sanjaykumar wrote:Do Chinese have any cultural concept of dignity and restraint?
They are debasing themselves while the world looks on. I must say their reaction serves Indian foreign policy/propaganda very well.
The Chinese will have to launch a small military action to save face.
Recently The National Interest carried a hugely interesting article which analyses a position paper written by three Chinese Navy officers on the South China Sea issue. Since the paper was meant for internal circulation among PLA officers it is shorn of rhetoric and gives some strong insights on Chinese strategic thinking.
It's a long article but worth a read. I'm going to post some quotes, all of them pertain to Chinese position in South China Sea but perceptive posters here will note that they pretty much also explain the Chinese position and actions in the Himalayas.
Three PLAN Officers May Have Just Revealed What China Wants in the South China Sea
The authors write, the United States has long “stuck its nose in” South China Sea affairs. But for years, it only intervened from behind the scenes. It did not publicly declare a position on any of the disputes themselves. American military operations in these waters were always fairly restrained. However, since 2015, the “balance of initiative” in the South China Sea has gradually “tilted towards China.” As a result, the United States has grown “restless”, and become more assertive.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative has also agitated the Americans. Citing a book published by the late Zbigniew Brzezinski, they claim that the primary task of American strategy in the twenty-first century is to prevent the rise of any state that might “challenge American hegemony on the Eurasian continent.” As such, China’s Belt and Road Initiative—which spreads PRC influence across Eurasia—is certain to “touch a raw nerve in the American hegemon”. As an important but troubled segment in the twenty-first century maritime Silk Road, the South China Sea makes a fine target for American subversion.
You'll note the language is very similar to the propaganda that's emanating Global Times and other rags on the Sikkim issue. There is same sense of victimhood and India has also "opposed" the OBOR nonsense.
What is striking is that the authors are extremely sanguine about how such a crisis might play out. In their view, the scale and intensity of any future crisis could be kept under control, and the “possibility of a crisis leading to a military conflict or a war is not at all large.” The U.S.-China relationship will continue to be characterized by a tendency to “struggle but not split”. The two countries maintain strong ties and common interests in important areas: economics, politics and global issues. These links will prevent crisis escalation. Also on the plus side, the authors point out that in encounters at sea both militaries are fairly restrained.
The bolded part in red nicely explains the meeting with RaGa and then, when RaGa's office denied the meeting the Chinese promptly deleted the message from its website. It also explains how the usual suspects have been activated (via the Congress?) to start writing articles warning India about the consequences of a confrontation. The Chinese realise that the Global Times hagiography on how great the Chinese are and how India was no comparison with China's might and strength has diminishing returns and hence activate the Indian stooges. It also explains why trade is a big danda that India has in its possession. The question is will industry interest groups allow the Govt to use it?
For China’s part, it will continue its strategy of balancing assertive rights-protection activities with actions to maintain stability in its relations with other states. It will not allow matters to get out of hand. After all, China needs time to “digest and consolidate” its recent gains in the South China Sea. Chinese leaders have no desire to watch a military crisis escalate into a war, which would imperil the current “period of strategic opportunity” to focus on domestic affairs.
Again the color bolded part IMO offers an important clue. China really doesn't want a war but feels "assertive rights-protection" activities will serve its interests. One point seems to be clear, India's and Bhutan's reaction didn't go according to script and I think the Chinese realise that any escalation on their part could lead to a shooting war which they certainly don't want considering the results of such a war, without escalation, are hard to predict from the Chinese POV. With the big meeting coming in October, they don't want anything to happen which weakens Eleven's position.
Part two examines some of the specific scenarios China might face. Any crisis could involve a number of possible countries. These include both other claimants and extra-regional powers. Aside from the United States and Japan, the authors believe that India and Australia might also get involved in a crisis. These states would seize on the opportunity to clamp down on, repress, and contain China.
So Chinese victimhood fear is very real, despite its boast of being the rising power.
First, it should use political, economic and diplomatic means to improve relations with Southeast Asian states, thereby “dividing and disrupting” any potential alliances directed against China, creating a favorable strategic environment, and reducing the incentives for crises. This is the soft edge of Chinese strategy. At the same time, China should take steps to highlight its red lines, engage in demonstrations of power and adopt other coercive measures to deter military crises from taking place.
One would note that the exact same strategy in being followed in the subcontinent.
The authors readily acknowledge what Chinese leaders fiercely deny in public: that “the struggle in the South China Sea is not just about contention over rights and interests. More than that, it is a struggle for dominance in regional security affairs.” Given the stakes, China should use all of the means at its disposal—political, economic, diplomatic, legal, public opinion and military.
Jin, Xu and Wang endorse China’s current approach to handling disputes in the South China Sea. They describe it as “being both principled and flexible”. This expression they place in quotes, suggesting a doctrinal origin.
The doctrinal nature of their foreign policy is IMO both their strength and weakness. Strength because it provides strong commitment from all stakeholders, for example you wouldn't have a RaGa type of character trying to undermine foreign policy. On the other hand, when you have unexpected turns and twists in events, like India's unexpected robust response to road building in Bhutan, there really is no Plan B.
Lastly this para is very important:
This ensures the conditions for China to continue its current strategy of placing fishing, oil/gas and law enforcement forces on the front lines, which the authors pithily describe as “sending civilians first, and following them with the military” and “concealing the military among civilians”
Why is this important? Remember CEPC and some reports that soon the Chinese could outnumber the number of locals in Baluchistan?
