India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

[AshishA]

Okay let's say we can't raise the costs for Chinese in neither Tibet nor Xinjiang because of variety of reasons. So how about we start targeting their interests in Balochistan? Destroying the CPEC corridor will definitely hurt the Chinese deeply.

[Lisa]

^ Already a work in progress.

[darshan]

Chinese at work?

UNSC Sanctions Committee approves restoration of bank accounts of Hafiz Saeed and other LeT terrorists
https://www.opindia.com/2020/07/unsc-sa ... terrorists

[AdityaVM]

Part 2 of the Post on the thought process behind recent Chinese, behaviour and what can we gleam from the same.

It is my opinion that before we analyse the thought process of the Chinese in the recent incident, we need to first understand what is their “default” mentality. What are the primary motivations that guide Chinese behaviour and how can we understand the same, keeping Chinese history in mind?

Now, more important than analysing Chinese motivations and behaviour, it is important for us to understand what the Chinese DO NOT understand about us.

Because what I have observed here, (and I am guilty of the same as well) is that we assume by “default” that the Chinese understand us, our motivations, our fears, our aspirations and attitude. It is my belief that this is not the case, and the actions the Chinese have taken bears ample testimony to that fact.( I request all the gurus to feel free to pick apart my argument if there are any inconsistencies and things you don’t agree with. The aim here is to start a proactive discussion, allowing us to take advantage of the current Chinese psychological frailties and weakness. This is my aim here and Ego has no place in it. )

I will divide my presentation into Two parts. First part deals with how can we understand Chinese motivations and behaviours regarding us. Second will deal with the things Chinese (individually, as a society and at state level) do not understand about us.
So, allow me to get on with the first part.

I have always believed that the best way to understand a country is to look at how they view their history. Where do they draw the line from the part of their history that is modern ( i.e directly affecting the present state they see) and Ancient. In the Chinese case the modern Chinese history taught to the Chinese begins with the Opium wars. But before we begin with our analysis of the same, we need to understand a historical Chinese pattern that has been repeating cyclically without fail for thousands of years.
Going back to ancient times, Chinese history has had a cycle of events, where periodically, the “Lebensraum” of the Chinese ( Han) shrinks and expands.

Strong Empire- Expanded borders and conquering new territories Expanded military operations causes Imperial Overstretch Rebellions Loss of Centralised Power External enemies attack together - China defeated, Lebensraum shrinks, Chaotic times causes the rise of warlords and local states which fight for dominance From which the Winner establishes himself Strong Empire.
And the Cycle repeats. (This is a very simplistic assessment of the historical perspective, so please excuse)


This cyclical way of things has caused the basic nature of the Chinese state to be a one which expects subservience from its immediate neighbours. Because, your neighbours are not just your neighbours, they are also your primary threat and to neutralise them required you to “show them their place” and “teach them a lesson”. Requiring periodical raids and conquests to subjugate the “Barbarians”.

The way of the Chinese state when looking at war is to look at it in terms of “What price do I have to pay if I have to do this? “and so on. So, the reason the Chinese occupy Spratly and other Sundry Islands in the Champa sea, is because in their calculation, the price they pay for these transgressions is largely overshadowed by the benefit they get. Same principle applies to the LAC.

The Chinese were not following the “no guns” RoE because they have signed an agreement with us. The worth of that Agreement is not worth even toilet paper in a Public restroom. They follow that rule because in the event of escalation with guns, they will have to pay an “unacceptable price” for their misadventure and Salami Slicing.

But here is the more important point. The “unacceptable price “does not remain constant. It varies depending on the expectations from the Centralised authority, and most importantly if they are trying to “stave off” something even more calamitous. Because if they think that there is a situation that is so dangerous, that if they do not avoid that calamity, then the price they have to pay to preserve themselves is more than the “unacceptable price” they have to pay in a misadventure that can stave off that calamity, then what was “unacceptable” before becomes a “something they can live with”.
This distinction is important for us to understand Cheen behaviour in a given situation. The measuring stick should always be “What has changed that made the Chinese Accept a higher amount of “acceptable price” ?

So, in order to make an analysis of the nature of the State-to-State relationship between India and China, we must understand what is the approach of the two countries towards state relations. What is the expectation and the “default” nature of the relationship from their point of view?

India: Equality. The basic nature of the modern Indian state is to deal with any country with a level of equality and expecting the same in return. This can be seen in how India settled its maritime dispute with Bangladesh by accepting UNCLOS judgement that substantially favoured Bangladesh despite being larger and more powerful than it.

China: China’s default expectation in the state relations is “SUBSERVIANCE” The world is a hierarchy with the Middle Kingdom at the top. The only expectations from other states of the world is vassalage and be graced with Chinese magnanimity in return.

Pertaining to the relationship between the two countries, we must understand that the Chinese impressions of India were formed not by the works of Huan Tsang or any other Buddhist pilgrims, but by the Indian troops who were employed by the British in China.
The Sikhs, Dogras, and Madras Sappers along with the others in BIA, actually took part in the opium wars. IIRC the Dogra regimental centre still has an inverted flag of Imperial China from the Second Opium war.

Now, the Opium wars are the beginning of what the CCP terms as its “Century of humiliation” forcing China to sign “Unequal treaties”. A real oxymoron, that is because if you look at the objectives of the Western forces during the opium wars, one of the main objectives was to establish a permanent presence in Beijing. This was resisted by the Qing empire till the end, since it implied “Equality” between the European powers and the Chinese empire.

What we can gleam from this is that, all the treaties that the Chinese ever sign are ”Unequal Treaties” in favour of China which are called as a “natural and harmonious relationship” but the reverse is “Unequal treaties forced upon China when we were weak”, that they see no reason to follow when they see themselves as strong enough to break them.

The only treaties the Chinese complain about being Unequal are the ones NOT in their favour. Any in their favour is “natural and stable”, “Sustainable”, “in friendly spirit”. Now, do people get why these words keep propping up in PRC MoFA press conferences so much, especially when defending Han perfidity?

The Treaty of Peking in 1860 ( Ratified by Prince Gong, since the Xianfeng Emperor actually fled from Beijing.) which the victors forced China to sign, was particularly galling and embarrassing to the Chinese, since the Anglo-French troops were outnumbered by them in a ratio of 10 to 1 and still the Chinese lost. This is one of the events that shaped Modern Chinese thinking, and one of the pivotal moments to understand the worldview of the CCP.

The foreign policemen employed by the British to police the Chinese were Sikh policemen (RaviB garu has elaborated on this) , who in fact used to apprehend multiple Chinese men by tying up their hair braids together and leading them to jail in a procession.

Indian troops took part in the burning of the “Summer Palace” in the Forbidden City, an event so traumatic that it still rankles modern day Chinese. There are photographs available of Indian Cavalry riding into the Summer Palace. In fact, without the Indian troops it would have been very difficult for the Brits to come up with enough numbers to subjugate the Chinese army.

So, what we can get from this is that the Primary experience of Chinese with Indians in living memory is not as Buddhist monks and scholars but as soldiers who conquered them, under the British. (Hence, their paranoia about India teaming up with US and Japan)
During 20th Century Chinese history, by the End of WW2, when China was still in the midst of a countrywide Civil war, with the entire country’s administrative and economic systems in shambles, India had the largest and most battle hardened force in all of Asia and its administrative, judicial and economic framework was robust and stable. If India had the ambition, it could grow into a powerful economy and it could replicate to a small extent what the British accomplished militarily using Indian troops. India had the capability to directly affect China negatively, especially in Tibet.
This was a thoroughly unnerving prospect to the CCP, to have such a powerful state right next to it who could become a very dangerous threat that China would not be able to defend against, at least not without substantial cost. Hence, Mao’s initial friendly attitude and overtures along with Panchsheel nonsense. They wanted to get a feel of the Indian leadership, and estimate their capacity for Ambition and decisive action. We know what they thought of Nehru, so I won’t go there and depress people about lost oppurtunities.
Suffice to say that the CCP has got the measure of the Indian leadership of that time and had seen fit to impose a war not only to “Teach India a lesson” but also to buy a time of Peace for 20-30 years to consolidate their own country. And since 1967, they have been appreciative of India’s capacity to militarily dominate their borders. (At least till Deng Xiaoping)

Now, coming to the recent Galwan valley incident, it is important to remember that while the Chinese use the “Price “aspect to calculate whether a plan of action is feasible or not, some actions which under normal circumstances would be too “costly” become acceptable under specific circumstances as I have mentioned before.

The rise of Xi Jinping and his appointment of himself as “Chairman for life” has had a number of unintended side effects, especially the rise of “Yes men” in his coterie, who do not have the courage to inform him about unfavourable circumstances and force imbalances. They in turn, dump this onto their subordinates and expect them to do whatever the GEISHA Xi asked them to do, damn the reality of the circumstances.
The Expectations from the Chinese side during the clash was, they would take the IA by surprise, kill a few men, and retreat before the Counterattack into their side of the “LAC”. By doing this, they would have calculated that they can tolerate the “Cost” of this adventure so long as it was limited to India huffing and puffing diplomatically, Grinding its teeth in rage at its inability to impose costs on China ( Which would require crossing the LAC) finally forcing us to concede the encroached no mans land.

What they did not count on, was the Ferocious response of 16 Bihar, coupled with their willingness to cross into Chinese controlled territory to butcher them. That has completely thrown their entire Cost Benefit analysis of this entire operation into disarray. They were not counting on taking casualties, especially when they outnumbered us and had higher ground.
And they were especially not counting on the Casualties being so many.

Thus, they resorted to what the Chinese do when things do not go their way. They threaten and warn about “Consequences” and “Miscalculations”

So, what made the Chinese escalate so much on the LAC, even risking a small-scale war? What actually happened that suddenly made a previously “unacceptable price” of tangling with India “a price they can live with”?

Its because there is a silent storm brewing both inside and outside China.

Outside, the world has got a taste of what happens when the Chinese control the manufacturing of essential commodities, medicines and medical equipment. They will bully you by threatening the lives of your innocent citizens, for financial gain and advantage. (Who were put at risk because of a Bio weapon the Chinese intentionally released into the world.)
There is a silent movement of boycott of Chinese products and bringing back manufacturing from China. Countries are openly calling for investigations into the source of the Wuhan virus and how it spread around the world. There are calls for China to pay reparations to the world and the People who lost their lives because of the Chinese virus.

There is slowly but surely a backlash building against China. A silent gathering storm, that can rock the foundations of the wealth and power of the CCP. Because China’s economic growth has come mainly from export-oriented industries, any move to block, sanction, substitute or curtail these exports coming from China will have a disproportionate cascading effect on the Chinese economy and employment figures.

Already there are major protests against CCP because of large scale unemployment and growing food inflation. What most people do not know is that China is a net food importer. They do not grow enough food to feed their own population. They import food. (this is not the case with India, we are a net food exporter. Our problems of food security come from distribution side constraints. Anyway OT for this topic.) Any lack of consistent double digit or high single digit % economic growth, or sanctions will mean, there will be a problem for China in importing food. They will have to burn Forex to import food items to supply their population. Which is only a temporary fix anyway.

What I am getting at here, is that unlike India, which has a large internal market and is food self-sufficient, China is not. It has a small internal market for its size not sufficient to keep its industries afloat.

Which means lack of economic growth and any actions from the outside world on China in revenge for unleashing Wuhan virus, will result in direct financial pain to the “man on the ground” by rising food prices and lack of jobs. Already people in China complain of rising meat prices because of large scale culling of their pig population due to African swine flu. An increased inflation in other basic food items will mean increased unrest in China.
Because the CCP will have failed in two basic things to provide to the people. Food and Employment. No amount of propaganda can fill an empty stomach.
So, in this situation, the external storm will create the perfect conditions for an internal storm in China.
Remember, by appointing himself as Chairman for life GEISHA Xi has made a lot of enemies. These enemies are looking for an opportunity to bring him down and this will be a perfect situation for them to enact a “Purge” like the “Gang of Four” were purged in the 1970s.
If the external storm I mentioned comes to pass, the internal storm WILL always follow. Because, it’s the last opportunity for a generation of Chinese leader “hopefuls” and their backers to claw back their own space before they too are purged for “Corruption”.
GEISHA Xi and his internal coterie know this. They are probably already monitoring diplomatic channels and are getting strong indications of the actions to follow. So, if the external storm comes, then the only way for GEISHA to weather it is to pre-empt the internal storm with a distraction.
Hence, the constant stream of Chinese needling everyone and picking fights with everyone. It’s to create so much noise in the system that, any situation can be escalated with a prepared scenario of China “teaching a lesson “ to those who have wronged her under the revolutionary leadership of GEISHA Xi.
Hope this was useful and will start a conversation that will allow us to understand The present situation better.

[Philip]

Former NSA and veteran diplomat Shivshankar Menon interviewed by the Hindu.
Summarised xcpts.

Indo-China relations to be reset. after Ladakh spat.Meaning downwards. No biz as usual after China's perfidy . This marks a watershed in relations between the two states.

We must not fondly imagine that buffer zones and " disengagement" are ok, cheered on by jingoistic TV channels imagining that we've achieved a famous victory, as they imply that we too did something wrong. China MUST return to the LAC status quo ante. This is a typical Chink trick of "taking two steps forward and only one step backwards." If they don't return,it means they've achieved their objective using the same tactic as island / atoll annexing in the ICS,by shifting the LAC in their favour.

China after Doklam,where it withdrew but immediately set up on the plateau a huge mil. garrison,helipads,etc., not there before,saw India at a current tactical disadvantage.
China realised after Doklam that "as long as India declared a propaganda victory for home consumption,it could retain territory that it had encroached upon. " Therefore,all the news of disengagement, buffer zones,etc. only benefits China, if we fondly imagine it is retreating. As at Doklam,it has setup major military infrastructure in Ladakh to support 3 divisions much earlier than the latest spat,plus it has also opened potential flash points at other locations in HP and Sikkim.

Thanks to China,relations with Russia will further improve, Russia being our main supplier of weaponry. Relations with the US will too.

On the usefulness of the Quad ,he says it is effective only in the maritime domain as our current problem is " continental". However it is v.surprising for such an experienced hand that he has forgotten how key naval battles affected the course of history on land for centuries.Is ambassador Menon displaying the traditional " landlubber" mentality of the ranks of Indian strategists who cost us our sovereignty when the European naval fleets arrived on our shores some 500+ years ago? Thanks to the RN,the British set up an empire upon which the " sun never set."

From ancient times examples such as the Romans against the Carthaginians in the Punic wars,despite Hannibal crossing the Alps.
The Battle of Salamis where Themistocles defeated Xerxes and the Persians securing Europe from Persia. The Battle of Lepanto where the Venetians defeated the Ottoman Turks saving Europe from the Muuslims.Trafalgar and the Battle of the Nile that put paid to Napoleon's dream of extra-Europeam imperial conquests and saw him defeated at Waterloo. WW2 and the battle of the Atlantic which saved beleagured Britain and Russia from German subs sinking Allied shipping.

In our own independent era, the historic war of '71 where on both seaboards, IIN operations on both halves of Pak where naval attacks plus a naval blockades prevented resupply by sea of war material to both halves,and escape of the Paki army in the east ,bringing into creation Bangladesh and capture of 95,000 Paki prisoners,the largest surrender since WW2!

Adm. Thayer Mahan famously wrote that "the Indian ocean was the key to the seven seas and that the future destiny of the world depended upon control over it." Therefore,even if all that the Quad does is intel networking, it can prove decisive against China in the IOR,ICS and Pacific just as intel codebreaking in WW2 of both the German and Japanese codes determined the success of the war at sea in both theatres.

On the future, 3 options.First as in the aftermath of Sumdurong Chu,RG's visit to Beijing,agreements which kept the peacd for several years.Second, as in '62 a downward spiral in relations and pushed by strong public pressure conflict with China at some future date,to him the worst option. Third, a " no war, no peace" situ and adversarial relations for an undetermined period.
His take,we will for the time being " muddle through",but it runs the risk of things getting worse.

My take,option 2, a downward spiral and at some point in the future another clash or even larger conflict with a Sino- Pak JV. I don't think the GOI either is being fooled by the Chink mild mouthings as of now,given the urgent military measures being taken with alacrity including the green light for ramping up the ANC infrastructure,lengthening of air base runways,etc.
There is an important titbit from history about Mao being v.angry withthe Pakis for not attacking India in '62 and grabbing Kashmir.According to some,there was intense pressure upon Pak not to do so by the US/UK saying that after the war they would bring India around for a settlement. Today, should another war break out as it did in '62, you cam bd sure that Pak will join the party, like Mussolini and Italy,a jackal waiting to pick up titbits thrown to it by its master!

I think we should take a poll as we did many years ago on certain issues,which way the latest Indo-China crrisis will develop into,based upon Menon's 3 options.Perhaps other options could be added. Mods, work for you!

[Manish_Sharma]

Ok. You know best...

You are so cunning, never writing any informative post but putting question after question post after post, as if you have some great knowledge but can't deign to post that here ....

[nandakumar]

AdityaVM
That was an extensive tour de force of China's recent actions. I have no expertise in this area. So I will refrain from commenting on the specifics. But I just want to record my appreciation of your taking the trouble to pen your thoughts for the benefit of members on this forum.

[williams]

Philip, it is hard to take Shivshankar Menon seriously. I mean its is hard to fathom how this guy could manage the famous Sharm El Sheikh debacle where he managed to come up with an equal-equal agreement with the Pakis. Here is an agreement draft of that time.

(1) 'Terrorism is the main threat to both countries; sharing real-time, credible and actionable information on any future terrorist threats';

(2) 'Action on terrorism should not be linked to the composite dialogue process and these should not be bracketed';

(3) 'Pakistan has some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas'.

http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/j ... on/492721/

I am sorry to say this kind of over-analyzing theoretical Babus are the key reasons why we have been such a passive power so far. These guys advise our Netas with an amount of self-doubt on our hard power options and Netas immediately sign up for the path of least resistance. That is how we end up with 5000 km range Agni and 40kt thermonuclear bombs and endless talk about past maritime histories. We need someone with a bolder vision to deal with the Chins. I believe the Modi-Shah-Doval-Jaishankar team has a better vision. Unfortunately, they are not going to talk to the media and Chindu is never going to interview them. While I like the idea of polling for strategic options in BR, IMHO we should base that on ideas from someone else.

[Sanju]

AdityaVM
That was an extensive tour de force of China's recent actions. I have no expertise in this area. So I will refrain from commenting on the specifics. But I just want to record my appreciation of your taking the trouble to pen your thoughts for the benefit of members on this forum.

+1

[yensoy]

I have marked all the Chinese roads in Demchok area--->


The thick yellow line is the actual on the ground control line, which is mostly Indus river...
The blue/Cyan lines are Chinese roads... Thick blue line is G219 Highway...
Green lines are India roads (I haven't marked all roads... Only main roads)

Chinese control the North, East and South East parts...
Indians control the West, Central and South West parts...

Chinese control the heights on North side from Fukche to Demchok and on both sides of the road from Demchok to Ngari...

Good map overlay. I believe the red area is disputed.

The British in all their wisdom used watersheds and mountain crests to define boundaries, and we can see why. In this case, the boundary is the river - which is bad because (i) the river course is subject to change (ii) it brings both sides within shouting distance of each other and (iii) there is no defensive barrier - both banks of the river are easily targeted from heights.

[yensoy]

Former NSA and veteran diplomat Shivshankar Menon interviewed by the Hindu....
On the usefulness of the Quad ,he says it is effective only in the maritime domain as our current problem is " continental". However it is v.surprising for such an experienced hand that he has forgotten how key naval battles affected the course of history on land for centuries.Is ambassador Menon displaying the traditional " landlubber" mentality of the ranks of Indian strategists who cost us our sovereignty when the European naval fleets arrived on our shores some 500+ years ago? Thanks to the RN,the British set up an empire upon which the " sun never set."
...

As much as there is a land vs sea split thinking in India (I personally think because the civilization centered around Delhi/Punjab/UP plains were quite disconnected with the kingdoms of the seaboard and their histories, but that's a different story), Mr Menon does have a point.

Unless there is all-out war, the naval blockade or attack will not take place. We have escalation ladders which will restrict the fight to a localized border conflict. Different parts of the border for sure, but it will be along the Indo-Tibet/Xinjiang borders only. We absolutely need to have a credible naval attack component to deliver punishing losses on their coastal cities if they were to attack our commercial and political centers - however the probability of this eventuality is very slim.

Then there is the question of whether the Quad will actually deliver. Will they want to be pulled in over a territorial dispute over a region where "not a single blade of grass grows"? If the Chinese were to attack and threaten to take over a populated area like Tawang, that's a different story - but Quad will not support our definition of the LAC to reclaim access to Finger 8.

[LakshmanPST]

^^^ Yes, the entire red area boundary is claimed by both India and China... I previously thought that this entire area is under Indian control when I used to read news about Demchok being India's last village, until I read some post in this very thread few pages back...
It is only after I started marking the roads did I realise how much area is under Chinese control... Demchok is not even 1km away from on-the-ground LAC...
India needs to occupy the entire red area as and when possible because the road from Fukche to Demchok (which is around 40km) is totally exposed on North-East side... Demchok is also exposed to heights from South East side... Chinese control these heights and have extensive road network in the area...
While we can defend the area in case of Chinese attack coz. we control the heights on the other side, it will still give the Chinese an early advantage...
Also, in case we want to go on the offensive, it will be difficult for India to push an attack through this road without occupying those heights first...
-
I marked all the Chinese roads in Ladakh sector and the roads near Demchok are the most extensive... It might be because this area comes under Tibet and is nearer to some villages, while Aksai Chin comes under Xinjiang and is far from any permanent population...

[chola]

India: Equality. The basic nature of the modern Indian state is to deal with any country with a level of equality and expecting the same in return. This can be seen in how India settled its maritime dispute with Bangladesh by accepting UNCLOS judgement that substantially favoured Bangladesh despite being larger and more powerful than it.

China: China’s default expectation in the state relations is “SUBSERVIANCE” The world is a hierarchy with the Middle Kingdom at the top. The only expectations from other states of the world is vassalage and be graced with Chinese magnanimity in return.

Saar, those two alone make the analysis the same old one as we alway fall back on. Nothing new here. This is the f-ing stereotypes of the Gandhian Bharat and "Imperial" Dragon that had gotten us nowhere.

First of all, let's be honest here. We know in our heart we do not expect to be treated as equals by goras and will suffer that treatment for faint praise but we definitely won't suffer the same from pakis and chinis. Thank god for the latter part of that statement. As long as the Anglos were on top we were happy with the Hindu rate of growth but when the chinis started climbing the ladder we started racing. So it is a good thing that we see the chinis as a challenge. But do we treat them the same as the goras no and there is no reason we should. But it is what it is and we should take that into consideration instead of ignoring it.

Secondly, the whole "Imperial" Middle Kingdom sh1t is lazy analysis giving the chinis something akind to the Romans which instantly brings up a military power that demands subserviance from conquered peoples. No, Cheen is not a military power. It hadn't fought in 40 years because it can't fight and its leadership and people know it.

I've heard people explain The Thucydides Trap between the US and China as being similar to that between Rome and Carthage. Well, Cheen is NOT imperial like Rome but a nation of shopkeepers and peddlers like Carthage. In a war with the descendants of Rome, Cheen would be crushed easily. But what Cheen has that Carthage did not have is a massive industrial complex that can stave off war by making war seemingly costly for the enemy.

Sorry, your analysis will keep us in the same situation we have now. We sit and wait for an attack from an "imperial" power. Well, they hadn't fought a war in decades so we are waiting for what? For them to build up and create fait accompli like the SCS?

Accept that we are not as Gandhian as the goddam stereotypes, the chinis are not as imperial as we think they are and just fight. We might be surprised at the results of the kinetics (I won't be surprised personally) and how well the chinis might negotiate if we reverse 1962.

[Guddu]

Sorry, Prasad. Can't be discussing reasons etc.

Just trying to understand the forum rules thats all... esp if the warning was for anything in the posts openly readable on the forum.

I've been here for nearly 13 years, but sometimes the rules are still confusing.

Sir, one of the rules relates to perceived trolling.

[Karan M]

So, official brochure of LCA gives One way Range of aircraft armed with weapons rather than combat range? So IAF will fly LCA with bombs & never come back or just bomb on their own airfield? In any case, one way range of LCA with drop tanks is 3000km+.

Fast flying low level jets cannot be hit by Mapads except in your imagination.

Great find. The Tejas combat radius is ~ 700-800km assuming 20-30% for emergency fuel, loiter etc. And the oft quoted 500km combat radius then includes a fair amount of loiter, combat at range, and then return.

What the heck is wrong with the IAF that they aren't ordering more of this aircraft - it's fairly substantial against the PAF and will free up substantial number of Flankers and Rafales vs the PLAAF.

[dinesh_kimar]

Former NSA and veteran diplomat Shivshankar Menon interviewed by the Hindu.

Saar, there are few things you must understand.

Under Menon's watch, Chinese salami slicing, Siachen gifting and forgiving 26/11 all took place. (Compassion From the land of Gandhi and Buddha, give Gifts and Forgive , see.)

He was one of the people responsible for various "Gentleman's Agreements" with Pakistan, where small arms ammunition, 155 mm heavy caliber weapons, Denel AMR rounds, etc. would not be used on LOC.

Mani Shankar Aiyar (another stalwart in this business) would go to military camps and warn army personnel with consequences if they fired at pakis. If the pakis were firing, our boys were supposed to "duck".

The Pakis used to laugh and taunt us on the border, saying "Aapka firing ka permission Delhi sey aati hain."

My personal CT is that Gen. Sayeed Ata Hussain used worn out L70 AA guns to fire back because these were not covered under Menon's Agreements.

Hence no Governor / Ambassadorship for Gen. Hussain.

I'm sure Menon was quite furious at his own countrymen for firing back at the Pakistani Army, after he had personally drafted , along with his distinguished Pakistani counterpart, "an all encompassing , comprehensive document to address outstanding issues."

What do these unwashed masses know?

Hadn't he had a distinguished career, with him superseding no less than 16 of his seniors to become Foreign Secretary ?

Wasnt he so good with grasping security issues that Sonia Gandhi herself blessed his appointment as the Natural - sorry National Security Advisor?

Take that, you evil yindoos!

[k prasad]

Just trying to understand the forum rules thats all... esp if the warning was for anything in the posts openly readable on the forum.

I've been here for nearly 13 years, but sometimes the rules are still confusing.

Sir, one of the rules relates to perceived trolling.

Hmmm.... I like Hanlon's razor in such situations.

[morem]

Former NSA and veteran diplomat Shivshankar Menon interviewed by the Hindu.

My personal CT is that Gen. Sayeed Ata Hussain used worn out L70 AA guns to fire back because these were not covered under Menon's Agreements.

Hence no Governor / Ambassadorship for Gen. Hussain.

!

Dinesh,
minor nitpick - it is General Hasnain

[Philip]

SM might've in his time appeared to have let the side down,let iit down with surrender- monkey advice, but remember who was PM? Snake-Oil Singh who was his master. He to me suffered from the same disease ,the "Gujral flu", nostalgia for the lost lands of the Punjab now in Paki hands. The Pakis have played us for years on the sentiments of the Indian diaspora ( now in positions of influence) who fled to India after Partition, for a deal in its favour so they could savour the experience of visiting their former homelands. That generation is passing quickly. Indians born after Partition have few if any such sentiments.

Coming back to his points,they're quite relevant. He is mostly warning us not to be taken for a ride across the negotiating table. Our options/ questions given in BRF itself are rather similar. It's v.clear that the Chinese are now beyond the pale to Indians. They have no honour and dealing with duplicitous faecal parasites like them is taboo.
A fig-leaf of compromise if any occurs,will be just that. A postponement of future strife. At this moment in time,our best hope is to keep them in check from further ingress,while boosting our war machine to the max possible,until we feel confident in taking military matters pro-actively,that must be substantial to hurt their various interests.

Why should we limit ourselves to battling China on its terms in the mountains? For the vermin that they are,we should take the battle to theatres where we hold the cards,the obvious theatre being the IOR. We require a much larger fleet of subs,especially SSNs/ SSGNs to be able to attack Chin ports and naval bases. The Chinese have an overwhelming number of surface combatants and subs too. Our conventional subs will not be able to loiter for long in the ICS as they have only a 45 day patrol time, unlike a 90 day patrol by a nuclear boat. We don't have any logistic agreements too with any ASEAN state for sub logistics which would be required for such ops,like the Ru agreement using Tartus on lease for its navy giving it a solid foothold in the Meditt.
It is in the IOR that we have the advantage. Peninsula India jutting into the IOR at its centre like a dagger , gives it a unique ability to use naval and IAF assets to dominate it. The various chokepoints to and from Asia from the Malacca and Indonesian straits to the Gulf,Red Sea and the S.African cape, are well within the reach of the IN.We can bring far greater forces to bear against the Sino- Pak naval JV in the IOR for the moment. After a few years fromnow say around 2025, the situation may change considerably unless we continue to increase our naval strength hugely.

[titash]

AdityaVM
That was an extensive tour de force of China's recent actions. I have no expertise in this area. So I will refrain from commenting on the specifics. But I just want to record my appreciation of your taking the trouble to pen your thoughts for the benefit of members on this forum.

+1

+2

Excellent piece - very well thought out, and very well explained.

[Rishirishi]

Chinese motivation for border activity.

It is not only affecting India but almost all countries, Russia, Japan, Taiwan, Philippins, Vietnam and even Bhutan.

Could it have something to do with internal Chinese politics. Perhaps a turf-war or a distraction away from Covid-19? I do not think the reason will be some deep historical ideological thinking. The reason will more likely be a very practical reaction of some issues.
The question I am asking is, what did the Chinese want to gain from all the violations?

[williams]

We don't have any logistic agreements too with any ASEAN state for sub logistics which would be required for such ops,like the Ru agreement using Tartus on lease for its navy giving it a solid foothold in the Meditt.

I think we have a logistics agreement with Singapore, Australia, the US, Russia, France, South Korea, UK, and Japan. In theory, we can refuel in all the US bases in the region. I am not sure about subs though. Here is a map of the bases where our ships can refuel. Credit: https://idsa.in/idsacomments/military-l ... mas-261119



According to the below article, USN ships can replenish IN ships;

https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/us-merc ... china-sea/

[KLNMurthy]

1. I am neither endorsing China nor disparaging/questioning IA capabilities.
2. My wording is "to an extent" ... meaning not as actively as Pakistan and ISI
3. Are we ready, probably is a way to enlist the infrastructure we have in place to deal with NE insurgencies. We see new on a daily basis of the anti terror infra in Kashmir. My question was do we have the same level of sophistication in the NE. IMO the NE insurgensies are nowhere as active as the Kashmir insurgencies and hence currently have not needed such a response. How would we go about putting such an infra structure in place. Would new paramilitary be needed etc (like we sorely miss the Mountain strike corp)

If provoking thought deserves a ban please fire away.

If you write some snooty one-liner in the tone of a know-it-all uncle-type in a forum like BRF, can it be called "provoking thought?" I respectfully suggest you don't give yourself airs here.

As others have patiently pointed out, the amount of Chinese hostility in the North East as well as India's experience in dealing with it is vast. And, India's response to China can by no means be characterized as being rash or thoughtless of its own priorities and capabilities. The Modi administration has held the line admirably in the face of enormous ill-motivated pressure by naive as well as subversive forces.

If, inspite of these well-known facts, you have something to indicate that your FUD that India is going to do something to "provoke" the Chinese, and the Chinese are going to do "something" in the Northeast, and we won't be prepared for it, then the onus is on you to spell out your reasoning, and bolster it with facts that are not widely known in this forum.

Let me help you out, to make up for my curt response earlier. Answer the following questions:

Does China need actually need any "provocation" any more than the Wolf in Aesop needed provocation to eat the lamb?

After Nehru's disastrous "forward policy" has there been any instance of India overreaching in its management of China?

After 1962, has Indian military failed to handle any external threat, bringing it to an acceptable conclusion? The military has a long-stated doctrine that they want the best of men and materiel, but when it comes to the crunch, they will go to war with what they have, and achieve their objectives. Have they given any reason to doubt this?

[KLNMurthy]

AdityaVM
That was an extensive tour de force of China's recent actions. I have no expertise in this area. So I will refrain from commenting on the specifics. But I just want to record my appreciation of your taking the trouble to pen your thoughts for the benefit of members on this forum.

+11

[ks_sachin]

Ok. You know best...

You are so cunning, never writing any informative post but putting question after question post after post, as if you have some great knowledge but can't deign to post that here ....

On available evidence yes I know more than some. See basic knowledge of logistics, operations, terrain is expected before all the khayali pulao that is made.

[KLNMurthy]

India: Equality. The basic nature of the modern Indian state is to deal with any country with a level of equality and expecting the same in return. This can be seen in how India settled its maritime dispute with Bangladesh by accepting UNCLOS judgement that substantially favoured Bangladesh despite being larger and more powerful than it.

China: China’s default expectation in the state relations is “SUBSERVIANCE” The world is a hierarchy with the Middle Kingdom at the top. The only expectations from other states of the world is vassalage and be graced with Chinese magnanimity in return.

Saar, those two alone make the analysis the same old one as we alway fall back on. Nothing new here. This is the f-ing stereotypes of the Gandhian Bharat and "Imperial" Dragon that had gotten us nowhere.

First of all, let's be honest here. We know in our heart we do not expect to be treated as equals by goras and will suffer that treatment for faint praise but we definitely won't suffer the same from pakis and chinis. Thank god for the latter part of that statement. As long as the Anglos were on top we were happy with the Hindu rate of growth but when the chinis started climbing the ladder we started racing. So it is a good thing that we see the chinis as a challenge. But do we treat them the same as the goras no and there is no reason we should. But it is what it is and we should take that into consideration instead of ignoring it.

I am having some trouble following, but you seem to be saying that modern India has different levels of "equality", for white countries vs Chinese, therefore it is wrong to say that India deals with countries on the basis of equality.

I would say that India is invariably respectful of international treaties and judgments, and it is on that basis that we accepted the border settlement with BD. In our immediate neighborhood, we have, from time to time, acted in a way that may be perceived as hegemonic or high-handed, e.g., Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives etc. But I would argue that it doesn't break the principle of equality, just a recognition of a large power having the obligation to maintain some order in its neighborhood. In all the above cases, we have handled the other country with respect and kid gloves, compared with what the other major powers around the world do.

Secondly, the whole "Imperial" Middle Kingdom sh1t is lazy analysis giving the chinis something akind to the Romans which instantly brings up a military power that demands subserviance from conquered peoples. No, Cheen is not a military power. It hadn't fought in 40 years because it can't fight and its leadership and people know it.

I've heard people explain The Thucydides Trap between the US and China as being similar to that between Rome and Carthage. Well, Cheen is NOT imperial like Rome but a nation of shopkeepers and peddlers like Carthage. In a war with the descendants of Rome, Cheen would be crushed easily. But what Cheen has that Carthage did not have is a massive industrial complex that can stave off war by making war seemingly costly for the enemy.

Sorry, your analysis will keep us in the same situation we have now. We sit and wait for an attack from an "imperial" power. Well, they hadn't fought a war in decades so we are waiting for what? For them to build up and create fait accompli like the SCS?

Accept that we are not as Gandhian as the goddam stereotypes, the chinis are not as imperial as we think they are and just fight. We might be surprised at the results of the kinetics (I won't be surprised personally) and how well the chinis might negotiate if we reverse 1962.

Now this part I am really confused by. The OP only gave his insights into the Chinese mentality. Where do you get that he was recommending that we accept China as the all-powerful Middle Kingdom which should not get a pushback?

Of course India as well as China are going to depart from their ideal vision, we live in the real world after all. But that doesn't mean it isn't valuable to think about what those ideal visions might be.

Don't really understand your ire and abuse here.

[KLNMurthy]

My personal CT is that Gen. Sayeed Ata Hussain used worn out L70 AA guns to fire back because these were not covered under Menon's Agreements.

Hence no Governor / Ambassadorship for Gen. Hussain.

!

I am thinking there may be an NSA-ship for Gen. Hasnain in future, if & when Doval ages out. He is more than qualified in my view.

[ks_sachin]

So, official brochure of LCA gives One way Range of aircraft armed with weapons rather than combat range? So IAF will fly LCA with bombs & never come back or just bomb on their own airfield? In any case, one way range of LCA with drop tanks is 3000km+.

Fast flying low level jets cannot be hit by Mapads except in your imagination.

Great find. The Tejas combat radius is ~ 700-800km assuming 20-30% for emergency fuel, loiter etc. And the oft quoted 500km combat radius then includes a fair amount of loiter, combat at range, and then return.

What the heck is wrong with the IAF that they aren't ordering more of this aircraft - it's fairly substantial against the PAF and will free up substantial number of Flankers and Rafales vs the PLAAF.

Karan that range figure is not disputed and well known. IR has also alluded to it. I was just wanting to see if our worthy poster knew what he was talking about.
With a combat radius of say 700km I would not be launching them from ND to interdict G219. We have better platforms for that role no?
Also Manpads...the Chinese know the valleys as well as us. Usinga Jag or Hawk to fly low exposes them to VSHORADs or Manpads yes more than a higher flying SU or Rafael?

[RaviB]

Part 2 of the Post on the thought process behind recent Chinese, behaviour and what can we gleam from the same.

Thank you for taking the time to write this. This would perhaps fit better on the understanding China thread

You'll see that some of these themes have been discussed earlier.

I'll take exception to a few things:

1. Lebensraum (living space) is a concept better suited for Europe, for which Ratzel developed it. In China there is no uniformly densely populated space, Xinjiang and Tibet have not been seen as places to be settled, until recently. Lebensraum comes from the idea of the "state as an organism" (Ratzel was a failed biologist). As the state consumes its resources, it grows and needs to expand to get access to more resources. This is emphatically not the case for China. Regardless of the available space, most of it is not densely populated, with most people compresses into about 1/3rd of the country, due to economic reasons. The logic for annexing Tibet has nothing to do with Lebensraum.

2. Cyclic history of China is something old school western historians used to do, it's somehow become passé in academia and become a trope of popular history. The cyclic history idea was a product of westerners incomprehension and thinking of China as something exotic. Western history was a narrative of progress, things keep getting better. How to explain China which was rich and had become poor? Not opium, not looting, let's take cycles of history. The communist party in its own history making uses a Marxist idea of history. It has different stages like feudalism, capitalism, socialism (with Chinese characteristics). But there's something very distinct about PRC, the cultural revolution marks a complete break in traditional thought. Chinese killed all the people who actually knew anything about Chinese culture, destroyed their own museums and basically ended up with a kind of cultural amnesia.

The rest I broadly agree with, I had made similar points earlier.

[sudarshan]

Part 2 of the Post on the thought process behind recent Chinese, behaviour and what can we gleam from the same.

Thank you for taking the time to write this. This would perhaps fit better on the understanding China thread

I copied that post on Neutering/ Defanging thread and there was some fledgling discussion going on, but it was getting OT there. Please feel free to copy on the Understanding thread also and carry on with the discussion there. You'll have spectators, don't worry.

[kirpalbasra]

Part 2 of the Post on the thought process behind recent Chinese, behaviour and what can we gleam from the same.

But there's something very distinct about PRC, the cultural revolution marks a complete break in traditional thought. Chinese killed all the people who actually knew anything about Chinese culture, destroyed their own museums and basically ended up with a kind of cultural amne

** Deleted **

[Philip]

Logistics agreements aren't comparable to base facilities,where ship/sub lrepairs are possible, munitions can be stockpiled,facilities for crews,etc. ,or use of such facilities of the host nation's base.For example,Vietnam operates 6 Kilo subs.Ideally the IN should be able to use the VN's sub support facilities for its own Kilos operating in thecICS. What Pak has done at Gwadar,handing over to it the entire port for its pleasur,allows China to set up a full-fledged base for the PLAN enabling it to operate at will in the Arabian Sea. While Hambantota Port has been leased for 99 years,the Lankans claim all security of the port is theirs.The huge hinterland adjoining the port also handed out to China enables China to set up military supporting industries and facilities for the PLAN.

What the lines on the map tell us is that the simple trick of China claiming Galwan,Ar.Pr.,bits of Bhutan,Sikkim,Aksai Chin,etc. expanding its paper claims at will,is to cast doubt in the minds of the international community as to where the actual boundary lies.We asininely simply contest the claim defensively instead of extending our claim outwards into Chinese held Tibet .When Chin claimed Ar.Pradesh as S.Tibet,we should've claimed the whole of Tibet as Buddhist India,Northern Ar.P. whatever! This moving the LAC at will on a map by China is a trick that we've time and again been on thd backfoot.After the Galwan clash,we should've shown our territory as the whole of Aksai Chin and Ladakh,telling the Chinks to bugger off to Beijing. Practically speaking it sounds crazy only because we have not invested enough into our military against China to carry out the threat of forcible eviction.

Here are some hard truths.We are into the second term of the NDA-2. The defence budget has been steadily going downhill as a GDP %. Secondly, our MEA mandarins have behaved exactly like they did during the UPA era. Even Doklam wasn't a good enough wake- up call for them. What did they advise? Stroke XI's backside,flatter him,feast him,fawn over him and so we did at Sabarmati and Mahabalipuram. The Chinks must've split their sides with laughter at our efforts. Do we remember how XI received his equivalent foreign heads at Beijing a few years ago celebrating some great anniversary? He made all of them walk hundreds of metres on a red carpet from the porch to building to meet him,including a very fit Putin, NOT wait at the porch as others do! That was how Chin emperors received their visitors as inferiors during their imperial days. So we attempted to flatter him only for him to stab the PM in the back at Galwan as Mao did to Nehtu. We have to thank thde intrepid soldiers of the Bihar regiment for saving India's honour not our spineless MEA.

The knee-jerk purchases of Ru fighters,missiles,ammo,spares,etc.,
from other states as well, should've taken place immediately after Doklam. But what happened? Modiji was wooed at Wuhan and was told by our mandarins that "all is well" with China,falling for the trap. China's repeated refusal to support our UNSC status,NSG membership and continuous support for Paki terror was not challenged by our MEA with countermoves.The MEA,led by the likes of Jaishankar who amazingly served as our ambassador in Beijing and in Washington, read the tea leaves wrong and simply put faith in Uncle Sam and his cavalry to come to India's rescue. An irrational, unreliable Trump has put paid to that theory and expectation.

Expecting the Quad to jump into an Indo- Chinese spat is also the height of self-deception.We would be very well off if naval intel on the PLAN's movements alone was shared with the IN. By beefing up the IN in haste,equipping it with force multipliers like Backfires, LRCMs like Kalibir, extra subs ,etc.,we can aim and shoot at the PLAN ourselves. What is the most bewildering policy has been to advocate to treat Paki perfidy with the sword but equivalent Chink chicanery thus faewith the sponge. Unless there is a radical shakeup in the MEA and posting men of steel in it,we could end up losing to China across the diplomatic table what our gallant soldiers have bought with their blood.

[ramana]

AdityaVM, Good second part. An anecdote. In 1986 I met a Taiwanese expatriate in Berkeley who was really from mainland China. He was in his late 60s then.

He was very animated describing the role of India 150 years back i.e. 1840s in opium wars. I told him it was English East India Company and its hired soldiers. And can't hold modern India responsible for those things. He was adamant and gave me a window into Chinese mind.
Lately am reading the works of Hu Shih, who writes on Indianization of Chinese culture. Eventhough he fled to Taiwan his work influenced Mao Tse Dung to launch the Cultural Revolution to Sinicise Chinese culture.

Chola,
Thucydides Trap is between Athens and Persians. But agree that China's image is exotic and Orientalised as sleeping dragon. And India has moved far from the gullibility days of Nehruji though folks like Shiv Shankar Menon still peddle the naivity as state policy.

I am going to copy these to the China after 19th Congress for it's the Xi Jinping China.

[ramana]

Philip, Trust me all is well. Its not the same MEA. Took time to reform.

[SidSoma]

Just trying to understand the forum rules thats all... esp if the warning was for anything in the posts openly readable on the forum.

I've been here for nearly 13 years, but sometimes the rules are still confusing.

Sir, one of the rules relates to perceived trolling.

Lets see how that looks like.

"China has never interfered in Indian NE. If you think IA can handle tit for tat China's covert action in NE, you are dreaming" That is perceived trolling.....

That was neither what I said nor what I meant.

[arshyam]

Why should we limit ourselves to battling China on its terms in the mountains? For the vermin that they are,we should take the battle to theatres where we hold the cards,the obvious theatre being the IOR. We require a much larger fleet of subs,especially SSNs/ SSGNs to be able to attack Chin ports and naval bases. The Chinese have an overwhelming number of surface combatants and subs too. Our conventional subs will not be able to loiter for long in the ICS as they have only a 45 day patrol time, unlike a 90 day patrol by a nuclear boat. We don't have any logistic agreements too with any ASEAN state for sub logistics which would be required for such ops,like the Ru agreement using Tartus on lease for its navy giving it a solid foothold in the Meditt.

Very fair points. While I agree with you that the Navy should be given more funding and greater assets, has the Navy actually asked for these? Of late, they have only focused on the IAC and the 57 imported fighters to the detriment of everything - at least, going by what's available in the public domain. Why have they not raised a hue and cry about P-75I taking its own time? Why would the GoI, with all its pulls and pressures from the other services, go ahead and fund these assets to the Navy when they themselves aren't asking for them?

Even if the Navy asks for these assets, and the GoI has the money available for them, do they have the manpower to make full use of it? Not to mention that it would be a decade by the time these assets are inducted and fully operational. What do we do till then? We have to make the most of the assets we have, and the logistics agreements are a step in that direction. And we haven't been sitting idle either - the operationalising of INS Baaz is another way to use our existing capabilities (INS India and Fortress Andaman, if you will) to project power in the IOR and keep an eye on Chinese activities.

It is in the IOR that we have the advantage. Peninsula India jutting into the IOR at its centre like a dagger , gives it a unique ability to use naval and IAF assets to dominate it. The various chokepoints to and from Asia from the Malacca and Indonesian straits to the Gulf,Red Sea and the S.African cape, are well within the reach of the IN.We can bring far greater forces to bear against the Sino- Pak naval JV in the IOR for the moment.

Exactly. AFS Thanjavur with the MKIs, INS Baaz and the INS Dweeparakshak are all part of this and we have been working towards that. I'd also go ahead and suggest the Navy should get some dedicated land-based fighter assets that can be launched from an upgraded INS Parundu for a pure strike role (the IAF may not agree, but they could do the same w.r.t. their airfield at Thiruvananthapuram). This would increase our reach deeper into the southern IOR and can maximize the potential of our peninsula jutting into the ocean. Even the Tejas/LCA-Navy would do well there, given its 700km combat range as posted on this thread earlier. It can also keep an eye on southern Sri Lanka and Maldives using MPA aircraft as and when needed and save the 700km one-way haul from INS Rajali.

After a few years fromnow say around 2025, the situation may change considerably unless we continue to increase our naval strength hugely.

Yes, but why is the Navy not looking at this and asking for these assets?

Logistics agreements aren't comparable to base facilities,where ship/sub lrepairs are possible, munitions can be stockpiled,facilities for crews,etc. ,or use of such facilities of the host nation's base.For example,Vietnam operates 6 Kilo subs.Ideally the IN should be able to use the VN's sub support facilities for its own Kilos operating in thecICS. What Pak has done at Gwadar,handing over to it the entire port for its pleasur,allows China to set up a full-fledged base for the PLAN enabling it to operate at will in the Arabian Sea. While Hambantota Port has been leased for 99 years,the Lankans claim all security of the port is theirs.The huge hinterland adjoining the port also handed out to China enables China to set up military supporting industries and facilities for the PLAN.

True, logistics agreements are not equivalent to bases. By that same token, wouldn't Hambantota be of little use to the PLAN? Wasn't the airport offered to us in a JV, using which we could keep an eye on things in the region and deny the hinterland to the Chinese?

Expecting the Quad to jump into an Indo- Chinese spat is also the height of self-deception.We would be very well off if naval intel on the PLAN's movements alone was shared with the IN.

Sir, to be fair, GoI has never claimed any such benefit from the quad. If anything, they are using this forum only to enable logistics agreements (the recent one signed with Aus being an example) and maybe intel sharing. It's only some breathless posters on BRF who seem to think the quad is a military alliance.

By beefing up the IN in haste,equipping it with force multipliers like Backfires, LRCMs like Kalibir, extra subs ,etc.,we can aim and shoot at the PLAN ourselves.

Same Q as earlier - why haven't they asked for these things?

[D.Mahesh]

Former NSA and veteran diplomat Shivshankar Menon interviewed by the Hindu.
Summarised xcpts.
.........

This man is a holdover from the now gone-forever universalist/internationalist thought-frame that hobbled our thinking for years. This permeated the IFS and found its way into our MIL as well, greasing the way for pliant careerists, some of whom have been disastrous flag-rankers. SS Menon's type has nothing useful to offer today, neither intelligence, nor insight, nor perspective nor strategy. There's only one place for him and his kind - the trashcan

[Deans]

So, official brochure of LCA gives One way Range of aircraft armed with weapons rather than combat range? So IAF will fly LCA with bombs & never come back or just bomb on their own airfield? In any case, one way range of LCA with drop tanks is 3000km+.

Fast flying low level jets cannot be hit by Mapads except in your imagination.

https://www.globalresearch.ca/us-suppli ... anpads.htm
Gyanji
Look at the Russian aircraft loss in Syria!!

The book `Operation Aleppo' ( free on kindle unlimited) is the best study of Russian operations in Syria and what is takes to sustain operations far from home. Their aircraft losses were fairly low considering the number of sorties, harsh operating environment and constant threat from AA fire/ SAM's and (in one case) the Turkish air force.

[Deans]

[/quote]

I am thinking there may be an NSA-ship for Gen. Hasnain in future, if & when Doval ages out. He is more than qualified in my view.[/quote]

I think he would be an ideal Lt Gov of J&K, given his extensive experience in the State. Should have happened 2 years ago when Pres rule was imposed and there was a feeling that the then Gov was really too old and too political to make a difference with governance.

[Deans]

We don't have any logistic agreements too with any ASEAN state for sub logistics which would be required for such ops,like the Ru agreement using Tartus on lease for its navy giving it a solid foothold in the Meditt.

I think we have a logistics agreement with Singapore, Australia, the US, Russia, France, South Korea, UK, and Japan. In theory, we can refuel in all the US bases in the region. I am not sure about subs though. Here is a map of the bases where our ships can refuel. Credit: https://idsa.in/idsacomments/military-l ... mas-261119



According to the below article, USN ships can replenish IN ships;

https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/us-merc ... china-sea/

With these agreements, we have virtually got ourselves a `string of pearls' for free.
The flaw in China's own strong of pearls strategy, is that is dependent on coercing host countries into giving up land, because they can't pay up loans issued on unviable terms. There is a big risk that a change in strongman/dictator/general in the host country will put their whole BRI investment at risk. When they do operate a base, there is a risk of putting vessels thousands of miles of home without any support. They have done this because small groups of soldiers intruding across the LAC have intimidated us. If we change our mindset, we should view the strong of pearls bases as being under a serious and permanent threat from IN/IAF or an amphibious landing.

On the other hand, China will have to devote considerable resources to guard against the possibility that we MIGHT use any of the bases we have agreements for. A single P-8i aircraft in Seyshelles or Deigo Garcia, or an indication that we can refuel a sub there, will lead to re-routing for a thousand Chinese ships passing through the area, allocation of surface ships for convoy escort etc. We, in contrast, have a negligible number of merchant ships to worry about.