India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020

SriKumar · Post by **SriKumar** » 06 Sep 2020 20:34

mody wrote:https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news ... dden-story

A good read.

Quite the find. Not seen any article that gives such details, and is written cleanly. He did not say how their armored troop carriers and the associated convoy was stopped/forced to turn back. Either a couple of anti-tank missiles were fired, or worse, the Chinese army were just shown the weapons and the forces retreated. (He did say the first attempt was turned back after some shots were fired- they were not expecting it

after being imformed explicitly and officially of the policy change by GOI after Galwan. They did not believe it or thought Indian Army would not dare to fire at them and were not prepared for it.). They must be experiencing culture shock after their convey was 'dissuaded'. The author also mentions a cement road from Moldo to Rezang La. This whole thing sounds funnily like what Chola has been saying all along ...they built nice roads to the very frontlines but were not prepared to shoot in their march forward.

. Another thing- it appears that the IA, IAF and Navy were prepared for an all out war to begin when this operation was executed.

KLNMurthy · Post by **KLNMurthy** » 06 Sep 2020 20:42

csharma wrote:https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news ... dden-story

...

Riveting account.

Doesn’t talk about the clash with PLA that resulted in the loss of SFF JCO.

Also no clarity on Chinese POWs.

SriKumar · Post by **SriKumar** » 06 Sep 2020 20:51

^^^ It did read a bit like an Alistair MacLean story. One of his lines is 'India was caught off-guard'. He needs to be a bit careful about saying such things unless it is actually true and he meant it. There is also a note about IA not happy with the sticks-and-stones mode of fighting. I assume that has stopped now? I am especially curious whether larger cailber weapons (like anti-tank weapons) were discharged in the process of convincing the PLA armored personnel carriers to go back- if true it means India will bring all its weapons to bear in any conflict with PLA now. He does report that personal arms were discharged to dissuade their first assault from PLA troops. (Author reports their troop strength at 20,000).

rajkhalsa · Post by **rajkhalsa** » 06 Sep 2020 21:05

May be more relevant for the history thread, but here's a declassified 1963 CIA document showing Indian and Chinese positions on Feb 1963. Nice resource for place names and topographic features.

Excellent-quality TALENT photography of [] has revealed details of military defenses and related support facilities in the vicinity of Chushul, India, in the Sine-Indian border region (Figure l). The area covered extends from 33-00 N to 34-00 N and from 78-15E to 79-15E and includes Indian, Chinese, and disputed territory. Determinations of Chinese or Indian occupancy of the defenses are based on the orientation of firing bays, trenches, and gun positions.

This report covers numerous military areas and installations observed (items 1-20 on Figure 2). Annotated photographs (Figures 3 through
4) illustrate the major items. Of special interest are a small Indian landing strip, the Indian mine field and Indian and Chinese strongpoints at the west end of Spanggur Tso (Lake), and the absence of armored vehicles in the area. Although the general photographic quality is high, the obliquity of much of it and the presence of deep shadows in the mountainous terrain may preclude the identification of additional military installations, armored equipment, or roads. Geographic locations have been determined from available maps of this area, which are of only poor to fair reliability.

Found via Wikipedia. Full citation:

"SINO-INDIAN BORDER DEFENSE CHUSHUL AREA" (PDF). National Photographic Interpretation Center. February 1963. Archived from the original (PDF) on 23 January 2017. Retrieved 20 May 2020 – via CIA. Alt URL

sanjayc · Post by **sanjayc** » 06 Sep 2020 21:19

In Chushul’s forbidding heights, locals supply water, other essentials to Indian troops

Around 60 locals, including women from Chushul and Merak villages volunteered to deliver water and other essential commodities to the heights of Black Top.

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-ne ... x3AlI.html

Suresh S · Post by **Suresh S** » 06 Sep 2020 21:28

https://twitter.com/kstanzinladakh/stat ... 52/photo/1

jai hind

hanumadu · Post by **hanumadu** » 06 Sep 2020 21:47

From where/how do the chinese front line troops on LAC get their supplies of food, fuel, ammunition from? Is it from Ngari?

How about us? I am assuming since our population centres are closer to LAC and spread across the Ladakh region, we have a more distributed supply of food, ammunition and weapons.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 06 Sep 2020 21:49

Is there any truth to this

The Wolfpack@TheWolfpackIN
CCP run China Merchant Port Holdings attempts to acquire 50% of a shipping terminal in India and in Vietnam have been stalled by Indian & Vietnam govts.
4:54 PM · Aug 29, 2020·

Sharp Shooter@activator_n
CCP run China Merchant Port Holdings attempts to acquire 50% of a shipping terminal in India and in Vietnam have been stalled by Indian & Vietnam govts.
11:31 PM · Aug 29, 2020

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 06 Sep 2020 21:51

Care / Comfort packages for troops

Hope some leading personalities in India come forward to raise funds for the army to buy some comfort items like sunglasses (needed in mountains not a fashion statement), additional gloves, sox, thermals, food items like chocolates, toothpaste, etc. With the money create comfort /care packages and send the packages to the troops posted in the mountains, it server 2 purposes tells the troops that the folks back home care for them and provides some minimum comfort, just like US citizens do and send the care / comfort packages to troops in Afghanistan.

This effort has to start in India because non Indian people can't start raising funds for Indian army.
Once the fund raising starts NRI can also contribute to it.

manjgu · Post by **manjgu** » 06 Sep 2020 21:57

hanumadu wrote:From where/how do the chinese front line troops on LAC get their supplies of food, fuel, ammunition from? Is it from Ngari?

How about us? I am assuming since our population centres are closer to LAC and spread across the Ladakh region, we have a more distributed supply of food, ammunition and weapons.

Leh ....Tangste...nyoma

manjgu · Post by **manjgu** » 06 Sep 2020 22:04

hanumadu wrote:From where/how do the chinese front line troops on LAC get their supplies of food, fuel, ammunition from? Is it from Ngari?

How about us? I am assuming since our population centres are closer to LAC and spread across the Ladakh region, we have a more distributed supply of food, ammunition and weapons.

Leh is the nearest population centre.. there is a single road to tangste ..onward to nyoma..to chushul or ( not sure a track thru maan ..merak villages)

to gogra ..hotsprings is tangste..phobrang...

leh > durbuk ( which is close to tangste) > shyok village > DBO road... ( to galwan...DBO )

unfortunately everything in Leh ( from sugar to dal/chawal to atta to cooking oil to maggi to biscuit to cold drink to juice to petrol to disel) comes from kashmir side or Himachal side ( which are really the population centres which produce something). foodgrains/petrol/diesel comes from punjab. so our logistics is also quite stretched.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Sep 2020 22:32

Guys Why are you in Indian journalist mode and want operational details? Should be circumspect especailly being on BRF for years!

pushkar.bhat · Post by **pushkar.bhat** » 06 Sep 2020 22:49

@Ramana don't you think we need to go to part 2 of this thread. Already at 201 pages now. Earlier we used to cut over at 100.

rsangram · Post by **rsangram** » 06 Sep 2020 22:56

There is scant information and attention paid to what I believe is the most important sub sector - Depsang. From all reports, the Chinese have effectively completely blocked Indian patrolling in areas, which fall inside what India considers its territory - and there are no doubts that it is Indian territory - just not yet under its full control.

Can the experts enlighten us on the following.

1. What are the short term, medium term and long term implications if the Chinese continue to block Indian patrolling and our side is not able to "pry it open", so to speak.

2. What are the prospects that the Chinese will remove the block to Indian patrolling in the near future ? In what scenarios will the Chinese remove such blocks and how feasible, realistic and probable will such scenarios actually come to pass ?

3. Is it not true, that by putting such blocks in place, the Chinese have effectively gained several hundred sq kms of territory which we consider our own?

4. Is it not true, that if this situation on Depsang continues, that it poses an existential risk to Daulat Beg Oldie, and then Korakoram Pass and then ultimately to Siachen ?

5. Does the Indian Army and affiliated forces have any options in Depsang to pull a "Black Top" to gain any leverage in that sub sector or level the playing field there ? If so, what ?

6. Considering the terrain, the buildup on both sides, the deployments on both sides, the relative strength of both in Depsang sector, how likely is it that the Chinese can do very significant damage to Indian strategic defense and take over significant territory there, if they choose to make moves in that sector ?

7. As overall assessment of Depsang sector.

Thanks.

pushkar.bhat · Post by **pushkar.bhat** » 06 Sep 2020 23:12

SriKumar wrote:^^^ It did read a bit like an Alistair MacLean story. .... I am especially curious whether larger cailber weapons (like anti-tank weapons) were discharged in the process of convincing the PLA armored personnel carriers to go back- if true it means India will bring all its weapons to bear in any conflict with PLA now. He does report that personal arms were discharged to dissuade their first assault from PLA troops. (Author reports their troop strength at 20,000).

Well if the T-15 carries an active protection suite then I would have just light up the target with a laser. A whole bunch of Laser alerts will be adequate to send a warning. Alternately, fire a few flares to tell them that we can harm them if they continue.

I too am wondering what is the current disposition of the Moldo Garrison for the Chinese. That will tell us what they are willing to write off if they carry out an aggressive manoeuvre.

The stand-off on the South Bank of Pangangso reminds me of the Battle of Palkhed where Peshwa Baji Rao laid a seize to the Nizam of Hyderabad and forced a treaty where the Nizam was forced to make concessions to the Maratha. The only difference is that this time over the Chinese are trapped between a lake and a mountain whereas the Nizam was struck in a valley.

darshan · Post by **darshan** » 06 Sep 2020 23:40

VinodTK wrote:Care / Comfort packages for troops

Hope some leading personalities in India come forward to raise funds for the army to buy some comfort items like sunglasses (needed in mountains not a fashion statement), additional gloves, sox, thermals, food items like chocolates, toothpaste, etc. With the money create comfort /care packages and send the packages to the troops posted in the mountains, it server 2 purposes tells the troops that the folks back home care for them and provides some minimum comfort, just like US citizens do and send the care / comfort packages to troops in Afghanistan.

This effort has to start in India because non Indian people can't start raising funds for Indian army.
Once the fund raising starts NRI can also contribute to it.

+1. That's where contribution matters. Else, they are already on the ground and maps being flipped back and forth here is not helping them as much if not scaring them of information spill.

darshan · Post by **darshan** » 06 Sep 2020 23:41

chetak wrote:Is there any truth to this

Article in neutering thread.

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=7610&start=4760#p2457204

fanne · Post by **fanne** » 06 Sep 2020 23:42

rsangram wrote:There is scant information and attention paid to what I believe is the most important sub sector - Depsang. From all reports, the Chinese have effectively completely blocked Indian patrolling in areas, which fall inside what India considers its territory - and there are no doubts that it is Indian territory - just not yet under its full control.

Can the experts enlighten us on the following.

4. Is it not true, that if this situation on Depsang continues, that it poses an existential risk to Daulat Beg Oldie, and then Korakoram Pass and then ultimately to Siachen ?

5. Does the Indian Army and affiliated forces have any options in Depsang to pull a "Black Top" to gain any leverage in that sub sector or level the playing field there ? If so, what ?

6. Considering the terrain, the buildup on both sides, the deployments on both sides, the relative strength of both in Depsang sector, how likely is it that the Chinese can do very significant damage to Indian strategic defense and take over significant territory there, if they choose to make moves in that sector ?

7. As overall assessment of Depsang sector.

Thanks.

We have 2 armor regiments (nearly 100 + tanks) in the Spangur TSo area (as per news from few days back, unless the journalist reported it wrong). That area is so small,I don't know how we will play with 100 tanks (Chinese also have their armor behind Moldo post).

Now thing of Depsang plain. It is 10-20 times bigger than Spangar gap. We have regiments of armor (how many you can extrapolate). Of course chinese also have their mechanized division - armor, famously their light tanks (which in my humble opinion will prove to be a good target practice for the heavy tanks - T72/T90). I would make a guess, we have some 300-400 tanks only, along with more IFV, Apaches, IAF , artillery etc. I think we have amassed quite a bit and have let the conventional wisdom have sway - that we are poor and poorly equipped. If chinese also believe in these, they are in for a huge surprise.

hanumadu · Post by **hanumadu** » 06 Sep 2020 23:43

manjgu wrote:
hanumadu wrote:From where/how do the chinese front line troops on LAC get their supplies of food, fuel, ammunition from? Is it from Ngari?

How about us? I am assuming since our population centres are closer to LAC and spread across the Ladakh region, we have a more distributed supply of food, ammunition and weapons.
Leh is the nearest population centre.. there is a single road to tangste ..onward to nyoma..to chushul or ( not sure a track thru maan ..merak villages)

to gogra ..hotsprings is tangste..phobrang...

leh > durbuk ( which is close to tangste) > shyok village > DBO road... ( to galwan...DBO )

unfortunately everything in Leh ( from sugar to dal/chawal to atta to cooking oil to maggi to biscuit to cold drink to juice to petrol to disel) comes from kashmir side or Himachal side ( which are really the population centres which produce something). foodgrains/petrol/diesel comes from punjab. so our logistics is also quite stretched.

After Ramana's comment, I will just say that their production centers are much farther away than India's and their logistics might be much easier to disrupt than ours by special forces or air attacks.

hanumadu · Post by **hanumadu** » 06 Sep 2020 23:49

‘China Is An Anxious State; All Its Actions Are Driven By That Mental Condition’

The guest says that their internal security budget has exceeded their external security budget and the CCP has stopped reporting it.

hanumadu · Post by **hanumadu** » 06 Sep 2020 23:55

I am trying to find out their supply routes from Ngari to LAC. There is the G219 and a couple of branches from it to LAC, but I am unable to zoom in enough to see the details like condition of the roads or terrain. Will try and explore more on them.

nam · Post by **nam** » 07 Sep 2020 00:00

What are the short term, medium term and long term implications if the Chinese continue to block Indian patrolling and our side is not able to "pry it open", so to speak.

We will continue doing salami slicing. We plan to stay in winter. So either PLA has to stay with us or leave the place to continue our salami slicing.

The Chinis have painted them in to the corner. Their salami tactics worked, as long as we didn't respond.

Even if they decide to go for war... AND even if they win...PLA has to maintain the force to guard the ENTIRE 3400 KM LAC! Because in winter.. we will move in to places we "lost" or on to a new place!

nam · Post by **nam** » 07 Sep 2020 00:08

The Chinese have been huffing and puffing the entire week, because they realize, their own medicine has been tried on them!

They might end up guarding the entire 3400KM LAC throughout the year.. Half of PLA will have to be in Tibet, instead of basking in the glamour of facing the TFTA Americans.

Once the winter sets in, PLA's TFTA Type 15, IFVs and all other kit will be useless in the snow. It will ALL Infantry. Guess who has more men on LAC..

Y I Patel · Post by **Y I Patel** » 07 Sep 2020 00:10

The Sunday Guardian article - very well written overall, but it is the details that sent a thrill down my spine:

First, it was a brigade level assault (let's now call it what it actually was). This was known though from previous articles. Now it gets exciting

The assault brigade (which contained SFF, Shikh Light Infantry, one other battalion) was part of a reserve mountain brigade that was deployed to Ladakh. Okay, some new information, but again we knew that two divs have been moved to Eastern Ladakh. Now brace yourselves...

The mountain division was put under the operational control of the newly raised Mountain Strike Corps. So the assault has been carried out by a formation commanded by the Strike Corps. What a debut for the youngest Corps formation!! Jai Ho!

I hope people realize just how big this is. Two additional divs moved to Ladakh, but reports so far speak of GOC 14 Corps handling negotiations with the Chinese... but I was feeling deep inside that 4 divs and the entire UT of Ladakh is way too big a responsibility for 14 Corps, especially if a two front situation develops. Now we have confirmation that there is an additional Corps operating in Ladakh, and it is the one that is purposely configured to be a mountain strike corps. Remember the media reports of ITBP deployment? Now you see why it is being played up... would you want units of your strike corps tied down defending a pass, when their DNA says attack??

Some speculation now... maybe 14 Corps will face west, and 17 MSC will face east. Dividing line in north Siachen Glacier passes (Siachen Brigade will continue to be under 14 Corps)

All three east facing divs will come under operational control of 17 MSC. One div up north Murgo to KKP, one in the central zone (Galwan to Chushul and including the two lakes) and one in the southern Zone (Dungti to Demchok and Chumar)

I have not felt this way since I read about the three strike corps deployed side by side in Parakram. Just hope this time we do not have the same denouement to the mobilization!

shyamd · Post by **shyamd** » 07 Sep 2020 00:48

KLNMurthy wrote:
csharma wrote:https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news ... dden-story

...
Riveting account.

Doesn’t talk about the clash with PLA that resulted in the loss of SFF JCO.

Also no clarity on Chinese POWs.

There is disinfo. Not all of it in this article is correct. It’s good that sensitive details in the article has been hidden and or changed

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 07 Sep 2020 00:54

hanumadu wrote:From where/how do the chinese front line troops on LAC get their supplies of food, fuel, ammunition from? Is it from Ngari?

How about us? I am assuming since our population centres are closer to LAC and spread across the Ladakh region, we have a more distributed supply of food, ammunition and weapons.

On the Chinese side they are connected to Rutog which is about ~110km from Moldo, this is also where their road joins G219. Ngari is still about ~100 to the south, closer to Dehmchok area.

Also just noticed unlike North bank of Pangong So - Grgra/HotSprings - Galwan (and then into Aksai Chin) which are highly interconnected with roads, Spanggur appears to have only one road joining it all the way to G219 (the North is cutoff by Pangong and the south is only mountains and the Indus valley till Dhemchok. So by my armchair analysis they have far less flexibility in moving around their troops in this sector.

Vips · Post by **Vips** » 07 Sep 2020 01:08

BRO ropes in new machines, working 24x7 to provide faster passages to security forces in Ladakh.

The Border Road Organisation (BRO) has started working round the clock to complete the work on all roads connecting Leh and clean the patches which have seen landslides or were blocked otherwise amid a tense stand-off with China.

The work will help facilitate the armed forces who have to move heavy machines and other weaponry to required locations.According to the BRO officials, latest machines have been roped in costing crores of rupees to cut the road and frequent blasting is also being carried out.

Apart from this, BRO workers and hired labourers have been asked to work even on weekends and in double shifts. The workforce has also been increased considerably, sensing the gravity of the current situation at the China border.

"In the current situation, to help the Army and other forces to transport any heavy pieces of machinery, BRO has adopted the latest machine which you won't find in any other part of India. These machines are also reducing human risk and we are also dealing with explosives to cut mountains to build the roads," B Kishan, Executive Engineer Officer commanding, 81 Road Construction Company, BRO told ANI

"With this new machine, our speed of making roads has increased 10 times. We can now build roads very easily and swiftly as the machine helps us fix explosives to break rocks," Kishan added.

BRO has also been connecting the roads as per the requirement of forces. Amid the current situation at the China border, BRO has linked a road to Ladakh through Padam-Yulchung-Sumdo to Khalsi on National Highway 1. This will allow security forces to immediately use this third access route for operational purposes.

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 07 Sep 2020 01:20

Mort Walker wrote:Is there any estimate of how many PLA troops there are in Moldo and what are their supply lines?

IMO too much is being made of the significance of Moldo by the media, it's not a a modern day fort or a sprawling military complex, more administrative than anything. The main building is ~60mx20m with a few smaller adjacent building. There is another facility a few 100m's behind with a similar sized main building (and a basket ball court for R&R

) - all great for border policing, but once artillery and airstrikes start I would not want be anywhere close to that. Also the actual PLA camps are dispersed for nearly 10Km along the southern bank starting from Moldo.

hanumadu · Post by **hanumadu** » 07 Sep 2020 01:35

abhik wrote:
hanumadu wrote:From where/how do the chinese front line troops on LAC get their supplies of food, fuel, ammunition from? Is it from Ngari?

How about us? I am assuming since our population centres are closer to LAC and spread across the Ladakh region, we have a more distributed supply of food, ammunition and weapons.
On the Chinese side they are connected to Rutog which is about ~110km from Moldo, this is also where their road joins G219. Ngari is still about ~100 to the south, closer to Dehmchok area.

Also just noticed unlike North bank of Pangong So - Grgra/HotSprings - Galwan (and then into Aksai Chin) which are highly interconnected with roads, Spanggur appears to have only one road joining it all the way to G219 (the North is cutoff by Pangong and the south is only mountains and the Indus valley till Dhemchok. So by my armchair analysis they have far less flexibility in moving around their troops in this sector.

Rutog seems to be much smaller than Ngari. Also it is probably a military town rather than civilians living there. After Rutog, the G219 road follows along the east bank of Pongang Tso till the north edge of the lake and then a road follows along the the north bank of Pongang Tso till LAC. If you measure the road along the shore line, it probably will come up to 150 km - many twists and turns. The road is most prone to disruptions on the banks of Pangong Tso, east and north. Also in case of war, our first strike will be on Ngari and Rutong.

Karan M · Post by **Karan M** » 07 Sep 2020 01:42

Read between the lines. Our first real deployment of IBG happened on the LAC.
https://www.timesnownews.com/india/arti ... ina/502234

abhik · Post by **abhik** » 07 Sep 2020 02:17

As per Wiki the population of whole of Ngari Prefecture (which includes Rutog to the North, and Kailash Mansarovar area to the south) is less that 100k, with the "Shiquanhe" town said to have a population of upto 20K.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ngari_Prefecture

williams · Post by **williams** » 07 Sep 2020 02:26

rsangram wrote:There is scant information and attention paid to what I believe is the most important sub sector - Depsang. From all reports, the Chinese have effectively completely blocked Indian patrolling in areas, which fall inside what India considers its territory - and there are no doubts that it is Indian territory - just not yet under its full control.

Can the experts enlighten us on the following.

1. What are the short term, medium term and long term implications if the Chinese continue to block Indian patrolling and our side is not able to "pry it open", so to speak.

2. What are the prospects that the Chinese will remove the block to Indian patrolling in the near future ? In what scenarios will the Chinese remove such blocks and how feasible, realistic and probable will such scenarios actually come to pass ?

3. Is it not true, that by putting such blocks in place, the Chinese have effectively gained several hundred sq kms of territory which we consider our own?

4. Is it not true, that if this situation on Depsang continues, that it poses an existential risk to Daulat Beg Oldie, and then Korakoram Pass and then ultimately to Siachen ?

5. Does the Indian Army and affiliated forces have any options in Depsang to pull a "Black Top" to gain any leverage in that sub sector or level the playing field there ? If so, what ?

6. Considering the terrain, the buildup on both sides, the deployments on both sides, the relative strength of both in Depsang sector, how likely is it that the Chinese can do very significant damage to Indian strategic defense and take over significant territory there, if they choose to make moves in that sector ?

7. As overall assessment of Depsang sector.

Thanks.

So based on whatever is available in the OS, the spot where the Chinese have occupied is 18 km inside the LAC. It blocks us access to PP 10, 11, 12 and 13 from Burtse camp. The points especially 12, and 13 provides direct line of sight on to DSDBO road. More than access to tanks, this provides the chinese guns, more accurate guidance to target DSDBO supply route. There are some heights that IA can occupy to have their sight trained on the bottle neck area, but it is three or four times difficult to hike and supply those heights. We should push them out now, if we need to keep that road safe in the winter.

pankajs · Post by **pankajs** » 07 Sep 2020 02:57

^^
The Chinese IIRC have "blocked" our patrol around bottleneck areas but haven't "occupied" bottleneck area per say.

One may legitimately ask what the difference is between "blocked" and "occupied" when both "may" result in permanent loss of territory? The difference is that the Chinese haven't created any new infra or deployed forces on the ground which "occupied" would suggest.

IIRC, when the Chinese did the same thing in 2013 they had moved troops into the same area and built some track/road right up to that point as well as installed surveillance to monitor the junction plus some infra in that "grey zone". In-spite of their withdrawal then the status quo wasn't exactly restored in terms of what the Chinese had built e.g. Track/Road wasn't destroyed.

OTOH, our access to the bottleneck is by foot patrol through rough terrain. What that means is that much before our troops reach the bottleneck area the Chinse see our approach using their superior 24x7 surveillance system, mount their vehicles from their base nearby and intercept our patrol just as they reach the area thus "blocking" us at the bottleneck after which they return to their base.

At least this was the situation when it was initially reported and one reason we have seen no OSINT images of the area because there is hardly any change on the ground that can be spotted by satellite!

There was discussion on this at that time. I will re-link some of the posts from past when I find time to go back. The ground situation may have changed now but I am not aware of it except that both side have made heavy deployment in that sector after that time.

Also we've had about 39 re-adjustments done along the LAC in Ladakh and some of them might have taken place in Depsang plains for all that we know.

Mort Walker · Post by **Mort Walker** » 07 Sep 2020 03:05

hanumadu wrote:I am trying to find out their supply routes from Ngari to LAC. There is the G219 and a couple of branches from it to LAC, but I am unable to zoom in enough to see the details like condition of the roads or terrain. Will try and explore more on them.

China Highway S301 runs along the south side of Spanngur Tso to Moldo Post and into the Spanngur gap. It is likely the route where the PLA motorized and mechanized divisions came in, along with most likely surface resupply. The IA has a clear line-of-sight from the heights of Rezang La. It looks like a checkmate situation and it is unlikely the PLA will apply pressure here without facing significant losses.

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Eg_QZ1VU8AI ... ame=medium

Mort Walker · Post by **Mort Walker** » 07 Sep 2020 03:11

williams wrote:
rsangram wrote:There is scant information and attention paid to what I believe is the most important sub sector - Depsang. From all reports, the Chinese have effectively completely blocked Indian patrolling in areas, which fall inside what India considers its territory - and there are no doubts that it is Indian territory - just not yet under its full control.

Can the experts enlighten us on the following.

1. What are the short term, medium term and long term implications if the Chinese continue to block Indian patrolling and our side is not able to "pry it open", so to speak.

2. What are the prospects that the Chinese will remove the block to Indian patrolling in the near future ? In what scenarios will the Chinese remove such blocks and how feasible, realistic and probable will such scenarios actually come to pass ?

3. Is it not true, that by putting such blocks in place, the Chinese have effectively gained several hundred sq kms of territory which we consider our own?

4. Is it not true, that if this situation on Depsang continues, that it poses an existential risk to Daulat Beg Oldie, and then Korakoram Pass and then ultimately to Siachen ?

5. Does the Indian Army and affiliated forces have any options in Depsang to pull a "Black Top" to gain any leverage in that sub sector or level the playing field there ? If so, what ?

6. Considering the terrain, the buildup on both sides, the deployments on both sides, the relative strength of both in Depsang sector, how likely is it that the Chinese can do very significant damage to Indian strategic defense and take over significant territory there, if they choose to make moves in that sector ?

7. As overall assessment of Depsang sector.

Thanks.
So based on whatever is available in the OS, the spot where the Chinese have occupied is 18 km inside the LAC. It blocks us access to PP 10, 11, 12 and 13 from Burtse camp. The points especially 12, and 13 provides direct line of sight on to DSDBO road. More than access to tanks, this provides the chinese guns, more accurate guidance to target DSDBO supply route. There are some heights that IA can occupy to have their sight trained on the bottle neck area, but it is three or four times difficult to hike and supply those heights. We should push them out now, if we need to keep that road safe in the winter.

The PLA has to be resupplied to maintain that location. Either by air or surface route. Both should be strangled.

g.sarkar · Post by **g.sarkar** » 07 Sep 2020 04:10

https://www.timesnownews.com/india/arti ... icle-india
Indian Army sends hotline message to Chinese PLA over 'abduction of 5 Indians from Arunachal Pradesh'India
Times Now, Sep 06, 2020
New Delhi: Union Minister Kiren Rijiju on Sunday said that the Indian Army has sent a hotline message to Chinese People’s Liberation Army establishment at the border point in Arunachal Pradesh in connection with the five Indians who were allegedly abducted by the Chinese army.
India is still awaiting a response on the hotline by the Chinese PLA commanders, Rijiju, who is the MP from Arunachal Pradesh, said.
Congress MLA Ninong Ering on Saturday alleged that the PLA troops have abducted five people from Upper Subansiri district in Arunachal Pradesh. He said that the PLA kidnapped five boys from Nacho village of the district. “China's PLA (People's Liberation Army) has abducted five boys from Nacho, Upper Subansiri in Arunachal Pradesh. This has happened at a time when Rajanath Singh is meeting defence ministers of Russia and China. PLA's action has sent a very wrong message,” the Congress MLA was quoted as saying by ANI.
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Gautam

k prasad · Post by **k prasad** » 07 Sep 2020 05:23

williams wrote: So based on whatever is available in the OS, the spot where the Chinese have occupied is 18 km inside the LAC. It blocks us access to PP 10, 11, 12 and 13 from Burtse camp. The points especially 12, and 13 provides direct line of sight on to DSDBO road. More than access to tanks, this provides the chinese guns, more accurate guidance to target DSDBO supply route. There are some heights that IA can occupy to have their sight trained on the bottle neck area, but it is three or four times difficult to hike and supply those heights. We should push them out now, if we need to keep that road safe in the winter.

https://ibb.co/9c370X6

If there is indeed a Chinese force at the bottleneck, we should try and flank them from the heights and cut them off in a siege fashion. The bottleneck cuts both ways.

fanne · Post by **fanne** » 07 Sep 2020 05:42

https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation ... 92933.html

I hope members understand the meaning between the line. Why would of all places chinese civilians (or scouts in disguise if they were that) show up at Indian side of LAC at such a height? Doklam, mind you can be reached by road from china but is very tough and it is after many hair pin turns. Logic dictates that many of these points are manned by PLA (google images will confirm that). Moreover, with tension high, civilians may not be allowed near it. So why did Chinese citizen reach so near to be stopped by IA?
As one of the BR member just wrote few pages back that he was in Chusul and in the lake area as well (many films were shot there). Chinese citizen would also be similarly coming to places which is in China ('s border). But if the ownership of land suddenly changed, and the general citizen was not informed, he would encounter the new landlord.
Now next question - We have occupied 30 hill tops - yes only in one sector. There are many more sectors, and you have one more proof of 'occupation'.

fanne · Post by **fanne** » 07 Sep 2020 05:45

the general area where armor can come through in Spangur gap - (look at the second right of the map)

https://ifenewsnetwork.com/chushul-turn ... -deployed/

Anujan · Post by **Anujan** » 07 Sep 2020 07:15

One of the things you have to admire the Chinese for though is:

1) They have built roads everywhere, like ants. I hope SDREs dont think of occupying the ridge line as a temporary thing and build roads so they can be supplied, instead of utilizing porters. I do not know anything about building roads up mountain ridges, but at least the roads which can be used by specialized vehicles and a few warm pre-fab huts and sangars will make 24x7 deployment there easier

2) Going by the timeline (Aug 2019 for road repairs on chinese side, "logistics exercises" to practice moving men and material, things like light tanks and truck mounted arty -- the Chinese are preparing for war in this sector, and they have been doing this methodically for years. We on the other hand are in (I dont recall what phase) of LCH acquisition. There is no truck mounted arty. FICV is stuck (I dont know whether I should laugh or cry, but if you read the FICV saga: It is stuck because there is a debate on whether the project should follow Make-1 or Make-2 rules), we are thinking of importing light tanks.

Let us assume that Chinese withdraw today. What will be our preparedness in say 3 years? Will there be light tanks? Truck mounted arty? UAV based surveillance? LCH? Arms for LCH?