India's Border Security with China and Pakistan-2020 - Part 2

[Suraj]

Thanks RaviB and SSridhar! Generally I’m not too keen on just mocking the Chinese stink tank pronouncements. It’s more interesting to know who influences them. As for what they have to actually say, I prefer to see that in terms of the show business dictum - there’s no such thing as bad publicity. Every single angry finger wagging article merely lowers their own relative standing. Suits us just fine. It’s more important that we focus on the substance of our response than waste energy on an emotional response to them.

[pankajs]

Thanks RaviB and SSridhar! Generally I’m not too keen on just mocking the Chinese stink tank pronouncements. It’s more interesting to know who influences them. As for what they have to actually say, I prefer to see that in terms of the show business dictum - there’s no such thing as bad publicity. Every single angry finger wagging article merely lowers their own relative standing. Suits us just fine. It’s more important that we focus on the substance of our response than waste energy on an emotional response to them.

Yup.

Plus it leads to India China hyphenation which is something that should bother China more than India.

[pankajs]

Chinese View: India thinks it has got the better of China, so it can dare China - Prof. Liu Zhongyi, Indian Defence Review

Never had any admiration for Chinese diplomacy. The following is supposedly the reason given by a 'noted' intellectual in China on why China is unwilling either to resolve the border-dispute or even 'clarify the LAC'.

Excerpt


This interview is full of hilarious gems.

This is a significant disclosure! They want the border issue to fester like a septic wound so that India cannot focus on its middle east or south east asia policy. If India is absent in those regions, the Chinese will have a clear field to implement their agenda. For example, Bangladesh, Myanmar, malaysia, Indonesia, UAE, KSA.

Also want to prevent India from focussing on a strong economic policy with US & Western Europe. That is where they see a real challenge.

If Foreign minister and Finance minister are focussed on border issue, they cant focus on other things.

Agree with the first part where our defense resources & attention is diverted to the LAC from IOR, etc. With a limited budget we can only do so much.

However, it will NOT stop India from focusing on a strong economic policy with US and Europe. Infact, it will most probably compel India to align with US and Europe more closely in economic and foreign policy to counter China.

[vera_k]

Posting here as another insight into how China sees things. Strikes me that the same policy is being pursued at the land borders.

How China Is Taking Over International Organizations, One Vote at a Time

To Beijing, such divisions and the U.S. pullback from the multilateral order presented an opportunity, said Lanxin Xiang, director of the Center of One Belt and One Road Studies in Shanghai: “If this is your voluntary withdrawal, not us driving you away, filling in the vacuum should not be considered a provocative action.”

[Suraj]

Plus it leads to India China hyphenation which is something that should bother China more than India.

Indeed. The greatest gain out of all this is that it has focused the national resolve towards enabling capable policymaking regarding China, while they simultaneously revealed their own internal divisions, tendency to lash out and look like imbeciles (e.g. gobar times) and otherwise humanize themselves as impulsive and lacking much great power force of will, where they previously gave an appearance of being an entity working with cold calculated and remorseless efficiency.

[pankajs]

News is coming that Pakistan is planning to make GB a 5th province...
Let's say Pakistan changes its constitution to include GB as fifth province, then India will have every right to attack Pakistan... Infact, it will become a prestige issue for India and we will have to attack Pak if & when it happens...

Removal of Article 370 by India was a huge embarrassment to Pak due to the fact that they couldn't stop it and didn't respond to it...
If they 'integrate' GB in Pakistan, it will be a perfect H&D counter to India removing Article 370...
The only thing holding back Pak from doing this change until now is the prospect of India declaring war on them...

To reduce the chances of India declaring war, the only way is to keep India busy elsewhere... That is on Chinese front...
----
<snip>
-
For all other countries, removal of Article 370 by India will be equated to Pakistan 'integrating' GB with rest of the country... No country or mediahouse will delve into specific details... Infact, entire world media (and half of India's MSM & opposition) will equate both moves...
So, if India attacks Pak, India can be painted as an aggressor and China can join the fight...
If India does not attack, India's prestige will go down...
No amount of running to UN citing violation of UN resolutions by Pak will work...

Not quite the way I read the situation ..

1. India is a status quo power where as Bakistan is a revisionist power, at least that is how the world has come to view the situation in the subcontinent.

2. India was willing to settle for the LoC as the Border and perhaps still is. Even during Kargil we choose to respect the LoC under a BJP government.

3. After the reorganization of the previous J&K state, Indian FM was dispatched to Beijing to assure the Chinese that change in maps does not imply any change in Indian position on J&K but particularly Aksai Chin.

4. NO one in the International community expect a change in borders between two nuclear power, minor re-adjustments apart.

Given all the above, it is reasonable to assume that Indian move of removing Article 370 did embarrass the Bakis, the revisionist power where as GB being made bakistan's 5th province will not embarrass the status quo power that is India, given our prior signalling.

Unless India makes it an explicit prestige issue, it will not become one. The impression in most capitals barring Islamabad and Beijing is that India still is perfectly satisfied to convert LoC into the IB. Infact, when Modi makes a move on GB and/or PoJK, it will come as a huge surprise to the international community barring Baksitan and China.

The last bit is correct BUT only when viewed with the above i.e. the world is perfectly content with LoC == IB as a resolution of J&K conundrum. It is in line with India's prior signals and actions at the LoC. No loss of prestige here.

When India does make a move in GB and/or PoJK, it will definitely make India the aggressor in the region for the International community. China, in some shape or form, will join in to save its investment in Bakistan.

India has to prepare for a move in GB and/or PoJK very carefully for it will have to face China in addition to Bakistan PLUS it will hugely upset the International community. It means building a Indian MIC that will have to carry a lot of weight and stockpile of arms sufficient to be able to fight alone and without any external help even on the Chinese front. It cannot be a spur of the moment decision.

[pankajs]

Not sure if this is the right thread but here it goes ... mods let me know if it needs to be moved somewhere else.

https://twitter.com/TheWolfpackIN/statu ... 8990323712

Azeri Harop loitering drone infiltrated and damaged an Armenian AD S-300PMU2 system. India also has the same Harop system.

Shows it will be very effective against Pak LY-70/HQ-16 LOMADS (far inferior to S-300).

Harop will be useful against the Baki Air defense system and presumably against the Chinese Air defense at the LAC.

{ref:Wiki} Harop Range: 1,000 km (620 mi, 540 nmi)

Also, we need to start thinking of counters to such a move from our enemies.

[nam]

At the tactical level, the Chinis want to have leverage over our LAC infra. They already consider the possibility of good roads on our sides AND potential deployment of US forces in the future. Their version of 2 front war with really powerful force levels. Not Pak style failed state.

At the strategic level, they desperately want to prevent us from allying with US. For this they tolerate and encourage Russian arms sale. The S400 may be blocking the F35 from coming in. Along with this, they know any alliance with US will result in major economic gains for us. Because China is the living example of such an massive gain. A US allied India will be an automatic destination for Taiwanese, SK & Japanese companies to move the production... Not to mention the market access to US & Europe..

Any military action could lead to an direct alliance with US... that's probably what is holding them back.

[Larry Walker]

With all this pandemic and it's follow-on economic and social and un-employment impact - only retake of GB/PoK will put Modi back in pole position for 2024. Porkis are a rabid dog who need to be beaten each time they growl or attack - China on the other hand is a wild beast. Losing to Porkis is un-acceptable whilst maintaining even status-quo against Chinese aggression would be treated as an acceptable outcome.

[SSridhar]

News is coming that Pakistan is planning to make GB a 5th province....

It could be that the whole Ladakh drama of China is to keep us engaged in the east to prevent us from attacking GB and taking it away while Pakistan announced the new Province. It has been China which has been goading Pakistan for the last four years to make GB a province which Pakistan had been reluctant to do before because it knows it is illegal. GB is part of J&K and is therefore a part of POK. Pakistan is trying to alter this legal status which is against even the UNSC resolutions it quotes. As the Chinese situation turned dire everywhere and it apprehended a concerted military action, it probably wanted some stability along the Chin-Pak border. It has been always nervous about the tenuous link through the Khunjerab (and possibly the Mintaka) Pass with a restive population in GB. China wants Pakistani sovereignty established over the lands to protect its access to Gwadar and CPEC investments. China is giving Pakistan covering fire, in the form of Ladakh, and is forcing it to violate legalities. Even a fraudulent Pakistan had not attempted this before. It shows China's stranglehold on the Terrorist State of Pakistan.

Of course, China's (mis)calculation may be that India wouldn't want to go for a two-front war especially in these circumstances.

And, as is normally the case with the multiple objectives pursued by China in every move, any incidental gain in Ladakh would be welcome too. Unfortunately, it went awry, but China remains silent, prolonging the useless talks and biding for time for winter hoping the GB's provincial status would be established well and truly, and fait accompli achieved while the little bit of salami-slicing done (Finger 8 to 5) is for its keeps.

[Larry Walker]

If War breaks out and India makes a daring move to cut G219 between opposite Demchok and somewhere north of KK pass at some bottleneck in those mountains - will it not leave PLA completely stranded in middle of nowhere with no logistics or reinforcements?? Is this Chinks chicken-neck??

[Cyrano]

G219 and the rail link both need to be cutoff at multiple places, simultaneously with cutting off G318 opposite Bhutan and Arunachal to prevent PLA from opening a second front in the east. That requires air dominance and will to preemptively and punitively escalate on the part of GoI

[Larry Walker]

I am not sure if i am reading it correct - but India by amassing troops in Ladakh may have forced Chinese to amass and they would do so in Depsang plains as that is the only available space. Now with such huge concentration - if War breaks out then only choice for PLA with this huge mass is to attack the Indian positions is the mountains. If they stay on the plains then it manifold increases chances of IAF picking them apart on a featureless plateau plus the constant threat of IA cutting G219 North of KK pass. I am thinking that by deploying in excess India forced Chinese for a counter deployment and now Chinks are trapped. Slaughter either way - stay put and die or try fighting up the mountains and die.

[ks_sachin]

I am not sure if i am reading it correct - but India by amassing troops in Ladakh may have forced Chinese to amass and they would do so in Depsang plains as that is the only available space. Now with such huge concentration - if War breaks out then only choice for PLA with this huge mass is to attack the Indian positions is the mountains. If they stay on the plains then it manifold increases chances of IAF picking them apart on a featureless plateau plus the constant threat of IA cutting G219 North of KK pass. I am thinking that by deploying in excess India forced Chinese for a counter deployment and now Chinks are trapped. Slaughter either way - stay put and die or try fighting up the mountains and die.

Assuming the Chinese know their options and since we need to be prepared for the unexpected what would you as a Chinese strategist do?

[williams]

I am not sure if i am reading it correct - but India by amassing troops in Ladakh may have forced Chinese to amass and they would do so in Depsang plains as that is the only available space. Now with such huge concentration - if War breaks out then only choice for PLA with this huge mass is to attack the Indian positions is the mountains. If they stay on the plains then it manifold increases chances of IAF picking them apart on a featureless plateau plus the constant threat of IA cutting G219 North of KK pass. I am thinking that by deploying in excess India forced Chinese for a counter deployment and now Chinks are trapped. Slaughter either way - stay put and die or try fighting up the mountains and die.

Nope Chins don’t have the numbers to attack. Watch NGs discussion with the good general. They need a lot more troops to attack. For IAF to pick the ground forces they need to achieve air superiority. This is a stalemate unless we find some opportunity to maul the chins during winter.

[Larry Walker]

Assuming the Chinese know their options and since we need to be prepared for the unexpected what would you as a Chinese strategist do?

My point is that Chinese made first move here - but by deploying heavily and forcing PLA to counter deploy - India has now trapped China. If War breaks in Depsang - only option for Chinese is to put pressure in Chumbi/Dokalam axis and produce a counter threat or boost air-defenses like insane in the Depsang including building airstrips all around to provide Cap's and save the little emperors. Chumbi/Dokalam is offensive strategy and will lead to all-out war whereas loading Depsang with air-defences is defensive and will be loss of face for Chinese. Chushul may give a tactical victory but nothing much the Chinks can achieve there once they reach the town. India would tradeoff loss of some terrirtoy there if PLA can be decimated in Depsang and their psyche seared with defeat.

[pankajs]

I am not sure if i am reading it correct - but India by amassing troops in Ladakh may have forced Chinese to amass and they would do so in Depsang plains as that is the only available space. Now with such huge concentration - if War breaks out then only choice for PLA with this huge mass is to attack the Indian positions is the mountains. If they stay on the plains then it manifold increases chances of IAF picking them apart on a featureless plateau plus the constant threat of IA cutting G219 North of KK pass. I am thinking that by deploying in excess India forced Chinese for a counter deployment and now Chinks are trapped. Slaughter either way - stay put and die or try fighting up the mountains and die.

Some assumptions are incorrect ...

1. No Depsang is NOT the only place to amass troop on the Chinese side. IFF India's mountainous terrain allows us to amass troops all over, the Chinese relatively flat terrain allows them many more such places along the line of contact and in the depths around the G219.

2. Indian troops facing the Chinese in the general area SSN too are massed on the Depsang plains. If war breaks out on the there it will be fought on the plains and not the mountains unless the Chinese are able to defeat the Indian armor and advance up to the mountains on the Indian side.

3. Airspace over the Depsang plain will be highly contested it being nearest the Chinese base at Hotan. IAF will not have walk over and both sides will get to pick targets on "a featureless plateau".

4. We seem to suffer from either optimism bias or a pessimism bias. IFF all the Chinese are concentrated on the Depsang plains as you postulate, and they have their static defense right plus PAAF can keep the IAF engaged, there will not be any threat to G219 either to the north or south of KK pass.

Plus, I don't think India will make a play for G219 unless the Chinese start an all out war in which case all bets are off. The Chinese play till date has been salami slicing or the threat of a limited/localized skirmish at the point of their choosing. Indian position has been to establish/defend status quo. Therefore, there is no question of India trying to make a play for G219.

The Chinese haven't deployed enough for an all out war. So that is that. The fear of an Indian play for G219 is more in the Chinese mind at this point of time than a real threat. With better infra on the Indian side the fear and the threat will keep increasing but we are faaaaaar from the tipping point where the fear/threat becomes a reality.

Finally, the Chinese will be under pressure NOT because of Indian deployment, which in any case is defensive, but to show result for their gambit or loose face. It becomes even more stark for Xi given that the Chinese aggression has become a global talking point and will hand his detractors inside the CCP a handle to confront him.

[pushkar.bhat]

The Chinese are venerable to interdiction along multiple axis as far as G219 is concerned. If even PLAAF is able to secure air dominance (and that is a big if) in Depsang they are able to protect only a small portion of that vast highway.

[pankajs]

There are only a few path for mass injection of troops and the Chinese are deployed in strength at those very openings.

Plus, the equation of 10 attackers to 1 defenders gets reversed with China the defender and India the attacker. Has India built up anywhere close to that ratio in the Depsang plains or in the overall Ladakh sector??

Plus, India has NO intention of marching into Aksai Chin. All Indian statement make that clear. All Indian deployment make that clear. All Indian mobilization make that clear.

We are talking hawa baazi instead of ground realities. Scenario building has to have some foundational basics clear & correct.

[mody]

Has there ever been an analysis of the PLA performance and tactics and how they managed the logistics in 1962?
The 1962 war was also fought between Oct to December timeframe and even the Chinese infra at the time was very poor. Maybe slightly better than ours, but still very poor as compared to what they have currently. Besides all the other logistical challenges that they face today, were always there. Even to get water for their troops in 1962, would have been a challenge. Yet they managed to get heavier arty pieces and heavier weapons as compared to us and many slightly more man power.
How did they manage to do that. Also the acclimatization of the troops. In the current standoff, they had conducted some exercises on the Tibetan plateau and diverted the troops after the exercise.
Also, how were they so sure that IAF would not be used in the conflict in 1962? If IAF had been used, the PLA would have suffered higher losses.
The only thing where they had an advantage in 1962, as compared to today, was their disregard for their own losses or the capacity to take manpower losses.
I have never read any analysis of the Chinese military action and plans of the 1962 conflict. If there are any sources, that would come in handy.

[ks_sachin]

Assuming the Chinese know their options and since we need to be prepared for the unexpected what would you as a Chinese strategist do?

My point is that Chinese made first move here - but by deploying heavily and forcing PLA to counter deploy - India has now trapped China. If War breaks in Depsang - only option for Chinese is to put pressure in Chumbi/Dokalam axis and produce a counter threat or boost air-defenses like insane in the Depsang including building airstrips all around to provide Cap's and save the little emperors. Chumbi/Dokalam is offensive strategy and will lead to all-out war whereas loading Depsang with air-defences is defensive and will be loss of face for Chinese. Chushul may give a tactical victory but nothing much the Chinks can achieve there once they reach the town. India would tradeoff loss of some terrirtoy there if PLA can be decimated in Depsang and their psyche seared with defeat.

Why would you as a Chinese strategist only focus on Ladakh?

[manjgu]

Has there ever been an analysis of the PLA performance and tactics and how they managed the logistics in 1962?
The 1962 war was also fought between Oct to December timeframe and even the Chinese infra at the time was very poor. Maybe slightly better than ours, but still very poor as compared to what they have currently. Besides all the other logistical challenges that they face today, were always there. Even to get water for their troops in 1962, would have been a challenge. Yet they managed to get heavier arty pieces and heavier weapons as compared to us and many slightly more man power.
How did they manage to do that. Also the acclimatization of the troops. In the current standoff, they had conducted some exercises on the Tibetan plateau and diverted the troops after the exercise.
Also, how were they so sure that IAF would not be used in the conflict in 1962? If IAF had been used, the PLA would have suffered higher losses.
The only thing where they had an advantage in 1962, as compared to today, was their disregard for their own losses or the capacity to take manpower losses.
I have never read any analysis of the Chinese military action and plans of the 1962 conflict. If there are any sources, that would come in handy.

[manjgu]

Manpower losses as well as quality of manpower

[Aditya_V]

Has there ever been an analysis of the PLA performance and tactics and how they managed the logistics in 1962?
The 1962 war was also fought between Oct to December timeframe and even the Chinese infra at the time was very poor. Maybe slightly better than ours, but still very poor as compared to what they have currently. Besides all the other logistical challenges that they face today, were always there. Even to get water for their troops in 1962, would have been a challenge. Yet they managed to get heavier arty pieces and heavier weapons as compared to us and many slightly more man power.
How did they manage to do that. Also the acclimatization of the troops. In the current standoff, they had conducted some exercises on the Tibetan plateau and diverted the troops after the exercise.
Also, how were they so sure that IAF would not be used in the conflict in 1962? If IAF had been used, the PLA would have suffered higher losses.
The only thing where they had an advantage in 1962, as compared to today, was their disregard for their own losses or the capacity to take manpower losses.
I have never read any analysis of the Chinese military action and plans of the 1962 conflict. If there are any sources, that would come in handy.

Simple they had prepared for war since 1959 and familarised themselves with the terrain, All our forces in Arunachal were sent in the last minute. In Ladakh they heavily outnumbered us and we had very less or no Artillery.

On the Indian side in 1962 we did not believe Chinese will attack- for eg. we sent a small patrol without artillery or backup to the Thag la ridge, our forces were new to Se la- knew nothing of the Bailey trail, Walong again nobody knew the terrain. A small patrol held out in Galwan in June 1962- again only infantry on foot- absolutely no roads till Depsang plains- G219 was operational. Its apples and oranges- at that time only side 1 Chinese were ready for war- we drinking Hindi Cheeni cool aid.

So its a totally different story.

[RaviB]

As a Chinese strategist, my objectives are:

1. To coerce India to align itself with our strategic goals. The Chairman's pet/legacy project is one belt one road. India must support this or stop interfering with it
2. To prevent India from aligning with USA and other parties. Force it to stay on the fence by demonstrating the potential punishment for violating China's interests
3. Force India to desist from making provocative infrastructure and military moves in the Western Sector. India must be deterred, without increased Chinese deployment for the long term. Once India has been punished, it's resolve must be broken, it should stay quiet, without requiring additional military and strategic attention
4. Ensure peace for the next few decades in the secondary strategic direction to be able to focus for the long term on Taiwan & USA. This time we must demonstrate that we hold the territory up to our claim line and make sure India understands that this is the new red line which cannot be crossed.
4b. If India spends the next few decades doing heavy military expenditure instead of quietly seeking peace by diplomatic submission, it would disrupt India's development trajectory and would remove it as a potential threat post 2060.

What my objective are not:
1. Tactical gains of territory which require permanent deployment to hold them

How I will go about achieving these objectives:

1. We have the winning template of 1962, I tweak this and improve this to avoid mistakes of 1962.

2. The biggest mistake of 1962 was withdrawal after victory. This time either we prepare the logistics so there is no need to withdraw from the claim line or prepare to deter through demonstrated military punishment combined with the ability to surge troops to individual locations.

3. I will begin with overwhelming use of multiple avenues of attack*: Cyberwarfare, UN and diplomatic moves, disinformation, influence operation through sympathetic parties in India. This will be followed by ballistic missiles combined with crippling electronic warfare. PLAAF is at the same level as IAF, so to field it initially might be risky. India has always shown carefully graded escalation in other wars, so I will not bring in PLAAF first to avoid this step of the ladder, if possible. My focus is on air defense and keeping the PLAAF as reserve. Ground forces are weaker and less dispensable compared to IA, so they will be held back as far as possible. It may be possible that India starts negotiating after missile strikes and the PLAGF can be held back for a surprise attack once the talks have been sufficiently dragged on. This will be shown as a counter-attack in response to Indian provocation and force India to concede many more demands on the negotiating table.

4. I will hold the PLAAF in a defensive role in the western sector due to payload penalties, etc. I will attack in the eastern sector using strategic bombers taking off from Chengdu or Lijiang to target areas bordering South Tibet (I will not bomb Arunachal since it is my territory with my people, but Dibrugarh would be a good target).

*as prescribed by Unrestricted Warfare, the book PLA actually uses instead of Sun Tzu.

[mody]

Has there ever been an analysis of the PLA performance and tactics and how they managed the logistics in 1962?
The 1962 war was also fought between Oct to December timeframe and even the Chinese infra at the time was very poor. Maybe slightly better than ours, but still very poor as compared to what they have currently. Besides all the other logistical challenges that they face today, were always there. Even to get water for their troops in 1962, would have been a challenge. Yet they managed to get heavier arty pieces and heavier weapons as compared to us and many slightly more man power.
How did they manage to do that. Also the acclimatization of the troops. In the current standoff, they had conducted some exercises on the Tibetan plateau and diverted the troops after the exercise.
Also, how were they so sure that IAF would not be used in the conflict in 1962? If IAF had been used, the PLA would have suffered higher losses.
The only thing where they had an advantage in 1962, as compared to today, was their disregard for their own losses or the capacity to take manpower losses.
I have never read any analysis of the Chinese military action and plans of the 1962 conflict. If there are any sources, that would come in handy.

Simple they had prepared for war since 1959 and familarised themselves with the terrain, All our forces in Arunachal were sent in the last minute. In Ladakh they heavily outnumbered us and we had very less or no Artillery.

On the Indian side in 1962 we did not believe Chinese will attack- for eg. we sent a small patrol without artillery or backup to the Thag la ridge, our forces were new to Se la- knew nothing of the Bailey trail, Walong again nobody knew the terrain. A small patrol held out in Galwan in June 1962- again only infantry on foot- absolutely no roads till Depsang plains- G219 was operational. Its apples and oranges- at that time only side 1 Chinese were ready for war- we drinking Hindi Cheeni cool aid.

So its a totally different story.

Sir, you are again listing out all the things that wee got wrong. Not how the Chinese managed. There was a very nice analysis of everything that we did wrong in the Western sector in 1962 by a retired military officer, either posted in the beginning of this thread or maybe in the previous avatar of this thread. The numbers were stacked against India in Ladakh, but that is becuase a lot of our manpower was deployed neear Leh, thinking that would be the main target of the Chinese. There was ample time to move the troops to forward positions. Also, the deployment was flawed and that's what led to bigger losses. on our side.
What I wanted to know was what Chinese got right or what their planning was was.
If you say we did not know anything about Sela pass, surely the Chinese did not as well. it was not that they were sending in patrols all the way upto Sela pass and Walong, prior to 1962 and had perfect knowledge of the ground and the terrain.

Also, how did the Chinese manage their logistics trail. The conflict stretched from 20th October to 21st November. Maybe they had been planning for the war and had the winter clothing etc. sorted out. But what about food and water etc. Also ammunition and getting heavy weaponry to the front.
Currently we are still asking this question that how will China manage to get water for 50,000 troops. But they managed just fine in 1962. how did they do it.
unfortunately I have not come across any literature that lays out their battle plans and how they planned for that war and what things they got right and what they got. if anyone has seen such writeup, please post it.

[rsangram]

I don’t think pak declaring GB as fifth province would compel India to attack. We will attack at a time and place of our choosing. We might declare so and leave it unpredictable about what/when we will do something. I think our planners would have gamed that scenario.

Once winter sets in, nothing can be done anywhere anyway...

Aah, YES. Time and place of our choosing. Indeed.

And you forgot.......We do "KAdi Ninda" of this act by the Pakistanis.

Not to mention.

We can squash Pakistan anytime....albeit, at a time and place of our choosing. Our real competition is China.

Admin Note: you have been warned and banned by many admins for subtle and sometimes crass flame baiting. You already had two live warnings when you decided to make your appearance here. A long ban to chill out

[chetak]

[nam]

This is trying to do 2+2=5. If 370 was the reason, how does blocking patrol points at 2 places out of 700 KM long LAC, force India to roll back 370?

If it was meant to "protect" Aksai Chin, why leave the hole in spangur gap and most importantly Chumur and Demchock?

And again, if the action was meant to protect Aksai chin, I take PLA is ready to stay put all round the year? You cannot protect an region by going home for winter vacation.. who knows evil Indians might invade in winter...

[Cain Marko]

I would go so far as to say that - if things don't happen in the next month or so, their chances just took a nosedive. Once winter sets in, India gets a respite and will use the time to make it very hard for when things open up again next summer. We can expect - more rafales, S400, Tejas, Nirbhay, ISR platforms, and God knows what kind of leased maal they will bring into play. Maybe lease a few more Rafale or M2K or Su30SM, IFR and ISR platforms from the Khan. Who knows. The Nirbhay, S400 and Rafale will have a dramatic impact on the equation.

Panditji, sorting out logistics for China will be difficult, if not impossible. Nature simply doesn't permit it. Logistics lines to be truly effective in wartime, need to be short and this is not possible with most of their population centers so far away from flashpoints.

I will take a conservative view on this..even if our capabilities rise...Their deployments will make it harder for us to take and hold terriotry. I am looking from the offensive perspective. Yes from defensive perspective our holes will be plugged. Right now chinese supply lines are all in air. As much as they speak, they dont have an actual large scale deployment experience. This deployment will give them experience. They will learn from it (assuming they are not paxis)

The weapons India will bring to bear could certainly have a very potent offensive element. Case in point being rushed deployment of nirbhay and new test of brahmos with booster. Figuring out supply chain issues will take longer with need to develop support infrastructure in the region which is not easy in the winter. The ground simply freezes and Laying electric/water lines will be challenging.

[Aditya_V]

Also, how did the Chinese manage their logistics trail. The conflict stretched from 20th October to 21st November. Maybe they had been planning for the war and had the winter clothing etc. sorted out. But what about food and water etc. Also ammunition and getting heavy weaponry to the front.
Currently we are still asking this question that how will China manage to get water for 50,000 troops. But they managed just fine in 1962. how did they do it.
unfortunately I have not come across any literature that lays out their battle plans and how they planned for that war and what things they got right and what they got. if anyone has seen such writeup, please post it.

Their G219 road was built in 1959, they probably had their supplies stocked for months- this is for Ladakh, plus Indian POWs reported even the Chinese had only radish and rice during the 1962 winter- RICE which India supplied to the Chinese in the early 1960's before the conflict.

A lot of the Chinese who died in Ladakh in 1962 were from the Yarkand area of Xinjiang while it was mostly Han soldiers in Arunachal- supplies probably from Chengdu- they had a heads tart in planning- while we did stock for Winter and Zoji La was closed by the beginning of Oct 1962. I think bodies of Ahir Company were recovered from Rezang la only in the spring of 1963 by the Indian Army.

[nandakumar]

Chetak, please why don't you summarise the substance of the conversation and post a link? It is difficult to read the conversation given a black tint in the background at my age. Currently I have only access to my handphone.

[Deans]

Sir, you are again listing out all the things that wee got wrong. Not how the Chinese managed. There was a very nice analysis of everything that we did wrong in the Western sector in 1962 by a retired military officer, either posted in the beginning of this thread or maybe in the previous avatar of this thread. The numbers were stacked against India in Ladakh, but that is becuase a lot of our manpower was deployed neear Leh, thinking that would be the main target of the Chinese. There was ample time to move the troops to forward positions. Also, the deployment was flawed and that's what led to bigger losses. on our side.
What I wanted to know was what Chinese got right or what their planning was was.
If you say we did not know anything about Sela pass, surely the Chinese did not as well. it was not that they were sending in patrols all the way upto Sela pass and Walong, prior to 1962 and had perfect knowledge of the ground and the terrain.

Also, how did the Chinese manage their logistics trail. The conflict stretched from 20th October to 21st November. Maybe they had been planning for the war and had the winter clothing etc. sorted out. But what about food and water etc. Also ammunition and getting heavy weaponry to the front.
Currently we are still asking this question that how will China manage to get water for 50,000 troops. But they managed just fine in 1962. how did they do it.
unfortunately I have not come across any literature that lays out their battle plans and how they planned for that war and what things they got right and what they got. if anyone has seen such writeup, please post it.

There were some fundamental differences between the PLA in 1962 and now.
The PLA in 1962 was a battle hardened army, with all its senior officers fighting us, having survived the Korean war - which was a ruthless Darwinian test. By contrast hardly anyone in IA had combat experience. The terrain in Korea was fairly similar to Arunachal, so the PLA was comfortable with it. IA at the time had little understanding of the terrain. The army only entered Arunachal in 1960. Eastern command was in Lucknow !
The Chinese had local intel. They did actually understand the area around Se-La better than we did.
Today, it is IA that is battle hardened, understands the terrain well and has a friendly local population (and local intel on the Tibet side).

The heaviest concentration of Chinese forces was 5 brigades in West Arunachal and two in Ladakh. These were light infantry with no heavy vehicles. There wasn't that much artillery (we had nothing except mortars). A 1962 Chinese brigade would require a fraction of the supplies of a PLA brigade today. Yet, they were compelled to retreat in Nov, in the Tawang area, for fear of being cut off from their supplies, when snow blocked the Bum-La pass into India (this was in far more comfortable terrain than East Ladakh).

It's not about weather China can get water for 50,000 men. It's about getting water, food, ammo, POL for those men, creating accommodation & storage & maintenance facilities and ensuring that those men are rotated to lower altitude places (outside Tibet) periodically. We don't know how many of the PLA force of 1962 suffered from high altitude complications later.

[Srutayus]

Currently we are still asking this question that how will China manage to get water for 50,000 troops. But they managed just fine in 1962. how did they do it.

They declared that "India had been taught a lesson" and stood down once they had exhausted their logistics which had been secretly built up for that attack. We convinced ourselves that the war was over and that they had won, and dhoti shivered from then till now.

[vnadendla]

Chetak....

Ashley's interpretation is probably incomplete. It doesn't explain the six other fronts China opened with other countries. What can explain the situation in general? Maybe a combination of

• [1] Covid Condemnation ; Start of economic decline; Over estimating weakness of other countries due to Covid
  [2] Peak Population ; Aging population.
  [3] Megalomania vis a vis USA; misunderstanding of other countries (India, Germany etc.) willingness to choose it vs USA

Once Third World (no) War is decided as now or never option India is just one more front....

[Anoop]

Mody, 2 essential things PLA got right in 1962. They concentrated 1 Division behind Thagla ridge to face our 7 Bde in Arunachal Pradesh, which frontline units suspected but our higher command didn't believe. They had plenty of time to observe our deployment and plan their attack. Secondly, their attacks, particularly in the Eastern sector was by classic infiltration and one thing to remember is that each of the major battles, e.g. Rezang La, Thag La etc lasted barely 5 hours each, because our forces were overwhelmed due to poor deployment, lack of ammo etc. In other words, there was no long term need for PLA to be deployed. Finally, ther Oct to Nov campaign was in 2 stages, each lasting about 10 days with almost a month of respite in between while PLA regrouped. None of these conditions are valid anymore. They start a war, they will be defending as much as they are attacking, so no respite to regroup. Also, the damage IA and IAF can do to their reserves and rearward nodes will be such that they can't reinforce from out of theatre.

Finally, the magnitude of the Chinese victory in 1962 was magnified multifold by the withdrawal of 7 Bde, which turned out to be a rout. That rout was caused completely by Indian mistakes, not by Chinese war fighting. If there had been an orderly withdrawal by 7 Bde and a consolidation of one brigade of 4 Div (don't remember the name) at Bum La, we could have stopped the Chinese well forward of where they finally came to. And the 1962 war would have been recorded in history as a stalemate, much like the 1965 war is being spoken about.

[chetak]

[img]https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EixUJCyXgAA ... =large[img]

Chetak, please why don't you summarise the substance of the conversation and post a link? It is difficult to read the conversation given a black tint in the background at my age. Currently I have only access to my handphone.

Apologies, saar.


Basically tellis says that the cheeni have misunderstood and misinterpreted India's actions in cashmere regarding the removal of art 370 and have reacted by pushing and asserting their maximalist positions on the border claim lines that they see for themselves.

but try this you tube link on tellis making some very salient points to an Indian news channel regarding the Indo china standoff.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O16iBHl5u7Q


America's Asia Expert Dr Ashley Tellis Exclusive On Ladakh Standoff

[chetak]

Sir, you are again listing out all the things that wee got wrong. Not how the Chinese managed. There was a very nice analysis of everything that we did wrong in the Western sector in 1962 by a retired military officer, either posted in the beginning of this thread or maybe in the previous avatar of this thread. The numbers were stacked against India in Ladakh, but that is becuase a lot of our manpower was deployed neear Leh, thinking that would be the main target of the Chinese. There was ample time to move the troops to forward positions. Also, the deployment was flawed and that's what led to bigger losses. on our side.
What I wanted to know was what Chinese got right or what their planning was was.
If you say we did not know anything about Sela pass, surely the Chinese did not as well. it was not that they were sending in patrols all the way upto Sela pass and Walong, prior to 1962 and had perfect knowledge of the ground and the terrain.

Also, how did the Chinese manage their logistics trail. The conflict stretched from 20th October to 21st November. Maybe they had been planning for the war and had the winter clothing etc. sorted out. But what about food and water etc. Also ammunition and getting heavy weaponry to the front.
Currently we are still asking this question that how will China manage to get water for 50,000 troops. But they managed just fine in 1962. how did they do it.
unfortunately I have not come across any literature that lays out their battle plans and how they planned for that war and what things they got right and what they got. if anyone has seen such writeup, please post it.

There were some fundamental differences between the PLA in 1962 and now.
The PLA in 1962 was a battle hardened army, with all its senior officers fighting us, having survived the Korean war - which was a ruthless Darwinian test. By contrast hardly anyone in IA had combat experience. The terrain in Korea was fairly similar to Arunachal, so the PLA was comfortable with it. IA at the time had little understanding of the terrain. The army only entered Arunachal in 1960. Eastern command was in Lucknow !
The Chinese had local intel. They did actually understand the area around Se-La better than we did.
Today, it is IA that is battle hardened, understands the terrain well and has a friendly local population (and local intel on the Tibet side).

The heaviest concentration of Chinese forces was 5 brigades in West Arunachal and two in Ladakh. These were light infantry with no heavy vehicles. There wasn't that much artillery (we had nothing except mortars). A 1962 Chinese brigade would require a fraction of the supplies of a PLA brigade today. Yet, they were compelled to retreat in Nov, in the Tawang area, for fear of being cut off from their supplies, when snow blocked the Bum-La pass into India (this was in far more comfortable terrain than East Ladakh).

It's not about weather China can get water for 50,000 men. It's about getting water, food, ammo, POL for those men, creating accommodation & storage & maintenance facilities and ensuring that those men are rotated to lower altitude places (outside Tibet) periodically. We don't know how many of the PLA force of 1962 suffered from high altitude complications later.

winter shuts down everything including making medevacs very risky and difficult for the cheeni. This is new ground for the cheeni troops and they are sure to find the going a lot tougher than the Indians will.

India is perhaps in a better situation having gained considerable high altitude experience and expertise in managing troops and logistics on the glacier and also given that our supply lines (including air support) are a great deal shorter than theirs.

[ParGha]

There were some fundamental differences between the PLA in 1962 and now. The PLA in 1962 was a battle hardened army, with all its senior officers fighting us, having survived the Korean war - which was a ruthless Darwinian test. By contrast hardly anyone in IA had combat experience.

To be precise, hardly anyone in IA had higher-formation command experience in combat. Most of the senior officers (Colonel and above) and JCOs had plenty of combat experience in World War 2 and First Kashmir War, but they didn't have command and operational planning experience. It is a subtle but important distinction.

The Indian Army is no more "battle hardened" today than in 1962. In fact, it has even less experience with higher-formation combat than in 1962 since no one has seen a large-scale conventional war (I think Gen VK Singh was the last COAS who fought in 1971 War). The real difference is, today the Chinese have even less battle experience than Indians.

[Anoop]

Regarding the Pakistani plan of forcing India to war now by including Gilgit Baltistan as their province; we only need to remind ourselves that in 1971, another province of Pakistan was liberated at a time and place of our choosing.