Naval Procurements & Acquisitions: 02 April 2024

[srai]

At 5,000t, it would no longer be a “corvette”

[titash]

At 5,000t, it would no longer be a “corvette”

Sirjee,

Destroyers have gone from < 1000 tons to > 10000 tons in 100 years

Surely corvettes can make the leap from 500 tons to 5000 tons, no?

[Pratyush]

The days when the displacement defined roles of ships is over. And has been over for nearly 50 years.

The USSR had missile cruisers below 6000 tons during the cold war. The nuclear powered cruisers of the USN during the late cold war were initially called frigates. And then were reclassified as cruisers.

So displacement defining ships is over. The ship is what the Navy says it is.

[srai]

At 5,000t, it would no longer be a “corvette”

Sirjee,

Destroyers have gone from < 1000 tons to > 10000 tons in 100 years

Surely corvettes can make the leap from 500 tons to 5000 tons, no?

You forgot the “frigate”

[Rakesh]

Indian frigates / corvettes are known as "Pocket" Destroyers, for the fire power they carry in relation to their tonnage.

[Pratyush]

What to do when the moderator is derailing the thread. Derail it even more.

For the anemic firepower of Indian destroyers, what should they be called?

[Rakesh]

Frigate-Lite

Project 18 (NGD) will see a significant uptake in terms of weaponry and sensors.

[Rakesh]

Indian frigates / corvettes are known as "Pocket" Destroyers, for the fire power they carry in relation to their tonnage.

https://x.com/battle_machines/status/18 ... 4064356716 ---> Indian Navy's light pocket destroyer corvettes have always been an interesting ship. The Koras feature 16 Kh-35s, same as Delhi pre-upgrade/Brahmaputra. Preceding Khukhris featured 4 Styx, same as Godavari/Rajput class. Now the NGMVs (Next Generation Missile Vessels) will be 8 BrahMos, inline with P-17As.

[titash]

What is the main air search radar?

It's not cross dome - that's been replaced with a planar array. And it doesn't look like revathi...it's something lighter

The Lynx U2 & surface search radar are now ubiquitous. Finally some fleet-wide standardization

[Rakesh]

https://x.com/DefSysCI/status/1823710247216931174 ---> Progress on GRSE's half of P17A -

- Himgiri at 75% physical completion and will be out for harbour trials soon
- Dunagiri and Vindhyagiri at 62% and 50% respectively
- Delivery will be made on schedule
- 15% project cost constitutes of base and depot spares for the ships

[sanman]

What is this new S5 thing being worked on?

Is it SSGN?

They're saying larger tonnage than China's largest - but just because it's larger, doesn't necessarily make it superior.

How big is it compared to Oscar / Oscar-II?

[Pratyush]

Nothing is known about the S5 for certain. Except for her supposed powerplant. She is expected to be powered by a 190 MW nuclear reactor. The design of which was supposedly completed in 2016.

[Rakesh]

What is this new S5 thing being worked on?

Is it SSGN?

They're saying larger tonnage than China's largest - but just because it's larger, doesn't necessarily make it superior.

How big is it compared to Oscar / Oscar-II?

S5 is India's next generation SSBN. It is not a SSGN.

Similar in displacement to Oscar I and II Classes, but they are SSGNs. But Oscar II is bigger.

S5 will carry more SLBMs and will have even longer ranges than those on the Arihant Class.

[sanman]

S5 is India's next generation SSBN. It is not a SSGN.

Similar in displacement to Oscar I and II Classes, but they are SSGNs. But Oscar II is bigger.

S5 will carry more SLBMs and will have even longer ranges than those on the Arihant Class.

In the video they said it would carry SLCMs

[Rakesh]

Please do not believe that video

[sanman]

Please do not believe that video

Will we have any sub platform for SLCMs? Coz I think they're a vital weapon for our needs.

[Manish_P]

Please do not believe that video

Will we have any sub platform for SLCMs? Coz I think they're a vital weapon for our needs.

Should not be too challenging as we have built our missile subs.

The USN converted some of their boomers to CM platforms.

[Rakesh]

Please do not believe that video

Will we have any sub platform for SLCMs? Coz I think they're a vital weapon for our needs.

It depends on India's military doctrine. Is there need for such a platform? That is something for India's military planners to answer. It no doubt a great force multiplier i.e. the Ohio Class carries 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles and the US Navy has four of them. That is some righteous firepower!

The problem with videos like the above is that they pass theoretical assumptions as fact. While technically possible, is that something the Indian Navy is looking at doing? What purpose would that serve, other than the vanilla answer --> "Well....it gives the Indian Navy the ability to shoot multiple missiles from a single platform." The most sure fire way to bankruptcy is to Monkey See, Monkey Do. If we start mimicking everything that everyone does, we will go broke. This is what happened to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This is why the super carrier never got sanctioned i.e. Admirals were dreaming dreams far beyond what their pockets could afford.

1) The US Navy had 18 Ohio Class SSBNs, four of which were converted to the SSGN role. We have - at present, depending on the source - anywhere from 2 to 3 SSBNs (Arihant, Arighat and possibly a third). So 2 - 3 boats versus 18. Let that sink in for a second. Can we spare even a single boat for a SSGN role?

2) What target package is out there that requires such a salvo of missiles?

3) Can another platform do the same task for cheaper? If so, why not use that?

4) The succeeding S5 Class is also a SSBN. Around three are planned. Can we spare even one for a SSGN role?

5) It is *NOT* feasible to split the tubes into one set for SLBMs and another set devoted for SLCMs. That will be utter confusion for the boat commander and is guaranteed to pigeon hole India's nuclear doctrine i.e. assured second strike nuclear capability. SSBN boat commanders have one job - to stay silent at all costs in your assigned theatre. You never *EVER* reveal your location at sea. The second strike capability depends on you staying completely invisible and never conducting offensive ops i.e. shooting down enemy vessels. So Run Silent and Run Deep. When the command comes in to launch your SLBMs, you go up to launch depth, launch your SLBMs and then leave. You have no other mission to conduct. A SSN or SSGN boat commander does not operate on those extreme set of parameters and have a much wider latitude to operate in. More exciting to serve on a SSN / SSGN versus a SSBN.

What will be used will be the Project 75 Alpha Class, of which six SSNs are planned. These will have VLS cells for Brahmos-S and/or Nirbhay-S and/or NGSLCM, etc. And as newer and more powerful SSNs come on board, the number of VLS cells can increase. Perhaps in the future, as additional S5 Class of SSBNs come on board (to ensure greater availability at sea and to account for redundancy), then perhaps the Arihant Class can covert into a SSGN type of boat. But this is pure speculation on my part.

Don't take these videos as truth. They make sensational claims for YouTube hits, which increases their subscriber base

[sanman]

1) The US Navy had 18 Ohio Class SSBNs, four of which were converted to the SSGN role. We have - at present, depending on the source - anywhere from 2 to 3 SSBNs (Arihant, Arighat and possibly a third). So 2 - 3 boats versus 18. Let that sink in for a second. Can we spare even a single boat for a SSGN role?

We could build these instead of big expensive aircraft carriers, which are mainly intended to fight wars on the other side of the world, rather than in one's own region. SSGN is more flexible - it can be used to hit any target the AC can be deployed against, and do it far more inexpensively, without the large contingent of escort ships.
China likewise went in for the N-subs before starting on aircraft carriers only relatively recently. Very practical of them.

[Manish_P]

....It no doubt a great force multiplier i.e. the Ohio Class carries 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles and the US Navy has four of them. That is some righteous firepower!
....

Rakesh ji, i think perhaps that is what Sanman ji is saying. A potent stealthy platform which can deliver serious firepower (non-ballistic, hard to intercept, manouvering CMs) from close to the Opposition targets - without compromising on the nuclear deterrent.

[/i] The most sure fire way to bankruptcy is to Monkey See, Monkey Do. If we start mimicking everything that everyone does, we will go broke.

Agree. Our spending budgets are limited compared to China, US and some other nations.

Can we spare even a single boat for a SSGN role?

IMHO no. We can't even drop a few proposed hunter-killer Subs and divert that budget towards building CM carrying subs. Not yet.

2) What target package is out there that requires such a salvo of missiles?

Really now, Admiral ji

3) Can another platform do the same task for cheaper? If so, why not use that?

Cheaper perhaps but Subs would be more survivable than Missile boats and Attack/Bomber Aircraft over the long distances. The key is launching stealthy, fast, maneuvering missiles as low and from as close to the targets as possible.

4) The succeeding S5 Class is also a SSBN. Around three are planned. Can we spare even one for a SSGN role?

No. As i mentioned before we are not there yet in terms of spending power.

What will be used will be the Project 75 Alpha Class, of which six SSNs are planned. These will have VLS cells for Brahmos-S and/or Nirbhay-S and/or NGSLCM, etc. And as newer and more powerful SSNs come on board, the number of VLS cells can increase. Perhaps in the future, as additional S5 Class of SSBNs come on board (to ensure greater availability at sea and to account for redundancy), then perhaps the Arihant Class can covert into a SSGN type of boat. But this is pure speculation on my part.

The logic is sound and I would agree that it is probably the path the IN will follow.

[Rakesh]

We could build these instead of big expensive aircraft carriers, which are mainly intended to fight wars on the other side of the world, rather than in one's own region. SSGN is more flexible - it can be used to hit any target the AC can be deployed against, and do it far more inexpensively, without the large contingent of escort ships. China likewise went in for the N-subs before starting on aircraft carriers only relatively recently. Very practical of them.

Everything is a balance sanman-ji.

You need every platform to fulfill the objectives in your military doctrine. The first thing to do is define that doctrine and then you acquire the platforms to fulfill that doctrine. In order to achieve that, you need synergy across all the stakeholders. That is not present in India. Our Admirals want one thing, the babus and the political class want another thing.

SSGNs make sense in a global expeditionary military structure, which the US operates under. Does India share such a military doctrine? Because in the absence of that military doctrine, how do you convince the civilian stakeholders in India to sanction the funds for such a platform? The theory you mentioned above is sound, but you require financial sanction. For that sanction to happen, you require a well thought out military doctrine. Do we have one?

India's military doctrine states that aircraft carriers are required. But yet there was fierce opposition in the MoD to a super carrier with EMALS and nuclear power. MoD is content with STOBAR carriers, instead of CATOBAR ones. You have to convince them, not me.

[sanman]

Everything is a balance sanman-ji.
SSGNs make sense in a global expeditionary military structure, which the US operates under. Does India share such a military doctrine? Because in the absence of that military doctrine, how do you convince the civilian stakeholders in India to sanction the funds for such a platform? The theory you mentioned above is sound, but you require financial sanction. For that sanction to happen, you require a well thought out military doctrine. Do we have one?

I think SSGNs armed with SLCMs can be very useful against Pakistan, and even against PLAN. They're fine for a regional conflict. They are for more flexible, inexpensive and practical than aircraft carriers which are mainly intended as mobile airfields to fight wars on other side of the world.
Doctrines cannot be vaguely alluded to in the abstract, someone has to give me a scenario where the aircraft carrier is more preferable to the SSGN, and how that applies to us.

India's military doctrine states that aircraft carriers are required. But yet there was fierce opposition in the MoD to a super carrier with EMALS and nuclear power. MoD is content with STOBAR carriers, instead of CATOBAR ones. You have to convince them, not me.

What does that mean? It's like telling me that someone said "Simon Says do this" and so we must do it. I want to know how the aircraft carrier is more practical than the SSGN in our regional context.

[Rakesh]

Rakesh ji, i think perhaps that is what Sanman ji is saying. A potent stealthy platform which can deliver serious firepower (non-ballistic, hard to intercept, manouvering CMs) from close to the Opposition targets - without compromising on the nuclear deterrent.

2) What target package is out there that requires such a salvo of missiles?

Really now, Admiral ji

Please take into account Pakistan's strategic depth versus China's strategic depth, when formulating a target list and note how each target package provided could potentially escalate the conflict (i.e. spiral out of India's control) against China. Think beyond the number of cruise missiles that are being fired from the SSGN, but rather where exactly in China are these missiles going to be fired at i.e. Chinese mainland or military targets in Tibet? What ails Pakistan (strategic depth) vis-à-vis India, is the same ailment that we have against China.

India's military doctrine has always been reactive and never proactive (offensive defense). In a reactive/defensive military doctrine, India's response will remain tit-for-tat. And under such an umbrella, the thinking is geared towards a military capability that causes the least strain on the exchequer and thus the concept of a SSGN will have few - if any - takers among the stakeholders. And this is under the current Govt. The opposition has a far weaker vision for India's military.

[Rakesh]

I think SSGNs armed with SLCMs can be very useful against Pakistan, and even against PLAN. They're fine for a regional conflict. They are for more flexible, inexpensive and practical than aircraft carriers which are mainly intended as mobile airfields to fight wars on other side of the world. Doctrines cannot be vaguely alluded to in the abstract, someone has to give me a scenario where the aircraft carrier is more preferable to the SSGN, and how that applies to us.

Against Pakistan, what India has now is sufficient. PLAN is a different beast altogether.

An aircraft carrier can control all three spheres of a naval conflict i.e. air, surface and sub-surface. That is the theory and the US has put that theory into practice. But yet this is the same US Navy that has also invested significant resources in converting four SSBNs into SSGNs. They have the financial means and political will to do so. We are not there yet. Till then, in India, this is a concept that will stay academic.

What does that mean? It's like telling me that someone said "Simon Says do this" and so we must do it. I want to know how the aircraft carrier is more practical than the SSGN in our regional context.

The Indian Navy has been arguing for a super carrier for over a decade now. The MoD has refused to budge. There is no indication that this impasse will get resolved anytime soon.

If this is the attitude over a super carrier, can you imagine what the outcry will be for a SSGN fleet or even 1 - 2 such platforms? You are looking for an answer as to why aircraft carriers are more practical than SSGNs. But first we need to find a practical answer on how to sanction funds for the existing naval programs. So from which magician's hat will we pull out an argument to convince the MoD on a whole other naval program? Admiral Karambir Singh believed that the Govt could afford it all - super carrier, six SSNs, 57 carrier borne fighters, six Project 75I SSKs, etc. The late General Bipin Rawat - when he was CDS - put a full stop to that fantasy. On top of this, we want to add a SSGN program now?

Forget even the military doctrine, show me the money first. Then we can talk about why SSGN is more practical than an aircraft carrier.

A nuclear boat - SSN, SSGN, SSBN - is not a cheap affair by any stretch of the imagination. Look up the costs that Australia is looking at for AUKUS. I can provide you some reading material, if you are interested. And AUKUS is a SSN program.

[Manish_P]

...
Think beyond the number of cruise missiles that are being fired from the SSGN, but rather where exactly in China are these missiles going to be fired at i.e. Chinese mainland or military targets in Tibet?...

... India's response will remain tit-for-tat......

So if the current 'warm' skirmish with China goes hot and they launch a few missiles at us in say AP, we will launch missiles in Tibet?

[sanman]

Against Pakistan, what India has now is sufficient. PLAN is a different beast altogether.

An aircraft carrier can control all three spheres of a naval conflict i.e. air, surface and sub-surface. That is the theory and the US has put that theory into practice. But yet this is the same US Navy that has also invested significant resources in converting four SSBNs into SSGNs. They have the financial means and political will to do so. We are not there yet. Till then, in India, this is a concept that will stay academic.

What massive investment has to be made in converting SSBN into SSGN? It seems to be such investment would be dwarfed by the cost of developing and building new aircraft carriers, which to me seem to be vanity projects that don't serve us most efficiently.

The Indian Navy has been arguing for a super carrier for over a decade now. The MoD has refused to budge. There is no indication that this impasse will get resolved anytime soon.

If this is the attitude over a super carrier, can you imagine what the outcry will be for a SSGN fleet or even 1 - 2 such platforms? You are looking for an answer as to why aircraft carriers are more practical than SSGNs. But first we need to find a practical answer on how to sanction funds for the existing naval programs. So from which magician's hat will we pull out an argument to convince the MoD on a whole other naval program? Admiral Karambir Singh believed that the Govt could afford it all - super carrier, six SSNs, 57 carrier borne fighters, six Project 75I SSKs, etc. The late General Bipin Rawat - when he was CDS - put a full stop to that fantasy. On top of this, we want to add a SSGN program now?

I disagree - SSGN (even super-SSGN) will cost less than super-carrier, especially when you factor in all the escort ships and their operational cost.
Future is with drones over manned aircraft anyway, and large SSGN could even deploy fixed-wing drones for longer-range operations.

I like the idea of stealthily parking giant missile sub off coast of Pak, or Houthis, or Malacca Straits, and unleashing massive firepower suddenly and effectively without advance warning. It's a more flexible and deployable weapon for our home region.

Forget even the military doctrine, show me the money first. Then we can talk about why SSGN is more practical than an aircraft carrier.

A nuclear boat - SSN, SSGN, SSBN - is not a cheap affair by any stretch of the imagination. Look up the costs that Australia is looking at for AUKUS. I can provide you some reading material, if you are interested. And AUKUS is a SSN program.

Australia's economy is much smaller. They don't have any aircraft carriers either -- note that they too see subs as the superior alternative to aircraft carriers. Otherwise, why wouldn't they be going for carriers ahead of subs?

[Rakesh]

So if the current 'warm' skirmish with China goes hot and they launch a few missiles at us in say AP, we will launch missiles in Tibet?

The target package that India launches against China, will depend on where the Chinese missiles landed on Indian soil.

Attacking densely populated areas are vastly different from attacking military installations or bases. As mentioned earlier, India's military doctrine operates on a reactive manner i.e. tit-for-tat. In the last set of recent conflicts, even that has been strategically scaled back to avoid climbing up the escalatory ladder i.e. Kargil - don't cross the LoC; Surgical Strike - enter PoK (which is India's territory), Balakot - enter PoK (same as earlier) and Galwan.

Thus when climbing up the escalatory ladder, one has to be certain that they can go all the way if the need arises.

[Rakesh]

What massive investment has to be made in converting SSBN into SSGN? It seems to be such investment would be dwarfed by the cost of developing and building new aircraft carriers, which to me seem to be vanity projects that don't serve us most efficiently.

Which SSBN are you going to convert into SSGN? We have a grand total of 2 boats (perhaps 3) that are SSBNs. But let us err on the side of caution and go with the 2 we know of - Arihant and Arighat. How are we going to have a survivable second strike capability with just one boat, if we convert the other one into a SSGN? Nuclear powered boats take time to build. The Arihant Class is planned for four vessels and we will need all four vessels to have a guaranteed second strike capability.

Both the Royal Navy (Vanguard Class) and the French Navy (Triomphant Class) also have just four SSBNs each in their fleet. All four vessels are not at sea, at the same time. Some are in dock for repair & overhaul and/or maintenance while the others are at sea. And they rotate after they complete a tour. Their successors (the Dreadnought Class and the SNLE 3G) are also planned at four vessels. So a one-to-one replacement.

The same setup will exist with the Arihant Class, when all four vessels are in service. Till the Arighat was commissioned, India had just one SSBN at sea (and that too not on a 24-7-365 basis). When the Arihant returned to base - after completing her tour - we did not have a spare SSBN to compensate for the lack of availability of the Arihant. Now with the Arighat entering service, we have a back up to the Arihant. The end goal of a second strike capability is to have a permanent presence at sea of nuclear tipped missiles, ready to launch, upon the authority of India's Nuclear Command.

When you take a SSBN out of that rotation, you now hamstring your second strike capability. The greater the number of active SSBNs, proportionally robust is the survivability of your second strike capability. And the reverse is equally true. The lesser the number of active SSBNs, proportionally diminished is your second strike capability. Now the US Navy could afford to convert 4 of their 18 Ohio Class boats because they determined that they did not need 18 SSBNs for a guaranteed second strike capability. India does not have such a luxury. Even the two in service now is not enough.

The successor to the Arihant Class - the S5 Class - is reportedly planned at 3 vessels. Perhaps that might increase to a bigger number. When those boats are commissioned (at least three in *ACTIVE* service), then perhaps a conversion of the Arihant Class to a SSGN role could occur. But we are looking at the late 2030s (optimistic timeline) at the least. And that is assuming Arihant Class is technically viable for such a conversion and will serve for a good length of time. That is something we on BRF will never ever be able to determine. Theories are nice, but reality is another story.

So to answer your question wrt to massive investment, we will have to commission a new line of nuclear powered boats solely for the SSGN role...if we do not want to wait for the Arihant conversion. And that investment is huge, just on the boat alone. Lets not even bring up the associated shore costs that come with operating a nuclear powered submarine. From where will we find Aladdin's lamp to rub and request the genie to dole out money for this?

To a certain degree, I am in full agreement with you on the super carrier being a vanity project. That was a prestige program to peddle F-18SHs onto the Indian Navy. I am glad the super carrier did not get sanctioned. But it will happen at some in the future, with Rafale Ms and TEDBFs on board.

I disagree - SSGN (even super-SSGN) will cost less than super-carrier, especially when you factor in all the escort ships and their operational cost. Future is with drones over manned aircraft anyway, and large SSGN could even deploy fixed-wing drones for longer-range operations.

I like the idea of stealthily parking giant missile sub off coast of Pak, or Houthis, or Malacca Straits, and unleashing massive firepower suddenly and effectively without advance warning. It's a more flexible and deployable weapon for our home region.

Out of the 5 navies that operate aircraft carriers and SSBNs (basically the P5 countries), only two of them have active SSGN boats in service. One is the United States and the other is Russia. Unlike the Americans, the Russians built dedicated SSGNs from the keel laying stage. China, France and the UK do not operate SSGNs. It cost the US Navy US $1 billion - per boat - to convert four SSBNs into SSGNs. Good luck convincing the bean counters at the MoD on this!

I like many ideas too! One of them is Katrina Kaif taking me out on a date and us eating Kwality ice cream together. That does not mean it is going to happen. Ideas have to translate into reality (funding). That is easier said than done in India.

We don't need an Ohio Class type SSGN parked off the coast of Pakistan, the Houthis or the Malacca Straits. The planned Project 75 Alpha will be sufficient for the task. A SSN will serve our needs as effectively as a SSGN. Surely, the missile load out will be less on the SSN when compared to the SSGN, but the target package will also not be that gargantuanly massive that a 150+ missile carrying boat is an absolute must have.

Australia's economy is much smaller. They don't have any aircraft carriers either -- note that they too see subs as the superior alternative to aircraft carriers. Otherwise, why wouldn't they be going for carriers ahead of subs?

If the Ohio Class SSGN is that amazing, why would the US Navy spend US $13+ billion on the USS Gerald R Ford alone? And there are another nine more such vessels planned. Then there is the SSN(X) program, the B-21 Raider program, the NGAD program, etc. The SSGN has a role, but so does the aircraft carrier and so does everything else. One platform does not supersede the other. Rather they complement each other and gives US military planners a variety of options to strike with. That is why I said earlier, you need to strike a balance.

I am not against the idea of a SSGN. What I am against however is pulling an active SSBN out of service (for SSGN conversion) or investing funds in a SSGN, when a SSN can do the same task. There are a myriad of more important projects that require funding.

P.S. Below is a Ohio Class SSGN with the SSBN missile tube converted into a SSGN tube, that can hold 7 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Now the Project 75 Alpha SSN is still very much on the drawing board. A SSN with VLS missile tubes (that can hold multiple missiles in a single tube) is something I would be fully on-board with. So a P-75A SSN with a 8 to 10 VLS missile tube load out and with each tube capable of carrying three BrahMos-S or Nirbhay-S cruise missiles would be a game changer. That is 24 - 30 missiles per SSN.

Image Source: https://www.quora.com/Is-it-possible-fo ... ld-it-have

[sanman]

Which SSBN are you going to convert into SSGN? We have a grand total of 2 boats (perhaps 3) that are SSBNs. But let us err on the side of caution and go with the 2 we know of - Arihant and Arighat. How are we going to have a survivable second strike capability with just one boat, if we convert the other one into a SSGN? Nuclear powered boats take time to build. The Arihant Class is planned for four vessels and we will need all four vessels to have a guaranteed second strike capability.

So when I said "convert SSBN to SSGN" what I meant was convert our know-how on how to build SSBN into building an SSGN.
I did not mean to say convert an existing boat like Arihant/Aridahaman/Arighata - since as you say, we only have 3.
But how many SSBN do we really need?
I think we should branch out and build SSGN sooner rather than later, as we can make use of them sooner, and begin evolving them sooner.
SSBN can't be used except in extreme scenarios -- they're just an insurance policy.
SSGN can be used much more frequently, which makes them more useful for our needs, since we suffer terror attacks, etc on a routine basis, and SSGN is a useful retaliatory strike platform (ie. "surgical stirke,", etc)

The successor to the Arihant Class - the S5 Class - is reportedly planned at 3 vessels. Perhaps that might increase to a bigger number. When those boats are commissioned (at least three in *ACTIVE* service), then perhaps a conversion of the Arihant Class to a SSGN role could occur. But we are looking at the late 2030s (optimistic timeline) at the least. And that is assuming Arihant Class is technically viable for such a conversion and will serve for a good length of time. That is something we on BRF will never ever be able to determine. Theories are nice, but reality is another story.

Seems to me that SSGN are higher priority than SSBN, because by building them first we can use them sooner (ie. in actual military action) and this can help to shape our development of our SSBN)

To a certain degree, I am in full agreement with you on the super carrier being a vanity project. That was a prestige program to peddle F-18SHs onto the Indian Navy. I am glad the super carrier did not get sanctioned. But it will happen at some in the future, with Rafale Ms and TEDBFs on board.

Manned fighters are going to be obsoleted by UCAVs and other drones in the future.
SSGN could potentially even evolve capabilities to launch drones one day.

Carriers are easier targets to hit, so we'd be better off with multiple smaller carriers like Japan, and primarily using them as helicopter carriers which are more practical.

Out of the 5 navies that operate aircraft carriers and SSBNs (basically the P5 countries), only two of them have active SSGN boats in service. One is the United States and the other is Russia. Unlike the Americans, the Russians built dedicated SSGNs from the keel laying stage. China, France and the UK do not operate SSGNs. It cost the US Navy US $1 billion - per boat - to convert four SSBNs into SSGNs. Good luck convincing the bean counters at the MoD on this!

I like many ideas too! One of them is Katrina Kaif taking me out on a date and us eating Kwality ice cream together. That does not mean it is going to happen. Ideas have to translate into reality (funding). That is easier said than done in India.

I don't particularly like Katrina Kaif, nor do I feel that SSGN should be last on the development list. We should have some subs allocated to deterrent role, but we should have more of them allocated to conventional strike role, which means SSGNs launching SLCMs.
This is because we are a routine recipient of attacks, and this says that we must develop better retaliatory capability for better punishment of such attacks.
Otherwise our deterrent fixation seems to be hollow false comfort against death-by-a-thousand cuts from terror attacks and salami-slicing.
Just like some aircraft carrier on parade, it's all meant purely for show.

We don't need an Ohio Class type SSGN parked off the coast of Pakistan, the Houthis or the Malacca Straits. The planned Project 75 Alpha will be sufficient for the task. A SSN will serve our needs as effectively as a SSGN. Surely, the missile load out will be less on the SSN when compared to the SSGN, but the target package will also not be that gargantuanly massive that a 150+ missile carrying boat is an absolute must have.

What's your understanding of the difference between SSN and SSGN? SSN sounds like an attack sub meant to kill other subs.
I'm talking about attacking land targets, since jihadis don't swim.

If the Ohio Class SSGN is that amazing, why would the US Navy spend US $13+ billion on the USS Gerald R Ford alone? And there are another nine more such vessels planned. Then there is the SSN(X) program, the B-21 Raider program, the NGAD program, etc. The SSGN has a role, but so does the aircraft carrier and so does everything else. One platform does not supersede the other. Rather they complement each other and gives US military planners a variety of options to strike with. That is why I said earlier, you need to strike a balance.

Clearly the aircraft carrier is America's premier power projection platform and is much more useful for them than for us, since they do in fact mean to fight wars on the other side of the world, as opposed to just bombing Mexico or Canada. That's not the case with us - we have no need to bomb Brazil. Our wars are in our own vicinity. I don't want to get into B-21 Raider, etc, since that's air power. Obviously we'd be happy to have aerial strike systems like B-21 Raider to get past Chinese defenses. Meanwhile, China has its newer H-20 bombers which can be mass-produced a lot more cheaply than B-21 Raider. But let's not divert into air power, even though there's much to talk about there.

I am not against the idea of a SSGN. What I am against however is pulling an active SSBN out of service (for SSGN conversion) or investing funds in a SSGN, when a SSN can do the same task. There are a myriad of more important projects that require funding.

I find overspending on "insurance policy" (SSBN) while spending too little on active prevention to be a bad bargain. And by "active prevention" I mean active military strikes immediately following attacks on us (like the surgical strikes)

What form of return is SSBN actually giving us right now? China still grabbing land through salami-slicing, Pakistan still killing our people with terrorism. They have absolutely no need to launch nuclear attacks on us, when they can get plenty by these other means.
SSBN is like spending all your money barricading the front door, and then meanwhile thieves are coming in via back door to steal everything anyway.

P.S. Below is a Ohio Class SSGN with the SSBN missile tube converted into a SSGN tube, that can hold 7 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Now the Project 75 Alpha SSN is still very much on the drawing board. A SSN with VLS missile tubes (that can hold multiple missiles in a single tube) is something I would be fully on-board with. So a P-75A SSN with a 8 to 10 VLS missile tube load out and with each tube capable of carrying three BrahMos-S or Nirbhay-S cruise missiles would be a game changer. That is 24 - 30 missiles per SSN.

Okay, that sounds good - but I don't know what the difference is between SSN and SSGN. I thought SSN refers to attack subs which hunt/kill other subs & vessels.

[Rakesh]

So when I said "convert SSBN to SSGN" what I meant was convert our know-how on how to build SSBN into building an SSGN.

You can kiss that dream goodbye, for at least the next two decades. The Arihant Class is still on the building block. The succeeding class - the S5 - is coming next. Then there is the Project 75A Class SSN, of which six are planned. No SSGN will happen anytime in the near future. As mentioned earlier, this is a discussion that is academic.

I did not mean to say convert an existing boat like Arihant/Aridahaman/Arighata - since as you say, we only have 3. But how many SSBN do we really need?

Four Arihant Class are planned, of which two are in service. Then there is three S5 Class, which are larger than the Arihant Class. How many India needs depends on a number of factors - nuclear military doctrine, vessel capability, missile capability, etc.

I think we should branch out and build SSGN sooner rather than later, as we can make use of them sooner, and begin evolving them sooner. SSBN can't be used except in extreme scenarios -- they're just an insurance policy.

That is not true, but not germane to this discussion. All I will say - for now - is that SSBNs are extremely vital for India's nuclear triad.

SSGN can be used much more frequently, which makes them more useful for our needs, since we suffer terror attacks, etc on a routine basis, and SSGN is a useful retaliatory strike platform (ie. "surgical stirke,", etc)

India's SSGN for now will be the P-75A SSN program. A scaled down SSGN, but that is all that will happen for now. Wishes are different from reality.

Seems to me that SSGN are higher priority than SSBN, because by building them first we can use them sooner (ie. in actual military action) and this can help to shape our development of our SSBN).

That is your perception and you are certainly entitled to that. However, there has not been any official change in India's military doctrine with regards to nuclear powered submarines. To date, it still remains at SSBNs and SSNs. Work with what we have and not with what we wish to have.

I don't particularly like Katrina Kaif, nor do I feel that SSGN should be last on the development list. We should have some subs allocated to deterrent role, but we should have more of them allocated to conventional strike role, which means SSGNs launching SLCMs.

Once again, I reiterate that the P-75 Alpha SSN will be the SSGN-lite (if I dare use that nomenclature). That stance has not changed.

This is because we are a routine recipient of attacks, and this says that we must develop better retaliatory capability for better punishment of such attacks. Otherwise our deterrent fixation seems to be hollow false comfort against death-by-a-thousand cuts from terror attacks and salami-slicing. Just like some aircraft carrier on parade, it's all meant purely for show.

If a missile strike is a chosen option against Pakistan, India can launch salvos of BrahMos or Nirbhay cruise missiles from air, ship or road mobile launchers and they will all hit their targets. And equally important, they will be launched from well within Indian territory to prevent loss of personnel or material. What does it matter if you get slapped on the face with the right hand or the left hand? Are you aware on the recent BrahMos misfire from a mobile, land-based, Indian Army missile battery from India to Pakistan? The key takeaway from that incident was Pakistan's response (or the lack thereof).

Against China, there are other platforms that are in service, in development and that includes the Project 75 Alpha SSN.

What's your understanding of the difference between SSN and SSGN? SSN sounds like an attack sub meant to kill other subs. I'm talking about attacking land targets, since jihadis don't swim.

US Navy SSNs have launched Tomahawk cruise missiles against jihadis. Look up Operation Infinite Reach. US Navy SSNs have routinely used their land-attack cruise missiles to destroy land targets. They have been doing it for decades now.

Modern SSNs - Virgnia Class, Astute Class, Yasen Class, Suffren Class and even India's upcoming Project 75 Alpha SSN - are multi-mission submarines. They are not one trick ponies i.e. can only kill other subs. That is just one of their many roles. Recon, induction/de-induction of special forces, CBG protection, SSBN escort, launching UUVs, etc. Please brush up on your knowledge of modern SSNs. Lots of reading material available on the internet.

A SSGN does none of that. She serves as a single-use platform i.e. massive, concentrated firepower in a theatre of operations. In a budget-strapped military like India's, a single-use platform will find no takers. You will not get the funds approved for such a fantasy acquisition. it is not going to happen, no matter how long you hold your breath.

Clearly the aircraft carrier is America's premier power projection platform and is much more useful for them than for us, since they do in fact mean to fight wars on the other side of the world, as opposed to just bombing Mexico or Canada. That's not the case with us - we have no need to bomb Brazil. Our wars are in our own vicinity. I don't want to get into B-21 Raider, etc, since that's air power. Obviously we'd be happy to have aerial strike systems like B-21 Raider to get past Chinese defenses. Meanwhile, China has its newer H-20 bombers which can be mass-produced a lot more cheaply than B-21 Raider. But let's not divert into air power, even though there's much to talk about there.

Thank you for proving my point

Every major platform that the US military acquires is designed for power projection or as the Americans like to put it - peace through strength. Everything from aircraft carriers to SSBNs to B-21 Raiders to NGAD fighters to even SSGNs are acquired with that goal in mind.

Power projection is not India's military doctrine. Our wars are not fought on the other side of the world and thus investing resources into capital intensive programs like SSGNs - when there are more vital programs that require funding - is foolhardy. The SSN will serve as India's SSGN for the foreseeable future.

I find overspending on "insurance policy" (SSBN) while spending too little on active prevention to be a bad bargain. And by "active prevention" I mean active military strikes immediately following attacks on us (like the surgical strikes)

It is your prerogative to have that opinion. But your opinion is not a fact.

There are countless papers, articles and even real world examples of why SSBNs are so vital in a nuclear triad. Google it and you will find them.

What form of return is SSBN actually giving us right now? China still grabbing land through salami-slicing, Pakistan still killing our people with terrorism. They have absolutely no need to launch nuclear attacks on us, when they can get plenty by these other means. SSBN is like spending all your money barricading the front door, and then meanwhile thieves are coming in via back door to steal everything anyway.

What use is any military platform in India - SSBN, SSGN, SSN, Rafale, Su-30MKI, T-90, Arjun, BrahMos missile battery - if the political class is impotent? No point in having all this, if you are not going to use them. It is only in the Modi Govt, that stance has changed. But even that change has been conducted very judiciously.

* Look up all the terrorist incidents from May 2004 to May 2014 (under the then Manmohan Singh-led UPA Govt) and tell me how many counter strike missions were conducted.

* Look up all the terrorist incidents from May 1998 to May 2004 (under the then AB Vajpayee-led NDA Govt) and tell me how many counter strike missions were conducted.

If you are going to be limp, then you might as well stay home. Nothing is going to help you, not even a SSGN.

Okay, that sounds good - but I don't know what the difference is between SSN and SSGN. I thought SSN refers to attack subs which hunt/kill other subs & vessels.

As I mentioned earlier, it is not. A simple Google search will reveal otherwise.

[Pratyush]

This post is OT but then again several of the posts preceding this post are similarly OT.

Procurements are a function of national strategy. You can't say the India should prioritise X over Y. Unless you have a complete understanding of what national strategy has to be met. In the absence of an overreaching strategy, defence equipment are just toys for show.

First decide what is the national strategy, then the decision to procure equipment will follow automatically.

For example, the grand strategy of India from all public pronouncements is strategic autonomy. If this strategy has to be followed then it becomes incumbent on the Indian state to be able to successfully conduct several missions. In waters all the way out to the Arctic Ocean.

If we are going to activate the Vladivostok to Chennai corridor. Then we need forces capable of keeping that route open in the PRC front yard. SSGN/SSN however appealing in that scenario, are not going to cut it. We require a balanced naval fleet capable of dealing with the PLAN alone.

While the Navy is keeping sea route open. India also requires the ability to ensure that the PLAF is unable to aid the PLAN in anyway shape or form. That means an IAF with the technology and force strength to tie up the PLAF over the western theatre for PRC.

Because of our strategic autonomy, the USA is not going to spend any blood or treasure out of the goodness of its heart. Just to fight PRC for an India that is not aligned with it.
LET THAT SINK IN.

Similarly, we also require forces to be able to keep Suez open for us. possibility all at the same time.

I hope that you are getting a picture of what level of Naval and Air force is required by India. Unfortunately, I am not seeing any clarity about achieving such a force level within an acceptable timeframe. Or even an intellectual acknowledgement of the force requirements.

[Manish_P]

So if the current 'warm' skirmish with China goes hot and they launch a few missiles at us in say AP, we will launch missiles in Tibet?

The target package that India launches against China, will depend on where the Chinese missiles landed on Indian soil.

Attacking densely populated areas are vastly different from attacking military installations or bases. As mentioned earlier, India's military doctrine operates on a reactive manner i.e. tit-for-tat....

So how does tit-for-tat work? If they hit our military base in AP we hit them in Tibet? If they hit our military base in Andaman we hit them where ... and how?

Or are we building up our forces on the assumption that they won't hit us anywhere except where we would be ok with them hitting us

[Manish_P]

...
India's SSGN for now will be the P-75A SSN program. A scaled down SSGN, but that is all that will happen for now. Wishes are different from reality.

...
Once again, I reiterate that the P-75 Alpha SSN will be the SSGN-lite (if I dare use that nomenclature). That stance has not changed.

...

Perfectly put.

An Air Force analogy (somewhat) would be why the IAF avoided going for heavy bombers like the Backfires and Blackjacks and instead remained content with Su-30 MKIs.

[sanman]

This post is OT but then again several of the posts preceding this post are similarly OT.

Procurements are a function of national strategy. You can't say the India should prioritise X over Y. Unless you have a complete understanding of what national strategy has to be met. In the absence of an overreaching strategy, defence equipment are just toys for show.

First decide what is the national strategy, then the decision to procure equipment will follow automatically.

For example, the grand strategy of India from all public pronouncements is strategic autonomy. If this strategy has to be followed then it becomes incumbent on the Indian state to be able to successfully conduct several missions. In waters all the way out to the Arctic Ocean.

If we are going to activate the Vladivostok to Chennai corridor. Then we need forces capable of keeping that route open in the PRC front yard. SSGN/SSN however appealing in that scenario, are not going to cut it. We require a balanced naval fleet capable of dealing with the PLAN alone.

While the Navy is keeping sea route open. India also requires the ability to ensure that the PLAF is unable to aid the PLAN in anyway shape or form. That means an IAF with the technology and force strength to tie up the PLAF over the western theatre for PRC.

Because of our strategic autonomy, the USA is not going to spend any blood or treasure out of the goodness of its heart. Just to fight PRC for an India that is not aligned with it.
LET THAT SINK IN.

Similarly, we also require forces to be able to keep Suez open for us. possibility all at the same time.

I hope that you are getting a picture of what level of Naval and Air force is required by India. Unfortunately, I am not seeing any clarity about achieving such a force level within an acceptable timeframe. Or even an intellectual acknowledgement of the force requirements.

Yeah, I don't think we can realistically have any hope of doing those things, and should stick to being able to fight regional wars within the Indian Ocean - mainly Arabian Sea & Bay of Bengal. Anything more grand is just building Castles in the Sky.

We can make all sorts of pretentious claims about holding open the sea lanes between Chennai and Vladivostok, but that just can't happen.
Just Pie-in-the-Sky dreaming, wasting money on building Castles in the Sky, while more basic defense needs aren't being met.
We can't even protect our own borders - so we pooh-pooh the issue, and downplay it - saying we have more important concerns (Vladivostok, etc)

I think you've got to be able to walk before you can run, and crawl before you can walk. I'd say keep the home soil safe from neighbors projecting violence into our territory, and maintain an arsenal which can deter and punish said neighbors. Vladivostok can wait.

[Pratyush]

The ability to keep the flow of energy supplies and industrial raw materials is of vital importance for the future of Indian economic growth.

We can dismiss it as crawling before walking. But if India cannot keep it's energy supplies flowing, even if we succeed in defending our current borders. If PRC has the ability to squeeze our fuel supplies from Sakhalin. Then our victory on the Himalayan frontier will amount to nothing.

Second, do you really believe that our forces will be sufficient to deal with PRC. If they decide to send a 300 ship force to the Indian Ocean, in parallel with an all out offensive against India in the Tibetan theatre of operations, supported by the entirety of the PLAF.

The object is not to hand wave the problem. The object is to develop an honest understanding of the force required to keep our sea lanes open. While being able to defend land frontiers.

The argument about submarine and aircraft carriers has to be seen in that context.

[pravula]

The target package that India launches against China, will depend on where the Chinese missiles landed on Indian soil.

Attacking densely populated areas are vastly different from attacking military installations or bases. As mentioned earlier, India's military doctrine operates on a reactive manner i.e. tit-for-tat....

So how does tit-for-tat work? If they hit our military base in AP we hit them in Tibet? If they hit our military base in Andaman we hit them where ... and how?

Or are we building up our forces on the assumption that they won't hit us anywhere except where we would be ok with them hitting us

Escalation ladder is a thing and as silly as these seems, it is a factor. The assumption that we will hit them in Tibet is an assumption and as such is not 100% confidence outcome...

[Manish_P]

The ability to keep the flow of energy supplies and industrial raw materials is of vital importance for the future of Indian economic growth.

... The object is to develop an honest understanding of the force required to keep our sea lanes open. While being able to defend land frontiers.

The argument about submarine and aircraft carriers has to be seen in that context.

+1

I had initially LoL'd when some brilliant Paki analycysts described India as being 'Sea-locked'. But then looking at the land borders with our 'friendly' neighbours that word started becoming more & more understandable.

[Rakesh]

So how does tit-for-tat work? If they hit our military base in AP we hit them in Tibet? If they hit our military base in Andaman we hit them where ... and how?

India's military doctrine largely rests on Newton's Third Law of Motion ---> For Every Action, There is an Equal and Opposite Reaction.

From our NFU policy (highest level of military conflict) to the lowest (returning artillery / small arms fire), this is how it has operated.

I still remember reading an India Today article, in which an interview was being conducted with an Indian Army officer manning an artillery post at the Indo-Pak border. As the interview was ongoing (inside a bunker), the Pakistanis started their usual artillery shenanigans for the day. An Indian Jawan rushes inside the bunker to advise his officer of the incoming artillery fire. And the exchange goes like this...

Jawan: Sir, Pakistanis artillery fire shuru ki hai...

Officer: Kitna Round Mara?

Jawan: Teen Round Sir.

Officer: Panch Round Maro.

The military posture has always been first deterrent and then defensive in nature. We don't have the political will to conduct an Afghanistan or Iraq (Let-Freedom-Reign and Let-the-Oil-Flow) type operation. That is just not our mindset. There have been outliers to this though i.e. Operation Vijay in 1961 (Liberation of Goa), Operation Cactus in the Maldives in 1988 and Operation Pawan, which ended in a disaster for India due to Machiavellian political dealings. But these are one-offs and not the norm, but still needs to be mentioned.

So to answer your query ---> if they hit our military base in AP or elsewhere, we will respond with a military action. But when you go up against the dragon, your quiver of arrows better be full and be ready to be fired, if the need arises. Be prepared for escalation. Are we doing that?

Or are we building up our forces on the assumption that they won't hit us anywhere except where we would be ok with them hitting us.

Deterrence is the best form of conflict IMVHO. No one in their right mind wants to go to war. Only brain-washed Jihadis are the exception to the rule. So building up your forces and investing in vital areas is important for deterrence. You need to give the Chinese a moment of pause and let them think through the consequences of a military action that they might undertake. How much pain am I willing to absorb, to teach the evil Yindoos a lesson? There is a big question mark on that. Post Galwan, deterrence has produced a result. How good that result will play out in the long term, remains to be seen.

But deterrence is not just about buying a platform, but also investing in key areas (i.e. aero engines and not doing piecemeal orders i.e. 83 first, then 97 later). The strength of our MIC, will play a vital role in the outcome of a conflict.

[Rakesh]

An Air Force analogy (somewhat) would be why the IAF avoided going for heavy bombers like the Backfires and Blackjacks and instead remained content with Su-30MKIs.

Bingo! You get it. Thank You.

[Manish_P]

...
So to answer your query ---> if they hit our military base in AP or elsewhere, we will respond with a military action. But when you go up against the dragon, your quiver of arrows better be full and be ready to be fired, if the need arises. Be prepared for escalation. Are we doing that?
....

Not at all disagreeing with your points per se, Rajesh ji. What i (and perhaps Sanman ji) meant was simply that the CM subs are a very potent arrow in that quiver. Especially since our opponents quiver is much larger.

Being inherently stealthy they are an asymmetric force multiplier (and a higher rung in the escalation ladder). Hundreds of cruise missiles lurking somewhere in very close proximity to your export hubs and ports is a hell of a deterrence. Even more than an AC carrier group which is more easy to track (and thus engage).

Now i fully agree that budgetary constraints force us to use multi-purpose platforms in all our service branches.

And so for the foreseeable future it will be our present SSNs and regular subs (with missile firing capabilities) which will aid in the role.
(SSGN-lite as you put it rather eloquently ).

In the far off future hopefully we will have them (might even be unmanned). No humans on board will give more space for munitions, more on-station loitering ability (as not limited by food). As a jingo i wish and hope our labs are working towards such platforms.