The fact that we cannot get it from the Russians. Buying from them would preserve our 'strategic autonomy' (no allies) and not being part of any 'security architecture' because the Russians don't have one to offer.Viv S wrote: ...
What exactly is so game-changing about the EMALS that it'll throw the entire's country's geopolitical status out of whack, to the point where we ought to embrace the idea of hamstringing the IN's next carrier to preserve the status quo?
Not for a lack of trying on their part: http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ ... n-unveiled.Cosmo_R wrote:The fact that we cannot get it from the Russians. Buying from them would preserve our 'strategic autonomy' (no allies) and not being part of any 'security architecture' because the Russians don't have one to offer.Viv S wrote: ...
What exactly is so game-changing about the EMALS that it'll throw the entire's country's geopolitical status out of whack, to the point where we ought to embrace the idea of hamstringing the IN's next carrier to preserve the status quo?
That's about it. Seriously.
This is a deliberate cascading effort by the US to turn India into one of its deputies,and for India to bear the cost of the supercarrier which we will have to pay for to Uncle Sam as well! And gents,please do not underestimate what a 45K t CV can do.The IN used the obsolete Seahawks on the Vikrant to devastating effect in '71. It now has brand new MIG-29Ks on the Vik-A. The French CDG is also only 45K as well and the RN's new QE CVs only 65K t. The cost of building,equipping and operating a gargantuan supercarrier akin to that in the USN will not only beggar the IN but cripple the defence budget.I am glad that such ides will not happen simply because we don't have the moolah,unless... Uncle Sam gives us massive mil subsidies as it has done for Pak for decades!When you have an ex-NSA working for the premier US think tank and express that buying into the US security architecture is OK, for people like me who have aspirations for India being an independent power, it becomes very concerning. Now the question becomes to what degree do we have to buy into that architecture. For good or bad, we have allowed them a foothold or shall we say a wide doorway by now into our military domain. We should replace this ASAP, Why?
The day the US departs from this role of being THE global security provider and being the global hegemon is the day, we welcome buying from them like we do from any other. Until then, they also remain a long term strategic competitor in the IOR - our primary area of interest.
You're again side-stepping the basic question. (I'm not going to comment on the general political situation vis a vis the US relation; this is not the thread for it.)ShauryaT wrote:Viv S: These discussions are not understood in terms of specific technologies. So, questions like if we have X from the US, why not Y also. We can go on with these discussions forever. The thing to understand is the following. When you buy US arms, you are not just buying those arms, you are buying into a security architecture. EMALS will not be without their involvement in ship design and of course the very next thing one will say, why not F-35 then and the hawkeye and the refuelers and the UAV's!! With EMALS comes a whole host of treaties and EUMA.
Your source is mistaken. If the IN opts for conventional propulsion - they will choose between a Zorya or GE engine (likely the latter). If they decide to go nuclear (which they haven't yet) it'll be an local design by BARC (which has already achieved critical design competencies). The Russians meanwhile haven't inducted a nuclear powered surface vessel in two decades, but even if we assume they will be contracted to provide some degree of consultancy for adapting the BARC reactor for the Vishal, it in no way blocks the plan to integrate EMALS to the ship.Also, what do you do about propulsion, which they will not give for any price. I have it on reliable knowledge that a larger design of our propulsion will require Russian assistance.
I am inclining to agree. Only after the withdrawing the visa incidence. The opacity of decision making is something that should not be present yo this extent in a democracy, but that is a topic for another thread. However, I have wondered why India, with all things pretty much in her favor, is so limp and weak. To the extent that at the moment I cannot see her as a contributory member of the Security Council (so too Brazil, Japan and Germany). Too dysfunctional. Or living in the past.When you buy US arms, you are not just buying those arms, you are buying into a security architecture.
"Perhaps the main idea behind the Shtorm design is not so much about the Russian navy but about keeping India’s and China’s interest in military-technical cooperation." Peplayev says."NRao wrote:....
Not for a lack of trying on their part: http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ ... n-unveiled.
EMALS, E-2 look alike, naval PAK-FA, etc. But the proposed model has two ski jumps!!!!!
http://www.ainonline.com/sites/default/ ... 9257&w=500
Are you describing the recent Indo-Roos transactions where Indians have to pay for actual development of paper planes/carriers etc.?Philip wrote:Excellently put!This is a deliberate cascading effort by the US to turn India into one of its deputies,and for India to bear the cost of the supercarrier which we will have to pay for to Uncle Sam as well!When you have an ex-NSA working for the premier US think tank and express that buying into the US security architecture is OK, for people like me who have aspirations for India being an independent power, it becomes very concerning. Now the question becomes to what degree do we have to buy into that architecture. For good or bad, we have allowed them a foothold or shall we say a wide doorway by now into our military domain. We should replace this ASAP, Why?
The day the US departs from this role of being THE global security provider and being the global hegemon is the day, we welcome buying from them like we do from any other. Until then, they also remain a long term strategic competitor in the IOR - our primary area of interest.
What is the radar horizon of the Ka31 AEW choppers? The comparison is not between super carriers and lesser carriers, but between a carrier equipped with a Catapult with one that has none.Philip wrote:And gents,please do not underestimate what a 45K t CV can do.The IN used the obsolete Seahawks on the Vikrant to devastating effect in '71. It now has brand new MIG-29Ks on the Vik-A.
The French carrier compares extremely favorably with the Vikad, while the QE with its crowsnest solution is a much more even comparison. If there is ever a shooting match between Vikad/CDG, the CDG will be able to locate the Vikad much sooner and launch heavy strike packages at her while staying out of range herself.Philip wrote:The French CDG is also only 45K as well and the RN's new QE CVs only 65K t.
Philip wrote:The cost of building,equipping and operating a gargantuan supercarrier akin to that in the USN will not only beggar the IN but cripple the defence budget.
Look at the history of the British/French alliance before WW 1. There were no 'signed commitments'.TSJones wrote:....so the up shot of all of this is that India wants certain tech from the US, but really doesn't want to sign any entangling commitments in order to get it........
an unlikely scenario INMHO......
Why buy EMALS from US when French have already implemented the same on their Carrier CDG?ShauryaT wrote:Viv S: These discussions are not understood in terms of specific technologies. So, questions like if we have X from the US, why not Y also. We can go on with these discussions forever. The thing to understand is the following. When you buy US arms, you are not just buying those arms, you are buying into a security architecture. EMALS will not be without their involvement in ship design and of course the very next thing one will say, why not F-35 then and the hawkeye and the refuelers and the UAV's!! With EMALS comes a whole host of treaties and EUMA. Also, what do you do about propulsion, which they will not give for any price. I have it on reliable knowledge that a larger design of our propulsion will require Russian assistance.
When you have an ex-NSA working for the premier US think tank and express that buying into the US security architecture is OK, for people like me who have aspirations for India being an independent power, it becomes very concerning. Now the question becomes to what degree do we have to buy into that architecture. For good or bad, we have allowed them a foothold or shall we say a wide doorway by now into our military domain. We should replace this ASAP, Why?
The day the US departs from this role of being THE global security provider and being the global hegemon is the day, we welcome buying from them like we do from any other. Until then, they also remain a long term strategic competitor in the IOR - our primary area of interest. It is a competing power in the region by definition, who's interests differ substantially from Indian interests in what, how, when to deal with issues and in what manner in the IOR and its littoral states. A competitor who's services are useful in the pacific domain, until India can stand up to a rising China and if need be challenge her on our own strength.
The expectations is India shall not help them play their global games in the Pacific and in exchange do not expect their security umbrella in our back yard. We take that risk. India as a great power is not possible without our own investments and these investments have to reflect Indian objectives and priorities and capability evolution. India CANNOT be a power on borrowed strength. A castrated India living on borrowed strength is not my idea, even if many in GoI across political spectrums have effectively accepted, argued for or have hoodwinked in some cases the Indian public, leading us towards that objective of being a "free rider" of the US system. One thing the US has taught me is there is nothing free.
You do not become a $10 trillion economy first and then worry about protecting your interests. You define what your interests are FIRST and then protect it with increasing investments and capabilities. I do not buy this notion that one day we will become big and be on our own for one second. No precedence for the same in history. Not when Monroe put his doctrine, not when Elizabeth built her fleet and not when Mao defined ONE China! Yeltsin's mistakes in Russia is a stark reminder on what happens when you let your competitors too close - you compromise on your interests and loose geo-political power. This is not about EMALS as much, it is about power and interests and keeping a competing power out of your hairs. Provide me with an alternative for the P8 and I would want it replaced yesterday. So, support the light howitzer for now till ATAGS comes online and so forth.
The French are always the most expensive. Besides, the US is 120 volts and the French 360 volts. 120 is better. Less stress on the production components.Why buy EMALS from US when French have already implemented the same on their Carrier CDG?
Waiting for imported weapon systems.So much discussion on INS Vikrant thread. Can someone put the latest pic of INS Vikrant under construction pics?
The U.S. Navy and the French Connection
Military pilots are a gutsy breed, regardless of which country they fly for. And carrier pilots? Well, just imagine trying to land a high-performance fighter plane on a runway the size of a football field – a constantly moving football field, no less. One that is pitching and rolling on the high seas.
In essence, it’s just controlled crashing: slam the plane down on the deck, snatch the arresting cable with the tail hook, and pray the plane stops short of the runway’s end – and a quick plunge to the ocean below. The last thing a carrier pilot wants to worry about is whether the parts for the arresting mechanism were manufactured to the proper specifications.
DCN International, the commercial arm of Direction des Constructions Navales (DCN), France’s naval shipbuilding company, is putting its final touches on construction of the 38,000 ton, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. Construction started in May 1994, sea trials commenced July 1998, and the ship is due to be commissioned in 2000.
The French carrier, which is approximately half the size of an American nuclear-class Nimitz carrier, is equipped with two USN Type C13 catapults, rated to launch aircraft weighing up to 22 tons at a tempo rate of one aircraft per minute. When operational, the ship will have a fleet of 40 Rafale M combat aircraft, the Super Etendard, the Hawkeye E-2C airborne early warning aircraft, and the AS 565 Panther helicopter. The de Gaulle’s manning will be approximately 1200 ship’s company and 600 air wing personnel, for a total compliment of 1800.
With aircraft launch and recovery operations scheduled for May 1999, the ship had a lot of preparation ahead. The Rafale jet had been to the Naval base at Lakehurst, NJ, for carrier suitability development in the past, and was scheduled to return to Lakehurst for support equipment integration later this year. Still, actual real time launching and arresting on a new ship presents many challenges.
Counting down weeks to go before actual at-sea tests posed an excellent time for carrier equipment experts to review the French program. During the time frame of March 22 to 24, 1999, Mr. George DiBiase and Rear Admiral Joe Dyer visited the DCN Brest naval shipyard in Brittany. They were briefed on the progress, installation and check-out of all of the ship’s subsystems. Discussions followed, allowing an exchange of information beneficial to both countries.
The French highlighted several concerns they were having with the aircraft arresting gear on their new ship. DiBiase, venerably titled “Mr. Catapult” by the French for his contributions and help in developing the de Gaulle, took a heightened interest. Most of the problems encountered with the gear probably had been experienced in the past, and if any one person has this level of knowledge, it would be the Navy’s Chief carrier engineer, George DiBiase.
The island on the de Gaulle is forward of the location used on US Navy carriers. Due to the shorter deck, the “runout” span of the arresting cable was changed from 345 feet for U.S. carriers to 320 feet for the de Gaulle. Lakehurst engineers had performed worst case analysis that indicated an E-2 aircraft with an off-center, maximum run-out arrested landing would put the E-2 Hawkeye’s nose wheel at or over the upwind end of the angle deck. Although recognized to be safe, pilot apprehension of not seeing enough deck in front of him was an issue of great concern to the French.
After the program reviews, DiBiase and Admiral Dyer were flown by helicopter from Brest to the de Gaulle at sea. While reviewing the technical data from arrestments, DiBiase concluded the constant runout valve cam was not manufactured to the proper specification for a runout of 320 feet. This cam controls the amount of runout cable permitted to arrest an aircraft. A cam that is not properly set or manufactured could cause an aircraft to go too far on an arrestment and go overboard.
Without having the proper equipment on board to measure the exact size of the suspect cam, the French sailors removed the cams from the other two arresting engines and stacked each on one another so as to visually identify differences between the cams. The French engineers concluded the cam was different, and fretted that without any spares, delivery of a new cam would take months and interfere with their upcoming sea trials. “I’ll have you a new cam by next Monday,” promised DiBiase.
With the astonished French crew nearby, DiBiase called the manufacturing department at Navy Lakehurst and ordered a specially made cam: Lakehurst part number 626664. “I’ll need that delivered to France by April 5,” DiBiase said.
The call was received by Kellie Borrero, a program manager in the manufacturing facility. The navy maintains this core capability to provide prototype manufacturing support, producibility analysis, drawing package validation and the application of new manufacturing technologies to the design, development and product verification of flight critical aircraft launch and recovery equipment and support equipment. It is also used to complete the work of contractors that default, and, when an emergency arises in the carrier fleet, respond as quickly as possible to keep the ships operational.
Lakehurst has its manufacturing department located in six different buildings. Two of the buildings, which are old dirigible hangars, house large machines for heavy machining, cutting and welding. One smaller building is used primarily for working in a concurrent engineering environment where integrated product teams can work together to design, prototype and test equipment. It is an environmentally controlled building with state-of-the-art machines, that allows engineers and technicians to share thoughts and ideas more readily than the larger hangars. Manufacturing one cam to precise measurements is an ideal task for this building.
Moments after the call on March 25, a team was assembled. Joe Delano would provide the CAD/CAM support, while Chris Arkenau would machine cut the cam. Bob Wigginton would be the quality assurance expert. “We need to take a three month schedule and compress it into nine days,” said Borrero.
A piece of 4340 pre-hardened steel was identified that was suitable for the cam. Delano and Arkenau started to transfer over 500 data points from the three prints to the computer, using Mastercam software. Mike Buppert from the producibility group developed a manufacturing process for manufacturing fixtures, jigs and test specimens. With the process plans agreed to, Delano wrote 18 software programs, some with more than 2700 lines of code, that would shape a blank piece of steel into the heart of a carrier’s arresting engine. The machine assigned to tackle the job was a Haas VF-4 vertical machining center. “Although the programs were large, the Haas VF-4 is user friendly and can easily receive programs from other computers, store in memory and execute these programs when required,” said Arkenau.
Kellie Borrero, program manager, gets a perfect view of the French cam as it is machined on the Haas VF-4. The cam is for one of the arresting engines on the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle.
According to Joe Delano there wasn’t anything easy about this. “When you get a part like this that has incredibly tight tolerances measured to one thousandth of an inch, you have to think everything through. Fixtures, tools, gauges all have to be perfect. You plan everything, and then you keep going through in your mind how it will work. Every working moment, until the cam is finished, you’re thinking about it.”
The team members, who had never made a cam of this size before, all agreed this was a “ten” on a scale of one to ten for determining complexity. “When you envision a cam, you think of a small gear. But there is nothing small about this cam, which begins with a blank piece of steel weighing more than 60 pounds, and the final weight is 40 pounds,” declared Arkenau. “It is not the kind of task you wish for, especially because of the tight schedule. But that is what we are here for, to solve fleet problems. If anyone can make critical ship items within these tight schedules, it’s us here at Lakehurst,” said Wigginton. “We are the heart of Naval aviation.”
Listening to Delano and Arkenau explain the manufacturing steps helps understand why management refers to these employees as artisans. “You have to sneak up on the last cut of the transitional surface in order to hold a 63 profiled finish,” quipped Delano, referring to the almost mirror like surface on the final cam which was achieved by using a 1 1 / 2" inserted carbide endmill. “We came up with a novel way to position pre-located and measured spindles to let us know how close we were to the final desired width,” uttered Arkenau.
Borrero prepared a detailed program plan identifying all of the steps necessary to complete the job, from obtaining the raw material to final check-out. Each step was assigned a time measure in order to provide instant recognition of each stage of completion. “I wanted to be prepared to respond to the U.S. Navy and French government if any programmatic questions were raised,” expressed Borrero.
But no questions were forthcoming. Arkenau and Delano surpassed even the most optimistic schedule, and by Friday afternoon, April 2, Wigginton was dimensionally inspecting over 300 data points on the cam. “I’ve inspected a lot of cams in my lifetime, and this was the finest cam I ever saw,” said Wigginton.
The cam was prepared for shipping and sent to France on Easter Sunday.
“It is not the kind of call you like to receive; however, it demonstrates how absolutely critical Navy Lakehurst is to maintaining the fleet and military readiness. Whether it is a supply systems shortage, contractor default or fleet emergency, we are here to respond. It is nice to see our capability being extended to other countries that have a strategic relationship with the U.S.,” said Rich Headley, manager of the prototyping and manufacturing department.
“The Navy launches $60 million airplanes off its carriers every day, every night and regardless of the weather conditions. These aviators have to know that the equipment that launches them, and the equipment that catches them after their sortie, will do its job. This is accomplished by designing and making equipment correctly every single time. We at Navy Lakehurst take great pride in our people and work. But our people are only half of the equation. It takes great equipment like Haas to complete the job.” — Mark Gindele
Mark Gindele is the manager in charge of quality assurance and material for prototyping and manufacturing at the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, in Lakehurst, New Jersey.
the US despite G. Washington's warnings on foreign entanglements in his farewell speech, has a penchant for treaties and ensuing obligations there of.sudeepj wrote:Look at the history of the British/French alliance before WW 1. There were no 'signed commitments'.TSJones wrote:....so the up shot of all of this is that India wants certain tech from the US, but really doesn't want to sign any entangling commitments in order to get it........
an unlikely scenario INMHO......
Barring a major change in China, there is no escaping a full Indo-US *alliance*. Both need each other.
For the Chinese, Admiral Harris, 59, is not only a tough talker. He was born in Japan, the son of a Japanese mother and an American father who was a chief petty officer in the American Navy. The Chinese have zeroed in on his ethnicity as a mode of attack.
“Some may say an overemphasis on the Japanese background about an American general is a bit unkind,” Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, wrote. “But to understand the American’s sudden upgraded offensive in the South China Sea, it is simply impossible to ignore Admiral Harris’s blood, background, political inclination and values.”
This plays out each day in India against PM Modi. This used to work perfectly in old times when the opposite voice is not heard or is suppressed. Today in this internet age these tricks do not work but backfire in many cases. 
India and the United States are in talks to help each other track submarines in the Indian Ocean, military officials say, a move that could further tighten defense ties between New Delhi and Washington as China steps up its undersea activities.
The US was always playing and they still are. At the end of they day, what are they going to do to China?NRao wrote:Here is another, what I would consider a very important, data point. The thoughts and their maturity, which I believe makes the situation in the Indo-Pacific very, very urgent.
http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewto ... 6#p2015376
China is not playing any more. And the US is serious.
An example of how the Chinese function. Their means of placing people in uncomfortable buckets to meet their own end.
Something they will do to India, to manage India.
For the Chinese, Admiral Harris, 59, is not only a tough talker. He was born in Japan, the son of a Japanese mother and an American father who was a chief petty officer in the American Navy. The Chinese have zeroed in on his ethnicity as a mode of attack.
“Some may say an overemphasis on the Japanese background about an American general is a bit unkind,” Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, wrote. “But to understand the American’s sudden upgraded offensive in the South China Sea, it is simply impossible to ignore Admiral Harris’s blood, background, political inclination and values.”
I have posted what the US thinking, etc in the Indo-US thread or the International naval thread. For sure the US cannot just talk.RoyG wrote: The US was always playing and they still are. At the end of they day, what are they going to do to China?
On the Information Exchange Agreement (IEA):In addition to EMALS, the IEA has an agreement for cooperation on air wing operations for the first IAC - Vikrant which is currently in an advanced stage of construction and is on course to begin sea trials by September 2017 and aviation trials after December 2018.
Mr. Moore stated that there is a detailed process for testing, certification and delivery. “We can hold discussions on certifying the flight deck, testing and so on as you are doing it for the first time,” he said.
The third meeting of the Carrier Working Group is scheduled this summer around July in the US. “IEA will be done by then,” Mr. Moore added.
The US Navy has also offered courses related to carrier operations to Indian navy personnel at their Defence Acquisition University. The Indian side is currently reviewing the course catalogue and a decision is expected shortly.
Some details on the process:The IEA will formalise the exact technology that the U.S. will share and at what classification level, design side, operations among other things, a senior U.S. Admiral said. Both sides had already signed the Terms of Reference on June 17, 2015 during the first meeting of the India-U.S. Joint Working Group (JWG) on carrier technology cooperation.
“We provided them a draft when I visited them in February and it is going through the necessary channels of the Indian government to make sure you are ok with it. We are very close,” said Rear Admiral Tom Moore in an exclusive interview to The Hindu, in the US capital late last month. He is the U.S. Navy’s Program Executive Officer for Aircraft Carriers, and the Co-chair of the JWG. From the Indian side it is chaired by Vice Admiral G.S. Pubby, Controller for Warship Production and Acquisition.
“It is a necessary document to take the next step. We have made a lot of progress over the last year,” he noted.
On the future roadmap of the JWG, Rear Adm Moore said that the US is currently engaged in a formal process of reviews required as per their law covering high technology sales to other countries and stated, “We are in the stage of looking into that and expect to finish that in the next 6-8 months which will allow us to come to a decision on sharing the technology.”
Meanwhile the Indian Navy too is carrying out a feasibility study to determine the characteristics of the carrier like propulsion, kind of aircraft and type of launch mechanism for which EMALS is under consideration. The Navy intends the carrier to be of 65,000 tons.
This bit is worth highlighting for it won't be long before some start linking the decision to go into the 60K + Ton category as linked to a potential adoption of steam CAT's or EMALS rather than something that may have been in the plans all along even if the option to pursue a STOBAR is ultimately exercised.Meanwhile the Indian Navy too is carrying out a feasibility study to determine the characteristics of the carrier like propulsion, kind of aircraft and type of launch mechanism for which EMALS is under consideration. The Navy intends the carrier to be of 65,000 tons.
US is one of the most liked nations. What a way to say "National Interest" without stepping on anyone's toes.Non-alignment to multi-alignment
Another comparison would be for a latest LHA (USS Americas) vs that of a 100,000 Ton Nimitz. LHA-6 cost (procurement) approximately 54% of the cost of CVN-77. Of course it doesn't pack half as much capability by any account since its not a carrier (making the cost or capability comparison rather redundant).Cybaru wrote:Is that true? Wasp class carriers cost 750 million vs 11 to 13.5 billion for ford cost. ( may not be the best comparison )
What about cost of operations of small vs big ships?
It's 7 million a day for ford class of ships or 2.5 billion a year multiplied by 60 years and inflation. I couldn't find any number for the wasp class.
How often could we afford to operate our older ships Vikrant/Viraat every year over the years? If you are going to have three or four carriers, how many can we afford to keep in the water for how long of operations?
CNAS Paper wrote:Factoring in the total life-cycle costs of
an associated carrier air wing, ve surface com- batants and one fast-attack submarine, plus the nearly 6,700 men and women to crew them, it costs about $6.5 million per day to operate each strike group.
Goa, May 15: India's navy has all but finalised plans for a nuclear-powered super-carrier, which is scheduled to be built in Kochi with US help.
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Nuclear energy enables a carrier to sail for months without needing to dock for refuelling. The navy wants a nuclear-powered carrier for "longer sea legs", to enhance its reach beyond territorial waters.
It has determined that the carrier will need a nuclear reactor generating 180MW for propulsion, and may go for two reactors of 90MW each. Talks with the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (Barc) are at an advanced stage.
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The Indian navy is fairly certain that it does not want the indigenously built light combat aircraft (navy) for the Vishal. The IAC II has been planned as a catobar (catapult-assisted take-off and arrested recovery) that would launch aircraft with a catapult powered electromagnetically.
...........................................
A possible fighter aircraft to be based on the Vishal would be in the category of an advanced medium combat aircraft that is being designed by the Aeronautical Development Establishment under the Defence Research and Development Organisation.
But the navy believes the advanced medium combat aircraft too would need a foreign (western) partner to make the jump from the design to the series-production stage.
1. The Nimitz's problems were with electricity generation rather than available thermal power. IIRC it can produce about 64 MWe for ship's operations (in addition to upto 100 MW of shaft power for propulsion). Each EMALS, in turn, requires ~10 MW (6.35 MVA*) which for four catapults equates to 40 MW. A Vishal with two catapults will likely require only 20 MWe dedicated for carrier ops.ShauryaT wrote:Let's do a test, is 180 MW enough to power the EMALS? Also this would mean an uprated Arihant design for the reactor - one of the choices that was clearly available, so what happens to the SSN project? A 90MW to power a hunter-killer?
The Ford class has a 550 MW reactor in place, my understanding is the ship and all its components need about 300 MW. One of the reasons to NOT retrofit the EMALS to Nimitz class was the insufficiency of the available power.
(*)One of the major advantages of electromagnetic launch is the ability to integrate into the all electric ship. The Navy has directed substantial research into its Advanced Surface Machinery program that is developing electric derived propulsion schemes for the next generation of surface combatants. There has also been a good deal of work in high power electric weapon systems. As such, more and more of a ship's systems will evolve into the electrical counterparts of old mechanical systems. This is true of the launch, and eventually, the arresting gear. The average power required by EMALS is only 6.35 MVA. Taking these power levels off the grid should not be a problem in an all electric ship, considering multimegawatt pumps already exist on carriers for various applications. - Link
