Johann and sunil: I would think that bin Laden and Al Juwahiri are calm and deliberate enough to have thought several moves ahead and beyond 9/11.
So, I believe, do you think. And that is the only basis I see for the premise of this thread. What else have they put in place?
Yes, they have conducted regular attacks at about 1-month intervals (need to construct a time series and analyze it one of these days). At minimum, this means that they either have a functioning command and control system still - or it means that there is a completely autonomous terror chain already set in motion. I believe the former.
Remember the Charles Bronson movie "TELEFON"? Maybe there are "sleeper" cells all around the world, brainwashed and ready to be triggered when, say, Musharraf says: "Bismillah ur Rehman ur Rahim" 3 times inside 2 minutes in a PTV speech. For all I know.. (sorry for any religious offence - none intended).
And, I hate to admit, they have succeeded exactly in what bin Laden said in his videotape:
No peace, no security for the world.
The economic cost is over 1.5 trillion in the US alone - and maybe 3 times that, measured worldwide. Travel is a misery. Fear underlies every workplace....
The Israeli and Mumbai and Iraq and Chechnya experiences show that there is no stopping the car bomb and the suicide vest by just "security measures".
So sunil, acceding to blackmail will not work. Its a slow death for civilization unless the snake is completely routed out and destroyed quickly. The CIA and the White House must see that as clearly as we can.
If the US does not destroy the Pakistani center of the Crescent of Terror, the West will start seeing increasing xenophobia and internal violence. There will be no economic recovery, even due to increased weapons production - because China is over there, unaffected by all this.
Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
The problem with this "clean judicial process" theory is that it is, by definition, unattainable. The Indian judicial system, being a product of human beings and not of gods, is inherently imperfect. Ditto for every human endeavour in India and in any other society you care to name.
If the proper response to real or perceived injustice is terrorist bombings, every country in the world should face these bombings, and places like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia should be wiped off the map, because they don't even have a justice system to speak of, they have their glorious and ultra-decent sharia. When blacks suffer real or perceived injustice in the US, you don't see them bombing airliners and buses, do you? (And if they did, would American liberals cheer them on?).
It seems almost incredible to me that I have to explain these basics to the terrorist-apologists, but it simply isn't possible to have a perfect justice system, or even one that pleases everyone all the time. There will always be blemishes and imperfections. Or, to put it in terms that are closer to us on BR, you don't see Rahul Mehta out bombing buses and airliners, do you? After all, everyone here knows he thinks the Indina justice system stinks, but he's doing his part to improve things by argument and reason, not by murder and mayhem. Should he abandon his efforts at persuasion and start bombung the No.6 bus or the Thane train? How about if his name was Rashid Mohammed instead of Rahul Mehta? Would that make bombing acceptable?
If the proper response to real or perceived injustice is terrorist bombings, every country in the world should face these bombings, and places like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia should be wiped off the map, because they don't even have a justice system to speak of, they have their glorious and ultra-decent sharia. When blacks suffer real or perceived injustice in the US, you don't see them bombing airliners and buses, do you? (And if they did, would American liberals cheer them on?).
It seems almost incredible to me that I have to explain these basics to the terrorist-apologists, but it simply isn't possible to have a perfect justice system, or even one that pleases everyone all the time. There will always be blemishes and imperfections. Or, to put it in terms that are closer to us on BR, you don't see Rahul Mehta out bombing buses and airliners, do you? After all, everyone here knows he thinks the Indina justice system stinks, but he's doing his part to improve things by argument and reason, not by murder and mayhem. Should he abandon his efforts at persuasion and start bombung the No.6 bus or the Thane train? How about if his name was Rashid Mohammed instead of Rahul Mehta? Would that make bombing acceptable?
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Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
Now...Now...Ladies let's be nice to each other 
Shivani, I thought you were policing SIIRF. Kya Ho Raha Yaar? Kuch Tho Karo. Adi Kollu some members
Shivani, I thought you were policing SIIRF. Kya Ho Raha Yaar? Kuch Tho Karo. Adi Kollu some members
Whether Indians get killed (regardless of their religious affiliation) it is the nation that suffers as a whole and not just Hindus and Muslims alone. Stop thinking in Hindu-Muslim terms and you will see that is exactly what divides us Indians. You folks might think of this as some self-righteous or cliched speech, but there is no better way to put it. Terrorists are traitors of the nation, once again, regardless of their religious affiliation.Originally posted by Sarma:
Mohan Raju: I have learnt one thing. It is just fruitless and pointless to argue with people who acts as terrorist apologizers. If Hindus get killed by Muslims, it is in retaliation to a perceived injustice and is just fine. But, if Hindus do the same, they are murderers and what not.
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
Then couple of questions here:
1) What is the relevance of the timing (February 20, 2003) to the Zia-isation of Mushaf Ali Mir?
2) N^3, if the US can ask the Pakistani junta to keep the US out of the terrorism target but run riot elsewhere ... my question is why would the US allow TSP to run riot anywhere else other than India?
3) Did the delivery of the final crate of "interesting" mangoes happen mistakenly to go to a person called "Mushaf" instead of "Musharraf"?
1) What is the relevance of the timing (February 20, 2003) to the Zia-isation of Mushaf Ali Mir?
2) N^3, if the US can ask the Pakistani junta to keep the US out of the terrorism target but run riot elsewhere ... my question is why would the US allow TSP to run riot anywhere else other than India?
3) Did the delivery of the final crate of "interesting" mangoes happen mistakenly to go to a person called "Mushaf" instead of "Musharraf"?
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
If Mushaf Ali Mir is done in (Zia style) for his strong links to Islamists and al Qaeda then why has Mehmood 'Mustafa' Ahmed been spared (presuming he was the banker of the infamous $100K wire transfer? He was hind picked by Mushy too to be the DG ISI.
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
A tough one. Then again, if we were not desis, we would not ask why they allow TSP to run riot in India, would we? If we were Russian, we would ask: "Why is the US allowing the *****s to run riot in Russia?" and conclude that its because the US wants to "balkanize" Russia and keep it from rising again. Same for Israelis, Indonesians, Malaysians and probably Moroccans, Tunisians and anywhere else that there have been terror attacks.why would the US allow TSP to run riot anywhere else other than India?
The only answer I have is that the US has not yet Zia'ized Musharraf, and hence they are not stopping the terror. That's just statement of fact, now the question remains: "Why?" Best answer I have is: "Not enough resources." Goes back to the complex interplay of base security in KSA, need to head off Saddam-jehadi deal leading to the fall of the Middle East, need to shift bases out of KSA to protect (and maybe to grab) oil .. all higher priority than protecting Australian revelers in Bali or children in Mumbai. Now stuck in EyeRak - and the Taliban is attacking all-out while the US is stretched in EyeRak. Suddenly, Mush does not fear imminent landings by the 101st Airborne - and he's getting them killed at the rate of 3 a week using the jehadis shipped to Eyerak.
What other explanation do you suggest?
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
Now you are asking the right question. Search for "Paul Thompson" on the internet.why has Mehmood 'Mustafa' Ahmed been spared
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
The other "explanation" may be that agreements and plans are in place to "catch" Osama, sometime in Sept/Oct 2004 (just weeks before Nov 2004).
Also, it's been exactly 6 months since the last major Al_Qaeda bust in Pakistan. Since, big catches have been "made" in March 02, Sept 02, March 03 - we're surely up for one such "catch" soon.
Also, it's been exactly 6 months since the last major Al_Qaeda bust in Pakistan. Since, big catches have been "made" in March 02, Sept 02, March 03 - we're surely up for one such "catch" soon.
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
arindam: That will be YET another of the "Top Five of the Inner Circle of Al Qaeda" to join the 600-odd other Top Five members already there. In alphabetical order:
Aamir bin Asinine Al Binori
Abdul bin Kabul Al Kindergarteni
Abbas bin Nitwit Al Peshawari
..... et al.
I note that Al Zubeidah who was formerly a "mid-level recruiter" is now described as "A Top Lieutenant of Osama bin Laden" - key term is "Lieutenant" there. Just one step "Below Lieutenant Colonel" in the Pak Army rank scheme.
Seriously, let me see the Top Five Lieutenants so far:
Ahmed Shah Ressam, LAX Millennium Bomber.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
Ramzi Youssef
Mustafa Ahmed (the stand-in, I mean)
"Binalshibh" or "bin Al Shaibah"
Al Zubeidah
Saddam Hussein
Uday Saddam
*** Saddam.
Chemical Ali - killed in Basra
Chemical Ali - now captured in Basra
......
Mohammed Attef - killed in Afghanistan
Mohammed Attef: now reported in Peshawar
Al Juwahiri: last seen shopping at Neiman Marcus last week??
Aamir bin Asinine Al Binori
Abdul bin Kabul Al Kindergarteni
Abbas bin Nitwit Al Peshawari
..... et al.
I note that Al Zubeidah who was formerly a "mid-level recruiter" is now described as "A Top Lieutenant of Osama bin Laden" - key term is "Lieutenant" there. Just one step "Below Lieutenant Colonel" in the Pak Army rank scheme.
Seriously, let me see the Top Five Lieutenants so far:
Ahmed Shah Ressam, LAX Millennium Bomber.
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
Ramzi Youssef
Mustafa Ahmed (the stand-in, I mean)
"Binalshibh" or "bin Al Shaibah"
Al Zubeidah
Saddam Hussein
Uday Saddam
*** Saddam.
Chemical Ali - killed in Basra
Chemical Ali - now captured in Basra
......
Mohammed Attef - killed in Afghanistan
Mohammed Attef: now reported in Peshawar
Al Juwahiri: last seen shopping at Neiman Marcus last week??
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
http://dailynews.att.net
Oh, no!
Oh, no!
Tough-Guy Actor Charles Bronson Dies at 81
Updated 1:35 PM ET September 1, 2003
By Arthur Spiegelman
LOS ANGELES (Reuters) - Coal miner turned tough-guy actor Charles Bronson, a star of more than 60 films including the popular "Death Wish" series in which he played a one-man army, has died at the age of 81, a spokeswoman said on Sunday.
The craggy-faced Bronson died of pneumonia
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
The CEO of TSP is claiming that " no freeze in Nuke plans"
PAK NUKE PLANS __NO FREEZE
No freeze in N-plan: Musharraf
ISLAMABAD(SEPT 3):Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf on Wednesday rejected any freeze in the country's nuclear programme and hinted at upgrading technology to strengthen national security.
Musharraf "dismissed any talk of freeze or roll-back as irrelevant, outdated and totally false", a statement issued by the Pakistan military said.
The President who chaired a meeting of the National Command Authority, the high-level body overseeing Pakistan's nuclear programme said that "ensuring qualitative upgrades in the country's nuclear programme would fortify national security".
He, however, "reiterated Pakistan's resolve not to enter into an arms race with anyone while ensuring consolidation of Pakistan's minimum deterrence needs".
The meeting was attended by Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali, Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri and senior military officers including Navy and Air Force chiefs, the statement said.
Musharraf said that Pakistan's nuclear programme had "matured over the years and would continue to the receive top national priority".
He also castigated international media reports regarding Pakistan's alleged assistance to Iran's nuclear programme and described the reports as an "inspired and malicious campaign".
Pakistan has a "strong non-proliferation record," Musharraf said reiterating the country's commitment to universal non-proliferation goals.
PAK NUKE PLANS __NO FREEZE
No freeze in N-plan: Musharraf
ISLAMABAD(SEPT 3):Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf on Wednesday rejected any freeze in the country's nuclear programme and hinted at upgrading technology to strengthen national security.
Musharraf "dismissed any talk of freeze or roll-back as irrelevant, outdated and totally false", a statement issued by the Pakistan military said.
The President who chaired a meeting of the National Command Authority, the high-level body overseeing Pakistan's nuclear programme said that "ensuring qualitative upgrades in the country's nuclear programme would fortify national security".
He, however, "reiterated Pakistan's resolve not to enter into an arms race with anyone while ensuring consolidation of Pakistan's minimum deterrence needs".
The meeting was attended by Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali, Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri and senior military officers including Navy and Air Force chiefs, the statement said.
Musharraf said that Pakistan's nuclear programme had "matured over the years and would continue to the receive top national priority".
He also castigated international media reports regarding Pakistan's alleged assistance to Iran's nuclear programme and described the reports as an "inspired and malicious campaign".
Pakistan has a "strong non-proliferation record," Musharraf said reiterating the country's commitment to universal non-proliferation goals.
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
Catchwords ...Originally posted by rvaidya:
PAK NUKE PLANS __NO FREEZE
No freeze in N-plan: Musharraf
...
Musharraf "dismissed any talk of freeze or roll-back as irrelevant, outdated and totally false", a statement issued by the Pakistan military said.
The President who chaired a meeting of the National Command Authority, the high-level body overseeing Pakistan's nuclear programme said that "ensuring qualitative upgrades in the country's nuclear programme would fortify national security"
....
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
Propoganda stuff
An Indian 'War on Terrorism' Against Pakistan?
by Kanti Bajpai
Since the events of September 11, 2001, many in India have argued that if the United States can justify its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of combating terrorism, destroying weapons of mass destruction, and changing regimes, then India is justified in attacking Pakistan. Indian external affairs minister Yashwant Sinha is reported to have said, "India has a much better case to go for preemptive action" against Pakistan than the United States had in Iraq. The massacre of more than twenty Hindu men, women, and children in Nadimarg, Kashmir, in late March 2003, renewed calls for sterner action against Pakistan. And yet, Indian anger notwithstanding, military action against Pakistan would be both ineffective and dangerous.
Ever since the Kargil War of 1999, influential Indian strategists have argued that India should be prepared to fight "limited war under nuclear conditions," that is, military operations of a limited conventional nature. This is the only way, they believe, to respond to Pakistan's strategy of sub-conventional warfare-terrorism, and, as in 1999, incursions across the line of control in Kashmir. Pakistan can only be dissuaded from continuing its sub-conventional warfare, in this view, by the threat of military punishment. This new Indian thinking challenges the Pakistani conviction that its nuclear weapons protect it from Indian retaliation.
There are probably two reasons for the new Indian thinking on limited war. The first is the belief that India, with its bigger nuclear forces, has "escalation dominance" and can up the ante at every level of violence. To the extent that India has the whip hand, Pakistan's threat to use nuclear weapons against a punitive Indian strike would be neutralized. Islamabad would be dissuaded from resorting to nuclear weapons by the fear of massive retaliation.
The second reason is a calculation that the nuclear powers, especially the United States, would not allow either country, but Pakistan above all, to use nuclear weapons. Indian thinking on the subject is not available in cold print but quite likely rests on the following kinds of arguments. First, the nuclear powers are determined to preserve the nuclear taboo and in particular to stop anyone outside the nuclear five (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) from using nuclear weapons. Second, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan could draw in other nuclear-weapon states. Imagine that Pakistan appeals to China for help after using nuclear weapons against an Indian conventional attack. Faced with the prospect of Chinese involvement, India turns to Russia. The United States urges both China and Russia to stay out of the fight but finds that Beijing and Moscow are unable to stand on the sidelines. Surely Washington must do everything it can to avoid such a situation, including stopping Pakistan from starting a nuclear crisis in the first place. Third, American troops on the ground in Pakistan since September 11 would be trapped in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Clearly, this would be unacceptable to Washington. Finally, in regard to Pakistan, the United States and other nuclear powers do not want a Muslim state using nuclear weapons at a time when other Muslim countries are in the hunt for weapons of mass destruction.
How persuasive are these Indian suppositions? Does India have escalation dominance, and will this stop Pakistan from using nuclear weapons against an Indian conventional strike? First of all, it is unclear that India can raise the stakes at every level of violence. The most important consideration here is whether India has superiority at the nuclear level-this is essential if one is to play the game of escalation dominance. Given the secrecy of the two nuclear programs, it is hard to say. Some reports suggest that Pakistan has the nuclear lead in terms of deliverable weapons (even though India has more fissile material). Whatever the truth of these reports, Indian nuclear superiority is not an established fact. Furthermore, even if India has nuclear superiority, the logic of escalation dominance may be invalid-Pakistan may not be deterred from raising the level of violence. Everything depends on how Pakistan perceives Indian military goals once the fighting begins. If it concludes that Indian objectives go beyond mere punishment, it might well feel that it has to use nuclear weapons, that it is better to go down fighting than to surrender or be conquered.
Nor can we count on the nuclear powers' restraining Pakistan. Faced with the possibility of nuclear war in South Asia, they might choose to wash their hands of both India and Pakistan and bend their energies to avoid being dragged into the conflict. Even if this is not the case and they do exert themselves on Pakistan, they may not have much influence in a fast-deteriorating military situation. A country, and a government, that thinks it is on the verge of dismemberment and defeat is not likely to be swayed by threats from the international community. After all, the ultimate threat from the nuclear powers would be to do to Pakistan what India was in the process of doing anyway, namely, punishing it militarily. One could argue that international pressure at such a crucial moment would only deepen Pakistan's sense of desperation and push it further toward the suicidal brink.
Leaving aside the contentious matter of escalation dominance and the role of the nuclear powers, there is the crucial question of whether or not any kind of limited war could be effective in reducing the terrorist threat and Pakistan's support of it. A set of thought experiments will show that none of India's military options is very good. There are, roughly, seven options: fomenting terrorism in Pakistan; hot pursuit of terrorists; special- forces attacks against terrorist camps; air and artillery strikes against terrorist facilities; conquering and holding a slice of Pakistani territory; a naval blockade or bombardment of Pakistani ports; and a serious military push into Pakistani territory. This list is not exhaustive. The Indian air force, as also the Indian navy, could, in addition, mount strikes against other Pakistani targets-dams, cities, and military targets. However, these are even more dangerous and immoral ventures, and most of my critique of the lesser options will apply even more acutely to them.
Let's look at each of the options. First, some strategists argue that India should do to Pakistan what Pakistan has been doing to it for the past fifteen years: it should encourage internal dissent and violence. This sounds like an attractive option at a purely military-strategic level, but the problem with it is twofold. For one thing, going by past experience, Pakistan is not likely to be stopped from interfering in its neighbors' affairs by its own internal instabilities. Ethno-religious violence in Pakistan has been ferocious since at least the 1980s, and no province and city has been left unscathed. But this did not stop Islamabad from mounting anti-Indian rebellions in both Punjab and Kashmir in the 1980s and 1990s. Nor did it stop Pakistan from prosecuting a civil war in Afghanistan and from ousting the Soviet forces. Is there any reason to believe that Pakistani leaders today are more sensitive to internal violence than they were in the past? Ironically, the recent American intervention in Afghanistan has freed Pakistani resources for other theaters, including Kashmir, even as Islamabad deals with domestic disturbances.
Second, and more important, in contemplating the destabilization of Pakistan, India must consider whether such actions are compatible with its public and long-standing complaint that Pakistan is a terrorist state. Indian complaints will carry little moral weight if India itself supports terrorism. Destabilizing Pakistan is not just a moral issue; it is also an issue of statecraft. In the global war against terrorism, India would be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. It could become the object of international sanctions, whereas it has profited-and could profit further-if those sanctions were directed against Pakistan. In short, India would join Pakistan as a terrorist state. This would be a moral and strategic catastrophe for liberal democratic India.
What about the various military actions to which India could resort? These include hot pursuit, special-forces raids, and air and artillery strikes. All these would be directed primarily at destroying terrorist facilities in the Pakistani side of Kashmir, thereby reducing the incidence of terrorism. These options at least have the advantage of being morally justifiable because they will not target innocent civilians. Their military effectiveness, however, is questionable. Hot pursuit strikes would involve Indian troops' crossing the line of control in chase of terrorists. But these attacks probably would not achieve a great deal. Indian troops would probably kill some terrorists and temporarily destroy training and base facilities. The supply of terrorists is large enough, however, and Pakistan could rebuild and relocate the affected facilities fast enough, so that India would have to repeat the attacks, perhaps deeper into Pakistani-held territory, thus making its forces more vulnerable to counter attacks. Indian units that cross the line would also run into Pakistani fire, and casualties might be heavy. India would then be faced with the choice of calling off the pursuit or escalating the engagement.
Most of these limits apply as well to raids by special forces, which also have their own difficulties. They depend, critically, on surprise, stealth, and speed. Indian special forces could attain all three, but we should be cautious. In the history of warfare, the number of special operations that have gone wrong may well outnumber the ones that have succeeded. The capture and destruction of Indian units caught on the Pakistani side would be a public relations disaster if not a serious military reverse. Moreover, and this is crucial in terms of effectiveness, one or two successes will do little to reduce the tempo of terrorism.
Air and artillery fire against the terrorist camps or even against Pakistani military units is another plausible option. The Indian air force and army could launch a series of strikes against terrorist camps and Pakistani military targets. The success of remote fire of this kind, either from the air or from ground artillery, depends on intelligence and accuracy of targeting. If Indian fire is inaccurate, it risks hitting innocent civilians, which would be both morally corrosive and diplomatically counterproductive. Satellite imagery, air reconnaissance, specialized radar, modern locating systems, and precision-guided munitions are just some of the requisites for a bombardment campaign against terrorist facilities and Pakistani military targets. It is unlikely that Indian forces have the requisite capabilities. In any case, the Pakistanis can camouflage, harden, and move these facilities and targets, thereby rendering the Indian campaign ineffective.
Finally, India could opt for a much more ambitious set of punitive actions against Pakistan: conquering and holding a slice of Pakistani territory, a naval blockade or action, and a serious military push into Pakistani Punjab and Sindh. Each of these, too, is fraught with risks. Grabbing and then holding a swath of territory on the Pakistani side of Kashmir or in Pakistan proper is by no means easy. In Kashmir, difficulties of terrain would make it a tough operation to mount and sustain. In Pakistan proper, the prospects are even more daunting, as the Pakistani forces are much stronger there, with considerable armor to back them. India too is strong, but the question is whether or not a potentially expensive operation would serve much purpose. The idea behind it would be, once again, to punish Pakistan for its support of terrorism and to offer it a trade-return of territory for the end of terrorism. What if Islamabad simply shrugs off the loss of territory even as it battles to get it back and continues the terrorism campaign? As we noted earlier, Pakistan is not afraid to fight on several fronts simultaneously. India would then have to decide whether to extend this kind of salami-slicing to other sectors or to expand the scale of operations.
One way of expanding the conflict is by a naval blockade or other naval actions along the Pakistani coast. India signaled the possibility of naval operations when it sent a flotilla of ships into the Arabian Sea in the summer of 2002. A naval campaign could involve a blockade of Karachi harbor, crippling Pakistan's trade, destruction of Pakistani military and merchant shipping, and destruction of the Gwadar naval base, which the Pakistanis are currently expanding (with Chinese help).
But a naval blockade raises a number of difficulties. For one thing, it could cause great suffering among Pakistani civilians. And it would antagonize many of Pakistan's trading partners, including the major economic and military powers important to India. A large Indian naval presence over a long period of time would get in the way of the American fleet that is positioned in the area as part of the campaign in Afghanistan. This would lead not only to diplomatic friction with the United States, but would also risk the two navies' physically blundering into one another. Finally, a flotilla would be vulnerable to Pakistani air and naval retaliation, in particular by its submarines and the deadly Exocet and Harpoon missiles with which its ships are equipped. An attack against Gwadar is much more attractive, but how would that work to stop Pakistan's terror campaign?
Instead of a naval campaign, India could do what it does best militarily-or at least what it is most predisposed to do-which is to go to war on land, in the plains of Punjab and Sindh. If anything would truly hurt Pakistan, it is the loss of territory in its heartland. The Indian army combined with the air force could invade Punjab or Sindh or both in the kind of "final conflict" that the Indian prime minister frighteningly referred to in one of his speeches during the crisis of 2002.
This is a military fantasy at best and a nightmare at worst. An invading Indian force would have to get past densely mined Pakistani forward positions. Next, there would be canals and ditches, and, most likely, more mines. Beyond these passive defenses, the Indian army would run into Pakistan's active defenses-its armor and regular infantry units. Contrary to what most Indians and even more foreigners imagine, India does not have a substantial lead in conventional forces on its western border. Indian forces are deployed along the northern border with China and cannot be reduced much further in that sector. Many Indian troops are deployed for internal security duties, particularly in Kashmir and the Northeast, and it would be stretching them dangerously to draw their numbers down significantly. The tide might turn in India's favor if the air force achieved a rapid and decisive victory in the skies. Few people, however, would predict that this could be achieved. In short, the Indian attack would be a very hard slog, and the war might just turn into a stalemate marked by mutual attrition. And that's the good news. The bad news is that if India succeeded in making a breakthrough, Pakistan might unleash its nuclear weapons at Indian troop formations or Indian cities in order to halt Pakistan's military collapse.
The general point that emerges from these thought experiments is that much may be ventured, at great risk, for very small gains. The costs of war would probably be much greater than the costs of the uneasy, flawed, and violent peace that exists today. Some military ventures will gain India little in terms of stopping terrorism even if they succeed. Others could gain it a lot but have little chance of success. Yet others spell catastrophe.
In short, there are great dangers in applying the doctrines associated with the U.S. war on terrorism-retaliation and preemption-in South Asia. While there is no doubt that Pakistan does sponsor terrorism in India, the simple truth is that Pakistan is not as weak as Afghanistan or Iraq, and India is not as strong as the United States. Going after Pakistan militarily will either be ineffective or extremely dangerous. Whatever the United States can or can't, should or shouldn't, do, India's response to terrorism has to be different, and it is mere casuistry to claim that New Delhi should emulate Washington's methods.
Kanti Bajpai is professor of international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/articles/su03/bajpai.htm
An Indian 'War on Terrorism' Against Pakistan?
by Kanti Bajpai
Since the events of September 11, 2001, many in India have argued that if the United States can justify its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the name of combating terrorism, destroying weapons of mass destruction, and changing regimes, then India is justified in attacking Pakistan. Indian external affairs minister Yashwant Sinha is reported to have said, "India has a much better case to go for preemptive action" against Pakistan than the United States had in Iraq. The massacre of more than twenty Hindu men, women, and children in Nadimarg, Kashmir, in late March 2003, renewed calls for sterner action against Pakistan. And yet, Indian anger notwithstanding, military action against Pakistan would be both ineffective and dangerous.
Ever since the Kargil War of 1999, influential Indian strategists have argued that India should be prepared to fight "limited war under nuclear conditions," that is, military operations of a limited conventional nature. This is the only way, they believe, to respond to Pakistan's strategy of sub-conventional warfare-terrorism, and, as in 1999, incursions across the line of control in Kashmir. Pakistan can only be dissuaded from continuing its sub-conventional warfare, in this view, by the threat of military punishment. This new Indian thinking challenges the Pakistani conviction that its nuclear weapons protect it from Indian retaliation.
There are probably two reasons for the new Indian thinking on limited war. The first is the belief that India, with its bigger nuclear forces, has "escalation dominance" and can up the ante at every level of violence. To the extent that India has the whip hand, Pakistan's threat to use nuclear weapons against a punitive Indian strike would be neutralized. Islamabad would be dissuaded from resorting to nuclear weapons by the fear of massive retaliation.
The second reason is a calculation that the nuclear powers, especially the United States, would not allow either country, but Pakistan above all, to use nuclear weapons. Indian thinking on the subject is not available in cold print but quite likely rests on the following kinds of arguments. First, the nuclear powers are determined to preserve the nuclear taboo and in particular to stop anyone outside the nuclear five (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) from using nuclear weapons. Second, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan could draw in other nuclear-weapon states. Imagine that Pakistan appeals to China for help after using nuclear weapons against an Indian conventional attack. Faced with the prospect of Chinese involvement, India turns to Russia. The United States urges both China and Russia to stay out of the fight but finds that Beijing and Moscow are unable to stand on the sidelines. Surely Washington must do everything it can to avoid such a situation, including stopping Pakistan from starting a nuclear crisis in the first place. Third, American troops on the ground in Pakistan since September 11 would be trapped in a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Clearly, this would be unacceptable to Washington. Finally, in regard to Pakistan, the United States and other nuclear powers do not want a Muslim state using nuclear weapons at a time when other Muslim countries are in the hunt for weapons of mass destruction.
How persuasive are these Indian suppositions? Does India have escalation dominance, and will this stop Pakistan from using nuclear weapons against an Indian conventional strike? First of all, it is unclear that India can raise the stakes at every level of violence. The most important consideration here is whether India has superiority at the nuclear level-this is essential if one is to play the game of escalation dominance. Given the secrecy of the two nuclear programs, it is hard to say. Some reports suggest that Pakistan has the nuclear lead in terms of deliverable weapons (even though India has more fissile material). Whatever the truth of these reports, Indian nuclear superiority is not an established fact. Furthermore, even if India has nuclear superiority, the logic of escalation dominance may be invalid-Pakistan may not be deterred from raising the level of violence. Everything depends on how Pakistan perceives Indian military goals once the fighting begins. If it concludes that Indian objectives go beyond mere punishment, it might well feel that it has to use nuclear weapons, that it is better to go down fighting than to surrender or be conquered.
Nor can we count on the nuclear powers' restraining Pakistan. Faced with the possibility of nuclear war in South Asia, they might choose to wash their hands of both India and Pakistan and bend their energies to avoid being dragged into the conflict. Even if this is not the case and they do exert themselves on Pakistan, they may not have much influence in a fast-deteriorating military situation. A country, and a government, that thinks it is on the verge of dismemberment and defeat is not likely to be swayed by threats from the international community. After all, the ultimate threat from the nuclear powers would be to do to Pakistan what India was in the process of doing anyway, namely, punishing it militarily. One could argue that international pressure at such a crucial moment would only deepen Pakistan's sense of desperation and push it further toward the suicidal brink.
Leaving aside the contentious matter of escalation dominance and the role of the nuclear powers, there is the crucial question of whether or not any kind of limited war could be effective in reducing the terrorist threat and Pakistan's support of it. A set of thought experiments will show that none of India's military options is very good. There are, roughly, seven options: fomenting terrorism in Pakistan; hot pursuit of terrorists; special- forces attacks against terrorist camps; air and artillery strikes against terrorist facilities; conquering and holding a slice of Pakistani territory; a naval blockade or bombardment of Pakistani ports; and a serious military push into Pakistani territory. This list is not exhaustive. The Indian air force, as also the Indian navy, could, in addition, mount strikes against other Pakistani targets-dams, cities, and military targets. However, these are even more dangerous and immoral ventures, and most of my critique of the lesser options will apply even more acutely to them.
Let's look at each of the options. First, some strategists argue that India should do to Pakistan what Pakistan has been doing to it for the past fifteen years: it should encourage internal dissent and violence. This sounds like an attractive option at a purely military-strategic level, but the problem with it is twofold. For one thing, going by past experience, Pakistan is not likely to be stopped from interfering in its neighbors' affairs by its own internal instabilities. Ethno-religious violence in Pakistan has been ferocious since at least the 1980s, and no province and city has been left unscathed. But this did not stop Islamabad from mounting anti-Indian rebellions in both Punjab and Kashmir in the 1980s and 1990s. Nor did it stop Pakistan from prosecuting a civil war in Afghanistan and from ousting the Soviet forces. Is there any reason to believe that Pakistani leaders today are more sensitive to internal violence than they were in the past? Ironically, the recent American intervention in Afghanistan has freed Pakistani resources for other theaters, including Kashmir, even as Islamabad deals with domestic disturbances.
Second, and more important, in contemplating the destabilization of Pakistan, India must consider whether such actions are compatible with its public and long-standing complaint that Pakistan is a terrorist state. Indian complaints will carry little moral weight if India itself supports terrorism. Destabilizing Pakistan is not just a moral issue; it is also an issue of statecraft. In the global war against terrorism, India would be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. It could become the object of international sanctions, whereas it has profited-and could profit further-if those sanctions were directed against Pakistan. In short, India would join Pakistan as a terrorist state. This would be a moral and strategic catastrophe for liberal democratic India.
What about the various military actions to which India could resort? These include hot pursuit, special-forces raids, and air and artillery strikes. All these would be directed primarily at destroying terrorist facilities in the Pakistani side of Kashmir, thereby reducing the incidence of terrorism. These options at least have the advantage of being morally justifiable because they will not target innocent civilians. Their military effectiveness, however, is questionable. Hot pursuit strikes would involve Indian troops' crossing the line of control in chase of terrorists. But these attacks probably would not achieve a great deal. Indian troops would probably kill some terrorists and temporarily destroy training and base facilities. The supply of terrorists is large enough, however, and Pakistan could rebuild and relocate the affected facilities fast enough, so that India would have to repeat the attacks, perhaps deeper into Pakistani-held territory, thus making its forces more vulnerable to counter attacks. Indian units that cross the line would also run into Pakistani fire, and casualties might be heavy. India would then be faced with the choice of calling off the pursuit or escalating the engagement.
Most of these limits apply as well to raids by special forces, which also have their own difficulties. They depend, critically, on surprise, stealth, and speed. Indian special forces could attain all three, but we should be cautious. In the history of warfare, the number of special operations that have gone wrong may well outnumber the ones that have succeeded. The capture and destruction of Indian units caught on the Pakistani side would be a public relations disaster if not a serious military reverse. Moreover, and this is crucial in terms of effectiveness, one or two successes will do little to reduce the tempo of terrorism.
Air and artillery fire against the terrorist camps or even against Pakistani military units is another plausible option. The Indian air force and army could launch a series of strikes against terrorist camps and Pakistani military targets. The success of remote fire of this kind, either from the air or from ground artillery, depends on intelligence and accuracy of targeting. If Indian fire is inaccurate, it risks hitting innocent civilians, which would be both morally corrosive and diplomatically counterproductive. Satellite imagery, air reconnaissance, specialized radar, modern locating systems, and precision-guided munitions are just some of the requisites for a bombardment campaign against terrorist facilities and Pakistani military targets. It is unlikely that Indian forces have the requisite capabilities. In any case, the Pakistanis can camouflage, harden, and move these facilities and targets, thereby rendering the Indian campaign ineffective.
Finally, India could opt for a much more ambitious set of punitive actions against Pakistan: conquering and holding a slice of Pakistani territory, a naval blockade or action, and a serious military push into Pakistani Punjab and Sindh. Each of these, too, is fraught with risks. Grabbing and then holding a swath of territory on the Pakistani side of Kashmir or in Pakistan proper is by no means easy. In Kashmir, difficulties of terrain would make it a tough operation to mount and sustain. In Pakistan proper, the prospects are even more daunting, as the Pakistani forces are much stronger there, with considerable armor to back them. India too is strong, but the question is whether or not a potentially expensive operation would serve much purpose. The idea behind it would be, once again, to punish Pakistan for its support of terrorism and to offer it a trade-return of territory for the end of terrorism. What if Islamabad simply shrugs off the loss of territory even as it battles to get it back and continues the terrorism campaign? As we noted earlier, Pakistan is not afraid to fight on several fronts simultaneously. India would then have to decide whether to extend this kind of salami-slicing to other sectors or to expand the scale of operations.
One way of expanding the conflict is by a naval blockade or other naval actions along the Pakistani coast. India signaled the possibility of naval operations when it sent a flotilla of ships into the Arabian Sea in the summer of 2002. A naval campaign could involve a blockade of Karachi harbor, crippling Pakistan's trade, destruction of Pakistani military and merchant shipping, and destruction of the Gwadar naval base, which the Pakistanis are currently expanding (with Chinese help).
But a naval blockade raises a number of difficulties. For one thing, it could cause great suffering among Pakistani civilians. And it would antagonize many of Pakistan's trading partners, including the major economic and military powers important to India. A large Indian naval presence over a long period of time would get in the way of the American fleet that is positioned in the area as part of the campaign in Afghanistan. This would lead not only to diplomatic friction with the United States, but would also risk the two navies' physically blundering into one another. Finally, a flotilla would be vulnerable to Pakistani air and naval retaliation, in particular by its submarines and the deadly Exocet and Harpoon missiles with which its ships are equipped. An attack against Gwadar is much more attractive, but how would that work to stop Pakistan's terror campaign?
Instead of a naval campaign, India could do what it does best militarily-or at least what it is most predisposed to do-which is to go to war on land, in the plains of Punjab and Sindh. If anything would truly hurt Pakistan, it is the loss of territory in its heartland. The Indian army combined with the air force could invade Punjab or Sindh or both in the kind of "final conflict" that the Indian prime minister frighteningly referred to in one of his speeches during the crisis of 2002.
This is a military fantasy at best and a nightmare at worst. An invading Indian force would have to get past densely mined Pakistani forward positions. Next, there would be canals and ditches, and, most likely, more mines. Beyond these passive defenses, the Indian army would run into Pakistan's active defenses-its armor and regular infantry units. Contrary to what most Indians and even more foreigners imagine, India does not have a substantial lead in conventional forces on its western border. Indian forces are deployed along the northern border with China and cannot be reduced much further in that sector. Many Indian troops are deployed for internal security duties, particularly in Kashmir and the Northeast, and it would be stretching them dangerously to draw their numbers down significantly. The tide might turn in India's favor if the air force achieved a rapid and decisive victory in the skies. Few people, however, would predict that this could be achieved. In short, the Indian attack would be a very hard slog, and the war might just turn into a stalemate marked by mutual attrition. And that's the good news. The bad news is that if India succeeded in making a breakthrough, Pakistan might unleash its nuclear weapons at Indian troop formations or Indian cities in order to halt Pakistan's military collapse.
The general point that emerges from these thought experiments is that much may be ventured, at great risk, for very small gains. The costs of war would probably be much greater than the costs of the uneasy, flawed, and violent peace that exists today. Some military ventures will gain India little in terms of stopping terrorism even if they succeed. Others could gain it a lot but have little chance of success. Yet others spell catastrophe.
In short, there are great dangers in applying the doctrines associated with the U.S. war on terrorism-retaliation and preemption-in South Asia. While there is no doubt that Pakistan does sponsor terrorism in India, the simple truth is that Pakistan is not as weak as Afghanistan or Iraq, and India is not as strong as the United States. Going after Pakistan militarily will either be ineffective or extremely dangerous. Whatever the United States can or can't, should or shouldn't, do, India's response to terrorism has to be different, and it is mere casuistry to claim that New Delhi should emulate Washington's methods.
Kanti Bajpai is professor of international politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/articles/su03/bajpai.htm
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
The Pakistani ruling establishment (whether military or civilian, in the rare instance) should be highly contended to have a Dept. of Pak. Propaganda at JNU, right in New Delhi, that too at the expense of the Govt. of India!
"Pak has Nukes. So, India beware and despair". It seems that's all the South Asian/International Specialists at JNU can offer as counsel.
"Pak has Nukes. So, India beware and despair". It seems that's all the South Asian/International Specialists at JNU can offer as counsel.
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
Now Mushy says Nuclear issue belongs to the past!!!Is it noocleer noode speaking? 
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/holnus/01091808.htm
Indo-Pak. nuclear stand-off thing of the past: Musharraf
Moscow, Sept. 9 (PTI): Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, has said the nuclear showdown between India and Pakistan was a thing of the past, but asserted that lasting peace in the sub-continent would be possible only after resolution of the Kashmir issue.
"The tension in bilateral (Indo-Pak) relations will subside if the root causes of the dispute are removed through a peace dialogue. The dialogue on the Kashmir problem and its solution will ensure a lasting peace," Musharraf said in an interview to Russian influential daily 'Kommersant' published today.
Responding to a question about Indo-Pak relations and possibility of a nuclear stand-off between the two South Asian rivals, Musharraf said all apprehensions about an exchange of nuclear strikes between the two countries were a "matter of past".
"The times when there were talks about exchange of nuclear strikes between Pakistan and India are a matter of the past. Even in those days we maintained calm and insisted on resolving all the disputes through dialogue," Musharraf said.
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/holnus/01091808.htm
Indo-Pak. nuclear stand-off thing of the past: Musharraf
Moscow, Sept. 9 (PTI): Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, has said the nuclear showdown between India and Pakistan was a thing of the past, but asserted that lasting peace in the sub-continent would be possible only after resolution of the Kashmir issue.
"The tension in bilateral (Indo-Pak) relations will subside if the root causes of the dispute are removed through a peace dialogue. The dialogue on the Kashmir problem and its solution will ensure a lasting peace," Musharraf said in an interview to Russian influential daily 'Kommersant' published today.
Responding to a question about Indo-Pak relations and possibility of a nuclear stand-off between the two South Asian rivals, Musharraf said all apprehensions about an exchange of nuclear strikes between the two countries were a "matter of past".
"The times when there were talks about exchange of nuclear strikes between Pakistan and India are a matter of the past. Even in those days we maintained calm and insisted on resolving all the disputes through dialogue," Musharraf said.
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
nuclear showdown between India and Pakistan was a thing of the past
Hark! Repent! Ye UnBelievers! The Proof Hath Arrived!
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
Is this Bajpayee a stand up?
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
N guru>> The SSSSnake Mushy is implying that India does not need (to be sold) Arrow .
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
What are the ramifications of Sharon's visit to India on TSP redlines? I think they would be more circumspect in issuing threats.
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
According to Bajpai, the safest and least risky thing to do is let Pakistan continue its terrorism against India. For truly, that would not hurt any Pakistani civilians, or cause friction with the US, or make any other countries upset, or be immoral on the part of India. Yes, the best thing to do is to do nothing at all and let things be.
OK, after Purefool and Aiyar, Bajpai has not entered my hallowed list of people that needs a boot in their a$$. Who's next? I smell Cohen.
OK, after Purefool and Aiyar, Bajpai has not entered my hallowed list of people that needs a boot in their a$$. Who's next? I smell Cohen.
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
I would have thought Steven "uneven" Cohen would have been near the top of the list of such people who deserved such treatment.
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
> India-Pakistan nuclear exchange was a thing of the past. - Musharraf
When accused of profanity even a prostitute claims the chastity of a nun.
When accused of profanity even a prostitute claims the chastity of a nun.
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
Very true, They are building a case so that India does not need the Arrow or the Phalcon if possible.Originally posted by John Umrao:
N guru>> The SSSSnake Mushy is implying that India does not need (to be sold) Arrow .
THere will be some campaign regarding this in DC and other places. Keep a watch.
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
This was posted by Ramana in another thread and offers an interesting aspect to the discussion here:
ramana Member Member # 356 posted 23 October 2003 09:49 AM
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Here is more stuff from newsinsight.net.....
US forcing Musharraf to get elected by 2005
23 October 2003: Rejecting controlled elections and "guided democracy" in Pakistan, the United States has ordered General Parvez Musharraf to get himself elected latest by 2005, or step down, and accordingly, the military and the ISI are going through the paces of setting up a political party for him.
Apprehensive about the rise of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, US ambassador to Pakistan, Nancy Powell, called upon Musharraf and passed on her government's message of early restoration of democracy, and both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharief have been informed about the American decision.
Bhutto and Sharief insist that Musharraf must permit them to return and contest the elections against him, since they fear he will otherwise split the PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz) and PPP (Pakistan Peoples' Party) in the search for experienced candidates and trained cadres, and the US has accordingly instructed Musharraf, according to senior Western diplomats.
Nancy Powell delivered the Bush administration's ultimatum a week before the UN General Assembly session, so that Musharraf could prepare his objections when meeting US officials in New York, but both American thinktank specialists and state-department representatives rejected his pleas that the US proposal stemmed from a lack of understanding of the ground situation in Pakistan.
Alongwith early elections, the US wants to restructure the Pakistan military, which will involve scaling down the operations of the notorious ISI, and keeping a strict watch on its terrorist activities in India and Afghanistan, though diplomats would not reveal more on this subject.
The US has said that Pakistan will receive US military assistance only if it tailors its military according to US requirements, which will necessarily involve a return to the barracks, stepping out of government, breaking off links with terrorist organisations like the Al-Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, and in return, America will also set up a thinktank with US and Pakistani servicemen.
In line with its aim to moderate the Pakistan army, the US is also effecting a purge of hardline elements, and this is expected to occur soon, and as an outlet for disempowered service officers, America is permitting Musharraf to include them in his proposed political party, which will also comprise upwardly-mobile Pakistani youth, academicians, and defected politicians from the PML-N and PPP.
ramana Member Member # 356 posted 23 October 2003 09:49 AM
--------------------------------------------------
Here is more stuff from newsinsight.net.....
US forcing Musharraf to get elected by 2005
23 October 2003: Rejecting controlled elections and "guided democracy" in Pakistan, the United States has ordered General Parvez Musharraf to get himself elected latest by 2005, or step down, and accordingly, the military and the ISI are going through the paces of setting up a political party for him.
Apprehensive about the rise of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, US ambassador to Pakistan, Nancy Powell, called upon Musharraf and passed on her government's message of early restoration of democracy, and both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharief have been informed about the American decision.
Bhutto and Sharief insist that Musharraf must permit them to return and contest the elections against him, since they fear he will otherwise split the PML-N (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz) and PPP (Pakistan Peoples' Party) in the search for experienced candidates and trained cadres, and the US has accordingly instructed Musharraf, according to senior Western diplomats.
Nancy Powell delivered the Bush administration's ultimatum a week before the UN General Assembly session, so that Musharraf could prepare his objections when meeting US officials in New York, but both American thinktank specialists and state-department representatives rejected his pleas that the US proposal stemmed from a lack of understanding of the ground situation in Pakistan.
Alongwith early elections, the US wants to restructure the Pakistan military, which will involve scaling down the operations of the notorious ISI, and keeping a strict watch on its terrorist activities in India and Afghanistan, though diplomats would not reveal more on this subject.
The US has said that Pakistan will receive US military assistance only if it tailors its military according to US requirements, which will necessarily involve a return to the barracks, stepping out of government, breaking off links with terrorist organisations like the Al-Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, and in return, America will also set up a thinktank with US and Pakistani servicemen.
In line with its aim to moderate the Pakistan army, the US is also effecting a purge of hardline elements, and this is expected to occur soon, and as an outlet for disempowered service officers, America is permitting Musharraf to include them in his proposed political party, which will also comprise upwardly-mobile Pakistani youth, academicians, and defected politicians from the PML-N and PPP.
Re: Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds
http://us.rediff.com/news/2003/dec/14pak.htm
Pakistan to move missiles closer to borders: Expert
December 14, 2003 14:36 IST
Concerned over India's strides in defence technology, Pakistan is planning to move its missiles closer to the borders to hit back with minimum time loss in any eventuality, according to a nuclear expert.
Moves by India to master the anti-ballistic technology coupled with the acquisition of Phalcon and green-pine radars from Israel may push the nuclear arms race in the subcontinent to a second phase, Pervez Hoodbhoy told a seminar in Islamabad on Saturday.
India's moves in the field of defence made the Pakistan defence establishment "very nervous", Hoodbhoy, a strong critic of Pakistan's nuclear policies, was quoted as saying by local daily Dawn on Sunday.
He said the prediction by Indian and Pakistani analysts that the 1998 nuclear tests would lead to a "balance of terror" in the region virtually came true when Pakistan military officials launched the Kargil conflict expecting the nuclear deterrence to prevent New Delhi from striking back.
Itty Abraham of the Social Science Research Council, Washington, in his address said the US was no longer interested in Pakistan and India rolling back their nuclear programmes.
Washington's current policies vis-à-vis nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran could serve as an additional argument for the governments of Pakistan and India to persist in their tit-for-tat approach in the missile race, Abraham said.
He believed that the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan did not have military aims but only political ones.
Abraham said there was sharp contrast in the public opinion in India and Pakistan towards nuclearisation.
While Indian public expressed its support for the nuclear programme, surveys in Pakistan revealed that 54 per cent of Pakistanis believed that the army had vested interests in flaunting its policy on Kashmir and nuclear issue.
Pakistani defence analyst Ayesha Siddiqa Agha expressed concern over militarisation of the civil society to the neglect of development.
There was no transparency in defence spending and the civil society was completely out of picture in these matters, she said.
Pakistan to move missiles closer to borders: Expert
December 14, 2003 14:36 IST
Concerned over India's strides in defence technology, Pakistan is planning to move its missiles closer to the borders to hit back with minimum time loss in any eventuality, according to a nuclear expert.
Moves by India to master the anti-ballistic technology coupled with the acquisition of Phalcon and green-pine radars from Israel may push the nuclear arms race in the subcontinent to a second phase, Pervez Hoodbhoy told a seminar in Islamabad on Saturday.
India's moves in the field of defence made the Pakistan defence establishment "very nervous", Hoodbhoy, a strong critic of Pakistan's nuclear policies, was quoted as saying by local daily Dawn on Sunday.
He said the prediction by Indian and Pakistani analysts that the 1998 nuclear tests would lead to a "balance of terror" in the region virtually came true when Pakistan military officials launched the Kargil conflict expecting the nuclear deterrence to prevent New Delhi from striking back.
Itty Abraham of the Social Science Research Council, Washington, in his address said the US was no longer interested in Pakistan and India rolling back their nuclear programmes.
Washington's current policies vis-à-vis nuclear programmes of North Korea and Iran could serve as an additional argument for the governments of Pakistan and India to persist in their tit-for-tat approach in the missile race, Abraham said.
He believed that the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan did not have military aims but only political ones.
Abraham said there was sharp contrast in the public opinion in India and Pakistan towards nuclearisation.
While Indian public expressed its support for the nuclear programme, surveys in Pakistan revealed that 54 per cent of Pakistanis believed that the army had vested interests in flaunting its policy on Kashmir and nuclear issue.
Pakistani defence analyst Ayesha Siddiqa Agha expressed concern over militarisation of the civil society to the neglect of development.
There was no transparency in defence spending and the civil society was completely out of picture in these matters, she said.