Dr Chidambaram's talk on Pokharan II

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 13 Dec 2002 06:57

Originally posted by Kaushal:

Of course BK questions the strategy of 'simultaneous detonation and the use of a boosted fission trigger in the primary when a simple fission bomb would have done just as well

Hah!
After RC's talk it is clear to me why nuclear physics is the realm of nuclear physicists. Bharat Karnad is not one and reveals his ignorance.

Let me explain, because RC explained it (See footnotes 1 and 4 in my report above)

Fission requires a chain reaction to occur. For this you need a massively increasing number of neutrons to go and bash nuclei and split them. The faster you get neutrosn the better. The problem with the process of fission is that it is "energy intensive" - that is - it produces a lot of energy relative to the number of neutrons produced. This causes inefficiency in that the temperature may disrupt and destroy the fissile material before enough fission occurs. If you could somehow increase the number of neutrons by a "burst" of neutrons - you could get a really quick and compact fission bomb that can serve as trigger for the bigger fusion bomb.

That "burst" of neutrons id got by adding Deuterium or othet fusion material to the fission bomb. A little fusion occurs producing a burst of neutrons that accelerate the fission process.

In huge massed of Uranium or Plutonium this may not matter, but when you have a small subcritical mass as trigger for a deliverable fusion bomb - you need to get the trigger working efficiently - you don't want to put 20Kg Plutonium in the trigger. Critcality to cause the fission explosion is acheieved by the neutrons froma small amount of fusion - a proces that produces far more neutrons per unit energy.

I hope this is clear enough.
added later:

How do you know how much fusion has occured?

By the products of fusion - by analysis of teh "glass" balls in the cavity - RC mentioned 54 Mn - but there are many others. I wish I could have taken his overhead slides from him.

csharma · Post by **csharma** » 13 Dec 2002 07:21

In May 2002, there was a paper in saag.org was Dr Chidmabaram. Seems like the talk was pretty similiar to that. In that paper, there was the Venn diagram , Shiv is talking about. I tried to find the paper on saag but could not locate it.

Ashok · Post by **Ashok** » 13 Dec 2002 07:24

Originally posted by csharma:
In May 2002, there was a paper in saag.org was Dr Chidmabaram. Seems like the talk was pretty similiar to that. In that paper, there was the Venn diagram , Shiv is talking about. I tried to find the paper on saag but could not locate it.

csharma, perhaps this is the one you meant:
http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper451.html

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 13 Dec 2002 07:43

Originally posted by M.T.Wheeler:

csharma, perhaps this is the one you meant:
http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper451.html

thanks for postingthe link.

This contains many of the slides that RC used, inclusingthe one about decreasingUS tests with increasing processor speed, and the Gamma ray spectroscopy analysis of fusion products - with the 54 Mn positioned on the left side of one of those graphs.

Umrao · Post by **Umrao** » 13 Dec 2002 08:36

The sub-kiloton devices tested again had all the features needed for integration with delivery vehicles and were tested from the point of view of developing low-yield weapons and of validating new weapon-related ideas and sub-systems.

from the SAAG article.

This means we do have Tacticle Nukes.

read this
"http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fn ... 0610&sid=2"

However, the third most prominent player is China, which is suspected to have about 120 TNWs. It is from this stock that some warheads are believed to have been delivered to Pakistan. India does possess strategic nuclear missiles but does not have TNWs.

This perhaps explains Islamabad's nuclear rhetoric. Pakistan is suspected to have 20-30 nuclear warheads but it is not known how many TNWs it has managed to obtain. Significantly, in the past, Pakistani officials have often reiterated that TNWs are part of their nuclear deterrence policy.

Acknowledged international security experts like Eric Arnett have observed that should Pakistan exercise its nuclear option, it might target Indian tank divisions in the Rajasthan desert or iaf bases. These attacks might be perceived as striking at the military since relatively few civilians are likely to be killed.

"http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fn ... 0610&sid=1"

"We have intelligence inputs and field reports that indicate Pakistan has clandestinely
acquired highly sophisticated miniaturised tactical nuclear weapons which could be launched even from field artillery guns or aircraft," the general said.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 13 Dec 2002 09:35

Thanks you Shiv all at Bharat-Rakshak for serious, no-nonsense discussion and research.

Manne · Post by **Manne** » 13 Dec 2002 09:59

Shiv and yugandhar,

Thanks for noticing and attending the presentation, reporting on it and also talking about BR to Dr.C. You guys made my day. Great show.

Shiv, you met Dr.C and mentioned BR! Namastubhyam!

I am impressed with Prasthutha. I am going to write them a mail congratulating them for the job they are doing. Talk of ignited minds.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 13 Dec 2002 10:49

Umrao Repeat after me slowly- its low yield not tactical weapons. The Indian doctrine considers all nukes as strategic for their use takes the whole game to a different level. At that level there could be utility for low, medium or high yield weapons based on target. This they realized long ago. ACM Mehra pointed out the subtlities long ago in his talk at Stanford. BTW there was a weaponeer at Los Alamos who also said the same thing a couple of years ago that small arsenal will merge the two roles. His article was reviewed in BRM.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 13 Dec 2002 11:01

Originally posted by yugandhar:
ramana,
here is the address
Prasthuta

BR is the first link from the links page.

Manne · Post by **Manne** » 13 Dec 2002 11:11

Folks, sorry for diversion...

Calling yugandhar, calling yugandhar:

The e-mail ID given on Prasthutha's home page (prasthu@tejas.serc.iisc.erent.in) does not work. My mail bounced back. I pinged the mail server but request times out. Maybe they have changed tjhe server. Can you inform them and post the correct mail ID here?

Thanks in advance.

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 13 Dec 2002 14:47

shiv, I am not sure that BK is ignorant of nuclear physics after reading his book. He displays considerable acquaintance at least with the principles and fundas of the subject. His remark on the use of the boosted fission trigger as opposed to a simple fission device was made in the context of an argument that BARC was constrained to test many different devices in 1 shot, as well as to ensure the success by providing redundancy in triggering mechanisms.

I do not agree with his remarks on the yield of S1 but i do agree with him and PKI that more tests are definitely needed. I feel RC would say the same had he been a free agent, unconstrained by his ties to the GOI. The partial burn issue remains unresolved also. Let us hope that an opportunity will present itself relatively sooner and India will not have to wait another quarter of a century to conduct the next test.

Kaushal

Yugandhar · Post by **Yugandhar** » 13 Dec 2002 17:15

Manne,
there is some overhaul at SERC, which is actually causing problems to everybody here, so please bear with it, till prastthuta get it right.

Umrao · Post by **Umrao** » 13 Dec 2002 20:28

ramana garu>>

Umrao Repeat after me slowly- its low yield not tactical weapons. The Indian doctrine considers all nukes as strategic for their use takes the whole game to a different level.

I did what you prescribed (and being tube light it did not completely sink in

) so I googled and found that definition of TNW & SNW are subjective. As you rightly indicate when you said <I>"The Indian doctrine considers all nukes as strategic for their use takes the whole game to a different level." </I>.

here is something that I learned.
1) "Tactical nuclear weapons are those under a certain limit, let's say 1MT of explosive power. These weapons are intended to be "lobbed" over a mountain into a remote battlefield, thus eliminating a huge number of the enemy with one blow."

2) "'Tactical nuclear weapons' (TNWs) include a broad array of atomic explosive devices, ranging from so-called nuclear landmines and nuclear artillery shells to air-dropped or missile launched nuclear warheads. TNW yields range from relatively low (0.1 kiloton (KT)) to higher than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (10-15 KT, upwards to 1 megaton). "

3) "Tactical nuclear weapons (also called non-strategic or sub-strategic nuclear weapons): Nuclear weapons intended to be used on the battlefield against conventional targets. In other words, non-strategic targets. In general, no universal definition exists. In other contexts, the phrase "tactical nuclear weapons" is often used to refer to lower yield nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons that travel distances less than what is needed to attack another continent. What defines tactical nuclear weapons in a true sense, however, is not how far they can travel or how powerful their explosive potential is, but how they are used. "

SNW:
1) Strategic nuclear weapons are the really big ones. From 1MT to above 500MT fusion weapons, this class of nuclear weapon is intended to be used on vast areas, strategic targets such as whole cities or fortified launch sites, bunkers or other "hard targets".

2)Strategic nuclear weapons: Nuclear weapons intended to be used against counter-force targets (an opponent's nuclear weapons) or counter-value targets (an opponent's non-combatant population). While the phrase "strategic nuclear weapons" is often used to describe nuclear warheads attached to intercontinental delivery vehicles (missiles or aircraft), such usage is technically incorrect, as strategic targets can be nearby the state with the weapon in question.

***

Keeping in mind the above definitions, and realizing the fact that the max yield of demonstrated Indian weapon design is limited to 200 KT. It is perfectly understandable as to why India considers everything to be SNW.

Thanks once again.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 13 Dec 2002 20:37

Ramana,

I sent you an email about four days ago on scheduling issues for the Wargame. Please check mail and reply.

sorry for the disturbance.

Priyank · Post by **Priyank** » 13 Dec 2002 22:02

Umraoji,

200 kilotons is a lot of firepower. The multi megaton class heavies were required during the early days of the cold war when the US and Russian missiles had a CEP of several miles. With the increasing accuracy of missiles, all that megatonnage has become less and less useful. Note that the average yield of fielded warheads has consistently come down with increasing missile accuracy. Most of the latest warheads have yields that are less than 1 megaton. For instance take the W-88, the latest US thermonuclear warhead carried by Trident-2s in the USN's Ohio class SSBNs. Their maximum yield is around 475 kilotons and the Americans certainly consider it to be a strategic warhead. The Americans and the Russians might have a few multi megaton warheads in land based silos though. Also all those multi megaton warheads were big and cubersome to deploy. I recall seeing a picture of a Russian 50 megaton airdropped bomb. The thing was as large as a small room. The technicians standing beside it looked puny. Also I dont think a 500 megaton weapon was ever built. IIRC the largest nuke ever built and tested was a Russian 100 megaton one.

So in short, a 200 kiloton thermonuclear warhead is enough to give the Pakis and the Chinese second thoughts.

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 13 Dec 2002 22:39

The issue is not just whether 200 kT is enough, and since none of us has experienced it ,one can make a safe assumption that it will give you a big headache if one were to fall on one's head.

The point is whether India has a second strike capability against the Chinese and the ability to deliver it deep into the population and countervalue centers in the eastern seaboard of China, after a first strike. India does not have the delivery system to hit china deep and China has even more depth geographically than does India (relative to TSP). Neither does it have the numbers of missiles (nor the triad) which is a prerequisite for a second strike against China.

If TSP is at a disadvantage relative to India when it comes to depth, so does India vis a vis China. China can target all parts of India with relative ease with its current arsenal(and many of its missiles based in Tibet and southern china do so) and definitely has the capability to incinerate most population centers of India should India manage to hit Beijing or Gwangdung.

All of the P5 arsenals have city busters ( 1 MT and above)in their quiver. If they were not of use , why would they deploy them if they were not needed.

I do not question that India has an adequate deterrent against TSP. But that is all it has. It has a very dubious deterrent, certainly not one that is credible against any of the P5 and in particular against China.

Kaushal

Prateek · Post by **Prateek** » 14 Dec 2002 01:23

Some one on the forum was putting a claim that India has certainly demonstrated the capability to have missiles with MIRV's, when India launched multiple satelites at a time. So even with out a megatonner, India still can launch a severe atatck, if we develop the MIRV capability. Assuming each missile is launched with min of 3 warheads of 200 KTonnes each, the total would be around 600 Kilo Tonnes, with one shot, which I believe is enough fire power. Isn't that enough to deter teh Chinese ? Correct me if I am wrong.

P Babu · Post by **P Babu** » 14 Dec 2002 01:29

Originally posted by yugandhar:
Manne,
there is some overhaul at SERC, which is actually causing problems to everybody here, so please bear with it, till prastthuta get it right.

They are bringing in some more IRIX and Sun Solaris workstations? When i used to study there we used to spend all-night at SERC.. BTW is it still 3 story bldg or they is more stories?

shashidhar · Post by **shashidhar** » 14 Dec 2002 02:17

The other beautiful part is when RC says -we have advanced even more since then!Your's is 1992 vintage,ours 1998!
There is a critical answer to those who have qestioned the Indian tests of five as opposed to hundreds by US and USSR.The fact is these folks built the body of science and technology through these tests.India assimilated these and plus our research to come up with trumps.
The key is when RC means-'We didn't develop designs by tests but confirmed the design validity by testing!IOW we put the data we had and design to test thereby validating in the process the literature available and our own.It can't get simpler than that!
That is a precise and valid explanation by RC who in one shot had demolished the opponents!

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 14 Dec 2002 03:10

Interesting,

Kaushal,

Need a clarification.

From what I have read here, the picture painted seems to state that TSP is "covered". So, India has BOTH the nukes and the delivery system to "scare" TSP.

WRT, one of these two does not seem to be in place, because I get the picture that China is not convinced India has the means to hit them back. Now, what is China not convinced about: India not having the nukes, a credible delivery system or both.

The Geographic depth China has leads me to believe the delivery system is the culprit.

Also, any other issues that would complete this picture?

TIA (Thanks in Adavance).

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 14 Dec 2002 03:12

muddur:
For the time being keeping the MIRV discussion aside, I would submit that deterrence is unaltered irrespetive if a city can be hit with 200Kt versus 1Mt. A major city destroyed 70% versus 80%.

OTOH fission weapon of ~20Kt will destroy ~7% of the city amd many nations consider even that much unacceptable and sufficient to impose deterrence.

Now back to nuclear test topic versus deterrence discussion.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 14 Dec 2002 03:23

Originally posted by Priyank:
IIRC the largest nuke ever built and tested was a Russian 100 megaton one.

So in short, a 200 kiloton thermonuclear warhead is enough to give the Pakis and the Chinese second thoughts.

Actually the largest was the 50 MT Soviet "king of bombs", a 3 stage device.

200 kT is ideal for a warhead delivered by a missile with low CEP.

Still, one wishes for just one Indian multi- megaton test.

saint · Post by **saint** » 14 Dec 2002 04:57

http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper43.gif

interesting...

russians gave to chinese, and the ch!nkos to pakis.

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 14 Dec 2002 05:40

Niranjan, one cannot separate the missile from the warhead, because CEPs enter into the picture. The larger the CEP the greater the need for a larger weapon size (KT). Numbers are also important, if some are to survive a first strike. Remember it is not just the delivery system that must survive but the personnel to man it.

In any event without further testing , refinement of the nukes, and ensuring reliability of the arsenal, will be difficult despite all the brave talk of simulation capability

India has a long way to go to reach an adequate deterrence level w.r.t China and with a moratorium on further testing , it is unlikely it will ever get there

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 14 Dec 2002 06:58

Regarding the presence or absence of a "credible" Indian nuclear deterrent - the debate has been going on since 1998 and will continue - and I am going to speculate on how long it will continue.

In response to a question about why US satellites with 60 cm resolution did not pick up preparations in Pokhran in 1998, RC gave a "quotable quote" as reply, referring to satellite data that was available to the US.

"Data is not information, information is not knwoledge, and it may also be said that knowledge is not truth". While this got a big laugh - it IS true isn't it?

If you look at the data we have on the Indian nuclear "deterrent" - we find that India could be said to have had no nuclear deterrent or in fact no nuclear arsenal at all prior to May 1998.

Suddenly, a deterrent appeared, and was said by some to be "credible". All the data we have suggests that India has virtually no deterrent. Media spculation has been generous to India - and India's "nuclear arsenal" is nowadays quoted as being somewhere between 25 and 75 bombs.

In point of fact, there is nothing to suggest this. We are required to take R Chidambaram and associates' word on this. Politicians statements do not count, and arguments and data such as those on BRM/BRF and eleswhere regarding yield do not necessarily increase "credibility"

The key word here is "credibility" as used in "credible nuclear deterrent". What is never spelled out is "what is credible?"

Theer was a news report in the <a href="http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanheral ... sp">Deccan Herald</a> that was credible to many. "Credibility" in the absence of a large amount of data and information requires an act of faith. It requires a very personal decision as to just how much evidence one needs to see before accepting something as true.

In the case of a "nuclear deterrent" - credibility can be thought to be required at two levels. Credibility of the arsenal/deterrent in the eyes of an adversary is essential - or it will be no deterrent. The second, and perhaps less vital level of credibility is credibility in the eyes of the public.

How much data, or information, needs to become public before a nuclear deterrent becomes credible? How much continuing information is required to maintain credibility? Unfortunately we are dipping into philosophy here.

If nuclear tests are conducted on a "regular" basis - eg one or two a year, and followed up by missile tests, public credibility would certainly be higher. If testing is stopped for a few years, credibility will fall - because worries will start about nuclear weapon stewardship. 30 years after the moon landing, the feat itself is being questioned - a change from credibility to incredulity. There is a parallel in medicine in which the faith that a particular course of treatment will work over time gets diluted by distance from the doctor. A nearby physician is useful being reassuring and bolstering morale that is damaged by multiple inputs from multiple people. But all that matters is that the patient gets better.

The disussion on the Indian nuclear deterrent follows similar lines. Ultimately all that matters is whether the people with their fingers on the nuclear button in China or Pakistan find it credible or not.

What is the data on this?

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 14 Dec 2002 07:39

Shiv,
Thanks a heap for the information Chidambaram brought home.
What I cannot understand is the failure of Karnad, Tellis etc. to give any consideration to Indian scientists who support the yield and their arguments. Tellis in particular dismissed any defence of the yields and placed his entire scientific argument on Wallace's nonsense.
Did Chidambaram mention anything about Douglas and his gang ?

Umrao · Post by **Umrao** » 14 Dec 2002 09:02

Prior to shivji's post, while driving home I was thinking.

Vietnam taught a lesson or two to china with out nukes.

Korea is scaring the $hit out of sheriff, Japan and S Korea.

Pakistan is able to contain India to defensive posture and also scare unkil, if not at least
co opt Pakistan as an all lie.

So India does not need a 1 MT or 100 Mt bomb to deter china, it is how we conduct with self-assurance and with decisive action after a bhashan.

This is where India is found wanting not in scientific prowess or capability.

So in nutshell

Deterrence like beauty is in the eye of the beholder ( Spinster 1999)

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 14 Dec 2002 09:32

Originally posted by Sanjay:
Tellis in particular dismissed any defence of the yields and placed his entire scientific argument on Wallace's nonsense.
Did Chidambaram mention anything about Douglas and his gang ?

I made it a point to mention Wallace and Douglas both before the talk, when RC was sitting next to me and in a later question.

RC appeared not to lay much weight in what either says. He was not dismissive, but did not appear to be "pricked" or in any way shaken by these people's work at all. Actually he was a picture of confidence, bith in speech and body language. He made it a point to talk about a lot of papers that have been published showing up the fallacies in Wallace and Douglas' papers - and he specifically mentioned Sikka's 2002 Ocotber paper. The two specific, related comments I recall are the rather sarcastic joke about expecting that a presentation tothe senate should normally be truthful (Wallace's change between 1994 and 1998 I think), and a comment near the end about the general issue of doubting Thomases, "All that is dying down now"

IOW we may be making a bigger deal about it than it actually is.

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 14 Dec 2002 12:09

So India does not need a 1 MT or 100 Mt bomb to deter china, it is how we conduct with self-assurance and with decisive action after a bhashan.

This is where India is found wanting not in scientific prowess or capability.

It is not a case of either/or. By all means work on societal issues and work on attitude and the 'Self' but a hefty Minuteman or a Trident can work wonders for a society's sense of well being. Abnegation of weaponry was never the message of Sri Krishna ...

In fact if anything the concept more predominant in the ancient world is that of Chakravartin, the lord of the universe, who did not hesitate to use Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD)

'The overarching ethical sanction for the use or threat of use of WMD was provided , as the ancients saw it, by the depravity of the Dark Age (Kaliyuga) they feared the world was transiting through, 'when war is conducted in an unfair ,mean and deceitful manner'. This being the case any restraints in waging wars became a liability and taking recourse to WMD, which promised to bring the enemy speedily to his knees by causing destruction were by implication, the weapons to rely upon.'

-Karnad 'Nuclear weapons and Indian security', p.15

shashidhar · Post by **shashidhar** » 14 Dec 2002 20:02

http://nuketesting.enviroweb.org/hew/Usa/Weapons/W84.html

I just aded this curiuous link about W-85 warheads for pershing missiles.The yield if we note is 5-150 kt (variable yield).It is also a boosted primary with secondary.

The point is:
1)The warhead's explosive power depends on the size of the target/nature of the target/mission.
2)The accuracy of the delivery system.

The 200 kt device and the presence of intermediate missile in Indian arsenal implies Indians are confident that 200kt will be sufficient!IOW the CEP for Prithvi (in the same category as pershing-2 ) is close-a significant achievement!
Also the agni must be close too!Otherwise the 200kt needs to have changed!

The new design work obviously must be for 400-500kt yields if India is keeping it's options open for ICBM nad SLBM capability.

Also what would be intrtesting to know is the size of Indian warheads-in order for us to have MIRV capability.I have come across no such data though!

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 14 Dec 2002 20:22

Towards the end of the meeting RC was saying something about yields and amount of damage which I somehow did not catch properly, but it was something like this:

If R is the radius of destruction due to a bomb of yield Y, then to increase the radius of destruction to 2R you have to cube the yield, i.e. you need a yield of Y^3 to increase the radius of destruction to 2R.

That is if you get a 1 Km radius of destruction with a 10 kt weapon, you will need a 10^3 i.e. a 1 megaton weapon to increase the radius of destruction to 2 Km. Seems like a lot of extra bang for only a small result doesn't it?

shashidhar · Post by **shashidhar** » 14 Dec 2002 20:52

http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Lab/2742/numbers.htm

This may be a good site for basic effects on nuclear explosions.

NRao · Post by **NRao** » 14 Dec 2002 21:06

Kaushal,

Your post seems to imply there is no hope WRT China. Is that (my understanding) right?

Why self imposed moratorium? I recall reading something, but not the details (thanks in advance). Don't subcritical testing have any significance? And, why are we comparing Indian efforts to others when India has reversed the methodology (others: test and gather data, India: gather information, build model and test model). Just because India did not follow the general methodology should not mean that India does not have credibile deterence. On the contrary.

I took Umrao's post and did a Little deep thinking (God!! on a Saturday AM). Here is my theory:
1. come up with a plan that threatens US interests and the US will make sure that peace prevails, as in the Indi-Pak case: Us issues a economic threat with a travel advisory.
2. Come up with an equivalent WRT China. A credible economic threat is more credible than a nuclear threat it appears. Not that we should pack our bags WRT nukes.

Kumar · Post by **Kumar** » 14 Dec 2002 21:38

If R is the radius of destruction due to a bomb of yield Y, then to increase the radius of destruction to 2R you have to cube the yield, i.e. you need a yield of Y^3 to increase the radius of destruction to 2R.

Actually, instead of cubing the yield you would need to increase it by a factor of 2^3.

Since the effect of the bomb spreads in a 3 dimensional volume, yields would scale with R^3 and not with R (radius).

Y = constant * R^3

That is why there is not that much of a difference between a 200KT weapon vs a 1MT weapon as far as destruction radius is concerned. (Going from 200kT to 1MT implies 400% increase in yield while the destruction radius increases only by approx. 25%).

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 14 Dec 2002 22:19

Your post seems to imply there is no hope WRT China. Is that (my understanding) right?

Why self imposed moratorium?

Without lifting the moratorium, we will never know for sure whether India's 'model and build and test' works. The test is a crucial part of the paradigm.

One has to assume that the belief in India's computing and simulation prowess overawes everything else the enemy sees in India (e.g.the fractious polity, the inability to build a nuke submarine for 30 years - IG originally approved the ATV in the late 60's) and that there is credibility of the deterrence. We are left hoping that the enemy 'buys' India's 1 single 45 kT thermonuclear test.

My own personal feeling is that the P5 do not have the slightest intention of abandoning refinement and deployment of ever more lethal WMD and one of them will test one of these days. India should follow suit, quick like a jackrabbit, and test a half a dozen designs. So there is hope. But India is as always left in a 'reactionary ' mode. But test, India must.

Kaushal

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 14 Dec 2002 22:21

Sanjay, This constant refrain that Wallace and Douglas might have some basis and why are they so dismissive of India is getting old. It could be that they have an agenda. Douglas cant do algebra we know that for a fact. Wallace has told the POK-I story twice which one is correct?
If you look at both their backgrounds they are non-prolif mullas or muezzein. The POKII tests have robbed them of their daily livelyhood and they are in denial. Both thier end points is that the CTBT monitoring system hasnt failed.

Tellis is from RAND and that is a govt funded org. I have no qualms about his work for he is a political scientist and has come to terms and spread the word of India. So he may call India names but in the end he is good for India as his work has squared the circle. And an added bonus is he reads BRM regularly!

Folks when discussing the Indian reach please dont forget that S-1 was 500kg per IPCS website. Dont ask me to post the link go do some research.

Anaath · Post by **Anaath** » 14 Dec 2002 22:22

The establishment seems to have chosen stockpile build-up(numbers) over yield, at the present time. This would make sense if availability of core material is limited, as seems to be the case.

If, after 10-15 years, the establishment makes known that it favors a second look into higher-yield designs, that could be interpreted as indicating stockpile completeness. If this line of reasoning were true, additional tests would seem to be matter of when not if. The other possibility would be a revision of the size of an "ideal" stockpile in the future to deter additional players/ current players with increased capabilities/ current players looked at through the prism of revised threat perceptions.

In any case, RC's thoughts about the Indian Deterrent and data/ info/ knowledge (as highlighted by Doc Shiv above) would continue to be relevant.

The late Kim Il Sung had come up with the "Crazy Fearsome Cripple" doctrine that seems to be working for Pyongyang even today,deterring the world as it does with less than 5 warheads. India needs a more dignified implementation of this principle. JEM has described the possible contours of such an approach in his posts before.

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 14 Dec 2002 22:38

There is adequate literature on the destructive effects of Nuclear weapons. I came across this table in one of the references. The quantities quoted are the peak static overpressures generated in a blast

Effect of Range on Blast

Range (yards) 1000 2000 3000
Yield
1kT 11.9 kPa 2.1 kPa .29 kPa
1 mT 908.kPa 87 kPa 11.9kPa

Ref: Charles Grace Nuclear weapons:Principles, Effects , Survivability. Land Warfare, Barasseys Battlefield Weapons systems and Technology series, London, Vol.10, 1994

'Nuclear modelling has shown that the lethal radius around a hard target is expressed by the equation'

rk = y^1/3/ g(h)

rk = Probability of destruction
y = yield in megatons
h = hardness of target in PSI overpressure
g(h) = requisite hardness function

Nuclear strategy for India by rajaMenon, p.140.

The above is obviously an empirical relationship but it bears out what AK says regarding the yield and the radius of the blast range.

kaushal

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 15 Dec 2002 03:14

Gentlemen,
I put this to you - we currently have on average enough weapons grade plutonium for around 50 weapons.
Estimate only Agni warheads will be 200kT based on the S-1 design.
Look at what delivery systems we realistically have available at present:
10-12 Agni-2 at present
10-12 Agni-1 in about 1-2 years
20 gravity bombs for Mirage 2000
4+ nuclear armed Prithvi SS-250

Truth is we lack the delivery systems to absorb more than 50 warheads at present. Moreover our core materials production is not static but can be estimated as at least 5 per year - and this is not an overestimate.

member_4589 · Post by **member_4589** » 15 Dec 2002 03:53

And tactical (and sub KT ) weapons?