Ramana, Very good explanation. Now NPT is actually arms control for all non-P-5 countries. But for P-5, NMD will make sure that they do not stray apart such as the lone bandit. India will be part of the discussion on this table maybe a small one but a significant one.
A US specialist thinks NMD will slow down India's rise and advises a rethink.<BR> <A HREF="http://www.indiaserver.com/hindu/stories/0514134a.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.indiaserver.com/hindu/stories/0514134a.htm</A>
The naysayers are being way too pessimistic about NMD. As Ramana said, the US will likely deploy some form of missile defence, perhaps a less effective one than its champions hope for, but one that is nevertheless at least partially effective.<P>As for the GoI's response to Bush's proposal, it was refreshingly different from the old days of knee-jerk opposition to all things American. Now, it may turn out that India won't benefit as much from this support as the pro-BJP observers think it will, but that does not mean that it wasn't a good idea to try.<P>Russia is smart enough (I think) to negotiate a modification to the ABM treaty that will take care of their interests.<P>As for the Chinese and their sulk, they'll get over it. They won't have a choice. If the technology works, the Americans are going to deploy it, regardless of what China and NK think. If it doesn't, of course, they won't.<BR>
One more endrosement. More clarity.<P> <A HREF="http://www.dailypioneer.com/secon3.asp?cat=\wld1&d=WORLD" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dailypioneer.com/secon3.asp?cat=\wld1&d=WORLD</A> <BR> Court India, US think tank tells Bush <BR> Agencies/Washington<BR> <BR> The US should not miss the opportunity of making India a de-facto strategic partner and should<BR> lift sanctions against it immediately, a well regarded conservative think tank has said.<P> Ted Galen Carpenter of CATO Institute has asked President George W Bush in an article for<BR> the media to overrule the <B>"fanatics in middle ranks of the State Department"</B>, enthusiastically<BR> support India's ambition to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council; and make it<BR> clear that it has no intention whatsoever to interfere in the Kashmir dispute.<P> India, he says, "is being courted by the great powers, including the US, Russia and even China.<BR> America would be wise to try to gain India's favour." During a recent visit to New Delhi, Deputy<BR> Secretary of State Richard Armitage spoke warmly of India's growing economic strength and its<BR> significant political and moral influence in world affairs. He indicated that the United States took<BR> India seriously as a rising great power. Armitage's approach, says carpenter, was consistent<BR> with the attitude of the Bush administration. Indeed, Bush himself signalled an interest in India<BR> as a possible us strategic partner in his first major foreign policy address as a presidential<BR> candidate in late 1999.<P> <B>CATO suggests that India is keeping its options open because, during the Clinton<BR> administration, America's actions often made New Delhi nervous. One important reason for the<BR> recent surge in India's military spending is to make certain.<BR></B><BR> Washington's imposition of economic sanctions in response to India's nuclear tests also<BR> annoyed Indians across the political spectrum. Those sanctions, reflecting the influence of the<BR> arms control faction in the US, were "a monumentally bad way to treat a rising great power,"<BR> Carpenter said. He says that there is good reason for viewing India as a possible US strategic<BR> partner. There are no serious issues on which the interests of the two countries are in conflict.<BR> Conversely, there are numerous areas on which Indian and US interests coincide. "Chief among<BR> them are stability in the Persian Gulf and placing a limitation on China's ambitions." Carpenter<BR> warns "a continuation of the inept diplomacy of the Clinton years, however, could drive India into<BR> the waiting arms of Russia and China." Stressing India's importance, he says not only is India<BR> the world's second most populous country, but in recent years it has begun to discard the<BR> shackles of socialist planning and adopt market reforms that have spurred economic growth.
TOI says that "India might benefit from NMD" by MK Palat. He goes thru various scenarios and says prospects of Chinese proliferation are moot. Note the context in whihc the prolif happened. It flows from direct consequences of the Nixon-Chou talks. The US thought that India and SU were allies!!!! What doozers.<BR> <A HREF="http://www.timesofindia.com/today/19indi11.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.timesofindia.com/today/19indi11.htm</A>
J.N. Dixit asks substantative questions on the Indian stance on NMD. Quite thought provoking. Fundamentally he asks how does NMD enhance Indian interests. Typical of Indian experts he provides no answers. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.indian-express.com/columnists/jndixit/20010517.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.indian-express.com/columnists/jndixit/20010517.html</A> <P>I think we are seeing glimpses of the new security architecture for the post-Cold War era where the global cop has understandings with regional powers while ensuring that they cannot threaten him. <BR>It is more like cooperative engagement on security to provide a stable environment for peace and prosperity. As this is linked to security only, expect no quarters on trade issues.<BR>The lynchpins of this arrangement will be Israel and Egypt in the Mid East, S Africa in Sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya in East Africa, Nigeria in West Africa, Saudi and GCC in the Persian Gulf, India in the South Asia, ASEAN in East Asia, Japan and S Korea for the Far East and Australia in Polynesia. Turkey and Russia in Central Asia as they move towards Westernization. If China transforms(fat chance!) then it has a role. <P>The next step is to ensure bilateral engagement among these in addition to the engagement with the super cop. In other words its a bilateral cordon sanitaire around rogue regimes with out identifying clear challengers.<p>[This message has been edited by ramana (edited 21-06-2001).]
<B>wow!... a must read article</B><P>NMD, TMD and INDIA: Let not our imagination run riot:<P>by S.Chandrasekharan<P><BR>The decision of US to deploy a National Missile Defence System (NMD) together with a Theater Missile Defence System (TMD) in Western Pacific has brought a sharp reaction from both Russia and China. For India , the question is whether the proposed deployment has any impact on Indian security per se and if not, indirectly when China in retaliation expands its nuclear arsenal and the delivery systems. <P>Although China still lacks the "strategic triad", India’s nuclear weaponisation and delivery systems programme being at a very preliminary stage will, for quite some time to come be no match to China and therefore any enhancement and modernisation of Chinese arsenal cannot have any direct impact on India. What India is looking for is credible nuclear deterrence and not nuclear parity. But if China persists in deliberate proliferation and continues to transfer sophisticated nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan, then, it will have a serious impact on India’s security. <P>Official reaction of India so far, to the ambitious programme of US on TMD and NMD has been correct and appropriate. Response if any, has been guarded and non specific.<P>On the eve of his visit to India in the third week of July, the Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, in a written response to the Hindu 1 said that "China has always taken a cautious and responsible attitude towards the export of missiles and related items and exercised strict and effective control. " To another question whether the export of missiles and related technology by China may be providing a justification for TMD and NMD by USA, an irritated foreign minister said that "it is nothing but an irresponsible gossip."<P>Actually the second issue should have been put differently whether China irritated by the determination of USA to pursue TMD and NMD is retaliating by continuing to provide missiles and related technology to Pakistan among other countries. Though the foreign minister may not call it an irresponsible gossip, he would at any rate have denied it stoutly. But the facts are other wise.<P>Chinese aid to Pakistan in the nuclear field violating all the non proliferation norms is well known and documented. From transfer of weapon designs of nuclear devices , delivery systems of M-11s, to a reprocessing plant for Plutonium as well as the construction of the whole factory for the production of M11s, China has been and continues to be consistently aiding Pakistan. China acquiesced in the transport of Nodong Missiles (known by its reincarnation Ghauri) and provided transit facilities at Urumchi for the PIA planes that made frequent trips from Pyongyang to Pakistan in late nineties.<P>What is disturbing is the New York Times report of July 2 this year 2 that China has continued to aid Pakistan’s effort to build nuclear capable long range missiles by stepped up shipment of speciality steels, guidance systems and technical expertise to Pakistan. Intelligence agencies report that Chinese experts were seen around the latest missile factory of Pakistan.<P>As the revelations were complicating President Clinton’s agenda to grant permanent normal trade relationship to China now awaiting Senate approval, a delegation headed by John Holum, Senior Adviser for Arms control was sent to Beijing. At the end of two days talks in Beijing on July 7th and 8th, John Holum made hardly any progress and the issue remains unresolved.3 <P>President Clinton is facing two problems. One, the confirmation by the National Intelligence Council that China had indeed transferred missiles to Pakistan in 1992 in which case China would automatically face sanctions unless there is a Presidential waiver. The second aspect is the continuing transfer of missile components and technical know how to Pakistan in the last two years. <P>The Chinese, it appears are said to be adjusting their policy in South Asia, meaning continuing to supply missile technology to Pakistan in retaliation to what is perceived by China as shift in US policy towards India in the last two years "in accepting India as a defacto nuclear power state." 4 <P>Tang Jixuan to another question said "As a close neighbour of both India and Pakistan, what China wants to see is peace and stability, not arms race in South Asia." But does China expect to maintain peace and stability by continuing to support nuclear and missile programmes in Pakistan?<P>What is worse, China continues to maintain that the Indian nuclear tests or weaponisation does not affect the overall Chinese strategic posture. Zhao Gancheng, Senior fellow of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, while reiterating the three principles of Chinese Strategic Doctrine 5 makes an astounding statement that "Few Chinese believe India would be a threat to China, even after India’s nuclear tests. In one of our earlier papers (Paper 53.html) we have shown that Chinese Scholars and Scientists were concerned with India’s nuclear developments even before Pokhran II, testing of Prithvi and Agni.<P>No country however strong, can be unmindful of the strategic developments taking place in its proximity. Alexander A.Pikayev 6 while describing ABM Treaty revision as a challenge to Russian Security refers to the imbalance that will be created with China when USA goes ahead with the NMD programme. He said "Currently the predominance of Chinese conventional weapons vis-a-vis the vast sparsely populated Russian Far East is balanced by Moscow’s superiority in nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear build up (in response to TMD) might considerably erode this superiority, further weakening Russia’s position in the Far East. This is coming from Russia at a time when the relations between the two countries are excellent.<P>With the development of Agni II in India , China would forfeit the formidable natural defences like the mountain chains and the inhospitable Tibetan Plateau.7 To say that the Chinese are not concerned with the nuclear and missile developments in India, a view echoed by some Indian China watchers too, may not be correct. <P>There is enough literature on the National Missile Defence and Theatre missile Defence plans of USA, their efficacy or other wise and we are not going into detail on these issues. Suffice it to say that both the plans will have a direct impact on the present ABM treaty, the Start II ratification and Start III negotiations. Any setback to Start II and Start III will no doubt go against the very spirit of disarmament envisaged under Article VI of the Norn Proliferation Treaty.<P>The question before India is- whether the NMD and TMD plans will have any impact on Indian security or the Indian Nuclear Doctrine now being debated. <P>The argument that it does affect India runs thus. The NMD and the TMD though not directed against India would bring in a natural response from China to accelerate the modernisation and expansion of its nuclear arsenal. The small strategic deterrent force of China with two dozens of ICBMs will be converted into a full nuclear war fighting capability with significant increase in the number of ICBMs and MIRVing them.<P>The argument then goes further 8 that a modernised Chinese force will have a cascading effect in South Asia. India’s response could be renewed testing of nuclear weapons as well as delivery systems such as Agni II which in turn would trigger a similar response from Pakistan including a renewed transfer of missile technologies to Pakistan from China and North Korea.<P>In a cross border dialogue of SIAF forum on the impact on South Asia of China’s strategic modernisation 9 as a consequence of TMD and NMD Plans of USA, almost all the scholars from Pakistan opined that China out of its legitimate concern may seek to enhance its strategic potential and as a chain reaction India and in its wake Pakistan would end up towards a costly and vicious arms race. It did not occur to them that China’s pique with USA would help Pakistan get more transfers of sensitive materials!<P>A Chinese analyst quoting PLA Generals predicted the collapse of the non proliferation regime if India is accepted in the nuclear weapon club and warned that China would "retaliate by continuing the proliferation of nuclear technology and devices that are restricted by the NPT either intentionally or because of loopholes in its export- import system." 10 <P>An Australian based Indian Analyst assessed that whenever bilateral relations between China and US deteriorate, Beijing retaliates by doing what it has always done in the past, namely by stepping up its transfers of nuclear and missile technologies to countries hostile to India...." This is partially true but it does not fully explain the consistent proliferation pattern of China in respect of Pakistan.11<P>The point that is missed is, that China’s transfer of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan is not in retaliation to what US does to itself or Taiwan which could be incidental but more a deliberate proliferation exercise to counter India’s growing strength in the nuclear and missile fields. <P>In the name of constructive engagement and trade USA has been unable to make China accountable to the obligations under NPT. One respectable Indian "Strategic Guru" has gone to the extent of saying that unable to prevent China from proliferating, USA in order to safeguard its own security has gone ahead with the NMD plan and could not care less how China’s proliferation activities affect the security of other nations. 12<P>But has India ever taken up strongly either with China or USA on the continuing proliferation of China that affects India’s security interests? Why should India be defensive in taking up this matter? Did the Indian Foreign Minister take it up with Tang Jiaxuan during the latter’s visit to India in forceful terms? <P>Imagine a hypothetical situation of India transferring Prithvi technology to Vietnam. What would be the reaction of China? Same as India’s? <P><BR>30.8.2000<P><BR>Notes:<P>1. The Hindu dated 22nd July 2000, in written answers to questions sent in by C.Raja Mohan.<BR>2. Reported in Asian Age of July 3, 2000.<BR>3. Quoted under "Region" in FEER, July 20, 2000, P.18<BR>4. Ibid. P..20<BR>5. The three principles are 1. Not to use nuclear weapon firstly. (2) not to use nuclear weapons on non nuclear states. (3) not to support any country to develop nuclear weapons.<BR>6. A. Pikayev., "ABM Treaty Revisions: A Challenge to Russian Security, Issue No. 4., Disarmament Diplomacy, March 2000, P.7. In this paper he says that Beijing has adopted a US 10$ billion package for a new nuclear build up with two new types of ballistic missiles, one against USA and another against Russia.<BR>7. See an excellent analysis of "China’s Western Campaign" by Kai-Alexander Schievogt in FEER of August 17, 2000.<BR>8. See Frontline of August 4, 2000, "Implications for India".,by R.Ramachandran, quoting Gaurav Kampani of the Centre of Non Proliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies, US.<BR>9. SIAF Forum- Dialogue XIV, "China’s strategic modernisation and its impact on South Asia."<BR>10. Quoted by Mohan Malik, Defence Studies Programme, Deakin University, Victoria, Australia (June 16 of SIAF forum, Dialogue XIV)<BR>11. Ibid, SIAF Forum<BR>12. K.Subrahmanyam, "Death of a Treaty", Times of India in the first week of July 2000. <A HREF="http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper140.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper140.html</A> <P>
Anybody saw the testimony of Sce. Colin Powell last night in c-span before the Sen. Intl Rel. Committee .<BR>Lot of these same question from everybody including Dixit were also put there. Every time GWB speaks all the lawmakers have to get some clarification. <BR>According to Powell there are three level of interceptions - BPI, Mid stage and end/terminal stage. <BR>The testing and development will go on and as the systems become proven they will be deployed. Now the Aegis system with a ABM mode actucally breaches the treaty right now.<BR>But the earliest time when they have to consider breaching is 2003 when they have to make the decision. Powell said that they are counting on Russia not to respond by MIRV and more missiles becuase of economic problems!<BR>They think Russia will cooperate in some way and US will have some preliminary system which will be expanded in 10-15 years. He also mentioned some numbers such as even upto 1000 missiles could be defended hence Russia should not any problem but rest of the nations will never be able to break the sheild after the final deployment.<BR> <BR>Some people asked on how it will change the MAD doctrine to a non-MAD policy and this will be the main reason for the NMD. Few question were relation to Asia and the name taken by Powell for discussion are India,China,Japan and Pak.<P>From the above post:-<BR>In the name of constructive engagement and trade USA has been unable to make<BR> China accountable to the obligations under NPT. One respectable Indian "Strategic<BR> Guru" has gone to the extent of <I>saying that unable to prevent China from<BR> proliferating, USA in order to safeguard its own security has gone ahead with the<BR> NMD plan and could not care less how China’s proliferation activities affect the<BR> security of other nations.</I><P>There is some truth to this. Uncle Sam is not feeling that it is the Global cop without the NMD. After the NMD Uncle 'might' be able to help India to counter China/Pak nexus. Now with or without NMD China will continue its nexus with Pak and it could become very dangerous in 5-10 years.<BR> India needs to give support to NMD because India needs NMD directly or indirectly. <BR><p>[This message has been edited by acharya (edited 21-06-2001).]
acharya, I watched some of it on Cspan. I did not catch too many references to India. One statement that caught my attention was made by Rumsfeld ' we will deploy systems even though they are not fully tested'. This has of course relevance to India and the deployment of nuclear tipped missiles, even though they are not fully tested.<P>BR is not the only one that has caught the nuances of the NMD debate. Take a look at this article ,<BR> <A HREF="http://www.expressindia.com/news/june24/world1.shtml" TARGET=_blank>http://www.expressindia.com/news/june24/world1.shtml</A> <P><B>US using 'India card' to contain China: Chinese media </B><P>"Further, the article said that the Bush administration has no desire to get involved in the Kashmir conflict, and regards the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as "waste paper" because of its desire to develop NMD."<P>Kaushal - Of course both the US and India are strenuously disavowing any play of the 'India card'and that relations with China and Pakistan are on independent trajectories.<P><BR>"The article ends by quoting Indian media reports which urged the government "not to fall into a trap set by the United States" and that "Indo-US relations should not come at the expense of Sino-Indian relations. (PTI)"<P>Kaushal - Of course,but it is a legitimate question to ask what benefit Sino-India relations have been to India other than being stabbed on the back repeatedly.<P>Kaushal <p>[This message has been edited by Kaushal (edited 26-06-2001).]
IIRC, this has appeared in the past in BR, but I couldnt find references to it in the archives. The reason I bring it up again, is that Gobarev, believes there are 3 main threats to India (China, Pakistan and the US), at least he claims that is what Indian strategic thinkers are postulating. It is worth rereading all this, in light of the congruence of views between India and the US on the 'new Global security architecture' of which NMD is but a part.<P>My view is that there has been a fundamental change in thinking in New Delhi and Washington vis a vis the Indo/US relationship. On the Indian side, the fundamental change has been the backing away from 'complete disarmament' as a pillar of Indian policy. On a broader level this is the dominance of geopolitical realism over a 'moral idealism' which impressed nobody in the world and which was in turn flung back at India anytime she strayed out of the corral of the non-proliferation regime and the other regimes (MTCR).<P>On the banks of the Potomac there is realization that India is a presence to be reckoned with (this despite a considerable portion of Indian media which is clueless about strategic matters and rants negatively about every little event in India).<P>Of course the Cato Institute is libertarian in philosophy, and the Republican party is far from libertarian in outlook(although it is closer to such views than the Democrats) , so we are not under the illusion that these views have congruence in the state department - yet.<P>Kaushal<BR> <A HREF="http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa381.pdf" TARGET=_blank>http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa381.pdf</A> <P><B>INDIA AS A WORLD POWER: CHANGING WASHINGTON'S MYOPIC POLICY </B><P>by Victor M. Gobarev <P>Victor M. Gobarev is an independent security policy analyst based in Washington, D.C. Previously, he was a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center and George Washington University. <P>Executive Summary: <P>American interest in and concerns about India rose sharply after that country carried out underground nuclear tests in May 1998. Clinton administration officials belatedly acknowledged that developing a good working relationship with India should be one of America's top foreign policy priorities. President Clinton's visit to South Asia in March 2000 was an important symbolic step. <P>That initiative, however, does not constitute a major breakthrough in relations between India and the United States. Paying greater attention to India, although long overdue, cannot by itself dramatically improve uneasy U.S.-Indian relations and turn India into a de facto strategic partner. The fundamental mistake made by U.S. leaders has been to underestimate India and its economic and military potential. How India uses its growing power can either enhance or seriously undermine U.S. interests. Continued insistence by the United States that India liquidate its nuclear arsenal will only cause major problems in relations between Washington and New Delhi. <P>Washington's overemphasis on the proliferation issue illustrates the tendency of U.S. policymakers to treat India as a potential adversary rather than a potential friend. U.S. leaders should not insist on improvement in New Delhi's human rights record in Kashmir, or set other preconditions, for the U.S.-Indian relationship. Pursuing the current course may well extend the impasse in relations to the point of irrevocably "losing" India. <P>Mistakes in U.S. policy have contributed to India's drifting toward a Russia-India-China nexus aimed at preventing U.S. global domination. The likelihood of India's participation in an anti-U.S. alliance will depend on what New Delhi thinks about American geopolitical designs toward India and its national security interests. <P>A long-range strategy needs to be based on Washington's willingness to accept India's world power status. That means accepting India into the club of nuclear weapons states and enthusiastically endorsing New Delhi's bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council. The main benefit to the United States of such a breakthrough in U.S.-Indian relations would be to prevent a dramatic adverse change in the current global geopolitical situation, which currently favors the United States. An assertive India could help stabilize the Persian Gulf and Central Asian regions. Even more important, India could become a strategic counterweight to China and a crucial part of a stable balance of power in both East Asia and South Asia.<P>
It is interesting that Sridhar Krishnaswami considers this item to be newsworthy. There is hardly anything new here in this item. It is the same old chant that the subcontinent(and China) is incapable of managing the risks of nuclear deterrence.<P>Whatever else we might think of the power elite in Pakistan, we(and the strategic community in India) have never underestimated their instinct for maximizing the presence of Pakistan on the world stage, without going over the brink. Michael Krepon (he has now roped in PR Chari, alas in a land of 1 billion you can always find enough of this variety) - he of the 'non-proliferation' varna - has hardly said anything new in this. Let us assume that it was a slow week for news in Washington DC and SK had no other choice for his column.<BR> <A HREF="http://www.hinduonline.com/today/stories/03250006.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.hinduonline.com/today/stories/03250006.htm</A>
<B> 'India, Pak. must reduce n-risks' </B><P>This can be done by repeat testing by India and TS Pakistan.<P>The risk reduction follows like this,<BR>India by repeat testing will perfect the fusion techniques to the satisfaction of Wallace et al, which means robust and working fusion, tactical nukes so that HMV of TSP will understand and leash its poodle.<P>Secondly TS Pakistan by rpeat testing will exhaust (their Pavlovian reflexes to Indian testing) its stock pile and will come to complete senses, like they way they are coming to economic senses.<BR>After that complete reduction of N risks as desired by Mike and Charry.<BR>
An account from my meeting with a member of Indian NSAC (National Security Advisory Council?): around January 2001, the Indian NSAC team went to Pakistan on an explicit agenda to discuss measures to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapon, this involves each country clarifying and exchanging measures for safety, authorized-control. <P>Before the visit one of the ground rules for the meeting were made clear and re-affirmed, to stay focused and to avoid the risk of rhetorical quagmire, there would be no mention of disputes like Kashmir. True to Pakistani colors, the Pakistani officials however did not play by the rules and could not resist harping on the basis of Pakistani existence (religious majority of Kashmir and the supposed injustice of partition).<P>That brings to the fore <B>the perennial lack of Pakistani psyche to stay TRUE to an agreement.</B> The story keeps repeating with all Pakistanis all the way from:<BR> <BR>1. Partition of India & Lawful Kashmiri accession<BR>2. Kashmir war, and denial of TSP army <BR>3. Shimla Agreement<BR>4. Lahore Agreement<BR>5. Kargil war and denial of TSP army.<P>What does Gen. Musharraf have to offer to India ? <P>What guerentees they provide to India to ensure that Pakistani Govt. will keep its word ? <P>Why should India talk to Pakistan / Gen.Musharraf ?<P>Pakistan is a country of incorrigible liers. What a pitiful irony that the so-called Pak-istan is founded on Na-paki treachery & lies. They would cease to exist of they become truthful, since the foundation of that country is built on rabid animosity to secular India at any cost. Even if it cost them their own self. GOD give them some wisdom.<BR>
Kaushal, <P>China used to supply the nuclear fuels for India's reactors, after the agreement with France fell through in the early 1990s.<P>That's not exactly a stab in the back - in fact, it's kind of peculiar. Didn't Lenin once say something about giving capitalists the rope to hang themselves? This is kind of the reverse. <P>I do think, however, that it's fair to say the the Sino-Indian relationship has been complex, and not always implacably hostile.<P>Tim
Tim, relations improved after Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in the late 80's. But it is clear that the perception is widespread in India that the Chinese were lying constantly in the 50's while they were busy building the road thru Aksai Chin from Xinjiang to Tibet. In fact this was the brainchild of the late Deng Xiao Ping who had a lifelong relationship to the oppression and rape of Tibet. Anyway you are wasting your time trying to convince me otherwise. The evidence is too strong that China was out to 'get' India in the 50's and now the declassified papers show that the collusion(in 1971) between Nixon/Kissinger on the one hand and Zhou on the other was too blatant. Subsequent actions such as the proliferation of WMD to Pakistan(Plutonium, Missiles, PU separation factory - the list is long and getting longer), the strategic encircling of India, these are not the actions of a Power that is friendly.<P>Anyway the cycle has turned again and the the US view of China is far more guarded than it was in 71 and it seems to offer an opportunity for policy planners in New Delhi and Washington to improve Indo/US relations that may have some staying power. Ironically Chinese Indian relations are improving as we speak but i find it hard to believe they will ever go back to the days of the early fifties. <P><B>Incidentally you must remember there is a pretty strong pro-Chinese lobby in India both in the media and in the Congress/Left Parties. The present President of India is one such proponent of a strong China India relationship. The pro-Chinese lobby also happens to be invariably against improving relations with the US.</B><P>Kaushal<BR><p>[This message has been edited by Kaushal (edited 25-06-2001).]
The 'China factor' in ties with U.S. <P> By Amit Baruah <P> SYDNEY, JUNE 25. It came quite easily to Mr. Jaswant Singh. In response to<BR> a shot-in- the-dark question from an Australian reporter in Adelaide on Friday,<BR> the External Affairs Minister said India was not averse to the idea of considering<BR> American access to Indian military bases. <P> He said: ``Military-to-military cooperation is one of the components of<BR> Indo-U.S. cooperation. Access to bases... you are moving too fast yet. Let<BR> these things evolve over time.'' <P> Some years ago, such a response would have been unthinkable. Today, it<BR> appears to be the natural order of things. <P> Very little is known about the dialogue Mr. Singh held after the May 1998<BR> Pokhran nuclear tests with the then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Mr. Strobe<BR> Talbott. The Government's engagement with the Bush administration, too, has<BR> been shrouded in secrecy. <P> Does the External Affairs Minister have the Parliament sanction to announce<BR> that New Delhi may allow American access to its military bases? Is it time, then,<BR> for India to officially withdraw from the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM)? If<BR> the end of the Cold War placed a big question mark on NAM, Mr. Singh's<BR> statement, surely, calls for India to exit the organisation? <P> While developing good relations with the United States is an unexceptionable<BR> goal, the hurry displayed in extending support to the Bush administration on<BR> anti-missile defence raises many questions about India's intentions. India and<BR> Australia are the only two countries in the Asia-Pacific region that have<BR> extended support even as New Delhi has tried to put `new spin' on its original<BR> statement after criticism from several quarters. <P> Japan and South Korea, old-time allies of the United States, have not<BR> responded in the way India has. South Korea has made public its reservations<BR> on missile defence. <P> Mr. Singh's statement comes at a time when the senior- most U.S. military<BR> official, General Henry Shelton, is poised to visit India next month - a point<BR> mentioned by Mr. Singh himself at his Adelaide press conference. <P> In these days of spawning ``strategic dialogue'' and ``engagement'', what are the<BR> guiding principles of Indian foreign policy? After standing up to the Western<BR> world on the nuclear issue, does the BJP Government want to turn India into<BR> another Australia in terms of foreign policy positions? <P> And, despite all the denials that can be summoned, many Indian officials this<BR> correspondent has spoken to in the last several months point to the China<BR> dimension in India's new positions. <P> Is India to be the new American bulwark against China? Is that to be our new,<BR> unspoken foreign policy? A policy about which Indians have been told very<BR> little, if at all. And, if you ask the question, you will be met with the routine<BR> denial. In addition, you will be told that India even has a security dialogue with<BR> China. <P> But the world is not blind to what is happening. The Asia-Pacific region is<BR> curious about India's new world-view and, increasingly, Indian leaders are<BR> being asked the `big questions' about its intentions and role, specially in<BR> South-East Asia. <P> A commentary in the China Daily said today that the ``rapid development'' of<BR> Indo-U.S. relations would give the U.S. more ``diplomatic and strategic'' angles<BR> to play in the region. <P> ``Among the benefits, it (the U.S.) can foster an anti-China stronghold<BR> south-west of China, reduce Russia's traditional influence in this region and<BR> increase United States' influence on Iran and Central Asia. The U.S. can also<BR> link its troops deployed in the Middle East with its forces in the Indian Ocean<BR> region to fortify its control of marine transportation lifeline (sic) and oil bases,'' it<BR> said. <P> ``The improvement of U.S.-India relations will increase both the United States'<BR> strengths in conflicts between big powers and India's diplomatic might. India's<BR> economic and military expansion will fuel its ambition to dominate South Asia.<BR> Under such circumstances, the India-Pakistan dispute could be further<BR> aggravated. Moreover, India's frequent provocation under the excuse that<BR> China is allegedly a threat to its security could destabilise the region,'' the<BR> commentary added. <P> Whatever be the truth in the opinion expressed above, it is clear that India<BR> cannot afford to be `used' in the strategic games being played out between the<BR> United States and China. <P> India's national security is too important to be subject to the power play of the<BR> moment. Any concerns about China must be rooted in our own security<BR> context, not that of Washington. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.chinadaily.net/cndy/2001-06-25/15991.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.chinadaily.net/cndy/2001-06-25/15991.html</A> <p>[This message has been edited by acharya (edited 25-06-2001).]
A paper on 'Indian Views of the Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs' by Mahnken and(Tim) Hoyt. This may have been reviewed previously in BR (but a search did not reveal any citations)<BR> <A HREF="http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/nssp/nssq/thoyt.pdf" TARGET=_blank>http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/nssp/nssq/thoyt.pdf</A>
The definition of a fuzzy-headed academic is one who doesn't even know his own articles are posted on his department's website. <P>This one's a couple of years old - there have been developments since then. However, I think it's still pretty good, and I'll be writing again on the same topic later in the year for a conference next fall, so any comments will be appreciated.<P>Tim
Nothing particularly new in this analysis but there is clarity in his arguments(euphemism for 'this is within my intellectual capability'). The analyst has contributed to ipcs, but i wont hold that against him,Kaushal<BR> <A HREF="http://www.financialexpress.com/fe20010519/an2.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.financialexpress.com/fe20010519/an2.html</A> <P>ANALYSIS <BR> <BR>Will NMD affect India’s security interests? <P>G Balachandran<P>The initial Indian response to the Bush administration proposal for the National Missile Defence (NMD) system has been criticised for being too responsive to the interests of the United States, not taking into account Indian security interests. How far is this true? And what, indeed, are the national security implications of NMD? This can be analysed from three perspectives: (i) national (ii) regional and (iii) global. First, what are the implications of the NMD for Indian national security?...<P><BR> <BR><p>[This message has been edited by Kaushal (edited 27-06-2001).]
You can hear directly from the man who is doing the job.<P> <A HREF="http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=95000715" TARGET=_blank>http://opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=95000715</A> <P>Toward<BR> 21st-Century Deterrence <BR> New threats are emerging. We must be<BR> prepared to meet them. <P> BY DONALD H. RUMSFELD <BR> Wednesday, June 27, 2001 12:01 a.m. EDT <P> President Bush's recent visit to Europe capped a<BR> month of intensive consultations with allies and<BR> friends by Secretary of State Colin Powell, by me,<BR> and by other senior officials on the need to move<BR> beyond the Cold War and fashion an approach to<BR> security that is tailored to the 21st century. We<BR> found growing recognition that the threats we will<BR> face in decades ahead are changing. As Russia's<BR> defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, said after our<BR> meeting at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,<BR> "There are not only more threats facing us now in<BR> the 21st century, but they are multifaceted,<BR> much more so than they were in the past."
Look at CPM folowing the call of their Chinese masters! Shame on them<P> CPM flays move to 'open up N-E military bases' for US<BR> Pioneer News Service/New Delhi<BR> <BR> The Communist Party of India (Marxist) on Wednesday strongly reacted to the government's<BR> move to provide US army access to sensitive military bases in North East and asked the<BR> government to restrain itself from taking such action.<P> "The announcement by senior Army officer Lt Gen T S Shergil that the Indian Government is<BR> considering to give US Army access to Jungle Warfare Training college in Mizoram is bound to<BR> cause serious concern," said a CPM politburau statement."The US armed forces would be given<BR> access to a sensitive military installatipon in the north-eastern region bordering China and<BR> Mayanmar. This revelation follows the recent remarks of Defence Minister Jaswant Singh in<BR> Australia about the US access to Indian military bases not being ruled out in the future," the<BR> statement added.<P> "The polit bureau demands that the Vajpayee government provide a full and open account of the<BR> nature of military cooperation being put in place with the US. The polit bureau stongly opposes<BR> such a move to provide the US access to sensitive installations under the military exchange<BR> programme," the statement added.
<I>"Look at CPM folowing the call of their Chinese masters! Shame on them."</I><P>These low-lifes have always been this way. I'll bet that if you went back and checked the newspaper archives from 1962, you would find that they sided with the Chinese in that war. Traitorous scum!
Good article by Balachandran. He has covered all the bases. Except in the last para after making his case he ends up being preachy. Thats his perogrative but all in all a balanced article. Also most of his arguements were covered in BRF two threads on India and the NMD.<P>BTW IPCS is changing its tune. The site has more balanced articles to even out Chari's views. The initial problem was it had a lot of funding from US NGOs and reflected their opinion.
<A HREF="http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jul/03spec.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jul/03spec.htm</A> <P>I am bringing this here since there is no thread on China now. There should always be one( Admins).<P>I want to highlight this part<BR><B>Given the fact that security and strategic factors dominate the relationship, the<BR> People's Liberation Army remains the major shaper of China's India policy. A<BR> coalition of hardline forces have deeply influenced boundary policy, resulting in<BR> endless negotiations that lead nowhere, resulting in very negative<BR> consequences for her relations with India.</B><P>This shows the dynamics in China about India policy. THe hardliners and PLA have controlled the India policy and the absense of a strong constituency which tones down the belligerence we are going to see lack of progress in the relationship. This may also explain increased activity by PLAAN in IO and India's plan to thrawt and face the challange of PLAAN. <p>[This message has been edited by acharya (edited 04-07-2001).]
<BLOCKQUOTE><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by acharya:<BR><B> <BR>I am bringing this here since there is no thread on China now. There should always be one( Admins).<P> </B><HR></BLOCKQUOTE><P>Why don't you start one?<P>
Some plain talk (as always) by Yoda himself. A note of caution , that the future is filled with imponderable peril...<P>Kaushal<BR> <A HREF="http://www.timesofindia.com/210501/21edit4.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.timesofindia.com/210501/21edit4.htm</A> <BR><B>NMD as Fait Accompli <BR>India Must Fit into New Paradigm <P>By K SUBRAHMANYAM</B><P>"...Whether this policy will enhance international stability and contribute to international peace or not will depend on whether there are likely to be credible challenges to growing US dominance from any other single nation or group of powers. The idea of an India-China-Russia combine does not appear to be realistic because of asymmetry of power among the nations, their geographical proximity, Chinese demographic pressure on Siberia and Central Asia and China's condescending attitude towards India and its relationship with Pakistan. Further, India has a 1.6- million-strong human bond with the US and the latter does not make any secret of its intention to import more Indian brains in order to ensure its technological lead over the rest of the world. <P>A US-dominated world may not be to the liking of non-Americans. However, in the next two or three decades, US dominance over the rest of the globe in technological, military, economic and political terms is inevitable. The only possibility of countervailing power and influence is for the other balancers to get together. Given China's political centralism one wonders whether that is likely. <P>The Cold War has ended and the world is entering a new security paradigm. Assessing it in terms of a continuation of Cold War bipolarity will be a grievous error. The Cold War with two superpowers was a unique period in history.<B> A better analogy would be with Pax Britannica, when Britain was the sole superpower because of its dominance over the oceans. In these circumstances, coping with this new security paradigm, attempting rapid economic growth in a globalised world and sustaining optimum strategic autonomy presents a formidable challenge to the Indian security establishment. </B><P><BR>
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