India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

TKiran · Post by **TKiran** » 16 Jul 2020 00:03

^^^^ it's still a mystery why our soldiers didn't use firearms when our soldiers went for purely revenge attack after our Shri.Babu was killed in deception. It was purely to kill as many Single Princes as they could without worrying about their own safety.

But what is even more surprising is why PLAGF didn't use firearms, even after losing a number of their soldiers. The fighting lasted for 8 hours and no single bullet was fired from either side.

I think what could have happened was that our soldiers went there in a fit of rage without taking their firearms. Seeing nihatta soldiers PLA soldiers tried to engage with our soldiers thinking that they too can fight without firearms out of shere superiority complex. Because the fight was for prolonged 8 hours, PLA didn't realize that their dead soldiers were 5 times that of Indian soldiers death count. Even Taiwan president quoting their intelligence sources has said the PLA soldiers killed were 230+.

I think even 20 of soldiers killed from our side was exaggeration as only 5 to 6 soldiers (including col. Babu+ 2 ) were shown in TV with enormous number of people attending funeral inspite of COVID19.

I think it was total victory for our soldiers with very minimum loss (2-3 soldiers killed if you exclude initial 3 who were killed in deception). It's 1:10 soldiers killed Indian vs. PLA soldiers.

Now that PLA soldiers have learnt their lesson, they will engage with no Indian soldiers without their toys.

Now we should show them that we can once again kill 1:10 even with toys. Pongong Tso gives us that opportunity. We should go locally kinetic there, that will really bring chill in their spine.

Let's hope we demonstrate our capabilities, and Hans will never deploy their soldiers on frontline or vicinity and come begging for final settlement of borders with India.

Mollick.R · Post by **Mollick.R** » 16 Jul 2020 00:14

India's shopping for lightweight mountain-friendly tanks post China tussles
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... 969376.cms
By Manu Pubby, ET Bureau Last Updated: Jul 15, 2020, 07:10 AM IST

NEW DELHI: The government, amid border tensions with China, has given the army approval for emergency procurement of lightweight tanks that can be deployed in high-altitude conditions.

This will be a significant upgrade allowing the reintroduction of light tanks that can play a critical role in areas such as Ladakh, where they can be more nimble than the heavier main battle tanks, informed sources told ET. The acquisition will be made under the emergency purchase nod given after the recent Ladakh standoff to bolster defences.

The deployment of new Type 15 light tanks by China along the LAC in eastern Ladakh in late April has come as a wakeup call.

Deterrence measures

The army has been given the go-ahead for urgent purchases amid signs that Beijing intends to keep the border hot.

The army is looking for air-transportable tanks that can be landed or airdropped at forward locations for lightning-quick deployments to counter aggression, sources said. Unlike China, which has an extensive road network connecting the border, India’s infrastructure is still matching up and is being upgraded, though forward airfields have been developed at strategic locations.

The decision to go ahead with a new light tank is part of a series of major emergency procurements cleared by the government at a critical meeting last week. This includes new loitering munitions from Israel, more Heron unmanned aerial vehicles, additional Sig Sauer assault rifles, man-portable surface-to-air defence missiles, Spike anti-tank guided missiles and a range of ammunition.

“The satellite imagery visuals of Chinese T-15 / ZTPQ light tanks camouflaged in the depth areas of eastern Ladakh, during the recent standoff, is a wakeup call for upgrading deterrence in areas where medium-category tanks are difficult to employ,” former director general, mechanised forces, Lt Gen AB Shivane (retd), has written in a detailed study on the reintroduction of light tanks for the government-backed Centre of Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS). The retired officer has suggested that light tanks would add to the credible deterrence posture and war-fighting capability on the northern front where medium-category tanks cannot reach. He has also suggested that these new tanks be made in India.

Limited options

However, for emergency procurement, India will have limited options as few nations currently produce these tanks. While China is not an option, the US has embarked on a light tank under its Mobile Protected Firepower Program but it’s currently at prototype stage. Russia has the air-transportable Sprut SDM1 light tank that has commonalities with the T72 and T90s operated by India.

While India has a robust tank force, all of them are heavy main battle tanks — T72s, T90s and the Arjun — considered more suitable for operations in the plains. While these tanks have been sent to the Himalayan border as well, navigating them to difficult borders has been a major issue.

India has operated light tanks in the past that came in handy during the 1947-48 Kashmir operations as well as the 1962 war but these have been slowly phased out as the world moved to heavier armour.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 Jul 2020 00:16

R Singh,

The story is behind a paywall so I could only see the first couple of paras. In the Indo-PRC matchup studies estimate that they have too few bases to stage too many fighters and the average high performance PRC fighter can only take off with half of its payload from the std fighter base due to their higher altitude basing. If they skimp fuel for payload and use longer runways to compensate, then they need IFR and that's limited to their obsolete H-6 type platforms of which they have too few. For now. Because if there is anything PRC is good at, its building away and they will add AFB. But the payload issue will remain.

So yes, they could use up these fighters as drones, once newer bases come up as adding IFR to these obsolete platforms is way too much effort, say guided by a LOS H-6 hiding far behind and "soak up" IAF missiles while the actual attackers stay behind to deliver the coup de grace. Its a tactic that might well work, if the IAF can't see through it, but that pre-supposes we don't track the appearance of a large number of obsolete fighters in AFB very close to the operational area (the fuel carried by these fighters makes them very short ranged). But why would the PLAAF waste them though - they would rather be of use against the Taiwanese where the payload/range makes them of far more utility.

In short, they can be a threat provided we drop the ball. Which makes them unlikely to be the weapon of primary choice. The bigger threat IMO are missile attacks for which India's defense is too limited. While we confidently state we can weather it through, weathering an attack is not exactly optimal. Thanks to the recent ME conflicts, a lot of assumptions regarding ballistic missiles and their utility need to be reassessed. Their improved CEP and the fact that massed salvos or even single units launched from multiple axis are relatively hard to intercept by ATBM constrained states (apart from Russia who exactly is not!) plus cluster munitions makes them a potent threat. Yes, we can weather the strikes but at the cost of men and material and the fact is that we simply have not invested enough to face the threat.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 Jul 2020 00:25

All this emergency purchase hoop-la needs to be taken in stride. Please remember that this years (2019-20) Capex for the Armed Forces, esp IAF was considered enough to only meet committed liabilities. The new purchases - if they are not mixed up with the earlier purchases around 2019 - are expected to be around $1Bn. "Easily $1Bn" per media. Ok, make that $1.5Bn then, thats around $500 Mn per service, and around 10% of say, the IAFs Capex for example. In short, these are mostly spares top ups, some weapons additions, but not huge purchases of the kind the media reports suggest. At even $500 Mn per service, that translates to around a dozen deals per the revised Capex limits under emergency procurement. So two things - the services will be better prepared for a conflict for sure - the very nature of current inventory means most of the procurements will be imports, but more importantly your readiness to fight is improved. Second, these are top ups and plugging some basic holes. They are not changing the overall picture. The IAF is still at 30 odd squadrons, the Army still has gaps re: key areas, ditto IN. You will need far more than one set of sudden purchases to swing any difference in force availability or even positioning. In short, this is likely deterrence and holding off the PRC. Not some prep to take Tibet as some folks are hyper-ventilating on social media.

TKiran · Post by **TKiran** » 16 Jul 2020 00:33

https://mobile.twitter.com/tsaiing_wen/ ... 9597710336

蔡英文 Tsai Ing-Wen Flag of Taiwan
@tsaiing_wen
Jianli Yang, a former Chinese military official and son of a leader in the Chinese communist party, made a sensational claim ‘More than 100 Chinese soldiers were killed in the dreadful conflict between Indian and Chinese soldiers, in the night of 15th June.

#IndiaChinaFaceOff

This account looks like a fake account, but still ....

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 Jul 2020 00:35

If this is the guy in the US who is writing for US papers, he made no comments about 100 soldiers.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 16 Jul 2020 01:34

https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cove ... 2020-07-11
Build up on the border -- 11 July 2020

On July 7, just hours after the de-escalation began, defence minister Rajnath Singh asked Lt General Harpal Singh, director-general, Border Roads Organisation (BRO), to expedite the existing projects along the LAC, road infrastructure, 30 permanent bridges and tunnels worth Rs 20,000 crore. The directives to the MoD’s road construction agency was a clear signal from the government—de-escalation did not mean the foot was being taken off the infrastructure pedal.

<snip>

One of the many reasons analysts have attributed to the PLA’s move is a message to halt the Indian build-up. The most crucial project to have been completed so far, the 260-km Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road is, as an MoD briefing note calls it, ‘highly sensitive and critical for army formations in the area’. The all-weather road with multiple bridges cuts journey time between Leh and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), the northernmost outpost, from a week to three days.

In a June 19 article on news portal warontherocks.com which was widely read by India’s security establishment, Yun Sun, senior fellow and co-director of the East Asia Program at the Stimson Center, argued that the Chinese saw Indian infrastructure development ‘as a consistent and repeated effort by Delhi that “needs to be corrected every few years”’. ‘For the Chinese,’ it goes on to say, ‘the infrastructure arms race in the border region has enabled the repeated incursions and changes to the status quo and therefore needs to be stopped. Otherwise, all the things China fought for in the 1962 war would have been in vain.’

In her 2018 MIT doctoral thesis, ‘Calculating Bully: Explaining Chinese Coercion’, the scholar Ketian Zhang holds the 2006 completion of the railway as ‘the most important factor contributing to increased Chinese transgressions’. China’s infrastructure in the border regions had dramatically improved to the extent that many roads could reach areas merely five or 10 kilometres from the LAC which makes it easier for border forces to patrol along the area, Lin Minwang, a former diplomat at the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, was quoted as saying in the thesis.

A prescient MoD briefing note to the standing committee that year warned of a long-term infrastructure development plan by both China and Pakistan in the northern areas. ‘These plans will enable these countries to concentrate and move sizeable forces all along the Indian border and will pose a significant threat in the event of any conflict,’ it said.

The changes began in November 2014 with the induction of the technocrat defence minister Manohar Parrikar, who was laser-focused on transforming border infrastructure. The BRO was placed under the MoD in January 2015 and closely integrated with the army and defence ministry.

The 72-day Doklam stand-off between the two armies in 2017 was another major factor that speeded up road construction by the BRO. The stand-off began over a road that the PLA began constructing towards a vital ridge overlooking Indian territory and which the Indian army successfully blocked. By 2018, the BRO had constructed a second road to the disputed valley, converting a mule track into a motorable road and is building a third one to be completed by 2021. New techniques like building a road at five ‘attack points’ were used to hasten completion of the strategic 80-km Ghatiabagarh-Lipulekh road near the Indo-Nepal border, inaugurated by Rajnath Singh on May 10.

More importantly, the ICBRs were brought under a five-year works plan, where the BRO would prepare estimates without waiting for specific approvals from the government. The present works plan approved in 2018 is for 282 roads of 22,803 km (including the ICBRs) at a cost of Rs 22,000 crore, and is set to be complete by 2023 which would see India finally catching up with China. The Himalayan race seems poised for an exciting finish.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 16 Jul 2020 03:25

any protests from the pakis, eyeranians or anyone from the rest of the ummah

or is sickularism only reserved for and enforced in India, always to the detriment of the majority

CNNNews18@CNNnews18 · 6h

The official narrative that the white papers of Chinese govt were delivering to us was that the original religion of Xinjiang has been Buddhism & now, the Uighurs must revert back to Buddhism in order to join Han Chinese civilization

ManuJ · Post by **ManuJ** » 16 Jul 2020 03:52

From the above article:

The most crucial project to have been completed so far, the 260-km Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road is, as an MoD briefing note calls it, ‘highly sensitive and critical for army formations in the area’. The all-weather road with multiple bridges cuts journey time between Leh and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), the northernmost outpost, from a week to three days.

If true, that's still unacceptable. The total distance can't be more than 500km. Google tells me that the shortest route, Leh - Khardung La - Saser La - DBO is only 282 kms, which underscores the importance of this alternative route.

Gyan · Post by **Gyan** » 16 Jul 2020 04:01

SSridhar wrote:
arshyam wrote:Do we authoritatively know where PP-14 is? For a long time, forum knowledge was assuming it to be the triangle area where the Galwan river sharply turns west, and there were lots of twitter chatter about 'chinese' construction in that area (lone dissenter being Nitin Gokhale) that now appears to be our own, including a helipad.
I request everyone to see this discussion carried by Swatantra TV between Lt. Gen. S.L. Narasimhan [Retd], Currently Member, National Security Advisory Board (had commanded a Corps along China border, been India's Defence Attache in Beijing and also member of India-China JWG, currently heads The Centre for Contemporary Studies of China, a think-tank affiliated with MEA) and Commodore. R. Seshadri Vasan. Indian Navy [Retd] (Ex Commander INS Rajali, Commander ICG, Eastern Command and Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies)

Lt Gen SLN views may be closet to the possible official thinking on the subject. I am extremely disappointed about lack of resolve even on economic action.

Though, I feel our domestic & even International analysts may be missing an important possibility that Xi has decided that its time to become World Emperor & Carve out his own economic block.

In that Case, China will keep us on the hook, without escalating

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 Jul 2020 04:53

Which is why there is a rush for state of the art surveillance gear from the 30 Sea Guardians to the 10 extra Herons for the IAF. They want to conserve valuable P-8I hours but also maintain round the clock surveillance over the LAC to ensure we don't get salami sliced again, and also, we don't have to maintain super expensive all-throughout-the-year deployment all across the LAC.

vimal · Post by **vimal** » 16 Jul 2020 05:23

Karan M wrote:Which is why there is a rush for state of the art surveillance gear from the 30 Sea Guardians to the 10 extra Herons for the IAF. They want to conserve valuable P-8I hours but also maintain round the clock surveillance over the LAC to ensure we don't get salami sliced again, and also, we don't have to maintain super expensive all-throughout-the-year deployment all across the LAC.

So we ban imports from China to import from west.

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 16 Jul 2020 05:37

TWITTER

Sriram
@sriramthg:

Every country worth its salt in WW2 - Rapidly bring weapons systems to the front from drawing board->Asses use/gather feedback->Improve design.
India - Give requirements after browsing brochures -> Run through years of endless summer winter monsoon venus martian terrain -> Import

https://twitter.com/sriramthg/status/12 ... 41441?s=20

Roop · Post by **Roop** » 16 Jul 2020 08:59

KLNMurthy wrote:"caring about lives" can have multiple meanings:

When we lose our soldiers, we feel love & pain of loss. And anger towards whoever caused this loss. Even though for most of us, the dead soldiers are not our personal family / friends. That's one way of caring.

When the Chinese lose their soldiers, they feel insulted / loss of face. ... That's another way of caring.

That was an excellent post, IMO. The whole post, but especially the two paras that I have quoted back.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 16 Jul 2020 13:45

FWIIW ... Twitter gyan

https://twitter.com/TheWolfpackIN/statu ... 5683872769

The Wolfpack @TheWolfpackIN

Ladakh: Reports that Chinese forces are relucant to fully withdraw from Fingers 4 to 8 of Pangong Tso lake and want to main some presence near F8.
India adamant that a complete withdrawal is the only solution.

Ok .. from a more reliable source
https://twitter.com/IndiaToday/status/1 ... 6556144640

IndiaToday @IndiaToday

#BREAKING
China reluctant to move back from the Finger area: Sources India Today's @manjeetnegilive and @AbhishekBhalla7
share latest updates Watch #IndiaFirst, with @gauravcsawant: http://bit.ly/IT_LiveTV

The commentary in the attached clip is atrocious. Indian TV channels really need a good training.

Here is a TOI report on the same
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ind ... 985947.cms
China reluctant to withdraw completely from Finger area, India firm on complete withdrawal: Sources

However, sources said the Chinese have agreed for complete withdrawal from other friction points including the Galwan valley, Hot Springs and Gogra post area in Eastern Ladakh.

"In the talks, the Chinese showed reluctance for complete withdrawal from Finger area as they want to maintain some elements in areas near Finger 8," a source said.

In the area in and around the Patrolling Point 17, the Chinese have apprehensions that after its withdrawal India might use the strategic heights under it for gaining a tactical edge there.

In Patrolling Point 14, the Chinese have gone back substantially from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and adjoining area in PP-15.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 Jul 2020 17:43

vimal wrote:
Karan M wrote:Which is why there is a rush for state of the art surveillance gear from the 30 Sea Guardians to the 10 extra Herons for the IAF. They want to conserve valuable P-8I hours but also maintain round the clock surveillance over the LAC to ensure we don't get salami sliced again, and also, we don't have to maintain super expensive all-throughout-the-year deployment all across the LAC.
So we ban imports from China to import from west.

Sadly, you dont have a local replacement available. The Heron will likely be at least partly made in India. Sea Guardians - at best offsets, which we pay for via a price hike anyhow.

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 16 Jul 2020 18:02

I have a question about the oft quoted "high airfield disadvantage in terms of payload and range" for the PLAAF in Tibet. Why can't they take off with full load of weapons but with lower internal fuel to keep total takeoff weight low and then top it up with air to air refuelers?

Thank you.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 16 Jul 2020 18:30

Anoop wrote:I have a question about the oft quoted "high airfield disadvantage in terms of payload and range" for the PLAAF in Tibet. Why can't they take off with full load of weapons but with lower internal fuel to keep total takeoff weight low and then top it up with air to air refuelers?

Thank you.

I can think of 3. Others can add ...

1. Number of refulers that will need to be deployed to maintain operational tempo during a conflict.
2. How near or far from the LAC will the refulers be deployed. They can't be too deep for that will mean the act of refulling itself will consume a lot of fuel.
3. If they are deployed too near the LAC, they will be prime targets themselves and a very juicy one at that.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 16 Jul 2020 19:20

self deleted

sorry wrong thread.

Vinod Ji · Post by **Vinod Ji** » 16 Jul 2020 19:26

Anoop wrote:I have a question about the oft quoted "high airfield disadvantage in terms of payload and range" for the PLAAF in Tibet. Why can't they take off with full load of weapons but with lower internal fuel to keep total takeoff weight low and then top it up with air to air refuelers?

Thank you.

I think it is because of air density. with less air density has a lower lift. u can only fill the amount of fuel which is already burnt, not more. no have source for copy paste. Gurus can explain

Deans · Post by **Deans** » 16 Jul 2020 19:51

pankajs wrote:
Anoop wrote:I have a question about the oft quoted "high airfield disadvantage in terms of payload and range" for the PLAAF in Tibet. Why can't they take off with full load of weapons but with lower internal fuel to keep total takeoff weight low and then top it up with air to air refuelers?

Thank you.
I can think of 3. Others can add ...

1. Number of refulers that will need to be deployed to maintain operational tempo during a conflict.
2. How near or far from the LAC will the refulers be deployed. They can't be too deep for that will mean the act of refulling itself will consume a lot of fuel.
3. If they are deployed too near the LAC, they will be prime targets themselves and a very juicy one at that.

The PLAAF has a total of just 13 refuelling tankers, of which just 3 are modern IL-78s. That's nowhere near the number needed to sustain air operations across the LAC from Tibetan airbases.
The refuelling will have to take place close to the LAC, during which time the aircraft are very vulnerable.

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 16 Jul 2020 19:56

Thank you for your replies, Pankaj and Vinod.

Google suggests that the PLAAF does not have very many refuelers. In 2014, they began taking possession of 3 IL-78 refurbished tankers from Ukraine(the original order of 8 from Russia could not be filled due to trouble with Ukraine)

https://www.popsci.com/blog-network/eas ... al-tanker/

This report from 2020 suggests that the total number of refuelers they have is about 18 which include repurposed H-6 bombers for the refueling role:

https://southasianvoices.org/the-evolvi ... r-balance/

This is a very relevant and recent appraisal of PLAAF in Tibet.

https://cenjows.in/upload_images/pdf/PL ... l-2020.pdf

Opposite Ladakh, Ngari Gunsa a dual-use military and civil airport serving the town of Shiquanhe in Ngari Region can be used for fighter operations. Since the last major standoff between China and India at Doklam in 2017 military presence at the Ngari Gunsa Airport has been expanded and fighters have been stationed. The airport is 200 kilometres from Pangong Tso, Ladakh. ...Hotan, Yarkant and Kashgar are the other air fields North of Ladakh which can be used by PLAAF. Hotan is nearly 390 km far from Leh whereas, Kashgar is further 500 km NW of from Hotan (607 km from Leh). Yarkant lies in between Kashgar and Hotan and is 405 km from Leh. All these could be used by PLAAF for defence of the southern border, primarily the Karakoram Pass to the west and disputed Aksai Chin region. Far
location of these airfields naturally will impose limitations in fighter operations by PLAAF. These may also may also serve as bases for bomber operations and large cargo aircraft such as military transport ferrying heavy equipment, artillery and in case of war with India. The air fields are so far off from each other that these cannot mutually support each other which is vital
in fighter operations. In case of war with china, it will spread to other areas and not remain restricted to Ladakh region. Compared to the North, the Eastern sector opposite Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh are better served by air fields. But mutual support to other sectors is not feasible.
...The paper also surmises that higher elevation of these air field will limit the Chinese aircraft ability to carry only their half payload and fuel, unless PLAAF resorts in flight refuelling which as routine is not practicable as refuelers and fighters are vulnerable during refuelling. It clearly means that China would need to launch twice the number of sorties to achieve the results as against India which does not suffer this limitation at all. Further, except for the handful, most airfields don’t have hardened shelters or blast pens for protection of aircraft thus, making them vulnerable to the dedicated Indian air strikes. India in comparison do not suffer these limitations hence,IAF would be in position to achieve air superiority.

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 16 Jul 2020 20:21

I see that Deans has also said the same re the low number of refuelers in the PLAAF.

So that leads me to the second question - does the lack of PLAAF fighter cover over Tibet really affect their overall operations? Due to the flat terrain, their supply lines are exposed and the IAF is in a better to interdict it. So the PLAAF needs to deny IAF air superiority. Can it not do that with sufficient SAM (against GA aircraft) and MANPADS (against helos)?

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 16 Jul 2020 20:33

LIVE ...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wa_Yvqz6EvM
[LIVE AT 2000Hrs IST] India's LAC Conundrum: What Next?

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 16 Jul 2020 20:46

Anoop wrote:I have a question about the oft quoted "high airfield disadvantage in terms of payload and range" for the PLAAF in Tibet. Why can't they take off with full load of weapons but with lower internal fuel to keep total takeoff weight low and then top it up with air to air refuelers?

Thank you.

I just said the same thing above - use longer runways then top up in air. The issue is they have only go 15 odd H-6 class refuellers. They are vulnerable too. I find a lot of our claims re: PLAAF not having this, that to be specious. We have equal gaps if not worse and we manage. Their basic issue is lack of AFB to host a large number of aircraft w/all support ecosystem - IFR, AEW&C, EW - they will fix that, and deploy enough HQ-9/S-3/4-XX to make our task that much harder.

Gyan · Post by **Gyan** » 16 Jul 2020 21:09

When Chinese Fighter Aircraft take off from Tibet Airfields (except Hotan) what is the degradation? 40% of MTOW or 40% of payload?

Hotan, degradation of 25% of MTOW or 25% of Payload?

Why Chinese Construction machine never bothered to build HAS in Tibet (except Hotan)?

As refuelers would be flying from 2000km away, what will be response time? 4 hours? How many fighter sorties a day using refuelers? 25? 50?

Hotan can generate how many fighter sorties per day, 40? 80? 100?

How many strike & how many Air Defence sorties?

How fast Chinese Aircraft will degrade because they are Chinese & due to special problems of High Altitude Airfields?

Indian AF theoretical capacity of sorties per day? 1500? 3000? Per day? Response time? 1 hour? 2 hour?

Can Chinese S400 differentiate between Lakshya & Mirage 2000? How?

How much fuel IL-78/H-6 need to retain in their wings to prevent accelerated fatigue cracks?

nam · Post by **nam** » 16 Jul 2020 21:48

We should stop considering the high altitude degradation as a drawback for PLAAF. They would have easily figured out the good fuel, missile ,runway length combo to allow them to be at LAC and stay on station for long enough.

Let's not be dumb to think the Chinese would not have figured this obvious point. If PLA can invest in light tank and IFV, so can PLAAF.

However the lack of airbase and probably the distance is some drawback. I expect them to fix it.

To cover up these, they will saturate the LAC and our airspace with SAM HQ9/S300 etc or may be S400.

The prime job of PLAAF is to keep IAF busy. Keep IAF busy dodging BVR and SAM. PLA has enough assets for tactical firepower. Moreover these are static fights, where they can don't have to be dependent heavily on PLAAF for CAS. But PLA expects PLAAF will keep IAF away from providing support to IA.

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 16 Jul 2020 21:51

Thanks, Karan. Can you address my question about whether the current PLAAF fighter cover drawback is really a critical one as far as their warfighting doctrine goes? Even if they don't address it, if they deny the IAF air superiority through the use of the SAMs you mentioned, doesn't it serve their purpose?

When I look at the ground interdiction role the IAF and IA Aviation Corps has to perform, some points come to light:

1. The G219 and the Ngari airbase are quite close to the LAC (10s of km and 200 kms from Pangong Tso respectively). In other words, to interdict them the IAF doesn't have to establish an air superiority over a large depth of airspace.

2. However, the terrain on their side is such that even if the G219 is interdicted, vehicles can ply off-road while repair work is done. So the effect of that interdiction is going to be temporary. In contrast, our DSDBO road has long bridges that if disrupted, will effectively halt traffic. On the Chinese side, there is a similar 100 ft bridge across the Indus from the North to the South bank that can affect the movement of their troops to the Indus river valley approaching Demchok.

3. Helicopters flying from the Indian side have a screen of the mountain range running along the Indus river with peak heights in the range of 14,000 to 15,000 ft. There is no corresponding screen on the Chinese side. There are several SW-NE "valleys" across this mountain range that allow access to the valley below which both armies can use for armor. These "valleys" are also around 13000 ft ASL but have reasonably width (around 1 km or so). My question for Hari Nair Sir and Deejay Sir are:

1. Are these approaches feasible for helicopter operations - in terms of width, height and look-down angle to interdict armor?

2. If the IA were to employ MANPADs along these ridges, can they effectively stop PLA helicopter support for their armor?

Thank you

nam · Post by **nam** » 16 Jul 2020 21:51

The two absolutely critical asset for us to defeat the Chinis: Artillery & IAF.

If only our 155MM was ordered earlier...sigh.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 16 Jul 2020 22:06

nam wrote:The two absolutely critical asset for us to defeat the Chinis: Artillery & IAF.

If only our 155MM was ordered earlier...sigh.

The first, and perhaps the only asset we need is a - "plan". everything else will flow from that.

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 16 Jul 2020 22:37

An interesting talk by Lt. Gen. Narasimhan (R) on the PLA's reorganization. It would seem that the type of war they will initiate will be cyber, EW, drone intensive on the "soft-kill" side and missile and PGM intensive on the "hard-kill" side. In other words, we are unlikely to see the PLA commit a large number of troops to a task that could result in a large number of casualties.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KgaBpuGfsUU

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 16 Jul 2020 22:56

nam wrote:The two absolutely critical asset for us to defeat the Chinis: Artillery & IAF.

If only our 155MM was ordered earlier...sigh.

Where is the real estate to put up large fire bases, that won't be susceptible to counterfire or to air interdiction? Crest clearance to hit rear areas of PLA is difficult given the peak heights. On the other hand, PLA has the advantage or terrain to base their artillery further back and dispersed to provide different axes of fire.

Use of artillery in support of infantry to retake PLA positions on ridges may be a good use case, but unlike Kargil where the Pakistanis had trouble with resupply lines and were isolated, that is not the case with the PLA positions across Ladakh.

On the other hand, our ability to take out their radar and SAM sites across DBO and Fukche and stop an armored thrust through the Spanggur Gap and along the Indus Valley as well as keep our DSDBO road/bridges intact would be critical.

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 17 Jul 2020 00:16

RE: Negotiations

The current pullback is only for the next few weeks, till the complete pullback from depth locations. Border will be out of bounds for both sides and no foot patrol is allowed, so that no Galwan type incident occurs again.

GOI/IA view is that negotiations are going in favour of PRC. IA message to GOI is that we should not allow this buffer zone and holding of territory to become the new normal.

PRC/GOI have to decide whether to go in for another round of local talks or discuss via the usual PRC/India boundary committee (Yang and Doval).

Dilemma - continue talking while PRC just drag their feet and entrench OR conduct a mil operation.... The longer these talks go on the more ready PRC is...

IA asking for green light. GOI only gave amber for preparations. IA now slowly going public to force hand of politicians.

My view is they’ll opt for Yang/Doval option with a call with Xi. Last ditch... expect the worst possibility.

nam · Post by **nam** » 17 Jul 2020 01:52

Anoop wrote: Where is the real estate to put up large fire bases, that won't be susceptible to counterfire or to air interdiction? Crest clearance to hit rear areas of PLA is difficult given the peak heights. On the other hand, PLA has the advantage or terrain to base their artillery further back and dispersed to provide different axes of fire.

We have decades of experience using artillery on reverse slopes on LC. And it is not easy to counter these reverse slope positions. A miss of 10-15mtrs will result in rounds falling off in to valleys. And this is the crucial difference b/w our towed artillery and PLA. We have high angle of fire towed. 105 IFG or Bofors or Dhanush. All have high angle of fire, to clear the peaks.

The only confirmed way to neutralize reverse slope artillery is airpower or killer drones. As long as IAF is in the air, PLAAF cannot knock off our artillery.

Artillery is absolutely crucial to break off incoming PLA attacks. Just like how PA did against our forces in Kargil. 70% of our troops died from PA artillery in Kargil.

I would have to question our decades of experience, if we cannot find enough real estate along 3400KM of LAC for 155MM guns!

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 17 Jul 2020 02:27

Anoop wrote:An interesting talk by Lt. Gen. Narasimhan (R) on the PLA's reorganization. It would seem that the type of war they will initiate will be cyber, EW, drone intensive on the "soft-kill" side and missile and PGM intensive on the "hard-kill" side. In other words, we are unlikely to see the PLA commit a large number of troops to a task that could result in a large number of casualties.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KgaBpuGfsUU

_____________________
TWITTER

@KUNALBI25146617

In this short clip we are seeing China's ASN-301 anti-radiation loitering munition system, which is copy of Harpy system that was purchased by China in the 1990s, Will be explaining in depth.

+
Israel sold the Harpy to China in 1990s,20 years latter China show their own Harpy.

ASN-301 has same 135kg weight as the Harpy,but 2.5m it is slightly shorter than harpy 2.7m,endurance of 4hs,speed 220 km/h vs 180 km/h,its range is shorter 288km vs 500km.
+

China`s ASN-301 targets radar frequencies in 2-16 GHz and its radar homing device has a search range of 25 km. The system can target up to eight pre-set radar targets. Its 7,000-fragment warhead has a proximity laser fuse with a destructive range of 20 m.

https://twitter.com/KUNALBI25146617/sta ... 38625?s=19

@Firezsrater1:

It's also called the Harpy and was clearly part of the tech transfer package between Israel and the PRC (including the Lavi/J-10, Spike ATGM, AAM tech, AESA TRMs etc) before the US cracked down on the money-making.

https://twitter.com/Firezstarter1/statu ... 49573?s=19
(Suggest reading whole thread by Firestarter on this link)

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 17 Jul 2020 03:22

nam wrote:
Anoop wrote: Where is the real estate to put up large fire bases, that won't be susceptible to counterfire or to air interdiction? Crest clearance to hit rear areas of PLA is difficult given the peak heights. On the other hand, PLA has the advantage or terrain to base their artillery further back and dispersed to provide different axes of fire.
We have decades of experience using artillery on reverse slopes on LC. And it is not easy to counter these reverse slope positions. A miss of 10-15mtrs will result in rounds falling off in to valleys. And this is the crucial difference b/w our towed artillery and PLA. We have high angle of fire towed. 105 IFG or Bofors or Dhanush. All have high angle of fire, to clear the peaks.

The only confirmed way to neutralize reverse slope artillery is airpower or killer drones. As long as IAF is in the air, PLAAF cannot knock off our artillery.

Artillery is absolutely crucial to break off incoming PLA attacks. Just like how PA did against our forces in Kargil. 70% of our troops died from PA artillery in Kargil.

I would have to question our decades of experience, if we cannot find enough real estate along 3400KM of LAC for 155MM guns!

Plus in valleys only certain line of attack will work unless munitions are dropped from overhead where as on a plateau/flat land, a position is open on all sides.

OTOH, Lateral movement to dodge counter-fire is limited in a valley where as on a plateau/flat land repositioning is open on all sides to escape counter-fire.

My layman's understanding.

Manish_Sharma · Post by **Manish_Sharma** » 17 Jul 2020 05:40

2018 video on War Scenario between India and China: A Comparison

Indian Ground Troops:
Active Army : 1.2 million
Army Reserve: 960,00
Paramilitary: 1.4 million

Chinese Ground Troops:
Active army: 1.1 million
Army reserve: 510,000
Paramilitary: 660,000
--------------------------------

Indian Tanks
T-90M : 1300
Arjun: 124
T-90S: 300
T-72M1/2: 2000
TOTAL: 3500

Chinese Tanks:
ZTZ-99A: 350
ZTZ-99: 600
ZTZ-96A/B: 1500
ZTZ-96: 1100
ZTZ-88: 300
ZTZ-59/79: 2200
1050 various light/wheeled tanks
TOTAL: 7100
--------------------------------

Artillery:
Indian
Catapult 130mm, self-propelled: 40
2S1Gvozdika 122mm, self-propelled: 110
FV433 Abbot 105mm, self-propelled: 80
155mm, Towed: 500
122/130mm, Towed: 1120
105mm, towed 1350
MRL 300mm Smerch: 38
Pinaka MRL 214mm: 50
MRL 122mm: 150
TOTAL: 3435

China:
152/155mm, self-propelled: 760
122mm, self-propelled: 1650
152mm, Towed: 2100
122/130mm, Towed: 4100
300mm MRL: 175
107/122mm MRL: 1700
TOTAL: 10,395
__________________

Indian IFV/APCs:
BMP-2 Tracked IFV: 1800
BMP-1 Tracked IFV: 700
Tarmour Tracked heavy APC: 500
BTR-50 Tracked APC: 100
Wheeled APCs: 160
Anti-tank missile vehicles: 110
TOTAL: 3220

Chinese IFV/APCs:
ZBD94/ZBD86 Tracked IFV: 2150
ZBL09 WHEELED IFV: 500
Tracked APC: 4150
Wheeled APC: 2050
Anti-Tank missile vehicles: 900

TOTAL: 9750
__________________

Indian Transport Helicopters:
Mi8/17 Transport: 195
Sea King Transport: 11
Dhruv Light Utility: 230
various very light utility: 200
TOTAL: 636

Chinese transport Helicopters:
Mi-8/17 Transport: 250
Z-8/Sa321 Transport: 150
S-70 utility: 19
Z-9A light utility: 55
TOTAL: 474
___________________

IAF Fighters:
Su 30MKI: 235
Mig 29K: 45
Mig-29UPG: 63
Mirage: 51
Tejas: 10
Mig 21: 100
Mig 21 Bison: 40
TOTAL: 540
Chinese Fighters:
J-10B/C: 120
J-16: 50
J-11/J-15: 222
Su 30MKK: 100
Su 35: 5
J-10A/S: 315
J-11/Su-27: 145
J-8F/H: 145
J-7E/G: 300
J-7II/H: 120
TOTAL: 1520
___________________
Indian Conventional Missiles:
Klub Cruise Missile: Dozens
Brahmos Cruise Missile: 100
Prithvi Ballistic Missile: 200

Chinese Conventional Missiles:
AKD-20/CJ-10 Cruise Missile: 2500 Km
3M-14E Klub/YJ18 Cruise Missiles: 100
DF015B Ballistic Missile Range 800Km: 400
DF-11A Ballisti missile Range 600Km: 600
DF-21/CD Ballistic Missiles Range 2000Km: 200
DF-16 Ballisti missile, Range 1000Km: 50
DF-26 Ballistic Missiles, Range 3500Km: 50
___________________

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 17 Jul 2020 06:09

nam wrote: We have decades of experience using artillery on reverse slopes on LC.

Cross LoC tube artillery duels have occurred in Poonch, Rajauri and Nowshera sectors. The terrain there is very different on both sides, allowing sufficient depth to cite artillery units.

Except for opposite the Depsang plains, such a situation is not there on the LAC in the Ladakh sector. Just as an example, in 1962 Rezang La was crested against Indian artillery support because of the intervening Pt. 18300. And looking at the terrain in Depsang, if we have to break up massed armor formations, I would choose rocket artillery, not tube artillery.

And even in Kargil, the tube artillery batteries were dispersed in twos and threes due to lack of space or crowded together wheel to wheel.

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spot ... argil-war/

All have high angle of fire, to clear the peaks.

It is not sufficient to clear peaks, it is also necessary to have the needed trajectory on the other side to be able to hit targets at depth. The higher the angle of fire to clear crests, the narrower the range on the other side. That is why direct fire mode was used in Kargil, because we were targeting bunkers on the mountain tops.

Just like how PA did against our forces in Kargil. 70% of our troops died from PA artillery in Kargil.

That number does not sound right - source please. Rather, 80% of PA casualties were caused by our artillery fire. And that was because they were stationary targets, not moving columns.

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... 216559.cms

It is also an correct comparison because we had only the NH-1A for supply convoys which was interdicted by PA causing casualties, whereas that is not the case on the Chinese side as far as approaches go.

I would have to question our decades of experience, if we cannot find enough real estate along 3400KM of LAC for 155MM guns!

Non sequitur. The question is not about lateral length and even if that were the case, what is the relevance of 3400 km when we are talking about a less than 100 km frontage in Ladakh now?

It is also worth thinking why there is the purchase of limited number of M-777 ULH (even if it is 155 mm caliber), a USP of which is its ability to be transported between valleys.

https://nenow.in/neighbour/indian-army- ... vijay.html

What does that say about how many artillery tubes are expected to be employed as full battery detachments?

This is not to discount the use of artillery. Merely to suggest that to prevail over the Chinese in Ladakh, that is not likely to be the decisive arm.

Anoop · Post by **Anoop** » 17 Jul 2020 06:22

A glimpse from Ex. Changthan Prahar in Ladakh from Sept 2019 of what the IA thinks is important:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fFYt2Ri ... e=youtu.be

The para drop is from helicopters.

https://zeenews.india.com/india/watch-h ... 35234.html

D.Mahesh · Post by **D.Mahesh** » 17 Jul 2020 06:45

Philip wrote:Mahesh,don't shoot the messenger,counter the message....don't annoy China".

I haven't seen anything this bass ackwards. Extremely surprising that you would lend any credence to a report in T.H. that is entirely based on desk-work on Mount Road.
This incident wouldn't have happened but for the aggressive Indian buildup - uncharacteristic - over the last six years.