field is met with a advancement in countermeasures or change in tactics. this is a very evolving and dynamic field. Unless the missiles are fired in real combat their advertised or theoritical capabilties will remain theoritical at best. there are enough examples when weapon systems failed to perform as advertised in their brochures..
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by shiv »

Karan M wrote: How do you know that it has not worked as advertised?

Your statements ignore all real world cases wherein active exercises prove the capabilities of these systems repeatedly.

Do you mean to say none of these systems work as advertised because there have been no shooting wars?
Sorry Karan. I have stated repeatedly that war experience is not the same as exercises. If there is no real war data then it is not "combat proven". That banal truism is unavoidable. My opinions are based on my reading and I have posted the articles on which I base my opinion.

If being combat proven was not important, I would call to question anyone who claims that as an extra point in favour of some equipment.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

shiv wrote:I did not say "no radar". LCA and F-16 radars will do. A radar with the ability to detect targets at 200 km would not be needed
Agreed, but modern day fighter radars are already reaching 200km.

The AN/APG-80 on the F-16 is quoted as 70-80 nm at 1mtr square target. That's around 150km.
Having said that modern targeting pods are extremely capable - IR, visible spectrum with insane zoom as well as laser designation and tracking. Pakis are using just that and not the sort of A-A/A-G AESA capability that US F-216s have
Shivji, those pods are super expensive & all pods will put aero & other maneuvering restrictions on carrying aircraft. Also, for all weather performance, you need this:
http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-WEZDcPZJ_gU/U ... -30MKI.jpg

The ones (going by memory) Pakistan are getting are Condors & Oblique photography pods.

That is why radars on fighters are so important.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by manjgu »

On February 15, 1991, President George H. W. Bush traveled to Raytheon's Patriot manufacturing plant in Andover, Massachusetts, during the Gulf War, he declared, the "Patriot is 41 for 42: 42 Scuds engaged, 41 intercepted!"[41] The President's claimed success rate was thus over 97% to that point in the war. The U.S. Army claimed an initial success rate of 80% in Saudi Arabia and 50% in Israel. Those claims were eventually scaled back to 70% and 40%.

On April 7, 1992 Theodore Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Reuven Pedatzur of Tel Aviv University testified before a House Committee stating that, according to their independent analysis of video tapes, the Patriot system had a success rate of below 10%, and perhaps even a zero success rate.[42][43]

Also on April 7, 1992 Charles A. Zraket of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and Peter D. Zimmerman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies testified about the calculation of success rates and accuracy in Israel and Saudi Arabia and discounted many of the statements and methodologies in Postol's report.[44][45]

According to Zimmerman, it is important to note the difference in terms when analyzing the performance of the system during the war:

Success Rate – the percentage of Scuds destroyed or deflected to unpopulated areas
Accuracy – the percentage of hits out of all the Patriots fired
In accordance with the standard firing doctrine on average four Patriots were launched at each incoming Scud – in Saudi Arabia an average of three Patriots were fired. If every Scud were deflected or destroyed the success rate would be 100% but the Accuracy would only be 25% and 33% respectively.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

shiv wrote:Sorry Karan. I have stated repeatedly that war experience is not the same as exercises. If there is no real war data then it is not "combat proven". That banal truism is unavoidable. My opinions are based on my reading and I have posted the articles on which I base my opinion.
In short, avoid any and every data which shoots down your arguments.

Facts are that in between wars, there are enough events by competent AFs to test & validate their procedures.

Lets just ignore all of that.
If being combat proven was not important, I would call to question anyone who claims that as an extra point in favour of some equipment.
In which case why is the world rushing to buy the JSF since its not combat proven & the IAF the Su-30 MKI?

Both weren't combat proven.

Why did the IAF not buy the MiG-21 only since its the only platform they had which was combat proven?
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by shiv »

Karan M wrote:What is the purpose of Red Flag and exercises like the one the IAF holds within India again? Clearly, they are not about shooting wars, so lets ignore them. No ordinance is dropped, no lessons are learnt, nothing of value is determined to improve equipment..
You are free to ignore them Karan if that is what you wish. I did mention Red Flag and TACDE. They are about the best possible simulation in the absence of war. But no cigar. Still not war. War experience can only come from looking at war data.

Simulation experience comes for exercises. I am not talking about ignoring that as you have suggested. But the data that has come from real life combat suggests that BVR combat does not really take place as discussed (or advertised). Combat aircraft have simply not detected adversaries 120 km away and shot them down at 80 or "scared away all the opposition" by simply shooting and missing (as commonly alleged in internet discussions).
Karan M
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by Karan M »

manjgu wrote:I am not contesting ur arguments about increased sophistication of missiles. The point i am making is that the Air forces are constantly devising countermeasures, tactics to nullify the increased sophistication. a bit like cat and mouse game. One advancement in missile field is met with a advancement in countermeasures or change in tactics. this is a very evolving and dynamic field. Unless the missiles are fired in real combat their advertised or theoritical capabilties will remain theoritical at best. there are enough examples when weapon systems failed to perform as advertised in their brochures..
And the point that I am making is that right now, the countermeasures, tactics to counter IIR equipped CCMs are severely lacking. Even with the best AF out there.
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Re: Indian Military Aviation - 21 Sept 2015

Post by shiv »

Karan M wrote: Lets just ignore all of that.
Karan - this argument is unnecessary. Not least because you are making it, not me. If you don't mean it, please don't say it. I am not saying it. You and I have different views. We need not have consensus on what both of "us" should believe.
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