Russian / Ukranian Combat Tactics

[Atmavik]

^^ The Russian Army does look heavily Motorized. they do have a lot of wheeled APCs. here is one layaing waste to Mariopul along with chechen fighters. this seems to be a leason from the syrian war.


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HuX8i9u6jFI

[Deans]

Thanks, the engagement in this video happened exactly as I imagined. But in many videos I did not see it happen, so got very confused.

Russian army is heavy on armored and artillery firepower. They use fire power to clear the path for infantry. A Russian army division will have 3 brigades with two being armored and one infantry. Infantry follows the armor. Other armies like the IA is heavily focused on infantry where it may have 2 infantry brigades and 1 armored brigade.

A Russian combined arms army has 2 artillery brigades (1 field/ SP guns brigade and 1 MLRS) compared to 1 in a IA Corps.
I believe a Russian motorised rifle division would have the same no of tanks (1 regiment) as a IA Infantry division, but more APCs and more artillery.
Since the Manpower of a Russian motorised rifle division is lower than a typical IA infantry division, the ratio of infantry to Tanks & Artillery is a lot lower in Russia.

[ks_sachin]

Russian army is heavy on armored and artillery firepower. They use fire power to clear the path for infantry. A Russian army division will have 3 brigades with two being armored and one infantry. Infantry follows the armor. Other armies like the IA is heavily focused on infantry where it may have 2 infantry brigades and 1 armored brigade.

A Russian combined arms army has 2 artillery brigades (1 field/ SP guns brigade and 1 MLRS) compared to 1 in a IA Corps.
I believe a Russian motorised rifle division would have the same no of tanks (1 regiment) as a IA Infantry division, but more APCs and more artillery.
Since the Manpower of a Russian motorised rifle division is lower than a typical IA infantry division, the ratio of infantry to Tanks & Artillery is a lot lower in Russia.

Deans if you can find out more about how the BTGs have actually fared in combat where securing the flanks when armr is moving along a narrow front. BTGs if I recollect have a lot of firepower but are low on infantry so while then can bring to bear fire power from depth could struggle if the enemy is able to weather that barrage and then attack the flanks of the advancing Armr and mech troops.

Also we I think we are too focussed on the amount of arty and armr etc when the quality and style of leadership is a significant issue. Much like the Soviet airforce relied on GCI as opposed to empowering their airmen, the Soviet army and now the Russian Army is very linear in their decision making - a reason that explains the attrition of senior officers in the UKR ops.

[ManuJ]

and parts until it is satisfied with no Nato on its border

It appears increasingly likely (than ever) that to make this a reality Putin may have to invade Finland, and by extension also Sweden (throw Norway in for good measure).

Lol, don't forget the three Baltic countries!
And add Poland since it borders the Kaliningrad enclave.

[Deans]

Deans if you can find out more about how the BTGs have actually fared in combat where securing the flanks when armr is moving along a narrow front. BTGs if I recollect have a lot of firepower but are low on infantry so while then can bring to bear fire power from depth could struggle if the enemy is able to weather that barrage and then attack the flanks of the advancing Armr and mech troops.

Also we I think we are too focussed on the amount of arty and armr etc when the quality and style of leadership is a significant issue. Much like the Soviet airforce relied on GCI as opposed to empowering their airmen, the Soviet army and now the Russian Army is very linear in their decision making - a reason that explains the attrition of senior officers in the UKR ops.

I'm not aware of the BTG's current performance, but there is background info, which is important to understand why the BTG was formed and what it was intended for.

The BTG originated in the Russian intervention in the Donbass in 2014-5. Because of the limitations of deploying entire brigades in a foreign country, a BTG was formed from each existing brigade. The basic structure was a mechanized battalion, which had approx half the firepower of a motorised rifle brigade. This BTG had almost all the volunteer / long service soldiers in the brigade.

A BTG was inserted with each `brigade' of the Donetsk & Luhansk militia. Their role was to stiffen the DPR/LPR militia, act as an armoured fist and conduct short raids into enemy lines, or short advances to take territory, while fighting a smaller sized opponent. It was the local militia that had to provide flank security, recon, local intel etc and infantry to police any captured area. It was not the BTG's job to provide flank protection for a larger formation.

Rear area support came from the brigade - often 100 km behind the BTG. Casualties were also replenished by brigade and these were often low quality conscripts. The quality of replacement equipment was also uncertain. That was one reason for the BTG commander to avoid casualties. The other was that successful command of a BTG meant commanding a brigade next, so the BTG commander did not want to take risks in advancing too far ahead of supporting militia infantry. Even the loss of 3-4 tanks (out of 10) would make a BTG unable to perform its task.

Because of the pressure to have more BTG's, a second BTG was carved out of the brigade. This meant that both BTG's of the brigade now had some conscripts (who have to be supervised for all but the simplest tasks) and some vehicles liable to break down.
The militia attached to each BTG in the Donbass had to communicate with the BTG on cellphones, as they were not equipped with the Russian army's battlefield communication systems (which are believed to be inferior to NATO). Local intel was basically a militia man phoning his friend, in the enemy held village ahead, who would tell him where the Ukie position was.

In the current situation, a Combined Arms army commands anywhere from 12 to 15 BTGs. it has made command and control difficult. The BTG commander is not used to taking the initiative and exploiting opportunities, or he may be scared of casualties (not because he loves his men, but because the replacements may be of poor quality). If I go by situation maps that Russian analysis present, there have been numerous instances where the BTG has broken a hole in the Ukie lines and then has lacked the power to exploit, or a retreating Ukie unit was allowed to withdraw because the BTG did not have the strength or fuel to pursue and destroy. A single tank, or an infantry platoon with AGTM's can block the advance of a BTG, allowing the retreating unit to escape.

In the BTG it is often only the BTG commander who knows where the other BTGs of the division are. If he has to communicate with his company commanders, he has to call them over for a talk over a physical map.

[Cyrano]

RA claims to have intercepted comms in several EU languages in Mariupol indicating a large number of foreign "mercenaries" stuck along with Azov battalions in Azovstahl, Ilyich factories and in a few pockets in the port. On the night of 8 April a Ukrainian cargo ship veered off course and attempted to reach the Mariupol port ignoring RN warnings. Flares were fired from the port by people waiting to be rescued. RN fired on the ship setting it on fire. Its crew surrendered and the fire was put out. cargo ship under RN custody and escorted to Yeysk, Russia.

Yet another desperate attempt to rescue some high value individuals from Mariupol has failed. French presidential elections 1st round today. I think of these foreigners get captured and truth comes out before the 2nd round next week, Macron will lose.

RA has been capturing large no.s of PoWs, gruesome videos of RA soldiers being executed have surfaced, including one of a RA soldier chained to an anti-tank hedgehog and tortured and burnt alive.

NATO might be smug that by banning RT and other channels they have blocked people from propaganda of "the other side" but they will have a lot to answer for. The full monstrous face of these sanctimonious leaders will eventually get exposed.

[John]

By the way I believe anti tank missile that is being fired in the video is Stugna it can be fired remotely and likely the operators are few hundred ft away.

the speed, range and top attack looks like NLAW.

Yes confirmed to be NLAW I am surprised they work that close.

RA has been capturing large no.s of PoWs, gruesome videos of RA soldiers being executed have surfaced, including one of a RA soldier chained to an anti-tank hedgehog and tortured and burnt alive.

There has been so many stories of the chained pow from both sides I wouldn’t believe anything, Ukranian’s say he is Russian traitor chained by Russians where as Russians say he is Ukrainian traitor or a Russian pow.

Anyway reports of new 8 mile long convoy north of Izyum.

https://twitter.com/georgewbarros/statu ... 8p-vaj6j6g

[Cyrano]

Its so easy to be dismissive of facts saying "both sides are claiming this or that..." fits perfectly with western narrative.

[ShivS]

Deans if you can find out more about how the BTGs have actually fared in combat where securing the flanks when armr is moving along a narrow front. BTGs if I recollect have a lot of firepower but are low on infantry so while then can bring to bear fire power from depth could struggle if the enemy is able to weather that barrage and then attack the flanks of the advancing Armr and mech troops.

Also we I think we are too focussed on the amount of arty and armr etc when the quality and style of leadership is a significant issue. Much like the Soviet airforce relied on GCI as opposed to empowering their airmen, the Soviet army and now the Russian Army is very linear in their decision making - a reason that explains the attrition of senior officers in the UKR ops.

I'm not aware of the BTG's current performance, but there is background info, which is important to understand why the BTG was formed and what it was intended for.
.

This is helpful. I completely agree that the number of tanks is so low that losing 2/3 to enemy action would make a commander very fearful.

Added to that is the structure of a BTG. Tanks and IFVs should be at the FEBA. Heavy artillery and MBRLs should be 5-20 km behind - how do you manage command in this situation?

How do you manage supply? A BTG will need POL, food, water, small arm ammo, tank ammo, 155 mm ammo, atgm reloads, MBRL loads. Re supply is going to be a nightmare in terms of co-ordination.

Lends credence to the fact that the Russians assumed they would face militias +, not serious opposition.

[ldev]

NATO might be smug that by banning RT and other channels they have blocked people from propaganda of "the other side" but they will have a lot to answer for. The full monstrous face of these sanctimonious leaders will eventually get exposed.

It is my guess that part of the mutual banning of mass media has been done to avoid the potential origination of protests and protest marches. If you go back long enough in history you will see the massive civilian demonstrations in Europe against the basing of Pershing 11 nuclear missiles in Europe by the US in the 1980s. At that time the real threat of nuclear war had made the population quite fearful. Quite a contrast to today when hawks on both sides are almost saying, "Bring it on", to nuclear war.

[Cyrano]

Absolutely! NATO has to ensure people are totally in the dark on this dance of death they have engaged in with Russia

[Deans]

This is helpful. I completely agree that the number of tanks is so low that losing 2/3 to enemy action would make a commander very fearful.

Added to that is the structure of a BTG. Tanks and IFVs should be at the FEBA. Heavy artillery and MBRLs should be 5-20 km behind - how do you manage command in this situation?

How do you manage supply? A BTG will need POL, food, water, small arm ammo, tank ammo, 155 mm ammo, atgm reloads, MBRL loads. Re supply is going to be a nightmare in terms of co-ordination.

To make matters worse, some brigades have BTG's from another division - a mix and match of sorts. For e.g. the BTG that is alleged to have carried out the massacre at Bucha is from a division that is part of the Eastern military district, which is not part of this operation. When brigade has to send reinforcements, it will invariably favor its `child' BTG rather than the `orphan' one. Getting BTGs from other divisions was done to reduce dependence on conscripts.

The BTG has SP guns, which as you mention, would be well to the rear of the FEBA. The MLRS regiment and field guns are with the division (or Army). Logistics are reasonably streamlined till brigade HQ. Sending trucks (of which there is a shortage) to BTG's moving in different directions, is a nightmare. A lot of these problems were not apparent when fighting defensive battles in the Donbass in 2014-5.

[enaiel]

Another obviously one-sided but very interesting read: Ukrainian MiG-29 Pilot's Front-Line Account Of The Air War Against Russia

Some interesting points:

• Claims they shot 2 Il-76 transports
• In Clear Skies 2018 tactics against more powerful aircraft were honed by exercising against USAF F-15Cs simulating RuAF Su35S
• Mig-29s are being tasked with ground attack missions. With what? Guns and unguided rockets? Can they drop dumb bombs or PGMs?
• Hopping from airfield to airfield to avoid Russian missile strikes.
• Missile strikes against both Lviv State Aircraft Repair Plant and RD-33 engines repair facility in Lutsk will have severe implications.
• S-300 long-range SAM very capable but not very mobile, putting it at risk of airstrikes. The medium-range Buk SAM is very mobile and it’s very easy to hide and so is more feared.
• RuAF has advantage in numbers, better radar, better BVR missiles, better ECM, and better awareness with use of A-50 AEW&C.
• Getting harder and harder to avoid russian threats.

[John]

It was noted earlier about lack of TB2 vids, looks like control equipment is moving around Odessa interestingly reported by Russian in their telegram channel (most such videos are quickly taken down by Ukraine). In channel it has been mentioned TB2s are being used around Kherson but interestingly Ukraine has not being releasing any videos.

https://twitter.com/jesusfroman/status/ ... OH0t9SSyNQ

[Vayutuvan]

If you go back long enough in history you will see the massive civilian demonstrations in Europe against the basing of Pershing 11 nuclear missiles in Europe by the US in the 1980s.

I was in the Netherlands at that time. Protests were massive by US/European standards - about 100-200 people just taking a walk in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (mostly).

[brar_w]

It appears increasingly likely (than ever) that to make this a reality Putin may have to invade Finland, and by extension also Sweden (throw Norway in for good measure).

Lol, don't forget the three Baltic countries!
And add Poland since it borders the Kaliningrad enclave.

Yeah those too . With Finland expected to put in its NATO papers in the coming weeks we'll see how that impacts the war. How many BTG's to take over Finland and Sweden?

Finland poised to request NATO membership as early as May

[Parasu]

Gurulog, taking into account what is known publicly in this war till now, the performance of russion weapons seems to be below par and underwhelming.

Keeping the above in mind, how do military planners in the country will like to assess our war preparedness and effectiveness? Be it against chyna or bakistan.

It is well known that Russia is playing catchup in some sectors. UAVs for example.

They have improved their tech and machinery considerably in the last decade though. Their missiles (Iskander/Yakhont) are very effective and so is their artillery.
Besides their tactics is different than western approach to warfare. They are more land based than air based. As such, they are trying to do what they know. Land maneuvres, armored thrusts, artillery assaults etc. The infantry is the weak link. Without sizeable manpower, which is willing to take casualties, such an approach could cause problems in a drawn-out war.
Russian forces are now targeting fuel storage and supplies of Ukrainian army. In the last week they have targeted refineries, storage tanks etc. I guess this is aimed at turning the Ukrainian force into stationary sitting ducks, which thereafter will be easier to take out. As to how effective this will be remains to be seen.

[enaiel]

Thanks, the engagement in this video happened exactly as I imagined. But in many videos I did not see it happen, so got very confused.

Russian army is heavy on armored and artillery firepower. They use fire power to clear the path for infantry. A Russian army division will have 3 brigades with two being armored and one infantry. Infantry follows the armor. Other armies like the IA is heavily focused on infantry where it may have 2 infantry brigades and 1 armored brigade.

Thanks for the explanation. But without infantry support, by the time the tanks can re-position to target the ambushers, the ambushers have long gone. The Ukies are using shoot 'n' scoot tactics when ambushing:

https://twitter.com/kemal_115/status/15 ... 6128623619

https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/ ... _and_date/

[John]

Look like Mariupol might fall atleast in Russian telegram groups there have been posting supposedly linking to FB post from Ukr Marines saying it will fall today.

Could be real or fake will see.

https://m.facebook.com/129736044230484/ ... 98582/?d=n

Ukrainians claim to have ambushed the 8 mile long convoy but the video released doesn’t quite match up with sat images so this is likely a smaller convoy

https://youtu.be/-44Uiu5WnI0

[ramana]

Why is Russia losing so many tanks in Ukraine?

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/wh ... ar-AAW5XIW

My comments:
Despite overall tone, it has lessons for India.
PLA also has Combat Batallion Groups as the main formations. These come in different flavors from heavy to light but all have mechanized units. Ukraine war shows the vulnerability of such formations. The second note overall losses are after abandonment. Even Nazi heavy Tiger tanks to Pak Patrons had the same ratio of abandoned tanks. It still continues.
One conclusion is troops along LAC need more individual ant tank rounds. Recall IA recently bought NLAW from Sweden to augment Carl Gustaf.

[ks_sachin]

Why is Russia losing so many tanks in Ukraine?

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/wh ... ar-AAW5XIW

My comments:
Despite overall tone, it has lessons for India.
PLA also has Combat Batallion Groups as the main formations. These come in different flavors from heavy to light but all have mechanized units. Ukraine war shows the vulnerability of such formations. The second note overall losses are after abandonment. Even Nazi heavy Tiger tanks to Pak Patrons had the same ratio of abandoned tanks. It still continues.
One conclusion is troops along LAC need more individual ant tank rounds. Recall IA recently bought NLAW from Sweden to augment Carl Gustaf.

Ramana sir it’s not the LAC that will see Armd action. The lesson actually is that we need to think deeply about how we will employ armr.
Another lesson or perhaps an area of introspection is how the IBGs operate. How are the infantry and mech assets get used so that anti armr capability of the enemy is minimised.
The Russians have shown what not to do and perhaps the weakness of the BTGs were not considered in an offensive role.

[John]

From what I am seeing main problem appears to be poor reconnaissance and almost non existent air support. Both of that combine to allow ambushes and when units are getting ambushed it seems like the way BTG are being used they are unable to call upon assistance from other units or call up air support.

[Cyrano]

RA armoured vehicles moving in long columns is not bad tactics but due to constraints of soft thawing terrain and road infra in Ukr. Where the land is firm, we do see videos of them advancing in broad fronts.

Conditions on India's western borders are lot more conducive to make armour advance as a front and avoid columns, except when faced with canals/rivers. These crossings will be top picks for ambush by the enemy. Of course small infantry groups with ATGMs can lay ambush here or there but they cant do repeated damage and after initial attack, can be located and destroyed.

Conditions on our northern and eastern borders are quite different, mountain passes and narrow valleys make wide front assaults not easy and are conducive to laying mine fields and enemy ambush. Such ambush teams cant be easily destroyed due to terrain which offer lot of hiding places. Even air strikes are tough in mountainous terrain, as we experienced in Kargil War. Few exceptions like Depsang plains where armour vs armour battles can occur. Elsewhere, its India which will let the enemy approach and when they enter valleys we can pick them off from the heights. Like Afghans did this to Russians a few decades ago.

[Atmavik]

Why is Russia losing so many tanks in Ukraine?

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/wh ... ar-AAW5XIW

My comments:
Despite overall tone, it has lessons for India.
PLA also has Combat Batallion Groups as the main formations. These come in different flavors from heavy to light but all have mechanized units. Ukraine war shows the vulnerability of such formations. The second note overall losses are after abandonment. Even Nazi heavy Tiger tanks to Pak Patrons had the same ratio of abandoned tanks. It still continues.
One conclusion is troops along LAC need more individual ant tank rounds. Recall IA recently bought NLAW from Sweden to augment Carl Gustaf.

I don’t think we have NLAW, we got AT-4 from Sweden

[Deans]

X posted from the main Ukraine thread.

It's actually Russia that may be facing a manpower shortage.
Russia reduced conscription in 2008, to just 12 months, More importantly, only about 20% of the eligible population are conscripted.
That's because Russia has intended for the last 10 years, to more to an all volunteer army of professional soldiers. Conscripts form only 25% of the
personnel in the Russian army.
Of the approx. 600,000 men who can be conscripted every 6 months, only about 130000 do so. This is based on a manpower requirement released every 6 months. Based on that eligible conscripts (there are many exemptions) are called up under a lottery system.
Conscripts serve 12 months, of which 8 months is basic training. In the 4 months that they spend in their unit, they perform only basic tasks. There is no interest in their training and welfare since they will be gone in 4 months. Nor does the Russian army have experienced JCOs to take charge of fresh soldiers. Conscripts cannot serve abroad. Only 10% of conscripts are interested in serving again in the military, or receive any kind of military training after their 12 months ends.

To overcome this problem, Russia has tried to build an army reserve. This is intended to be former conscripts who are paid a stipend for a 3 year contract, under which they undergo 1-2 months of training with their unit each year and will fight if called to do so, while working in their civilian jobs. Russia was to have a reserve of 100,000 such soldiers this year, but it is doubtful if they have even 10,000.

If Russia intends to call up the last 3 years of conscripts (and issues a decree to let them fight abroad), its doubtful if more than 10% will. The estimate is that 250,000 conscripts * 3 years, gives a reserve pool of 750,000 men. Of that, 600,000 will have training in roles relevant for combat in Ukraine. 60,000 will actually join (informal opinion polls in Russia). 10,000 of these are already in the reserve. It will also take at least a couple of months for them to be combat ready and in their units, which is why this exercise should have begun months ago.

Ukraine has done a better job of mobilizing reserves. In all fairness though, a semi trained conscript can do a much better job in a defensive role than in an offensive one.

[ks_sachin]

X posted from the main Ukraine thread.

It's actually Russia that may be facing a manpower shortage.
Russia reduced conscription in 2008, to just 12 months, More importantly, only about 20% of the eligible population are conscripted.
That's because Russia has intended for the last 10 years, to more to an all volunteer army of professional soldiers. Conscripts form only 25% of the
personnel in the Russian army.
Of the approx. 600,000 men who can be conscripted every 6 months, only about 130000 do so. This is based on a manpower requirement released every 6 months. Based on that eligible conscripts (there are many exemptions) are called up under a lottery system.
Conscripts serve 12 months, of which 8 months is basic training. In the 4 months that they spend in their unit, they perform only basic tasks. There is no interest in their training and welfare since they will be gone in 4 months. Nor does the Russian army have experienced JCOs to take charge of fresh soldiers. Conscripts cannot serve abroad. Only 10% of conscripts are interested in serving again in the military, or receive any kind of military training after their 12 months ends.

To overcome this problem, Russia has tried to build an army reserve. This is intended to be former conscripts who are paid a stipend for a 3 year contract, under which they undergo 1-2 months of training with their unit each year and will fight if called to do so, while working in their civilian jobs. Russia was to have a reserve of 100,000 such soldiers this year, but it is doubtful if they have even 10,000.

If Russia intends to call up the last 3 years of conscripts (and issues a decree to let them fight abroad), its doubtful if more than 10% will. The estimate is that 250,000 conscripts * 3 years, gives a reserve pool of 750,000 men. Of that, 600,000 will have training in roles relevant for combat in Ukraine. 60,000 will actually join (informal opinion polls in Russia). 10,000 of these are already in the reserve. It will also take at least a couple of months for them to be combat ready and in their units, which is why this exercise should have begun months ago.

Ukraine has done a better job of mobilizing reserves. In all fairness though, a semi trained conscript can do a much better job in a defensive role than in an offensive one.

This is proving very ugly for Russia.
From a purely military perspective a catastrophe. A tradgedy. A cataclysmic, apocalyptic, monumental calamity!!!

[hnair]

ks_sachin, kit et al, request you to stop quoting long posts for brief comments. Just mention poster name or quote only a small part of post that caught your attention. Rest assured, those who pay attention, will get what you are referring to.

Also kit, easy on the pride-flag mode with color fonts. Once again, those who care to read, will read the regular fonts.

In these days of phone browsing, it is incredibly difficult to go over threads if folks keep quoting long posts. So as a consideration for readers!

Thanks

[ks_sachin]

Done

[John]

This is proving very ugly for Russia.
From a purely military perspective a catastrophe. A tradgedy. A cataclysmic, apocalyptic, monumental calamity!!!

Current estimates are of 30-40 BTG no longer present it is not that they are fully wiped out it is that Russians had to put together couple BTGs together due to losses to get one functional one. Russian casualties are at around 40-50k (dead, injured, captured).

https://twitter.com/phillipspobrien/sta ... bz3XTRqwdg

Which dispel any myths that Kyiv attack was a faint, they were supposed to launch full scale invasion on Donbass before Putin speech today and they are still busy outfitting there forces and as a result delayed. Giving Ukr plenty of time to move their artillery lines and set up their drones.

Here is breakdown of what is in a BTG and their problems and why it is taking so long for Russians to regroup for example Soviets in middle of winter we’re able to regroup much faster during Winter war with Finland

https://twitter.com/partizan_oleg/statu ... bz3XTRqwdg

https://twitter.com/dupuyinstitute/stat ... bz3XTRqwdg

[John]

Reportedly Ukr are claiming Russian Slava class cruiser Moskva has been hit by two Neptune Ashm (Uran knock off) and distress signal in morse code is being transmitted. Not sure if it is legit I would wait for confirmation. The track record for Ukr claims has been 1 of 2 when it comes to sinking of Russian ships, Sarov was sunk but Vasyl Bykov turned out to be fine. If true it would largest ship post WW2 sunk in combat.

https://twitter.com/osint88/status/1514 ... bh08MBjLZw

https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status ... bh08MBjLZw

[vinod]

Zelensky had been rejuvenated after call with Biden.

A huge list of weapons to be delivered to Ukraine.

Russia really has to ramp up the violence if they have to get any semblance of victory. Forget about peace deal, Zelensky is too much of a puppet to agree to anything.

[John]

Russians confirm the ship has been hit say crew is safe but same was said about Sarov but turned out to be full loss of crew.

https://ria.ru/20220414/kreyser-1783435471.html

Translation: Ammunition detonated on the Moskva missile cruiser as a result of a fire.


I would wait for more information before confirming it.

[brar_w]

Russians confirm the ship has been hit say crew is safe but same was said about Sarov but turned out to be full loss of crew.

https://ria.ru/20220414/kreyser-1783435471.html

Translation: Ammunition detonated on the Moskva missile cruiser as a result of a fire.


I would wait for more information before confirming it.

From the article - "The crew was completely evacuated". Let's wait for images (if we get them) but this looks like a similar outcome to the Saratov which is remarkable given its a 12K ton cruiser, flagship of Russia's black sea fleet with some of their best defensive systems (one would assume).

[John]

Looks like severe weather might affected the FCR radar performance?

The Moskva has giant blind spot for its S-300 system only 180 degree coverage it uses outdated OSA Sam to cover that blind spot. It’s ironic Russia noted they shot down a drone a day ago by Grigorovich class frigate (Talwar class sister ship), I think Ukranians where probing the defenses with drones.

Speculation that Crimea could start coming under Tochka and Drone attacks with Moskva which was providing area air defense gone.

[Cyrano]

Roger L. Cloutier Jr. captured by Russian Army near Mariupol, video of him being taken to a local military hq released by RA. He was being treated quite respectfully but in handcuffs.

Cloutier is a United States Army lieutenant general who serves as the Commander of the Allied Land Command. Previously, he served as the Commander of the United States Army Africa.

This is big news and puts Biden administration in a fix. Or may be they'll lie through the whole thing and disown him.

[John]

Fact checked and proven false

https://www.reuters.com/article/factche ... SL2N2W914L

[Cyrano]

That was perhaps an earlier denial, hard to deny latest video evidence unless US decides to disown him calling body double like Putin is used to etc etc..

But there will soon be a lot more captured NATO officers. A lie now will keep getting bigger and bigger until it will blow up in the face.

[Deans]

Speculation that Crimea could start coming under Tochka and Drone attacks with Moskva which was providing area air defense gone.

Also speculation in Russia that Ukrainian forces near Sumy may attack across the border into Russia (probably company sized raids). This will have significant propaganda value and may compel Russia to put more forces to defend its territory. It could also be a justification for Russia to order a mobilization of reserves, or attack Ukrainian cities.

[YashG]

Important learning: More discourse, debate and democratic sunlight improves military capabilities. Works in India's favor. Expect good results if dragon tries a misadventure.

[k prasad]

Important learning: More discourse, debate and democratic sunlight improves military capabilities. Works in India's favor. Expect good results if dragon tries a misadventure.

There might be some mild correlation, Saar, but I'm not sure it is so cut and dried. The democratic sunlight COULD ensure military capabilities are improved, but only if the civilian administration and political opposition are capable of holding the military and government to account to ensure that. India was a robust democracy when we lost to China. US and France were both robust democracies when they lost in Vietnam. And we had our Sru Lanka.

Pakistan, despite being a not-robust democracy has a fairly strong military, and one that we cannot and do not take lightly.

Ultimately, it comes down to the professionalism of the armed forces, government support for them (financial support, operational independence, political-diplomatic backing), and strong oversight to ensure competence and to ensure that corruption, incompetence, and nepotism do not deteriorate the warfighting capabilities. Democracies tend to have structures that make this happen, but it isn't an intrinsic feature of democracy. Such systems can be equally robust in non-democracies as well.