Maybe years of being on the defensive, More dug in. jmt.Guddu wrote:Did not get an answer earlier...what is the reason we are able to destroy paki posts, but not the other way around. Just to be clear, I dont want any of our posts damaged or soldiers hurt. Both sides seem to use similar mortar, do we somehow have higher accuracy ?
Fair question. No we don't have higher accuracy, but they are targeting our civilians to move Hindus and Sikhs out of areas closer to IB. We are targeting their posts deliberately and I wonder if we have used arty for this fire assault. Generally the term fire assault is used when arty is used. In Keran sector there is very little habitation on our side, in fact the villages were evacuated a few years ago. Heavy habitation on their side. We may be using guns from 10 kms behind to fire on pre registered tragets.Guddu wrote:Did not get an answer earlier...what is the reason we are able to destroy paki posts, but not the other way around. Just to be clear, I dont want any of our posts damaged or soldiers hurt. Both sides seem to use similar mortar, do we somehow have higher accuracy ?
+1rahul_r wrote:Could also be from the attack on the police cadets
It is Quetta attackmalushahi wrote:+1rahul_r wrote:Could also be from the attack on the police cadets
habal sir agree with you ..that they will collapse by their own, but they seem to be in hurry for that as well, it's just that we havent taken the bait thinking that their time hasnt come...Didn't get why world comm will be silent till feb 18?habal wrote:All things considered, all options weighed, I think Pakistan will fall under internal contradictions and global loss of face. They are giving us ample opportunities, we can accelerate their fall or postpone it as our wish. World community will be totally silent till Feb 18, we can do anything with them in interim, sacrifices of our soldiers shall not go in vain.
I am having naughty ideas of targeting sharif's handing over ceremony after Nov 30. We need to strike pindi at location.
AK Sir,Akshay Kapoor wrote:Fences and fixed defences never hold Ranjan. From the Great Wall of China to the Alps (Hannibal) to the Maginot line.....attack is the only sensible defence. There is something in Rudradev ji's idea...we need to find a way of getting the Pakis to fight each other and break up. At the same time hammering them in consonance with our best interests.
+1Akshay Kapoor wrote: Re your fencing point, I suggest going to google earth and slowly seeing the terrain starting with LC and moving South to IB. You will appreciate what a difficult situation it is with the terrain. Even on a completely flat featureless terrain a fence only works with heavy patrolling...in this terrain it is at best an obstacle.
Need to happen on the Map still.Samay wrote:People deprived from their own thinking often say that pukistan will fall , collapse, break into pieces some day. That is a fine job already done by Yankees, but through their propaganda they let the world believe (specially Indians) that it has not yet happened.
As I understand it - the Pakis, under the cover of "cease fire agreement" built a lot of bunkers close to the LoC from where they could facilitate infiltration. I suspect the current action has something to do with sanitizing every single one of these. The Indian army did ask for 6 months to clean up infiltration infrastructure in J&K. They may have got permission now.Guddu wrote:Did not get an answer earlier...what is the reason we are able to destroy paki posts, but not the other way around. Just to be clear, I dont want any of our posts damaged or soldiers hurt. Both sides seem to use similar mortar, do we somehow have higher accuracy ?
...
Neelum Valley runs along a 200-kilometre stretch and is home to an entire generation born inside bunkers during the fighting of the conflict in the 1990s. In the years since the 2003 ceasefire, Neelum Valley residents became increasingly intolerant of rebel-led activities.
Up until now, firing had been limited to sparsely populated areas in the mountainous region.
At least three people were wounded in the Neelum Valley violence on Saturday. Also on the Pakistani side, at least two were injured in Bhimber sector.
Adnan Khursheed, police deputy commissioner of Kotli district, told Al Jazeera at least six people had been killed and seven wounded in Nakyal sector since Wednesday.
Abdul Waheed, police deputy commissioner of Neelum, told Al Jazeera that tourists were asked to leave the area and sent back to Muzzafarbad, the regional capital. Schools and government offices have been closed.
Al Jazeera spoke to some residents about the recent attacks.
Khawaja Bilal, 20, Neelum Valley
We were sleeping and woke up to sounds like blasts at 4am in the morning. We did not realise it could be cross-border shelling and slept again.
Khawaja Bilal [Al Jazeera]
When we woke up in the morning, we came to know that Indian and Pakistani soldiers were engaged in an artillery duel in Keran sector near Athmuqam.
This was the first time since the 2003 ceasefire that Indian soldiers targeted the civil population in Neelum Valley.
There is immense fear among the local population.
Many were forced to live in bunkers built during times of heightened tension from the 1990s onward. But others don't have bunkers, and they don't have enough money to build them.
Awais Ahmed, 40, hotel owner, Neelum Valley
There were about 30 tourists in the guesthouse last night. On Saturday morning, we had wanted to organise a discussion about hydropower generation in the area in collaboration with a daily newspaper.
We were arranging chairs for the guest speakers and almost 200 local people were due to attend this event. Suddenly, Indian forces resorted to shelling - nearly a dozen mortar and artillery shells.
Most of them landed around the building but one shell hit and devastated the guesthouse. As a result, three people, including two tourists from Lahore and a local person, were wounded.
The shelling also caused damage to other guesthouses here.
Rukhsana Kouser, 28, Kotli
I was attending a wedding ceremony of a local villager when mortar shell landed.
As a result of this, I was wounded and lost conscience. When I woke up, I was in the hospital.
....
No shit? This bugger's compatriots must all have had this very experience right before birth.Aditya G wrote:
As a result of this, I was wounded and lost conscience.
In this particular situation, I am guessing IA has some big guns at Uri, with the threat that paki position is guaranteed to be wiped out, ie MAD. This game works only when your own position is impregnable.manjgu wrote:a) also the volume of fire from Indian side is much more than en fire. b) one thing i did not understand say in Uri..the indian camps, posts are clearly visible from the pakis who are on the heights..why are these camps not targetted by Paki counter fire? these would be easy targets. I do understand that similarly we must be on dominant positions in other areas..but how does it work? is there an agreement we dont target X and u dont target Y?
Interesting ref to 106 mm RCL;
Pak has launched a full scale Fire asasult on 70 of our posts and some 40 villages using small arms, battalion level mortars( 81 Mm)and RPGs. Reportedly they have also used 120mm mortars which are an artillery weapon and hence an escalation. This is in retaliation for our Surgical strike which they were trying to deny but are well aware of what happened.There were reportedly 3 BAT style actions. In the one in Tangdhar apparently the SSG commandoes were trying to cross the LC fence when they were foiled. So far we have responded at a matching level. Why should we impose such restraints. Response should be over-matching.We should use artillery for effect. Small arms and mortars do nothing to troops in Defenses. Mostly just wates ammunition. From 2000- 2003 we were using medium and heavy artillery and had made Pak cry uncle and ask for a cease fire.
The date 29 Nov is critical. Gen Rahil Sharief retires that day. I personally dont think he is in a mood to retire. the easiest way to get an extension is to escalate militarily on the LC/IB.I wont be surprised if more of that happens.
Im slightly baffled by this compartmentalised action between Army and BSF. Why is the BSF fighting a seperate war?The Army has enough 155 mediums, Grads and Pinakas to support it. I see no reason as to why Pak has to DICTATE the level of weapons usage. from 2000 -2003 we had a full scale artillery war on the LC with heavy use of mediums.. We saw no escalation to nuke level. Lets get back to that as the new normal. The 2003 cease fire is dead as a dodo.the small arms and battalion mortars- as per my experience are practically useless against troops in built up defenses. it just amounts to a complete waste of ammunition. The only weapons that make an impression are Medium Guns and Anti- Tank guns (106 mm).As far back as 1990 one regiment of 105 mm Field guns , one battery 120mm mortars and 5 platoons of 81 mm mortars had fired in my support in Kargil( Dalunang)Besides we had one 75/24 in direct shooting role, 4 x 106 mm anti- tank guns and 4x 23 mm AD guns.The anti - tank guns were devastating and made the Pakis cry uncle.If we could use this in 1990 what the hell is the problem now?I hope our babus are not controlling the fire from Delhi??
Yet another beheading.This is absolutely intolerable. Lets not talk nonsense about infiltration. It was a Pak Army BAT which has done it now in the Machail sector. We must hit back very hard in this sector to convey a clear message that such barbaric behaviour will have very major costs and consequences. We must retaliate in that sector either with more surgical strikes or use of heavy artillery or Rockets to inflict severe casualties on Pak. I fail to understand this reluctance to use artillery. It was used very effectively from 2000- 2003 and Pak had been made to cry uncle. it was they who sued for a ceasefire. our medium guns especially the Bofors were most effective. Who has laid down the restriction that we can retaliate with only the weapons that Pak is using- that is small arms and 81 mm Battalion mortars. Is Pak to dictate the pace? I fail to understand why the Army has not been retaliating with artillery.
Simply because you don't want an established enemy leader who knows how to use the system to continue.ramana wrote:What strengthen civilians mantra that GOI has been chanting since 26/11?
The civilians are a cover for TSPA to receive legitimacy in the West for funding, and have no relevance to any thing in Pakistan.
And if Raheel gets extension it cuts down many careers down the chain of command just like Mushy did.
So what does India care.
Well Kayani didn't do Zarb-e-Whatever. Raheel did.Karan M wrote:lol as if next guy is going to be any better. can we give up on the chunkian earth e shaster theories? simple logic dictates GOI should smash the pakistanis into smithereens rather than putting up with fire assaults etc.
multiple reasons are trotted out each time. i hope this time is different.salaam wrote:Well Kayani didn't do Zarb-e-Whatever. Raheel did.Karan M wrote:lol as if next guy is going to be any better. can we give up on the chunkian earth e shaster theories? simple logic dictates GOI should smash the pakistanis into smithereens rather than putting up with fire assaults etc.
There might be multiple reasons why GoI is waiting. One might be to actually let winter set.
After September 29, when the Indian Army took the Pakistan army by surprise through the surgical strikes on terror launch pads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), they went into the assault mode again on Saturday.
The Indian Army decimated four outposts of the Pakistan army, along the Line of Control (LoC), opposite the Keran sector in north Kashmir. “Four Pakistani posts were destroyed in a massive fire assault in the Keran sector. Heavy casualties inflicted,” tweeted the Army’s Northern Command.
Officers privy to the action describe the assault as a coup de maître as the Pakistan army was given no time to respond to the barrage of firepower using heavy-weapon systems. “These four posts were tactically placed and used to facilitate infiltration by the militants,” said an Army officer.
Decimating the posts was not an action taken overnight or in a hurry, they said. But the decapitation of the soldier in the Machil sector on Friday proved to be the trigger and the action, which was in the planning stage, was fast-tracked. Earlier on Saturday, a BSF soldier and a woman were injured when the Pakistan army violated ceasefire in Keran sector.
“It was a carefully-planned operation. From gathering information to keeping a close vigil on Pakistani posts and watch towers, preparing for the assault and using heavy-weapon systems, everything was carefully planned beforehand,” said an officer.
Seven Pakistani posts were chosen for the assault and four were completely destroyed. Under a comprehensive plan, Indian Army troops in strategically located posts launched a multi-pronged offensive to pin down the posts.
“Indian troops changed the projectile and trajectory of the mortars in a manner that they directly hit the posts. At the same time, troops opened fire with light, medium and heavy machine guns. It created confusion among the Pakistani troops,” said an officer. {Mortars in direct fire mode?}
After pulverising the posts, the Indian Army used rocket launchers to pin down the posts on the ground. “Rockets were fired from different angles, so that the posts were brought down in quick succession. Later, flat-projectile weapon systems were used to ensure that the enemy suffers heavy casualty and none of the troops guarding the posts flee,” said an officer. {reference to ATGMs or AMRs?}
The difference in the surgical strikes and the destruction of posts was that the Indian Army did not cross the LoC in the Keran sector on Saturday, while it went deep into PoK for the surgical strike on (September 29.)
“On Saturday, we maintained an element of surprise. After beheading our soldier, Pakistan might have been preparing for surgical strikes from our side. But we carried out the action in such a manner that their posts were destroyed and inflicted huge casualties by using fire power without crossing the LoC,” said another officer.
Figures reveal that Pakistanis have carried out 57 ceasefire violations on the borders since the surgical strike. Around 405 incidents of cross-border firing have taken place along the border in Jammu and Kashmir in 2015, resulting in the death of 16 civilians. Of these, 253 incidents of cross-border firing have taken place along the International Border and 152 along the LoC.
Over the weekend, the most happening thing in the country was the simultaneous Diwali, in the metropolises of India and at the Line of Control (LoC)/International Border (IB). The former was a happy one with benign lights and sounds while the latter was deadly. Lots of people were hearing the term fire assaults for the first time and social media was demanding to be informed more about this phenomenon. Surgical strikes are passé and fire assaults are in. It is the Indian Army, which in these days is setting the pace for gaining new knowledge.
So here is most of what you would like to know.
What is the LoC and how does it differ from the IB; good to know that. It is a delineated line in a disputed area (although India does not consider J&K as disputed, it is only contested) along which the armies of the claimants are deployed in eyeball to eyeball contact without any no man’s land. The LoC runs well east and south of the actual international boundary and is the alignment along which the conflict of 1947-48 came to a halt, thus creating Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK - often referred as Azad Kashmir, or AK, by Pakistan). Later, after 1971 and the Shimla Accord, it was delineated under the Suchetgarh Agreement. Unlike the IB, there are no boundary pillars (BPs) delineating the LoC. However, there are a series of mostly difficult to discern landmarks such as boulders, trees and nullahs, which have undergone change over the years.
The Indian and Pakistani armies are in an eyeball contact in their various pillboxes and posts all along the alignment, but at places, terrain constraints may separate the two, by two or more kilometres. It is an environment little known to the outside world; here the notion of ‘Grabbers, Keepers’ exists. Translating this into reality, it means that any side grabbing a piece of ground for a tactical advantage gets to keep it unless forcibly evicted (recall Kargil 1999). It is the classical extended form of defence where some key defended localities are held in strength and a few others in the vicinity to support them. There exist gaps, which are patrolled and dominated by fire and in the context of infiltration, ever since 2004 there exists a continuous LoC fence, which is manned 24x7. The gaps are, therefore, no longer existent but the deployment is in penny packets as the LoC itself is hugely manpower intensive, due to the sheer nature of terrain. I can visualise eyebrows being raised with the inevitable question – technology, can’t it replace manpower? The answer is always yes, but the constraints of the LoC terrain cannot easily be imagined. Secondly, the deployment of technical resources is expensive and the nation is unwilling to spend on it unless it increases the defence allocations. Test bed technology demonstrators set up in 2003 are yet to see the light of day.
The IB sector manned by the Border Security Forces (BSF) is a little different. Pakistan does not recognise it as the IB. It calls it the working boundary, denoting that it is not permanent, while for us it is a resolved boundary with nothing contentious. The Army only occupies contentious boundaries, where the threat to territory exists. Only in war will it move up its forces to ‘tactically’ occupy the border even as the BSF continues to man peacetime border outposts. The word tactically means that deployment may not be bang on the border but such that a planned defensive battle can be fought or an offensive can be undertaken. Manning every inch of territory is irrelevant for that.
That brings us to the real subject, fire assaults. Well, you can use troops to physically attack, destroy and evict the enemy but you will suffer high casualties in the course of doing that. The option of not crossing the LoC exists and could also be a politico-diplomatic term of reference from the government of the day for specific purposes. Yet, if the enemy, including the terrorists, connive to cross the LoC and target our posts and the smaller detachments along the fence and gaps there has to be retribution. After the surgical strikes the expectation would be that the Army crosses over each time there is a contingency. That is tactically not possible and there are other options, which the Indian Army is very successfully adopting in the last few days. One of them is fire assaults.
Fire assaults were often used prior to 26 November 2003, and also in some selected areas in later years; areas such as Nangi Tekri in the Rajouri/Mendhar sector, where infringements have been the order of the day. A fire assault involves the optimum employment of mix of weapons of choice, from small arms and machine guns to mortars, missiles, artillery and direct firing artillery guns over a fixed/flexible duration, with the specific aim of causing destruction and casualties in a given area. The fire assault plan has an allocation of heavy ammunition with timings and sequence of employments as felt necessary and caters for the neutralisation against enemy weapons, which will be used as response.
These fire assaults can be absolutely deliberate or pre-decided and employed during contingencies. The important things are to ensure that the firing is not without aim and the punishment is sufficient for the enemy to pay a penalty for his rash actions. It also presupposes adequate overhead, frontal and flank protection for own troops when they are subjected to the response. The surprise factor is most important in this and the ingenuity and experience of the local commander will come handy in planning, execution and catering for contingencies. Surprise can be obtained and ensured by ingenuous choice for deployment of direct firing artillery guns, roving artillery, use of missiles from concealed locations and misleading the enemy on the deployment of force multipliers.
My recount of an incident in 2008 may help understand the importance of fire assaults. A particular area on the LoC had not been frequented by my troops for some time. When I ordered that the area up to the LoC be dominated to avoid the ground being considered by the enemy as his, the local unit sent a small detachment to a temporary location to dominate the ground by day. On the third day of such deployment a Pakistani sub unit under a young officer attempted to evict them by day using a ploy of white flags while dressed in track suits. {Old Paki Trick of sending in soldiers w/o uniform....jeez} It led to a brawl with exchange of fire. One of my men was killed but the presence of mind of the light machine gun man saved the day as he opened fire and killed seven Pakistanis on the spot. The rest ran to their post. The Commanding Officer (CO), a phenomenally fit officer, rushed to the area by running and climbing at a height of 13,000 feet. He took charge and recovered the body of our brave heart. Then he asked me what his orders were. I gave him my decision, which was exactly the methodology currently being followed in the last few days. I directed him to destroy the erring post of the Pakistanis from which the officer and his men had emerged to engage our men and any other which interferes with our actions. But I lay the term of reference that the LoC would not be crossed by him or his men.
The brave heart CO was true in his commitment and professional to the hilt. He used the firepower of his unit, no artillery to prevent escalation, and employed heavy weapons in a most ingenuous way the entire night. By morning, pictures sent to me through multimedia displayed exactly what I wished; the flattening out of the Pakistani post, which incidentally was on a lower slope so at much disadvantage; there were many casualties. Not one man from our side crossed the LoC. The next day the radio intercepts revealed the chaos on the Pakistani side with questions and allegations being raised about who was responsible for sending the officer across the LoC in this unconventional suicide mission. Our moral victory was the sighting of an olive green Pakistan Army helicopter on the next afternoon which landed at the brigade headquarters. It took the Brigade Commander away as the only passenger; the Commander was removed from command.
Before the ceasefire came into effect in November 2003, fire assaults were common, particularly in the Poonch and Uri sectors. The Bofors medium gun is extremely useful for such fire assaults and its USP is the surprise that one can obtain with it. The issue which differentiated the Pakistani fire assault from ours was the unpredictability and ingenuity. Our officers, men, porters and animals all joined into the effort and ideas from different sources, higher and lower, were absorbed. Plans were hardly ever repeated. {Somebody on this forum was asking what is the difference b/w our approach and theirs}
The other aspect, which soldiers with lesser experience need to remember is that without first ensuring your own protection, never undertake fire assaults. Such protection does not come easy. It is a measure of your appreciation of ground, the amount of backbreaking effort you will undertake to shell proof your own defences and even lowly ambush sites which may be in the open. The moment you reveal a weakness of yours, remember you won’t live to regret it. Senior commanders on visits to posts must always have the corner of the eyes trained to observe flaws such as this, baffle walls and quality of frontal protection. I once made the mistake of assuming that one of my key guns was well protected, without physically visiting the detachment. The gun was blown by an accurate missile strike from the other side; mercifully casualties were superfluous.
In an era when the common understanding is that ‘surgical strike’ is the only term in the lexicon of the Indian Army the public may feel surprised to keep learning and absorbing more terminologies, which form part of military vocabulary. ‘Fire assault’ is not the least of them.
Aditya G wrote:Gen Hasnain;
http://swarajyamag.com/defence/fire-ass ... -conducted
In an era when the common understanding is that ‘surgical strike’ is the only term in the lexicon of the Indian Army the public may feel surprised to keep learning and absorbing more terminologies, which form part of military vocabulary. ‘Fire assault’ is not the least of them.
Kapoor Sir, this restriction was introduced after 2003 or after 2014?Akshay Kapoor wrote:In this context I agree with Gen Bakshi that we must not have artificial restrictions on calibre size. I ah e posted several times since 2014 oct that our COs we're not allowed to use heavy weapons even 81 Mom without higher hq permission.
I meant that I have posted about it in 2014 when we retailited to Pak fire. Even then this restriction was there. Pakistani commanders at battalion level used any weapon they deemed necessary and our hands were tied.salaam wrote:Kapoor Sir, this restriction was introduced after 2003 or after 2014?Akshay Kapoor wrote:In this context I agree with Gen Bakshi that we must not have artificial restrictions on calibre size. I ah e posted several times since 2014 oct that our COs we're not allowed to use heavy weapons even 81 Mom without higher hq permission.
As I understand restriction was introduced in 2003 after ceasefire agreement, with partial rollback after 2014 border skirmishes.
The Yankees have seriously disabled the snake but it it still remains dangerous and capable of biting and causing grievous injury to people within it's vicinity (which we are). Cutting it into multiple pieces and crushing the head of the snake, which would neutralize the threat, is still pending.Samay wrote:People deprived from their own thinking often say that pukistan will fall , collapse, break into pieces some day. That is a fine job already done by Yankees, but through their propaganda they let the world believe (specially Indians) that it has not yet happened.
One way to address this is to improve on and widen the technological edge. Of course the terrain is tough and the need for manned presence cannot be wished away. However, more automation, unmanned turrets, better communication systems, better protection and gear for individuals along with more hardened bunkers for posts will help blunt any advantages they may currently have due to better terrain or being the aggressor each time. We need to do all across the LOC and IB (at least on the hot sectors) what we did to them at Siachen i.e muscled them out over time due to technical and financial superiority till all they can do is whine and activate aman ki asha types to plead their cause.Sid wrote:AK ji, porkies found their deterrence in the form of nooclear bums.
What is our deterrence factor, limited fire assaults or some disproportionate response? Just like us porkies are capable of absorbing limited fatalities for a long period of time. Faujis are cannon fodder on both ends.
Sorry I may sound like some lefty peacenik, but I am still not clear on the streategy here. I am more the happy to provide what our force wants, i.e. a free hand, but strategically is it gonna work?
