India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

[RajaRudra]

https://m.timesofindia.com/india/diseng ... 157832.cms

China shifting onus on disengagement on India.

Msy be, IA should capture some more tops and put onus on China..

[williams]

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/road-to-daulet-beg-oldi-will-allow-tank-movement-by-oct-15-as-army-prepares-for-ladakh-winter/story-2DMzLy5y1rZCyWvLWAd6tO.html

With an aim to keep weapon deployment in East Ladakh to match the PLA build-up in occupied Aksai Chin, the BRO is expected to strengthen all bridges and culverts to Class 70 on the DSDBO road by October 15. Class 70 bridge means that it can bear a load of 70 tons, which is more than the weight of a fully-loaded tank trailer. In strategic terms, this means that in case of a worst-case scenario, the DSDBO road can be used to deploy T -90 tanks, infantry combat vehicles, and surface to air missiles all along the eastern Ladakh Line of Actual Control with Tibet.

Are they planning to bring in Arjun Tanks?

[pankajs]

https://m.timesofindia.com/india/diseng ... 157832.cms

China shifting onus on disengagement on India.

Msy be, IA should capture some more tops and put onus on China..

This is classic psyops and we shouldn't fall for it ...

IFFF the NEW status quo favors India, as most of us believe, where is the "need" for IA to do more? I am not against tactical re-adjustment as and when required or opportunity offered BUT the business of "putting the onus on China" is already done. PLA/Xi is in a pickle and not IA/Modi. Don't fall for Chinese bluster!

https://twitter.com/YusufDFI/status/1306271637029842944

Indian military planners have already moved more than 150,000 tonnes of materials into the region [Ladakh]

"All the supplies that we need have already been pushed to wherever they are required,"

[V_Raman]

I would gladly maintain the new status quo and develop chushul airfield and see how China reacts

[Pratyush]

https://m.timesofindia.com/india/diseng ... 157832.cms

China shifting onus on disengagement on India.

Msy be, IA should capture some more tops and put onus on China..

Where is the finger icon when you need it.

[Pratyush]

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/road-to-daulet-beg-oldi-will-allow-tank-movement-by-oct-15-as-army-prepares-for-ladakh-winter/story-2DMzLy5y1rZCyWvLWAd6tO.html

Are they planning to bring in Arjun Tanks?

That may just be the first nail in the coffin of the t family tanks in the army.

[Roop]

... Even the Cheeni attempts to save face or do psyops have succeeded. ...

This has got to be a typo on your part. Surely you mean "have not succeeded"???

[rsingh]

7. Thank you for playing our favourite songs.
8. Did you know that your emperor for life sent his daughter to Harvard in America? What a cosy life your masters live!
9. Hey buddy, how is the flood in your village? Is your mom safe? Did someone die in your family? It seems there is no food in the village.
10. Its been many months since you came here. Nothing happens here right. Time to go back home and sleep.
11. Forget your CCP controlled Internet. Connect to our Free WIFI. No censorship. Free p0rn!
12. Connect to our Free WIFI. You can see your Emperor Xi starring as Winnie The Pooh! What fun!

Chinese are forcing Tibetian Youth to fight IA. Their parents are taken hostages. Same thing happened in 1962.

[Philip]

I think it was said in the aftermath of the '65 war that it was the first time India had for several centuries blunted and surged forward against an invader from the west. In the intervening years since the great victory of '71, we saw of both Han and Paki attempts at conquest at Kargil and Sumdurong Chu. But,Galwan was another milestone for the country and the IA,followed by the hilltop seizures indicating a new military doctrine against the Han horror,since 1962. "Slaughter them mercilessly if need be,no holds barred,no quarter asked,none given." That appears to be our new doctrine,which we should blare into Han ears by loudspeakers in return for their gesture of playing Bollywood numbers to our troops! The fate that waits them should they cross the red line must be daily dinned into their heads. War cries of the famous regiments of India must be broadcast every night into their ears at max. decibel level. They must be taken by surprise when the balloon goes up.

We can see from the limited info. given that the GOI is going all out with military measures to prepare for any eventuality. The nation,its people,are fully behind the Govt. and PM in standing upto the Han fascist neo-imperialists led by their fuhrer Xitler. We shall not bother about their putrid propaganda and warnings.Xitler must be sent a roll of toilet paper made from the Global Times garbage!

[Dilbu]

China has now realised that India is running away with the narrative and the news from Indian media is trickling down into their country as well. Now there seems to be a sudden rush to manage the story for domestic audience.
China Isn’t Hiding the Border Tensions With India From Its Public Anymore

There was an intriguing silence in the Chinese language media narrative following the clash between the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian Army. Chinese language state-run news media agencies such as Xinhua and People’s Daily largely ignored the June 15 clash between the two sides. Besides some debate around who instigated the aggression and the number of causalities in the Galwan Valley on Sina Weibo, Chinese language media remained silent.

India’s ban on Chinese-owned apps was a turning point in the tone of the Chinese language media narrative. On June 29, “India bans 59 Chinese apps” was the second most searched hashtag on Twitter-like Chinese social media platform, Sina Weibo. It was also the second most searched phrase on Baidu search engine, the Chinese equivalent of Google. India’s second wave ban on China-owned apps generated widespread interest — a hashtag based on the story was viewed 300 million times on Weibo. The news about the app bans was prominently reported by major Chinese language state-media outlets such as Beijing News, People’s Daily, and Xinhua.

The recent developments at the Line of Actual Control have featured in Chinese language state media publications such as Xinhua. On August 31, the phrase “Western Theater Command’s statement on China-India border situation” trended as the number one searched term on Baidu. The hashtag #Western Theatre Command responded to India’s illegal crossing of line and firing threats# was viewed 260 million times on Weibo. The search phrase “Chinese and Indian Defense Ministers meet in Moscow” topped Baidu search results on September 4.

More than that, a story about the meeting between Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe and Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh in Moscow was on the home page of the Chinese language web edition of Xinhua. On June 25, the Chinese edition of People’s Daily also reported the Chinese Ministry of National Defense spokesperson’s statement on the border conflict.

The Chinese public’s attention on the events at the border with India will add pressure on the party leadership to find a narrative that can be presented as a victory for China. The military escalation may have been an easy decision by Central Military Commission, but the de-escalation process will be a complicated process amid public interest in the developments at the Line of Actual Control.

[Aditya_V]

https://indianexpress.com/article/india ... s-6599063/

No ground lost in Depsang but India hasn’t accessed large parts for 15 years

Clearing the air on the situation in the Depsang Plains in Ladakh, where China has been blocking India’s access to four traditional patrolling points since April this year, a top security officer has told The Indian Express that while there has been no loss of ground this time around, Indian troops have not had access to a large chunk of territory on their side of the Line of Actual Control for “more than 10 to 15 years” now.

SO UPA 1 and 2 handed this to China, soo much for the Ajai Shukla types and supporters and Pappu's.

[pankajs]

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-ne ... Ad6tO.html
Road to Daulat Beg Oldi will allow tank movement by Oct 15 as army prepares for Ladakh winter

Preparing for a long winter ahead facing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in East Ladakh, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has decided to allowed Srinagar-Zoji La-Kargil Leh axis to be closed only for 45 days from past average 95 days due to snow this year and will strengthen all the bridges on Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) road to bear the load of tank plus truck trailer by next month.

Authoritative government sources told Hindustan Times that the BRO, under the defence ministry, will also keep the new Darcha-Padam-Nimu-Leh road clear of snow throughout December and January 2021 so that military supply route is maintained route the clock. The Modi government is now considering to prepare for the shortest tunnel at Shinku La on Darcha-Padam axis so that this road this snow free throughout the year.

This axis is anyways open to traffic for 10 months in a year. What this means is that it will be kept open all throughout winter.

Given that the PLA is showing no signs of abiding with the agreements between the Special Representatives on Boundary Talks (July 5, 2020) and between foreign ministers (September 10, 2020) on total disengagement to restore status quo ante on LAC, the Indian Army is rushing in supplies with the BRO ensuring that 17,580 feet high Chang La pass and 17,582 feet Khardung La on route to contested Pangong Tso is kept snow free throughout the year.

Same for Chang La and Khardung La.

[RajaRudra]

https://m.timesofindia.com/india/diseng ... 157832.cms

China shifting onus on disengagement on India.

Msy be, IA should capture some more tops and put onus on China..

Where is the finger icon when you need it.

No need to get angry..

My point is, China is now in backfoot and perplexed.
We should use this confusion to move the perceived LAC to our adcantage where ever possible. That way, we are keeping the chinese in reactionary mode..and will not be able to concentrate force in any single location..
I am sure, chinese will be probing our defences also all along..

[Jayram]

China has now realised that India is running away with the narrative and the news from Indian media is trickling down into their country as well. Now there seems to be a sudden rush to manage the story for domestic audience.
China Isn’t Hiding the Border Tensions With India From Its Public Anymore

There was an intriguing silence in the Chinese language media narrative following the clash between the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Indian Army. Chinese language state-run news media agencies such as Xinhua and People’s Daily largely ignored the June 15 clash between the two sides. Besides some debate around who instigated the aggression and the number of causalities in the Galwan Valley on Sina Weibo, Chinese language media remained silent.

They could also be preparing thier people for war!
Must keep our powder dry.

[ks_sachin]

https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/road-to-daulet-beg-oldi-will-allow-tank-movement-by-oct-15-as-army-prepares-for-ladakh-winter/story-2DMzLy5y1rZCyWvLWAd6tO.html

Are they planning to bring in Arjun Tanks?

That may just be the first nail in the coffin of the t family tanks in the army.

On the contrary....

An Arjun in Ladakh....dream on sir...

[nam]

Chinis have built up shelters on the Lhasa airfield for fighters. Cannot say it is a full fledged blast proof, however it will of some protection level.

They have been built in a single line.. hurriedly built.I always felt, we can take the Chinis seriously once they have HAS on their airbase. May be this is the time.

Regarding the number of airbases, it doesn't take too long to create Landing ground or temporary airbases. I am sure PLAAF has created temporary airbases. So we should not be under no illusion about Chinis not being able to deploy large number of fighters.

I guess IAF will be able to find out about new airbases, when fighters and large aircrafts disappear from radar in unknown places.

GoI's low confidence in disengagement progress must be due to their observation of Chini build up of air assets.

[Aditya_V]

We have enough satellites who can pick up the construction and set up of airbases in Tibet- there are no civilians or vegetation.

[Paul]

https://www.theweek.in/theweek/current/ ... oming.html

Winter is comingThe Army must stock supplies if it has to post more troops along the LAC in LadakhPradip R Sagar By Pradip R Sagar August 23, 2020 17:53 IST
army-ladakh
Ready for the long haul: An Army convoy in Ladakh | Sanjay Ahlawat
The line between disorder and order lies in logistics, wrote Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu. The observation is quite relevant for India today. With no immediate de-escalation between India and China in the Ladakh sector, the Indian military now faces the challenge of getting crucial supplies to the nearly two lakh soldiers and support staff deployed there.

On August 11,Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat told a parliamentary committee that the military was ready for a long haul on the LAC and for deployment in harsh winter.



No other army deploys as many soldiers at such heights, and the Leh-based XIV Corps carries out the world’s largest winter stocking exercise annually. The Army spends an estimated 015 lakh a year to keep a soldier on heights ranging from 15,000ft to 18,000ft. The cost excludes weapon and ammunition, information on which is classified.

Retired Major General Amrit Pal Singh, former chief of operational logistics of the XIV Corps, said that, usually, about two lakh tonnes of supplies are transported and stored before the winter sets in October, cutting Ladakh off from the rest of the world. This is called Advanced Winter Stocking (ASW), which serves the forces for about six months. “But with additional deployment, you require at least double the logistics,” he told The WEEK.

Ladakh is connected by road through the Manali-Leh road and the Jammu-Srinagar-Kargil-Leh route. During winter (October to March), passes on these routes are closed. So, in the window between April and September, the Army dispatches about 100 trucks a day with rations, engineering and medical stores, weapons, ammunition and equipment, clothing and vehicles. There are about 80 items stocked for soldiers, including vast amounts of kerosene, diesel and petrol, which provide heat and fuel vehicles.

Singh said that a Srinagar and Leh round-trip for a truck that can carry 10 tonnes of supplies costs around 01 lakh. With a C-17 Globemaster military aircraft, which can carry up to 50 tonnes, an hour-long flight would cost roughly 024 lakh. A helicopter sortie of 45 minutes costs around 04 lakh. Multiple transport aircraft usually carry 200 to 250 tonnes of supplies every day from Chandigarh to Leh.

He also said that, by this time every year, about one lakh tonne of supplies would have been dispatched. “But we still need to send nearly three lakh tonnes in the next two months,” he added. “In the best-case scenario, if we use 400 trucks a day, we can send 4,000 tonnes by road. [But] maintaining the road for peak transportation capacity is the need of the hour. We find slush on roads due to [heavy traffic] of trucks.”

He also pointed out that Leh was just the first stop. There, the Army needs transit shelters for truck crew and support staff. Not everything can go by air; heavy material has to go by road. Though Zoji-la and Rohtang are the main passes, the road gets tougher from there. There are two more passes on the route—Baralacha La and Thanglang La—which are at a higher altitude than Rohtang.

Retired Lieutenant General D.S. Hooda, former northern Army commander, said that the advanced winter stocking is usually a well-planned exercise, but with additional deployment, the issue was not only transportation, but also procurement and supply. For instance, the Army would need pre-fabricated shelters, which cost at least 015 lakh apiece, to accommodate 20 troops each. “Shelters have be to procured, transported and constructed before winter,” he said. “It is almost next to impossible to carry out any construction in winter. Planning for construction of shelters usually takes place over two seasons. Now we have taken the decision to remain on those heights, [so] we need to speed up the process. The window is small now, and I see it as a big challenge.”

Reportedly, the Army, through its defence attaches in embassies in the US, Russia and Europe, is hunting for makers of warm clothes and snow tents. Additionally, the Ordnance Factory Board has been asked to speed up deliveries of extreme cold climate (ECC) clothing.

Military observers said that, with the temperature dipping to minus 40 degrees Celsius, it is going to be a battle of who lasts there. The soldier has to negotiate three elements—the weather, his health and, of course, the enemy across the border. With better infrastructure and an easier terrain in Tibet, the Chinese can continue to mobilise from deep areas. However, it costs the People’s Liberation Army four times as much to sustain a soldier on the Tibetan plateau than in the plains.

“Besides the temperature, the chilly winds in Galwan, Gogra and Hot Springs do the maximum damage,” said a serving Army officer, adding that it was the extreme cold and low level of oxygen that had claimed most of the 20 lives lost in the Galwan clash of June 15. “When you are in an eyeball-to-eyeball situation, you prepare yourself for any eventuality. Unlike in Siachen, troops on these friction points have to be on the highest level of alertness throughout winter.” He also said that the low temperature affects equipment, ammunition and artillery guns, which need special storage.

Military planners said that “mirror deployment” throughout winter would come at a huge cost. “All your perspective plans go for a toss if you do mirror deployment. Money and material meant for capability-building in some other areas is going to be diverted to Ladakh,” said Singh.

Instead of mirror deployment, he added, India should have done deterrent deployment, which means holding your forces back and putting them in places opposite to the enemy’s vulnerable areas. If this had happened, the Chinese would not have even moved to places like Galwan or Depsang, he said.

“Now, we are only committed and reactive,” he said. “Being reactive, you only pay in cost. We have lost an opportunity to be pro-active. With the absence of a mountain strike corps, the Indian Army is missing its offensive capabilities.”

Said Hooda: “Massive deployment, up to three division-level strength on those heights through the winter, will incur a huge cost. And if the situation does not improve, it will continue into the next year.”

The military thinkers seem to believe in Napoleon’s quote: “Amateurs discuss tactics; professionals discuss logistics.”

[SSridhar]

China-India border clash: civil words cannot hide the lack of trust - Cmde C.Uday Bhaskar, South China Morning Post

It is difficult to be optimistic about the outcome of the Moscow talks.

[ArjunPandit]

All things point to plenty of intelligence sharing right now

Sure, there is significant amount of cooperation going on between India and the US. That's a good thing.

But what Nalapat et al and some on this forum are pushing for is for India to throw in its lot completely with the US, as in, their enemies are our enemies and our enemies possibly-maybe-perhaps-hem-haw are their frenemies, maybe sometimes when it suits the US.

That's not going to fly with India. At the very least, US has to show good faith by declaring TSP a terrorist state, stop giving them any money at all, and banning all visas to Pakis. And declaring China a supporter of terrorists. Will the US do that? I don't think so. And can the US stop the heightened denunciation of India's "fascist Mudi" policies in Congress, EJ cells in state department, and so on, which is bound to happen if India signs on as an "ally" with the US? Again, I don't think so.

OTOH the US will expect India to join the war against Iran and have Indian soldiers as cannon-fodder under US command in Afghanistan, Syria etc. Will India do that? I don't think so.

Bottom line is, the US not quite the imperialist power that lefties like to bray on about, but it also doesn't have any template under which an ally is not some kind of a vassal, even if it is a vassal that manipulates and cheats constantly like TSP. Wiser heads in US policy establishment understand that until there emerges a template for an equal partnership, there is no point in talking about India as a US ally, or in the "US camp."

valid point, but we have to keep working that on whatever floats our boat best and takes if farthest..no point in being moralistic..what we have also to realize is that we are in general not going to be in conflict with US directly in first half of this century or close. Two we are not going to cross over them in military power anytime this century. I do not see any aspirations of it either. India considers its zone across IOR, and US everywhere. wherever we can collaborate without being paxtan or their chaiwallah munna we should be fine. we will have to make some adjustments too. I like this govt is working just fine. Taking small cautious steps in signing india specific agreements. As SJS said in a raiseena dialogue, we are on INdia's side not on US or china's side.

[Philip]

We appear to have enough MBTs,T-72/90s, ^but are deficient in light tanks, deficiency, being addressed by the IA.
One item caught my attention,BMP-2s being equipped in Ru forces with additional slat/ lattice armour to defeat tandem- warhead ATGMs. The same could be done at home-any street fabricator can do it, with the upgradation of BMPs in our inventory.

One tactic that the IA can use v.effectively is extensive mining of routes traditionally used by aggressors to invade our territory.
We tragically lost an ITBP soldier to a '62 mine! Mine clearing in the mountains for the Hans willbe extremely hazardous,with the inability of tanks with mine trawls in many sectors due to hostile terrain. This can effectively slow down any Han intrusion in sectors where we plan defensive ops.

[nam]

I hope we have restarted Prithvi 350KM builds.

We had dropped the ball, when it comes to airpower and cheap long range strike option. We have been carrying out only theoretical threat analysis, without investing in local airpower and long range solutions.

Couple of more sqd of LCA, Astra 2, 350KM Ballistic missiles, 15MM guns would have been quite helpful.

The above kit would have allowed us to give severe pain to the Chinis, rather than a stalemate.

[Suraj]

If there's one thing I've noticed the Chinese repeatedly do, it is this - they seldom use force accumulation as a way to expand their claims. In other words, they don't depend primarily on a continuous presence of highly trained and heavily armed troops. Not much is established about the capabilities of the Chinese forces at the Spanggur Gap sector, but given their past record of depending on spiked club ambushes...

What the Chinese really are good at , is treating their border claims as an extension of their economic activity focused on fixed asset building. A road here, an air strip there, an artificial island elsewhere... Had it been the Chinese in Siachen, they'd have build a significant complex there, even if it's not known how good their troops are at high altitude acclimatization and mountain warfare.

Their approach works great against an enemy who is intimidated by the speed and scale of their construction, assuming the next step is that they'll use those to efficiently overrun any defended positions. But is that so ? They're clearly great at building things. Why does that mean the soldiers themselves are equally competent at the low level ? In actual face to face engagements recently, the Chinese haven't come across as much more than the bullies they're known to be - belligerent, but also well within IA's ability to inflict greater casualties upon.

Perhaps IA would find it useful to take up a doctrine of grabbing peaks and also either destroying or capturing any Chinese infrastructure that unoccupied or undefended.

[ArjunPandit]

That may just be the first nail in the coffin of the t family tanks in the army.

On the contrary....

An Arjun in Ladakh....dream on sir...

can they take tanks just like that..shouldnt they require a logistic/engineering support of recovery vehicles.testing their performance in such heights should also be very important....
and most importantly how do we plan to take it in the first place? C17 is the only one......once everythign is complete C17 sorties could be used to transport..but i dont think that is the IA priority just my thoughts happy to be proven wrong

[chola]

China-India border clash: civil words cannot hide the lack of trust - Cmde C.Uday Bhaskar, South China Morning Post

It is difficult to be optimistic about the outcome of the Moscow talks.

Amazed that we had gone 4 decades without firearms but it was bound to end.

It's either Siachen type long term hostilities or a border war. Chinis would want to do the former because it less risk to them and plays to their strength. We need to raise that risk and exploit that to their weakness in actual combat by bringing kinetic war to them.

[Dilbu]

We have enough satellites who can pick up the construction and set up of airbases in Tibet- there are no civilians or vegetation.

With unkil also allegedly sharing real time intel, it will be difficult for China to hide such activities.

[Pratyush]

On the contrary....

An Arjun in Ladakh....dream on sir...

can they take tanks just like that..shouldnt they require a logistic/engineering support of recovery vehicles.testing their performance in such heights should also be very important....
and most importantly how do we plan to take it in the first place? C17 is the only one......once everythign is complete C17 sorties could be used to transport..but i dont think that is the IA priority just my thoughts happy to be proven wrong

If the Indian army needs to move tanks on c17 then they have bigger problems on the battlefield then the ability to airlift tanks.

However, the ability to move heavy armour by road is a different kettle of fish and should always be available.

Once the IA gets comfortable with the thought of being able to move and sustain MLC 70 class equipment. Then the need to always classify tanks as Heavy, Medium and light goes away.


Which in turn makes it open to Arjun in place of T series.

[nam]

Amazed that we had gone 4 decades without firearms but it was bound to end.

It's either Siachen type long term hostilities or a border war. Chinis would want to do the former because it less risk to them and plays to their strength. We need to raise that risk and exploit that to their weakness in actual combat by bringing kinetic war to them.

The issue is even a LAC wide fight is too remote for the Chini population to be effected. The dead bodies will be hidden, just like it was done after Galwan.

If there is a fight, it is imperative that we need PR to get the info over to the Mango Chini. We sadly lack the firepower to completely decimate the Chinese forces on LAC. A stalemate is a win for us, but it is not perfect..

[RaviB]

If there's one thing I've noticed the Chinese repeatedly do, it is this - they seldom use force accumulation as a way to expand their claims. In other words, they don't depend primarily on a continuous presence of highly trained and heavily armed troops. Not much is established about the capabilities of the Chinese forces at the Spanggur Gap sector, but given their past record of depending on spiked club ambushes...

What the Chinese really are good at , is treating their border claims as an extension of their economic activity focused on fixed asset building. A road here, an air strip there, an artificial island elsewhere... Had it been the Chinese in Siachen, they'd have build a significant complex there, even if it's not known how good their troops are at high altitude acclimatization and mountain warfare.

Their approach works great against an enemy who is intimidated by the speed and scale of their construction, assuming the next step is that they'll use those to efficiently overrun any defended positions. But is that so ? They're clearly great at building things. Why does that mean the soldiers themselves are equally competent at the low level ? In actual face to face engagements recently, the Chinese haven't come across as much more than the bullies they're known to be - belligerent, but also well within IA's ability to inflict greater casualties upon.

Perhaps IA would find it useful to take up a doctrine of grabbing peaks and also either destroying or capturing any Chinese infrastructure that unoccupied or undefended.

One thing I've been wondering about is whether the infrastructure also means that soldiers are present. So far all the analyses have been based on satellite imagery of their shelters, etc. to extrapolate the number of their soldiers. But since they are so good at building infrastructure, surely this just means the maximum number of soldiers that would be stationed at a place, rather than the actual number inside those shelters. It might very well be that the number of soldiers is much lower, since their strategy is to rapidly move around their soldiers along the LAC to surge them at specific locations.

If we had adequate intelligence on the ground, this would help us identify positions with lots of empty tents that would be easier to capture. Instead of destroying their infrastructure, it would be smarter to use it to station our own troops and mine the approaches from the Chinese side. We would capture territory, be able to hold on to it and their tents are probably comfier with a good supply of high quality literature. And of course Sun Tzu, lots of it.

As Sun Tzu says: Use the enemy's strength to defeat him (I made this up, but I'm pretty sure he said something of the sort)

[Dilbu]

Recommend reading it in full. Sajid Farid Shapoo. The writer is a PhD scholar in Security Studies at Princeton University and is an Indian Police Service officer
Limits of a limited war

Amidst the dawning realisation that China may not readily accede to such a demand, there is a growing clamour amongst some military strategists, both domestic and foreign, for a “limited war” to re-establish the status quo ante. Some even alluded to the Yom Kippur War kind of limited aggression when a combined Arab (Egypt and Syria) military action against Israel in 1973 forced Israel to bargain with Egypt over the Sinai restoration. Similar limited aggression by India may force China to come to the negotiating table and pave the way for bargaining over the pre-April status quo. However, such arguments defy the logic of coercion and exhibit a faulty understanding of the concept of “limited war”.

Coercion encompasses both deterrence and compellence. While deterrence involves a threat to prevent the adversary from starting something by fear of consequences, compellence is a threat intended to make the adversary act — to do something or stop him from doing something. Since the goal here is to either convince or coerce China to go back to pre-April 2020 positions, the deterrence stage has passed, and now China ought to be compelled to submit to India’s will. This can be achieved in varied ways, chief among these are coercive diplomacy and use of force. With few coercive tools in India’s diplomatic toolkit, many military experts are making a case for the limited use force to compel China into pulling back. According to them, coercive diplomacy — banning of Chinese apps, overt support to Tibetan dissidents — may not be enough to force China to yield to India’s legitimate demands. It is under these circumstances that the bogey of “limited war” is being raised.

There appears to be conceptual confusion about what “limited war” actually means. Traditionally experts have explained limited war as short of general war to achieve specific political objectives, using limited forces and limited force. Another, but more prevalent, understanding of limited war focuses on the military means used by the combatants, which are way less than what the belligerents are capable of. Julian Corbett described limited war as something that does not seek to overthrow the enemy government; rather, its objectives are smaller and limited. Thus a “limited war” is always understood in relation to a total or general war. The concept gained currency during the Cold War when the US thought it could fight the Soviet Union in Europe or elsewhere without the war escalating to an unlimited or total war. Thus the Korean War and even the Vietnam War were seen as “limited”. But these wars were hardly limited for North Korea and North Vietnam. The focus only on the means used also robs the political objective of its criticality. Clausewitz famously explained war as a continuation of politics by other means. The political purpose sought explains the war, not the means employed to achieve it. A limited war for limited objectives belies the understanding of war as an error term that may be difficult to contain or limit once started.

The events of late August may convince China that its attempts at intimidation through coercive use of force have failed to pressure India to rethink or roll back Indian efforts at ramping up force deployment, building infrastructure, and constructing road networks along the LAC. On the contrary, China’s aggressiveness will more likely provoke India to strengthen further its efforts to fortify the border than desist. Sustained strengthening of troops’ positions and fortifications can also help in attaining two vital strategic goals. One, it could forestall future aggressions and deny China the window to present India with another fait accompli, something China has been doing intermittently since 1962; second, it strengthens India’s future coercive diplomacy efforts leveraging the threat to use force. Finally, the current geometry of international alliances and China’s increasing isolation at the international level over its belligerent policies with its neighbours would only work to India’s advantage.

[nishant.gupta]

On the contrary....

An Arjun in Ladakh....dream on sir...

Vivek Ahuja sir's book is a better reference than any other military reference book. LCH and then an Arjun dream! Just late by few years.

[chola]

Amazed that we had gone 4 decades without firearms but it was bound to end.

It's either Siachen type long term hostilities or a border war. Chinis would want to do the former because it less risk to them and plays to their strength. We need to raise that risk and exploit that to their weakness in actual combat by bringing kinetic war to them.

The issue is even a LAC wide fight is too remote for the Chini population to be effected. The dead bodies will be hidden, just like it was done after Galwan.

If there is a fight, it is imperative that we need PR to get the info over to the Mango Chini. We sadly lack the firepower to completely decimate the Chinese forces on LAC. A stalemate is a win for us, but it is not perfect..

Prisoners and film. We lacked both at Galwan. If we annihilate a battalion, a brigade there would be prisoners and bodies by the hundreds on ground that we control. It will destroy their narrative and position in the Asian power hierachy quickly and even more so if they tried to deny living prisoners crying for return as single children to their mommies.

[RaviB]

Prisoners and film. We lacked both at Galwan. If we annihilate a battalion, a brigade there would be prisoners and bodies by the hundreds on ground that we control. It will destroy their narrative and position in the Asian power hierachy quickly and even more if they tried to deny living prisoners crying for return as single children to their mommies.

I agree about the prisoners, they would be a massive pressure tactic against the CCP.

But the film is something the Average Zhou would never get to see and we would be violating Geneva convention as well. We could get around that by unattributed leaks but then we risk the Chinese doing the same.

[pankajs]

We have enough satellites who can pick up the construction and set up of airbases in Tibet- there are no civilians or vegetation.

Right ...

Large static structures are easily picked up with the current Indian Sat capability with, IIRC, revisit of between 5-10 days. No big deal.

Our issue remains small dynamics movements that require 24x7 surveillance that we currently lack or have in pockets based on our small UAV fleet and that too can't look much beyond the LAC. We lack 24x7 surveillance capability in the depths.

[Aditya_V]

We don;t lack prisoners on film in Galwan, we had picks of both at Galwan- but it has been prudent GOI and IA has not published this, it was just pushed PLA and CCP into a corner. We are deliberately waging warnor do we want to blunder into one. We will fight only if forced to by the PLA.

[pankajs]

We had prisoners at Galwan ... Whether we have them on film is not know. The Chinese too had captured some Indian troop who went too far and got lost in the darkness.

Ultimately as exchange was worked out. Not sure if the handover/exchange will happen so smoothly in the future now that the LAC is hot.

[pushkar.bhat]

If there's one thing I've noticed the Chinese repeatedly do, it is this - they seldom use force accumulation as a way to expand their claims. In other words, they don't depend primarily on a continuous presence of highly trained and heavily armed troops. Not much is established about the capabilities of the Chinese forces at the Spanggur Gap sector, but given their past record of depending on spiked club ambushes...

What the Chinese really are good at , is treating their border claims as an extension of their economic activity focused on fixed asset building. A road here, an air strip there, an artificial island elsewhere... Had it been the Chinese in Siachen, they'd have build a significant complex there, even if it's not known how good their troops are at high altitude acclimatization and mountain warfare.

Their approach works great against an enemy who is intimidated by the speed and scale of their construction, assuming the next step is that they'll use those to efficiently overrun any defended positions. But is that so ? They're clearly great at building things. Why does that mean the soldiers themselves are equally competent at the low level ? In actual face to face engagements recently, the Chinese haven't come across as much more than the bullies they're known to be - belligerent, but also well within IA's ability to inflict greater casualties upon.

Perhaps IA would find it useful to take up a doctrine of grabbing peaks and also either destroying or capturing any Chinese infrastructure that unoccupied or undefended.

There are strategic ramifications of an Indian Breakout through the Spanggur bowl. The destruction of a Chinese Army in this area will create a direct threat to Rutok(Rudok) and a Parallel Indian thrust along the Dungti-Fukche-Demchok axis can mean a princer move on the Chinese deployments on the South Kailash Range and Ngari. The Chinese are in the Bowl to fight to the last man, and will not deploy Border Militia in the region.

The fall of Rudok & Ngari will mean that the entire sector across from the Spiti Valley down to the start of the middle sector opposite Uttarakhand are untenable for the Chinese. Any Chinese PLA General who is held responsible would rather die in action instead of going to Beijing and facing a death by a Party Execution squad.

[SSridhar]

Prisoners and film. We lacked both at Galwan.

No, we didn't. We had both at Galwan.

[Aditya_V]

Regarding Last year Swit retreat incident, we chosen not to display all the bombs, gun camera footage from Squadron leader Vyas- Abhinandan's wingman- NTRO has probably obtained a lot of POk videos etc. Just Mig 25 flying low which cooked Pakis goose at Mantho Dhalo- we probably will wait before disclose stuff.

No point showing videos during a tense situation just to put XI/PLA/CCP into a corner, war has a cost for India too. While we should not ignore any provocation, simply blundering into an unplanned war is best avoided.

[Deans]

China deploys 10k troops on south bank of Pangong Tso, 50 battalions stationed in Ladakh LAC

NEW DELHI: China is believed to have brought forward more troops in the past week along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, taking its total troop deployment to approximately 52,000. Of these, 10,000 troops have been deployed on the southern bank of the Pangong Tso that has witnessed hectic military activity since the manoeuvres of August 29-30.

According to this assessment, the number of battalions deployed in Ladakh by People Liberation Army (PLA) has gone up from 35 in August to 50 in September. Each battalion consists of 1,000-1,200 soldiers. On September 7, PLA troops attempted to come dangerously close to one of the forward positions of Indian Army, which resulted in shots being fired in the air.

The strength of the entire PLA's western theatre does not exceed 50 infantry battalions.