Eastern Europe/Ukraine [Feb 6th 2015]

[Baikul]

…
Given that Ukr are finding russian abandoning there vehicle that are fully fueled, parked neatly in people’s driveways and without even destroying any of operation mission documents. Nothing should be surprising.

I know Russians have probably suffered considerable equipment losses, but sometimes the SM chatter gets too much. In the example you cited, for example it could just be fog of war - IIRC the exact same thing happened in the early stages of the war when UA abandoned its positions in a hurry (Kherson was an example).

[Rudradev]

A "massacre" was needed because after Syria and the White Helmets, no one would believe a claim of "chemical weapons strike" coming from Democratic Party NSA or DOS officials.

A massacre is a nicely gruesome event that provides plenty of dead bodies for "evidence", but conveniently enough, no living people as witnesses. It is exactly the kind of thing needed to invoke emotional responses and outrage while shutting down logic and reasoning among the general public.

Believe me. Take this in writing from me. A desi version of Bucha IS going to happen in Kej-rensky's Punjab. Not a question of "if", but "when". My guess is, before the 2024 elections.

Previously it used to be only Pakistan's ISI and jihadi Tanzeems who did this kind of massacre (e.g. Nadimarg, Chittisinghpora) while wearing stolen uniforms as a false flag. But who needs Pakistan when you have the Aam Aadmi Party.

[Cyrano]

If any Indian TV reporting crew in Ukraine were critical of the regime, they would be in grave danger. Elensly regime is run by brutal thugs, check where it's police chief comes from - Azov battalion. A Western crew may be jailed or asked to leave, but Indian crew will be killed and some story cooked up like they stepped on a mine etc, coz India chose to not tow the western line all the way and will be seen as siding with Russia.
Our idiots there are better off blabbering whatever they are blabbering.

[Deans]

A summary of Russia's order of battle (ORBAT) for this war, as far as I can make out:

….

Excellent work Deans ji.

So I’m guessing that current predictions are that the western military district forces being pulled back from Kyiv/Sumy/ Chernihiv will reinforce the eastern Donbas front.

There are also 2 divisions assaulting Mariupol. One moving East from Crimea, the other West from the Donetsk region. These units have started moving north and are supposed to exploit any breakthrough in the Ukrainian positions, moving North, to link up with the redeployed Kiev/Sumy/Cheriniv force, moving South from Izyum. That plan is fairly obvious to the Ukrainians too.

[hanumadu]

Excellent work Deans ji.

So I’m guessing that current predictions are that the western military district forces being pulled back from Kyiv/Sumy/ Chernihiv will reinforce the eastern Donbas front.

There are also 2 divisions assaulting Mariupol. One moving East from Crimea, the other West from the Donetsk region. These units have started moving north and are supposed to exploit any breakthrough in the Ukrainian positions, moving North, to link up with the redeployed Kiev/Sumy/Cheriniv force, moving South from Izyum. That plan is fairly obvious to the Ukrainians too.

Are Ukranians redeploying too from Kiev? If they are redeploying tanks or any military vechicles, they will likely be bombed. That leaves out only personnel. They have to use civilian vehicles to travel using smaller roads avoiding highways.

[sohamn]

A "massacre" was needed because after Syria and the White Helmets, no one would believe a claim of "chemical weapons strike" coming from Democratic Party NSA or DOS officials.

A massacre is a nicely gruesome event that provides plenty of dead bodies for "evidence", but conveniently enough, no living people as witnesses. It is exactly the kind of thing needed to invoke emotional responses and outrage while shutting down logic and reasoning among the general public.

Believe me. Take this in writing from me. A desi version of Bucha IS going to happen in Kej-rensky's Punjab. Not a question of "if", but "when". My guess is, before the 2024 elections.

Previously it used to be only Pakistan's ISI and jihadi Tanzeems who did this kind of massacre (e.g. Nadimarg, Chittisinghpora) while wearing stolen uniforms as a false flag. But who needs Pakistan when you have the Aam Aadmi Party.

You don't have evidence for who did the massacre and both sides are spreading rumours. Let us not convert this thread into a propaganda and spread rumors / hate about an imaginary DESI Bucha.

[sohamn]

A summary of Russia's order of battle (ORBAT) for this war, as far as I can make out:

Organisation: A Military district has 2 to 3 Combined Arms Armies. Each CAA usually has 2-3 divisions and 2 brigades of Artillery.

Southern Military district: 58th, 8th and 49th Army + 1 airborne division and 1 Naval infantry brigade.
They have been fully deployed in the Crimea and Donbass. They also have peacekeepers in Armenia.

Crimea: 58th Army: 2 Motorised Rifle divisions and parts of the airborne division.
Donetsk: 8th Army: 2 Motorised Rifle divisions (one of them attacking Mariupol along with some Naval infantry).
+ 3 Brigades equivalent of DPR Militia.
Luhansk: 49th Army: 3 Motorised Rifle brigades + 3 brigades equivalent of LPR Militia.

Western Military district: 1st Guards Tank Army, 6th Army, 20th Guards Army
East of Kiev (Sumy/Cherniv): 1st Guards Army: 2 Tank and 1 Motor rifle division
West of Kiev: 20th Guards Army: 2 Motor Rifle divisions and 1 tank brigade.
Reserve: 6th CAA: 1 Airborne division and 2 Rifle brigades.

Central Military district: 41st Army & 2nd Guards Army
Deployed in the Kharkiv/ Izyum region
41st Army: 3 Motor rifle brigades.

Central district is a weak reserve command, based in Siberia. Its only other formation, 2nd Guards was not deployed, but there are reports
that 1 of its 3 brigades has either reinforced, or has replaced 1 brigade of 41st Army.
Russia's most experienced command is the Southern Military district. All its formations have been rotated through the Donbass since 2015, apart from combat experience in the Georgia war, Syria and Crimea.

Can you please repost this in the Ukraine strategy / tactics thread?

[Cyrano]

If all the UkrA units or most move from Kyiv eastwards to reinforce their troops the cauldron, what stops RA from re-invading from the north and capturing Kyiv or catching UkrA troops from behind? They have free access to ByloR.

What's more likely though is UkrA's mobility in any direction is severely reduced due to shortage of vehicles and fuel since RA has attacked fuel depots and refineries systematically in the past few weeks. They are of course open to air raids.

[sohamn]

I am also very surprised that some Indians are able to sympathize with the Ukrainian Nazi regime, which allows mockery of the non-white population of Ukraine. In this case, Ukrainian soldiers and party activists mock young women of Indostan origin (Gypsies).
https://ibb.co/VSW2mCM
https://ibb.co/374RqZ1
https://ibb.co/QKcCdqS
https://ibb.co/hd5KCM9
https://ibb.co/8BFHWQj
https://ibb.co/K5y7DcN
https://ibb.co/5h7J4Mw

Igorr - the Ukrainian regime is not a Nazi regime and none of their government representatives have pro nazi views. If you have evidence then please refute it. Zelenski's family had suffered in holocaust itself. Furthermore, until few years ago - the Nazi squad's were enemy's of the state but now it has become enemy's enemy is my friend situation.

Lets be clear, Putin didn't risk the entire Russia economy because he cared deeply about eliminating Nazi's from Ukraine. He did it because Ukraine was cozying up to NATO and thereby threatening Russian security. And Indian govt is neutral not because India is deeply vested in cleaning up the Nazi's, it merely because India has deep security interests with Russia vis a vis China, and it needs Russia's help in UN as well.

[Cyrano]

Sohamn,
Instead of pushing whatever you are pushing, go back 15 pages or so and re-read this thread. Ukr Govt is a sham installed by US State Dept, they used rightwing extremist Neo nazis since 2014 to operate a regime change. These Nazis were then integrated into the regular army and police, many new battalions were raised by corrupt Ukrainian oligarchs to retain grip over the govt under the benign watch of US State Dept. NATO military officers were pressed in to train and arm regular UkrA units to bring them to NATO standards to threaten Russia, meanwhile the Neo-nazi battalions were let loose in Donetsk and Luhansk on "pro-Russia" populations, who actually massively voted for elensly.

Ukr forces today are highly enmeshed with Neo-nazi militia, who are having a free run in the chaos today and elensly is in their grip now. Read this thread, do some research on your own, you'll see things are perhaps worse than I described.

Putin's motivations cited are what he stated, they include de-militarisation to reduce NATO threat, and de-nazification to protect Russophone people and stamp out the ideology. Igor said "some Indians" why are you equating with Indian Govt?!

[Rudradev]

Let us not convert this thread into a propaganda and spread rumors / hate about an imaginary DESI Bucha.

Yes, let's leave that to the State Department and their White Helmet-type proxies. They're the real professionals, as most of the world can tell from experience.

Hell, they actually honed these very skills in Jammu and Kashmir itself. Look up who Robin Raphel was, and her role in assembling and promoting the Hurriyat Conference during the early 1990s.

[Mort Walker]

If any Indian TV reporting crew in Ukraine were critical of the regime, they would be in grave danger. Elensly regime is run by brutal thugs, check where it's police chief comes from - Azov battalion. A Western crew may be jailed or asked to leave, but Indian crew will be killed and some story cooked up like they stepped on a mine etc, coz India chose to not tow the western line all the way and will be seen as siding with Russia.
Our idiots there are better off blabbering whatever they are blabbering.

They killed a NY Times reporter in Irpin the 2nd week of the war and blamed Russians, but Russians never occupied Irpin. Apparently the reporter had collected evidence Ukrainian thugs doing nasty things.

[kit]

The U.S. is deliberately waging a war of regime change against Russia, and this started many years ago
This RAND Corp. paper discusses the methods used to enact regime change and destroy Russia. The pathological focus on ruining a country is extremely sick. Consider this in context with the expansion of NATO, and the agenda becomes quite clear. Destroying a country means unrest, civil war, and the collapse of social services. To consider this some kind of game in which we “win” against some other nation is ghoulish. Real people are hurt when this happens.



https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB10014.html

his brief summarizes a report that comprehensively examines nonviolent, cost-imposing options that the United States and its allies could pursue across economic, political, and military areas to stress—overextend and unbalance—Russia’s economy and armed forces and the regime's political standing at home and abroad. Some of the options examined are clearly more promising than others, but any would need to be evaluated in terms of the overall U.S. strategy for dealing with Russia, which neither the report nor this brief has attempted to do.

The maxim that “Russia is never so strong nor so weak as it appears” remains as true in the current century as it was in the 19th and 20th.

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Today’s Russia suffers from many vulnerabilities—oil and gas prices well below peak that have caused a drop in living standards, economic sanctions that have furthered that decline, an aging and soon-to-be-declining population, and increasing authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin’s now-continued rule. Such vulnerabilities are coupled with deep-seated (if exaggerated) anxieties about the possibility of Western-inspired regime change, loss of great power status, and even military attack.

Despite these vulnerabilities and anxieties, Russia remains a powerful country that still manages to be a U.S. peer competitor in a few key domains. Recognizing that some level of competition with Russia is inevitable, RAND researchers conducted a qualitative assessment of “cost-imposing options” that could unbalance and overextend Russia. Such cost-imposing options could place new burdens on Russia, ideally heavier burdens than would be imposed on the United States for pursuing those options.

The work builds on the concept of long-term strategic competition developed during the Cold War, some of which originated at RAND. A seminal 1972 RAND report posited that the United States needed to shift its strategic thinking away from trying to stay ahead of the Soviet Union in all dimensions and toward trying to control the competition and channel it into areas of U.S. advantage. If this shift could be made successfully, the report concluded, the United States could prompt the Soviet Union to shift its limited resources into areas that posed less of a threat.

The new report applies this concept to today’s Russia. A team of RAND experts developed economic, geopolitical, ideological, informational, and military options and qualitatively assessed them in terms of their likelihood of success in extending Russia, their benefits, and their risks and costs.

Figure 1. Russian Petroleum Exports Are Declining

Year Percentage of the total value of exports
2012 ~70
2013 ~70
2014 ~68
2015 63
2016 47
SOURCE: United Nations (UN), UN Comtrade Database, electronic online database, 2017.

Economic Cost-Imposing Measures
Expanding U.S. energy production would stress Russia’s economy, potentially constraining its government budget and, by extension, its defense spending. By adopting policies that expand world supply and depress global prices, the United States can limit Russian revenue. Doing so entails little cost or risk, produces second-order benefits for the U.S. economy, and does not need multilateral endorsement.

Imposing deeper trade and financial sanctions would also likely degrade the Russian economy, especially if such sanctions are comprehensive and multilateral. Thus, their effectiveness will depend on the willingness of other countries to join in such a process. But sanctions come with costs and, depending on their severity, considerable risks.

Increasing Europe’s ability to import gas from suppliers other than Russia could economically extend Russia and buffer Europe against Russian energy coercion. Europe is slowly moving in this direction by building regasification plants for liquefied natural gas (LNG). But to be truly effective, this option would need global LNG markets to become more flexible than they already are and would need LNG to become more price-competitive with Russian gas.

Encouraging the emigration from Russia of skilled labor and well-educated youth has few costs or risks and could help the United States and other receiving countries and hurt Russia, but any effects—both positive for receiving countries and negative for Russia—would be difficult to notice except over a very long period. This option also has a low likelihood of extending Russia.

Economic Cost-Imposing Options Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia Benefits Costs and Risks
Expand U.S. energy production HIGH HIGH LOW
Impose deeper trade and financial sanctions HIGH HIGH HIGH
Increase Europe’s ability to import LNG from sources other than Russia MODERATE HIGH MODERATE
Encourage emigration from Russia of skilled labor and well-educated youth LOW LOW LOW
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.

Geopolitical Cost-Imposing Measures

Syrian Democratic Forces trainees, representing an equal number of Arab and Kurdish volunteers, stand in formation at their graduation ceremony in northern Syria, August 9, 2017.

Photo by Sgt. Mitchell Ryan/DoD

Providing lethal aid to Ukraine would exploit Russia’s greatest point of external vulnerability. But any increase in U.S. military arms and advice to Ukraine would need to be carefully calibrated to increase the costs to Russia of sustaining its existing commitment without provoking a much wider conflict in which Russia, by reason of proximity, would have significant advantages.

Increasing support to the Syrian rebels could jeopardize other U.S. policy priorities, such as combating radical Islamic terrorism, and could risk further destabilizing the entire region. Furthermore, this option might not even be feasible, given the radicalization, fragmentation, and decline of the Syrian opposition.

Promoting liberalization in Belarus likely would not succeed and could provoke a strong Russian response, one that would result in a general deterioration of the security environment in Europe and a setback for U.S. policy.

Expanding ties in the South Caucasus—competing economically with Russia—would be difficult because of geography and history.



Reducing Russian influence in Central Asia would be very difficult and could prove costly. Increased engagement is unlikely to extend Russia much economically and likely to be disproportionately costly for the United States.

Flip Transnistria and expel the Russian troops from the region would be a blow to Russian prestige, but it would also save Moscow money and quite possibly impose additional costs on the United States and its allies.

Geopolitical Cost-Imposing Options Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia Benefits Costs and Risks
Provide lethal aid to Ukraine MODERATE HIGH HIGH
Increase support to the Syrian rebels LOW MODERATE HIGH
Promote liberalization in Belarus LOW HIGH HIGH
Expand ties in the South Caucasus LOW LOW MODERATE
Reduce Russian influence in Central Asia LOW LOW MODERATE
Flipping Transnistria LOW LOW MODERATE
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.

Ideological and Informational Cost-Imposing Measures

Muscovites protesting the war in Ukraine and Russia’s support of separatism in the Crimea on the Circular Boulevards in Moscow on March 15, 2014.

Photo by Dmitry Vereshchagin/Adobe Stock

Diminishing faith in the Russian electoral system would be difficult because of state control over most media sources. Doing so could increase discontent with the regime, but there are serious risks that the Kremlin could increase repression or lash out and pursue a diversionary conflict abroad that might run counter to Western interests.

Creating the perception that the regime is not pursuing the public interest could focus on widespread, large-scale corruption and further challenge the legitimacy of the state. But it is hard to assess whether political volatility and protests would lead to a more extended Russia—less able or inclined to threaten Western interests abroad—or to a Russia more inclined to lash out in retaliation or to distract, making this a high-risk option.

Encouraging domestic protests and other nonviolent resistance would focus on distracting or destabilizing the Russian regime and reducing the likelihood that it would pursue aggressive actions abroad, but the risks are high and it would be difficult for Western governments to directly increase the incidence or intensity of anti-regime activities in Russia.

Undermining Russia’s image abroad would focus on diminishing Russian standing and influence, thus undercutting regime claims of restoring Russia to its former glory. Further sanctions, the removal of Russia from non-UN international forums, and boycotting such events as the World Cup could be implemented by Western states and would damage Russian prestige. But the extent to which these steps would damage Russian domestic stability is uncertain.

While none of these measures has a high probability of success, any or all of them would prey on the Russian regime’s deepest anxieties and might be employed as a deterrent threat to diminish Russia’s active disinformation and subversion campaigns abroad.

Ideological and Informational Cost-Imposing Options Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia Benefits Costs and Risks
Diminish faith in the Russian electoral system LOW MODERATE HIGH
Create the perception that the regime is not pursuing the public interest MODERATE MODERATE HIGH
Encourage domestic protests and other nonviolent resistance LOW MODERATE HIGH
Undermine Russia’s image abroad MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.

Air and Space Cost-Imposing Measures
Sailors
Marines assigned to the Thunderbolts of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 251 remove a training AGM-88 HARM from an F/A-18C Hornet on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71).

Photo by Anthony N. Hilkowski/DVIDS

Reposturing bombers within easy striking range of key Russian strategic targets has a high likelihood of success and would certainly get Moscow’s attention and raise Russian anxieties; the costs and risks of this option are low as long as the bombers are based out of range of most of Russia’s theater ballistic and ground-based cruise missiles.

Reposturing fighters so that they are closer to their targets than bombers as a way to achieve higher sortie rates to compensate for their smaller payloads would likely concern Moscow even more than reposturing bombers, but the likelihood of success is low and risks are high. Because each aircraft would need to fly multiple sorties during a conventional conflict, Russian leaders would probably be confident that they could destroy many fighters on the ground and shut down their deployment airfields early on with few or no additions to their missile inventory.

Deploying additional tactical nuclear weapons to locations in Europe and Asia could heighten Russia’s anxiety enough to significantly increase investments in its air defenses. In conjunction with the bomber option, it has a high likelihood of success, but deploying more such weapons might lead Moscow to react in ways contrary to U.S. and allied interests.

Repositioning U.S. and allied ballistic missile defense systems to better engage Russian ballistic missiles would also alarm Moscow but would likely be the least effective option because Russia could easily saturate current systems and any planned upgrades with a small percentage of its existing missile inventory, leaving many missiles still available to hold U.S. and allied targets at risk.

There are also ways to get Russia to extend itself in strategic competition. In terms of benefits, such developments would exploit Moscow’s demonstrated fear of U.S. airpower capabilities and doctrines. Developing new low-observable, long-range bombers, or simply adding significantly more of types that are already available or programmed (B-2s and B-21s) would be worrisome for Moscow, as would developing autonomous or remotely piloted strike aircraft and producing them in high numbers. All options would likely incentivize Moscow to devote ever-greater resources to making its command and control systems harder, more mobile, and more redundant.

A key risk of these options is being drawn into arms races that result in cost-imposing strategies directed against the United States. For example, investing in ballistic missile defense systems and space-based weapons would alarm Moscow, but Russia could defend against such developments by taking measures that would probably be considerably cheaper than the costs of these systems to the United States.

As for likelihood of success, some options are good cost-imposing strategies, but some—such as investing more in HARMs or other electronic warfare technologies—are clearly better than others, and some approaches should be avoided, such as those that focus on space-based weapons or ballistic missile defense systems.

The United States might goad Russia into a costly arms race by breaking out of the nuclear arms control regime, but the benefits are unlikely to outweigh U.S. costs. The financial costs of a nuclear arms race would probably be as high for the United States as they would be for Russia, perhaps higher. But the more serious costs would be political and strategic.

Air and Space/Nuclear Cost-Imposing Options Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia Benefits Costs and Risks
Option 1: Changing air and space force posture and operations
Reposture bombers HIGH MODERATE LOW
Reposture fighters LOW MODERATE HIGH
Deploy additional tactical nuclear weapons HIGH LOW HIGH
Reposition U.S. and allied ballistic missile defense systems LOW LOW MODERATE
Option 2: Increasing aerospace research and development (R&D)
Invest more in low-observable aircraft MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE
Invest more in autonomous or remotely piloted aircraft HIGH MODERATE MODERATE
Invest more in long-range strike aircraft and missiles HIGH HIGH MODERATE
Invest more in longer-range high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs) HIGH MODERATE MODERATE
Invest more in new electronic warfare technologies MODERATE MODERATE LOW
Focus on long-range, precision-guided conventional missiles (e.g., conventional prompt global strike) MODERATE MODERATE HIGH
Focus on space-based weapons LOW MODERATE HIGH
Focus on “spaceplanes” LOW TO MODERATE MODERATE HIGH
Focus on small satellites LOW MODERATE HIGH
Option 3: Increasing air and missile components of the nuclear triad
Break out of the nuclear arms control regime LOW MODERATE HIGH
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.

Maritime Cost-Imposing Measures
USN
A U.S. sailor aboard the guided missile destroyer USS Mustin (DDG 89) fires a torpedo at a simulated target during Valiant Shield 2014 in the Pacific Ocean September 18, 2014.

Photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Declan Barnes/DVIDS

Increasing U.S. and allied naval force posture and presence in Russia’s operating areas could force Russia to increase its naval investments, diverting investments from potentially more dangerous areas. But the size of investment required to reconstitute a true blue-water naval capability makes it unlikely that Russia could be compelled or enticed to do so.

Increasing naval R&D efforts would focus on developing new weapons that allow U.S. submarines to threaten a broader set of targets or enhance their ability to threaten Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which could impose anti-submarine warfare costs on Russia. There are limited risks, but success depends on being able to develop these capabilities and on whether they are sufficiently capable of influencing Russian expenditures.

Shifting nuclear posture toward SSBNs would entail increasing the percentage of the U.S. nuclear triad assigned to SSBNs by increasing the size of that fleet. While it might force Russia to invest in capabilities that can operate in a blue-water environment in two oceans and would reduce risks to U.S. strategic posture, the option is unlikely to entice Russia into changing its strategy and, thus, extending itself.

Checking the Black Sea buildup would involve deploying strengthened North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) anti-access and area denial over the Black Sea—perhaps in the form of long-range, land-based anti-ship missiles—to drive up the cost of defending Russian bases in Crimea and lower the benefit to Russia of having seized this area. Russia would certainly mount a vigorous diplomatic and informational campaign to dissuade coastal NATO and non-NATO states from participating. Also, operating in the Black Sea is politically and logistically more difficult for the U.S. Navy than the Russian Navy; it is also more dangerous for the former in a conflict.

Maritime Cost-Imposing Options Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia Benefits Costs and Risks
Increase U.S. and allied naval force posture and presence MODERATE MODERATE LOW
Increase naval R&D efforts MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE
Shift nuclear posture toward SSBNs LOW LOW LOW
Check the Black Sea buildup MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.

Land and Multidomain Cost-Imposing Measures
#ArtemisStrike
Exercise Artemis Strike was a German-led tactical live-fire exercise with live Patriot and Stinger missiles at the NATO Missile Firing Installation in Chania, Greece, from October 31 to November 9, 2017. More than 200 U.S. soldiers and approximately 650 German airmen participated in the realistic training within a combined construct, exercising the rigors associated with force projection and educating operators on their air missile defense systems.

Photo by Anthony Sweeney/DVIDS

Increasing U.S. forces in Europe, increasing European NATO member ground capabilities, and deploying a large number of NATO forces on the Russian border would likely have only limited effects on extending Russia. All the options would enhance deterrence, but the risks vary. A general increase in NATO ground force capabilities in Europe—including closing European NATO member readiness gaps and increasing the number of U.S. forces stationed in traditional locations in Western Europe—would have limited risks. But large-scale deployments on Russia’s borders would increase the risk of conflict with Russia, particularly if perceived as challenging Russia’s position in eastern Ukraine, Belarus, or the Caucasus.

Increasing the size and frequency of NATO exercises in Europe may help to enhance readiness and deterrence, but it is unlikely to prompt a costly Russian response unless the exercises also send risky signals. Large-scale NATO exercises held near Russia’s borders and exercises that practice counterattack or offensive scenarios could be perceived as showing the intent and willingness to consider offensive operations. For example, a NATO exercise simulating a counterattack to retake NATO territory lost to advancing Russian forces might look like an exercise to prepare for an invasion of a piece of Russian territory, such as Kaliningrad.

Developing but not deploying an intermediate-range missile could bring Russia back into conformity with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty but could also prompt an acceleration of Russian missile programs. Withdrawing from that treaty and building the missiles but not deploying them in Europe would add little to U.S. capabilities and would probably prompt Russia to deploy such missiles itself—and, perhaps, invest more in ballistic missile defense. Taking the further step of deploying the missiles to Europe, assuming that NATO allies were willing, would also almost certainly prompt a Russian response, potentially involving substantial resources, or at least the diversion of substantial resources from other defense spending, though it is hard to assess what share would be directed toward defensive capabilities versus offensive or retaliatory ones.

Incremental investments in new technologies to counter Russian air defenses and increase U.S. long-range fires could significantly improve defense and deterrence while compelling increased Russian investment in countermeasures. Investments in more-revolutionary, next-generation technologies could have even greater effects, given the Russian concerns about new physical principles, but depending on the capability, such investments could also risk strategic stability by threatening the Russian regime and leadership security in a crisis.

Land and Multidomain Cost-Imposing Options Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia Benefits Costs and Risks
Option 1: Increasing U.S. and NATO land forces in Europe
Increase U.S. forces in Europe MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE
Increase European NATO member ground capabilities LOW HIGH LOW
Deploy large number of NATO forces on the Russian border MODERATE MODERATE HIGH
Option 2: Increasing NATO exercises in Europe
Increase the size of U.S participation LOW MODERATE MODERATE
Generate a mass mobilization of European NATO member forces LOW HIGH MODERATE
Hold exercises on Russia’s borders MODERATE MODERATE HIGH
Hold exercises practicing counterattack or offensive scenarios MODERATE MODERATE HIGH
Option 3: Withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
Fund a missile development program without withdrawing MODERATE LOW MODERATE
Withdraw and build missiles but do not deploy to Europe HIGH LOW MODERATE
Withdraw, build missiles, and deploy to Europe HIGH MODERATE HIGH
Option 4: Investing in new capabilities to manipulate Russian risk perceptions
Invest in incremental improvements in counter–anti-access and area denial capabilities (e.g., enhanced Army Tactical Missile Systems, advanced anti-radiation guided missiles) HIGH MODERATE MODERATE
Invest in revolutionary, swarm counter–anti-access and area denial capabilities HIGH HIGH HIGH
Invest in incremental improvements in counter–ground forces/fires (e.g., enhanced Javelin) LOW LOW LOW
Invest in revolutionary, unmanned ground forces/fires capabilities MODERATE MODERATE MODERATE
Invest in weapons based on “new physical principles” (e.g,. directed-energy counter–air-defense weapons) MODERATE HIGH HIGH
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.

Implications for the Army
The task of “extending Russia” need not fall primarily on the Army or even the U.S. armed forces as a whole. Indeed, the most promising ways to extend Russia—those with the highest benefit, the lowest risk, and greatest likelihood of success—likely fall outside the military domain. Russia is not seeking military parity with the United States and, thus, might simply choose not to respond to some U.S. military actions (e.g., shifts in naval presence); other U.S. military actions (e.g., posturing forces closer to Russia) could ultimately prove more costly to the United States than to Russia. Still, our findings have at least three major implications for the Army.

The U.S. Army should rebuild its linguistic and analytical expertise on Russia. Because Russia does pose a long-term threat, the Army needs to develop the human capital to engage in this strategic competition.
The Army should consider investing and encouraging the other services to invest more in capabilities, such as Army Tactical Missile Systems, Indirect Fire Protection Capability Increment 2, longer-range anti-air defense, and other systems designed to counter Russian anti-access and area denial capabilities. The Army also might consider spending some R&D resources on less-mature, more-futuristic systems (e.g., swarm unmanned aerial vehicles or remote combat vehicles). While these measures would likely be insufficient in themselves to greatly extend Russia, they would benefit U.S. deterrence efforts and could augment a broader whole-of-government policy.
Even if the Army were not directly involved in extending Russia per se, it would play a key role in mitigating the possible blowback. All the options to extend Russia incur some risk. As a result, enhancing U.S. deterrence posture in Europe and increasing U.S. military capabilities (e.g., an enhanced Javelin or active protection systems for Army vehicles) might need to go hand in hand with any move to extend Russia, as a way of hedging against the chance of tensions with Russia escalating into conflict.
Conclusions
The most-promising options to “extend Russia” are those that directly address its vulnerabilities, anxieties, and strengths, exploiting areas of weakness while undermining Russia’s current advantages. In that regard, Russia’s greatest vulnerability, in any competition with the United States, is its economy, which is comparatively small and highly dependent on energy exports. Russian leadership’s greatest anxiety stems from the stability and durability of the regime, and Russia’s greatest strengths are in the military and info-war realms. The table below draws from the earlier tables to identify the most-promising options.

Most of the options discussed, including those listed here, are in some sense escalatory, and most would likely prompt some Russian counterescalation. Thus, besides the specific risks associated with each option, there is additional risk attached to a generally intensified competition with a nuclear-armed adversary to consider. This means that every option must be deliberately planned and carefully calibrated to achieve the desired effect. Finally, although Russia will bear the cost of this increased competition less easily than the United States will, both sides will have to divert national resources from other purposes. Extending Russia for its own sake is not a sufficient basis in most cases to consider the options discussed here. Rather, the options must be considered in the broader context of national policy based on defense, deterrence, and—where U.S. and Russian interests align—cooperation.

Most-Promising Cost-Imposing Options Likelihood of Success in Extending Russia Benefits Costs and Risks
Expand U.S. energy production HIGH HIGH LOW
Impose deeper trade and financial sanctions HIGH HIGH HIGH
Increase U.S. and allied naval force posture and presence MODERATE MODERATE LOW
Reposture bombers HIGH MODERATE LOW
Invest more in autonomous or remotely piloted aircraft HIGH MODERATE MODERATE
Invest more in long-range strike aircraft and missiles HIGH HIGH MODERATE
Invest more in longer-range HARMs HIGH MODERATE MODERATE
Invest more in new electronic warfare technologies MODERATE MODERATE LOW
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in the same way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in light orange while a low likelihood of success is shaded in dark orange. All assessments listed in the tables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.

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News Release
NEWS RELEASE

Nonviolent Ways the United States Could Exploit Russian Vulnerabilities
Apr 24, 2019
A game of chess between Russia and the United States, image by Petrik/Adobe Stock; design by Pete Soriano/RAND Corporation
REPORT

Extending Russia
Apr 24, 2019 James Dobbins @Jim_Dobbins, Raphael S. Cohen, et al.
Research conducted by
RAND
ARMY RESEARCH DIVISION
The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army and conducted by the RAND Arroyo Center.

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[kit]

“The Icelandic journalist Haukur Hauksson visited Volnovakha and saw in all details the military bases of the nationalists.

“There were Nazi flags, Nazi literature, a swastika all around, symbols, bottles of alcohol and drug residue. They treated the local population very ugly - they seized houses, drove people out. We were in one of those houses. There, the owner was killed only because he resisted when his entire family was expelled,” he said.

Hauksson said that the Western media spread false information about the Russian troops in Ukraine.”

[kit]

https://brandnewtube.com/watch/don-t-sh ... uJPNb.html

[kit]

“Ukraine deported a foreign military correspondent for reporting on a fire at the Odessa oil depot after a missile attack

The SBU arrested Dutch journalist Robert Dulmers and expelled him from Ukraine for publishing footage of a fire at an oil depot in Odessa after a Russian missile strike.

Dulmers was banned from entering Ukraine for 10 years. The Union of Journalists of the Netherlands said that Ukraine complicates the work of the media and prevents reliable coverage of events in the country.

It should be noted that according to the law adopted on March 25, Ukraine provides for criminal liability for the publication of materials on the details of hostilities and troop movements.”

https://t.me/novostldnr/3654

[kit]

a video that is going viral which shows a brutal execution committed by a Ukrainian solider who suspected a Ukrainian citizen for having links with Russia.

[kit]

Let us not convert this thread into a propaganda and spread rumors / hate about an imaginary DESI Bucha.

Yes, let's leave that to the State Department and their White Helmet-type proxies. They're the real professionals, as most of the world can tell from experience.

Hell, they actually honed these very skills in Jammu and Kashmir itself. Look up who Robin Raphel was, and her role in assembling and promoting the Hurriyat Conference during the early 1990s.

[kit]

https://twitter.com/i/status/1511049376956928009

[kit]

https://consortiumnews.com/2022/04/04/c ... -to-bucha/

Mainstream pundits calling for a military escalation that could set off nuclear war and end humankind should get on a plane and go fight Russia directly themselves.

[hanumadu]

If all the UkrA units or most move from Kyiv eastwards to reinforce their troops the cauldron, what stops RA from re-invading from the north and capturing Kyiv or catching UkrA troops from behind? They have free access to ByloR.

What's more likely though is UkrA's mobility in any direction is severely reduced due to shortage of vehicles and fuel since RA has attacked fuel depots and refineries systematically in the past few weeks. They are of course open to air raids.

Yep.

[Tanaji]

Baniansky is now calling for Russia to be expelled from Security council. Wonder if thats even a thing…

It is just optics though: Baniansky either wants nato troops in ground or SAMs or tanks. He doesnt seem to be talking about no fly zones anymore

The Ukr success so far has been down to defender advantage and more importantly the near real time situational awareness that they have been receiving from Nato with its full array of sensors in play. Russia has nothing like that and more importantly is employing bizzaire tactics

[kit]

UK blocked twice the call of UN Security Council by Russia on Bucha fake incident. So, Russia had to carry out a press- conference today on this incident and demonstrated materials showing that video on mass murder of civilians is staged or it was a crime committed by Ukrainian forces and it is an attempt to avoid responsibility.



MUST WATCH

[vera_k]

Per the WSJ, the EU is moving to drop Russian energy supplies. Germany is said to have figured out how to do without Russian gas supplies. Sanctions on Indian and Chinese companies buying Russian oil are under consideration.

Bucha Escalates Putin’s Risks

[John]

If all the UkrA units or most move from Kyiv eastwards to reinforce their troops the cauldron, what stops RA from re-invading from the north and capturing Kyiv or catching UkrA troops from behind? They have free access to ByloR.

What's more likely though is UkrA's mobility in any direction is severely reduced due to shortage of vehicles and fuel since RA has attacked fuel depots and refineries systematically in the past few weeks. They are of course open to air raids.

They likely will have roads mined and probably rely on TDF to guard the north.

Not sure how much impact the fuel depot hits are having they have their underground tanks and pipes, not to mention supplies coming from western neighbors. However any forces reinforcing the east will have to travel thru open roads where Russian AF could interdict them easily but so far they been struggling to do more than couple hundred sorties.

know Russians have probably suffered considerable equipment losses, but sometimes the SM chatter gets too much. In the example you cited, for example it could just be fog of war - IIRC the exact same thing happened in the early stages of the war when UA abandoned its positions in a hurry (Kherson was an example).

But in UA case it seemed to be case of general who switched sides (or so Ukranians claim ) and also it is shock of having enemy only few miles away. But this withdrawal by Russians is planned no excuse for Russian forces deep within Irpin to just abandon them, Ukr forces took days to secure the city after their withdrawal. Unless Ukranian forces had started attacking immediately and this wasn’t as planned of a withdrawal as it seems.

[Baikul]

Russian sources are abuzz with reports of western soldiers trapped in Mariupol and looking for a way to get out. If true this would be a major propaganda win for Russia, especially if these are serving soldiers.

Quoting directly from one- “NATO officers from France, Germany, Britain, and ….Sweden …stuck in Azovstal in Mariupol. They are in touch with Russian troops right now asking to help them leave, organise a corridor for exit”.

[Karan M]

Igorr - the Ukrainian regime is not a Nazi regime and none of their government representatives have pro nazi views. If you have evidence then please refute it. Zelenski's family had suffered in holocaust itself. Furthermore, until few years ago - the Nazi squad's were enemy's of the state but now it has become enemy's enemy is my friend situation.

You have ignored a lot of data.

We know this how? That none of their representatives have pro Nazi views. The Azov unit is deeply enmeshed in their command structure. Stands to reason they have many sympathisers in their Govt too. And secondly see who funds Zelensky.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.news18 ... 93575.html

Check this link in particular

https://mronline.org/2022/03/10/discern ... -zelensky/

Or this
https://greatgameindia.com/hunter-biden ... -neo-nazi/

[Ambar]

Russian sources are abuzz with reports of western soldiers trapped in Mariupol and looking for a way to get out. If true this would be a major propaganda win for Russia, especially if these are serving soldiers.

Quoting directly from one- “NATO officers from France, Germany, Britain, and ….Sweden …stuck in Azovstal in Mariupol. They are in touch with Russian troops right now asking to help them leave, organise a corridor for exit”.

I sometimes wonder if these rumors are spread by Ukraine and NATO just to make Russians look incompetent, dumb and untrustworthy. Yesterday there were posts on twitter and FB about US Lt Gen Roger Cloutier being caught by the Russians in Mariupol but by end of the day it turned out to be fake as expected. At this point in the war if Russians had anything worth demoralizing Ukraine and NATO they would be using it instantly.

[g.sarkar]

https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/worl ... volnovakha
Ukraine crisis: 7-hour long ceasefire begins in Mariupol, Volnovakha
OUR CORRESPONDENT, March 5, 2022
A seven-hour ceasefire has begun in Mariupol and Volnovakha cities of Ukraine to set up humanitarian corridors for the evacuation of civilians and delivery of food and medicines, said a media report.
“Temporary ceasefire begins in Mariupol and Volnovakha to set up humanitarian corridors. The corridors will serve to evacuate civilians and deliver food and medicine to the cities that have been cut off from the world by Russian attackers,” tweeted The Kyiv Independent, a Ukraine media outlet. The media outlet informed that the ceasefire will aid the evacuation of 440,000 people of Mariupol and 21,000 people of Volnovakha.
“The ceasefire is declared for 9 a.m. – 4 p.m. today. The evacuation of civilians is set to start at 11 a.m. Mariupol, of 440,000 people, and Volnovakha, of 21,000 people, have been largely cut off water, heat, and electricity,” it tweeted.
Earlier, Mykhailo Podoliyak, the advisor to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, informed that humanitarian evacuation corridors are being prepared for opening in Mariupol and Volnovakha.
“In Mariupol and Volnovakha, humanitarian evacuation corridors are being prepared for opening, columns are being formed from those who are subject to evacuation. The parties temporarily ceased fire in the area of the corridors…,” he tweeted.
This comes as the Russian defence ministry declared a ceasefire for the evacuation of civilians in Mariupol and Volnovakha, adding that the corridors and the evacuation routes had been agreed upon with Ukraine.
Russian forces launched military operations in Ukraine on February 24, three days after Moscow recognized Ukraine’s breakaway regions – Donetsk and Luhansk – as independent entities. Amid the Ukraine-Russia crisis raging for over a week now, Ukraine plans to hold the third round of talks with Russian officials to try to end the fighting triggered by Moscow’s invasion this weekend, said one of Kyiv’s negotiators.
.....
Gautam
Is this the corridor that Baikulji wrote about created to save Western (NATO) officers trapped in Mariupol?

[banrjeer]

Per the WSJ, the EU is moving to drop Russian energy supplies. Germany is said to have figured out how to do without Russian gas supplies. Sanctions on Indian and Chinese companies buying Russian oil are under consideration.

Bucha Escalates Putin’s Risks

Yes they can do all this be emigrating to the US. If rejected they will emigrate to Syria. Germans are crazy about sunlight.

[Baikul]

Russian sources are abuzz with reports of western soldiers trapped in Mariupol and looking for a way to get out. If true this would be a major propaganda win for Russia, especially if these are serving soldiers.

Quoting directly from one- “NATO officers from France, Germany, Britain, and ….Sweden …stuck in Azovstal in Mariupol. They are in touch with Russian troops right now asking to help them leave, organise a corridor for exit”.

I sometimes wonder if these rumors are spread by Ukraine and NATO just to make Russians look incompetent, dumb and untrustworthy. Yesterday there were posts on twitter and FB about US Lt Gen Roger Cloutier being caught by the Russians in Mariupol but by end of the day it turned out to be fake as expected. At this point in the war if Russians had anything worth demoralizing Ukraine and NATO they would be using it instantly.

Fog of war and all that. Who knows if (assuming western nationals are fighting in Mariupol at all) they’re actual NATO officers, or mercenaries*. But yeah at the moment it’s just rumours.

*For example this guy is almost certainly there from all accounts (British, fought against ISIS, now believed to be in Mariupol).

https://instagram.com/cossackgundi?utm_medium=copy_link

[banrjeer]

Igorr - the Ukrainian regime is not a Nazi regime and none of their government representatives have pro nazi views. If you have evidence then please refute it. Zelenski's family had suffered in holocaust itself. Furthermore, until few years ago - the Nazi squad's were enemy's of the state but now it has become enemy's enemy is my friend situation.

You have ignored a lot of data.

We know this how? That none of their representatives have pro Nazi views. The Azov unit is deeply enmeshed in their command structure. Stands to reason they have many sympathisers in their Govt too. And secondly see who funds Zelensky.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.news18 ... 93575.html

Check this link in particular

https://mronline.org/2022/03/10/discern ... -zelensky/

Or this
https://greatgameindia.com/hunter-biden ... -neo-nazi/

Zelensky made videos targeted to Russia or Russian speakers too on how hard he has tried to reign in fascists and how they have threatened him. He has tried to play both sides and has been doing things for camera for a while.

[hanumadu]

Russian sources are abuzz with reports of western soldiers trapped in Mariupol and looking for a way to get out. If true this would be a major propaganda win for Russia, especially if these are serving soldiers.

Quoting directly from one- “NATO officers from France, Germany, Britain, and ….Sweden …stuck in Azovstal in Mariupol. They are in touch with Russian troops right now asking to help them leave, organise a corridor for exit”.

There was talk about two helicopters trying to evacaute from Mariupol were shot down by Russia.

[Baikul]

War footage has gotten pretty intense. Continuing with the helicopter shoot downs, a Ukrainian BTR engaging a Russian APV, the explosive detonation of a Russian tank in Mariupol, here’s footage of a tank versus a column that’s going viral.

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/ ... ame=iossmf

…

There was talk about two helicopters trying to evacaute from Mariupol were shot down by Russia.

Yes there were unsubstantiated rumours that these had a few high value targets.

[Cyrano]

Yes, one fell on land, 2 survivors recovered by Russians, other fell into the sea. Rumours of 2 French Mil Int officers killed. Macron sacked Head of French Mil Int few days ago. Many others rumoured to be holed up in Azovstahl factory.

I think Bucha false flag is to pressure Russia to secure extraction, the humanitarian cease fire could help with that. No one really knows, Russians aren't talking.

Indian statement at UNSC yesterday basically sided with Russia, condemned the killings and demanded independent probe.

Germany has seized control of Gazprom's German subsidiaries "temporarily" to ensure its storage tanks are filled to the brim in the coming months in prep for next winter - with Russian gas ! Putin-da will not like that.

US has stopped some of the payments due on Russian bonds from the Russian funds it has frozen, with help from JP Morgan. Bond holders include US pension funds et al. Russia can't be said to be technically in default. Messy legal battle will ensue between bond holders, banks and US govt.

Biden has announced 180 million barrels of oil to be released from US strategic reserves, about 35% of current stock. The idea is to ease global demand and buy back when the price falls, while hurting Russia's gains. Lets see how it works out. OPEC can cut production, no ?

[IndraD]

Bucha was a smoke screen to corner France, Germany (Europe) into subjugation, guilt trap them into not buying Russian oil, as secondary aim, enforce blanket sanction on India & others still buying Ru oil. note media bytes of Zelensky he is continuosuly blaming these 2 countries while calling UK friendly, clearly indicating which direction is he wagging tail to. He dared these 2 countries past heads to visit Bucha to see 'what has 14 yrs of their relationship with Russia lead to' absolving others of crime.

[ks_sachin]

So is Putin a dead duck now or living on borrowed time or will he do a Bashar al Assad?

[Cyrano]

Putin: Magar merey paas maa hai (mother of all bombs) !!

[Pratyush]

So is Putin a dead duck now or living on borrowed time or will he do a Bashar al Assad?

Russia is a democracy. Unlike what the US say's about it.

A lost war and attendent economic hardships will have consequences for Putin.

[Baikul]

Gents I am on record in the very early days stating my opinion that this war would ultimately be harmful to Putin and Russia. But I also don’t think he’s going down anytime soon.

The almost mystical patriotism of the average Russian, their ability to absorb loss as a society, and Putin’s ability to whip up the spirit of nationalism will all factor in. This is not as yet an unpopular war in Russia.