Indus Water Treaty

[Kashi]

X-post

Look who crawled out of the woodwork

Indus treaty must not be violated, says Medha Patkar

INDORE: Narmada Bachao Andolan leader Medha Patkar today said she was not in favour of India unilaterally scrapping the Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan.

In the wake of terror attack on Army base at Uri, some strategic thinkers have demanded that India scrap the water-sharing treaty to pressurise Pakistan.

"We are not in favour of breaking the Indus Water Treaty with the neighbouring country and launching a water war with it. We don't want to turn rivers into a battle-field," Patkar said here.

"Whether the issues related to sharing of water are international or inter-state, they should be solved through dialogue. These problems cannot be solved through politics," she said.
Nary a peep from you when Cauvery issue heated up, why this sudden itch?

Patkar was here to take part in a seminar on utility of large dams in India.

"Government constructs large dams saying that they would produce hydro-power for supplying electricity to villages and provide water to the rural areas and agriculture. But in reality benefits go to the capitalists," she said.

She demanded a review of the policy which favours big dams and immediate stoppage of ongoing construction of such projects.

"We are not saying that big dams are not useful for the country. But alternatives to them should be considered so that there is minimal displacement of people and least damage to the nature."

She also opposed centralised system of water management and said the decision-making should be left to the common people.

The nexus runs deep doesn't it?

[chetak]

How India Can Unilaterally Walk Away From The Indus Waters Treaty

The Indus Waters Treaty
Ajay Kumar - September 30, 2016,

How India Can Unilaterally Walk Away From The Indus Waters Treaty

SNAPSHOT
As India reviews the Indus Waters Treaty, Nawaz Sharif says no one country can walk away from the Treaty.

But as it turns out, India can separate itself from the Treaty on its own – and within the norms of international law.

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has gone on record saying that no one country can unilaterally separate itself from the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 (the Treaty).

This comes at a time when Pakistan has approached the World Bank, seeking to invoke the arbitration clause in Article IX of the Treaty to prevent India from exercising its rights to the maximum extent permissible under it.

On paper, Sharif may have a case. Article XII (4) of the Treaty reads:

The Provisions of this Treaty, or the provisions of the Treaty as modified under the provisions of Paragraph (3), shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two governments.
A plain reading of this provision would say that unless India and Pakistan mutually agree, the Treaty cannot be terminated. But international law does leave India with some options that it can exercise should it wish to terminate the Treaty unilaterally. With these options, India can terminate the arbitration clause as well and deny the Pakistani request for arbitration.

The law relating to treaties is largely governed by customary international law. This was codified by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. India participated in the Vienna Conferences, which were held to discuss the draft text proposed by the International Law Commission. In fact, if one goes through the minutes of the sessions, one will find that India's contributions to the draft text have been quite substantial. (For instance, the minutes of Session 1 and Session 2)

However, India has neither signed nor ratified the law on treaties. So, it can make an argument that it is not bound by the additions in the text that were not a part of customary international law at the time of adoption. Put simply, India is party to the contract, but the Contract Act doesn't apply to it; only the general law of contract will.

So, then, how does India get around Article XII(4)?

India can cite the fact that the circumstances under which the Treaty was agreed upon have undergone a dramatic shift in the intervening years and those circumstances formed an essential basis for the consent that was given at the time. India cannot make use of hostilities with Pakistan to make this a straightforward argument, as it has not done so in the past. There have been hostilities in the past, in 1947, 1965, 1971 and, more recently, in Kargil in 1999, but the present circumstances are fundamentally different. Here is why:

Pakistan's duality in power

The Preamble to the Treaty speaks of the Government of India entering into the Treaty in a spirit of "goodwill and friendship" and states that the purpose of the Treaty is to make a settlement in a "cooperative" spirit of any such questions that may arise in the future on the use of such waters. India can cite the fact that it no longer knows who is the lawful civil power in Pakistan with which it is to conclude any agreement or arrangement, given the nexus between the military and civilian state apparatus.

At the time of entering into the agreement, Pakistan was under a military arrangement and has seen the restoration of a civilian government and further coups ever since. However, the current situation is a quasi one, where promises made by the Pakistani civilian government can no longer be held reliable on account of the military and security establishment running a parallel establishment since the apparent restoration of a civilian government after Musharraf.

In the past, India has either dealt with a Pakistani general or a Pakistani civilian leader. Today, India is in a situation where it is difficult to engage in negotiations with either, making goodwill, friendship and cooperation difficult, thereby fundamentally changing the circumstances.

The threat of terrorism

Previous engagements with Pakistan have been on a military level, with civilians largely left out of the picture. But Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism has changed the dimensions, as the Pakistani establishment has begun targeting civilian targets. With the Security Council's resolutions calling on states globally to take steps against nations who are known supporters of terrorism, India has a case to make that the Pakistan of 1960 is very different from the Pakistan of 2016 and, therefore, the circumstances under which India gave its consent to the Treaty in 1960 have been fundamentally altered.

Further, India's commitment to the global war on terrorism also requires it to cease all cooperation with state actors who support and sponsor designated terror outfits. India can cite Pakistan's support for groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (which Pakistan still hasn't banned) as a cause for ending all cooperation with Pakistan.

Indus Treaty was too liberal to Pakistan

India can also point out that the Treaty is one of the most liberal water sharing arrangements in the world, giving 80 per cent of the water to a lower riparian state and call for a realignment of the Treaty with existing norms of international law.

While Sharif may be right on a plain reading of Article XII (4), should India choose to, it can make the argument that this Article, along with the whole Treaty itself, does not bind India and unilaterally terminate it. This would also terminate the arbitration clause.

However, the government may also just exercise its full rights under the Treaty, as it currently plans to do, and make its case before the arbitral tribunal. The dams required to exercise these rights will take many years to construct, so Pakistan has a very weak case for interim relief as there is no impending construction. So if Pakistan is hoping to win any international brownie points by going before the arbitral tribunal, it needs to perhaps rethink its entire strategy..


Ajay Kumar
Ajay Kumar, is a lawyer who writes on topics related to Indian Laws and International Laws.

[kit]

How India Can Unilaterally Walk Away From The Indus Waters Treaty

The Indus Waters Treaty
Ajay Kumar - September 30, 2016,

How India Can Unilaterally Walk Away From The Indus Waters Treaty





Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has gone on record saying that no one country can unilaterally separate itself from the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 (the Treaty).

This comes at a time when Pakistan has approached the World Bank, seeking to invoke the arbitration clause in Article IX of the Treaty to prevent India from exercising its rights to the maximum extent permissible under it.

On paper, Sharif may have a case. Article XII (4) of the Treaty reads:

The Provisions of this Treaty, or the provisions of the Treaty as modified under the provisions of Paragraph (3), shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two governments.
A plain reading of this provision would say that unless India and Pakistan mutually agree, the Treaty cannot be terminated. But international law does leave India with some options that it can exercise should it wish to terminate the Treaty unilaterally. With these options, India can terminate the arbitration clause as well and deny the Pakistani request for arbitration.

The law relating to treaties is largely governed by customary international law. This was codified by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. India participated in the Vienna Conferences, which were held to discuss the draft text proposed by the International Law Commission. In fact, if one goes through the minutes of the sessions, one will find that India's contributions to the draft text have been quite substantial. (For instance, the minutes of Session 1 and Session 2)

However, India has neither signed nor ratified the law on treaties. So, it can make an argument that it is not bound by the additions in the text that were not a part of customary international law at the time of adoption. Put simply, India is party to the contract, but the Contract Act doesn't apply to it; only the general law of contract will.

So, then, how does India get around Article XII(4)?

India can cite the fact that the circumstances under which the Treaty was agreed upon have undergone a dramatic shift in the intervening years and those circumstances formed an essential basis for the consent that was given at the time. India cannot make use of hostilities with Pakistan to make this a straightforward argument, as it has not done so in the past. There have been hostilities in the past, in 1947, 1965, 1971 and, more recently, in Kargil in 1999, but the present circumstances are fundamentally different. Here is why:

Pakistan's duality in power

The Preamble to the Treaty speaks of the Government of India entering into the Treaty in a spirit of "goodwill and friendship" and states that the purpose of the Treaty is to make a settlement in a "cooperative" spirit of any such questions that may arise in the future on the use of such waters. India can cite the fact that it no longer knows who is the lawful civil power in Pakistan with which it is to conclude any agreement or arrangement, given the nexus between the military and civilian state apparatus.

At the time of entering into the agreement, Pakistan was under a military arrangement and has seen the restoration of a civilian government and further coups ever since. However, the current situation is a quasi one, where promises made by the Pakistani civilian government can no longer be held reliable on account of the military and security establishment running a parallel establishment since the apparent restoration of a civilian government after Musharraf.

In the past, India has either dealt with a Pakistani general or a Pakistani civilian leader. Today, India is in a situation where it is difficult to engage in negotiations with either, making goodwill, friendship and cooperation difficult, thereby fundamentally changing the circumstances.

The threat of terrorism

Previous engagements with Pakistan have been on a military level, with civilians largely left out of the picture. But Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism has changed the dimensions, as the Pakistani establishment has begun targeting civilian targets. With the Security Council's resolutions calling on states globally to take steps against nations who are known supporters of terrorism, India has a case to make that the Pakistan of 1960 is very different from the Pakistan of 2016 and, therefore, the circumstances under which India gave its consent to the Treaty in 1960 have been fundamentally altered.

Further, India's commitment to the global war on terrorism also requires it to cease all cooperation with state actors who support and sponsor designated terror outfits. India can cite Pakistan's support for groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (which Pakistan still hasn't banned) as a cause for ending all cooperation with Pakistan.

Indus Treaty was too liberal to Pakistan

India can also point out that the Treaty is one of the most liberal water sharing arrangements in the world, giving 80 per cent of the water to a lower riparian state and call for a realignment of the Treaty with existing norms of international law.

While Sharif may be right on a plain reading of Article XII (4), should India choose to, it can make the argument that this Article, along with the whole Treaty itself, does not bind India and unilaterally terminate it. This would also terminate the arbitration clause.

However, the government may also just exercise its full rights under the Treaty, as it currently plans to do, and make its case before the arbitral tribunal. The dams required to exercise these rights will take many years to construct, so Pakistan has a very weak case for interim relief as there is no impending construction. So if Pakistan is hoping to win any international brownie points by going before the arbitral tribunal, it needs to perhaps rethink its entire strategy..


Ajay Kumar
Ajay Kumar, is a lawyer who writes on topics related to Indian Laws and International Laws.

According to Swamy , that article was never ratified by parliament.. so there is none except for academic purposes !!

[ritesh]

X-post

Look who crawled out of the woodwork

Indus treaty must not be violated, says Medha Patkar



The nexus runs deep doesn't it?

Now naxals showing true colours....keep them coming let ordinary people know what these vermins stands for.

[chetak]

^^^^^^^

The commies are deliberately muscling themselves into the cashmere peace process when in actual fact they neither have the mandate not the political heft to speak for India.

This has all the hallmarks of a fraud foundation type of instigation from extra territorial entities.

[IndraD]

As India mulls scrapping of Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan, China blocks tributary of Brahmaputra in Tibet to build dam

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 622469.cms

[manjgu]

why are we not building a dam on Kabul river in Afg??

[Lalmohan]

a dam by itself is not a big problem (I think), its diversion of the river channel or a take off via a canal that is

[Kashi]

why are we not building a dam on Kabul river in Afg??

According to Wiki, there are quite a few damns on Kabul in Afghanistan. Wiki says "The Naghlu, Surobi, and Darunta dams are located in Kabul and Nangarhar provinces of Afghanistan."

Darunta in particular is near Jalalabad.

[manjgu]

i mean to store substantial amounts of water... pray someone can make a map with major rivers/tributaries , dams on it and water flows etc?

[anupmisra]

why are we not building a dam on Kabul river in Afg??

Patience, my friend. Here y'go. (recent Afg. website link) http://1tvnews.af/en/news/afghanistan/2 ... abul-river

Pakistan concerned over plan to build dams on Kabul River

Pakistan is apparently concerned over plan to build a dozen dams on Kabul River that potentially drops water flow to the neighboring country.

On Sunday, a Pakistani newspaper claimed that Afghanistan with the help of Indian experts completed the feasibilities and detailed engineering of 12 hydro-power projects along Kabul River with capacity to generate 1,177MW of electricity. Four dams would be built on Pansjhir sub-basin while the remaining eight would be built on upper and lower Kabul sub-basins.

the hydro-power projects would cost $7,079 billion and would be funded by World Bank and with assistance from India

And the usual baki rona-dhona:

No doubt it is the failure of the authorities and political leadership of not building the Kalabagh Dam and Munda Dam

[Philip]

Of all the planned punishments to be handed out to Pak,the scare of Indus waters drying up is what is sending the vermin in Pak scurrying in sheer panic.Pak's kulaks in and out of uniform realise that real trouble is staring them in the face thanks to their perfidy.But this is where India must turn the screw to the max effect and get our legal team at work in countering any Paki arguments. No water as long as Pak supports terror should be the mantra drilled into the conciousness of every nation on the planet.

The Paki viewpoint in the "Yawn" which we have to counter totally.What immediately comes to mind is Pak's violation of the Simla agreement.It harbours terrorists who have been designated as such by the intl. community,thus is a terrorist sponsor state.No Q about that including the splendid track record of harbouring one OBL! If Pak wants war then so be it.The dismemberment of Pak must take place.

http://www.dawn.com/news/1287565/treaty-in-trouble

Treaty in trouble
SIKANDER AHMED SHAH | UZAIR J. KAYANI —
The writers are professors of law and policy at Lums.
In the wake of the Uri incident, India has launched a campaign to ‘punish’ Pakistan. The Indian offensive has proceeded swiftly on the diplomatic, political, economic and, as of this writing, militaristic fronts.

An early salvo is India’s aggressive stance on the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960. Last week, India said it would increase its water withdrawals from three rivers that flow through India to Pakistan to the maximum levels permitted under the treaty. India is also considering building dams on the Jhelum which flows through the Kashmir Valley before entering Pakistan. Both measures threaten serious economic and humanitarian harm for Pakistan.

See: Indus Waters Treaty rides out latest crisis

India has further claimed it will cease participating in meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission, set up under the IWT, until “terror comes to an end”. It has decided to indefinitely suspend the regular meetings of the Indus water commissioners of India and Pakistan. Each of these measures is a potential breach of the treaty, and Pakistan should prepare its case for the Permanent Court of Arbitration, should any of these materialise.

The basic elements of such a case are straightforward. First, the IWT does not permit India to unilaterally abrogate its obligations. Such an abrogation would be a material breach, since the treaty has no termination date. Treaties of this kind exist in perpetuity unless rescinded or modified by both parties through mutual consent. Second, Pakistan has approached the World Bank (a party to the treaty) — so there is an ongoing dispute or controversy. In the Nicaragua case, the US was not allowed to retract its consent to the International Court of Justice’s jurisdiction once a dispute arose and was being entertained by the court. This was so even though, unlike the IWT, the treaty at issue there allowed the US to withdraw its consent to ICJ jurisdiction.

If India breaches or abrogates the Indus Waters Treaty, it would be a violation of international law.
There is some suggestion that India might justify a breach of the IWT or other actions in bad faith by claiming it is ‘retaliating’ to some supposed misstep by Pakistan. As a threshold matter, there has been no independent inquiry of any such accusation, and curiously, no interest on India’s part in allowing one. However, even assuming, for argument’s sake, that such claims were tenable, they would not justify the type of collateral ‘retaliation’ India seems to contemplate. Put simply, two wrongs would not make a right. International law has parallel obligations, and treaties such as the IWT are self-contained. The breach of one treaty or obligation does not allow the aggrieved state to respond by breaching a different treaty, or other international law principles.

But if India jettisoned the law, it would still need to consider the political and economic fallout. First, the IWT was based on negotiations and compromise. India should realise that if the IWT were to go away, Pakistan’s claim to the rivers that were given to India (Beas, Ravi and Sutlej) would be revived. Absent the treaty, Pakistan, as a lower riparian state, would have strong rights on these waters.

Second, the IWT does not exist in a vacuum. By breaching it, India would also likely breach the Shimla Agreement, by going against its ‘guiding principles’. At a minimum, it would be working against its spirit. A breach of the Shimla pact will likely be costlier for India than Pakistan. It could lead to a chain reaction, with tit-for-tat withdrawals by both countries from operational arrangements and security agreements. Given these states’ nuclear capabilities, such an unravelling would pose a significant threat to international peace and security.

Third, aside from Pakistan’s reaction, India should carefully consider its reputational costs in the international community. India has a number of similar treaties with other countries, like Myanmar and Bangladesh. The international community will rightly be concerned by India’s cavalier treatment of its international law obligations.

Albatrosses notwithstanding, India continues to escalate. It pulled out of the now cancelled Saarc summit and has convened a meeting to discuss stripping Pakistan of its Most Favoured Nation trade status. Modi and External Affairs Minister, Sushma Swaraj have also given back-to-back inflammatory speeches labelling Pakistan a “terror state” or “state sponsor of terrorism.” It is hard to imagine what sort of endgame such cowboy posturing is meant to achieve.

One possibility is that by ‘retaliating’ through planned IWT violations, India is creating a pretext for undermining CPEC. (who the ehckv cares?) Critical Chinese investments in Gilgit-Baltistan and AJK depend on the river water India now threatens. A salient example is the Neelum–Jhelum hydropower plant. If such a pretext is at play, then India must consider not only Pakistan’s reaction, but Chinese concerns as well. Just as India is an upper riparian state to Pakistan, China is an upper riparian to India. Any sabotage of the One Belt, One Road project can trigger a reaction from China.

India has also claimed having undertaken “surgical strikes” inside Pakistan. This is a deeply troubling development, and raises the possibility that India could use restricted water supply as a preparatory step for further hostile action. This context adds another dimension of international law. The waters awarded to Pakistan under the IWT are its natural resource. Stopping them or diverting them is a direct breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter by India, because it violates the territorial integrity and political independence of Pakistan. Targeting a state’s natural resources, installations, assets, or citizens extraterritorially is a serious violation of international law. Numerous aggrieved states have responded to such violations with force.

A breach of Article 2(4) would trigger Pakistan’s inherent right to self-defence. Pakistan should make good-faith diplomatic and legal efforts to dissuade India from such a course. However, as a last resort, and complying with the requirements of necessity and proportionality under the law of self-defence, Pakistan would be within its rights to use not only “necessary countermeasures”, but also force, to remove any headworks, dams, or other diversionary installations in India-held Kashmir that illegally restrict the flow of these rivers into its territory.

The writers are professors of law and policy at Lums.

Published in Dawn October 3rd, 2016

[SSharma]

the hydro-power projects would cost $7,079 billion and would be funded by World Bank and with assistance from India

7k b usd

[svenkat]

http://swarajyamag.com/world/indus-waters-treaty-nehrus-original-himalayan-blunder

“No armies with bombs and shellfire could devastate a land so thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India's permanently shutting off the source of waters that keep the fields and people of Pakistan green.” – David Lilienthal, former chief of the Tennessee Valley Authority, US

The ‘Aqua Bomb’ is truly India’s most powerful weapon against Pakistan. As the upper riparian state, India can control the flow of the seven rivers that flow into the Indus Basin. And yet, in the last 69 years, only once has it exercised this great power – and not very well.

On 1 April, 1948, with India and Pakistan battling for control of Jammu & Kashmir, engineers in Indian Punjab shut off water supplies from the Ferozepur headworks to the Depalpur Canal and Lahore. Around 8 per cent of the cultivable command area in Pakistan was impacted during the critical kharif sowing season. The city of Lahore was deprived of the main sources of municipal water, and the supply of electricity from the Mandi hydroelectric scheme was also cut off. Water rationing was introduced in Pakistan’s second largest city.

When India had its foot on Pakistan’s parched throat, when a little more pressure would have forced Islamabad to behave, and when Indian soldiers were fighting – and dying – to liberate Indian territory, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru committed his first Himalayan blunder by relaxing India’s chokehold on Pakistan.

Later, it was to be under his leadership that India inked the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), giving away 82 per cent of the total water to Pakistan. Niranjan D. Gulhati, India's chief negotiator, exemplified India’s muddled thinking: “We had to keep in view the interests of the other side: they must live; we must live. They must have water; we must have water.”

In his book Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Media, Gulhati narrates Nehru’s reaction to the stoppage of the waters: “Officially, the provincial government had acted without the federal government’s prior approval, and were to elicit little sympathy from some sections of the Indian central government. In fact, Nehru is thought to have castigated the East Punjab government and their engineers, in September 1949, for having taken matters into their own hands.”

Engineers in Indian Punjab had a valid reason for stopping the water to Pakistani Punjab. While the borders of India and Pakistan were demarcated haphazardly by British officials panicking in the backdrop of mutinies by India’s defence forces, the distribution of water resources was not discussed at all. Therefore, as a stopgap measure, India and Pakistan signed the Standstill Agreement on December 20, 1947, which maintained the status quo till March 31, 1948.

In the absence of any formal agreement, according to the engineers, had East Punjab had not closed the water temporarily, it might have led to West Punjab acquiring legal rights to the canal waters in that area. In effect, East Punjab was concerned about allowing a precedent to arise that would prove detrimental to it at a later stage.

On 24 April, 1948 Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan asked for the “immediate restoration of the water supply”. Nehru replied on 30 April that he had instructed East Punjab to restore supplies to Lahore and Dipalpur. He also agreed to the Pakistani proposal for a conference to settle the dispute.

Delhi Agreement: Pakistan wriggles out

With Lahore screaming for water, Pakistan signed the May 1948 Delhi Agreement, which restored the water supply – but at a cost. Firstly, Pakistan was to pay for the transport of water through India. Secondly, India was to be allowed gradually to diminish this supply to Pakistan. India’s contention was that colonial rulers had built the irrigation system in West Punjab but neglected East Punjab completely. Such a state of neglect could not continue after independence, and therefore it would need to draw some water that flowed into West Punjab.

The ink had barely dried on the Delhi Agreement when Pakistan started to dig a channel from the River Sutlej in order to circumvent the Ferozepur headworks. It justified its decision to dig as a precautionary measure against India closing down the water supply in the future. India warned that it would take retaliatory action, and dig a channel further upstream of Pakistan’s channel.

Pakistan said the Delhi Agreement had been signed under duress, and gave notice of its expiry, in a note to the Indian government on 23 August, 1950. With both countries embarking upon competing – and conflicting – river diversion projects, Nehru wrote to Liaquat Ali Khan, proposing a joint declaration that their countries would not go to war over any dispute between them.

And typical of how Nehru had always acted – and would do so over and over again to the detriment of India’s interests – he proposed that both countries would seek peaceful means to resolve their differences, including third party intervention in the form of mediation, agencies especially set up to resolve the matter, or an international body recognised by both countries. This was like free money for Pakistan – Liaquat Ali Khan agreed.

Enter the World Bank

While India favoured a water sharing tribunal with an equal number of experts from each side, Pakistan kept demanding foreign mediation, preferably the International Court of Justice. It was even prepared to take the dispute before the UN Security Council. However, it was the World Bank – in reality an American bank – that waded into the dispute.

While Pakistan was happy with the outcome, there were many in India who doubted the World Bank’s intentions. One of these sceptics was President Rajendra Prasad. However, Prasad was softened up by Nehru’s nephew B.K. Nehru who was the Indian Executive Director of the World Bank. In early 1952, he allayed the President’s fears of falling into a debt trap by telling him that “international debts were never meant to be repaid”.

The World Bank also hinted that funding for the Bhakra-Nangal project, which was to usher in India’s Green Revolution, depended on the successful settlement of river disputes. A country on the brink of war would hardly be regarded by the World Bank’s bond investors to be a good investment opportunity, the bank’s representative pointed out.

The pressure worked. India agreed to World Bank mediation, surrendering all its advantages as the upper riparian state. Incredibly, Nehru refused to link the Indus river dispute to the settlement of the Kashmir issue. In a letter to the World Bank, the Prime Minister made it clear: “The canal waters dispute between India and Pakistan has nothing to do with the Kashmir issue; it started with and has been confined to the irrigation systems of East and West Punjab.”

The Pakistanis couldn’t believe their luck. Liaquat Ali concurred with this opinion, stating that the parties should “refrain from using the negotiations in one dispute to delay progress in solving any other”. How convenient.

Generous to a fault

After nearly three years of negotiations, in 1953 India and Pakistan presented their respective proposals. Again, typical of Nehru’s misplaced magnanimity, India was more generous than Pakistan was towards India. India was willing to give Pakistan 76 per cent of all the waters of the three eastern rivers, whereas Pakistan was allocating a meagre 13 per cent to India. Even the Indian claim to 7 per cent of the western rivers was drawn from the River Chenab flowing through Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir.

Keeping in view how much each side was willing to yield, and sensing Nehru’s soft side, the World Bank Plan allocated 82 per cent to Pakistan and a mere 18 per cent to India. Nehru gave the thumbs up to the plan.

The Indian negotiators believed there was enough water within the entire Indus Basin to meet India’s requirements. Nehru stated: “We are convinced that there is more than enough water in the Indus Basin to satisfy the needs of both India and Pakistan, provided it is properly exploited.”

China on his mind

There was another critical factor that contributed to the undue haste with which Nehru gifted the Indus Basin to Pakistan. In the early 1950s, China had began its incursions, first into Tibet, and then into the Indian border regions themselves. For years, Nehru had dismissed the Chinese threat, sidelining and even rebuking loyal army officers who pointed out the fallacy of his China policy. He had even declined a permanent seat in the Security Council, saying that it belonged to Beijing. With Chinese troops making provocative incursions across the McMahon Line, Nehru realised he now had more than the Pakistani boundary to defend. He believed he could buy peace with water.

Pakistan’s mindset

The treaty provides a peek into the Pakistani way of thinking. For Pakistan, anything that involves India is the unfinished business of Partition, which was essentially the Islamist vision to establish a beachhead from where it could launch jihad or “holy war” on India. Islamabad’s constant cribbing is in keeping with that mindset. From Pakistan's perspective allocation of "only" 82 per cent of water as against 90 per cent of irrigated land violated the principle of "appreciable harm", writes Moin Ansari in the book India’s Aqua Bomb.

Western involvement

For many Indians it’s a mystery why the West rushes to Pakistan’s defence every time it gets into trouble. Well, it’s not such a mystery. Pakistan was midwifed by Britain and the United States as a bulwark against Russia. There was no way they would have allowed it to fail.

In all its wars against India, Pakistan was rescued by its patrons in the West before it was destroyed as an entity by India. The IWT was backed by the governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, the US, West Germany and the World Bank itself. It is clear the Anglo nations did not want their future satellite to fail or be absorbed by India.

Pakistan is today the Ivy League of terror but the West isn’t ditching its baby yet. The Anglo countries continue to describe the IWT as the “treaty that has survived four wars”. These are the same words the leftist media and Lutyens crowd use, urging India not to abrogate the treaty.

The IWT should have been abrogated in 1965 when Pakistan launched a war in Kashmir. But many liberal Indians continue to believe India is Pakistan’s older brother and reckon that being generous towards Pakistan will buy peace. Well, that theory has been proved wrong hundreds of times – most lately in Uri – by Pakistan. At any rate, after Uri, the treaty is past its use by date.

If India walks out of the treaty, Pakistan is in big trouble. Even with the plentiful waters of the Indus Basin, it remains a semi-arid country where drought has parched many parts. Its water table is falling rapidly. Pakistani Punjab, which has the largest canal density in the world, is getting waterlogged. Its vast reservoirs – that were built to offset the loss of the three eastern rivers to India – are silting up. India, which never quite stopped building dams and hydro-power projects in Kashmir in keeping with the spirit and letter of the IWT, is ideally placed to divert water to its own parched cities.

The impact of the Aqua Bomb will indeed be greater than being imagined now. India should use it wisely to make Pakistan wind up its terror industry and give up its anti-India policy.

[williams]

Good article but IMO things have changed a bit to India's advantage WRT playing with IWT. UK is not as powerful as before. There are more elements in the US establishment that consider Pakistan as an enemy and need more of Indian help to keep China in check. Other western countries have tasted the pain of terror and will fall in line.

The real disagreement within Indian establishment and outside is the thought about rehabilitating Pakistan. So of them still think Pakistan can be rehabilitated to let go of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. IMO they are not going to give away this policy even if you stop all the water flowing from India. Until we come to that realization, no amount of military, diplomatic, economic coercion will change this reality, we are doomed to repeat this cycle of terrorist attacks and analysis of how to stop it. I see some change at least in our PM's recent speech -- words like "war of 1000 years". We need to translate that into policy and destroy Pakistan as a nation state. That is the only option we have.

[salaam]

Swarajya Magazine - Clearing the fog around Indus waters treaty faqs

• IWT cannot be abrogated - False
  World Bank is the third party to IWT - False
  China will retaliate on behalf of Pakistan and stop the flow of Brahmaputra and Indus - Irrelevant
  India cannot use the waters of the Western Rivers due to geography - False
  Pakistan can go to International Court of Justice (ICJ) - False
  Pakistani public, which is sympathetic to India, will become hostile to India - False
  War will become imminent - True and False

[anupmisra]

Exiting an unfair international treaty? Done all the time!

http://www.virginialawreview.org/sites/ ... 1579_0.pdf

"Although clauses authorizing denunciation and withdrawal from treaties are pervasive, international legal scholars and international relations theorists have largely ignored them. This Article draws upon new empirical evidence to provide a comprehensive interdisciplinary framework for understanding treaty exit. It examines when and why states abandon their treaty commitments and explains how exit helps to resolve certain theoretical and doctrinal puzzles that have long troubled scholars of international affairs."

Neither treaties nor the geo-strategic context in which they are embedded are static, of course. When shifts in the political landscape or domestic preferences undermine a treaty’s objectives or render its terms unduly burdensome or obsolete, international law directs states to eschew unilateral action in favor of negotiation with their treaty partners. The plausible outcomes of such collaborative efforts are constrained only by the parties’ ingenuity. They range from a temporary suspension of the treaty, to a modification of its terms, to wholesale abrogation of the agreement with or without the adoption of a fresh set of treaty commitments.

Such provisions, known as denunciation or withdrawal clauses, permit a state to “exit” from a treaty that the state had previously ratified and that is otherwise valid and in force

[anupmisra]

From the link above, here are recent examples of states denunciating unfair international treaties to suit the changing geo-polotical situations. For those pakis that claim that India will be in violation of international law, my advice will be to get a real lawyer who practices public international law and be prepared to pay him well. I know a couple of firms in NY. They ain't cheap.

The United States’ denunciation in the 1970s and 1980s of the agreements establishing the International Labor Organization (“ILO”) and the United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) follow this pattern. In each instance, the United States used exit and threats of exit—and the loss of organizational support and funding these entailed—to pressure the organizations to change their behavior, after which it renewed its membership. The Soviet Union and its allies pursued a similar approach in the 1950s, temporarily withdrawing from but later rejoining the World Health Organization (“WHO”), UNESCO, and the ILO. More recently, the United States and the European Communities used an exit strategy to close the Uruguay Round of trade talks that created the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). They withdrew from the old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)—a treaty that gave special benefits to developing countries—and then also ratified the new WTO Agreement as a “single undertaking,” forcing developing nations to accept a broad package of obligations favorable to United States and European interests.

[Gyan]

First atleast use the benefits already given by IWT, before abrogating it.

[Lilo]

First atleast use the benefits already given by IWT, before abrogating it.

^
See,this is a completely wrong approach .

India's investment in Indus basin should be guided by the principle of marginal utility - i.e maximum benefit per rupee invested.
Kashmir doesnt need much additional water for its irrigation - the hilly soils of J&K are not likely to be productively cultivable(in the traditional sense) even if canal water is provided.We will be making a swamp out of it.

However water is needed in the NW plains (states of Punjab,Haryana,Rajasthan are perennially water stressed) . The waters of a western river like Chenab cannot be supplied to these plains within the bounds of IWT.

The greatest benefit will be when Chenab is linked to satluj system - which is then linked to Satluj-Yamuna link canal & IG canal in Rajasthan can be further extended to the south and east.

Any other works in Indus basin - whose irrigation benefits are limited to J&K is total waste of money.So mopping up of that 3.0MAF unused capacity(per IWT) in western rivers for J&K is not the priority.That storage is not even enough to play mischief with paki agricultural activities downstream.

Abrogate IWT or Renegotiate IWT
If pak chooses latter get additional benefits for India - even if not much on water - definitely gain transit rights through pak to Central Asia & afghan & build in penalties for cross border terrorism into the new IWT.
If Pakis dont want to come down for renegotiation, abrogating IWT & making it a free for all is the only way we can get Pakis to behave.

[Gyan]

You are basically making the point that western rivers should be connected to the canal network of eastern rivers so that the waters can be diverted. First issue is - whether the eastern river canal network is adequate to even carry the water of western rivers ? Like SYL is incomplete and perhaps no hope of ever being complete?? So we have to build excess capacity on Canal and Dam network of Eastern Rivers, so that one day we can inter-connect the two to benefit the arid Haryana, Delhi,MP, Rajasthan & Gujarat. Once Waters reach Delhi then they flow to UP, Bihar, Orissa to West Bengal

[SSridhar]

Deactivating the Permanent Indus Waters Commission - Gautam Sen, IDSA

The Indus Waters Treaty (1960) has not been immune to the vicissitudes currently affecting India-Pakistan relations. In the aftermath of the attack by Pakistani terrorists on an Indian Army camp in Uri on 18 September 2016, the Government of India (GOI) has indicated its decision, at the highest level, to comprehensively review the functioning of the Treaty. India has been a scrupulous adherent to the Treaty over the past 56 years despite the periodic conflictual relations it has had with Pakistan. In the past, India has responsibly reacted to issues raised by Pakistan on India`s water usage in the Indus basin and tried to resolve them within the legal ambit of the Treaty.

GOI is reportedly contemplating the suspension of the mechanism of the Permanent Indus Waters Commission (PIWC) set up under Article VIII of the Treaty. The PIWC is intended to act as a first-tier bilateral review platform for the two signatories to monitor its implementation, exchange and evaluate data on water usage, works impinging on the water flows, drainage, storage, etc. of the Indus system (apropos Article IX) and deliberate on issues which may arise incidental to the Treaty’s functioning. India and Pakistan each nominate a senior technical expert in the realm of hydrology and water usage (normally not below the rank of chief engineer) as the Indus Commissioner. The Indus Commissioners constitute the PIWC. The PIWC meets at least once a year. The last meeting was held on 16 July 2016.

If the GOI were to implements its latest decision on deactivating its representation in the PIWC, that may be construed as a violation of the Treaty. It would in all probability make Pakistan invoke the dispute resolution mechanism which would involve a neutral expert to consider issues under Article IX (2) and, thereafter, even a reference to a Court of arbitration apropos sub-clause (5) of the said Article. This would likely be on the ground that India is impeding the observance of an in-built provision of the Treaty by obstructing the functioning of the PIWC – an integral operative institution within its fold. Pakistan has raised many issues against India in the past relating to the so-called excess storage proposed to be created by the latter under the Tulbul navigation project on the Jhelum river and adequacy of water discharge through the western rivers, among others.

If India were to shut off an institutionalised mechanism for mutual communication like the PIWC, Pakistan will further malign India on the bona fide activities the latter undertakes within the scope of its obligations and legitimate benefits accruable under the Treaty. Furthermore, it is important to mention that even in respect of the eastern rivers of the Indus system (fully allocated to India under the Treaty),there are some stretches where the flows of the eastern rivers may not be totally immune to hydrological interference by Pakistan. For instance, the waters of the tributaries of the Sutlej and Ravi flow in some stretches through Pakistan and merge into portions of the main rivers flowing through India before finally entering Pakistan. All diplomatic demarches and disputes on such matters, should they arise, may become intractable and difficult to resolve, if the first-tier mechanism of PIWC were to be deactivated.

There is a basic purpose for which a mechanism like the PIWC was built into the Treaty. It is the first tier where hydrological engineers are expected use their techno-economic acumen in a cooperative spirit to arrive at an agreed view or give their analyses on the differing views on interpretation of water flow and usage data, incidental structures constructed or planned in the Indus basin, etc., and submit a report annually by June 1 pertaining to the previous financial year to the two governments. In the event the PIWC is unable to proceed because of differences between the Indus Commissioners or if there is a delay in arriving at decisions by a Commissioner or both, there is a provision for attempting a political solution. However, the idea of the initial negotiators of the Treaty was that mutual cooperation and understanding should be feasible at the PIWC level itself.

The statement of the spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) on 22 September 2016 indicates that differences have arisen between India and Pakistan on the Treaty, and cooperative arrangements vis-a-vis the Treaty like the PIWC are likely to be affected because of lack of trust. The moot point now is whether India’s overall interest would be served by deactivating or downgrading a key operative instrument of the Treaty when it is in its interest to continue to adhere to the Treaty provisions and try to obtain maximum benefit legitimately obtainable by subscribing to it.

From the point of view of India`s overall interests and factoring in the power sector development and agricultural and allied sectoral needs of Jammu & Kashmir, it may be appropriate to plan more efficacious water usage arrangements under the Treaty and, thereafter, adhere to our stand determinedly in defence of the consequent measures taken. For instance, projects like Tulbul (in Baramula district near Sopore)have been in cold storage since 1987 owing to Pakistan`s protestations. This, despite India’s rightful stand, that the regulation of the depletion of naturally stored water for non-consumptive use is permissible under the Treaty. It is of the essence to reckon that any project of water regulation and usage in a state like Jammu & Kashmir requires at least a ten-year time-span to be successfully operationalised. It may be worthwhile to work with such a focus towards the realization of the water usage potential assigned to India under the Treaty, rather than retracting from some provision of this international legal instrument which is internationally acclaimed as a successful water-sharing arrangement between unfriendly neighbours.

[kit]

The primary interest of Pakistan in Kashmir may be to secure its water !!

[kit]

Also to get a direct path to Indias heartlands !!

[vinod]

Its about time for next Bhageeratha Prayathnam

[chetak]

The primary interest of Pakistan in Kashmir may be to secure its water !!

maybe??

It is the reason.

However the mix has suddenly gotten very complicated with the CPEC and china being thrown into the churn. The hans have armed and supported the pakis against India hoping that they would have been successful by now in wresting away cashmere from India.

balochistan was not thrown casually into the equation by chance. It is a direct and frontal attack on the hans, one they wanted to avoid at all costs.

the hans have been subdued ever since Modi's independence day speech and India's assertion that POK is India's and it's still unfinished business. They know that India has escalated matters well beyond the rhetoric stage now.

It has been a double whammy for the paki army.

[kit]

Its time for an economic war with China if they dam up the mighty Brahmaputra river.. has anyone calculated how much Chinese stuff is sold in India ..are they all consumer goods ??

[salaam]

Reposting (earlier in stfup):

Indus and tributaries v/s Brahmaputra have very few similarities.

Almost all of Indus et al. catchment area in is in the undivided state of J & K. We should not be party to any water sharing as we are upper riparian.

Brahmaputra catchment is about 50% in Tibet. 42% in India/Bhutan and 8% in Bangladesh. China just blocked one small tributary. Even if they block all, Assam valley cultivation will be easily taken care off. We will have to put in check dams to counter Chinese flooding Assam valley (but this is hypothetical). Bangladesh will be worst hit though.

We should happily go and rescind IWT.

[SSridhar]

Also to get a direct path to Indias heartlands !!

The primary interest of Pakistan in Kashmir may be to secure its water !!

I re-post what I posted about a decade back with some minor additions.

Is Kashmir, which Pakistan calls as ‘an unfinished agenda of Partition’, a territorial dispute ? While most conflicts in history are territorial in nature, it will be incorrect to dismiss the India-Pakistan conflict as purely territorial because there are other more important factors involved in this, though Kashmir is often that casus belli that Pakistan cites.

Jinnah, since circa 1937, claimed that the 9 Crore Muslims of British India needed to be ‘saved’ from the ‘Hindu Raj’ after the British left India.

As events have shown, religion as well as the need to acquire and protect resources, especially territory and water played a central part in the nascent stages of the Kashmir dispute. As Pakistan’s significant water resources, such as the Indus system of rivers, went through the State of Jammu & Kashmir, Pakistan felt compelled to annexe that State to re-assure itself of securing its water resources. Pakistani leaders, including Jinnah, have referred to J&K as Pakistan’s ‘Shah-e-Rag’ (jugular vein). Arguing before the UN Security Council in c. 1950, Sir Zafarullah Khan, the then Pakistani Foreign Minister said “The three rivers beginning at the top of the map – the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab – which flow from Kashmir into Pakistan control to a very large extent the agricultural economy of Pakistan. . . If Kashmir were to accede to India, this supply is liable to be cut off . . .Therefore, to think in terms of Pakistan without Kashmir as an independent country is a complete fallacy. If Kashmir should accede to India, Pakistan might as well, from both the economic and strategic points of view, become a feudatory of India.”.

There was also another militarist reason which was the Pakistani desire of Kashmir acting a s a buffer between itself and India since its principal garrisson cities were uncomfortably within easy reach from Indian borders. These fears were explicitly expressed by W.J. Cawthorne, in a speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA) in c. 1948. He later founded the present-day Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) “Whatever the legal position might be, from the political, economic and strategic points of view, Pakistan could not afford to have a hostile India right up to the Western borders of J[ammu] & K[ashmir] : a) It would bring Indian army within 30 miles of the military headquarters of Pakistan and right behind the vital north—south communication line; b) it would give India control over the waterworks of Chenab, Jhelum and Indus; c) it would give India direct contact with Afghanistan and Chitral and Swat in the backdrop of indications that the Indian Congress and the Young Afghan Party were jointly encouraging the Pathanistan idea; d) it would also place India in an almost direct contact with Russia.”

However, both these factors, viz water & security, slowly receded into the background as religious fervour overtook them. There are two reasons why water & security issues receded in Pakistan in the 50s & early 60s. Water issue was helped by the generous terms of the IWT. Having thus secured the water rights, at least for the immediate future, Pakistan could focus on other areas in its conflict with India. I blame the IWT for Pakistan's 'enduring hostility' with us. There was absolutely no need to enter into an American-sponsored treaty as the USA had already shown its hand vis-a-vis Pakistan by entering into 'Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement' (MDAA) much against Indian opposition as far back as c. 1954. India's impeccable adherence to the IWT since then, has emboldened Pakistan as it was assured of its water position. One of the reasons that Pakistan frequently resorts to international arbitration under IWT is to establish the authority of the Treaty internationally thereby forcing India, which takes its bilateral & international commitments seriously, not even to think of any unilateral action that could be damaging to Pakistan. It is also catch India constantly off-guard with respect to IWT. The manufactured security concern also disappeared as the US drafted Pakistan into its security fold under SEATO, CENTO & MDAA. That was the reason why the Islamist ISI Chief, Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul declared that “We have to liberate the other nation in Hindustan”. Of course, these other factors were then made to fit into the religious framework. So, a slogan was coined ‘Kashmir Banega Pakistan’ (Kashmir will become Pakistan) that the masses have steadfastly clung to ever since.

But, the three issues - of Islam (citing which Jinnah demanded and got Pakistan), Kashmir (citing which Zafarullah Khan argued Pakistan's Kashmir case in the UN) and 'military fears' (citing which Cawthorne branded India as a 'perpetual enemy' country) - have gelled together to define the 'Paranoidistan' today. The issues are so intertwined today that they can no longer be separated. Nothing exemplifies Islam, irredentism, insecurity and insatiable greed (the 4i's) being at the core of Pakistani behaviour than the spectacle of an UNSC-sanctioned Islamist jihadi terrorist, Hafiz Saeed who is the sword-arm of the Pakistani Army and who wants nothing short of a 'conquest of India' based on Ghazwa-e-Hind, talking about 'India stealing Pakistan's water' and demanding 'bombing of Indian dams'.

[Lilo]

Clearing The Fog Around Indus Waters Treaty: FAQs
Sanjay Dixit - October 03, 2016
In spite of the propaganda against it doing so, India can very well abrogate the Indus Waters Treaty.

Besides, withdrawal from the Indus Waters Treaty is necessary to press India’s claim on the whole of Jammu and Kashmir.

While the debate over the abrogation of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) rages on, with its various nuances, there is so much fogginess over the various facets of the Treaty that a full article is needed to disabuse people about the narratives being propagated – many by Pakistan, but even more by the motivated and/or ignorant Indian commentariat.

This piece is being written with the assumption that the reader has some basic idea of the IWT.

1. IWT cannot be abrogated. False

The word abrogation is used for international treaties with a context. There are treaties with an abrogation clause. IWT is not one of them. However, nothing prevents India from withdrawing from the Treaty. Articles 57 to 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties deal with the termination, withdrawal and suspension of treaties.

Article 62 of the Vienna Convention reads thus: FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) The existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) The effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty. 2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: (a) If the treaty establishes a boundary; or (b) If the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty. 3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.

However, India has neither signed nor ratified the Vienna Convention, so even the moderately worded provisions do not apply. India can withdraw at will.

2. World Bank is the third party to IWT. False

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) is included in the definitions section of the IWT, and had a role as a guarantor of the financial arrangements of the IWT. (India had to pay Pound Sterling 62,060,000 to the Indus Development Fund to be maintained by it. Other than that, IBRD had certain powers under Article 10 of IWT (emergency provisions) till 31 March, 1965. So, the World Bank has no role in the Treaty any longer.

3. China will retaliate on behalf of Pakistan and stop the flow of Brahmaputra and Indus. Irrelevant

China has already built three run-of-the-river dams on Brahmaputra (with work planned on two more) and another one on the Indus near Ngari. The Zangmu dam has an installed capacity of 510 MW at an elevation of 3,100 m - about 200 km upstream of Nyingchi. Incidentally, there is no agriculture possible at that elevation for more than two months in a year.

China has built another small run-of-the-river project on the Indus near Ngari for 14 MW power generation that will be expanded to 28 MW in future. This dam is at a 3,900 m elevation, which cannot support any agriculture at all at any time of the year.

China has done all this over the last 20 years without any talk of IWT being in the air, so it is just an irrelevant bogey. China has done in the past, and will continue to do whatever it thinks to be in its national interest.

The recent news of another dam on a minor tributary of Brahmaputra, Tsiabu Chu (Xiabuxu) must be seen in this light. It carries just 0.15 per cent of the total Brahmaputra flows as said in this article.

As far as the famous bend in the Brahmaputra is concerned, the gorge is 4,000 to 5,000 m deep at places with two 7,000 m plus peaks on each side of the gorge. Even if China wants it, nothing more than a hydel project of 38,000 MW can be built there, which would provide an assured flow of 50,000 to 100,000 cusecs downstream depending upon the hydraulic head. I would prefer this assured downstream flow to anything else China can offer me by way of a treaty. There is no way China can divert this water for agriculture due to the geography.

Thus China has been doing what it wants to do with dams and hydro-power projects on all rivers originating from Tibet – on Upper Mekong and Upper Salwein as well. So IWT issues have no impact on what China is doing and will do. It is totally irrelevant.

4. India cannot use the waters of the Western Rivers due to geography. False

India already has a cultivable command of 60,000 hectares in Jammu from Ranbir Canal and Pratap Canal on the left and right banks of Chenab respectively. A parallel canal to Ranbir Canal with a couple of aqueducts and a lift near Kathua to make a Chenab-Ravi link is entirely feasible. Another option is that Baglihar dam to Tawi river requires just a 30-km tunnel. (A 24-km tunnel in the Kishanganga Hydel project and a 38-km tunnel cum channel from the Pandoh dam on the Beas-Sutlej link are a demonstration of capability).

Building a barrage on Tawi and taking the water to Madhopur barrage is child’s play for irrigation technologists today. A 20,000 to 30,000 cusecs channel to augment the Ravi-Beas link is not only feasible, but totally desirable. Another option is to have a 40-km tunnel directly from Ratle dam to RanjitSagar. This option can be exercised if India ever decides to withdraw from the IWT. On Jhelum, dams on Jhelum, Liddar and Sind can considerably increase the present 150,000-hectare agricultural potential of the valley. There is also the possibility of many run of the river hydel projects on Shyok, Zanskar, Suru, Shingo, Drass and the Indus.

5. Pakistan can go to International Court of Justice (ICJ). False

In 1974, India withdrew from ICJ for all bilateral matters. India accepts ICJ jurisdiction only in multilateral issues. India has also not signed or ratified the Vienna Convention document on the Law of Treaties in spite of being fully involved in its drafting. This gives India a clear exit route from any bilateral treaty. In spite of Pakistan and our commentariat purveying the falsehood that World Bank is a party to IWT, what matters in the IWT is only the two signatories. That makes it strictly bilateral, and India is at full liberty to withdraw from this bilateral arrangement without giving Pakistan any recourse to ICJ, or to any other world institution including the UN.

6. Pakistani public, which is sympathetic to India, will become hostile to India. False

This is the greatest canard that has ever been spread. One of the saddest part of independent India has been that we completely forgot the lessons of Partition. Partly the information was deliberately suppressed in the interest of harmony, but not quite so in Pakistan. The very ideology, which led to Partition, has been used to inculcate a permanent hate in the heart of the average Pakistani, particularly the Punjabi.

Partition was based on the theory that Hindus and Muslims were two separate and equal nations. This theory itself has its provenance in the exclusivist Islamic worldview.

While Jinnah was able to achieve a separate nation with not a little help from the British, the doctrine of parity came into stark focus after the Partition. In the end, Pakistan got 17 per cent of India’s territory, 18 per cent of its resources and 30 per cent of its military. Public has been bred on the parity concept resulting in deep insecurities. This has been further accentuated by four defeats which Pakistan denies in their history text books. Add to that the concepts of Shari’a which even the educated middle class of Pakistan believes in (unbelievable). So the Pew Research finds that only 16 per cent Pakistanis think rationally, as 84 per cent believe in the irrational Shari’a Law.

The military creates the bogey of India in order to perpetuate its hold on Pakistan’s resources. It feeds into the Islamic concept of ghazwa-e-hind or the eternal war against the infidel Hindus. Even if India were to concede Kashmir, Pakistan would continue to seek parity and dominance, however irrational it may sound to the bystander. Therefore, it is delusional on the part of any Indian to think that Pakistan’s majority public can ever be friendly. It has been hostile and shall remain hostile till the idea of Pakistan lives. That is why the only way to reconcile is to dismember Pakistan and thus end Pakistan military’s and Punjabi mullahs’ hold on the state(s). It is also idle thinking that there is a deep schism between the civilian government and the military in Pakistan. It is only a skin deep difference of approach of the two entities.

Every self respecting Pakistani hates to hear Indians talk about shared history and culture as it reminds them of their actual roots. When combined with the talk of infidels having no rights except as zimmis as spelt out in the Islamic scriptures, it becomes a deadly cocktail which breeds not only irrational thinking but also a permanent sense of hostility. Even the migrants who went from India to the Land of Pure now know it, so much so that Altaf Hussain openly called for rebellion against Pakistan, and the Sindhis, the Baloch, and the Pashtuns are doing it daily.

It stands to reason, therefore, that there is no love lost for India in the minds of ordinary Pakistanis. So who are the peaceniks appeasing?

7. War will become imminent. True and False

Pakistan has been in a mental state of war with India ever since Partition. This is in consonance with its idea of Dar-ul-Islam in the subcontinent with Pakistan as its executant. One of the stories the Muslim League told India’s Muslims used to centre around Muslim’s entitlement to the whole of India, and Pakistan being only the temporary transit point. Jinnah used the threat of civil war to push Partition towards Congress, which believed in a modern progressive country. Many other reasons are the same as explained in the foregoing paragraphs. The war has, therefore, always continued as far as Pakistan is concerned.

As the attack on the RR base at Baramulla shows, and as many experts including American and Pakistanis have said, Kashmir is not the central issue for Pakistan, the very existence of India is their central issue, exactly in the same manner as the very existence of Israel is for the Arabs.

IWT was accepted by Jawaharlal Nehru in the fond belief that it would remove an important element of discord and would promote peace. Fundamentally, it was wrong on the part of Nehru to have accepted the IWT in this form as it practically legitimised the Cease Fire Line as it then existed. Mangla Dam was allowed to be constructed in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) with India’s concurrence to the IWT. After the 1994 parliamentary resolution that the whole of PoK belongs to India, IWT cannot remain on the statute as it falls foul of that resolution.

Withdrawal from IWT is necessary to press India’s claim on the whole of erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir . This step would additionally starve the Pakistani military of the resources to carry on the low intensity proxy war it has prosecuted since 1979.

In my opinion, therefore, there is no downside to withdrawal from the Indus Waters Treaty.

^Some good points .
There is one important point missing in the argument regarding China.
i.e Tibet supplies only 20% of the waters of Brahmaputra & rest all water comes from Indian catchment areas in North east.
Assam basin can easily manage anywater loss incase China diverts water from Brahmaputra.
In that aspect water diversion by China is not a strategic threat - however India can negotiate give & take on Brahmaputra due to its legal status as a lower riparian - incase China wants to start a water diversion project far in the future.

Reposting (earlier in stfup):
Indus and tributaries v/s Brahmaputra have very few similarities.

Almost all of Indus et al. catchment area in is in the undivided state of J & K. We should not be party to any water sharing as we are upper riparian.

Brahmaputra catchment is about 50% in Tibet. 42% in India/Bhutan and 8% in Bangladesh. China just blocked one small tributary. Even if they block all, Assam valley cultivation will be easily taken care off. We will have to put in check dams to counter Chinese flooding Assam valley (but this is hypothetical). Bangladesh will be worst hit though.

We should happily go and rescind IWT.

The highlighted are the percentages of the respective geographical(i.e areal) extent of the catchment areas in each country. However what matters is the percentage inflow from each catchment to the total flow of the river on average.That as i said is 20% from Tibet(China) 80% from India at the point where BP enters Bangladesh.

[Gyan]

Proposed Chinese dams on Indus is one more reason to abrogate IWT.

J&K assembly can pass a resolution abrogating IWT as IWT is not supported by either Parliamentary or J&K assembly approval.

IWT Can be discarded as Pakistan has failed to fulfill its treaty obligations on other matters like granting us MNF status or adhere to Simla Pact.

[srin]

What happens if we just decide to stop following the terms of the treaty ? Who will force us to comply ?

[Gagan]

When people say that Pakistan's principal interest in Kashmir is water, they are giving wayyyy toooo much intelligence to the organism called Pakistan

Their main issue with India is Jealosy. Plain and simple.
Add to that big time inferiority complex! These are not empty slogans, these have been borne out time after time, in their behaviour, actions. It is now fairly predictable, even laughable.

All issues are secondary.

Even if India abrogates the IWT outright, Pakistan will remain pretty much the same way it is today. They will continue to mismanage everything there is to mismanage, at the same time blaming others for all the problems.

So I say, start now, build the dams and canals and tunnels that need to be built, and in a decade, divert 30-40% of the water from J&K to north india and beyond

[sanjaykumar]

Pakistan's problem is even more fundamental, and cruder than the above.

India over the past 15 years has been slowly but now exponentially outclassing Pakistan. The latter is really no longer an Asian country, it is more African in temperament. I do not mean that in any racist sense.

The idolaters not only spurned the self evident superiority of the sole true religion but they have negated the natural corollary. That is the expectation that Pakistan would show India how to be a civilized nation. Given that the Pakistani identity is so heavily invested in Islam, their rage comes from India showing up Islam as inferior to idolatry.

This has led to a depersonalisation-derealisation disorder. They no longer recognise themselves in the mirror. Nor do the realise the reality of the world.

[Cosmo_R]

Slightly tangential: how does the River Interlinking project fit into the Indus projects that we might build?

[Lalmohan]

When people say that Pakistan's principal interest in Kashmir is water, they are giving wayyyy toooo much intelligence to the organism called Pakistan

sirji, i would say that it began there (and not in the desert) and when the US told UK to get on with divesting their empire in 1945, the water issue was used as the bait to set up the pakistan project to support the wells-of-power paradigm. at the time, the pakjabbi's understood that logic - might have meant more to them than pure green-ness.

over time, green-ness has taken over everything (especially the brain cells), so now there is nothing but anti-india-ness

matter/anti-matter... the rest we know

[SSridhar]

When people say that Pakistan's principal interest in Kashmir is water, they are giving wayyyy toooo much intelligence to the organism called Pakistan

sirji, i would say that it began there (and not in the desert) and when the US told UK to get on with divesting their empire in 1945, the water issue was used as the bait to set up the pakistan project to support the wells-of-power paradigm. at the time, the pakjabbi's understood that logic - might have meant more to them than pure green-ness.

over time, green-ness has taken over everything (especially the brain cells), so now there is nothing but anti-india-ness

matter/anti-matter... the rest we know

Absolutely true. See my post for details as well.

[Agnimitra]

Can Afghanistan offer ‘other Indus’ option to India against Pakistan?

[Prem]

http://nation.com.pk/columns/17-Oct-201 ... r-pursuits
India’s suicidal water pursuits

Having come to terms with the irrevocability of Indus Water Treaty (IWT), India is contemplating launching its water wars through Afghanistan. Pranab Dhal Samanta in his recent article “Can Afghanistan offer ‘other Indus’ option to India against Pakistan?”, carried by the Economic Times on October 14, indicates Indian mindset over this option. However, as domino effect, these water wars may spread far beyond India’s liking.About 65 percent of Pakistan’s geographical area is Indus basin dependent. Country has the world’s largest canal irrigation system, which accounts for more than 90% of its irrigated area. Its three biggest dams, and several smaller ones, are located here. These are sources for hydroelectricity, irrigation and drinking water for millions of Pakistanis.Now, India is trying to rope in Afghanistan to build Baghlihar-like pseudo run-of-the river projects on its eastern rivers, mainly Kabul, Kunnar and Chitral. Pakistan does not have a water sharing agreement with Afghanistan. The rules governing flow of these rivers into Pakistan are internationally accepted principles. However, these days, Ashraf Ghani can do anything, anti-Pakistan to please for Modi, what to talk of flouting global norms—nasty embrace is quite tight, at least for the time being. However, India does not have the capacity to fund such projects to the extent of seriously hindering the water flow of these rivers into Pakistan. Requisite water reservoirs take a fortune to build.

India’s particular interest is in river Kabul. This river merges with Indus River, at Attock. Though average water flowing through river Kabul, 23 million acre feet, is only a small fraction of Pakistan’s net water resource, however, its availability is critical for our winter crops, as flow in pre Attock stream of Indus river falls sharply during this period. India is trying to convince Afghan water officials that India could replicate likes of Baglihar, Kishanganga and Tulbul navigation projects over River Kabul. Afghanistan is being persuaded to portray as if it desperately needs to tap irrigation and electricity potential of its eastern rivers.While doing so, India is not revealing the facts that all three projects in Indian Occupied Kashmir have been declared illegal by international neutral umpires, arbitrators and International Court of Arbitration. Ruling in Kishanganga case has clearly defined what a run of river project means, gate level of such dams is to be determined in a way that no storage is permitted and gates of run of river dams cannot be opened on the plea of flushing out silt, as silt deposition is violation of run of river criteria.

India was trying to store water at Baglihar’s illegally constructed water storage reservoir. As a result of retrospect application of this principle to Baglihar, this dam will get silted way within a decade. And water India was trying to divert from Kishanganga is poised to enter Pakistan from North of Mangla. So both these multibillion rupee dams will not be able to store water for India. India’s plans to build a barrage, Tulbul Navigation Project, on the Jhelum River at the mouth of Wullar Lake, alarmed Pakistan in 1984. Pakistan’s protests resulted in halting the project.
As the nature would have it, India has its own vulnerabilities with regard to the portion/tributary of Indus River flowing in from China. Prime Minister’s Advisor on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz has rightly cautioned India that if it tried to interrupt water flowing into Pakistan’s rivers, it would not only violate the treaty but also set a regional state practice under which an international law could serve as precedence for others. “Such an Indian act may also provide China with a justification to consider suspension of water in India’s Brahmaputra River.” India has water sharing disputes with all its neighbours, prominent being with Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan.China is moving ahead with blocking the Xiabuqu tributary of River Yarlung Zangbo — the Tibetan name for Brahmaputra to build $740 million Lalho hydropower project. River Brahmaputra flows down into bay of Bengal via India and Bangladesh. The Lalho reservoir is designed to store up to 295 million cubic meters of water and help irrigate 30,000 hectares of farmland in Xigaze, which usually suffers from severe drought. Indian media is reading too much into the Chinese move which came days after Modi considered plans to reconfigure IWT in the aftermath of India’s false flag operation on its Uri military base on September 18. However, it would be naïve to construe that Chinese action is on Pakistan’s behest. It’s a long standing Chinese programme, initiated in 2014, and the timing of blocking the tributary is a mere coincidence. Besides, China’s 12th Five Year Plan reveals that three more such power projects will be built on the river.
A day after Modi sat down with his senior aides to consider the possibility of reconfiguring the Indus Waters Treaty, Islamabad warned that such a move would be construed as an ‘act of war’. In retaliation to Uri attacks, India has upped the ante by giving the go-ahead to nine run of-the-river projects on Pakistani rivers, including three that had been put on hold due to objections raised by Pakistan under the IWT provisions. Pakistan has already approached the World Bank to seek arbitration on disputes with India on Kishanganga and Ratle projects, as their designs violate the treaty. Pakistan formally requested India on 19 August 2016 for settlement of these outstanding disputes by referring the matters to the Court of Arbitration as provided in Article IX of the IWT. On September 27, a Pakistan government delegation met with senior officials of the World Bank at its headquarters to discuss these matters. The World Bank committed itself to timely fulfilling its obligations under the treaty while remaining neutral.India is unnecessarily embroiling itself into water wars which will come back to haunt it. Pakistan’s rights are well protected by the IWT, while India stands vulnerable to actions by those neighbours with whom it does not have water sharing treaties.

[sanjaykumar]

Just a pointer to Pakis: For the inbreds sophistry is superfluous, just write Muslims good, kafirs bad. No need to step out of the comfort zone of the seventh century.