ramana wrote:KLNMurthy wrote:
is it like the drunk searching for his keys under the light?
India is seen as a soft & vulnerable state, so the US thinks it is easy to chalk up a win here.
Not so simple. We are missing some thing.
Ok per Luttwak's Logic of strategy (LOS)
Suppose
#1 US
#2 China
#3 India
#4 Russia
#5 EU which is the joker in the pack.
LOS says
1) #1 will team up with #3 to prevent being displaced by #2.
2) Same time #2 will hit #3 to prevent teaming up with #1.
So far that is happening.
3) Now #1 doesn't want #3 and #4 getting together to protect #5. However #3 is a friend of #5
4) While #2 is teaming up with #4
LOS says #1 should prevent #2 and #4 from getting together.
Why is 4) not harmful to #5? They can ride roughshod on #5 in every which way.
The reality is #1 wants to preserve #5 at all costs and the rest is a charade.
Now work on everything with this as the top objective of #1.
What's wrong with this picture?
If #1 wants to retain its influence over #5 no matter what the cost, then given the rising strength of #2, #1 needs to acquiesce to a spheres of influence model.
That is, #1 must let #2 have mastery over #4 and #3. #2 will be granted this by #1 if #2 promises to keep #4 on a short leash that prevents #4 from extending any independent influence into Europe (#5). #2's BRI network must also terminate at Istanbul and Kaliningrad. Everything west of that unquestionably belongs to #1.
#1's calculus is that because of sanctions etc, #4 will turn into a dysfunctional satellite of #2, much like NoKo, Laos, Pakistan. #2 exerts its imperial authority via the zamindar-hiring-dacoits model. #2 gives loans, builds infrastructure, etc in its tributary states, but also has rogue states under its payroll to keep the tributaries in line. #1 says ok to all this, as long as #4 is never allowed to intimidate #5.
#1 also knows that #3 will (very soon) chafe at the dominance of #2 in its sphere of influence. #1 aims to make #3 a Super Ukraine of sorts... strong enough to bog down #2 but not strong enough to win decisively and extricate itself from the bog. #1 is counting on tensions between #2 & #3, and ultimately between #2 & #4, to shift the balance of power westwards in favour of the #1+#5 sphere of influence.
The swing areas will be the Ummah states (from Egypt/Turkey to Pakistan), where the UK will be brought in as #1's proxy/emissary, and the Indo-Pacific (especially the Western Pacific). Africa and Latin America will be of secondary importance.
In the Indo-Pacific, #1 will turn over ASEAN to #2's sphere of influence quite readily (allowing #2 & #3 to compete for it) but #1 will still consider the Pacific littorals: Japan, SoKo, Australia as its own sphere of influence.
Am I missing anything?