Siachen News & Discussion

The Military Issues & History Forum is a venue to discuss issues relating to the military aspects of the Indian Armed Forces, whether the past, present or future. We request members to kindly stay within the mandate of this forum and keep their exchanges of views, on a civilised level, however vehemently any disagreement may be felt. All feedback regarding forum usage may be sent to the moderators using the Feedback Form or by clicking the Report Post Icon in any objectionable post for proper action. Please note that the views expressed by the Members and Moderators on these discussion boards are that of the individuals only and do not reflect the official policy or view of the Bharat-Rakshak.com Website. Copyright Violation is strictly prohibited and may result in revocation of your posting rights - please read the FAQ for full details. Users must also abide by the Forum Guidelines at all times.
Bishwa
BRFite
Posts: 233
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Bishwa » 05 Oct 2017 07:56

The book "The Long Road To Siachen The Question Why" by Kunal Verma ad Rajiv Williams has some great photos of that area.

Gagan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 11004
Joined: 16 Apr 2008 22:25

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Gagan » 05 Oct 2017 08:11

Yes its a nice book
The part about J&K's history is very interesting

Gagan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 11004
Joined: 16 Apr 2008 22:25

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Gagan » 05 Oct 2017 08:23

Image
Shepri Kangri in the middle
Ghent Kangri on the left

Gagan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 11004
Joined: 16 Apr 2008 22:25

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Gagan » 05 Oct 2017 08:50

Image
:D
Looking at the Siachen Glacier from the helo which is approx over Bilafond La
Other things visible too

Gagan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 11004
Joined: 16 Apr 2008 22:25

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Gagan » 05 Oct 2017 08:53

K-12
Image

Aditya_V
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9823
Joined: 05 Apr 2006 16:25

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Aditya_V » 05 Oct 2017 10:38

In the pic of Bilafond La is K2 visible in the distance?

manjgu
BRFite
Posts: 1569
Joined: 11 Aug 2006 10:33

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby manjgu » 05 Oct 2017 11:11

gagan and YIP ...thanks for the pics/maps... i can also die peacefully now... gagan...can u mark the points of interest on ur bana sonam pic... A friend of mine climbed apsarasas kangri... which overlooks the siachen... will chk if he has pics..

manjgu
BRFite
Posts: 1569
Joined: 11 Aug 2006 10:33

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby manjgu » 05 Oct 2017 11:15

nooo..K2 will not be visible from Bila .. unless u looking in a certain direction... if u looking towards directly across the pass ( towards pakis //ali bragansa ) then u cant see K2... if u looking north east ..then u can see ( i am saying this based on their positions..i have not been there !!!)

manjgu
BRFite
Posts: 1569
Joined: 11 Aug 2006 10:33

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby manjgu » 05 Oct 2017 11:15

need to mark N on the pics for better appreciation..

manjgu
BRFite
Posts: 1569
Joined: 11 Aug 2006 10:33

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby manjgu » 05 Oct 2017 11:30

that pic of conway saddle..sia la is most probably taken from Gasherbrum ..( the beautiful mountain)...

manjgu
BRFite
Posts: 1569
Joined: 11 Aug 2006 10:33

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby manjgu » 05 Oct 2017 11:31

conway saddle is with pak army IMHO...

deejay
Forum Moderator
Posts: 3799
Joined: 11 Aug 2016 06:14

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby deejay » 05 Oct 2017 11:51

Thanks for sharing YIP ji and Gagan Sir. Some of those helipads sent chill down the spine when I saw them today. And those mountains...

Manish_P
BRFite
Posts: 1572
Joined: 25 Mar 2010 17:34

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Manish_P » 05 Oct 2017 12:06

God, what beauty! Looks so deceptively quiet and serene. I have been a sea-level guy all my life but these snow-capped mountains..

Gagan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 11004
Joined: 16 Apr 2008 22:25

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Gagan » 06 Oct 2017 02:32

Image

Gagan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 11004
Joined: 16 Apr 2008 22:25

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Gagan » 06 Oct 2017 02:47

deejay wrote:Thanks for sharing YIP ji and Gagan Sir. Some of those helipads sent chill down the spine when I saw them today. And those mountains...

Deejay ji
Please no Sir for me.

Gagan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 11004
Joined: 16 Apr 2008 22:25

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Gagan » 06 Oct 2017 02:52

manjgu wrote:conway saddle is with pak army IMHO...

They were kicked out. There is a post right on the saddle.
The pakis are far below

They can't even see the Siachen Glacier, except if they climb a peak far far away, then maybe a little bit.
Qaid Post now Bana post was the last such post where they had a bird's eye view of the glacier. (maybe if they climb the Shepri Kangri)
In the early years, the Indian Army systematically kicked them off the Saltoro range, one place at a time - a lot of blood spilled on that glacier, lots of lives lost

Y I Patel
BRFite
Posts: 507
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Y I Patel » 10 Oct 2017 06:38

Gagan - thanks for labelling the Bana/Sonam post photo. Combining your annotations with news reports about the avalanche at Sonam post and then going back to google earth makes the location of Bana top and Bana Post very clear: here's a hitchhiker's guide to getting to the highest helipad in the world :)

Start northwards on the Siachen Glacier. Take a left at the Lolofond Glacier fork, towards the NE. You will get to Bilafond La at the crest of the saddle separating Bilafond and Lolofond Glaciers. The mountain feature on your left is the one housing bunkers at the top for Bana Post. What is most interesting is that this is only if you want to take selfies. To actually go up and shake hands, you have to take the first left before you get to Bilafond La. You will enter a club (as in cards) shaped cul-de-sac where you are surrounded on all sides by mansions taller than 6000 meters. As you enter the cul-de-sac, you are facing towards the SE. Enter the leaf of the club to your right, which is actually formed by a C shaped curve of the mountain feature that has Bana Top. Now start climbing that mountain feature - you will enter the C shaped formation that Gagan has annotated above. At the floor of the ridgelines, roughly, is the world's highest helipad. While chatting with the friendly IA natives of Sonam Post, turn around roughly towards SW and look up towards the ridgeline of the mountain feature. And wave. Folks from Bana Post will wave back. However, be careful not to wave too far to the south, where the ridgeline begins to dip downwards into a saddle. That's where residents of Amar Post live, and they are mighty resentful because they are actually the frontline against Paki attacks from the Ali Barangsa Base Camp. Bana and Sonam get all the glamour and glory, while to poor folks at Amar go unsung and unheard of. If you are feeling particularly adventurous or belligerent, ask for directions to the less friendly mansion called Tawiz post, which is facing and roughly to the NW of Chez Bana across Rue Bilafond. Now those folks are not particularly friendly, especially if you look like you are buddies with the residents of Bana, Sonam and Amar. But worry not. All you need to do is to pull out your candle and start talking about Aman ki Aasha. Then you will be okay, although your candle will be frozen.

Gagan, any pointers to where the Tawiz Post is, relative to Bana top? Is it still manned?

Bishwa
BRFite
Posts: 233
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Bishwa » 10 Oct 2017 07:39

Amar post does not go unsung in knowledgeable circles.. It played a pivotal role in the capture of Bana Post..

2nd Lt Balraj Sharma was posted here with a seven man detachment... a MG detachment from this post was crucial in cutting of Quaid Post and making it Bana Post

Gagan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 11004
Joined: 16 Apr 2008 22:25

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Gagan » 10 Oct 2017 23:30

Amar is on the other side of the Bana Perfecture
Similarly located as the Sonam post is, but on the other side of the Bana Top
They had put up a machine gun nest during the assault on the quaid post.

Sonam post played a vital role in stopping Pervez Musharraf’s several attacks on Bilafond La, dead in their tracks

Rakesh
Forum Moderator
Posts: 5842
Joined: 15 Jan 2004 12:31
Location: Planet Earth
Contact:

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Rakesh » 11 Mar 2018 21:52

https://twitter.com/majorgauravarya/sta ... 4899342337 --> With Brigadier Ashok Chaudhary, Vir Chakra. In 1988 in Siachen, he climbed down Pak side to cut ropes fixed on a sheer ice wall, totally exposed to enemy for 10 hours. “यह पागलपन है. (This is madness, Sir).” I said. He smiled “मोहब्बत और पागलपन में बहुत कम फ़र्क़ होता है (There is very little difference between love and madness)."

Image

Rakesh
Forum Moderator
Posts: 5842
Joined: 15 Jan 2004 12:31
Location: Planet Earth
Contact:

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Rakesh » 11 Mar 2018 22:08

https://twitter.com/neeraj_rajput/statu ... 3879958528 ---> Army bids farewell to gallant officer Lieutenant Colonel Deepak Thapa in Dharmshala yesterday after long fight with cancer. 'Thapa Base' in Siachen Glacier named after him for his actions against Pakistan in 1989. RIP.

Image

Rakesh
Forum Moderator
Posts: 5842
Joined: 15 Jan 2004 12:31
Location: Planet Earth
Contact:

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Rakesh » 11 Mar 2018 22:13

https://twitter.com/shatrujeet009/statu ... 0464798721 ---> Some more exclusives from the highest battlefield Siachen Lynx Snowmobile in service with Indian Army.

Image

Vips
BRFite
Posts: 1105
Joined: 14 Apr 2017 18:23

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Vips » 09 Jun 2018 18:19

The need to remember Kargil.

Even as India’s attention focuses on the ceasefire at the LoC/IB and the suspension of operations in Jammu and Kashmir’s hinterland, social media is abuzz with the remembrance of Kargil of 1999. Various acts of valour form the deserving narrative of honour. However, it is the big picture, the collective one, which is rarely explained or examined in the public mind. An informed idea of what really happened at the lofty heights in mid-1999 will help India’s current generation and many more to appreciate some of the nuances of how Kargil really occurred and how it was handled. Indian military literature on this is limited but currently, opinion in Pakistan is having a field day.

Two recent books have discussed and exposed issues concerning the Kargil episode. Nasim Zehra, a Pakistani journalist, has released her book ‘From Kargil to the Coup’, and there is ‘The Spy Chronicles’, a joint effort by two former Chiefs of India’s and Pakistan’s premier intelligence agencies, which has some discussions relating to the misadventure. Zehra calls it the handiwork of a clique of generals and not of the Pakistani army. She terms it a disaster because it undermined the honest efforts of the Lahore Agreement of February 1999 which attempted to overcome some of the mistrust arising out of the nuclear tests of May 1998. Comments of Pakistani panellists at some of the book’s launch events reveal Pakistan’s continued mindset. One of them stated that Pakistan owed no apologies to India for Kargil because India, too, deceived Pakistan on Siachen and did not follow the Shimla Agreement while occupying it. A consensus opinion was that the planning and execution in isolation was a disaster and made the operation an adventure rather than an aimed and planned effort. In fact, a Pakistani general believed “had there been proper planning and full logistical support, the operation could have delivered the desired results of clogging the support line of India in Kashmir”. Nawaz Sharif also came under criticism for his unplanned rush to Washington and yielding to Bill Clinton’s pressure to vacate the remaining intrusion. Obviously, little regret and even lesser remorse make up Pakistan’s opinion on Kargil.

Asad Durrani, former DG ISI, in the jointly written book, ‘The Spy Chronicles’ expresses his perception that Pervez Musharraf as Pakistan’s DGMO was obsessed with the Kargil plan which was rejected by then PM Benazir Bhutto. The opportunity came when Musharraf was elevated to the position of the Pakistani army chief. How much of this intent and plan was known to his then mentor, Nawaz Sharif, will always remain cloaked in doubt, an issue also inconclusively analysed in Zehra’s book. However, 1998-99 provided the opportunity for the execution of the plan through the winter. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s Lahore Bus Yatra on February 21, 1999, offered scope for enhanced deception.

A brief explanation will clarify many of the issues above. The road from Srinagar to Leh enters the Ladakh sector after crossing the Zojila pass. Along the 100-km distance from Zojila to Kargil, major segments are overlooked by Pakistani posts across the LoC at a short distance. In winter these were vacated every year as were the Indian posts opposite them. Beyond Leh, a road leads into the Nubra Valley across the Ladakh range; the Army’s base camp is housed here for the defence of Siachen glacier. The Indian occupation of the latter in a coup de main operation in May 1984 put Pakistan at a huge strategic and psychological disadvantage. Musharraf, as a younger officer with Pakistan’s Special Forces, was known to have personally led failed assaults to evict the Indian Army from the Saltoro Ridge in 1987. The Kargil plan was a classic employment of manoeuvre which envisaged choking the Zojila-Leh road by an early winter occupation of vacated posts of both Pakistani and Indian armies, preventing the logistics resupply of Ladakh (and thereby Siachen) by interdiction and making the Indian Army’s defence of Ladakh untenable. An alternative supply artery to Leh existed from Pathankot via Manali but it was comparatively fragile and undependable due to heavy snow accumulation and road closure for extended periods. Discovered quite accidentally in May 1999, the Pakistani intrusion at the Dras and Kargil heights did embarrass the Indian Army whose attention was focused on the Kashmir Valley and south of Pir Panjal where militancy was fast spreading. It was as much an intelligence failure as an ‘intellect failure’ as India did not ever assess the nuisance potential of Kargil in a low-intensity war. Without an idea of the extent and depth of penetration, India attempted to locally restore the situation. When that failed, it inducted additional troops with 8 Mountain Division, then deployed in North Kashmir, to take on the mantle of restoration. The restoration operations fought at lofty heights were based upon company and platoon battles against entrenched Pakistani troops with some valorous feats by Indian junior soldiers and officers. Initial support by the Indian Air Force was helpful but difficult to execute. Later medium artillery (Bofors) became the backbone of fire support. Having recaptured a large chunk of the intrusion, India allowed diplomacy to play its role; that saw Sharif’s rush to Washington.

Kargil’s impact on the Valley was indirect as large tracts of North Kashmir were vacated and progressively occupied by our troops from elsewhere. It may never have been Musharraf’s intent, but this situation provided the space for a spurt in terror activities in Kashmir, including the infamous suicide ‘sneak attacks’ (sometimes erroneously called fidayeen). Kashmir witnessed the highest casualties among civilians and soldiers/policemen in 2001 and the tenuous situation on the counter-terror grid remained in place almost till 2003.

A major lesson emerged from Musharraf’s failed exploits – that initiation of operations could be brilliant but without an accompanying termination plan suited to various contingencies, success would invariably be elusive; he underestimated the resilience of the Indian Army and its sense of honour as had many of his predecessors. In her book, Zehra quotes a Pakistani major – “We said a two rakaat prayer of gratitude to Allah,” once Pakistan’s decision to vacate the remaining occupied heights was announced.

Siachen was the actual reason for the Pakistani misadventure at Kargil. When people today question the Indian Army’s continued insistence on remaining deployed at the Siachen glacier, as against mutual withdrawal along with the Pakistan Army, they need to be reminded of two things. First, in military standoffs trusting the adversary is suicidal, just as Kargil’s annual winter vacation exemplified. Second, if Siachen is to be vacated, it will only be one army which will withdraw. Unknown to the Pakistani people and largely to the Indian public, the Siachen is firmly in India’s grip with no Pakistani presence which can even glimpse the glacier.

Austin
BRF Oldie
Posts: 21977
Joined: 23 Jul 2000 11:31

Re: Siachen News & Discussion

Postby Austin » 13 Jun 2018 15:42

First MiG-23BN fighter landing at Leh
With the escalation of the Siachen operations in 1984, Contingency plans were developed to utilise high performance fighter aircraft from Leh airfield as and when needed. Air Marshal A D Joshi narrates the first landing of the MiG-23BN at Leh airport - The planning and training for this event was no simple matter, as this narration will make it evident.

Classic view of SM290

Ever since flying operations commenced at Leh in Ladakh , it has been the base for transport and helicopter operations only. Fighter operations could not be undertaken due to various limitations on the aircraft , as Leh is situated at a fairly high altitude. Even the British Harrier trials planned in 1973 could not be undertaken due to various problems and confidence levels of the British test pilots.

In April 1984 when Siachen operations commenced, the Army was in need of fighter support if the situation warranted it. The Air Force decided on deploying the Hunter aircraft initially, however because of weapon limitations that the Hunter aircraft could carry, it was decided to utilize the Mig-23 variable wing sweep, supersonic fighter bomber.

On 4th April 1984, No. 221 Squadron AF, was operationally deployed at Pathankot, standing by for operations. The squadron was equipped with the MiG-23 BN fighter bomber aircraft. The MiG-23 BN was capable of reaching the target area from Pathankot itself, with the maximum load. The only factor that needed to be considered was the flying time that it would take to reach the target area.

While at Pathankot extensive valley flying training was undertaken under my guidance, then a Squadron Leader, senior flight commander and offg commanding officer of the unit. Dummy attacks on possible targets in the valley as well as on mountain tops were practiced.

Practice diversion sorties were flown to Leh, so as to get used to the terrain and circuit pattern. The approach to land at Leh was only for Runway – 07. Two types of approaches were possible . One was a direct approach from Khalsi and the other was a standard circuit descending on down wind and base leg like the transport aircraft. The circuit for R/W 07 was behind the mountain range and approach was along the slope of the mountain. The airfield could not be seen on down wind and base leg and became visible just prior to rolling out on finals. The approach all along was just 50 meters above the slope and there was a big hump just after the Indus river and short of the 07 dumbbell, and lot of care had to be taken when doing an overshoot after round off, as the engine response and speed build up was slow.

Since there was a big hill feature at the other end of the runway a turn had to be executed to the right, so as to fly along the Indus in a south easterly direction to build speed and height.

On 15 May 1984 on instructions from HQ WAC, I along with two aircraft ferried back to Halwara. Technicians from the Base Repair Depot (BRD) were to carry out some trials on the turbo starter which started the main engine. A .1mm jet was fitted to the fuel pipe line to reduce the fuel inlet into the turbo starter. The squadron was still not aware as to why this mod was being carried out. After various trials, on 16th May, the aircraft were ferried back to Pathankot.

On 18th May on instructions from WAC, I led a detachment of three aircraft to Awantipur . At Awantipur some more trials were carried out on the turbo starter and finally .6mmjet was fitted. Simultaneously ground crew was moved to Leh.

The SASO WAC Air Mshl Raghavendran visited Awantipur on 22nd May along with AOC J&K AVM Arvind Dalaya . It was then that I was asked to land the MiG-23BN at Leh. I was given to understand that our own test pilots were not too confident about the aircrafts operational utilization from Leh.

On 23 May1984 at 10:00 hrs I was escorted by my no 2 Sqn Ldr Paul and 2 Mig 23 MFs ,as a single fighter aircraft is prohibited from flying over the mountains and my no 2 was to return to Awantipur. My aircraft (SM-245) configuration was clean with only internal fuel. The unit had already calculated the all up weight of the aircraft required for a safe landing at Leh. Based on temperature and pressure the (Touchdown Air Speed) TAS was calculated. The permissible hub speed for the undercarriage of the aircraft was 320 kms for the main wheels and 280kms for the nose wheel. The altitude of Leh being 3256 mtrs , the true airspeed at touchdown was approx 60 kms more than the IAS (Indicated Air Speed) . The tail chute limitations of less than 280kms was another factor that had to be kept in mind. Therefore , it was necessary to keep the aircraft floating for as long as possible ,so as to ensure that the touchdown TAS would be less than 320kms and the nose wheel lowering as well as the tail chute deployment would be less than 280kms.

On reaching overhead Leh , the other three aircraft detached and were orbiting overhead. I carried out practice circuits and over shoots so as to bring the fuel state to a figure as low as possible. When the fuel state reached 550 liters, I decided to land the aircraft as the fuel available did not permit another circuit. If I had failed to land the aircraft, it would result in an ejection due to lack of fuel.

After announcing my intention to land, there were calls of ”best of luck “ from my airborne buddies as well as the ground based personnel ( ATC and Tpt aircraft ). I carried out my descending circuit as precisely as possible, turned onto base leg , and just before roll out made contact with the runway. The approach was made on Radio Altimeter maintaining 50 mtrs all along the slope, adjusting the height speed combination.

I was aware that on crossing the Indus River short of the runway there would be light turbulence, erratic winds, speed fluctuations, as well as a mild sink. There was also a big hump in line with the runway, short of the dumb-bell which gave the feeling that the main wheels would touch it.

The speed on threshold was 280 kms IAS, round off was on the dumbbell. I reduced the throttle gently, allowed the aircraft to float and touched down at a speed of 240 km IAS. Things moved in a flash and at a speed of 220 km IAS, I lowered the nose wheel and deployed the chute. The aircraft rolled till the the end of the runway under control.

R/T NATTER OF “CONGRATULATIONS JOE “came from one and all including the IAC captain . I turned right into the taxy way leading to the blast pen at the end of R/W 07. I jettisoned the tail chute, stopped the aircraft, switched off and then gradually depressurized the cockpit as sudden decompression could cause problems.

Gp Capt S K Behal , the officiating COO for fighter operations was present to receive me. I was taken to the ops room and made to speak to Air Mshl Wollen the AOC-in-C WAC who extended his congratulations and asked a lot of questions.

I then carried out a recce of the runway and gauged that the down slope from dumbbell 25 to 07 was fairly steep, and there was no arrester barrier at the 07 end, therefore aborting take off meant going off the runway hitting the hump and then going over into the Indus river. In case one decided to eject, the minimum height required was 30 meters and speed above 130 kms.

I then carried out start up and taxy trials . The trials completed, the aircraft was made ready for takeoff and return to Awantipur. However bad weather set in and flying was called off for the day .

I was elated at the fact that I had created history . As per rules , an overnight stay meant rest for 48 hrs , however on instructions from WAC the restriction was waived and if I was found fit the next day I was to take off.

On 24 May 84, after a thorough medical examination I planned my take off . Once the three aircraft from Awantipur came over head Leh, I started up the aircraft which posed no problems , Oil pressure had to be adjusted to remain within limits ,I then lined up on R/W 25. Take off was also a little awkward as 300mts up the runway it slopes away and therefore the controls initially have to be eased forward to prevent premature liftoff and on crossing the hump then eased back to lift the nose wheel. This is to be done gently as the gap between the tail fin and runway surface is very little and chances of it touching is runway are bright.

At a speed of 130 km IAS, I raised the nose wheel as I had crossed the hump and unstuck at 290 km IAS short of middle marker. This worked out to a speed of 352 km TAS which was way above the 320 kms restriction on the hub.

The flight to Awantipur was uneventful and on landing was received and congratulated by the SASO and other station personnel.

Three more trial landings and take off’s with various loads were carried out before full flying operations on the Mig 23 BN’s was cleared for other fully ops pilots. This was certainly a red letter day for me personally and the Air Force .

During my tenure as CO of the same unit from April 85 to May 87 the squadron carried regular operations at Leh. I was also tasked to carry out range trials at Toshe Maidan near Srinagar , Dummy dives at camp 6 on the Siachen Glacier . Since it was dangerous to carry out full range work on the glacier, based on my recommendation Kar Tso was opened as a regular range after I had carried out trials of all weapons ( guns ,rockets & bombs ).

I was then given the task of briefing Mig 21 Bis and Mig27 sqns. Besides this, approaches were carried out by me at Thoise, and a number of Photo recee sorties were personally under taken by me and some unit pilots. It has certainly given me great satisfaction for being the first pilot to start operations from Leh as even the Soviets had not operated at such heights and possibly the most experienced fighter pilot to fly in this area.

Air Marshal A D Joshi (10886 F(P))was commissioned in the IAF in June 1967, as part of the 97th Pilot's Course. In his service spanning over 39 years, he commanded No.221 Squadron flying the MiG-23BN, and was the C-in-C for Eastern Air Command and Strategic Forces Command. He is a recipient of the PVSM and VM.


Return to “Military Issues & History Forum”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: Google [Bot], Kakarat, komal and 40 guests