Here is a very good picture of current Indian thinking.NRao wrote:For the record, here is the more complete Jaishankat-LG interaction.
what changes sir..Philip wrote:The huge shake-up in the MEA with a massive reorganisation, extra Addl.Secs. inducted to head vital divisions,etc. i
GOI has started to wield the danda and that is a welcome change.
She seems to have taken "the Hypocrite's oath"wikipedia biopage on Debbie Abrahams wrote: Personal life
Abrahams married John Abrahams, a former captain of Lancashire County cricket team, in the late 1980s. They have two daughters, both of whom were sent to private schools, despite Abrahams being opposed to selective education
or the International community agrees to act as per the Natural aspiration and makes Baluchistan which should never been a part of Pakistan as independant.nvishal wrote:^afg has no future
The only way they can get out of the mess is if the shias get absolute power over afganistan, which allows them access to the Arabian sea through Iran.
The pashtuns are too dumb to see 5 years ahead.
India would only be wasting money and resources over a hopeless situation.
HIGHLIGHTS
* Election to the UNSC will be held on June 17
* EAM Dr Jaishankar has already launched our set of priorities for our stint in the UNSC: Ambassador TS Tirumurti
* "COVID-19 has made us rethink how we can use multilaterism and international cooperation to make this a better world," Ambassador TS Tirumurti told India Today
In his first interview after taking over as India's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York, Ambassador TS Tirumurti emphasised the key agenda and priorities of India at the world body. He will serve as the Indian envoy at a crucial time when India is set to become a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) after over a decade.
Speaking to India Today from New York, Ambassador Tirumurti was confident that India will be elected in the group of elite 15 by winning a two-thirds majority. He said that his focus will be to "strengthen the voice of those who are not heard".
At a time when the UNSC has been used against India by Pakistan with help from its all-weather friend China, the Indian envoy said that he will not look at India's presence in the Security Council purely through the "narrow prism of India-Pakistan bilateral issue". Trimurti emphatically said that there were no takers for Pakistan's "false propaganda" and India's fight against "cross-border terrorism" and "terror financing" will continue.
Here are excerpts from the interview:
How has the beginning of your stint been, given that you took office in these difficult times of the Covid-19 pandemic?
TS Tirumurti: Thank you Geeta for having me on your programme. Yes, I have landed in the midst of Covid-19 in New York. It has been a very difficult time for the US, particularly New Yorkers. It has not been an easy time for the UN as well. Everything is going on in virtual mode.
So, it has not been an easy time for the UN and certainly very difficult for the US but I must say that I have been very fortunate. I have been able to communicate with many of my colleagues in spite of COVID and the lockdown.
What would your key priorities be as India's envoy to the UN, especially in the context of the forthcoming elections to the UNSC where India is a candidate?
TS Tirumurti: The immediate priority is naturally to get India elected in the forthcoming elections for the non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This will be in a few days on the 17th of this month.
In fact, this will be the first activity inside the UN premises since it was closed down in mid-March.
External Affairs Minister Dr Jaishankar has already launched our set of priorities for our stint in the UN Security Council. We have set ourselves five overarching priorities under the acronym NORMS, which stands for New Orientation for a Reformed Multilateral System. The five priorities include:
* is 'New Opportunities for Progress'. We have always been known for working closely with our partners, particularly in the context of development and developing partnerships, to ensure sustainable peace. The repercussions of Covid-19 have impacted all of us like never before. Even in the COVID situation, we have assisted more than 120 countries. Consequently, to be in the Security Council in the post-COVID period gives us an opportunity to put forward our development and peace agenda.
*Secondly, we will focus on an 'Effective Response to International Terrorism'. India has been a victim of cross-border terrorism and you are aware of our strong interest in fighting terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Our presence in the Security Council will help pursue concrete and result-oriented action.
* Our third priority would be 'Reform of Multilateral Systems'. Prime Minister has already put forth his vision of "reformed multilateralism". Even as we remain committed to multilateralism, we are equally conscious that it does not reflect contemporary realities. We need to do so to make the multilateral system credible and effective. An important step in this direction will be the reform of the Security Council where India has a strong claim.
* The fourth priority is to have a 'Comprehensive Approach to Peace and Security'. Armed conflicts around the world are getting increasingly complex. Traditional and non-traditional security challenges continue to grow. We need to give greater direction to the mandates of UN peacekeeping operations. You are aware that Indian peacekeepers have played a historic and pioneering role in the UN peacekeeping even while they are protecting lives across the world. We need to protect the protectors.
* Our fifth priority will be 'Technology with a Human Touch'. India has made tremendous progress to bring technology to the people. We would like to take our example to the world and promote technology as a force for good and enhance ease of living.
Overall, during our tenure, we will seek to reflect our ethos of 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam' - the World is One Family.
The most important development that we will see in coming days is India joining the UNSC as an elected member? How confident are you of securing the seat even though India stands unopposed? It comes after a decade when last we had Hardeep Puri sit in that room.
TS Tirumurti: We have received tremendous support. Countries see our presence in the Security Council as not just strengthening the Council but also strengthening the voice of those who are not heard. Of course, I am also reaching out to the various countries to ensure that our message and our priorities for the Security Council are understood and appreciated.
They see that India will add value to the UNSC. I have pretty big shoes to fill after minister Hardeep Puri's stint.
Afghanistan gave up its turn for India. How important was it for India to be in that room? The UNSC recently has been used against India by Pakistan through their all-weather friend China?
TS Tirumurti: I don't want to see our presence in the Security Council purely through the narrow prism of India-Pakistan bilateral issues. India has a global role, more so in the context of COVID. COVID-19 has made us rethink how we can use multilaterism and international cooperation to make this a better world. We have the ability to work closely with partners and overcome old and new fault lines.
We have advocated dialogue and fairness to solve global issues. We have a great opportunity to shape the post-COVID scenario. Therefore, our election to the UN Security Council will be very timely.
Recently, the UN envoys of OIC nations met and Pakistan tried to raise the alleged persecution of minorities in India. But, it seems like there are no takers for Pakistan's propaganda anymore?
TS Tirumurti: There are no takers for such false propaganda. Pakistan has tried to couch its anti-India disinformation campaign in religious terms and raise this in OIC in New York but found no takers. You are already aware that on the 50th anniversary of OIC, India was invited for the first time as the chief guest on the first of March last year at their Foreign Ministers' meeting where the late Hon'ble Sushma Swaraj had participated.
We also have excellent bilateral relations with OIC countries, especially in the last few years, including in the Gulf and Africa and others where our relations are at an all-time high. The OIC countries share, acknowledge, appreciate and value our pluralistic and democratic ethos.
Terrorism has been spelt out as one of the key agendas by EAM Dr Jaishankar. How would you take up the issue of terrorism, especially cross border terrorism at the world body?
TS Tirumurti: As I mentioned, terrorism is definitely one of the priorities for our Security Council agenda. It is an enduring threat to international peace and security having linkages across the border and regions in recruitment and operations. The UN itself has recognised the grave threat posed by terrorism and has set up the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism in 2016 to bring the issue to the fore to involve the wider UN membership to join efforts to put an end to the scourge.
We will take it up strongly and address both its sponsors as well as the various dimensions like the abuse of ICT by terrorists, stop the flow of terror finance and ensure greater coordination to fight terror. It will be a comprehensive way, looking at all dimensions of terrorism.
Finally, with the changing global order in the wake of the pandemic, could there be a serious relook in the rising demand for UN reforms and expansion of the UNSC that would reflect the right representation of a changed world order?
TS Tirumurti: Reform of the Security Council is going to be a very important part of our agenda. There is definitely a need to look seriously into the reform of the Security Council. As I mentioned, Prime Minister has made a clarion call for reformed multilateralism. The status quo of the multilateral system is what some countries would like to revert to and reinforce. This does not reflect current realities.
It is also not in the interest of developing countries, which have started playing a major role within the United Nations and outside, but whose voices have not found traction in these multilateral bodies. Consequently, there is a need to go beyond the 1940s multilateral architecture and provide for greater representation, starting with the UN Security Council. In other words, the multilateral architecture needs to get contemporary and reflect reality to be relevant.
India is set to enter the UN Security Council as an 'elected' member for a two-year term. Victory is assured in next week's election because India is running unopposed for the Asia-Pacific seat, the only question being the margin of victory.
India's UNSC term runs January 2021to December 2022, a time sure to be marked by profound change, great power competition and possible realignment. But it's also a time to push, generate valuable discussion and prove India's 'vishwa guru' credentials. It will be India's eighth innings in UNSC and, perhaps, the most challenging. It needs 129 votes of the 193 votes to win in the UN General Assembly. Whether it improves last time's record of 187 votes remains to be seen.
First, it's important to use the term 'elected' instead of 'non-permanent' to describe India's entry, because 'while elected members are chosen by a democratic ballot with twothirds majority, none of the existing five non-elected members have undergone such a democratic scrutiny so far since 1945,' Asoke Mukherji, India's former UN permanent representative, told me. It was during his tenure that the path to India's uncontested nomination became clear.
Mukherji's point is pertinent. It segues nicely into India's aim to reform UNSC and make it more representative. When, or whether, UNSC will expand to include a democratic nation of 1.3 billion people is anyone's guess. But it's important to keep pushing.
Given Prime Minister Narendra Modi's love of acronyms, this time the goal comes riding on a vehicle called NORMS, or New Orientation for a Reformed Multilateral System. Interesting, especially since there is trouble with 'INCH Towards Miles,' or India-China Towards a Millennium of Exceptional Synergy, given the border situation. Hopefully, the Chinese incursions will have been sorted out by the time India's envoy sits in the same room as China's ambassador.
Indian diplomats are confident their hard work in Africa and in the Arab world will be remembered on voting day. As for the difficulties created with regard to Article 370 and Kashmir, most countries consider it a matter to be resolved bilaterally between India and Pakistan. Still, Arab ambassadors have been troubled by what's happening to the Muslim community in India
Most countries value New Delhi's perspective because they believe India as a developing country brings a nuanced position and offers solutions they can accept. India has extended $7 billion in lines of credit, $700 million in grants, and $1billion in buyer's credit to African countries in the last 4-5 years, apart from assigning thousands of slots for IT training and scholarships. Add to that India's medical aid during the Covid-19 pandemic, and 35 visits at the level of PM, president and vice-president, apart from ministerial trips, to African countries in recent years.
Foreign Minister S Jaishankar said that an unreformed and under-representative multilateral system can't effectively deal with new or persistent challenges — Covid-19 and terrorism. Incidentally, both have a Chinese flavour, one infused globally, the other regionally. A multilateral system designed last century can't effectively deal with the current disorder.
Change is essential, and it's time to counter countries whose main business is to block and prevent others from playing a bigger role. Also, the US must decide how it wants to play. US disengagement over the last 10 years has only helped China gain influence within the UN and beyond. The US should help UN evolve, even as Washington gets busy creating 'circles of trust' with 'like-minded countries' outside.
That means the US-European alliance must be healthy. But Europe is pulling in a different direction while in awe of Beijing. European nonalignment will be costly, because the US-China Cold War will remain a feature, no matter who wins the White House in November. The western alliance could push for UNSC expansion, instead of paying mere lip service. The only permanent member that doesn't want change is China.
India is expelling half the staff at Pakistan's high commission (embassy) in its capital Delhi, accusing diplomats of spying and dealing with terrorists.
India will also reduce staff by the same number at its high commission in the Pakistani capital Islamabad, the external affairs ministry said.
There was no immediate response from the Pakistani authorities.
Relations between the nuclear powers were already tense after India expelled two Pakistani staffers three weeks ago.
They were accused of trying to obtain information about Indian troop movements.
Indian media suggest the latest move was prompted by the alleged mistreatment of two Indian staff members in Islamabad.
Last week, the Indian government accused Pakistan of abducting the two men but Pakistan said they had been detained by police after hitting a pedestrian while driving.
According to the Hindustan Times newspaper, each of the two countries has an agreed strength of 110 staff at their respective high commissions, although the current number is actually about 90.
India's decision means the two commissions will both have to send back 35 staff members within a week.
The Pakistan High Commission in Delhi - high commission is the term used for the embassies of one Commonwealth country in another
"They [the Pakistani staff] have been engaged in acts of espionage and maintained dealings with terrorist organisations," India's external affairs ministry said in a statement.
It summoned Pakistan's Charge d'Affaires, Syed Haider Shah, to make the accusations.
He was also told, the Hindustan Times reports, that Pakistan had "engaged in a sustained campaign to intimidate the officials of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad from carrying on their legitimate diplomatic functions".
What are the allegations about the Indian staffers?
The Indian government's position, according to the Hindustan Times, is that Pakistani security agencies picked up the two men in Islamabad, tortured them and framed them over a road accident and fake currency.
When the two men, Dwimu Brahms and Selvadhas Paul, returned to India on Monday, they are said to have provided "graphic details of the barbaric treatment that they experienced at the hands of Pakistani agencies".
Pakistan police say the two men were detained after running a man over and trying to flee the scene but were later released from custody because of their diplomatic status.
There was no immediate comment on the allegations that the two men had been tortured.
The Cold War 2.0 between the US and China that is unfolding quite rapidly both on India’s west and on her east offers a stark choice to her. India can either choose to be the fulcrum in this war, and leverage that position to secure herself strategically and economically; or India can keep latching on to the hoary hoax of cultural, historical and civilisational links, and continue the strategic self-deception of unlikely ‘friendly and good neighbourly relations’ and uncertain economic benefits, to adopt a position of neutrality (or if you will, Non-Alignment 2.0) and end up risking not just her security and economy, but also her very future. At a time when the world is again on the cusp of entering new alignments, India must choose her side. Because if she doesn’t, India will end up being squeezed, both from her east and west. Unlike Cold War 1.0 which was fought primarily in a distant theatre and only its denouement – Afghanistan – occurred in India’s neighbourhood, the theatre of Cold War 2.0 finds India in the very centre of the struggle for how the world will run in the 21st Century.
Over the last couple of years, the US-China relationship has been going into a tailspin. In January 2018, the National Defence Strategy of the US had clearly identified “inter-state strategic competition” – read China and Russia – as the ”primary concern” in US national security. A few months later, the first shots were fired in the trade war between the US and China, that has since escalated. The spectre of a new Cold War had already been looming large when the Covid-19 pandemic hit the world, and accelerated the process. China’s aggressive ‘wolf-warrior’ diplomacy and opening of multiple fronts – both security and economic – against Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, India, Vietnam hardly helped matters and led to attitudes hardening all around.
The US was already signalling that it wasn’t going to give a walkover to the Chinese in India’s east. Restrictions were imposed on Chinese companies and students, Chinese officials were sanctioned for human rights violations in Xinjiang, and in a show of force, two carrier strike groups were despatched to South China Sea to hold exercises. Strong statements by both the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows left no doubt over the direction in which things were headed.
Even as things were heating up on India’s east, a bombshell of sorts was dropped with the news of a mammoth security and economic deal between Iran and China. Within a few days, another piece of news further muddied India’s strategic environment in its west – Iran ousted India from a rail project to link the Chabahar port to Zahedan on the Afghan-Iran border. The Chinese presence in Pakistan, including its potential naval bases in and around Gwadar, was already a matter of serious strategic concern to India. With the Chinese doubling down on taking their relations with Iran to the next level – the China-Iran deal is virtually another China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) like arrangement and like in the case of Pakistan, will eventually transform Iran into a virtual satellite state of China – the strategic implications for India are quite deadly. In short, the Iran deal completes India’s encirclement by China.
The immediate impact of this deal will of course be felt on India’s outreach to Afghanistan. Iran offered an alternate route for India to access Afghanistan, and even Central Asia. With the US already all set to abandon Afghanistan, it means that India’s options there are going to be severely curtailed. With Iran likely to play the China game (read Pakistan and China game), India’s access to Afghanistan will be limited to the air route. The limitations of that in terms of not just trade and economic assistance but also military assistance are self-evident. Effectively, it means that the door is starting to shut on India in Afghanistan. The Chinese are in any case working through Pakistan in Afghanistan, and by roping in the Iranians, and given their influence in Central Asia and with the Russians, it is pretty much slam-dunk as far as Afghanistan is concerned. Already the Chinese have made a renewed push to play a bigger role in Afghanistan and one indication of this came from the recent Afghanistan-Pakistan-China trilateral.
More worrying is the imminent possibility of the emergence of a new axis of countries with the acronym PRIC (no pun intended) – Pakistan, Russia, Iran and China. The PRICs alliance has for long been a dream of Pakistani strategists, and it now seems far more possible, even imminent, than when the idea of such an axis was first floated. While originally this alliance was aimed at only Afghanistan, its potential as a challenger to the existing world order under Chinese leadership now goes far beyond Afghanistan. At the very least, such an axis completely demolishes India’s strategic environment to her west and endangers her economic, energy, political and territorial security.
Iran has of course done what it thinks best serves its interest. Having been pushed to the very edge by the US, Iran had probably no option but to accept the life-line thrown by China. The Chinese had in 2016 signed a flurry of agreements during the visit of Xi Jinping to Tehran. At the time an ambitious target of raising bilateral trade to $600 billion in ten years was set. But with the US re-imposing sanctions on Iran, this grand plan seemed to have been put on the backburner by the Chinese. If now an even grander plan has been unveiled, it is because the Chinese calculate that they can take on the Americans and their still inchoate and somewhat fuzzy plans to pushback against Chinese expansionism.
With the Chinese openly defying the US and making a bold power play in the Middle-East (where until now the US has held virtually unchallenged sway), the US red-line was crossed. The Americans were quick to strike back in China’s proverbial backyard. After years of dillydallying over Chinese attempts to convert the South China Sea into China’s personal lake, the US has finally taken a position on this issue. Rejecting China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea, the US has declared that “Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them” and added that “the world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire”. The Chinese were quick to react and in a statement the Chinese embassy in Washington accused the US of trying to “sow discord between China and other littoral countries”. The statement went on to say that the US was “flexing muscle, stirring up tension, and inciting confrontation in the region”.
Clearly, the gloves are coming off, on both sides. Going forward, tensions are only going to rise, even more so because of the new alignments that are taking place. Many of the countries sitting on the fence will soon have to decide which side they throw in their lot with. For India, the crunch time is coming. For years every country in the world, including India and the US, had been in denial about the threat that a totalitarian and expansionist China poses to the world order. In ignoring China’s rise, they were practically sleep-walking towards an unmitigated disaster. But thanks to Chinese aggressive expansionism, India appears to have been rudely woken up from its slumber. So too the US, which has suddenly realised that China’s rise is neither benign nor peaceful.
For many years, US officials have been quite candid in telling their Indian interlocutors that while there is 95% strategic convergence between India and US east of India, there is only 5% west of India. The main sticking points were of course Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Circumstances and choices made by others have now conspired to increase the convergence west of India to at least 50%, if not more. With Iran joining the Chinese camp, it will be that much easier for India to align her interests with the US. Add to this the imminent possibility that India could end up marginalised in Afghanistan because of extremely restricted access, another point of some divergence between US and India gets resolved. With Afghanistan out of the equation, the Pakistani problem can also be addressed more easily. Post withdrawal, Pakistan’s utility for the West will take a tumble. Add to this the fact that Pakistan is now a virtual vassal of China against whom the new alignments will be made, and Pakistan will no longer remain the sticking point it has been in the last so many decades.
In the east of India, with the expanding Chinese footprint in India’s neighbourhood – an openly hostile Nepal government is just one example – India’s strategic challenges are only increasing. It was bad enough that India had to factor in a two-front war because of the China-Pakistan collusion. Now, there is the possibility of other fronts also opening up. India therefore needs to break through the strategic encirclement by aligning more closely with the US and allies. This was a decision India had been avoiding for the longest. But the Chinese hostility and over-reach, coupled with the moves that other countries in region have made, India can now shed the strategic shibboleths of the past that prevented her from taking sides.
Home Expert Speak
India as the fulcrum in a Cold War 2.015 July 2020
SUSHANT SAREEN
The Cold War 2.0 between the US and China that is unfolding quite rapidly both on India’s west and on her east offers a stark choice to her. India can either choose to be the fulcrum in this war, and leverage that position to secure herself strategically and economically; or India can keep latching on to the hoary hoax of cultural, historical and civilisational links, and continue the strategic self-deception of unlikely ‘friendly and good neighbourly relations’ and uncertain economic benefits, to adopt a position of neutrality (or if you will, Non-Alignment 2.0) and end up risking not just her security and economy, but also her very future. At a time when the world is again on the cusp of entering new alignments, India must choose her side. Because if she doesn’t, India will end up being squeezed, both from her east and west. Unlike Cold War 1.0 which was fought primarily in a distant theatre and only its denouement – Afghanistan – occurred in India’s neighbourhood, the theatre of Cold War 2.0 finds India in the very centre of the struggle for how the world will run in the 21st Century.
Unlike Cold War 1.0 which was fought primarily in a distant theatre and only its denouement – Afghanistan – occurred in India’s neighbourhood, the theatre of Cold War 2.0 finds India in the very centre of the struggle for how the world will run in the 21st Century
Over the last couple of years, the US-China relationship has been going into a tailspin. In January 2018, the National Defence Strategy of the US had clearly identified “inter-state strategic competition” – read China and Russia – as the ”primary concern” in US national security. A few months later, the first shots were fired in the trade war between the US and China, that has since escalated. The spectre of a new Cold War had already been looming large when the Covid-19 pandemic hit the world, and accelerated the process. China’s aggressive ‘wolf-warrior’ diplomacy and opening of multiple fronts – both security and economic – against Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, India, Vietnam hardly helped matters and led to attitudes hardening all around.
The US was already signalling that it wasn’t going to give a walkover to the Chinese in India’s east. Restrictions were imposed on Chinese companies and students, Chinese officials were sanctioned for human rights violations in Xinjiang, and in a show of force, two carrier strike groups were despatched to South China Sea to hold exercises. Strong statements by both the Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and the White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows left no doubt over the direction in which things were headed.
Even as things were heating up on India’s east, a bombshell of sorts was dropped with the news of a mammoth security and economic deal between Iran and China. Within a few days, another piece of news further muddied India’s strategic environment in its west – Iran ousted India from a rail project to link the Chabahar port to Zahedan on the Afghan-Iran border. The Chinese presence in Pakistan, including its potential naval bases in and around Gwadar, was already a matter of serious strategic concern to India. With the Chinese doubling down on taking their relations with Iran to the next level – the China-Iran deal is virtually another China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) like arrangement and like in the case of Pakistan, will eventually transform Iran into a virtual satellite state of China – the strategic implications for India are quite deadly. In short, the Iran deal completes India’s encirclement by China.
With the Chinese doubling down on taking their relations with Iran to the next level – the China-Iran deal is virtually another China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) like arrangement
The immediate impact of this deal will of course be felt on India’s outreach to Afghanistan. Iran offered an alternate route for India to access Afghanistan, and even Central Asia. With the US already all set to abandon Afghanistan, it means that India’s options there are going to be severely curtailed. With Iran likely to play the China game (read Pakistan and China game), India’s access to Afghanistan will be limited to the air route. The limitations of that in terms of not just trade and economic assistance but also military assistance are self-evident. Effectively, it means that the door is starting to shut on India in Afghanistan. The Chinese are in any case working through Pakistan in Afghanistan, and by roping in the Iranians, and given their influence in Central Asia and with the Russians, it is pretty much slam-dunk as far as Afghanistan is concerned. Already the Chinese have made a renewed push to play a bigger role in Afghanistan and one indication of this came from the recent Afghanistan-Pakistan-China trilateral.
More worrying is the imminent possibility of the emergence of a new axis of countries with the acronym PRIC (no pun intended) – Pakistan, Russia, Iran and China. The PRICs alliance has for long been a dream of Pakistani strategists, and it now seems far more possible, even imminent, than when the idea of such an axis was first floated. While originally this alliance was aimed at only Afghanistan, its potential as a challenger to the existing world order under Chinese leadership now goes far beyond Afghanistan. At the very least, such an axis completely demolishes India’s strategic environment to her west and endangers her economic, energy, political and territorial security.
Iran has of course done what it thinks best serves its interest. Having been pushed to the very edge by the US, Iran had probably no option but to accept the life-line thrown by China. The Chinese had in 2016 signed a flurry of agreements during the visit of Xi Jinping to Tehran. At the time an ambitious target of raising bilateral trade to $600 billion in ten years was set. But with the US re-imposing sanctions on Iran, this grand plan seemed to have been put on the backburner by the Chinese. If now an even grander plan has been unveiled, it is because the Chinese calculate that they can take on the Americans and their still inchoate and somewhat fuzzy plans to pushback against Chinese expansionism.
Iran has of course done what it thinks best serves its interest. Having been pushed to the very edge by the US, Iran had probably no option but to accept the life-line thrown by China
With the Chinese openly defying the US and making a bold power play in the Middle-East (where until now the US has held virtually unchallenged sway), the US red-line was crossed. The Americans were quick to strike back in China’s proverbial backyard. After years of dillydallying over Chinese attempts to convert the South China Sea into China’s personal lake, the US has finally taken a position on this issue. Rejecting China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea, the US has declared that “Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control them” and added that “the world will not allow Beijing to treat the South China Sea as its maritime empire”. The Chinese were quick to react and in a statement the Chinese embassy in Washington accused the US of trying to “sow discord between China and other littoral countries”. The statement went on to say that the US was “flexing muscle, stirring up tension, and inciting confrontation in the region”.
Clearly, the gloves are coming off, on both sides. Going forward, tensions are only going to rise, even more so because of the new alignments that are taking place. Many of the countries sitting on the fence will soon have to decide which side they throw in their lot with. For India, the crunch time is coming. For years every country in the world, including India and the US, had been in denial about the threat that a totalitarian and expansionist China poses to the world order. In ignoring China’s rise, they were practically sleep-walking towards an unmitigated disaster. But thanks to Chinese aggressive expansionism, India appears to have been rudely woken up from its slumber. So too the US, which has suddenly realised that China’s rise is neither benign nor peaceful.
For many years, US officials have been quite candid in telling their Indian interlocutors that while there is 95% strategic convergence between India and US east of India, there is only 5% west of India. The main sticking points were of course Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Circumstances and choices made by others have now conspired to increase the convergence west of India to at least 50%, if not more. With Iran joining the Chinese camp, it will be that much easier for India to align her interests with the US. Add to this the imminent possibility that India could end up marginalised in Afghanistan because of extremely restricted access, another point of some divergence between US and India gets resolved. With Afghanistan out of the equation, the Pakistani problem can also be addressed more easily. Post withdrawal, Pakistan’s utility for the West will take a tumble. Add to this the fact that Pakistan is now a virtual vassal of China against whom the new alignments will be made, and Pakistan will no longer remain the sticking point it has been in the last so many decades.
With Iran joining the Chinese camp, it will be that much easier for India to align her interests with the US. Add to this the imminent possibility that India could end up marginalised in Afghanistan because of extremely restricted access, another point of some divergence between US and India gets resolved
In the east of India, with the expanding Chinese footprint in India’s neighbourhood – an openly hostile Nepal government is just one example – India’s strategic challenges are only increasing. It was bad enough that India had to factor in a two-front war because of the China-Pakistan collusion. Now, there is the possibility of other fronts also opening up. India therefore needs to break through the strategic encirclement by aligning more closely with the US and allies. This was a decision India had been avoiding for the longest. But the Chinese hostility and over-reach, coupled with the moves that other countries in region have made, India can now shed the strategic shibboleths of the past that prevented her from taking sides.
India needs to break through the strategic encirclement by aligning more closely with the US and allies. This was a decision India had been avoiding for the longest. But the Chinese hostility and over-reach, coupled with the moves that other countries in region have made, India can now shed the strategic shibboleths of the past that prevented her from taking sides
Given that India is sitting in the middle of the new Cold War which is unfolding all around it, New Delhi is the natural fulcrum of this new struggle for deciding the future of the world. If India plays her cards smartly, she stands to gain the most; on the other hand, if India remains ambivalent, and tries to hedge her bets, then she very well could end up being the biggest loser. In the emerging scenario, neutrality is probably the worst option for India. There is no way India can go with China because that is the path of servitude. With the US and its allies, it will be a partnership, albeit a somewhat unequal one. Because of the sheer power differential, it is a given that the US will be the first among equals. Even so, the benefits in terms of trade and security from joining a US-led alliance will be far greater and more equitable than those that will accrue to India if she tied up with a exploitative, extractive, egotistical and expansionist China.
India and the emerging world: The impact on the global order of China’s rise will be visible over the next generation
Dr. S. Jaishankar, Minister of External Affairs
If you had believed the best minds of our times, this was not supposed to happen. But for two decades, China had been winning without fighting, while the US was fighting without winning. Something had to give and it did, in the 2016 American presidential election.
The world faces an extraordinary prospect of its two leading players doing what it takes to win, and then some more. In the ultimate analysis, the ability of major powers to reach accommodation will shape our times. When ‘black swans’ meet ‘grey rhinos’, the very nature of the habitat undergoes transformation.
The US-China relationship that currently holds global attention has gone on for four decades, not a short span in modern times. Who benefited more in this period is a question to which we may get a different answer today than two decades ago. But because it was long enough to be taken as a given by two generations, we attribute to it a sense of being natural. We ask why it is under stress now, when we could wonder equally easily why it lasted that long.
Many of the discomforts today arise from differences on key issues like the relationship between the state, politics, society, business, faith and the markets. It is expressed in matters of personal freedoms and institutional firewalls. Sociology matters, especially once it assumes global proportions. This is at the heart of the predicament the world faces today. And creating common ground is, therefore, the hardest diplomatic challenge.
The rise of a new global power was never going to be easy, and an order waiting to happen will look like chaos till it does. In an interdependent and constrained world, it can only unfold through tensions and negotiations, adjustments and transactions. In this process, much will depend on what is allowed to take root.
The impact on the global order of these developments is likely to be visible over the next generation. That would have many dimensions, each of them in itself a source of potential instability. The most obvious one is that the world will be increasingly multipolar as distribution of power broadens and alliance discipline dilutes. A more nationalistic approach to international relations will undeniably weaken multilateral rules in many domains. This will be particularly sharp in respect of economic interests and sovereignty concerns.
This prospect of multipolarity with less multilateralism suggests a more difficult future even for the near term. This does not mean giving up on the latter. On the contrary, it requires a new energy to be poured into reformed multilateralism. The current anachronistic order must be pushed to change, along with its outdated agenda. The emerging world is also likely to fall back on balance of power as its operating principle, rather than collective security or a broader consensus. History has demonstrated that this approach usually produces unstable equilibriums. World affairs will also see a proliferation of frenemies. They will emerge from allies who criticise each other or competitors compelled to make common cause.
The really uncharted territory that US-China frictions will take us into is that of coping with parallel universes. They may have existed before, most recently during the Cold War. But not with interdependence and interpenetration of the globalised era. As a result, divergent choices and competing alternatives in many spheres will rest on partially shared foundations. This dilemma will be evident in a growing number of domains, from technology, commerce and finance to connectivity, institutions and activities. The key players will themselves struggle with the dichotomy of such parallel existence. Those who have to manage both, as most of us will, may then find themselves really tested.
Even if ties between China and the West take on a more adversarial character, it is difficult to return to a strongly bipolar world. The primary reason for that is the landscape has now changed irreversibly. Other nations are independently on the move, including India. Half of the 20 largest economies of the world are non-Western now. Diffusion of technology and demographic differentials will also contribute to the broader spread of influence. We see forces at play that reflect the relative primacy of local equations when the global construct is less overbearing. The reality is that the US may have weakened, but China’s rise is still far from maturing. And together, the two processes have freed up room for others.
If division within alliances was one evolution, reaching beyond them was another. As the world moved in the direction of greater plurilateralism, result-oriented cooperation started to look more attractive. They were better focussed and could be reconciled with contrary commitments. The growing imperative of sharing responsibilities was combined with an appreciation of influences beyond formal structures. Asia has been a particular focus for such initiatives, as regional architecture is the least developed there. India today has emerged as an industry leader of such plurilateral groups, because it occupies both the hedging and the emerging space at the same time.
Because global fluidity is so pervasive, India must address this challenge of forging more contemporary ties on every major account. Achieving an overall equilibrium will depend on how it fares on the individual ones.
In this year’s civil services exam, the Union Public Service Commission has picked 354 candidates for the top three services — the Indian Administrative Service, the Indian Police Service and the Indian Foreign Service.
The number of candidates selected for the IAS is 180, while that for the IPS is 150. And for the IFS, whose officers are mandated with making and implementing India’s ever-changing and complex foreign policy, the number is 24.
Under the Narendra Modi government’s maxim of ‘minimum government, maximum governance’, all civil services in India have been reducing recruitment since 2014. But the fall in recruitments for the already short-staffed IFS has been both steep and glaring.
Initially, the Modi government had, in fact, picked more IFS officers than the preceding three years’ counts of 30 (2012), 32 (2013) and 32 (2014). In 2015 and 2016, 45 officers each were selected for the IFS, but the next two years, the numbers fell to 42 and 30, respectively.
“The IFS is one of the smallest cadres in the country. The government recruits more officers in most other civil services…What does that tell you about the country’s priorities when it comes to foreign policy?” said a retired diplomat, who did not want to be named.
India’s global footprint and size of IFS
According to the Ministry of External Affairs, India’s sanctioned IFS cadre strength is 850, as against 6,500 for the IAS and 4,843 for the IPS, as of 2017.
In 2016, briefing the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, then foreign secretary S. Jaishankar, now the External Affairs Minister, had said India has 2,700 diplomats. Asked to provide a breakdown, he told the committee that it included 912 IFS (A) grade officers, 252 Grade 1 IFS (B) officers, 33 of the Interpreters Cadre, 24 of the Legal and Treaties Cadre, 635 attaches, 540 diplomatic officers from sectorial staff, and 310 diplomatic officers for other ministries.
Compare this to other world powers — South Korea has over 1,250 diplomats, New Zealand has over 1,300, Brazil has over 2,000, China has over 4,500, and Japan has over 5,700. Even a small island nation like Singapore has 800-850 diplomats — nearly as many as India’s IFS ‘A’ cadre.
The numbers are glaring because of the size of New Delhi’s diplomatic footprint around the world. According to Australian think tank Lowy Institute’s Global Diplomacy Index, India’s diplomatic network ranks 12th in the world — behind smaller countries such as Turkey, Spain, and Italy.
A more micro-level comparison with China and Brazil sheds light on India’s relatively smaller global footprint — China has 276 total diplomatic posts around the world, Brazil has 222 and India 186. In terms of embassies and high commissions, China has 169, Brazil has 138, and India has 123, while in terms of consulates and consulate-generals, China has 96, Brazil 70, and India 54.
This means Brazil, whose GDP is about $1.8 trillion, almost a trillion less than India’s, has a larger global presence than India. While the scale of China’s global presence is in line with the size of its economy, looking at some particular criteria further highlights Beijing’s mammoth foreign service capacity.
Other than foreign embassies and high commissions, China has 12 permanent missions across the world, as compared to India’s five. The gulf in Indian and Chinese capacity becomes all the more stark when one looks at the internal structure of some of these permanent missions.
India’s Permanent Mission at the United Nations has 14 officers, while its Chinese counterpart has 12 separate divisions, with many more officers serving in each of them.Similarly, at the World Trade Organization (WTO), India has eight officers, while China is believed to house a staff of 1,000.
China, thanks to its large diplomatic corps, not only has permanent missions in significant entities such as the European Union (EU) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), but also a much larger internal capacity at its missions across the world.