Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

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chola
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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chola » 23 Jul 2017 18:11

panduranghari wrote:
chola wrote:We own every advantage against Cheen in this ocean today. But with time those advantages will be eroded as surely as the tide does to sand on beach.


Sigh!

Demographics:
To repeat again, 2030 is the year when officially Chinese demographic decline gets set in stone. It becomes irreversible sans inward migration from foreigners. Even if the Chinese start reproducing like rabbit from today, it will be back to where they are today by 2037 the earliest. It essentially means they have to start running the fastest they can to stay where they are. If the get tired, they start falling back.

Debt:
China since 2009 has added more debt internally than the US did in 150 years. If you believe in mathematics, you will know the outcome is only one.

Deflation:
Chinese economy intricately linked to the amount of debt they create. If they do not create more debt, people do not enjoy the feeling of prosperity. CCP has promised by 2049 i.e. 100 years of CCP rule, the Chinese dream (based on the American dream) will be complete. If we understand the basis of the miracle of American dream, it becomes clear that debt has to grow even more from here on.

Too much dhoti shiver for no reason. Sometimes bidding time like Chinese have done is not a bad policy. It does not mean GOI become MMS or IK Gujral type GOI.



All three are simply hopeful wishes for the best.

Demographics? Cheen was younger and more numerous relative to the rest of the world in 1960s when it was miserably poor.

Debt? In 2016, the government debt to GDP was 27% in Cheen and 67% in India. How is that even an argument in our favor? Besides which, look at all great economic powers in the world: the US and Japan are heavily indebted to themselves. China owes debt to itself. debt to oneself is nothing more than the ability to create credit.

Deflation? How the hell a transitory state of the currency that can hit any economy over time predict their end? It is like saying someone going to die each time he catches a cold.

What you are proposing is doing nothing except sitting around hoping the bully kicking at your door trips and falls while refusing to drop the anvil you have hanging over his head.

Just drop the anvil from the second floor and crush his fvcking skull don't wait.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SriKumar » 23 Jul 2017 19:34

^^^ I would say that the first step in this direction has been taken. India forcibly stopped China from constructing military infrastructure in its neighborhood and actually did this on territory that (though bordering India) is nominally Bhutanese. This is un- precedented for India certainly (and even for China- no one has stopped their border expansion plans to my knowledge in the last 30 years i.e. after they really began to expand economically).

If China takes military action to break this stand-off, India will give a more than adequate response to China and this will be the second step towards the scenario you are advocating. What I have no idea about is how does the third step i.e. the end-game going to look per GOI's planning. Will it be 100% localized defensive war along the border, or will there be some action on the Tibetian plateau, or will action go the plains beyond to send a message. I think the third possibility cannot be ruled out and may happen, especially if China opens new fronts.

Added later: The note to IAF to prepare for an 'intense war' seems to suggest that it will go all-out from the start. No gradual escalation.
Last edited by SriKumar on 23 Jul 2017 19:43, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby fanne » 23 Jul 2017 19:43

Some more on PLAAF constraint in Tibet
http://www.claws.in/347/plaaf-deploymen ... rdhar.html
Most Tibet bases are at higher altitude than Leh/Thoise and on our side, IL-76 for takeoff can only takeoff without passenger and lesser fuel. Similarly the helis can operate with grand total of 25 kg cargo weight. I guess the danger is from the su 27/30 and the plaaf Xerox copy of it. They are not that many.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Mort Walker » 23 Jul 2017 20:07

Vivek K wrote:
fanne wrote:Mort Sir, let me just point out the current LCA deficient (which does not make it bad, the program must continue and 100 be made) -
The radar is not yet selected and the one present is not adequate. No BVR or any radar guided weapon is integrated. Perhaps one can live with the current envelope it can fly, but FOC is at least a year away and full operational readiness many years ago. If we had pursued it with some more purpose and intent, it may have been, but not in the number you say. Designing and flying a plane is one thing, producing it in number is quite another. IAF, in my humble opinion should have had 42 approved SQ no matter what (imported or indigenous) and then pursued LCA. In that respect, A bison is better than a LCA that is not ready (yes when ready it will be few generations ahead but only when it is ready). We should have gone for additional 100-150 SU30MKI (and ignored the argument of being top heavy, a good IAF is the one that can win a two from war, irrespective of the mix or the origin of the aircraft), as that was the only modern platform available and we already had infra and training for that.

LCA's current radar (with the old and the new radome) is better than the Kopyo on the Mig-21. LCA has completed A2G payload trials long ago. Derby ER is being integrated because the R-77 turned out to be a dud. In every respect the LCA is better than the Mig - availability, safety, ease of upgradation etc. FOC will occur when it does - that does not stop operationalization. Squadron formation is on. So please report facts and not personal biases.


Absolutely. If the IAF Eastern Air Command had the availability of 5 squadrons of the LCA, the PLA would not enter the Doklam Plateau.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Hari Seldon » 23 Jul 2017 20:16

Heh.

Image

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chetak » 23 Jul 2017 20:21

fanne wrote:Some more on PLAAF constraint in Tibet
http://www.claws.in/347/plaaf-deploymen ... rdhar.html
Most Tibet bases are at higher altitude than Leh/Thoise and on our side, IL-76 for takeoff can only takeoff without passenger and lesser fuel. Similarly the helis can operate with grand total of 25 kg cargo weight. I guess the danger is from the su 27/30 and the plaaf Xerox copy of it. They are not that many.


No body in this region is willingly going to tangle with the IAF.

Everybody is well aware of what it can do. The PAF stayed well clear of the IAF during kargil, even when they became aware of the operational details of musharraf's hare brained scheme.

the PAF will go all out to protect it's fighter assets. the PA can maybe afford to lose some men but the PAF cannot replace planes so easily now. So they will be shy in engagements.

If they are foolish enough to attack our population centers, they will deeply and immediately regret it.

The PA is already getting an unprecedented pasting on the borders from the IA. Modi is the new sherrif in town.

Aircraft from the usual suspect gulf partners may not be available this time around for the PAF to augment its resources as they themselves are all embroiled in their own little shooting war with Syria and the loser ISIS lot.

India is too big a market for the gelf to annoy and also we now have alternate sources for oil from russsia and south amreica.

Incidentally, the dhruv can lift higher loads at altitude.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Sanju » 23 Jul 2017 20:23

RDji, IIRC, there was an article from Ravi Rikhiye of Orbat that you had alluded to, wherein he had written that the PLA had been enamoured by the "shock & awe" of the GW I & GW II and had markedly decreased their number of soldiers to around 900 K. They were investing in more of the missiles and other armaments that can be delivered without involving their soldiers in direct contact.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 23 Jul 2017 20:32

A list of major Chinese military installations, radar sites and logistics hubs near the border with India with coordinates. Will provide kmz file later
https://youtu.be/KtCb2P_KOgA

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Mort Walker » 23 Jul 2017 20:36

Is Ravi Rikhiye still around and updating ORBAT data? I thought he had retired.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SwamyG » 23 Jul 2017 20:44

panduranghari wrote:Kaplan in one of his talks inverted the map of China and its relation to the Indo-China Sea. We can see the scale of the problem facing China there.

That is a great inverted map of China; and gives a great perspective. Pandas should be frightened in my opinion. Look at this way. On one side they have the mighty Himalayas, then have captured Tibet a land that does not belong to them, then far over they have bunch of Muslims and Muslim territory with different ethnicity, then they have the cold Mongolia and Russian borders. Then very close they have Japan an arch rival in the recent history; and then a bunch of smaller countries and lands that it has tried to concur and subjugate.

Granted Chinese migration into S.E.Asia ranks probably as one of the largest migration in human history; there are just too many countries (and types of people) in its vicinity that do not trust China. China's influence on them is fear and intimidation - and of course economics. Such holds can be broken by India with good strategic planning and actions.

Both India and China can gain allies and enemies in those lands, and keep China and India embattled in that region, without ever bringing it to the shores of India. :mrgreen: India is the nice kid, China is the bully. In order to appreciate the nice, one needs a bully around. The nice kid just needs to be strong and mind its business.

Give China a break folks, allow it back to come into Indic Sphere of Influence.
Last edited by SwamyG on 23 Jul 2017 20:53, edited 4 times in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SwamyG » 23 Jul 2017 20:47

ramana wrote:
Pratyush wrote:The map is upside down. Please fix it. I will delete this post when done.



Its on purpose to make one think. India projects into Indian Ocean,
Vice Admiral M.N> Roy (R) made this very point in US Naval Institute Proceedings in mid 1990s

I don;t understand the penchant of members to take offence very quickly as if they know everything,

I am sorry I should have posted the link to the tweet where Harpreet makes it clear the intention of the inverted map. Sorry Pratyush to cause confusion.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby nam » 23 Jul 2017 21:31

This "brigadification" business is great for overseas deployment, fighting helpless countries, TV wars and works for USA because of the hammer called USAF.

How will the Chinese use brigades against a large army formation? Let say there are 25 PLA brigades with their own artillery support. Will they will have 25 point of action? Will PLAAF be on call at 25 points? How will integral artillery work with other brigade artillery? Will the artillery move with the brigades? or sit together with other brigade artillery?

So say against a IA Strike Corps will these brigades fight their own battles? If the brigades have to be deployed together because it has to face a Corp, well what is the point of having brigades? They might as well be divisions.

Even if 25 brigades make 25 point of entry , any brigade meeting IA corps would be decimated. Corps don't even have to call in for IAF, as they can handle the brigades themselves. Which leaves IAF lot of time on their hand .....having fun with brigades "integral" air support.

Or I am being naïve.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby GopiD » 23 Jul 2017 21:59

shiv wrote:A list of major Chinese military installations, radar sites and logistics hubs near the border with India with coordinates. Will provide kmz file later
https://youtu.be/KtCb2P_KOgA



Great video Shiv ji. Thanks for your efforts. Will make sure to do my bit and pass it on.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby chetak » 23 Jul 2017 22:19

SwamyG wrote:
ramana wrote:

Its on purpose to make one think. India projects into Indian Ocean,
Vice Admiral M.N> Roy (R) made this very point in US Naval Institute Proceedings in mid 1990s

I don;t understand the penchant of members to take offence very quickly as if they know everything,

I am sorry I should have posted the link to the tweet where Harpreet makes it clear the intention of the inverted map. Sorry Pratyush to cause confusion.


All these and more have been postulated more than a century earlier by a great amreki naval thinker called A T Mahan whose theories revolutionised thinking in naval warfare/strategy and greatly influenced even countries like japan during ww2.

All other navies have used mahan's ideas in one form or the other

Like the hans, India also has been influenced by mahan. one of his primary postulates for a great sea power status was a country with two coasts dominating the waters therein. India with it's two coasts, jutting out greatly into the ocean is like a huge aircraft carrier moored permanently in place and also straddling two oceans fits the bill. This gives us an immeasurable advantage over the hans

We are close to choke points and other hostile assets which have to be supported from a great distance by the hans. They do not have any history or experience in such operations of using ships or even aircraft. what they do have is the experience of mao's rag tag barefoot army and this will not help much in the extreme weather conditions of doklam.

read carefully mahan's six elements of sea power.


By arguing that sea power—the strength of a nation’s navy—was the key to strong foreign policy, Alfred Thayer Mahan shaped American military planning and helped prompt a worldwide naval race in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Mahan studied at Columbia for two years beginning in 1854—he was a member of the Philolexian Society, the campus literary club established in 1802—before decamping for Annapolis, from which he graduated in 1859. A longtime naval officer who cut his teeth on the Union side in the Civil War, Mahan eventually lectured on history and strategy at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. It was there, inspired in part by a history of Rome, that he began developing his theories; in 1890 he turned his lecture notes into The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783.


Appearing at a time when Japan and the nations of Europe were engaged in a fiercely competitive arms race, Mahan’s work had a singularly profound influence on politics worldwide. In the United States, Mahan’s theories found a particularly receptive audience in Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt: His work bolstered the case for rapid expansion and reconfiguration of the U.S. Navy, which replaced small cruisers with massive battleships and underwent a concomitant change in tactics; continued expansion overseas (to the Philippines, Hawaii and other Pacific islands, and the Caribbean), which allowed the creation bases at which U.S. ships could refuel and protect commerce; and even the construction of the Panama Canal, which facilitated the movement of fleets and freight. Mahan’s work influenced strategists in other countries as well, leading to naval buildups in England, Germany, and Japan in particular.

Although Mahan saw military might as a means for avoiding war, the global growth inspired by his theories very clearly set the stage for World War I.


Image
Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914)

The Geopolitical Vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan


The Geopolitical Vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan

One hundred years later, the insights of the American strategist continue to have extraordinary relevance today.

By Francis P. Sempa
December 30, 2014



December 1, 2014, was the 100th anniversary of the death of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the renowned naval historian, strategist, and geopolitical theorist. It was an anniversary, unfortunately, that went largely unnoticed. Beginning in 1890 and continuing for more than two decades, Mahan, from his perch at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, wrote twenty books and hundreds of articles in an effort to educate the American people and their leaders about the importance of history and geography to the study and practice of international relations. His understanding of the anarchical nature of international politics, the importance of geography to the global balance of power, the role of sea power in national security policy, and history’s ability to shed light on contemporary world politics remains relevant to the 21st century world.

Mahan, the son of the legendary West Point instructor Dennis Hart Mahan, was born in 1840, graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1859, served in the Union Navy during the Civil War, and thereafter served on numerous ships and at several naval stations until finding his permanent home at the Naval War College. In 1883, he authored his first book, The Gulf and Inland Waters, a study of naval engagements in the Civil War. It was his second book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 (1890), however, that brought him national and international fame. The book, largely based on Mahan’s lectures at the Naval War College, became the “bible” for many navies around the world. Kaiser Wilhelm II reportedly ordered a copy of the book placed aboard every German warship.

In his memoirs, From Sail to Steam, Mahan credited his reading of Theodore Mommsen’s six-volume History of Rome for the insight that sea power was the key to global predominance. In The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, Mahan reviewed the role of sea power in the emergence and growth of the British Empire. In the book’s first chapter, he described the sea as a “great highway” and “wide common” with “well-worn trade routes” over which men pass in all directions. He identified several narrow passages or strategic “chokepoints,” the control of which contributed to Great Britain’s command of the seas. He famously listed six fundamental elements of sea power: geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, size of population, character of the people, and character of government. Based largely on those factors, Mahan envisioned the United States as the geopolitical successor to the British Empire.

Eight years before the Spanish-American War resulted in the United States becoming a world power with overseas possessions, Mahan wrote an article in the Atlantic Monthly entitled “The United States Looking Outward,” (1890) in which he urged U.S. leaders to recognize that our security and interests were affected by the balance of power in Europe and Asia. Mahan understood that the United States, like Great Britain, was geopolitically an island lying offshore the Eurasian landmass whose security could be threatened by a hostile power or alliance of powers that gained effective political control of the key power centers of Eurasia. He further understood that predominant Anglo-American sea power in its broadest sense was the key to ensuring the geopolitical pluralism of Eurasia. He famously wrote in The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire that it was the navy of Great Britain (“those far distant storm-beaten ships”) that stood between Napoleon and the dominion of the world.

This was a profound geopolitical insight based on an understanding of the impact of geography on history. In later writings, Mahan reviewed the successive moves toward European continental hegemony by the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs, Louis XIV’s France, and Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, and the great coalitions, supported by sea power, that successfully thwarted those would-be hegemons.

In subsequent articles and books, Mahan accurately envisioned the geopolitical struggles of the 20th and 21st centuries. In The Interest of America in International Conditions (1910), Mahan foresaw the then-emerging First World War and the underlying geopolitical conditions leading to the Second World War, recognizing that Germany’s central position in Europe, her unrivalled industrial and military might on the continent, and her quest for sea power posed a threat to Great Britain and ultimately the United States. “A German navy, supreme by the fall of Great Britain,” he warned, “with a supreme German army able to spare readily a large expeditionary force for over-sea operations, is one of the possibilities of the future.” “The rivalry between Germany and Great Britain to-day,” he continued, “is the danger point, not only of European politics but of world politics as well.” It remained so for 35 years.

Mahan also grasped as early as 1901 the fundamental geopolitical realities of the Cold War that emerged from the ashes of the first two world wars. In The Problem of Asia, Mahan urged statesmen to “glance at the map” of Asia and note “the vast, uninterrupted mass of the Russian Empire, stretching without a break . . . from the meridian of western Asia Minor, until to the eastward it overpasses that of Japan.” He envisioned an expansionist Russia needing to be contained by an alliance of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Japan, which is precisely what happened between 1945 and 1991. (This was the great game)

Mahan’s prescience did not end there, however. He also recognized the power potential of China and foresaw a time when the United States would need to be concerned with China’s rise. In 1893, Mahan wrote a letter to the editor of the New York Times in which he recommended U.S. annexation of Hawaii as a necessary first step to exercise control of the North Pacific. If the United States failed to act, Mahan warned, “the vast mass of China . . . may yield to one of those impulses which have in past ages buried civilization under a wave of barbaric invasion.” Should China “burst her barriers eastward,” he wrote, “it would be impossible to exaggerate the momentous issues dependent upon a firm hold of the [Hawaiian] Islands by a great civilized maritime power.”

Similarly, in The Problem of Asia, Mahan depicted a future struggle for power in the area of central Asia he called the “debatable and debated ground,” and identified the “immense latent force” of China as a potential geopolitical rival. “[I]t is scarcely desirable,” Mahan wrote, “that so vast a proportion of mankind as the Chinese constitute should be animated by but one spirit and moved as a single man.” Mahan knew that Western science and technology would at some point be globalized and wrote that under such circumstances “it is difficult to contemplate with equanimity such a vast mass as the four hundred millions of China concentrated into one effective political organization, equipped with modern appliances, and cooped within a territory already narrow for it.”


Like Germany before the First World War, China in the 21st century has embraced Mahan. Naval War College professors Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes have examined the writings of contemporary Chinese military thinkers and strategists in this regard in their important work, Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan. With regard to Mahan’s elements of sea power, China is situated in the heart of east-central Asia and has a lengthy sea-coast, a huge population, a growing economy, growing military and naval power, and, at least for now, a stable government. China’s political and military leaders have not hidden their desire to supplant the United States as the predominant power in the Asia-Pacific region. Under these circumstances, China’s embrace of Mahan is reason enough for Americans to reacquaint themselves with the writings of that great American strategic thinker.

Francis P. Sempa is the author of Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Transaction Books) and America’s Global Role: Essays and Reviews on National Security, Geopolitics, and War (University Press of America). He has written articles and reviews on historical and foreign policy topics for Strategic Review, American Diplomacy, Joint Force Quarterly, the University Bookman, the Washington Times, the Claremont Review of Books, and other publications. He is an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, an adjunct professor of political science at Wilkes University, and a contributing editor to American Diplomacy.

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Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Peregrine » 23 Jul 2017 23:01

X Posted on the Analyzing CPEC & STFUP Threads

China's New Chick : China's Proposed Infrastructure Project Running Through PoK | Exclusive



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0QDbLhOqrO8

Cheers Image

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby ldev » 23 Jul 2017 23:18

India's geography and relations with it's major neighbor's is such that India is effectively an island. Compared to most nations that have land borders with other nations, the amount of trade and people traffic from India to Pakistan/China/Bangladesh/Burma by land is miniscule in comparison with other countries. Look at nations in the Middle East, South East Asia, Africa, Europe, North America and South America and compare passenger and goods traffic across their land borders and then compare the same with India and it's neighbors. India's overseas trade and passenger traffic is overwhelmingly by sea and air, not land.

Furthermore as mentioned earlier by many posters India occupies a very central place in the Indian Ocean region. As such, both to protect it's international trade which is overwhelmingly sea borne and to deny other countries access to their sea borne trade, India needs a powerful navy both to control the seas and to control the air space over those seas.

The land battles with China and/or Pakistan will be effectively stalemates as the necessary force superiority required to make a large scale breakthrough is difficult to accumulate for either side. Just remember Kargil and the fact that it took 6 weeks to dislodge the PA from a very small area. Now multiply Kargil to the entire India-China land border........ So what should be prioritized is the defence of critical land fronts such as the Siliguri corridor.

And the decisive battles will be sea denial strategies to China by interdicting and blockading their commercial shipping in the Indian Ocean, especially oil.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SwamyG » 23 Jul 2017 23:50

Are we sure China does not have good experience plying ships? I thought they have experience with various types of crafts in the Indo-China area.

Anyways, in the 21st century the role of air power has taken over or is important. Naval power alone won't do.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby VinodTK » 23 Jul 2017 23:59

shiv wrote:A list of major Chinese military installations, radar sites and logistics hubs near the border with India with coordinates. Will provide kmz file later
https://youtu.be/KtCb2P_KOgA

Thanks Shiv for the good video, as usual great job

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby A Nandy » 24 Jul 2017 00:21

I guess we also have phased array stations in proper locations.

Since they can see our planes above the horizon, we need to take out their elint minutes before bombing their airports. I guess it would take some very dangerous flying to stay below the horizon all the way.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby BSR Murthy » 24 Jul 2017 04:16

Thanks Shiv for the excellent videos and narration. Looks like the SAM sites are serviceable by Brahmos ER.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby anupmisra » 24 Jul 2017 04:24

American Analyst Describing Why China is Worried About Rising India


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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby anupmisra » 24 Jul 2017 04:46

The China Bubble


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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SriKumar » 24 Jul 2017 05:02

Posting this article because it seems to have some useful information collated in one place (Iftikar Jilani is author). The article seems to be reasonably well-written. His headline is 'Whimper of the dragon- New Delhi's response has rattled the dragon' :) (Nice contrast to all the hot air coming from rest of the media').

http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-th ... on-2510941

List of recent incursions by China- the Sept. 14 incursion was *during* XI Jinping's visit to India after Modi was just elected.
March 2015: Burtse and Depsang in north of Ladakh, twice in a week
September 2014: Lasted 16 days in Chumur sector in southern Ladakh
April 15, 2013: Near DBO in J&K’s Ladakh. Lasted till May 5
Last edited by SriKumar on 24 Jul 2017 05:08, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Bade » 24 Jul 2017 05:03

^^^ By opposing OBOR/CPEC India has pissed them off as it impacts their growth rate plans. They are readying themselves for a Asia wide Marshall Plan to keep growing. After CPEC it is going to be Nepal & Bangladesh along with the rest of south east Asian nations.

If India were to destroy their infra in Chumbi valley and beyond, but not hold on to territory then it would still be a victory for them, sort of. They will just be happy to go back to rebuilding all of that to keep their growth rates up. If more than 50% of their economy is just building infra, then their pain or loss of face will be short-lived.

The only way to give a permanent blow to their ego is to keep what we bomb out.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SriKumar » 24 Jul 2017 05:22

^^^ I am still incredulous at any suggestion that China's aggressive response is due to India's boycott of OBOR. If this is actually the case, their India experts must have their heads examined and should be fired en masse- putting it politely.

China has gone out of its way to publicly humiliate India, both as a nation, and personally at the PM of India (when XI Jinping visited India) and there are other incidents. On a substantative note, they have supported terrorist Pakistan with weapons and Masood Azhar in particular and opposed any integration of Arunachal Pradesh, protesting visits by Manmohan Singh, Pranab Ray and recently Narendra Modi.

For them to genuinely expect Indian cooperation in a Chinese expansionist plan suggests they really way off in reading Indian intent. I dont know if this is good thing or a bad thing- it could be used to India's advantage.

China protests Narendra Modi visit to Arunachal Pradesh: (Note is is the PM of India, not Dalai Lama visit they are protesting).
http://www.firstpost.com/world/china-pr ... 12461.html

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Bade » 24 Jul 2017 05:28

They are afraid that India will one day absorb both Bhutan and Nepal too. So they will keep opposing Arunachal as a part of India, till a time that at least Bhutan becomes a part of India, if not Nepal.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SriKumar » 24 Jul 2017 05:29

Bade wrote:If India were to destroy their infra in Chumbi valley and beyond, but not hold on to territory then it would still be a victory for them, sort of. They will just be happy to go back to rebuilding all of that to keep their growth rates up. If more than 50% of their economy is just building infra, then their pain or loss of face will be short-lived.
I fully agree with the bolded part. If the war is fought with no permanent changes to the border or agreements on what infra China can build near the border, then it is back to pre-June 2017, IMO. They will continue to build road infra wherever they want along the border- then bring troops in. The 'loss-of-face' thingy...whatever it means in substantative terms I'll never understand, will be temporary/fleeting. China could very well start another incursion next year and Indian Army will respond to it yet again as it has in the past. And Arunachal will still be disputed....'62 attack was in Arunachal (and Ladakh).
Last edited by SriKumar on 24 Jul 2017 05:40, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Bade » 24 Jul 2017 05:40

They can dispute Arunachal all they want, but simply cannot hold on to it. The very reason they left as soon as they came in '62. If they had overstayed they would have seen a loss of face in the least and chased out in any case.

Similarly holding on to Chumbi valley for India from just one side in Sikkim is tricky as of now. Occupation will take some effort and full co-operation from Bhutan.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 24 Jul 2017 07:00

BSR Murthy wrote:Looks like the SAM sites are serviceable by Brahmos ER.

Radar sites also

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 24 Jul 2017 07:03

SriKumar wrote:^^^ I am still incredulous at any suggestion that China's aggressive response is due to India's boycott of OBOR. If this is actually the case, their India experts must have their heads examined and should be fired en masse- putting it politely.

China has gone out of its way to publicly humiliate India, both as a nation, and personally at the PM of India (when XI Jinping visited India) and there are other incidents. On a substantative note, they have supported terrorist Pakistan with weapons and Masood Azhar in particular and opposed any integration of Arunachal Pradesh, protesting visits by Manmohan Singh, Pranab Ray and recently Narendra Modi.

For them to genuinely expect Indian cooperation in a Chinese expansionist plan suggests they really way off in reading Indian intent. I dont know if this is good thing or a bad thing- it could be used to India's advantage.

China protests Narendra Modi visit to Arunachal Pradesh: (Note is is the PM of India, not Dalai Lama visit they are protesting).
http://www.firstpost.com/world/china-pr ... 12461.html


It is our people and media who need to be exposed to the bhen(#0dgiri of two of our neighbours. We tend to be over-kind and over-forgiving of a bunch of mofos who need to be spoken of in the most contemptuous terms.

Unfortunately too many people project "Indian culture" as not doing and saying such things - which is a load of trollop.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 24 Jul 2017 07:12

shiv wrote:A list of major Chinese military installations, radar sites and logistics hubs near the border with India with coordinates. Will provide kmz file later
https://youtu.be/KtCb2P_KOgA


I am told that Google Earth and YouTube are both blocked in China - which means that the information in the video is completely inaccessible to 1.3 billion Chinese in the mainland :P

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Bade » 24 Jul 2017 07:21

The only way to punish the Chinese for Doka La and other intrusions across the undemarcated border is to activate slowly a military takeover of PoK. This has to be put full steam ahead, irrespective of what the residents in PoK think.

India will not declare war on China unilaterally, but nothing stops it from recovering what India claims as its territory. So we are on strong legal grounds even to do this. Same with Aksai Chin later after PoK is settled.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby SaiK » 24 Jul 2017 07:50

PoK can't be settled as a piece meal exercise without thinking about the greater destruction of paki land.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Bade » 24 Jul 2017 08:24

That is a recipe for inaction, with threat of nuclear war. Chinese intervention or US not being too happy with the outcome. Any terrorist violence in J&K is good enough grounds to go after PoK. Dismembering Pakistan requires a larger objective which does not exist now...unless we wait for a build out of Chinese infra with Gwadar as a military base. By then we are confronting China directly a decade or more down the road. Better do it piecemeal now, before it is too late.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby shiv » 24 Jul 2017 09:23

https://twitter.com/acorn/status/889311934385840128
Nitin Pai‏Verified account @acorn

We shouldn't rule out the possibility that Beijing will fire the first shot when India's NSA Ajit Doval visits later this week.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 24 Jul 2017 09:51

PLA 90th Anniversary is on 1 - August 2017. They wont put up a fight until its finished

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Lekhraj » 24 Jul 2017 10:06

shiv wrote:https://twitter.com/acorn/status/889311934385840128
Nitin Pai‏Verified account @acorn

We shouldn't rule out the possibility that Beijing will fire the first shot when India's NSA Ajit Doval visits later this week.


Yes, this is very much possible. Hans do not respect Indians and will tend to show middle finger.

IA / IAF should be prepared for the same.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Iyersan » 24 Jul 2017 10:59

PLA vows to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity ahead of 90th anniversary
http://www.ecns.cn/military/2017/07-24/266489.shtml
Yes, It could be that shots are fired this week

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Philip » 24 Jul 2017 13:44

The Eco-War has begun. 3 cheers for that! The Patriots have swung into action. The SJM has finally swung into public action after warning china earlier.The arrogant sh*tworms of Zhongnanhai have learnt nothing about India since '62 ,and are probably sky-high in their opium dens. Now for street protests to begin.

http://www.asianage.com/india/all-india ... goods.html
RSS-backed body starts war against Chinese goods
THE ASIAN AGE. | PAWAN BALI Published : Jul 24, 2017, 5:28 am IST Updated : Jul 24, 2017, 5:28 am IST

India-China border standoff: RSS targets blanket boycott by Diwali.

Organiser in a separate article has called on the people to boycott Chinese products as imports have resulted in closure of companies in India, leading to mass unemployment. (Photo: Representational Image)
Organiser in a separate article has called on the people to boycott Chinese products as imports have resulted in closure of companies in India, leading to mass unemployment. (Photo: Representational Image)
New Delhi: With increased hostility at the border with China, RSS-backed Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM) has threatened to intensify its boycott campaign against Chinese products to see that by Diwali “not a single rupee Chinese product will be purchased or sold in the Indian markets”.

In an interview in RSS mouthpiece Organiser, SJM claimed that due to its pressure, the Modi government had imposed a steep 18 per cent anti-dumping duty on Chinese steel and barred them from bidding in “power, steel, railways, plastic industries”.

Organiser in a separate article has called on the people to boycott Chinese products as imports have resulted in closure of companies in India, leading to mass unemployment.

“China is engaged in fierce inimical hostilities with Bharat. Yet, we have been bolstering the Chinese economy by purchasing Chinese products, worth more than Rs 4-5 lakh crores a year, leading to industrial closures, large scale unemployment and wide trade deficit for the country, ranging between $45 to $52 billion a year in the past 3 years,” said the article published in the magazine.

SJM national vice-president and head of Rashtriya Swadeshi Suraksha Abhiyan Satish Kumar said that the organisation had collected more than 87 lakh signatures from people who had taken a pledge of boycotting Chinese goods.

“The abhiyan is gaining momentum. They are burning Chinese goods publicly. Demonstrations are being organised all over the country. We are on the right track. I hope, by this Diwali, entire Bharat will be aware of Chinese nefarious designs and not a single rupee Chinese product will be purchased or sold in the Indian markets,” he said.
:mrgreen:

He said that different activities were being conducted as part of the campaign.

“Demonstrations outside the Chinese Embassy, mass protests in Delhi and other parts of the country are being held. Market associations across cities have also passed resolutions not to import and sale any Chinese good. We are motivating Indian industries to take up manufacturing,” he added.

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Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)

Postby Dumal » 24 Jul 2017 13:53

http://www.rediff.com/news/report/dont-harbour-unrealistic-illusions-china-warns-india/20170724.htm

In this version of the PLA/Defence Ministry hollering today, in the middle of it all lies what almost looks like a plea:"cease provocations, and meet China halfway in jointly safeguarding the border region's peace and tranquillity". Given their penchant for extremely rude and threatening vocabulary, this is a surprise. Have we been showing them a middle finger so firmly, that they are signalling a climb-down but habitually couched it within a barrage of threats.


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