Neutering & Defanging Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Doklam face-off a power play by New Delhi in the disguise of border dispute
By Zhang Ye Source:Global Times Published: 2017/7/27 19:58:40
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1058378.shtml
By Zhang Ye Source:Global Times Published: 2017/7/27 19:58:40
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1058378.shtml
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
samirdiw jisamirdiw wrote:Why wait till a fight starts instead of training in the basics much earlier? How much training can be got in the midst of a war? Higher training can be provided for the better fighters.Pratyush wrote:
Having a professional army doesn't mean not supported by non-professional. If the US or Russia fight a war where they see large losses dont you think they would force a conscription even though they may have professional armies. In the US even recently when the talk of women having the right to join all divisions including seals came up the question was then doesn't it mean that women have the responsibility to be conscripted and quite a few women said it makes sense.
Would we rather talk about mobile phones? Chinese wouldn't care a shit about mobile phones if their strategic objectives are met. And Indians will be rebuying mobile phones from them in a few years anyway.
Cool your jets boss.
We are OK on the armed forces front. Nothing for anyone to worry about.
plus ALL soldiers/officers released from service are on a five year compulsory reserve list, which means that they can all officially be called up again to wear the uniform and they are all ready trained to fight.
After retirement they all keep fighting with their wives so they are all fully battle hardened and raring to go.
-
- BRFite
- Posts: 604
- Joined: 31 Dec 2016 00:40
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
chetak wrote:samirdiw wrote: .
After retirement they all keep fighting with their wives so they are all fully battle hardened and raring to go.


Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Please forgive me. The kind word for your post is "ignorant". The word that seems most appropriate is "idiotic"samirdiw wrote: Why wait till a fight starts instead of training in the basics much earlier? How much training can be got in the midst of a war? Higher training can be provided for the better fighters.
Having a professional army doesn't mean not supported by non-professional.
I think that you have not heard of the word "logistics" Basically when one is at home with mummy and daddy, one of them buys cereals, vegetables, milk, sugar in advance to be ready for the next day's meal. That aside one of them will start early and cook the meal so people can eat. This goes on an on and on every day. This is an example of "logistics" having what is needed at the right time and place
Luckily most people have only a handful of people in the family.
One division of soldiers (assume 10,000 men/women) in wartime require 500 tons of stuff every day for food, water, fuel, ammunition, spares, medicines and other things. These 500 tons per day have to come up roads. Those roads may be bombed and transport may be slow but the army has plans and ways of ensuring that these supplies reach the right people on time most of the time.
if you add 20,000 untrained civilians to this mix these buggers will have to eat and drink and get treated for injuries, diarrhoea etc. They will be shitting and dying all over the place and preventing the army from doing its job. They will be clogging up the same roads that the army needs to supply soldiers. and their rice and sambar and gas stove/firewood/Bisleri bottles will be taking up weight and space that would otherwise be used for soldiers food and fuel. Your idea is stupid. Please stop. Your ignorance amounts to trolling.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
No need to be condescending and rude for just suggesting raising a volunteer force within a larger age group on standby without pay.shiv wrote:Please forgive me. The kind word for your post is "ignorant". The word that seems most appropriate is "idiotic"samirdiw wrote: Why wait till a fight starts instead of training in the basics much earlier? How much training can be got in the midst of a war? Higher training can be provided for the better fighters.
Having a professional army doesn't mean not supported by non-professional.
Btw are you from the army/ex-army man Shiv? It will be good to get a view point from an ex-army person if there are any in BRF. Otherwise, it's just one idiot against other idiots.

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
This is not the thread to discuss this matter. Please take it to appropriate thread.samirdiw wrote: No need to be condescending and rude for just suggesting raising a volunteer force within a larger age group on standby without pay.
Btw are you from the army/ex-army man Shiv? It will be good to get a view point from an ex-army person if there are any in BRF. Otherwise, it's just one idiot against other idiots.
-
- BRFite
- Posts: 604
- Joined: 31 Dec 2016 00:40
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
sir no need to hide your arrogence behind smiley.. Shiv sir is very senior and respectable member on this forum.. Try to understand his advise without being this ignorent..sorry for OT post..samirdiw wrote:No need to be condescending and rude for just suggesting raising a volunteer force within a larger age group on standby without pay.shiv wrote: Please forgive me. The kind word for your post is "ignorant". The word that seems most appropriate is "idiotic"
Btw are you from the army/ex-army man Shiv? It will be good to get a view point from an ex-army person if there are any in BRF. Otherwise, it's just one idiot against other idiots.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
China border stance firm
By Yang Sheng Source:Global Times Published: 2017/7/27 23:38:40
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1058440.shtml
By Yang Sheng Source:Global Times Published: 2017/7/27 23:38:40
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1058440.shtml
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Btw ORBAT lists 1.3 Mil as army and equal number as reserves. What are reserves and what issues it may face if they have to be recalled?
Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Iyersan :Iyersan wrote:China border stance firm
By Yang Sheng Source:Global Times Published: 2017/7/27 23:38:40
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1058440.shtml
Really? Sorry, Empty Threats!
REALITY :
China sends conciliatory signals after Doval's first meeting
BEIJING: National Security Adviser Ajit Doval met with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi on Thursday opening up possibilities of a deescalation of tensions over the border standoff. This is the first meeting between India's top security officials since the standoff started in mid June.
Yang who is China's state counsellor also held separate meetings with security officials of three other countries on the sidelines of a security dialogue of BRICS nations comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
He discussed issues concerning bilateral relations, international and regional issues and multilateral affairs with the visiting security officials, the official Xinhua news agency said.
The impact of the bilateral meeting was evident in a commentary released by the official Xinhua news agency which sent out a conciliatory signal hours before Dovam is expected to meet Chinese president Xi Jinping on Friday. It talked about the need to enhance mutual trust as the two counties are "not born rivals".
There were signs that the two neighbours were heading towards a deescalation of tensions caused by a military standoff on the border near Sikkim.
This is the first time in weeks that the official media ran a commentary without demanding withdrawal of Indian troops from the disputed Doklam region. China has so far been insisting that troop withdrawal is a pre-condition to a "meaningful dialogue".
Doval reached Beijing on Thursday ahead of his planned meetings with Chinese president Xi Jinping and State Counsellor Yang Jeiche on Friday.
The commentary made a strong plea to avoid the possibility of a war. "Most economies, including those in the West, will find themselves negatively affected by an India-China war in a globalized and intertwined world today," it said.
"The recent border issue between the two countries shows a lack of strategic trust on the Indian side," Xinhua said. It is not China but a set of problems common to all developing countries like corruption, a lack of quality education and healthcare is holding back India.
"India must understand that China wishes what's good for the Indian people and would love to see a strong India standing shoulder by shoulder with China," Xinhua, which reflects the government's thinking said giving an emotional touch to the vexed relationship.
Doval's formal purpose of visiting Beijing is to attend a security dialogue of BRICS nations, he is expected to discuss the border standoff with Chinese leaders in separate meetings. Chinese foreign ministry has said that bilateral meetings are usually held during BRICS meetings and indirectly confirmed meetings on the border issue with Doval.
"Instead of being rivals, India and China have much more common ground, common interests and common aspirations. Both as developing countries, the two need to work together on important issues like fighting climate change, protectionism and the financial privileges of Washington," Xinhua said.
It further said, "Hopefully, wisdom will guide the two countries to common prosperity. There is more than enough room for them to co-exist and thrive in Asia and in the world".
"Both China and India need to enhance communication and nurture trust between them, first by recognizing that the two are not born rivals and that harboring ill will against each other is dangerous," Xinhua added.
Cheers

Last edited by Peregrine on 27 Jul 2017 22:01, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Rather! civvies should be deployed in support roles (transport of ammunition, food, medic supplies, evacuation of injured, etc).,samirdiw wrote:
They should be provided assault rifles and ammo. They can fight closer to the border areas along with some groups of the main army. This way the supplies wont be an issue as they will be supported by civilians moving ever closer to the boundary. They will also cover areas without the main military so that chinese will find it difficult to circle around the main army.
Instead of sitting and folks fighting on facebook and twitter why not the govt prepare to support the main army from the start instead of avoiding the war of attrition.
Only rifles and ammo are not enough to make an effective fighting force..It will be too difficult to provide required supplies ,medical aid to these people.. Half knowledge is always dangerous.. Giving people better emergency training/ Dos and Don'ts during war is ok but using civilians for fighting border war in himalays will cause more problems..
Check this how Civilians aided the police in capturing and/or executing the Pakistani paratroopers in 1965 war.
http://www.dailyo.in/politics/1965-war- ... /6300.html
Continuing my series of notes on some of the more interesting aspects of the 1965 war with Pakistan in its 50th anniversary year, let me take you back to one of the most remarkable, but short-lived and relatively less talked about, events of that war.
It was the audacious para-commando attack by Pakistan with the intention of crippling three of the Indian Air Force's (IAF) most crucial and largest airbases in Punjab: Pathankot, Halwara (near Ludhiana) and Adampur (near Jalandhar).
This was on the night between September 6 and 7. On the September 6, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) carried out rather successful raids on those bases, causing large-scale destruction at Pathankot. Combined with an early setback over Chhamb, the loss of four Vampires, this was supposed to have left the IAF in disarray. And nightly commando drops were to take full advantage of that.
These were no small bands of paratroopers. Large C-130 Hercules aircrafts were used, taking advantage of the fact that India had no night-capable fighters in that war, and three groups of 60 paratroopers each were dropped in the vicinity of each airbase. Each group was lead by one or two officers and a junior commissioned officer (JCO).
The Pathankot group was the first to be discovered. It had an unintercepted yet far-from-perfect drop at 2.30am and was first noticed by a villager who raised an alarm. The Halwara group was spotted immediately thereafter. The Adampur group, in fact, partly landed inside the airbase perimeter and could have posed an immediate threat to an airbase bustling with frontline fighters and personnel, but only lightly protected by a Punjab Armed Police contingent as nobody had anticipated such tactical aggression and risk-taking by the Pakistanis.
On paper, the plan was brilliant. If it had even partly succeeded, it would have caused a serious blow to the IAF's strength and India's morale hours after initial reverses in the air and on the ground, mainly at Pathankot.
But true to Pakistan's track record, from Chhamb to Pathankot to para-commando raids, or from Kutch to Khem Karan to Kargil, great tactical dash is invariably followed by thoughtlessly incompetent execution, leading to disaster.
We have several accounts of the fate of these very well-trained paratroopers. But the amazing thing is how this is a chapter in that 50-year-old war where chroniclers of both sides agree. Both say the operation was a complete rout.
Of the 180 para-commandos dropped, 138, including all officers but one, were captured and safely taken to prisoner of war (POW) camps. Twenty-two were killed, or rather lynched by joint combing teams of villagers armed with sticks, police and even bands of muleteers released by the Army, from the animal transport battalion of the nearby Corps headquarters.
Only 20 para-commandos were unaccounted for and most escaped back to Pakistan under the fog. Most of these were from the Pathankot group, dropped less than 10km from the border in an area that had plenty of ravines, riverine tracks to navigate back along. One notable, commando-style escape was of Major Hazur Hasnain, the Halwara group commander who, along with his friend, hijacked an IAF jeep and somehow managed to return safe. I take the figures from Lt General Harbakhsh Singh's book, but Pakistani accounts fully confirm these.
The Pakistani accounts, the latest of which comes now from several participants in the wake of the 1965@50 commemorations, acknowledged the para-commando disaster but blamed it on poor briefing, planning and callous arrogance of the commanders. Some of these former Pakistani soldiers even write about having met some of these paratroopers and exchanged notes with them on how badly planned the operation was. Here is the account of Col SG Mehdi, himself a commando officer then.
The raid had immediately spread panic on the Indian side. A hurried defence was organised with the police leading the search parties along with large bands of enthusiastic villagers, NCC cadets and, of course, the muleteers whom the Army had released to fight one of the most ironical battle ever: muleteer versus para-commando. For airfield defence, a couple of wheeled armoured personnel carriers allocated to the local college NCC Wings were spared. By the time the sun shone in the morning, however, even the mopping up was over.
Pakistani accounts, however, claim that the raid caused confusion in Indian headquarters and resulted in its 14 Infantry Division, being moved from Lahore to the Sialkot sector to beef up the 1 Corps assault there, to be diverted to deal with the paratrooper menace. Some fanciful accounts now even claim that in the confusion, the 14 Division convoys were jammed on the highway and the PAF attacked these during daytime.
There is no confirmation from Indian accounts and Harbakhsh puts the total number of vehicles destroyed by the PAF quite low in that war. It’s an aside but this incident matches Anna Hazare's own spiced-up account of having been the lone survivor when the PAF hit a troop truck he was driving on a Punjab highway in that war.
Haste, arrogance and tactical foolhardiness had caused Pakistan the loss of the cream of it special forces then. Mule-drivers, other animal-handlers, NCC cadets, Punjab Police and ordinary villagers had earned their battle honours.
Last edited by SBajwa on 27 Jul 2017 22:01, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170726/51507444_0.shtml
From a retired Chinese Brigadier (use google translate). Talks of using artillery instead of facing the deeply entrenched Indian army head on. (assuming maybe like in the Vietnam skirmishes in and post 79. Note Vietnam used a lot of locals and non-regulars first along with the regulars and left a lot of main forces in the back)
From a retired Chinese Brigadier (use google translate). Talks of using artillery instead of facing the deeply entrenched Indian army head on. (assuming maybe like in the Vietnam skirmishes in and post 79. Note Vietnam used a lot of locals and non-regulars first along with the regulars and left a lot of main forces in the back)
Last edited by samirdiw on 27 Jul 2017 22:18, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Villagers hunting for the Baki paratroopers in 1965 war.


-
- BRFite
- Posts: 604
- Joined: 31 Dec 2016 00:40
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1058370.shtml
Australia woos India to counterbalance China
On her recent two-day visit to India, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said of the current China-India border standoff, "My understanding is that this is a long-term dispute ... Australia's position is that territorial disputes should be resolved peacefully between the claimant countries." This inappropriate remark reflects Australian politicians' ignorance about the event. There are no territorial disputes at the site where the incident takes place - Indian troops crossed into China's Doklam region illegally and refused to withdraw. Bishop's India visit amid ongoing Sino-Indian tensions is a representative for India's growing significance in Australia's strategic calculus. In fact, the Turnbull administration has made no secret of its intentions to deepen security cooperation with its Indian counterpart.
Traditionally, Australian strategists have largely ignored India. But with the so-called "Indo-Pacific" strategy becoming a predominant mantra in Australia's foreign policy, New Delhi soon became a natural strategic partner and a policy linchpin in Canberra's relations with the region. At the same time, the South China Sea issue, regional economic integrity, and China's Belt and Road initiative (BRI) all have pushed Australia to enthusiastically engage India - the latter is deemed as one of the few countries that can counterbalance China's regional clout.
Australia woos India to counterbalance China
On her recent two-day visit to India, Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said of the current China-India border standoff, "My understanding is that this is a long-term dispute ... Australia's position is that territorial disputes should be resolved peacefully between the claimant countries." This inappropriate remark reflects Australian politicians' ignorance about the event. There are no territorial disputes at the site where the incident takes place - Indian troops crossed into China's Doklam region illegally and refused to withdraw. Bishop's India visit amid ongoing Sino-Indian tensions is a representative for India's growing significance in Australia's strategic calculus. In fact, the Turnbull administration has made no secret of its intentions to deepen security cooperation with its Indian counterpart.
Traditionally, Australian strategists have largely ignored India. But with the so-called "Indo-Pacific" strategy becoming a predominant mantra in Australia's foreign policy, New Delhi soon became a natural strategic partner and a policy linchpin in Canberra's relations with the region. At the same time, the South China Sea issue, regional economic integrity, and China's Belt and Road initiative (BRI) all have pushed Australia to enthusiastically engage India - the latter is deemed as one of the few countries that can counterbalance China's regional clout.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Fully agree. It is easy to take action against China that is WTO compliant if GOI puts their mind to it. For e.g.schinnas wrote:The current steps government is taking in terms of looking at each product separately and in conformance with WTO and other rules is very siloed and myopic. We will not get anywhere with that approach. Even the private players involved give tips to government only relating to their particular use case and ignore the larger eco-system effect.schinnas wrote:China's exports to India in descending order of magnitude by $ value
.....
- Imports from Hong Kong to be treated as made in China (we actually treat them as separate entities).
- Have a floor price at which products will be valued at (e.g. Rs 5000 for a cellphone). It will affect low end products only and it is not our fault if they happen to be made mostly in 1 country. It will also eliminate under-invoicing. China will complain to WTO but it can be fought aggressively and we can drag out the case.
- 10% `Security surcharge' on imports from all countries supporting terrorism. (incl. refusal to blacklist international terrorists). This will be shot down by WTO, but the optics will be terrible for China and we gain US$ 5 billion in duties, in the year it takes WTO to decide. Alternately withdraw MFN status to Pak and China and charge higher duties.
- Any infra company that owes money to nationalised banks (they all do) will have to buy capital equipment from other companies that
owe money to banks (most do). That can be termed as `debt restructuring', rather than trade distorting decisions that China will claim they are.
- All Chinese applying for a work visa, have to get security clearance from MHA, after the employer proves that no Indian can do the job.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Exactly what I was thinking. Nobody will post civilian militias along with Army. They will be behind the battle lines as a support role, support whichever way necessary. It's just like US militia wherein any fit person between 17 and 45 can be called upon for these duties.SBajwa wrote:Haste, arrogance and tactical foolhardiness had caused Pakistan the loss of the cream of it special forces then. Mule-drivers, other animal-handlers, NCC cadets, Punjab Police and ordinary villagers had earned their battle honours.
Again, this is just example, there are militias in other places too.
I was watching a documentary sometime back. Someone ridiculed the present US militias saying, what such people have accomplished, a reply to that was: USA.
We had NCC in our schools, few of my classmates were very good shooters, some used to build good tents etc. Some continued even after that and joined engineering on NCC quota. Why waste such skills especially after giving them training.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
It is a hybrid if chinese supremacism and paki type bluster
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
In this case of course the brave villagers of Punjab had Pakis in their fields and helped hunt them down. there are other stories of villagers taking food for soldiers right up to the frontline under fireSBajwa wrote:Villagers hunting for the Baki paratroopers in 1965 war.
If you look closely at the image - you will see vertical scan lines. In the late 1990s I did not have a flatbed scanner but this image was in a booklet I have that I got in 1966 - with details of the 1965 war. I scanned the image using a hand held scanner which had to be rolled across the image and the scan lines are from that image - which I scanned maybe 2 decades ago from a 50 + year old booklet.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
If you read the history of the 1962 war many of our soldiers were killed in intense artillery and mortar barrages. So the Chinese general is not wrong. That said we are also going to use artillery. Artillery is the God of war. This "facing head on" is nonsense if you can pound the enemy and finish him off from many kilometers away.samirdiw wrote:http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170726/51507444_0.shtml
From a retired Chinese Brigadier (use google translate). Talks of using artillery instead of facing the deeply entrenched Indian army head on. (assuming maybe like in the Vietnam skirmishes in and post 79. Note Vietnam used a lot of locals and non-regulars first along with the regulars and left a lot of main forces in the back)
Guess what villagers in Vietnam helped with: LOGISTICS
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
The overall numbers are not very relevant, particularly when it comes to reservists.fanne wrote:Btw ORBAT lists 1.3 Mil as army and equal number as reserves. What are reserves and what issues it may face if they have to be recalled?
Shiv has pointed out some practical difficulties in inducting a large number of civilians into a battle zone. Some of these would apply to reservists.
Reservists have to be properly equipped (we are barely beginning to equip frontline infantry units with proper helmets, body armor and a rifle).
They have to be transported to the front - using the same transport and routes, meant for urgent supplies for existing units.
Reservists will have to have the experience of working seamlessly together (with people they may have never seen before) understand the local
terrain intimately. That said, I'm sure veterans, particularly from our hill regiments, will enthusiastically volunteer to help in any way.
Even the induction of our regular divisions in rear areas (e.g. Secunderabad or Pune) to the front, may take more time that the likely duration
of a war.
Reservists can and must be used for rear area duties like guarding airfields & infrastructure, patrolling gaps along the LAC (if the reservist hails from that area), traffic management, road opening etc. More aggressive use of reservists could see some replacing personnel of the RR deployed for counter insurgency, which in turn can release RR jawans to their parent infantry regiment in the Ladakh/Himachal area.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Yes it is one idiot against another. If you want to take it to that level. Be my guest. An armed forces person has actually said something after reading your posts. But you don't know about it.samirdiw wrote:No need to be condescending and rude for just suggesting raising a volunteer force within a larger age group on standby without pay.shiv wrote: Please forgive me. The kind word for your post is "ignorant". The word that seems most appropriate is "idiotic"
Btw are you from the army/ex-army man Shiv? It will be good to get a view point from an ex-army person if there are any in BRF. Otherwise, it's just one idiot against other idiots.
We are after all "Bharat Rakshak" and you are as much of a Rakshak as me and as much of an idiot also as me. Same club
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
To add my 2 cents worth to the posts about the volunteer force.
Outside of the native population, It would take a particularly fit man to be able to simply live in the 20 km belt along the LAC. These are high altitude areas, sparsely populated (75% of Tawang's population is the army), mountainous and forested. Consider the time it took to find the wreckage of a recently crashed IAF aircraft.
Outside of the native population, It would take a particularly fit man to be able to simply live in the 20 km belt along the LAC. These are high altitude areas, sparsely populated (75% of Tawang's population is the army), mountainous and forested. Consider the time it took to find the wreckage of a recently crashed IAF aircraft.
Last edited by Deans on 27 Jul 2017 22:58, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Aren't reservist ex armymen?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Yes and civil defence. Civil defence becomes really big in wartime in keeping a check on saboteurs, fifth columnists and general disrupters. And once bombs start falling their role becomes critical.Deans wrote:
Reservists can and must be used for rear area duties like guarding airfields & infrastructure, patrolling gaps along the LAC (if the reservist hails from that area), traffic management, road opening etc. More aggressive use of reservists could see some replacing personnel of the RR deployed for counter insurgency, which in turn can release RR jawans to their parent infantry regiment in the Ladakh/Himachal area.
Typically in wartime civilians in India unite to work and produce stuff or send gifts and packages to the armed forces. This was seen in 65, 71 and 99 People contribute to defence funds and hospitals are opened up for specialist casualties. In this situation one saboteur who sets a bomb off in a temple or something can provoke civil disturbances.
In 65 the war was in September around the time of Ganesh Chaturthi. I was in Pune and there was a rumour that a Pakistani (or a Muslim?) had urinated on a Ganesh idol. There were strict orders to scotch rumours. Media told to fall in line and the question of riots was not even allowed to arise. That was an era of blackouts - which I think will be of less use today - but i suspect blackouts will be there because roads and railway lines often serve as navigation aids for terminal targeting - and civil defence would ensure blackouts
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Yes. However, they would still have the constraints I listed in my earlier post. The exception would be reservists from our `Hill'' infantry regimentsfanne wrote:Aren't reservist ex armymen?
who would be living in the area and would most likely volunteer to help immediately.
As an aside, the IDF has a better reservist system because their country is very different from ours.
It takes an Israeli reservist a couple of hours to get from his home to the front (as it happened in 1973). They pick up their equipment from pre-positioned depots (very few are required, given the size of the country). They have tank `farms' of fully equipped tanks only waiting for reservists to arrive and crew them. The average age of a reservist in the US, Russia or Israel is 25, compared to 40+ in India. (it makes a difference when climbing a hill carrying 25kg at high altitude). With all that, IDF reservists and US national guardsmen took a higher proportion of casualties in the 2nd Hezbollah war and in Iraq respectively, because of their inexperience in the local terrain and relative lack of unit cohesion and leadership.
Last edited by Deans on 27 Jul 2017 23:24, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Yes and civil defence. Civil defence becomes really big in wartime in keeping a check on saboteurs, fifth columnists and general disrupters. And once bombs start falling their role becomes critical.shiv wrote:
[/quote]
True. From what little I have seen of civilian volunteers in civil defence, their level of knowledge, training and initiative is poor. This would be
an ideal place to induct reservists (e.g. to head a local civil defence team, or supplement the police force) and have preset procedures for activating them.
-
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 14045
- Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Wonder about the availability of MadeInChina non-stick frying pans that our intrepid BBBrigade can wield on the Doklam plateau to rout the PLA. Reading Mullah samir's persistent jihad seems very reminescent of the more durable forays at BRF by **** para-web-commandos back in the glory dins of 1999.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
On the topic of including civilians in a fight zone looks like the lesson of Marathas's defeat in Panipat has not been learned.
History repeats for those who don't pay attention.
The para drop by Pakis has removed any doubt in my mind that Pakis had plans to take over more than Kashmir in 65. The attack towards Lahore by India was described as surprise. No surprised army can para drop on 3 locations with a day or two of any attack by India. They were well prepared.
The Lahore front was not defended, because 1. Didn't want to flag the preparation 2. Urban space & canals can hold off IA attacks until counter mobilisation 3. Confidence that the India will be in disarrays after initial blow and will not be able to attack.
History repeats for those who don't pay attention.
The para drop by Pakis has removed any doubt in my mind that Pakis had plans to take over more than Kashmir in 65. The attack towards Lahore by India was described as surprise. No surprised army can para drop on 3 locations with a day or two of any attack by India. They were well prepared.
The Lahore front was not defended, because 1. Didn't want to flag the preparation 2. Urban space & canals can hold off IA attacks until counter mobilisation 3. Confidence that the India will be in disarrays after initial blow and will not be able to attack.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Can't some MNREGA work be receiving civil defense training?
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
I have heard/seen (1965, 1971, during operation Brasstacks) Villagers helping armed forces with things like
1. Setting up the artillery in the middle of their fields (camouflaged in sugarcane/wheat/rice/etc fields).
2. Providing daily hot food/water/tea/milk/etc to the various advance locations 3-4 times a day.
3. Many times villagers will stand along the major roads and give food packets/water/lassi/sweaters/warm clothes/etc to the soldiers on convoys.
4. Transport of the ammunition/petrol/etc to the very last mile (where units are dispersed away from roads) using their tractors, bikes, etc.
5. Scouting and reporting of any suspicious activities to MI.
6. Apart from the Military hospitals, Civilian Doctors/nurses/etc do set up makeshift camps locations in rear for any injured evacuees .
7. off course hunting any para and/or jasus bakis! I heard that Bakis in 1965 had dropped para troopers all the way to Ambala Air base.
There are billion ways in which all young/old can help.
1. Setting up the artillery in the middle of their fields (camouflaged in sugarcane/wheat/rice/etc fields).
2. Providing daily hot food/water/tea/milk/etc to the various advance locations 3-4 times a day.
3. Many times villagers will stand along the major roads and give food packets/water/lassi/sweaters/warm clothes/etc to the soldiers on convoys.
4. Transport of the ammunition/petrol/etc to the very last mile (where units are dispersed away from roads) using their tractors, bikes, etc.
5. Scouting and reporting of any suspicious activities to MI.
6. Apart from the Military hospitals, Civilian Doctors/nurses/etc do set up makeshift camps locations in rear for any injured evacuees .
7. off course hunting any para and/or jasus bakis! I heard that Bakis in 1965 had dropped para troopers all the way to Ambala Air base.
There are billion ways in which all young/old can help.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Do we really have a manpower problem in the Chinese front? I think IA combined with BSF,CRPF,ITBP,SSB, RR etc we should have enough first line, reserve and second line defence elements in place. If at all we need improvement, we need to get better equipment for NCC and start a NCO, JCO TA program.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Ok . For sake of sanity in this thread I banned samirdw for 2 weeks.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
All workable and very good suggestions... may be with some minor modifications from legal point of view (esp. regarding banks forcing one to use another).Deans wrote:Fully agree. It is easy to take action against China that is WTO compliant if GOI puts their mind to it. For e.g.schinnas wrote:
The current steps government is taking in terms of looking at each product separately and in conformance with WTO and other rules is very siloed and myopic. We will not get anywhere with that approach. Even the private players involved give tips to government only relating to their particular use case and ignore the larger eco-system effect.
- Imports from Hong Kong to be treated as made in China (we actually treat them as separate entities).
- Have a floor price at which products will be valued at (e.g. Rs 5000 for a cellphone). It will affect low end products only and it is not our fault if they happen to be made mostly in 1 country. It will also eliminate under-invoicing. China will complain to WTO but it can be fought aggressively and we can drag out the case.
- 10% `Security surcharge' on imports from all countries supporting terrorism. (incl. refusal to blacklist international terrorists). This will be shot down by WTO, but the optics will be terrible for China and we gain US$ 5 billion in duties, in the year it takes WTO to decide. Alternately withdraw MFN status to Pak and China and charge higher duties.
- Any infra company that owes money to nationalised banks (they all do) will have to buy capital equipment from other companies that
owe money to banks (most do). That can be termed as `debt restructuring', rather than trade distorting decisions that China will claim they are.
- All Chinese applying for a work visa, have to get security clearance from MHA, after the employer proves that no Indian can do the job.
Also a marketplace for local manufacturers needs to be set up and all government contracts can be mandated to use that marketplace. Just normal government purchases from computers, printers, stationaries, and office furnitures total to billions. Can enforce MII in that as well as government is already mulling an eCommerce marketplace for government office purchases.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
Sorry to disappoint. Nearly all the parts are made in China (probably some in Taiwan and very few in Korea). For mobile phone, Made in India stamp is applied (legally) if assembly is done in India. So all Chinese phone companies - Motorolla, Vivo, Oppo, One Plus, RedMi, etc., etc., all claim Made In India, and they do have reasonble sized plans that do the assembly, testing and final packing. Some of them have started including Indian made accessories such as chargers, USB cables, phone covers, etc., but in majority of cases even that is imported from China. Recently Government is making moves to ensure that atleast peripherals such as chargers and cables are made in India in order to be eligible for MII.Bart S wrote:India.UlanBatori wrote:Where is Motorola Moto G made?
For companies that assemble in India, government has provided concessions in terms of importing underlying parts such as battery, processor + circuit board, SIM readers, memory cards, screen, speakers, camera, etc.
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
There are two things that India must get right in our production base to wean off Cheen:
1) consumer electronic parts (cellphones are just one end results),
2) base chemical compounds (including those for the pharmaceutical companies)
The latter form the basis for generic drugs which is our strongest export component (outside of people) but it is 90% dependent on compounds made in China.
The former is the great stepping stone of global trade. Japan, Taiwan, Korea and Cheen used consumer electronics to pull their nations into middle class status and beyond. Without India gaining a large part of this eco-system, this traditional road to prosperity (especially in Asia) will be blocked.
1) consumer electronic parts (cellphones are just one end results),
2) base chemical compounds (including those for the pharmaceutical companies)
The latter form the basis for generic drugs which is our strongest export component (outside of people) but it is 90% dependent on compounds made in China.
The former is the great stepping stone of global trade. Japan, Taiwan, Korea and Cheen used consumer electronics to pull their nations into middle class status and beyond. Without India gaining a large part of this eco-system, this traditional road to prosperity (especially in Asia) will be blocked.
Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
US admiral stands ready to obey a Trump nuclear strike order
CANBERRA: The US Pacific Fleet commander said on Thursday he would launch a nuclear strike against China next week if President Donald Trump ordered it, and warned against the military ever shifting its allegiance from its commander in chief.
Adm Scott Swift was responding to a hypothetical question at an Australian National University security conference following a major joint US-Australian military exercise+ off the Australian coast. The drills were monitored by a Chinese intelligence-gathering ship off northeast Australia.
Asked by an academic in the audience whether he would make a nuclear attack on China next week if Trump ordered it, Swift replied: "The answer would be: yes."
"Every member of the US military has sworn an oath to defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic and to obey the officers and the president of the United States as commander and chief appointed over us," Swift said.
"This is core to the American democracy and any time you have a military that is moving away from a focus and an allegiance to civilian control, then we really have a significant problem," he added.
Pacific Fleet spokesman Capt Charlie Brown later said Swift's answer reaffirmed the principle of civilian control over the military.
"The admiral was not addressing the premise of the question, he was addressing the principle of civilian authority of the military," Brown said. "The premise of the question was ridiculous."
The biennial Talisman Saber exercise involved 36 warships including the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan, 220 aircraft and 33,000 military personnel.
It was monitored by a Chinese People's Liberation Army-Navy Type 815 Dongdiao-class auxiliary general intelligence vessel from within Australia's 200-mile exclusive economic zone.
Cheers
CANBERRA: The US Pacific Fleet commander said on Thursday he would launch a nuclear strike against China next week if President Donald Trump ordered it, and warned against the military ever shifting its allegiance from its commander in chief.
Adm Scott Swift was responding to a hypothetical question at an Australian National University security conference following a major joint US-Australian military exercise+ off the Australian coast. The drills were monitored by a Chinese intelligence-gathering ship off northeast Australia.
Asked by an academic in the audience whether he would make a nuclear attack on China next week if Trump ordered it, Swift replied: "The answer would be: yes."
"Every member of the US military has sworn an oath to defend the constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign and domestic and to obey the officers and the president of the United States as commander and chief appointed over us," Swift said.
"This is core to the American democracy and any time you have a military that is moving away from a focus and an allegiance to civilian control, then we really have a significant problem," he added.
Pacific Fleet spokesman Capt Charlie Brown later said Swift's answer reaffirmed the principle of civilian control over the military.
"The admiral was not addressing the premise of the question, he was addressing the principle of civilian authority of the military," Brown said. "The premise of the question was ridiculous."
The biennial Talisman Saber exercise involved 36 warships including the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan, 220 aircraft and 33,000 military personnel.
It was monitored by a Chinese People's Liberation Army-Navy Type 815 Dongdiao-class auxiliary general intelligence vessel from within Australia's 200-mile exclusive economic zone.
Cheers

-
- BRFite
- Posts: 604
- Joined: 31 Dec 2016 00:40
Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
^^ One more intercontinental warning missile is going to hit US soon



Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
The Global Times ICBM has been hitting all parts of the globe recentlyDrRatnadip wrote:^^ One more intercontinental warning missile is going to hit US soon![]()


Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
The two images linked below (courtesy NYT) are probably the best that I have seen illustrating the area of this stand-off and the area in dispute.
IMAGE 1: Shows the entire tri-border are. India on the west is Sikkim. What is striking about this image is that if the disputed area stretches all the way from Batang La in the north to Gamochen in the south, then the area of the present stand-off at Doka La is roughly half way between these two points i.e. over the years the Chinese have via building that road all the way down to the present point at Doka La, have already changed the reality on the ground by now claiming that northern disputed area, north of the road that has been built, as their own territory. I have been reading on various articles and twitter feeds as to how China feels that they have been doing road building in this area since 2003-2007 and have never been challenged. What has really happened is that GOI in all these years from 2003 onwards when China began this expansion, has not had the courage to stand up to the Chinese to stop their multi year land grab of Bhutanese territory, until now.

IMAGE 2: Shows a close up of the area where the road construction was stopped, literally under the nose of the Indian Army bunker. The road itself for now ends literally 500 feet from the IA bunkers.

IMAGE 1: Shows the entire tri-border are. India on the west is Sikkim. What is striking about this image is that if the disputed area stretches all the way from Batang La in the north to Gamochen in the south, then the area of the present stand-off at Doka La is roughly half way between these two points i.e. over the years the Chinese have via building that road all the way down to the present point at Doka La, have already changed the reality on the ground by now claiming that northern disputed area, north of the road that has been built, as their own territory. I have been reading on various articles and twitter feeds as to how China feels that they have been doing road building in this area since 2003-2007 and have never been challenged. What has really happened is that GOI in all these years from 2003 onwards when China began this expansion, has not had the courage to stand up to the Chinese to stop their multi year land grab of Bhutanese territory, until now.

IMAGE 2: Shows a close up of the area where the road construction was stopped, literally under the nose of the Indian Army bunker. The road itself for now ends literally 500 feet from the IA bunkers.

Re: Managing Chinese Threat (09-08-2014)
u got it.. One Belt One road.. They will build road everywhere and then claim that place because they built a roadtandav wrote:Interestingly China strategy is similar to 1950 where they built a road through the disputed Aksai Chin and then went on to annex it in 1962 formally. It appears that road building is Colonialism with Chinese characteristic just like Western colonialism where it was trading posts and churches. Strategy wise since these roads are in disputed territory they should be patroled by Indian vehicles and troops... any Chinese markers found must be replaced with Indian markers.

