Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramanian writes in his book "India's Wars" the following: . . . a large number of ships were under refit (which included INS Vikrant) . . . Vice Admiral Samson, India's Chief of Naval Staff had no clear directives from the GoI regarding the employment of the navy besides that it was to "defend territorial waters and the island territories of India and not venture beyond a distance of 200 miles from Bombay and north of Porbandar along the West Coast of India." It is believed that when he met the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister, they categorically told him that they dis not envisage an offensive role for the Indian navy despite his asserting that even without the Aircraft Carrier, the Indian Navy had the wherewithal to blockade Karachi". The Pakistani Navy too had no clarity from Ayub Khan and much of the initiative exercised by the PN can be attributed to their fleet commander. . . the Indian Fleet under rear admiral Samson was given orders after much coaxing to sail for the Kathiawar coast.
The PN however did launch an ineffective attack on the Indian port of Dwarka on 7 September with its cruiser PNS Babar, five destroyers and a frigate, disguised as merchant ships. Even though the IN frigate INS Talwar which was on station at Okha, a few miles south of Dwarka, was alerted of a possible attck after intercepting heavy communication traffic between the PN ships, it did ot give battle because of instructions which prevented it from heading north towards Dwarka.
Admiral SN Kohli in his book
We Dared wrote about the frustration of the IN having to fight with one hand tied to its back. He goes on to add:
"The Pakistani naval raid left the officers and the men of the Indian Navy infuriated and somewhat humiliated. I vowed to myself then if ever there was another round involving naval forces and if I was in any kind of positionof responsibility, I would go to the farthest extremes to teach the enemy a lesson"
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