Having N weapons in my layman's understanding is a multi-step process. 1 & 2 are N warheads + delivery vehicles ie missiles.
Both have shelf lives, warheads management is more complex since there is radioactive decay which can influence detonation, yield and stability. Liquid or solid fuelled missiles also have shelf lives that need maintenance and refurbishment.So it's not just about how many were produced each year and total but how many warheads and missile combinations that can be mated at short notice, how many can be kept readily mated at a given point of time.
The third part is launch platform. Can be stationary underground silos, or road/rail mobile platforms, air and sea launch from fighter jets or bombers or ships and subs. These are perhaps the easiest to manage because they need standard maintenance for the most part, except for secure comms for launch authorisations. And of course there is the aspect of the survivability of the launch platform at least until the job is done.
The last part is the whole decision and command issue mechanism and protocol.
All these moving parts have to work precisely to make N deterrence credible. They obviously cost an arm and leg to design, implement, test and maintain. And the other arm and leg to protect and hide from prying eyes in the sky and spies, saboteurs etc.
So it's to be expected that nothing really accurate is released into public domain.
Even in the conventional sphere, the west despite colossal intelligence assets and years of experience predicted that Russia will run out of missiles and was rudely surprised when that didn't happen.
Iran, despite years of sanctions, recently announced some 86% of enrichment, again surprising the world.
If anyone ventures to guess what is the size, scope and capability of India's deterrence they should be ready to accept that a wide margin of error will exist.
That itself is ambiguity, on the capability part. To that if we add a dose of ambiguity on the intent part but none whatsoever on the determination part, that will establish a fairly credible, reasonably predictable (ie no flippant sabre rattling) deterrence in India's context
Deterrence in a N superpower context is yet another level because MAD scenarios enter into play. The huge number of weapons and plethora of delivery platforms means a lot more people will be involved and therefore the probability of error goes up. Plus all kinds of posturing is done on the intent side because capability is anyway beyond doubt.
While the west goes into horrified convulsions that Putin "suspended" START, they keep avoiding the fact that the US already"withdrew" from ABM and INF.
At least we don't have the overhead of all that posturing
In fact, just not him 95%+ of the authors who write/talk on the issue are under inspiring to people who have followed things closely. I would even say RG delayed the order for too long. The matter was out in the open since at least 1985 and he would have known earlier than that and maybe even IG knew where Pakistan was.