Operational Art or War Doctrine

[ramana]

Big Serge analyzes Russian riposte in Ukraine.

https://twitter.com/witte_sergei/status ... 2qWxw&s=19

[ramana]

I have been reading about the naval Battle of Jutland between British and Germany

A few links:

https://macleans.ca/society/the-battle- ... f-ironies/

next
https://navymuseum.co.nz/explore/by-the ... 0the%20war.

The battle of Jutland was the only major clash between the British Grand Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet.

It occurred in the southern North Sea, off the coast of the Jutland Peninsula which gives its name to the battle.

While the British lost more ships than the Germans, it was the pivotal naval battle of the First World War.

Whilst the High Seas Fleet emerged twice more into the North Sea, there was no other major battle and the Royal Navy retained command of the sea, without which Germany could not win the war.
...
German losses in the battle were less than the British, but strategically, the German Fleet only ventured to sea on two further occasions before the end of the war.

Jutland was a battle that the British did not have to win, but if the Germans had won, they would have gained command of the sea and would have won the war.

https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/a-cen ... f-jutland/

Fisher knew how to use technological development for strategic ends. Because he never lost sight of the role of the fleet, each of its ships the Grand Fleet at Jutland was the product of a technological innovation that aimed at strategic results. Adapting technology to strategic needs and then using technological development to subdue an opponent is the great lesson that Jutland provides...


Command at sea is fought for chokepoints and access to a continent’s gateways; it is not an end in itself.

and a stupid article

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/di ... tter-16290


Next
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedi ... 0torpedoes.

While the tactics and strategy of Nelson have been studied for over a hundred years, the Battle of Jutland is far more complicated than the whole of Nelson's war experience, and it will take many years of faithful study to prepare us to reap the benefit of all the professional data furnished by this great sea fight.

[Pratyush]

The battle of Jutland and the battle of Midway are nearly identical in the ultimate scheme of things. That they are irrelevant to the outcome of the larger war being fought. Therefore, I disagree with the assessment quoted below that the Germans had to win this battle in order to win the war.

Jutland was a battle that the British did not have to win, but if the Germans had won, they would have gained command of the sea and would have won the war.

Primarily because, with the advent of industrial age the days of a battle deciding the outcome of a war between 2 industrial powers had ended.

All things being equal. If we consider the outcome of Jutland to be a German victory, which results in a complete destruction of the British Grand fleet. The Germans still would't have the naval fleet, merchant marine or even shipbuilding industry to sustain the momentum of this victory. That is, by being able insure an unrestricted flow of trade to reach Germany with industrial raw materials and food supplies. Which is the problem the Germans were trying to solve with this operation. If the Germans cannot solve that problem. They will loose the war in exactly the timeframe that they did.

The British had the numerical advantage in the numbers of Dreadnaughts, the calibre of guns and in the numbers of cruisers, destroyers and light scouting forces. Not to mention the ability to read the German codes.

Second, most enthusiastic proponents for a German victory in Jutland tend to ignore the most decisive factor for the German fleet. Germany was a continental power. It's army always came first. The Navy was a distant second in priorities, when seen in terms of spending priorities from before the war. That limited the High Seas Fleet to what it could accomplish during the war. The U Boat campaign was an effort to address the shortcomings of the High Seas Fleet. But even there the Germans were limited by the technology of the time.

The British being an island nation had the industrial capacity and productivity for a war of this nature. The Germans were a continental power and their economy was configured to exploit the advantages of continental trade. This war placed Germany in worst possible position both economically and industrially. Making defeat inevitable.

What I am trying to say is that operational arts and doctrine are useful, only if you are fighting for an achievable set of aims. If not, then you are not any different from the High Seas Fleet, during world war 1, or the PAF during 1965.

There are several lessons for India to be learnt from this war. Including but not limited to.

1) Keep our energy and industrial raw materials supplies open.
2) Choke point works for both sides ( e.g. Malacca straits).
3) Have the force structure to keep our trade open through the Malacca straits. While closing the traffic for enemies.

[drnayar]

i am questioning now the wisdom of having extensive military contacts with America.

Just one point.

Would Hasina have had to leave Bangladesh if she had the support of the military ?

Arent we opening the military to untoward influence of America

[ramana]

Sorry Dr nayar this is not the right thread for your question

[ramana]

Pratyush if High Seas fleet had sunk a couple of ships more it would make a difference.
Tactically High Seas fleet win but strategically lost. Submarine warfare was a loser strategy. In fact the scars of Jutland also defeated the German fleet in WW II. Wasted resources and lives.

[Pratyush]

Ramana, that's a great what if, of the whole affair. But only when seen in extreme isolation.

That's why I have disagreed with the assesment with that, a high seas fleet wining the battle of Jutland would alter the course of the war.

The Royal Navy strategy was not under pinned by the close blockade of the north sea. It was just the most visible part of the UK national strategy.

When Germany was still fighting on both eastern and western fronts. It just didn't have the resources to break the rest of the strategy. Even it unambiguously won the battle of Jutland.

That is the larger point. This is one of the cases where operational art is insufficient to deliver victory.

[Pratyush]

We also need to understand that the British Grand strategy was a function of its national interest as a global colonial power. With global trading interests. Those interests directly contributed to the shape of the Royal Navy.

You cannot remove that from the big picture when looking at its interactions with imperial Germany.

That is something that most Naval historians tend to omit when they are writing for non specialist civillian readers.

[ramana]

Operational Art in the Indian Context

Operational Art in the Indian Context

Author: Lieutenant General VK Kapoor, PVSM (Retd)

Period: October 2003 - December 2003


Operational Art in the Indian Context

Lieutenant General VK Kapoor, PVSM (Retd)

Introduction

A war fighting doctrine evolved by any nation is an outcome of an assessment of factors such as the historical experience of the nation, shape and contours of future wars and the anticipated battlefield environment. This belief and conviction of the current leadership of how military forces are to be employed in support of national objectives serves as a reference, a guide to senior military commanders in the field to formulate strategies for each operational situation confronted. The doctrine gets reinforced with every successful endeavor but if the effort ends in a failure then the doctrine would have to be modified.

Such assessments along with detailed research, for over a decade, drove the US Armed Forces to adopt the doctrine of Airland Battle, which was successfully employed, with modifications in both the Gulf Wars and in Afghanistan. In their case technology was the major driving force behind their doctrine. Indian Armed Forces are also conscious of the requirement of adopting a more dynamic approach to wars in the future and are seeking a synergetic tri-service approach at the operational and military strategic levels. This mandates a study of operational art, in our context, to examine the method of war fighting that we need to adopt in the future.

Scope and Importance of Operational Art

The importance of operational art lies in the fact that operational level of warfare, being the intermediary level, acts as a bridge to join policy and strategy on one end with tactical employment of forces on the other end. Hence a commander exercising operational art has to be well versed in all three levels of warfare and consequently it demands maximum skills from a commander who is selected to exercise command at this level. While strategy is not concerned with actual fighting, operational art and tactics are. Tactical results are useful only as a part of the larger design framed by strategy and arranged, organised, coordinated, stage-managed and masterminded by operational art. It is a fact of history that by themselves factors such as superior technology, superior numbers and tactical brilliance are insufficient to achieve ultimate success in war. A sound strategy and operational excellence are the hallmarks of mature nations and leaders who understand the art of war and mistakes in these spheres cannot be easily corrected. In fact strategic mistakes live forever. Yet for all its well documented and proven importance in winning wars decisively with least cost to own side, operational art continues to be disregarded by our military experts. The basic reason is the lack of adequate awareness about the subject within the armed forces.

Definition and Elucidation

Terms need to be defined and elucidated to share a common perspective of the subject. Essentials are:-

(a)
Operational art is the employment of military forces (tri-service in our context) to achieve strategic goals in a theatre of operations or a theatre of war through a unique contextual design, organisation and conduct of operations.

(b)
The intermediate level of warfare (called operational level), which connects strategy and tactics.

(c)
When we use the term “operational art” for the intermediate level of war, it means that there is creativity in operational planning at this level, which requires an exclusive method (sequence) to be followed and some norms to be observed. This are elucidated as under :-

(i)
Political aims set forth by political leadership are converted to military strategic aims and objectives through a regressive planning method and the art lies in designing an operational framework to achieve the laid down strategic objectives most skillfully.

(ii)
A new, unique and creative operational design is conceived for every situation confronted so as to achieve the military strategic goals with maximum efficiency and with least cost to own side.

(iii)
Economy of effort is inherent and integral to the term.

(iv)
The concept involves a tri-service approach to an emerging/existing operational problem and therefore advocates integration of all elements functioning in a theatre under a single commander.

(v)
Conduct of campaigns (major operations), their sequence, methodology and procedures, are contextually and jointly evolved. Senior officers need to learn the method of integrated operational planning within the military strategic framework evolved at the level of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in our context, based on a joint tri-service doctrine of war fighting (non existent at present).

(vi)
The entire operation is thought through to its terminal state (end state) so that all possible contingencies that may arise are catered for including likely enemy reactions and our counter reactions for each contingency.



The minimum level at which this concept can be applied, in our context, is that of a Command (Integrated Theatre).

Why Should We Study Operational Art?

The reasons, which necessitate the study of operational art contextually, are numerous and these need to be understood in a wider operational perspective, in the backdrop of the strategic framework of the higher defence planning, so as to grasp the method of application of operational art in future conflicts.

Our traditional methods have favoured deliberate, set piece military operations, which are attrition oriented and hence tactically biased. These have inevitably resulted in high cost and causalities to own side with limited gains. The 1971 war with Pakistan in the eastern theatre was undoubtedly an outstanding military victory. But this was made possible due to favourable strategic factors like geography, air supremacy, people’s support (in erstwhile East Pakistan) and poor enemy morale, whereby we could afford to take risks in our operational conduct. In the same war, in the western theatre, due to our proclivity for more traditional methods, the story was different and the operations remained deadlocked. Moreover we have, in the past, allowed historical experiences to create pre-conceptions in our minds about the nature of wars, leading to formulation of tactically biased operational plans resulting in stalemates. Unless we breakaway from the past methodology of planning and conduct of wars, our achievements will remain mediocre.

The enlarged spectrum of conflict of conventional war with nuclear back drop on one end and terrorism and insurgency on the other and the need to apply the multi-dimensional aspects of war (such as psychological warfare, information warfare and strategic and operational level deception) to win decisively, in a short time frame, necessitates the formulation of a new methodology of planning and conduct of wars – a doctrine based on contextually relevant principles in the future.

Nuclear backdrop, a reality in our context, infers certain concerns for the Armed Forces. The first is the strong possibility of international pressure to prevent a war in the region and if it does take place then to limit it to a short duration implying that if we wish to go to war, our political and military leadership will have to be very clear on what we wish to achieve by waging a conflict. Attempts to fight attritional battles, over territory per se are likely to result in stalemates and heavy causalities. The second aspect concerns the overall operational design evolved to fulfill the political aims of war. This operational framework must enable us to achieve the strategic objectives, in a short time frame and yet not cause escalation beyond the conventional realm. This means that the political aims and military objectives of war are carefully calibrated and our senior military commanders are clear, confident and convinced regarding the doctrine of war fighting, which should be adopted for the future. The basic tenets adopted must also guide us in re-shaping our organisations and force structures for the future. These issues need to be debated, discussed and war-gamed at strategic and operational levels so that our political and military leaders fully comprehend the constraints under which they would be required to function in the future.

Another concern is about the procedure to be adopted when an adversary adopts nuclear brinkmanship as a strategy. Operational level commanders (Army Commanders and equivalents) must be aware of the implications of their operational decisions on the overall war effort and the likely reactions of the opponent and our counter reactions and hence have to be part of the strategic decision making process including nuclear response. Unawareness and innocence of the strategic realm can lead to operational embarrassments and even disasters.

The next motive for the study is the rapid advances in technology in recent times. Historically there are countless examples to illustrate that technology is one of the principle factors that drives the change in the method of fighting and we are facing an entirely new technology era but have not been able to evolve a suitable joint doctrine for the Armed Forces. Moreover higher technology confers the advantage of being able to hit almost anywhere, which requires even lower tactical level commanders to understand the operational and strategic level implications of their actions. This also demands a re-look at the training of our military leaders.

Economy of force and effort is fundamental to the art of war and without economy there is no art in warfare. With increasing costs, likelihood of proliferation and increasing consciousness in the society of the essential wastefulness of warfare, we must devise ways by which these age old principles of warfare are applied more dynamically. Hence joint operations must give way to integrated operations of the three Services. Moreover as we move towards greater development, the value of human life will keep increasing. Our nation and our people will not accept unnecessary casualties, in war, in the future. Kargil controversy refuses to die down despite logic and reasoning. With technology showing the way, we should learn to win wars with the least human cost. In the past wars have been fought with pervasive ignorance on all sides and ignorance brings forth waste and imprecision. But the current and future technology era could eradicate this flaw if we learn to integrate technologies, which help us fight with greater precision.

Professional competence is a key attribute of a military leader and operational art demands the maximum skills from a military professional because it requires of him to be equally competent in all three levels of war i.e., strategic, operational and tactical. All military officers who aspire for higher ranks must study and understand operational art as an important ingredient of the art of war. This is, currently, a weak area of training in all three Services. Moreover an over centralised command and staff culture prevails in our military, which inhibits and prevents mental and intellectual growth and maturity. This calls for a change of culture in the Armed Forces.

Wars are fought for a purpose and the political leadership provides this- as Clausewitz stated, “War is an extension of politics by other means”. The Indian way of going to war must be studied and formalised. The regressive planning procedure of evolving a political aim at the level of the National Security Council/ Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), and converting it to military aims and objectives at the level of COSC and the system of issuance of directives/instructions from the highest strategic bodies to the lower tactical formations must be formalised as a part of the joint operational methodology. At the tactical level, all weapons, Arms and Services are combined in the fighting organisations so as to achieve complementarities and fulfill all relevant principles of war. The aim at this level is to make the enemy react in order to exploit his reaction. This dynamic at the operational level needs to be studied where the tools are different. Operational war fighting involves integrated operations where we must strive for integration of land, air and naval capabilities. This process requires organisation of a national command post and integrated theatres. We also require national and military war-gaming centres, where national strategic, military strategic and operational level war games based on various types of settings are conducted. This will give us the necessary experience and expertise at higher levels to face future contingencies. There is no wisdom in the current inertia and inaction.

Our respective commands are not even co-located and below that the tactical formations are in a stand-alone mode. In the 21st century, our Armed Forces are still planning for conflicts, Service wise, essentially, the way it was done in World War II. We have not even begun our journey for integrated warfare in the 21st century.

Theoretical Foundation

All operational systems must be developed from a sound theoretic basis so that all commanders concerned understand its operational logic and the mutual confidence between commanders at higher and lower levels remains undisturbed, while there is a universal commitment towards the operational aim (strategic goal), which gives adequate freedom to the subordinate commanders to exercise their initiative.2 The criteria are:-


(a)
Cognitive Tension. This reflects the contradiction and conflict between general orientation towards the strategic aim, which is given out in abstract terms, and the specific nature of a tactical mission. This polarisation between the abstract and the specific must be present.

(b)
Manoeuvre. It must be based on an operational level manoeuvre, expressing the dynamic interaction between the various elements within the system as well the relationship between the general action and the strategic aim.

(c)
Synergy. The planned action at operational level must be thoroughly synergetic and should yield a product greater than the linear arithmetic sum of its components and achievements. Moreover, in order to be regarded as operational, the act must reflect the notion of synthesis, through combined arms combat at tactical levels and amalgamation of various forms of warfare and integration of all forces (tri-service) and formations within a geographical area.

(d)
Disruption and Not Destruction. Whereas at the tactical level the action of destruction is accepted, an operational action should aim for disruption of its opponents systems as destruction would inevitably lead to attritional warfare.

(e)
Contemplative Attitude. Reflects a contemplative approach to the factor of randomness in war. Commanders at operational level must inculcate and acquire a contemplative approach to warfare, through introspection and meditation. This will make them more astute (penetrating) in their decision-making and confer an ability to think through the entire problem.

(f)
Nonlinear. It should be structured hierarchically and express depth in operations.

(g)
Method of Achieving Strategic Goals. Must reflect a deliberate interaction between attrition and manoeuvre with the latter being employed to achieve operational objectives (strategic goals) while the former is employed at lower tactical levels.

(h)
Independent Entity. Since operational level action is directly dependant on the need to achieve strategic aim(s) of war and is allocated resources accordingly, it constitutes an independent entity and must be regarded as such.

(j)
Universal Theory. To be regarded as operational it must be related to a broad and universal theory, which can encompass all types of operational actions and all forms of warfare.

Analysis of the Criteria

From the analysis of the above norms the following issues emerge contextually:-


(a)
We need to selectively combine our operational commands of all three Services into integrated theatres, as they constitute the operational level in our case. By so doing, the directives from the COSC can go directly to integrated theatres while the Service Headquarters are taken out of the chain of operational command. Greater synergy at lesser cost will benefit the nation as well as the Armed Forces.

(b)
We need to shed our conservatism, doctrinal backwardness, and our current operational methodologies of deliberate set piece battles that are attrition oriented and adopt the manoeuvre approach to achieve strategic objectives. This is especially relevant in the mountains where set piece battles will achieve very few operational gains. Hence there is a need to develop a dynamic and focused offensive capability for the mountains by re-engineering the existing Army and Air Force resources. Suitably integrated theatres (Commands) will ensure generation of the required synergy and will also enable unity of command, which is an important principle of war.

(c)
The operational design must aim to achieve strategic goals (political aims) of war in the shortest possible time frame which in turn implies:-

(i)
Higher emphasis on manoeuvre than on attrition.

(ii)
Acquiring new military capabilities and re-engineering of existing force levels to cater for future scenarios and settings.

(iii)
Demoralising and weakening the opponent before the start of the campaign. This can be achieved through political, diplomatic and military means (psychological warfare, information warfare and deception).

(iv)
Use of regressive planning methodology from CCS, COSC and Headquarters of Integrated Commands to lower levels should be formalised for executing joint operations.

(v)
Joint operations will ensure synthesis, synergy and success.

(vi)
Joint training, which must be given a much higher priority than the current rather flippant approach.



(d)
The overall change can be brought about by appointing a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) at the earliest and by giving an appropriate push to jointness and integration. This push will have to be provided at political levels through an Act of Parliament similar to the Goldwater – Nichols Act 1986, in the case of the US Armed Forces.

Operational Design and Planning Process

Operational level of warfare has resulted in new terms being introduced in the military lexicon. This is unavoidable because the introduction of new concepts of warfare has invariably led to the evolution of new terms, which describe the new concepts most appropriately. In the case of operational art, this diachronic framework is evident in the elements (concepts), which are central to the design and conduct of major operations and campaigns. The operational level commander designs his plan of operations around a number of building blocks, which help him to visualise how the campaign will unfold from the beginning to the end.3The concepts are:-


(a) End state.
(b) Centre(s) of gravity.
(c) Decisive points.
(d) Lines of operation.
(e) Sequencing.
(f) Manoeuvre.
(g) Tempo.
(h) Culminating point.
(j) Contingency plans.
(k) Shaping of battle space.
(l) Operational synchronisation.

There should be a structured format for estimating an operational level problem to ensure that higher commanders and senior staff officers when lacking exposure or experience in certain types of terrain or forms of warfare do not omit essentials from their operational planning. No joint format exists currently though the Army War College has done some work in this field for the Army Training Command.

A conscious commitment to the planning process by using these concepts will ensure adequate and appropriate focus on strategic issues and the desired end state of war. An operational level commander must never get too involved with a tactical objective. The operational design evolved must enable him to achieve the strategic goals through a variety of ways. A single tactical objective should not be allowed to derail a plan.

Future Warfare and New Technologies

Certain periods in history have been watersheds in technology and change. Today another shift in technology and change is sweeping the world. Glimpses of this change and use of new technologies were demonstrated in US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indian Armed Forces need to examine the entire issue contextually in relation to our conception of future wars i.e. the new methodology of war fighting along with the use of new technologies.

Modern technology has given rise to accurate intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations and technologies which exploit the electromagnetic spectrum, such as sensor and counter sensor, communication and information warfare. The latter includes command and control warfare, precision strike, precision movement and precision protection operations among others. The vital aspect of modern warfare and technology is that all information generated is integrated through digital communication network so as to facilitate movement and transfer of information. The new and emerging technologies that need to be studied are:-


(a) Transportation.
(b) Communications.
(c) Information technology.
(d) Missile technology.
(e) Laser technology and directed energy weapons.
(f) Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems.
(g) Nano technologies.
(h) Biological warfare and bio-molecular electronics.
(j) Sensor technology.
(k) Precision guided munitions.
(l) Stealth technology.

The major significance of these converging technologies is that they alter the traditional theories and practices of planning for and waging wars.

Since the first Gulf War we have seen that forces equipped with precision munitions are able to strike anything they can see. Advanced technologies are bringing smaller, more rapidly deployable and flexible ground forces to conflicts. Such forces, with the benefit of situational awareness, could identify accurately the location of friend or foe, and respond appropriately. Precision munitions linked to better situational awareness allowed for rapid and surgical strikes that could engage targets while precluding collateral damage. Increased force protection for our personnel will also be enhanced by the emerging technologies. Although situational awareness is a major contributor to force protection, these emerging technologies promise much more. Soldiers can be provided with ultra-light body armour and mine resistant vehicles. Lasers and directional electro magnetic pulse weapons can destroy incoming missiles. The rapid introduction of new technologies will change the very nature of future conflict. An interesting and abiding feature of these technologies is that they apply equally well across the full range of conflicts.

Our efforts should be to bring about the transformation faster than our adversaries so that we are in an advantageous position. We need to maximise their usefulness by synthesising technology with doctrine, training, leadership, organisational structure and force development. This will mandate cultural changes in the way we operate presently.

Guiding Principles of Operational Art

Although operational art is applicable across the full spectrum of conflict, its advantages and scope can be fully exploited in high intensity conflicts. The opinion of the US military experts seems to be veering to smaller conflicts of short duration in the future. They anticipate that in the fourth generation wars (future wars), the battlefield will include the whole of enemy society where the goal will be to collapse the enemy internally by identifying his strategic centres of gravity. Action will be dispersed through the use of small groups capable of unleashing intense violence. Emphasis will be on manoeuvre and exploitation of technology. According to their view, masses of men and firepower will become redundant. There will be decreasing dependence on centralised logistics. Such a war will be non-linear with no definable battlefield or fronts and the distinction between war and peace will be blurred. Success will be dependant on joint operations.

In our context, the fundamental causes for war in and around India have not changed after the cold war. On the other hand new threats and challenges have emerged and these have yet to be analysed contextually. Moreover with disputed borders with Pakistan and China, even the external military threat to India’s territory cannot be seen as having receded. Hence our threats and challenges are more now than ever before and we have to be prepared to deal with a larger spectrum and with new dimensions of warfare. Application of operational art will bequeath the skills necessary for military commanders at higher levels, to win wars decisively, across the full range of conflict.

In this regard it is recommended that certain guiding principles, considered vital, be included as a part of the war fighting doctrine. These are given in succeeding paragraphs.

Regressive Planning Process. The method of converting political aim(s) of a conflict to military strategic aim(s) and further to operational and tactical objectives and the method of issuing directives and instructions from the CCS to COSC and from there to integrated theatres/ Service Headquarters should be formalised. This is one of the most important facets of planning and preparation for a conflict and it is termed Regressive Planning because it moves backwards from the highest strategic body to lower echelons. Currently there is no formal procedure followed in this regard. In fact our political leadership, perhaps for political reasons, shies away from giving written directives to Service Chiefs. On receipt of political directives military commanders convert abstract political aim(s) of war to achievable military aim(s) and objectives and if after analysis they come to the conclusion that the political aim set forth is not achievable, they must have the courage to say so. The nation must not go to war for an unachievable political aim.

Integration and Joint Operations. Army-Air integration for the land battle, Navy-Air integration for the battle at sea and a tri-service integration where required must become the tenet of war fighting. This involves effective joint planning, logistics, procedures and training among areas of jointness. Integrated warfare requires a type of refinement in executing integrated operations, which is lacking at present. Victory will not be feasible, in the future, without close integration at operational and tactical levels and without combined all arms action at lower tactical levels. Air power will have to be far more responsive for the type of integrated Land Air operations anticipated in the future.

Campaign Design. This takes into account the focus on strategic goals of the conflict and the end state along with a number of other factors such as the enemy, environment, own forces (including combat support and logistics), surprise and security and time. The appreciation or the estimate carried out by the operational level commander or his staff follows the normal method except that the concepts of operational design emerge as deductions, which enable the identification of innovative options (courses of action).

Non-Linearity. This calls for an attitudinal change in the military mindset. We should be able to translate our idea of fighting the close, intermediate and deep battles in near simultaneity and synchronise the destructive effects of battles at sea and in the air. Indeed, simultaneity is the essence of non-linearity.

Manoeuvre Approach. There is an imperative need to evolve manoeuvre approach as the key element underpinning our approach to war fighting, in all types of terrain including our mountainous regions. Our force development and organisations will have to cater for this offensive capability that in the future will involve close integration of air and ground troops.

Least Cost and Minimum Effort. In imbibing the concept of operational art, our endeavour should be to win the campaign and indeed the war with least possible human and material cost. This reflects on the quality and the art of generalship.

Decentralised Command and Directive Style. For successful application of operational art the command style cannot be rigidly centralised according to our current practice. A more flexible style, which encourages risk taking and maximum initiative by subordinate commanders, will have to be adopted. This will also allow subordinates to conceptually grasp the manoeuvre approach to warfare in the Indian context in all types of terrain.

Visionary Leadership. Yet another requirement of operational art is the need for effective and enlightened leadership with a large enough vision to fully comprehend the entire perspective of operational level of warfare without over identification with tactical objectives. This mandates unbiased selection procedures and sound personnel policies. The key attributes of operational level leaders are considered to be as under:-


(a) Professionally astute.
(b) Vision.
(c) Wisdom.
(d) Contemplative approach.
(e) Self-restraint and self-control.
(f) Self-knowledge.
(g) Ability to inspire as a role model.
(h) Sacrifice of personal interest.
(j ) Possess all attributes of intelligence like intelligence quotient (IQ), emotional intelligence and spiritual intelligence.

Integrate Technology into Coherent Doctrines. Technology has always been the driving force behind military development and the changing nature of war. However, technology by itself is not capable of winning wars. In fact too much focus on technology at the expense of progression in operational thinking cannot ensure success. Operational concepts incorporating and integrating new technologies must be developed into coherent doctrines. We require innovative operational exploitation of new technologies to win wars. Technology can be a vital war winning factor when it is synthesised with doctrine, training, organisational structures and force development and employed imaginatively.

Close Politico-Military Interaction. Given the restrictive aspects of short duration wars, nuclear backdrop and other factors, destruction of adversary’s strategic forces or capture of large tracts of territory will not be possible. War aims will have to be modulated, tempered and calibrated according to the environmental constraints.

Therefore, translation of political aim(s) to achievable military objectives of war and skilful conduct of war will require a close politico-military interaction throughout.

Conclusion

The current clear lines between strategic, operational and tactical levels will become increasingly difficult to differentiate because of increased precision and longer ranges derived from new weapons and munitions and secure, encrypted and networked communications. This will bring a significant increase in combat effectiveness. However, as long as distinctions between strategic, operational and tactical objectives are not erased, corresponding levels of war will remain, though the boundaries of each level may expand into the next higher level, which also implies that without a creative and skillfully developed operational design for a given operational situation, military forces will not be able to perform at their peak performance levels. This is where the application of operational art will make the difference.


Notes

1.
In the Combat Journal of March 2002, I had written in detail on ‘The Fundamentals of Operational Art – A Contextual Review’. I intend to limit this article to some vital contextual issues of operational art, which need our serious consideration and thought.

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.


———————————————————————-
Lieutenant General V K Kapoor, PVSM is a former Commandant of the Army War College (erstwhile College of Combat), Mhow

We should analyze Operation Sindoor from Operational Art point of view:

a) End state.
(b) Centre(s) of gravity.
(c) Decisive points.
(d) Lines of operation.
(e) Sequencing.
(f) Manoeuvre.
(g) Tempo.
(h) Culminating point.
(j) Contingency plans.
(k) Shaping of battle space.
(l) Operational synchronisation.

I think Operation Sindoor was a great example of Operational Art.
It meets all the eleven criteria stated by Lt Gen V.K.Kapoor

[ramana]

John Spencer of West Point on what is strategy