India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

[vsunder]

The army veterinary and remount centre based in Meerut that I wrote about above ^^^ is involved in cross breeding Zanskari ponies with other varieties and mules. I suppose the Zanskari ponies are more adapted to high altitude than mules elsewhere. In addition they are also cross breeding dogs Mudhol hound for various K9 operations. I have seen average run of the mill mules carry heavy loads to Hemkund glacier and beyond as late as 2017 the last time I was up in the Valley of Flowers and Hemkund.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaniskari

[ldev]

To solve India's China problem once and for all one has to think big, big risks and big pay-offs. The ultimate goal should be to hive off Xianjing Province and Tibet completely, beginning with Kashgar and Lhasa. Interdicting and gaining control of G-219 is the start. And confine the Han Chinese to their traditional heartland. Xianjing and Tibet are empire to the Han, these outposts of empire are thousands of kilometers away from Beijing and they have to be shorn off. Both areas have restive minorities, the Uygurs in Xianjing and the Tibetans in Tibet. That will give India access to Central Asia and a huge buffer with Han China. And an enterprise of such magnitude will involve India cooperating with other countries to achieve it Instead of other countries re-drawing India's map, India should re-draw the map of other countries aka formation of Bangla Desh. India began with re-drawing the map of Pakistan, the next target should be China.

[Nihat]

The army veterinary and remount centre based in Meerut that I wrote about above ^^^ is involved in cross breeding Zanskari ponies with other varieties and mules. I suppose the Zanskari ponies are more adapted to high altitude than mules elsewhere. In addition they are also cross breeding dogs Mudhol hound for various K9 operations. I have seen average run of the mill mules carry heavy loads to Hemkund glacier and beyond as late as 2017 the last time I was up in the Valley of Flowers and Hemkund.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zaniskari

Funny enough that you mention that, my grandfather grew through the ranks to become Director of the meerut based RVC and we still have a host of memorabilia from his time.

The Zanskari ponies were very much part of his tales. Interesting to know if they still play a role in the logistics chain of today, especially in those regions?

[Nihat]

To solve India's China problem once and for all one has to think big, big risks and big pay-offs. The ultimate goal should be to hive off Xianjing Province and Tibet completely, beginning with Kashgar and Lhasa. Interdicting and gaining control of G-219 is the start. And confine the Han Chinese to their traditional heartland. Xianjing and Tibet are empire to the Han, these outposts of empire are thousands of kilometers away from Beijing and they have to be shorn off. Both areas have restive minorities, the Uygurs in Xianjing and the Tibetans in Tibet. That will give India access to Central Asia and a huge buffer with Han China. And an enterprise of such magnitude will involve India cooperating with other countries to achieve it Instead of other countries re-drawing India's map, India should re-draw the map of other countries aka formation of Bangla Desh. India began with re-drawing the map of Pakistan, the next target should be China.

Really sir

I mean, something like this is not even in the realm of probability and not even a part of our strategic thinking. Might be on par with a fantasy of the Chinese to take Arunachal and hold on to it.

[kit]

To solve India's China problem once and for all one has to think big, big risks and big pay-offs. The ultimate goal should be to hive off Xianjing Province and Tibet completely, beginning with Kashgar and Lhasa. Interdicting and gaining control of G-219 is the start. And confine the Han Chinese to their traditional heartland. Xianjing and Tibet are empire to the Han, these outposts of empire are thousands of kilometers away from Beijing and they have to be shorn off. Both areas have restive minorities, the Uygurs in Xianjing and the Tibetans in Tibet. That will give India access to Central Asia and a huge buffer with Han China. And an enterprise of such magnitude will involve India cooperating with other countries to achieve it Instead of other countries re-drawing India's map, India should re-draw the map of other countries aka formation of Bangla Desh. India began with re-drawing the map of Pakistan, the next target should be China.

Really sir

I mean, something like this is not even in the realm of probability and not even a part of our strategic thinking. Might be on par with a fantasy of the Chinese to take Arunachal and hold on to it.

what was the probability of something like a Corona pandemic?

[Mort Walker]

To solve India's China problem once and for all one has to think big, big risks and big pay-offs. The ultimate goal should be to hive off Xianjing Province and Tibet completely, beginning with Kashgar and Lhasa. Interdicting and gaining control of G-219 is the start. And confine the Han Chinese to their traditional heartland. Xianjing and Tibet are empire to the Han, these outposts of empire are thousands of kilometers away from Beijing and they have to be shorn off. Both areas have restive minorities, the Uygurs in Xianjing and the Tibetans in Tibet. That will give India access to Central Asia and a huge buffer with Han China. And an enterprise of such magnitude will involve India cooperating with other countries to achieve it Instead of other countries re-drawing India's map, India should re-draw the map of other countries aka formation of Bangla Desh. India began with re-drawing the map of Pakistan, the next target should be China.

Really sir

I mean, something like this is not even in the realm of probability and not even a part of our strategic thinking. Might be on par with a fantasy of the Chinese to take Arunachal and hold on to it.

Just putting G-219 in the accurate range of light artillery with the threat of cutting it off in a matter of hours will be good enough. It is doable.

[khan]

I was watching “Coupta” wag his hands around, he did make in interesting point though, he said that DB-Oldi road in its-self wasn’t just the only issue, it was satellite roads connecting DB-Oldi road to military camps that was also concerning to the Chinese. So, within hours IA can move 1000’s of people around (maybe 10’s of thousands), that has to be concerning to the Chinese.

Plus, these camps are staffed for foot patrols, so the same number of people can be much more lethal and effective once the roads are done.

I really hope that IA doesn’t give up the right to build up these satellite roads as the price of de-escalation. Those 12,000 construction workers on trains to Leh give me hope there is no sellout.

[NRao]

Yes, the feeder roads from the DB-Oldie road to the LAC is the issue.

DB-Oldie road has been in the making for years. Besides that, there is an alternative road being built from the south to Oldie. I cannot find the name as I type. So, access to Oldie is not an issue - but, something China would love Indians to keep on discussing.

Having said that I very much doubt even the feeders are the issue. China will make a tamasha and withdraw, except perhaps from the area between Fingers 4-8. 2 steps forward, 1 step back and then claim China was magnanimous by withdrawing and not taking an inch of Indian territory. And, that China did not escalate a difference into a dispute.

[NRao]

Here is the article on the two roads.

India working on two roads in Ladakh amid border row

June 9, 2020

India is working on two key roads near the China border in eastern Ladakh — the site of a tense weeks-long border stand-off with its northern neighbour — to provide connectivity to an important forward area that the military calls Sub-Sector North (SSN), two senior officers familiar with the developments said on Monday.

While the first is the strategic Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi (DS-DBO) road that provides connectivity to the country’s northern-most outpost, Daulat Beg Oldi, the second road being built from Sasoma to Saser La could eventually provide an alternative route to DBO near the Karakoram pass, said one of the two officers. The Sasoma-Saser La road axis is south-west of DBO.

Both projects are being executed by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), which is ferrying 11,815 workers to areas near the China border in Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand for building strategic roads, as first reported by Hindustan Times on May 31.

India is not allowing the border confrontation with China to hinder strategic road projects in forward areas, including the Ladakh sector, where soldiers of the two nations are eyeball-to-eyeball at four locations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), said the second officer cited above.

The current Chinese troop build-up in the Galwan valley threatens the critical 255-km DS-DBO road (also known as the SSN road), and top experts and China watchers have argued that India should build an alternative road to DBO.

The road from Sasoma to Saser La, at a height of almost 17,800 feet, is a tough project that falls under “Hardness Index-III”, the BRO’s top-most classification for hard projects, the second official added. Experts believe that the road can be extended to Brang Sa, Murgo and eventually DBO in the long term. BRO officials weren’t available for a comment.

“There’s a 200% need to have an alternative road to DBO in Sub-Sector North. The DS-DBO road can be interdicted at several choke points by Chinese forces during hostilities. While the road from Sasoma to Saser La can connect with DBO, it will be an engineering challenge due to the terrain. It may require construction of a tunnel too,” said Lieutenant General BS Jaswal (retd), a former Northern Army commander.

HT reported on May 27 that if the DS-DBO project is blocked, the Indian Army will be forced to use aerial supply lines and also build an arduous alternative route linking Sasoma to Murgo to DBO through the glaciated Saser La. Two years ago, the BRO said the Sasoma-Saser La road would be the world’s first motorable glaciated road.

Lieutenant General DS Hooda (retd), also a former Northern Army commander, said the construction of Sasoma-Saser La road in the glaciated terrain posed a huge challenge, especially in the final patches near Saser La.

“If we can build this road and further connect it to DBO, it could provide an alternative route during summer months. However, the all-weather DS-DBO road will remain very important for the army,” Hooda said.

The defence ministry told Parliament’s standing committee on defence last year that the Sasoma-Saser La road was a challenging project because of its peculiarities.

“Due to peculiarity of formation and shifting of moraines, the road suffers continuous shifting resulting in various gradients… The Central Road Research Institute has been approached for providing solution and the proposal based on CRRI recommendation is being prepared,” the ministry told the panel.

Amid the border stand-off, top officials said the BRO would complete all 61 strategic roads assigned to it along the China border by December 2022 for swifter mobilisation of troops and stores to forward areas.

A day after the external affairs ministry said that India and China will continue military and diplomatic contacts to resolve the border stand-off, defence minister Rajnath Singh met the chief of defence staff and the three service chiefs and reviewed the situation along the disputed border in the Ladakh sector.

An hours-long meeting on Saturday between a delegation led by Lieutenant General Harinder Singh, commander of Leh-based 14 Corps, and a Chinese delegation headed by Major General Liu Lin, commander of the South Xinjiang military region, at Moldo on the Chinese side of the LAC ended without a breakthrough.

The external affairs ministry said the meeting “took place in a cordial and positive atmosphere” and both sides agreed to work towards peacefully resolving the situation.

In the first official acknowledgement of a troop build-up along the disputed border with China. Singh last week said a significant number of Chinese troops were present along the LAC and the Indian Army had matched the neighbour’s military moves.

China has marshalled close to 5,000 soldiers and deployed tanks and artillery guns on its side of the disputed border in the Ladakh sector, where India has also sent military reinforcements, as reported by HT on May 26.

The situation of the ground remains unchanged in the midst of efforts to break the stalemate, said officials. They added that increased Chinese air activity had been observed on the other side of the LAC during the last few days.

[nam]

Tibet rail. The number of bridges are probably more than our stock of Brahmos.

[Raveen]

Tibet rail. The number of bridges are probably more than our stock of Brahmos.

Yet all you have to do is take one strategic bridge down the and line is out of service - only takes one Bmos.

[NRao]

India’s escalation worked against Pakistan, time for similar response to China

ndia’s strategic managers face a difficult problem: both China and Pakistan use asymmetric means that are not easy to counter. Pakistan uses terrorism because it ties down India’s stronger conventional military forces. And China has mastered the art of salami-slicing territory that is equally difficult to thwart, not just for India, but for China’s other neighbours and even the US. With the surgical strike and the Balakot attack, India may have found an appropriate response to Pakistan’s asymmetric tactics. But China is a harder nut to crack. New Delhi needs to think of other ways to tackle it.

Asymmetric tactics are difficult to counter. India’s traditional counter has been defence, but this clearly did not work against either Pakistan or China. Of course, defence has to be part of the strategic mix, but by itself, it will not work.

In dealing with terrorism, defences can never work perfectly every time. If the terrorists fail once, they can try again and again. As is well-known, the terrorist can afford to fail many times but only needs to succeed once, while the defence has to be successful every time. India’s fight against terrorism is a standing testament to this: however much India tightened its defences, it could never stop the attacks.

Defences are also a poor solution to salami-slicing tactics, as we are witnessing along the Line of Actual Control. The problem is that each individual act is so small that it passes without challenge. It is always tempting to ignore such infractions and to excuse it as a reaction to a mistake that others made. After all, in the South China Sea, other countries had also occupied some portions of the islands and even built ramshackle huts on them. Now we know different, but it is of course too late. Salami-slicing tactics encourage second-guessing by the victims, which further undermine any response.

Another problem with countering such tactics is that it is difficult to defend everywhere, especially in inhospitable terrain or in the waters. But the end result is that China has now asserted control over much of the South China Sea and is repeating the same method in Ladakh. India should be familiar with this: the Chinese used the same method successfully in the run-up to the India-China war in 1962. In trying to defend ‘every inch of land’, India ended up in an unsustainable military position.

Tackling Pakistan

There are alternatives to a purely defensive response to asymmetric attacks. One can mimic such asymmetric strategies, paying China back in the same coin. There is an agreeable symmetry to this, but agreeableness is, of course, less important than effectiveness. Doing this requires capacity and political willingness.

For example, Prime Minister Narendra Modi signalled a change on India’s Balochistan policy early on, which was seen as a tit-for-tat response to Pakistan’s terror strategy. But little appears to have actually been done, either because India lacks the intelligence and covert action capability to actually implement such a policy or the government simply lost its nerve. There is also the moral equivalence problem: can democratic India support groups that engage in such actions? India has supported such groups before but does it become problematic when India puts so much stress on international diplomatic action against terrorism?

Capability and political risk-acceptance become even more important if India wants to embark on its own salami-slicing tactics to counter China. Such tactics could quickly escalate: India’s forward policy in the run-up to the 1962 war was attempted without sufficient military capability to deal with escalation and we paid for it. Indian capabilities are far better today but the risks cannot be dismissed.

India may have found at least a partial answer to Pakistan’s asymmetric strategy of using terrorism: escalation. Both the surgical strike and the Balakot attack demonstrated that India had the political will to use its superior military capabilities. The debate about whether Indian bombs hit the target is irrelevant: Pakistan now has to factor the probability of an Indian escalation next time it plans a terror strike, something it did not appear overly concerned with before.

Tackling China

The challenge is not over, of course. Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s recent claims about a ‘false-flag’ operation by India and the foiling of a Pulwama-type terror attack a few days later may suggest that Pakistan will continue to use such tactics, which means that India will need to be prepared to escalate and punish again if another such attack takes place.

It is doubtful that such military escalation tactics will work in China’s case. But there are other ways to escalate that could work. New Delhi can signal that continued pressure on the border can have repercussions, such as strengthening Indian strategic partnerships with the US and others. India could also become more vocal about issues such as China’s roadbuilding in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, its role in the coronavirus pandemic, or its behaviour in Hong Kong. These have no intrinsic value to India, but to the extent that China values its narrative, they represent points of vulnerability that India can exploit.

Escalation is undesirable and would hurt both sides. China can surely respond in kind. But asymmetric tactics should not be tolerated either. The alternative to escalation is being repeatedly victimised, as India was for decades by Pakistan’s terrorism.

[ldev]

The most detailed report I have seen with specific numbers of nuclear forces, fighter aircraft, ground forces for India facing China and vice versa. Other than nuclear missiles where China has an overwhelming advantage in deployed missiles capable of reaching all of India, in terms of conventional forces available to China's Western Theater Command, India is at a distinct advantage in terms of numbers as well as being closer to the front lines. In an all out full scale conventional war China's Western Theater Command will probably have to call on reserves from the Central Military Commission to hold India back. Whether reserves will be available will depend on how comfortable China is that Taiwan, the US etc. will not take advantage of the situation on China's eastern seaboard.

The Strategic Postures of China and India: A Visual Guide

Read it in full. I am just going to paste the excerpt relating to Chinese conventional missile strikes on Indian Air Forces bases and the estimates of how many missiles will be needed to knock out these bases. This relates to the earlier discussion on the thread on this subject and this excerpt has a more detailed explanation, but before that the reasoning as to why the PLAAF would resort to a missile strike on IAF bases. Hence my earlier position of interdiction of G-219 appears within the realms of being achievable :

The most significant PLAAF forward air bases and airfields near Indian border areas—which will be pivotal in combat operations—are located at Hotan, Lhasa/Gonggar, Ngari-Gunsa, and Xigaze. Each hosts regular PLAAF detachments, and these are the nearest facilities to Indian targets in Kashmir, northern India, and northeast India.31 They are vulnerable to a dedicated Indian offensive. Ngari-Gunsa and Xigaze reportedly have no hardened shelters or blast pens for their aircraft, which sit in the open.32 Lhasa/Gonggar has recently developed hardened shelters able to protect up to 36 aircraft, while Hotan reportedly hosts “two aircraft shelters” of unknown capacity.33 An Indian early initiative to destroy or incapacitate these four bases—and achieve air superiority over them—would compel China to rely more upon aircraft from its rear-area bases, exacerbating its limited fuel and payload problems. Moreover, China lacks the redundancy and related force survivability compared to India in their comparative numbers of regional air bases. In sum, India has a stronger regional air position, with “a large number of airfields in the east and west, so even if some airfields are down, operations can continue from other locations.”34

PLAAF training and experience shortcomings that are not shared by the IAF amplify China’s air disadvantage.35 Recent PLAAF exercises with unscripted scenarios have found that pilots are excessively reliant upon ground control for tactical direction. In unanticipated combat scenarios, this dependence on explicit control tower guidance becomes extreme, while “ground commands” are simultaneously often unable “to keep up with the complex and changeable air situation.”36 This suggests that PLAAF combat proficiency may be significantly weaker than often estimated.

A comprehensive study found that scenarios with combat conditions where “some of the key first-line airfields were destroyed” would be especially concerning for Chinese strategists.37 Progressive base hardening in the eastern US-facing PLAAF facilities has reduced this risk in that area.38 A lack of similar measures in the India-facing west suggests that Indian destruction or temporary incapacitation of some of the four above air bases would further exacerbate these PLAAF operational inflexibilities and weaknesses. By contrast, recent conflicts with Pakistan give the current IAF a level of institutional experience in actual networked combat.

And therefore, recognizing the shortcomings of it's Air Force, this study concludes that the PLAAF will resort to early missile strikes to incapacitate IAF bases

Recognizing this dilemma, instead of a regional aircraft offensive, Chinese strategic planners envision early long-range missile strikes against Indian air bases in the event of conflict. However, India benefits from the greater number and redundancy of regional air bases, and the daunting number of Chinese missiles that would be required to truly incapacitate relevant IAF forces. A former IAF official, referring to the high number of disparate targets per air base, the requirement for at least two missiles per target, and the ability of base officials to repave the blast crater with quick-drying concrete within six hours, has articulated the operational problem:

“To keep one airfield shut for 24 hours, the PLAAF will require 220 ballistic missiles. This will not make any difference to IAF operations in the east or in the west since the IAF has a large number of other operational airfields to operate from. If the PLAAF attacks just three airfields, it will require 660 ballistic missiles per day for attacking the runway and taxi track alone. China’s stock of 1,000-1,200 MRBMs/SRBMs will be over in less than two days when attacking just three airfields, with no other major target systems like C2 centres or air defence units being addressed.”39
This analysis was authored before India began its process of integrating runway replacement fiberglass mats into its base defense systems, meaning it was likely calculated upon a previous “labour-intensive,” civilian-heavy method of runway repaving, as described by a former Indian Air Marshal.40 However, India is presently inducting these fiberglass mats and associated paving equipment, which will further reduce its runway reconstitution timeframe.41 It is therefore unlikely that the numerous PLAAF disadvantages detailed above can be overcome by China’s superior missile forces. This is critical beyond the air competition itself: “In any India-China conflict, the PLA cannot launch an attack without the support of the PLAAF.”42

To address its force shortfalls in the event of war, China could surge air and ground forces from its interior toward the border. However, what our analysis suggests is that the IAF’s superiority would mean that critical logistical routes—such as air bases and military road and rail links—could be cut by bombing or standoff missile strikes, limiting the extent to which China’s position could be reinforced.43 Such a Chinese surge would also attract attention from the United States, which would alert India and enable it to counter-mobilize its own additional forces from its interior.

[samirdiw]

To solve India's China problem once and for all one has to think big, big risks and big pay-offs. The ultimate goal should be to hive off Xianjing Province and Tibet completely, beginning with Kashgar and Lhasa. Interdicting and gaining control of G-219 is the start. And confine the Han Chinese to their traditional heartland. Xianjing and Tibet are empire to the Han, these outposts of empire are thousands of kilometers away from Beijing and they have to be shorn off. Both areas have restive minorities, the Uygurs in Xianjing and the Tibetans in Tibet. That will give India access to Central Asia and a huge buffer with Han China. And an enterprise of such magnitude will involve India cooperating with other countries to achieve it Instead of other countries re-drawing India's map, India should re-draw the map of other countries aka formation of Bangla Desh. India began with re-drawing the map of Pakistan, the next target should be China.

Unlikely to find much favor here with that thought. If hawks are not even ready to think about this what to expect from average public and politicians.

The battle plans make sense if there is an objective to grab land and keep it. If the idea is to give a bloody nose and give back the land then its only a matter of time before the opponent learns from their mistakes and improves. It would end up being Prithvi vs Chinese Ghauri and future generations will never forgive this generation. History is bound to repeat to those who don't learn from it.Folks may not like it but we have the blood of Tibetians on our hands. Any other group of people with the manpower would have entered into a fight to prevent the Chinese for taking over the roof even for their own self preservation. Replace Poland with Tibet.

At least this govt has tried to put its foot down...but the will to kick the chinese 3000 miles back will come to the politicians and army only if the people repeat time and time again that its expected.

[ldev]

Unlikely to find much favor here with that thought. If hawks are not even ready to think about this what to expect from average public and politicians.

The battle plans make sense if there is an objective to grab land and keep it. If the idea is to give a bloody nose and give back the land then its only a matter of time before the opponent learns from their mistakes and improves. It would end up being Prithvi vs Chinese Ghauri and future generations will never forgive this generation. History is bound to repeat to those who don't learn from it.Folks may not like it but we have the blood of Tibetians on our hands. Any other group of people with the manpower would have entered into a fight to prevent the Chinese for taking over the roof even for their own self preservation. Replace Poland with Tibet.

At least this govt has tried to put its foot down...but the will to kick the chinese 3000 miles back will come to the politicians and army only if the people repeat time and time again that its expected.

For it to become feasible there has to be a long term plan, such as Free Uyguristan by 2030 or Free Tibet by 2030. No question of returning land, the map has to be re-drawn. And then everything that needs to be done economically, militarily, via R&D and via alliances with other countries needs to be done. What think tankers call "internal and external re-balancing". In other words the country's total posture has to be such as to achieve those objectives by that date. Otherwise remain in the present quagmire with pushing and shoving matches every few years. If China could grow from economic parity with India in 1980 to an economy which is 2.7X to 4.5X larger based either on PPP or nominal numbers, then why cannot India do the same?

[NRao]

Supposedly, Xi has his handpicked lineup leading the Western Theatre. Two of three are supposed to be Tibet experts with an eye on consolidating the region to ensure that the new Silk Road is a grand success. Here is another dated map - 2017 or older (from Snapshot: China’s Western Theater Command).



India needs to do just enough to upset their plan and dethrone these three and Xi. IF possible, in the potential ensuing turmoil, India can then redraw the border all along. And, deorbit Nepal, etc.

@ldev,

Excellent find.

Wonder why the authors have not even mentioned Rafale.

Never the less, they do mention Chinese UAVs:

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) also suffers from a numerical disparity to the IAF in the border region. Unlike the tripartite organizational division of Chinese ground forces facing India, the Western Theater Command has assumed control of all regional strike aircraft.24 In total, this amounts to around 157 fighters and a varied drone armory. This includes an estimated 20 GJ-1/WD-1K precision strike UAVs, 12 WD-1 ground attack and reconnaissance UAVs, 12 WD-1 precision strike UAVs, and 8 EA-03 reconnaissance and electronic warfare UAVs.25 A proportion of these are reserved for Russia-centric missions. By comparison, as noted earlier, the Indian Eastern Air Command can field around 101 fighters against China alone. China also uses eight airbases and airfields relevant to India strike missions, although a majority are civilian airports that can be commandeered in wartime.26

All said and done, I would think it would come down to who can maintain their networks intact for the duration of the conflict and EW capabilities.

[ldev]

@ldev,

Excellent find.

Wonder why the authors have not even mentioned Rafale.

Because IAF Rafales are still in France sipping Bordeaux!! What is available on the ground right now I guess is what has been included in this ORBAT. You know in the IAF thread I had proposed an alternate version of the IAF buy which would have resulted in either a mix of F-16s and Meteor armed Tejas or if the IAF was hell bent on the Rafale then at least a mix of Rafale and Meteor armed Tejas, let's call the Tejas "Rafale light" or "mini Rafale". At a minimum the IAF would have a squadron of Tejas as of today armed with the Meteor if HAL had not gone for the "lowest cost AESA radar supplier".

[khan]

I have a feeling jongos will be disappointed with this years standoff - no war.

I do hope however, that GOI wakes up & does something about the 2-front issue by taking care of TSP this winter.

[NRao]

Raja Mandala: A statement of power

It is not change in J&K’s status, but growing power differential, that lies behind China's assertion in Ladakh.

An interesting new argument coming out of China these days is that Beijing has been compelled to insert itself into the Kashmir dispute because of the Indian decision last year to alter the constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir.

The Chinese arguments proffered on various occasions since last August have been summarised by Wang Shida, a Chinese scholar in Beijing. Wang argues that India’s move last August has “forced China into the Kashmir dispute, stimulated China and Pakistan to take counter-actions on the Kashmir issue, and dramatically increased the difficulty in resolving the border issue between China and India”.

Official Delhi rejects the argument that India’s action has “posed a challenge to the sovereignty of China and Pakistan”. It points out that the constitutional changes altered the nature of the relationship between Delhi and Kashmir within the Indian Union, and that it has no impact on the current territorial disposition with China and Pakistan. The government’s renewed claim over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and China-occupied Aksai Chin is simply a restatement of long-standing Indian positions.

It is ironic that the charge of unilateralism comes from Beijing, which has turned critical parts of the South China Sea into administrative districts of China and matched those moves with physical steps to gain effective control over the disputed waters. Delhi has taken no such action in Kashmir, nor does anyone believe India is in a position to gain control over the territories controlled by either Pakistan or China.

For most Indians, it might be baffling to hear the argument that Delhi has “forced” Beijing into the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. In their view, China is very much part of the Kashmir dispute. After all, China occupies large parts of Kashmir, including Aksai Chin and parts of Ladakh and sits on the Shaksgam valley ceded to Beijing by Pakistan in 1963. It is important to note a nuance in China’s articulation. The competing claims of Delhi and Islamabad over Kashmir are rooted in their shared understanding that there was a princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in undivided India. For Beijing, the territories it claims have never been part of J&K but belonged to Tibet and Xinjiang.

That Pakistan has largely swallowed the Chinese argument is reflected in the 1963 agreement on the boundary between “China’s Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan”. Not entirely surprising, since Pakistan’s primary focus is on getting the Indian-controlled areas of Kashmir rather than claim all the original lands of J&K.

While its claim to be outside the dispute has been consistent, China’s approach to the Kashmir question has seen considerable variation over the last seven decades and more. Some recent research has delved into Nationalist China’s active efforts to draw the Hunza region of the Gilgit district into a union with China during 1947-48. The Mir of Hunza, Jamal Khan, opened negotiations with officials of Xinjiang, but in the end, opted to accede to Pakistan. Communist China did not abandon the efforts of the Nationalist government and continued to show Hunza as part of its territory until the early 1960s.

In the 1950s, at the height of the “Bhai-Bhai” phase, China avoided taking a position on the Kashmir question. After the 1962 war, China’s position aligned with Pakistan’s as Beijing called for “self-determination” in Kashmir. After the Maoist era came to a close and Deng Xiaoping took charge in the late 1980s, China began to moderate its Kashmir position and find a better balance in its bilateral relations with India and Pakistan.

In the mid-1990s, in a significant setback to Islamabad, Beijing urged both India and Pakistan to put aside the Kashmir issue and focus on developmental cooperation. But China’s position on the boundary dispute in general and the Kashmir question in particular tended to harden against India since the late 2000s, when Beijing became more conscious of the widening power differential with all its neighbours, including India.

It’s a pity that India’s debate on the Ladakh crisis is fixated in finding China’s motives, including the argument that India’s constitutional changes were the trigger. The ground reality has not been altered by India’s constitutional changes. It is being changed by the PLA’s growing military capabilities and the political will to use them.

India’s constitutional changes might, in the end, look like a minor defensive move amid China’s continuing gains in Kashmir across the India-Pakistan divide. Although Beijing has let Pakistan keep Hunza for now, it has not really given up its claims on the region under the 1963 agreement. The CPEC, which enters Pakistan through Hunza, has laid the foundation for ever-larger Chinese economic influence in Gilgit-Baltistan.

Meanwhile, China’s ability to nibble away at the LAC in Ladakh will only grow as the military balance continues to shift in the PLA’s favour. While India’s significant current military deployment to counter Chinese mobilisation may yet help persuade Beijing to step back, there is no escaping the longer-term trend. If Delhi can’t redress the growing military imbalance and as Islamabad becomes even more dependent on Beijing, China will loom larger than ever on the entire Kashmir region. That is the real message from the new Chinese affirmation that it is now part of the Kashmir question.

In raking up the issue at the UNSC, raising economic presence in the Northern Areas and probing India’s military and political vulnerabilities, China is highlighting its new salience for Kashmir. This is part of China’s growing geopolitical impact all across the Great Himalayas.

[V_Raman]

India taking over GB will silence everyone. I dare say - it will be unopposed militarily and UN cannot interfere as it is bound by Simla agreement and it is Indian territory legally. China will scream bloody murder along with Pak. But they cannot do anything, All this buildup is to scare us off from that.

[nam]

Tweeter reporting trouble in Pangong...

Wonder if the first shot has been fired...

[Karna]

Won't it to be too early since discussions are going on..

@shivaroor
Troubling news coming in from Pangong Tso, Ladakh. Will update with official details shortly & on @IndiaToday.

[RajaRudra]

Tweeter reporting trouble in Pangong...

Wonder if the first shot has been fired...

Yes, Government and Army is taking and persisting with tough options instead of running away.
What ever the bad news(unsubstantiated news i got, but will wait for the official confirmation), its time to stand behind the Govt and Army like a rock.

Jai Hind

[sajo]

Twitter is full of tweets about a major (mostly negative) development in Eastern Ladakh/Pangong Tso. What has happened?

[Karna]

On Twitter :

Big Breaking: Indian Army Colonel and 2 Army jawans killed in action during a clash with Chinese troops at one of the standoff points in the Galwan Valley, Ladakh.

[Shaktimaan]

Shiv Aroor
@ShivAroor
·
3m
BIG BREAKING: Indian Army Colonel (Commanding Officer of an infantry battalion) and 2 Army jawans killed in action during a clash with Chinese troops at one of the standoff points in the Galwan Valley, Ladakh. Details awaited.

[Aditya_V]

Shiv Aroor
@ShivAroor
·
3m
BIG BREAKING: Indian Army Colonel (Commanding Officer of an infantry battalion) and 2 Army jawans killed in action during a clash with Chinese troops at one of the standoff points in the Galwan Valley, Ladakh. Details awaited.

Very sad, did we not fire back? No chinese causualties?

[TushS]

This is not acceptable at all. They haven't came here to talk.

[RajaRudra]

Shiv Aroor
@ShivAroor
·
3m
BIG BREAKING: Indian Army Colonel (Commanding Officer of an infantry battalion) and 2 Army jawans killed in action during a clash with Chinese troops at one of the standoff points in the Galwan Valley, Ladakh. Details awaited.

Very sad, did we not fire back? No chinese causualties?

Seems , casualties in both sides. need to wait for official confirmation.

[Aditya_V]

This is ridiculous, we are talking after they killed our soldiers. Shoot the entire bunch or bring them to Indian trial

https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/army-of ... -topscroll

Army Officer, 2 Soldiers Killed In "Violent Face-Off" With China In Ladakh

An official statement said: "During the de-escalation process underway in the Galwan Valley, a violent face-off took place yesterday night with casualties. The loss of lives on the Indian side includes an officer and two soldiers. Senior military officials of the two sides are currently meeting at the venue to defuse the situation."

WTF are we talkign when they have killed a Colonel and 2 of our soldiers??

If we did not inflict casualties this is 1962 again.

[chola]

Shiv Aroor
@ShivAroor
·
3m
BIG BREAKING: Indian Army Colonel (Commanding Officer of an infantry battalion) and 2 Army jawans killed in action during a clash with Chinese troops at one of the standoff points in the Galwan Valley, Ladakh. Details awaited.

Is this real? If so we have to go all out. It finally happened. My god.

[Aditya_V]

There is no talk of Chinese casualties- it is very unsettling that they killed a Colonel and 2 Indian soldiers just like that.

[Karna]

Shiv Aroor
@ShivAroor
·
3m
BIG BREAKING: Indian Army Colonel (Commanding Officer of an infantry battalion) and 2 Army jawans killed in action during a clash with Chinese troops at one of the standoff points in the Galwan Valley, Ladakh. Details awaited.

Is this real? If so we have to go all out. It finally happened. My god.

Not avenging the CO will be very demoralising for the unit. Am not sure how Sr. Commanders are going to de escalate this situation.

[asinh]

Hope they lost men too.

[Aditya_V]

All reports are only talking of Indian casualties and deescalation, there is no talk of Chinese casualties. This looks bad.

[Karna]

Hope they lost men too.

Press conference at 2. First loss of lives after 1975.

[TushS]

Causality on both sides.
https://twitter.com/ShivAroor/status/12 ... 3839755264
Two updates: Casualties on both sides (unclear what nature/numbers on Chinese side). No bullets fired, clash was with stones and clubs. Several injured. Will update.

[chola]

Is this real? If so we have to go all out. It finally happened. My god.

Not avenging the CO will be very demoralising for the unit. Am not sure how Sr. Commanders are going to de escalate this situation.

It would be demoralizing for the IA. There has to be a response.

Escalation is dependent on whether there were use of firearms I think. If deaths came from sticks and stones then the response might be comparable. If by firearms then allow gloves must be taken off and we use everything.

[Karna]

Not avenging the CO will be very demoralising for the unit. Am not sure how Sr. Commanders are going to de escalate this situation.

It would be demoralizing for the IA. There has to be a response.

Escalation is dependent on whether there were use of firearms I think. If deaths came from sticks and stones then the response might be comparable. If by firearms then allow gloves must be taken off and we use everything.

This is coming from Galwan valley which was never under dispute. CO and other ranks are from Bihar unit as per Twitter.

Dont think talks are gonna help at Pangong Tso where cheen have made structures. This can escalate pretty soon.

[sum]

Causality on both sides.
https://twitter.com/ShivAroor/status/12 ... 3839755264
Two updates: Casualties on both sides (unclear what nature/numbers on Chinese side). No bullets fired, clash was with stones and clubs. Several injured. Will update.

How does one lose a colonel and 2 jawans just by stone pelting?

Am sure even Chinese side has some casualties