Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation - 20 Feb 2004

daulat · Post by **daulat** » 01 Mar 2004 17:39

calvin, i don't think its just the machining. there are mettalurgical, bearing design and other issues. i haven't got my head around the 'magnetic bearings' issue, but is suggests mastery over complex electro-mechanical design and manufacture issues. getting a complex mechanical system to work under extreme conditions requires quite a lot of engineering funda

also, the machine thus produced with 50k+ working components of high complexity would be prone to all kinds of maintenance issues - throwing in signficant doubt its production capabilities. i have not yet seen any estimates of the 'yield' or efficiency of these machines. we can assume that they produce weapons grade purified U, however how many tons of raw material must be processed at what yield to give the required volumes that have been estimated?

the management overhead of such a facility is also non-trivial. i do not doubt that the Paks have the brains, but I struggle with their ability to do it ALL indigenously

I am increasingly convinced that they sold duds to Libya and probably Iran, prompting them to shop em to unkil. NoKo is a different story perhaps, and so is Saudi?

Tim · Post by **Tim** » 01 Mar 2004 17:53

Daulat,

I don't know if any of those estimates assume 24x7x365, or have down-time assumptions included.

I don't think Pakistan has necessarily done it all indigenously - as we see, Malaysia appears involved in some way in recent efforts. I also think Libya got busted - I don't think they felt cheated and went to the US. The ship that was caught in Libya in October was a catastrophe for them.

Johann,

For what it's worth (again, these are really rough estimates), I think it takes about 200 tons of yellowcake to build 50 bombs worth of HEU. I'll see if I can't track down that source. It's worth looking at China for supplies.

Tim

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 01 Mar 2004 18:23

For what its worth, "magnetic bearing" technology is marketed by people in the nuclear industry at trade shows etc. Recently saw a gadget about as tall and as far around as a good beer mug.

True, you don't need ball bearings to take the high speed then, but you do need good magnets and control systems. That shining array of centrifuges posted by Calvin is the brass-tube-thief's dream. No wonder Kahuta is said to be empty these days. General Musharraf's bathrooms in the New Jersey mansion must be really gleaming..

daulat · Post by **daulat** » 01 Mar 2004 18:37

Tim
the only estimates i have seen are at the other end of the production cycle, i.e. output from reactors - which satisfies the Pu requirement. For U, I have not come across (not that I look anywhere beyond BR!) any production estimates, but only words to the effect of 'they have about so much HEU... therefore... so many bombs'
as a lay person, I am interested in knowing what sort of availablity the centrifuges have! Any machine this complex is worthy of curiosity!

any declared shipping info on yellowcake? i am sure that the tonnage will crop up somewhere...

p.s. there has not been any suggestion that Malaysia is officially involved afaik, so does one assume that this was an order for 'pharmaceutical use' or something similar that was duly completed by a willing metalshop?

Amber G. · Post by **Amber G.** » 01 Mar 2004 18:41

For what it's worth (again, these are really rough estimates), I think it takes about 200 tons of yellowcake to build 50 bombs worth of HEU. I'll see if I can't track down that source.

FWIW - 200 Tons of Yellowcake would give about 120 tons of tuballoy or about 1000 Kg of oralloy.. so 50 bombs seem in the right ballpark.

(yellocake contains about 70% of Uranium oxide (U3O8), and 1 ton of uranium would produce about 7 Kg of HEU.)

(BTW a ton of yellowcake prob would cost only about 20,000 dollars in the open market)

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 01 Mar 2004 18:49

http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/PakArsenal.html

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program
Present Capabilities
Last changed 6 August 2001
Weapons Stockpile
The uranium enrichment facility that produces most of Pakistan's weapons material )(highly enriched uranium or HEU) is the gas centrifuge plant at KRL (A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories) at Kahuta, 50 km Islamabad. This facility, which employs 7,000 people including 2,000 scientists and researchers, began operating in the early 1980s, but suffered serious start up problems. A.Q. Khan announced that Kahuta was producing low enriched uranium in 1984. US intelligence believes that uranium enrichment exceeded 5% in 1985, and that production of highly enriched uranium was achieved in 1986. Kahuta has run essentially non-stop at enriching uranium since that time (though with varying numbers of gas centrifuges). At start-up Pakistan had reportedly manufactured 14000 centrifuges, but had only 1000 operating. By 1991 about 3000 machines were operating according to US intelligence. This implies a production capacity of 45-100 kg U-235/year depending on the tails concentration and production efficiency, enough for 3-7 implosion weapons. Shahryar Khan has said that the cost of Kahuta was relatively modest, less than $150 million[Albright and Hibbs 1992].
...
Pakistan has built a second enrichment plant at Golra, 6 miles from Islamabad. It is expected to be even larger than Kahuta, with more advanced centrifuges. It may not yet have begun production though due to difficulty in obtaining the necessary parts now. In March 1996 the New York Times reported that China had sold Pakistan 5000 ring magnets suitable for use in gas centrifuges.

It is estimated that Pakistan produced about 210 kg (range 160 - 260 kg) of HEU up to the moratorium in 1991 [Albright and O'Neill 1998]. The current production capacity of Pakistan is approximately 110 kg per year (range 80 - 140 kg/year), and the cumulative production of HEU (less the HEU expended in the 1998 tests) is estimated at about 800 kg at the end of 2000 (range 665 - 940 kg) [Albright 2000]. Since a uranium weapon requires about 15 kg this equates to a potential for 53 weapons (range 44 - 62), although somewhat more than 15 kg may be used to produce more powerful and efficient weapons.

Some general but detailed info here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mctl98-2/p2sec05.pdf

Also see:

http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/uranium.htm
Gas Centrifuge

The use of centrifugal fields for isotope separation was first suggested in 1919; but efforts in this direction were unsuccessful until 1934, when J.W. Beams and co-workers at the University of Virginia applied a vacuum ultracentrifuge to the separation of chlorine isotopes. Although abandoned midway through the Manhattan Project, the gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment process has been highly developed and used to produce both HEU and LEU. It is likely to be the preferred technology of the future due to its relatively low-energy consumption, short equilibrium time, and modular design features.

In the gas centrifuge uranium-enrichment process, gaseous UF 6 is fed into a cylindrical rotor that spins at high speed inside an evacuated casing. Because the rotor spins so rapidly, centrifugal force results in the gas occupying only a thin layer next to the rotor wall, with the gas moving at approximately the speed of the wall. Centrifugal force also causes the heavier 238 UF 6 molecules to tend to move closer to the wall than the lighter 235 UF 6 molecules, thus partially separating the uranium isotopes. This separation is increased by a relatively slow axial countercurrent flow of gas within the centrifuge that concentrates enriched gas at one end and depleted gas at the other. This flow can be driven mechanically by scoops and baffles or thermally by heating one of the end caps.

The main subsystems of the centrifuge are (1) rotor and end caps; (2) top and bottom bearing/suspension system; (3) electric motor and power supply (frequency changer); (4) center post, scoops and baffles; (5) vacuum system; and (6) casing. Because of the corrosive nature of UF 6 , all components that come in direct contact with UF 6 must be must be fabricated from, or lined with, corrosion-resistant materials. The separative capacity of a single centrifuge increases with the length of the rotor and the rotor wall speed. Consequently, centrifuges containing long, high-speed rotors are the goal of centrifuge development programs (subject to mechanical con-straints).

The primary limitation on rotor wall speed is the strength-to-weight ratio of the rotor material. Suitable rotor materials include alloys of aluminum or titanium, maraging steel, or composites reinforced by certain glass, aramid, or carbon fibers. At present, maraging steel is the most popular rotor material for proliferants. With maraging steel, the maximum rotor wall speed is approximately 500 m/s. Fiber-rein-forced composite rotors may achieve even higher speeds; however, the needed com-posite technology is not within the grasp of many potential proliferants. Another limitation on rotor speed is the lifetime of the bearings at either end of the rotor. Rotor length is limited by the vibrations a rotor experiences as it spins. The rotors can undergo vibrations similar to those of a guitar string, with characteristic frequencies of vibration. Balancing of rotors to minimize their vibrations is especially critical to avoid early failure of the bearing and suspension systems. Because perfect balancing is not possible, the suspension system must be capable of damping some amount of vibration.

One of the key components of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant is the power supply (frequency converter) for the gas centrifuge machines. The power supply must accept alternating current (ac) input at the 50- or 60-Hz line frequency available from the electric power grid and provide an ac output at a much higher frequency (typically 600 Hz or more). The high-frequency output from the frequency changer is fed to the high-speed gas centrifuge drive motors (the speed of an ac motor is proportional to the frequency of the supplied current). The centrifuge power supplies must operate at high efficiency, provide low harmonic distortion, and provide precise control of the output frequency.

The casing is needed both to maintain a vacuum and to contain the rapidly spinning components in the event of a failure. If the shrapnel from a single centrifuge failure is not contained, a "domino effect" may result and destroy adjacent centrifuges. A single casing may enclose one or several rotors.

Although the separation factors obtainable from a centrifuge are large compared to gaseous diffusion, several cascade stages are still required to produce even LEU material. Furthermore, the throughput of a single centrifuge is usually small, which leads to rather small separative capacities for typical proliferator centrifuges. To be able to produce only one weapon per year, several thousand centrifuges would be required.

The electrical consumption of a gas centrifuge facility is much less than that of a gaseous diffusion plant. Consequently, a centrifuge plant will not have the easily identified electrical and cooling systems typically required by a gaseous diffusion plant.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 01 Mar 2004 20:13

Narayanan,

I was hoping to avoid giving an opinion on the entire thing.

Case Green is a scenario where Pakistani indigenous capability is quite weak. This forces a reliance on Chinese inputs for everything. They can sell incomplete systems and parts of this-and-that but the thing being sold isn't anything more than a RDD.

Case White is a scenario where Pakistani indigenous capability in the field of Urainium refining is reasonable but their plutonium refining capability and a lot of their weapons technology (measurements and control) is poor. This enables them to trade their fissile material tech. for weapons tech. They have a workable device courtesy of China but they can't really export anything more than an RDD without seriously compromising their own program.

Case Red is a scenario where Pakistani indigenous capability in Uranium refining is robust. This in turn increases their plutonium production capability. Also Pakistani indigenous weapons tech is robust - they already have sufficient stocks (from import/indigenous manufacture) of weaponization related electronics etc... This makes them able to export not just the Uranium refining tech, but also a tested and proven electronics package for a nuclear explosive. This is a high value export.

It is said that in the real world, when you go to meet someone, you carry three files with you, Green, White and Red, and when you are asked your opinion, you pick a color and start describing the case in it. If I was someone I am not, I would start with the color red.

I notice there was some discussion on isotope signature earlier.

iirc the isotope signature changes from facility to facility, it is some function of the feedstock and impurities in other material used in processing. I think the signature of every facility is therefore different. To know where anything came from, you have to have a very high quality database of all materials produced from everywhere. It is logical to expect that there is already such a database - of some quality available through the IAEA but if reasonable confidence limits can't be set on the sample from available data something more will have to be done.

You can do an MS on a gaseous sample, I am not sure if NAA is possible on a gaseous sample. I was always under the impression that NAA was used on metals but please correct me if I am wrong. I can help but feel that there was no venting in the Chagai hills - those things are made from some very hard rock, the only way to find the origin of the fissile material was to sample the air over Khushab and see what the Kr85 count was. An increased count would denote a rise in Pu reprocessing. If there was no increase in the Kr85 count, then it stands to reason that any Pu used in the Chagai came from somewhere else.

Alok Niranjan · Post by **Alok Niranjan** » 01 Mar 2004 20:31

Originally posted by sunil s:

You can do an MS on a gaseous sample, I am not sure if NAA is possible on a gaseous sample. I was always under the impression that NAA was used on metals but please correct me if I am wrong.

If NAA is referring to neutron activation, yes it is done on gases all the time (mostly for air-quality analysis, for example, measuring sulphur content in smog). A typical technique is to fly aircraft throgh the contaminated air and collect samples on filters. The filters are then exposed to neutrons and emerging gammmas are measured for spectral analysis.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 01 Mar 2004 22:13

Mani T,

> run through a filter and the filter is exposed.

I didn't think of that, I knew you had to have something that was solid to expose to the neutron source. It never occured to me that some substrate of a known isotope signature could be used to fix the gaseous particles. Many thanks.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 02 Mar 2004 01:01

Vivek,

I already posted it in the previous page.

Rudra · Post by **Rudra** » 02 Mar 2004 01:56

per the seymour hersh article in NewYorker, bin
laden's hideout is adjacent to the Swat Valley.

http://www.mango.itgo.com/swat.htm

Manu · Post by **Manu** » 02 Mar 2004 02:51

Wrong Thread - Admin

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 02 Mar 2004 04:01

Sunil, thanks. The thing to note is that we are all focused on the (happy collapse of) TSP-mushbutt. But there are much larger implications here for other people who can, lets say, "read English" and have fast download connections.

My point on the isotope signatures etc. is not that there's anything invalid about the diagnostic technology. My point is that those who control the release of information from / supposedly about Classified programs also control WHAT to "release", and given that they know what the best in the outside world know about such techniques, they will release info which simultaneously:

a) Makes the outside world (translation: BRF. Who else can aspire to the title of "BEST"?

) go "Ahh! THERE's THE PROOF!"

b) is false, but points to whatever hypothesis the controllers wish the outside world to believe.

The whole point of "Classified" is not to hide what is possible (that can be seen/guessed from open-literature papers, news releases, Patent applications etc. ) but to hide what precisely from all those possibilities is actually done - so that those who waste time trying to extract such info can be misled to "favorable" results - like the Siberian Pipeline incident.

Thus, the greater the depth of scientific knowledge applied to analyzing such "releases" the worse the misguided hypothesis that results.

IOW, "I am not being paranoid, its just that the whole world is against me."

Hence the need to argue the logic of observed facts independent of data which can be fudged - if that is possible.

In the TSP Poo-Proliferation scandal, there are no good guys, only villains. When a senior CIA person says of it:

"We have never been so vulnerable since the British burned Washington DC"

we're talking big-leagues blame-apportioning. Those who fall in the category of "K&L" (Knew And Lied) about the TSP's nuclear program and proliferation proclivities, can fairly be said to be guilty of putting their own nation in "Clear and Present Danger". When those people also have former or current financial, personal or other links to "the most dangerous adversary of the United States" (viz, TSP) then their positions become rather shaky in the inner circles of Tubelightabad (away from USAToday and CNN spotlights). Suddenly, "American Friends of Pakistan" begins to spell:

Benedict bin Arnold al Hessi

When I check the "Survey of 5000 members of BRF" above, I see that:

"MOST people agree that US entities knew quite well in 1980 AT LEAST that TSP was going full speed on a nuclear-capability program, and the information was out there in front of their eyes that these were bigot entities NOT friendly to the US of A.

If we think that, so do people "in the know" in Tubelightabad. You see why it would be crazy to believe any "data" being released from related sources.... No one is going to be releasing any such data without making damn sure that they have written permission to release said stuff - which makes them as suspect as the statements of Pervez HoodBhoy.

There are very powerful and pressing interests at work here, outside TSP. Also, the lobbies owned by the PRC are not blind to the implications of these revelations for the future image of the PRC as a "responsible superpower" as opposed to an "Evil Empire".

Hence it may be smart to stick to the joyous spectator sport of watching Paki-wriggle.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 02 Mar 2004 04:24

N3, Excellent post.

The whole point of "Classified" is not to hide what is possible (that can be seen/guessed from open-literature papers, news releases, Patent applications etc. ) but to hide what precisely from all those possibilities is actually done - so that those who waste time trying to extract such info can be misled to "favorable" results - like the Siberian Pipeline incident.

This is the key. The thought process in the outside world ( eg BRF ) is being monitored to figure out what is the final perception of this fallout.

Prateek · Post by **Prateek** » 02 Mar 2004 04:55

http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=56715

Foreign agents penetrated into country’s N-programme: Aslam Baig

ISLAMABAD, March 02 (Online): Former Chief of Army Staff, General retired Mirza Aslam Baig said on Monday that anti-Pakistan forces have managed to penetrate into country’s nuclear programme and national defence and security are under threats.
“The agents of CIA, RAW, MOSAD and MI5 have managed to penetrate into our nuclear programme as anti-Pakistan forces were trying to roll back country’s nuclear capability,” he said in an exclusive interview with Online.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 02 Mar 2004 07:54

Originally posted by narayanan:

"We have never been so vulnerable since the British burned Washington DC"

I can't help anal-ysis

Who is "we"?

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 02 Mar 2004 08:19

The precise quote is:

The most dangerous country for the United States now is Pakistan, and second is Iran.” Gallucci (consultant to the C.I.A. on proliferation issues) went on, “We haven’t been this vulnerable since the British burned Washington in 1814.”

http://newyorker.com/fact/content/?040308fa_fact

THE NEW YORKER, MARCH 1, 2004

THE DEAL
by SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Why is Washington going easy on Pakistan’s nuclear black marketers?

Issue of 2004-03-08
Posted 2004-03-01

Good point, shiv. Is it "Americans" as assumed, or is it "DupleeCity" ?????

Because the reference to 1814 is curious - as I recall the British were really after just the DupleeCity establishment, not having anywhere near the resources to invade the whole country at that point.

Alok Niranjan · Post by **Alok Niranjan** » 02 Mar 2004 08:25

Originally posted by acharya:
The thought process in the outside world ( BRF ) is being monitored to figure out what is the final perception of this fallout.

who is monitoring BRF?

I hear simultaneous strains of self-doubt (as in "we are mushrooms, why bother?") and self-importance (as in "we are being monitored").

JCage · Post by **JCage** » 02 Mar 2004 09:41

NSA...you have been warned!
Now let me go wear my tinfoil hat, they cant control my brain thattaway!

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 02 Mar 2004 09:51

Originally posted by narayanan:
Good point, shiv. Is it "Americans" as assumed, or is it "DupleeCity" ?????

Because the reference to 1814 is curious - as I recall the British were really after just the DupleeCity establishment, not having anywhere near the resources to invade the whole country at that point.

Exactly.

Because if you talk of the US being at risk of nuclear attack - I thought 1962 was a much more fearful time.

So it's specific a$$es that are being covered here. It may hurt feelings - but I have been suspecting for some time that the Pakistani oligarchy and parts of the USG have a lot more in common that one would like to believe.

kgoan · Post by **kgoan** » 02 Mar 2004 10:41

Originally posted by shiv:
. . . but I have been suspecting for some time that the Pakistani oligarchy and parts of the USG have a lot more in common that one would like to believe.

.
Google search terms for the interested:

BCCI, Peter Dale Scott, Ralph McGehee and CIABASE (CIABASE is one word).

Raj Malhotra · Post by **Raj Malhotra** » 02 Mar 2004 12:43

Does anybody have copy of "critical mass" i have lost my copy?

i think the estimate was 1.5 bombs for pak and 6 for india in 1990

also is there no wear or tear, damage or destruction of centrifuges when installed??

Note from above posts Iran with more money and better engineering talent took 13 years(?) to reach 36% enrichment (?) nobody is saying that they have even half a bomb worth of HEU after so much effort. difficult to believe pak did better.

did not rajiv back out from bombing pak enrichment programme because he believed there was nothing relevant there??

also now tim wants to blame russia after NK, i am sure china is blame less. tim posts are always entertaining especially the drift.

N3

glad to see my original view that pak centrifuges never worked being adopted even by u.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 02 Mar 2004 12:52

Originally posted by kgoan:

BCCI, Peter Dale Scott, Ralph McGehee and CIABASE (CIABASE is one word).

Google for <a href="http://spot.acorn.net/jfkplace/03/RM/drugs-cia">BCCI, Peter Dale Scott, Ralph McGehee and CIABASE</a>

gives me a document which says:

From Ralph McGehee
Reference in CIABASE to:
Drugs and the CIA

afghanistan, 79-90 mujaheddin commanders inside afghanistan control huge
fields opium poppies and reap harvest of as much as four million pounds
opium a year. by 89 afghanistan and pakistan produced as much heroin as
rest of world combined. weiner, t. (1990). blank check: the pentagon's
black budget 151-152

afghanistan, 81-83 tribal groups we supporting increased cross-border
sales opium. afghanistan opium crop, refined in pakistan, now dominates
heroin market in eastern u.s. peterzell, j. (1984). reagan's secret wars 19

afghanistan. afghan rebels heroin ops. discussion of in counterspy 5/84 7

afghanistan. drug enforcement agency acknowledging rebels financing war in
part with proceeds of opium. dea estimates 4 to 4 and half tons heroin
smuggled into u.s. annually. counterspy 5/84 7

afghanistan, 82 sales of opium fund afghan afghan rebels. the dea said
52% of the heroin brought into the u.s. last year is believed to have come
from the area of afghanistan, pakistan and iran. u.s. policy contradictory
it wants to fight the drug traffic and to drive the ussr out of
afghanistan. 250 to 300 tons opium were produced in afghanistan in 81
that quantity could be converted into 25 to 30 tons of heroin. processing
done in pakistan. drug traffickers in u.s. import 4 to 4 1/2 tons of heroin
a year. washington post 12/17/83

afghanistan, 86-90 a billion dollar trade in drugs, arms, and smuggled
goods provided the material basis for the jihad. the progressive 5/90 27-30

afghanistan, 86 a dos report describes afghanistan and the bordering
tribal areas of pakistan as "the world's leading source of illicit heroin
exports to the us and europe. the sale of this opium plays an important
part in the finances of the cia-backed afghan rebels. nyt 6/20/86 from
intel parapolitics 9/86 p7

afghanistan, 89 adm dickering over how best to arm the mujahedeen. areas
controlled by them include some of the most fertile centers of opium
production. dos report circa 3/89 said afghanistan produced 700 to 800
metric tons of opium 88, most from territory held by rebels. rep bill
mccollum hit cia over handling of mujahedeen and working thru pakistan's
intel service. the nation 10/16/89 412

afghanistan, 89 the fight for control of prime poppy-growing areas near
pakistan has undercut mujahedin efforts to topple the afghan gvt according
to dos officials. newsweek 9/18/89 4

afghanistan, 92 per state dept big opium crop goes beyond 300 to 400 tons
- 500 tons probable. intelligence newsletter 5/28/92 7

afghanistan, iran, pakistan. (golden crescent) accounts for 75% all heroin
in u.s.in 83 4.5 tons heroin came to u.s from golden crescent. covert
action information bulletin (now covert action quarterly) summer 87 11

afghanistan, pakistan, 80-90 17 dea agents assigned to u.s. embassy in
islamabad. dea reports identified 40 significant narcotics syndicates in
pakistan. despite high quality dea intel, not a major syndicate
investigated by pakistani police in a decade. hekmatyar himself controlled
six heroin refineries. without fear of arrest heroin dealers began
exporting product to europe an america, capturing more than 50% of both
markets. when pakistani police picked up hamid hasnain, v.p. of gvt's habib
bank, they found in his briefcase the personal records of president zia.
phc 455 blatant official corruption continued until gen zia's death in an
air crash. typical of misinfo that blocked any u.s. action against
pakistan's heroin trade, the state dept's semi-annual narcotics review in
september called gen zia a strong supporter of anti-narcotics activities in
pakistan. mccoy, a.w. (1991). the politics of heroin: cia complicity in the
global drug traffic 456

afghanistan, pakistan, 80-90 pakistan gvt officials involved in drugs,
mujaheddin manufacturing heroin, exporting it to europe and u.s. using
money to support guerrillas. z magazine 1/91 71

afghanistan, pakistan, 85-90 u.s. gvt avoids investigating drug trade run
by afghan resistance movement. gvt has info re heroin deals gulbuddin
hekmatjar, leader of mujaheddin but takes no action. barnett rubin of yale
university based on washington post story: "people attempting research this
connection receive hardly any support. our relationship with pakistani
military is centerpiece our strategic presence in southern asia and even in
the persian gulf." article outlines movement of weapons and drugs via
pakistani isi and the national logistic cell (nlc) entirely owned by
pakistani army. top secret s/a-90 17-18

afghanistan, pakistan, 89 as foreign aid declined in 89, afghan leaders
expanded opium production to sustain guerrilla armies. a scramble among
rival mujaheddin leaders occurred. mccoy, a.w. (1991). the politics of
heroin: cia complicity in the global drug traffic 458

afghanistan, pakistan, 90 see article "u.s. declines to probe afghan drug
trade, rebels, pakistani officers implicated." washington post 5/13/90
a1,29

aid official in 72 reported "even though the cia was in fact,
facilitating movement of opiates to u.s. they hid behind shield of secrecy
and said it done in the interest of national security." national reporter s
86 43

Other quotes:

article "noriega crony admits laundering role." gonzalo mora jr. pleaded
guilty to $32 million money-laundering scheme. another defendant in case,
amjad awan, former official of bcci. washington times 1/18/90 a3

australia, book called "cochin connection" by australian couple brian and
alison milgate questions links between asis and drug trade. a dea official,
jerry moore, urged brian milgate to be careful [in testifying] since a
number of characters in drug org checked directly back to intel community -
the cia as well as another foreign gvt. if cia business threatened, he told
brian, their wrath would be deadlier than what might be expected from the
mafia. toohey, b., & pinwill, w. (1990). oyster: the story of the
australian secret intelligence service 254

also

panama, 86-87 details of use of bcci by drug interests. noriega had a $25
million slush fund in bcci. steven kalish got 3 panamanian passports from
cesar. kalish shipped cash from tampa to panama, $2 to 3 million at a time.
money deposited in bcci, bank that handled cesar rodriguez's and noriega's
accounts. dinges, j. (1990). our man in panama 171

and

panama, 89-90 noriega lived, spent lavishly in months before indictment."
general's banker, amjad awan of bcci, to begin trial. he and others of bcci
laundered $14 million in drug and crime profits. wt 1/12/90 a5. amjad awan,
noriega's banker guilty in drug case. washington post 7/30/90 a8

Tim · Post by **Tim** » 02 Mar 2004 17:33

Raj,

You reading ALL my posts? That was a specific response to someone else. China's not blameless - but I'm not sure what it's role is IN IRAN, where there's very good evidence that RUSSIA is involved and has been for a while. China has been much more important in Pakistan, and possibly in North Korea.

It's fairly clear that we don't know everything about Iran's program. From what has been posted on this thread, it took Pakistan roughly ten years to enrich to 5% HEU, so thirteen years for Iran to get to 36% isn't a major deviation from this reported Pakistani experience.

Hope you enjoyed this post as well.

Vivek_A · Post by **Vivek_A** » 02 Mar 2004 19:01

New Yorker = Seymour Hersh...so take it FWIW..

Report: Israel broke Iranian code

A secret Israeli intelligence unit, known as Unit 8200, broke a sophisticated Iranian code enabling Israel to monitor communications, including contacts with Pakistan regarding the development of Iranian nuclear weapons, the New Yorker magazine reported on Tuesday.

Raj Malhotra · Post by **Raj Malhotra** » 02 Mar 2004 22:38

Also paddy said pak was nude!

can't locate source now, but wasn't there some reports that pak only produced LEU between 90-98 (?)under US pressure. seems now that is all they could have produced.

N3

your nuke nood theory may have a major flaw. being that pak had no nukes to begin with. may be,chinese nukes were sent back after 9/11. perhaps their LEU was the thing that US took over.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 03 Mar 2004 01:52

Pioneer Op-Ed.... in Foray section..
America's terms for silence

Samuel Baid

On February 4, 2004, Dr AQ Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, apologised for himself and on behalf of his junior colleagues for their errors of judgement in proliferation of nuclear technology and appealed for Presidential pardon. He was pardoned the next day. All neatly sewn, and everyone will be happy. President Musharraf will assure the US that there will be no further Pakistani proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Behind the exposure of Pakistani proliferation is the dogged American investigation, and the messianic role of the US media exposure. Pakistani proliferation queered the pitch for USA with North Korea, almost gave Iran the nuclear muscle to threaten Israel, and could have extended Libya's defiant rogue status. On top of it all, Musharraf had been up to all kinds of games with the US on Al-Qaeda - he was hunting with the hounds and running with the hares. A secret tradeoff may have been extracted by Washington for its silence over proliferation. It could be willing to forget and forgive in return for Musharraf's undertaking that he would deliver Osama Bin Laden to the George W Bush administration ahead of the November Presidential elections. In addition, he would also have to rein in the Taliban which is flourishing in numerous madrassas across Pakistan and on its"wild west" frontier.

Clearly, the stakes are high for Pakistan. The Musharraf regime may appear to be mollycoddled in spite of its lapses but the heat is on. Pakistan faces the prospect of the pandora's box on its involvement in promoting terror being reopened for the first time since the Clinton administration went to the brink of declaring it a terrorist state.

While Dr AQ Khan may have taken the full blame for proliferation, Washington is aware that he was only the tip of the iceberg. The US agencies are fully aware and rightly concerned over the cover provided by the Pakistani army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to Khan and his colleagues over the past decade. Khan may not have been the most brilliant Pakistani scientist, but he was the most nationalist. While working for URENCO - an Anglo-Dutch-German consortium engaged in enrichment of uranium - he fled to Pakistan in 1975 after stealing the centrifuge uranium enrichment designs, apparently sacrificing a lucrative career.

Not unlike Musharraf, Khan is also a Mohajir with roots in India. The Pakistani leader perhaps appreciates the imperatives Khan felt to prove that a migrant could better a Punjabi in India - baiting. This motivation played no mean part in the scientist's decision to embark on the project to build an "Islamic bomb" to be used in future against kafer states like Israel and India. This was also an astute marketing ploy. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was Khan's original patron, used it to raise unlimited funding. A large part of the money was deposited in his private account. Khan too extracted personal benefit.

Geopolitical currents played a facilitating role. Khan established the Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL) at Kahuta in 1976 with liberal financial support from Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In due course, he was able to obtain the German centrifuge design "G-2", which used steel rotors. It is ironic that those western countries which normally take principled stands against proliferation adopted a benign position on Pakistan's clandestine nuclear programme. Though the Dutch government sentenced Khan to four years in prison in absentia for stealing the centrifuge designs, it subsequently dropped the case on technical grounds. During the 1970s and 80s, most of Pakistan's technology and support material and components for its nuclear programme came clandestinely from Europe and America.

Those were the Cold War years and much depended on which side of the two blocs a country stood. Pakistan was aligned to the West, specifically the US, and actively supported the American covert war against Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan. Included in the basket of rewards was the unwritten agreement to look the other way as Khan and his scientists went about collecting hardware and software for the Pakistani bomb. Khan worked with messianic zeal and gathered a group of trusted and competent scientists around him. He expanded KRL from uranium enrichment to include missile production, and before long was presiding over Pakistan's WMD production and delivery industry. The entire programme came under Pakistan's military control when Gen. Zia-ul-Haq toppled Bhutto in a coup and established military dictatorship.

Pakistan's nuclear cooperation with Iran started as early as 1984. This agreement was official, government-to-government, but highly secret. AQ Khan was Pakistan's nodal point for interface with Iran. This cooperation lasted till 2003 when, finally, the IAEA blew the whistle with inputs from the US.

Iranian nuclear scientists and engineers were trained in Pakistan, and uranium enrichment technology and centrifuge were transferred to Iran. In 1992, Iran offered US $3.2 billion to the then Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg, for further assistance in their weapons programme.

The close Pakistani-Iranian nuclear weapons cooperation is exemplified by the fact that after Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests, the Iranian Foreign Minister was the only ministerial level foreigner allowed to visit to the test site at Chagai Hills.

Highly impressed, the Iranians described the Pakistani nuclear bomb as the Islamic bomb. Pakistan's cooperation with Libya started in 1986, and with North Korea in the 1990s. Between 1994 and 2000, Khan travelled to Pyongyang at least seven times to negotiate a trade-off between nuclear technology supplied by Pakistan in return for North Korea's missiles. During this period, a North Korean official of the Vice-Minister level from its nuclear industry was posted at the country's embassy in Islamabad as a Counsellor. There are unconfirmed reports that Saudi Arabia too may have started a clandestine nuclear programme with Pakistani assistance.

The significance of the fact that so many countries came forward to help Pakistan in its project cannot be missed. In India, a country which stands to lose most from this, strategy experts overlooked the fact that the single biggest culprit is China. The Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation agreement dates back to 1974-75.

The agreement was conceived after the 1971 Bangladesh war, which dismembered Pakistan. China's entry in the war in Pakistan's favour was pre-empted by the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, and the Lin Biao affair which threatened civil war in China. Eager to make up for the lost opportunity, China, post-1972, decided to embark on a policy of nuclear containment vis-à-vis India.

China's nuclear assistance to Pakistan is no secret, though the Chinese deny it. From assistance to the IAEA-unsafeguarded KRL (ring magnates), testing of Pakistan's first nuclear device at Lop Nor, to delivery system (M-11 missiles), mountain silo storage sites and command-and-control system, Chinese finger prints are everywhere. Yet, what is totally unbecoming of a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council holding veto powers, is its blatant violation of its non-proliferation commitments as a nuclear power.

China did exactly that with Pakistan. In 2001, Pakistani nuclear experts sought assistance from China's Shanghai Nuclear Engineering and Research and Development Institute (SNERDI) for an undisclosed nuclear project in Iran. The Chinese response, which was in the form of an assistance programme which continued till late 2003. The entire Pakistan-North Korea missile-for-nuclear deal seems to have been brokered by China. Even as late as 2003, Pakistani C-130 military aircraft have shuttled between Islamabad and North Korea using Chinese air space. Undoubtedly, this added to China's muscle as a regional power, but the long term fallout of this game could be disastrous. Pakistan, however, went beyond the Rubicon to establish its status in the Islamic Ummah.

Available information says that since 1999, Pakistan's ISI facilitated contacts between AQ Khan and the Al-Qaeda. Khan met Osama Bin Laden at least once at an ISI safe house in Peshawar, and was flown twice subsequently to Kandahar in ISI helicopters for meetings with Laden. Two other scientists closely associated with Khan, Bashiruddin Mehmood and Abdul Hajid, have admitted to have met Laden and other Al-Qaeda activists. Indeed, they have directly helped in devising systems for dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents. A year ago, a western television programme had broadcast Al-Qaeda chemical experiments with dogs. An earlier anthrax attack on Washington DC's Capitol Hill, and the recent ricin chemical agent discovery at the same place, may, in retrospect be only be advertisement flyers from Laden. The real thing is yet to come.

-(The writer is Director, Institute for Media Studies and Information Technology, YMCA, New Delhi and former Editor, UNI)

Tim · Post by **Tim** » 03 Mar 2004 02:09

Anybody got a citation on this last statement about AQ Khan meeting Osama?

I'd missed that claim, so far. inquiring minds want to know...

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 03 Mar 2004 02:34

Nothing in public domain so far as I know. Wilson John is doing someone a favour methinks. If its been put out like this, it's probably true

- perhaps the impetus for the next turn of the screw.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 03 Mar 2004 02:55

I can ask Wilson John and see what he says.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 03 Mar 2004 03:19

Originally posted by JE Menon:
Nothing in public domain so far as I know. Wilson John is doing someone a favour methinks. If its been put out like this, it's probably true - perhaps the impetus for the next turn of the screw.

He is pushing the envelope so that there is logical conclusion.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 03 Mar 2004 03:38

There are 84 refs to Samuel Baid in google. He seems to be prolific writer.

Google search results on Samuel Baid

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 03 Mar 2004 04:06

UNI is a news media controlled by some of the powerful groups in the world. Make the linages and the conclusion is obvious.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 03 Mar 2004 06:23

Originally posted by Tim:
Anybody got a citation on this last statement about AQ Khan meeting Osama?

Even if it is true - which I suspect it may well be, I don't think it really makes a difference. the fact can be used any way.

For example that fact that Mullah Omar or Saddam met or supported Osama bin Laden are used in a manner that is not used with the fact that Ronald Reagan met Osama bin Laden.

It appears that the US - probably the CIA, has things to hide. With a bit of luck (for the US) those facts will remain hidden and the US will not have to suffer a terrorist nuke attack for those fact to come out. Someone else may face that attack. If the US's luck diesn't hold out - a serious attack may jog the rusty US machinery into looking inside its own records to see the degree of freedom US intel agencies have had to use drug funds, money laundering and nuclear blackmail to achieve their successes. Pakistan, Libya, Iran and co are hardly blameless, but someone in the US is desperately trying to hide something. That much is clear.

This sonds like a "conspiracy theory" of course. But conspiracy theories become more like the truth when a sufficient number of people start believing them.

daulat · Post by **daulat** » 03 Mar 2004 11:27

following on from shiv's point, and just out of interest. If a Jehadi Delivered Atomic Munition were to be detonated in the US or on US property worldwide; what would the US actually do in response? One has to assume that the jehadis would not bother to blow up one of the Florida Keys as a demo, more likely to be a NYC type scenario (perhaps 9/11 was the demo?). And let us assume for the purposes of the arguement that the 'isotopic signature' matched KRL/PAEC.

John_Doe · Post by **John_Doe** » 03 Mar 2004 11:53

Originally posted by Daulat:
following on from shiv's point, and just out of interest. If a Jehadi Delivered Atomic Munition were to be detonated in the US or on US property worldwide; what would the US actually do in response? One has to assume that the jehadis would not bother to blow up one of the Florida Keys as a demo, more likely to be a NYC type scenario (perhaps 9/11 was the demo?). And let us assume for the purposes of the arguement that the 'isotopic signature' matched KRL/PAEC.

White House: Lie about the isotopic signature and blame Iran for giving Al Quada nukes
State Dept: Disarm India and send more aid to Pakistan otherwise Dictator of the moth will be in trouble and things will get worse.
Media: go along with whatever White House says
Congress: Put together a comittee and investigate
Democrat Party: Blame it on outsourcing to India

Prateek · Post by **Prateek** » 03 Mar 2004 13:30

http://washingtontimes.com/commentary/20040302-085049-8784r.htm

What did Musharraf know?
By Arnaud de Borchgrave

Pakistan's nuclear hybrid — half Dr. Strangelove and half Dr. No — was arguably the world's most dangerous criminal. Abdul Qadeer Khan is the only proliferator of weapons of mass destruction the world has known since the advent of the atomic age in 1945.
Worse, he sold his country's nuclear secrets for profit to America's self-avowed enemies — North Korea, Iran and Libya. His motives were also hybrid — both greed and creed.
His Islamist fundamentalist ideology led him to believe it was within his power to make invincible America vincible. As the father of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, he was his country's most precious asset — and in the Pakistani pantheon of national heroes he was only a whisker below Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of the Pakistani state.
Yet President Pervez Musharraf pardoned the global criminal and allowed him to keep his ill-gotten gains, in return for which Mr. Khan went on national television and said — in English rather than Urdu, the national language — he was truly sorry and had acted strictly alone, unbeknownst to anyone else in the Pakistani government.
If Mr. Musharraf can pardon Mr. Khan, why can't he pardon Pakistan's two most important political leaders — Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, both former prime ministers — who are living in exile, and are still the recognized heads of Pakistan's two principal political parties?
Next to Mr. Khan's global nuclear Wal-Mart, the corruption charges against Mrs. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif are teensy-weensy. Both these leaders can testify that while they were in power at different times, military officials and scientists approached them seeking permission to export nuclear technology. Tired of being turned down, they went ahead anyway. Clearly, Mr. Khan was not acting on his own.
The only problem with the carefully rehearsed charade is that no one believed the story. Not Mr. Musharraf's I-had-no-idea disclaimer, nor Mr. Khan's act of contrition. So why did Mr. Musharraf agree to the giveaway show? The alternative — which would have been to tell the truth — would have been tantamount to scuttling the ship of state. Because it is inconceivable the all-powerful Inter-Services Intelligence spy agency wasn't aware of Mr. Khan's six trips to the hermit communist kingdom of North Korea.
Mr. Khan was Pakistan's most precious national asset, and ISI and ranking military officers were in charge of protecting the man who owned the country's crown jewels and who could be kidnapped or gunned down at anytime. What is more than likely is that ISI knew about Mr. Khan's nuclear rackets but didn't tell Mr. Musharraf because of the Pakistani leader's close rapport with U.S. President Bush.
Mr. Musharraf claimed the first specific details of Mr. Khan's global operations came from U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Gen. John Abizaid, head of U.S. Central Command, when they called on him last October. But Mr. Khan begun spinning his worldwide web of nuclear skullduggery 18 years ago, at the height of the war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, while the previous military dictator, Gen. Zia ul-Haq, was in power. His network of intermediaries stretched from Malaysia to Pakistan to Dubai, Istanbul, Tripoli and Casablanca and a small Swiss town, and employed nationals from Asia, the Middle East, North Africa and Europe.
It is becoming increasingly obvious Mr. Khan's clandestine activities paralleled closely the actions of several Pakistani governments. In 1984, for example, a partnership was concluded between Iran's Atomic Energy Organization and Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission. Also in 1984, Gnadi Mohammad Mragih, director of Iran's Nuclear Technology Center in Isfahan, visited Pakistan's super-secret Kahuta nuclear complex to meet with Mr. Khan.
In 1991, no less than three Iranian delegations came to Kahuta. An Iranian general who commanded the Iranian Revolutionary Guards led one of them. Again in 1991, the Pakistani chief of army staff went to Iran to sign a secret protocol on uranium enrichment technology.
Pakistan's nuclear ambitions are invariably portrayed as an answer to India's first nuclear test explosion in 1974. But the Maldon Institute reminds us their origin predates India's big bang. Pakistan's massive military defeat by Indian forces in 1971 was the energizer. This was when India rolled up East Pakistan and Bangladesh won its war of national liberation.
Following Pakistan's humiliation, Prime Minister Ali Bhutto (Benazir's father who was executed by President Zia) vowed Pakistanis would "eat grass if necessary" to develop nuclear weapons. Mr. Bhutto asked Mr. Khan, an engineer by training, to return home from the Netherlands to head the program. He did so, armed with stolen Dutch plans for a uranium enrichment plant.
Since then, Mr. Khan has served seven successive governments that always gave him and his nuclear efforts top priority for funds and materials. At a conference of Islamic states in 1974, Mrs. Bhutto announced Pakistan would produce an "Islamic bomb," which would be the foundation for Islamic countries to acquire strategic military capacities to counter other nuclear weapons powers.
Pakistani leaders denied time and again the country had a nuclear weapons program — until 1998, when Mr. Sharif declared Pakistan a nuclear power, punctuated with five nuclear bomb tests that followed five Indian bangs the week before.
It is inconceivable Mr. Khan, for three decades, could have indulged in such extensive nuclear proliferation without the knowledge and acquiescence of ISI and the military high command. Mr. Musharraf was army chief of staff prior to seizing the presidency in October 1999.

What did Mr. Musharraf know — and when did he know it — are the kind of lese-majeste questions Pakistani journalists who wish to stay healthy don't ask.

Arnaud de Borchgrave is editor at large of The Washington Times and of United Press International.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 03 Mar 2004 17:00

Hi,

I agree with John Doe's response to Daulat's question.

If the Pakistanis were to mount even one demonstration of their Jihadi Delivered Atomic Munitions, the US would be hard put to deal with it. Most Americans would simply not understand how such a thing could happen and they would demand action, but the Americans in government would fully understand why such a thing happened - and most importantly what it must do to avoid another attack.

The US Government will understand that despite what the people say it will have to keep give the Pakistanis a strong disincentive to do this again. Given how f*cked up a place Pakistan is - no threat of military action will work - and so the Americans will have to be polite and nice to the Pakistanis.

Given the strength of the Pakistan lobby in the USG, and the average lack of competence in several key areas of the USG, it is very possible that an appeasement policy will be followed.

It is possible that US public opinion may not survive such a gross assault on its sensibility but then that will only create space for the type of thing T S Jones talks about; a `National Military Government' and govt. sponsorred progroms against all black as*ed people in the US. The National Military Government would take the decisions that need to be taken without the necessary political cost - which say a political party would have to face and the govt. sponsorred progroms would do much to deflect pent up anger within the American population.

There would be a major economic slowdown that would result from such political restructuring in the US. It could be that a public backlash against a `National Military Government' eliminates the very political consensus and peace the `National Military Government' hopes to create. It is even possible to visualize the breakup of the US along civil war lines under such circumstances.

The end result of such a move is that the Pakistanis will have won their war against the US without an actual physical invasion.

I am not stating something new here - this is precisely the logic that the Pakistanis use against India.

I have merely replaced the word `India' with the word `America', and the phrase `Pakistani F-16s carrying nuclear bombs' with the phrase `Jihadi Delivered Atomic Munitions'. You can also have a similar description replacing the word `America' with Britain.

The basic Pakistani funda when it comes to nuclear weapons is - if Pakistan successfully uses the first one, the underprepared adversary will be keen to prevent another attack of this nature and like Japan in 1945 will carry out a complete unconditional national surrender. The more underprepared an adversary is - the greater the chance is that he will surrender.

The only thing the Pakistanis fear is pre-emption and there is almost no chance of pre-empting a Jihadi Delivered Atomic Munition.

Rangudu · Post by **Rangudu** » 03 Mar 2004 17:34

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3526969.stm

Is Pakistan's nuclear programme dying?

Analysis
By Paul Anderson
BBC correspondent in Islamabad

In all the heat generated by Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist, AQ Khan, confessing to nuclear proliferation, relatively little attention has been paid to the future of the country's nuclear weapons programme.

In the 1970s Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto famously declared that Pakistanis would go to any sacrifice to match India's nuclear weapons programme, even if it meant the people being reduced to eating grass.

Now they have a nuclear programme, they are discovering that weapons technology is a dynamic business which requires constant maintenance and upgrading.

That maintenance has been promised by President Pervez Musharraf.

But nuclear specialist and journalist Shahid ur Rehman believes the president will run into difficulties, the seeds of which were sown many years ago.

"Pakistan's programme was based on smuggled, imported technology," he says. "AQ Khan and his friends went shopping all over the world with the connivance of the Pakistani army.

"By contrast, India's programme was not as sophisticated, but it was indigenous. If there are curbs on India they will not suffer."

Shahid ur Rehman argues that it will be impossible for Pakistan to upgrade its nuclear programme legally.

"If Pakistan needs a nuclear component, they will have to approach the international market. They will not sell it, so Pakistan will have to buy it on the black market."

That means, he argues, that: "Pakistan's nuclear programme is now almost half dead. They won't be able to modernise facilities which are becoming obsolete. It is a de facto roll back."

And that is precisely what President Musharraf has promised to avoid.

"We will continue to develop our capability in line with our deterrent needs. I am the last man who will roll back," General Musharraf promised recently.

Inspections debate

So far, there is no obvious pressure on Pakistan to embark on nuclear reduction or a roll back.

But that could come, if or when new revelations about its proliferation history come to light.

The country could also come under pressure to open its facilities for inspection.

"The outside world would be quite justified in asking the Pakistani government for proper assurances," says AH Nayyar, a physicist and nuclear expert from Qaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad.

"They could demand to inspect the log books of all sensitive organisations in Pakistan to make sure every single kilo of highly enriched uranium is taken account of. That could be very intrusive," he says.

But as long as President Musharraf is in power, that is extremely unlikely.

"No to an internal independent inquiry and no to United Nations inspections teams," he said after AQ Khan's dramatic confession last month.

He might have added 'no' to joining the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which has been muted as a possible consequence of the proliferation scandal.

But it has been ruled out by one government official after another.

Pakistan would have to be legally recognised as a nuclear weapons state first, which is unlikely, and India would have to join the NPT at the same time, which is also unlikely.

Double standards?

NPT touches another nerve. There's a widespread belief in Pakistan that it is being singled out for scrutiny while India's weapons programme is overlooked.

Take the recent hi-tech agreement between India and the United States, on cooperation in nuclear power and space technologies.

Samina Ahmed, from the International Crisis Group, believes it is a green light for proliferation.

"Transfers of dual-use technology, nuclear technology and space technology is violating a basic principle of the Non Proliferation Treaty," she says.

"It is dangerous and counterproductive.

"Dangerous because with some of the gaps in India's nuclear weapons programme being filled in with American support, that will encourage India to go ahead with its ambitious nuclear programme.

"And counter-productive because it will lead to other states playing catch-up."

While these argument rage, Pakistan is quietly hoping the whole issue will go away.

Or if it does not, that the focus of attention is turned on what President Musharraf says is the real menace - the European companies which he says form the backbone of the nuclear black market.

So far though, there is little sign of that happening.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 03 Mar 2004 18:02

> Is Pakistan's nuclear program dying.

Hope springs eternal or as N^3 was saying. All this is an excuse to take the nuclear proliferation heat of Pakistan.

"Pakistanis are no longer a threat.. umm yes they were a threat but now their program is dying... I mean we totally shut down their - like - nuclear black market din' we? - like we are soooooooooooooooooooooo awesome.."

This self congratulatory crap makes me sick.