Project 75 Alpha Class SSN: News & Discussion

[Rakesh]

Last Page of Previous Thread ---> viewtopic.php?t=7110&start=2000

Info Sheet ---> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_75_Alpha

[Rakesh]

India 'fully ready' to add to fleet 2nd sub with N-tipped missiles
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ind ... 433199.cms
11 August 2024

Parallelly, on the conventional (non-nuclear) warfare front, the around Rs 40,000 crore project to indigenously construct two nuclear-powered submarines, armed with torpedoes, anti-ship and land-attack missiles, is now before the PM-led cabinet committee on security for the final nod after repeated iterations and inter-ministerial consultations, another source said.

The initial case was for six such 6,000-tonne ‘hunter-killer’ submarines (called SSNs) under ‘Project-77’ at the SBC. But it was whittled down and now stands at two vessels. It will take a decade to build the first two SSNs, which will be around 95% indigenous, while the next four will be approved at a later stage, the source said.

[Prem Kumar]

This penny-pinching is ridiculous. At 40K Crores for 2 boats (including R&D), Adani can personally own a fleet of 8 SSNs and have plenty of cash left

Just compare this to the vast sums poured into unproductive freebies like giving farmers dole 4 times a year

When it comes to national security, we seem to repeat civilizational level mistakes century after century

[Prem Kumar]

And the SSN project itself has languished for no good reason. Once INS Arihant was commissioned, an Arihant-derived SSN should have been worked on, in parallel

The SSBN progress of incremental feedback & growth is exactly what the Navy should have done on the SSN front (& the SSK front, for that matter)

We would have had our 1st SSN in the water by now & more on the way

I can't fathom this stupidity, when in a very adjacent space (SSBNs), much commonsense is on display!

[Yagnasri]

I think SSN design requirements may be different than those of SSBN. There are press reports that we have been working on SSN design, etc, IIRC, for at least the last couple of years, and with most of the internal things, it could be expected. One of the most critical things could be making a silent boat, and reports on Arighat suggest that it is quite a silent one. The same tech and methods may also make any SSN we make quite silent and thus more deadly.

[Prem Kumar]

Yes, they are different no doubt. SSNs have a higher power requirement & are designed more for speed than stealth. If anything, SSBNs need to be stealthier

SSN loadouts are also varied

But we could have started with the 83 MW reactor & the Arihant design and created a working SSN. Then iteratively build up from there

Even assuming that the SSNs need a higher powered reactor, by current estimates, the 190 MW S5-class SSBNs will hit the waters several years (2027-ish) prior to the SSNs (2034-ish). This is just unacceptable!

[Pratyush]

Snip. .

But we could have started with the 83 MW reactor & the Arihant design and created a working SSN. Then iteratively build up from there

Snip ....

When I suggested that in a thread some years ago. I was called Rajni Kant.

[Aditya_V]

If I am right INS Arihant was originally a SSN design and not SSBN, that's why it was just 6000 tons, post Pokran it was decided we needed a Triad and hence the design was modified to fire quasi ballistic missiles like K15 and K4. The INS Chakra 1 was leased in the late 1980s to study the working of SSN, then INS Chakra 2. I think we will get our SSNs faster than our diesel electric subs.

Any idea if INS Chakra 3 can make it back to service for a few years? If I am right we signed a USD 3 billion agreement in Mar 19 for another year lease.

[Rakesh]

When I suggested that in a thread some years ago. I was called Rajni Kant.

When Thailavar's name enters your mind, please ensure you get the right spelling ---> R-A-J-I-N-I-K-A-N-T-H

Folks in Tamil Nadu will take offense and there are a few crazies who will even get violent.

[Rakesh]

Yes, they are different no doubt. SSNs have a higher power requirement & are designed more for speed than stealth. If anything, SSBNs need to be stealthier

SSN loadouts are also varied.

But we could have started with the 83 MW reactor & the Arihant design and created a working SSN. Then iteratively build up from there.

Even assuming that the SSNs need a higher powered reactor, by current estimates, the 190 MW S5-class SSBNs will hit the waters several years (2027-ish) prior to the SSNs (2034-ish). This is just unacceptable!

The highlighted part in red will not work with the highlighted part in green. Just one (there are other factors) issue to handle is refueling intervals.

Unlike the S9G reactor aboard the Virginia Class (which does not require refueling for 33 years i.e. the life of the submarine), the 83 MW CLWR-B1 reactor - aboard the Arihant Class - requires refueling at regular intervals. Higher power requirements of a SSN will drain the fuel in the reactor quicker, than aboard the Arihant Class. Now refueling a HEU reactor is not like going to your local petrol station to put some fuel in your car. The process is far more complicated, but more importantly, highly time intensive.

More time spent at port (for refueling and other maintenance duties) means less time spent at sea. At the price these boats come in at, the greater the availability at sea...correspondingly more value you get out of the platform. Thus like any platform, they are only effective when they are out operating in their designed environment. Harbour Queen (borrowing the term Hangar Queen from the Air Force) serves no good to anyone.

There is plenty to criticize the armed forces over various procurement decisions. The reactor choice for the Project 75 Alpha SSN - the 190 MW CLWR-B2 reactor - is not one of them.

[Rakesh]

@ Prem Kumar: See this article below from 2018.

Deep diving into the facts about INS Arihant 'accident'
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ne ... 468708.cms
12 Jan 2018

Although the Arihant’s core is not designed to operate for the submarine’s lifetime and will need refuelling, it does not have a hatch. To refuel, the hull will have to be cut open and welded back, as is the case for the Russian nuclear attack submarine, the Akula-II Class that India has leased and operates as INS Chakra.

How many times do you want to cut open a SSN to refuel a 83 MW reactor?

The above quote mentions Akula II, which will have to undergo a similar procedure. But here is the kicker ---> the powerplant aboard the Akula II is the OK-650M HEU reactor, which has an output of 190 MW. India also leased an Akula boat and the reactor (CLWR-B2) output - of the planned P75A SSN - is 190 MW. The refueling times should mirror that of the OK-650M reactor.

More Powerful Reactor = Less Time Spent as a Harbour Queen = More Value Output From the Platform.

BTW, the upcoming S5 SSBN is supposed to have the same reactor as that of the P-75A SSN. So it appears that they are standardizing on one reactor design for the future. For a budget strapped Navy, this is great news.

We don't know how long between ROH (refueling and overhauls) of the 83 MW CLWR-B1 reactor and neither should we. But seeing this is our first attempt at designing and operating a naval nuclear reactor, see below for reference with the US Navy (the undisputed 'King' of naval, nuclear reactor design).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refueling_and_overhaul

An ROH usually takes one to two years for submarines and up to almost three years for an aircraft carrier, performed at a naval shipyard.

If it takes the US Navy around 1 - 2 years for a ROH on submarine, how long would it take India? Surely it will not be less.

[Pratyush]

Gentlemen, it's the % of enrichment of the reactor fuel that defines the fueling cycles of a submarine and not the absolute power output of the submarine. An 83 mw reactor with highly enriched fuel ( 20 to 30% ) will be sufficient for the full life of the submarine.

Whereas a 190 MW reactor with 5 to 7% enrichment will require refueling every 5 to 7 years. Depending upon the length of time spent on deployment.

Second, the argument about cutting up and re welding of the submarine in order to refuel the boat is a just an argument hiding a bad design decision. Because, if you can build a torpedo loading hatch. Along with multiple hatches for vertical lauch cruise and ballestic missiles. Then a nuclear fuel loading hatch is not impossible to implement.

You need to understand what are the other activities being carried out on the submarine during the refueling and complex overhaul of the submarine. In order to actually understand the reason why it takes that long to complete this excercise.

[Rakesh]

^^^

[Prem Kumar]

Thanks Rakesh for the link!

But like Pratyush mentioned, I don't see the connection between power output & refueling frequency. Secondly, like I mentioned, the same 190 MW based S5 class will hit the waters a good 6 - 7 years before the corresponding SSNs, per current estimates. While I agree that the reactor standardization is a welcome move, I fail to understand this large gap between the planned commissioning times of these 2 classes of subs (unless attributable to poor planning)

[Rakesh]

But like Pratyush mentioned, I don't see the connection between power output & refueling frequency. Secondly, like I mentioned, the same 190 MW based S5 class will hit the waters a good 6 - 7 years before the corresponding SSNs, per current estimates. While I agree that the reactor standardization is a welcome move, I fail to understand this large gap between the planned commissioning times of these 2 classes of subs (unless attributable to poor planning)

What Pratyush is saying is not grounded in reality. Like many of his posts, he is blithely passing off his assertions/opinions as facts.

He states, "...cutting up and re welding of the submarine in order to refuel the boat is a just an argument hiding a bad design decision." I don't know even know where to begin with this claim, but here goes...

Rolls Royce
PWR 1 reactor: Used 93% to 97% HEU. Powered the following SSBNs/SSNs in Royal Navy service ---> Valiant Class, Resolution Class, Churchill Class, Swiftsure Class and Trafalgar Class. When introduced in 1965, she was cutting edge for its time. The reactor needed refueling every 10 years, which required cutting open the hull. Refueling a boat makes it a bad design OR was it a limitation of the technological capability for its time?

PWR 2 reactor: Used 93% to 97% HEU, but removed the need for refueling as the reactor had a design life of 30 years. Introduced in the mid-1980s. So in two decades, Rolls Royce's nuclear reactor technology improved to the extent that refueling was eliminated. Powers the Astute Class SSN and the Vanguard Class SSBN. Despite the advancements in technology, there were safety concerns that were identified with the PWR-2 reactor. Now this can be identified as a bad design in terms of safety. Go here for more info ---> https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/ ... ctor-flaws

PWR 3 reactor: Improved version with design inputs from the SG9 reactor that powers the US Navy's Virginia Class submarines. To be fitted aboard the upcoming Dreadnought Class SSBN and the upcoming SSN-AUKUS program (for the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy).

General Electric / Westinghouse
In the US Navy, naval nuclear reactors have designations based on platform type. So US Navy nuclear powered aircraft carriers operate reactors that follow this nomenclature ---> A1W, A2W, A3W, A4W and A1B. Self explanatory, but A stands for...you guessed it...Aircraft Carrier! US Navy Cruisers that had nuclear reactors started with C (so C1W), US Navy Destroyers that had nuclear reactors started with D (so D1G, D2G) and US Navy subs that have nuclear reactors start with S (too many to list, as there were successive reactor designs starting from prior to USS Nautilus to date). Now since we are talking about submarines, will stick to nuclear reactors for submarines.

S9G reactor: I am going to start with the latest operational design (found aboard the Virginia Class). Has a run time of 33 years, before the need for refueling. Now keep that number of 33 years in mind and you let me know if this is a *BAD* design. Because the upcoming S1B nuclear reactor on the incoming Columbia Class SSBN, is designed to have a planned run time of 40 years, before it needs refueling. So since 40 > 33, does that make the S9G reactor a bad design? If these boats exceed their in-service life of 33 and 40 years respectively and you have to cut open the hull to refuel the reactor, does that make it a bad design? Tomorrow, technology could offer a nuclear reactor that will far exceed the hull life of a submarine. So will that automatically label all the previous reactor designs as bad? If you think through this logically as a rational person, you will realize how crazy that sounds.

S-series reactors prior to S9G: Right from the horse's mouth (the US Environmental Protection Agency). Link is provided below.
https://www.epa.gov/radtown/nuclear-sub ... t-carriers

Nuclear power allowed submarines to run for about twenty years without needing to refuel.

Los Angeles Class SSN had a reactor life of only 20 years, although other sources say 30+ years. But regardless of the number, if you want to refuel the reactor...you have to cut open the hull to refuel the SSN. So this is now a bad design?

OKBM Afrikantov
Powered virtually the entire then Soviet Navy (and now) Russian Navy nuclear powered submarines. Not much is available in the public domain about refueling intervals with Russian naval nuclear reactors. But we know about the Akula Class requiring a refueling, so the rest will have a similar procedure. I am not sure if the latest SSN (Yasen Class and the upcoming Laika Class) and SSBN (Borei Class and the upcoming Khabarovsk Class) boats have nuclear reactors that have a longer service between ROHs. But I would not discount that possibility.

I never realized that cutting open a hull, automatically translates to a bad design. Every country that operates nuclear powered submarines (that have HEU reactors) have to do this. Even the Kalvari Class SSK will require cutting open the boat - into two halves - to install DRDO's AIP plug. So this is also bad design? This is some amazing Lahori Logic!

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Secondly, prior to being given the assigned name INS Arihant....the vessel and the program was known for decades by its other name ---> Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV). The entire program was a technology demonstrator ---> from the 83 MW reactor onboard to the SLBM missiles to the VLS tubes and everything else in between. Despite being an ATV, she was put into active service (among other reasons) for the exorbitant R8D costs incurred. We are not the Rockefellers, to fund & develop a nuclear-powered, technology demonstrator submarine and then gleefully retire her, once all the technologies aboard have been validated.

But INS Arihant is the predecessor to all future Indian nuclear powered submarines. Every technology needs a starting point to validate certain concepts, but you don't continue to use that same technology for future platforms. Taking components off a technology demonstrator and expecting it to power a future SSN or SSBN is foolhardy. Each successive boat has an improvement over its predecessor. Even the Raksha Mantri has confirmed that INS Arighaat is more advanced than INS Arihant. We have already made improvements - limited by your imagination, as to what those improvements are - in the second vessel itself! The third, fourth and fifth vessels will be even better! See below...got the name wrong, but you get the idea...

https://world-nuclear.org/information-l ... ered-ships

The second and slightly larger Arihant-class SSBN, the INS Aridhaman, being built at the Ship Building Centre in Visakhapatnam, was launched in 2017 and is due to be commissioned by 2022. It will have a more powerful reactor.

83 MW not enough for the very next Arihant Class SSBN? Why?

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Thirdly, let us assume that the Indian Navy exists only to fleece the nation by buying expensive phoren toys!

Now the Royal Navy use the exact same reactor design - from Rolls Royce - to power their SSNs and SSBNs for the past 6+ decades? From PWR1 to PWR2 and the upcoming PWR3 reactor, it has been one design across multiple boats and even different classes of boats. Now before anyone jumps onto that point and states, "Well, that is what we are saying to do for India's SSN program!"

My response to that is find out what was the predecessor to the PW1 reactor. Surely Rolls Royce did not invent a nuclear reactor out of thin air! In the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement, the former handed over naval nuclear reactor technology to the latter with a bow tie attached around it. The father of Rolls Royce's PWR-1 nuclear reactor is the S5W nuclear reactor from the United States of America. Thus the UK had to invest nothing into R&D of a naval nuclear reactor. Rolls Royce took the US design and ran with it. But despite the money saved in R&D, the UK could not afford to do multiple reactor designs. They adopted the same reactor design, regardless of SSBN or SSN. But the design is a proven one and that is the point to understand.

Take a wild guess and tell me how many 83 MW CLWR-B1 reactors actually exist aboard a naval vessel as of today? And why will the P-75A Class SSN and the S5 Class SSBN use the exact same reactor design (190 MW CLWR-B2)? Because there are significant cost savings involved, with little to no technological disadvantages. The same cannot be said about the 83 MW reactor aboard the ATV (INS Arihant), despite whatever Pratyush claims.

Only the US uses different reactor designs aboard their submarines. They can afford to, because they *ARE* the Rockefellers.

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Fourthly, can you explain the following Madrassa math to me?

* We want a 6,000 ton with VLS cell, multi-mission SSN to run off a 83 MW nuclear reactor? And we want this vessel to do SSBN escort, CBG escort and be a hunter killer? Even the maulvis at the madrassa will tell you this is not possible. Please think about the cost being invested, the time spent in R&D, the missions it will undertake and the value output we will get out of the platform. Look at the *BIG* picture and not just at unit cost or what we perceive/assume as wasting time.

* The Suffren Class SSN from France is 5,300 tons submerged. She uses a 150 MW reactor. Read that again ---> 5,300 tons and 150 MW. Her predecessor - the Rubis Class SSN - used a 48 MW reactor and she was 2,600 tons submerged. Are the French crazy? Why not use a smaller reactor? Way cheaper to develop, design and even operate. What was the reason to jump from 48 MW to 150 MW, with only a ~50% increase in submerged displacement? What purpose - other than wasting money - is this going to serve France? Or is it really wasting money? Think about how much more capable the Suffren Class is versus the Rubis Class. Think about the MACRO view i.e. what does France actually want out of their new SSN? Now superimpose that very question onto the Indian Navy. Penny wise and pound foolish serves what point exactly?

* 6,000 tons with a 190 MW reactor. The P-75A will be a pocket rocket under the sea, albeit with significant sound deadening technologies, like pump jet propulsion, Potent and Powerful. Trust the Indian Navy on this one. You really can Saar.

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*Fifthly, waiting for someone (Pratyush, do the honours) to bring up the upcoming Álvaro Alberto of the Brazilian Navy. She is a Scorpene design at 6,000 tons with a 48 MW nuclear reactor You read that right - 48 MW, so waaaay less than 83 MW of INS Arihant

[Pratyush]

Rakesh, your biggest problem is that you try to confuse the issue. By introducing points that are valid for other nations. Instead of trying to develop an understanding of the position of Indian technical base and what is possible within that base.

Your entire thrust is based on an argument that 83 MW is insufficient to run an SSN. However, conveniently ignoring the fact that the USN had built nearly 100 perfectly serviceable SSNs and SSBNs. Powered by reactors producing not much more power than 83 MW.

Before they arrived at Los Angeles class and Ohio class.

The point is to make do with good enough capacity. Instead of waiting for perfection.

Now if you present the following argument. Its both coherent and logical.

India didn't have the ability to mass produce reactors to power both SSN and SSBNs at the same time. Due to budgetary and industrial reasons. So we focused on building SSBNs with available resources and developed the 190 MW reactors with the expectation that by the time this reactor is ready. We will have technical and economic resources to mass produce this plant for both SSN and SSBNs.

=========================================================

Rakesh, you wanted me to do the honours about Brazilian submarine being powered by a french derived 48 MW reactor.

Again you have conveniently missed the point.

The point is to make do with what's good enough with available technical and industrial resources. Instead of waiting for perfection and not having anything in hand for the immediate future.

This shows a determination to get the job done.

=========================================================

Rakesh, thirdly you are now going to bring to the discussion the need for the 6000 tons SSN to operate in the South China sea.

Within the first island chain, a submarine cannot be an underwater rocket.

Why?

Because when a body moves through the water, it generates a displacement wave. The magnitude of the wave is a function of the speed of the object. In waters of the continental shelf, this displacement wave will generate a seismic event on the sea floor. Giving a data point to be plotted and tracked for people who know what they're looking for. Localisation will then be done by airborne ASW assets killing your 6000 ton 190 MW undersea rocket. Those waters need something that is small and slow. Not big and fast to be effective.

Also, this pesky displacement wave will be visible on the surface as well. Because of shallowness of the seas.

I have omitted something very basic to submarines in this post. If you can figure out what that is. I will tell you why I have done so.

[Rakesh]

@ Pratyush: Please do not do multiple posts. A single post is fine. Your three posts have been merged into one.

Before I get into any of the other points you have mentioned in the post above....can you explain the following three;

Your entire thrust is based on an argument that 83 MW is insufficient to run an SSN. However, conveniently ignoring the fact that the USN had built nearly 100 perfectly serviceable SSNs and SSBNs. Powered by reactors producing not much more power than 83 MW.

Since the USN built nearly 100 perfectly serviceable SSNs and SSBNs with reactors not producing more than 83 MW, then why would the following SSNs and SSBNs in the US Navy service have the following reactors;

* Los Angeles Class SSN: 62 boats built with the S6G nuclear reactor producing 150–165 MW.
* Seawolf Class SSN: 3 built with the S6W nuclear reactor producing 220 MW.
* Virginia Class SSN: 66 planned, 24 completed and with the S9G reactor producing 210 MW.

* Ohio Class SSBN: 18 built with the S8G reactor producing 220 MWt.

If a double digit reactor output is "perfectly serviceable", then what was the need for the US to develop a reactor output in triple digits? Why does the UK, France and Russia all operate modern SSNs and SSBNs with a reactor that has an output in triple digits? What is this gem of knowledge - that only you have - that all the world's brightest engineering minds have failed to see? Someone should nominate you for the Nobel Prize in Physics!

The point is to make do with good enough capacity. Instead of waiting for perfection.

If a nuclear reactor - that has a double digit output - is good enough, why waste horrendous sums of money to develop a whole new reactor that has an output in triple digits? Moving from double digits to triple digits is now seeking perfection?

A 190 MW nuclear reactor is just the reality of what is required for the upcoming P-75A SSN and the S5 SSBN. Modern SSNs are multi mission boats, they are not your vanilla hunter killer boats of the past. It does not matter how much you try to spin this into your reality, it is not true.

“You are entitled to your opinion. But you are not entitled to your own facts.”
― Daniel Patrick Moynihan

India didn't have the ability to mass produce reactors to power both SSN and SSBNs at the same time. Due to budgetary and industrial reasons. So we focused on building SSBNs with available resources and developed the 190 MW reactors with the expectation that by the time this reactor is ready. We will have technical and economic resources to mass produce this plant for both SSN and SSBNs.

The ATV program was designed to develop a naval nuclear reactor for a submarine. Out of the nuclear triad, the missing piece in the puzzle was a sea based deterrent. Thus the SSBN was developed first and this gave birth to what we now know today as INS Arihant.

India is not going to mass produce naval nuclear reactors. This is a nuclear reactor we are talking about and not growing chickpeas on a farm. India will produce nuclear reactors for the number of platforms (surface or sub-surface vessels) that they have planned for. A single naval nuclear reactor runs into hundreds of millions of dollars (if not more) and has a long lead time.

We have not developed any 190 MW reactor to date. That is still in the planning stage. This is a classic example of how you pass off your opinions as facts. And we are not mass producing no 190 MW nuclear reactor. As per the current plans, the total production run of the CLWR-B2 will run into the low teens ---> six SSNs, three SSBNs and perhaps a couple more. This is not mass production. Please stop using that term.

The lessons learnt from developing the CLWR-B1 reactor (83 MW output) will form the basis of the CLWR-B2 reactor (190 MW output). This is how it has worked the world over. The short term goal is to continue the production of the Arihant Class SSBN and when the SSN design is finalized, then start the production. The officers that work at the Naval Design Bureau are not playing pocket pool, they know far more than you and me. Designing and developing a SSN, takes a length of time and in the political environment that exists in India, it will take even longer. Venting frustration at what you perceive is the Navy's quest for perfection is completely unfounded.

What is a planned six vessel SSN program, has been curtailed to 2 (for now) due to budgetary restrictions. And we have one production line at Vizag that makes nuclear powered submarines. ONE! And you want to mass produce naval nuclear reactors

[ShauryaT]

Take a wild guess and tell me how many 83 MW CLWR-B1 reactors actually exist aboard a naval vessel as of today? And why will the P-75A Class SSN and the S5 Class SSBN use the exact same reactor design (190 MW CLWR-B2)? Because there are significant cost savings involved, with little to no technological disadvantages. The same cannot be said about the 83 MW reactor aboard the ATV (INS Arihant), despite whatever Pratyush claims.

We should take this further and design the next aircraft carrier around a set of 4 CLWR-B2 and embark on a journey of EMALS and Laser weapons.

[ShauryaT]

@pratyush: Your make do approach is fine, until it survives what the enemy can throw at us. The 095 will make mince meat of a slow moving whale. Only sharks have a chance. The idea of a slow SSN as "better" for ventures into the SCS is not supported by ANY credible Indian military planner. Think about what are you proposing to go into the enemy's den with. Our hunter/killers need to be faster and quieter to have a chance. A fast moving sub at least has the option of an active sonar, but if one does not have speed you dare not play that game. I am personally worried about defending against a PLAN flotilla in the IOR with their sharks and India struggling to defend itself and her interests. We literally have no time and this issue is important enough that I will even support an AUKUS style deal, if available. (Not thrilled at that option, just think it is important enough to not be throttled by PLAN and its assets in our region). The ATV program made its inception in the 70's and the IN had an SSN in mind, until triad needs took precedence. There is another dark secret in all of this and it is BARC attempts to build its own compact submersible reactor has not succeeded leading to Russian "assistance". Be that as it may, our security interests comes first however we get there and if we do not have the assets to climb the escalation ladder then it is game over, even before it begins.

[Rakesh]

We should take this further and design the next aircraft carrier around a set of 4 CLWR-B2 and embark on a journey of EMALS and Laser weapons.

Indeed. See this Saar....

https://www.quora.com/Is-there-a-signif ... s-carriers

Below is from JS Squidley, former Senior Chief Petty Officer BMCS (SW/AW)(E-8) at United States Navy (USN) (1995–2021)

Submarine and Aircraft Carrier reactors are basically the same when it comes to the US Navy. Both are Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR). Both operate in a system that generates steam by heating water. Both operate in a system that sends some steam to turbines to generate electricity and some to turbines that turn propellers. The difference is size and output basically.

Nimitz and Ford differ greatly in how their reactor output is utilized. The Ford uses no ‘Service Steam’. Service Steam took up a considerable amount of output from the Nimitz system, in order to power steam catapults and some other things. Ford is all electric once the steam gets to the turbines.



The S9G reactor on the Virginia-class and the 2 A1B reactors on the Ford-class are basically the same concept. The Ford has 2 much larger reactors than the Virginia’s 1 and the output is much higher. Both utilize different systems than their predecessors, the A4W (Nimitz) and the S6W but, the reactors themselves are very similar.

The upcoming Columbia-class SSBNs will take it a step further system wise. Instead of diverting steam to 2 separate systems, Columbia will send all its steam to electrical generation. Then they will use the electricity to drive electric motors that will turn the the propulsor. But still the reactor will be a PWR type and very similar to the A1B, A4W, S9G and S6W.

The Columbia Class is going to be one wild SSBN

[Pratyush]

Rakesh,

Like you quoted about the opinions and reality and posts.

Your entire 1000 word contention is just that. Your opinion intruding into the reality of what's was technically possible for India in 2010s.

But I must thank you for inadvertently agreeing with me. By writing what you have written in your last paragraph. Even if, you have not understood exactly what you have done.

Well done.

[Pratyush]

Shaurya,

You post is about two seperate areas of operations. With seperate constraints and freedoms for any submarine.

A submarine is an asset operating in 3 dimensions. In order for it to be effective. It needs to be stealthy.

People tend to think that sound propagation from the machinery and propellers are the only methods of detecting a submarine. It's not.

In shallow waters, a fast moving submarine will be also be detected by the displacement waves it's movement generates and the interaction of those waves with both with the sea floor and the surface of the sea.

In order to understand this specific point you need to look at the continental shelf between the first island chain.

1) It not deep enough for your SSN to operate at full speed and not have it's displacement wave interact with sea floor and sea surface.

2) With PRC having built man made islands, they now have the ability to put a network of sensors on the sea floor looking for exactly the low level sisemic event the displacement wave of a fast moving object will generate. It might take a few Petaflops of computing capacity to analyse the data and figure out which is which, SSN or a merchant man.

3) during peace time, with the waters full of thundering merchant ships. It's not a problem. But with the first shot fired, the merchant men will all clear out. Leaving you with and asset. Who's size and speed has now become a liability.

Today the PRC might not have the sensor network. But by the 2040s it is possible.

Second operational area for the SSN is the IOR. Because the Indian Navy is operating a defined geographical area. With a fair amount of warning time available for deployment of submarines. It makes little difference about which boat is operating( SSK or SSN). Or even if no boats are operating. Because in a majority of the situations, IN surface forces or even land based long range Anti ship and anti submarine assets are going to be sufficient in order to do the job.

[Rakesh]

Within the first island chain, a submarine cannot be an underwater rocket.

Why?

Because when a body moves through the water, it generates a displacement wave. The magnitude of the wave is a function of the speed of the object. In waters of the continental shelf, this displacement wave will generate a seismic event on the sea floor. Giving a data point to be plotted and tracked for people who know what they're looking for. Localisation will then be done by airborne ASW assets killing your 6000 ton 190 MW undersea rocket. Those waters need something that is small and slow. Not big and fast to be effective.

Also, this pesky displacement wave will be visible on the surface as well. Because of shallowness of the seas.

When the first Seawolf Class boat was commissioned in 1997, she was known as the Ferrari of the Seas for her high speed while submerged. But what is really extraordinary about this submarine is that she can achieve that high speed, but still maintain her stealth (staying quiet). Good luck trying to find a Seawolf Class, based on your post above. They are designed to operate at high speed and remain invisible. This is one of the reasons why they have a powerful reactor (S6W producing 220 MW).

There is only one other boat - that I know of - that exceeded the Seawolf Class (in speed) and that was the Soviet Alfa Class. She had speed and maneuverability, but not the quietness. She relied on her speed and maneuverability to outrun any torpedo of her time.

In addition to Shaurya's reply to you, also see this. The accident below occurred because of sheer negligence on the part of the boat's leadership and thus they got relieved from command. The incident occurred not because of what you have indicated above, but rather set procedures were not followed. SSNs are primarily designed for high speed, but that speed is judiciously managed and SOPs followed...depending on where the boat is operating.

Attack Submarine USS Connecticut Suffers Underwater Collision in South China Sea
https://news.usni.org/2021/10/07/breaki ... in-pacific
07 Oct 2021

Almost a dozen sailors have been injured after a U.S. nuclear attack submarine hit an unknown underwater object in the South China Sea, USNI News has learned.
...
The last known instance where a submerged U.S. submarine struck another underwater object was in 2005. Then, USS San Franciso (SSN -711) struck an underwater mountain at full speed near Guam. One sailor died in the incident.

USS Connecticut CO, XO, COB Relieved Over Collision in South China Sea ‘Due to Loss of Confidence’
https://news.usni.org/2021/11/04/uss-co ... confidence
04 Nov 2021

Vice Adm. Karl Thomas, Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, relieved Cmdr. Cameron Aljilani as commanding officer, Lt. Cmdr. Patrick Cashin as Executive Officer, and Master Chief Sonar Technician Cory Rodgers as Chief of the Boat, of Seawolf-class fast-attack submarine USS Connecticut (SSN 22), on Nov. 04, 2021, due to loss of confidence. Thomas determined sound judgement, prudent decision-making and adherence to required procedures in navigation planning, watch team execution and risk management could have prevented the incident.

[Rakesh]

Rakesh,

Like you quoted about the opinions and reality and posts.

Your entire 1000 word contention is just that. Your opinion intruding into the reality of what's was technically possible for India in 2010s

But I must thank you for inadvertently agreeing with me. By writing what you have written in your last paragraph. Even if, you have not understood exactly what you have done.

Well done.

The depth of the South China Sea is 5,559 metres (18,238 feet). Good luck trying to find a boat that operates in the South China Sea.

Your hubris and ego are a dangerous combination. Forget the past, you are not even aware of what India is technically possible of doing now.

[Pratyush]

Wow, as is your style, you are absolutely selective in considering the point being made. And then introduce something to counter the point that is totally irrelevant to the larger point being made.

Such as Seawolf and that it could not be be detected using what was state of the art 30 years ago. When I am referring to detection capabilities that are going to be within PRC s technical and economic capacity in 2040s.

Then you take an implicit leap of logic. That a future Indian SSN will have the same capacity as the potential USN Seawolf replacement. That too without any of learnings that only come from constant operations in different operating environments.

If seeing through your tactics and not falling for your diversionary actions is an example of my hubris. Then I am happy with it.

Secondly, WRT, my learning or lack thereof, I have spent the last 35 years of my life reading through most defence trade publications. Going through published thesis of different services professionals published by respective staff collages where available and reputed sources, such as;

1) Federation of Americas scientists.
2) Global security
3) Bulletin of Atomic scientists.
4) De classified reports from different nations parliamentary standing committees.
5) Scientific and academic papers dealing with the subject matter, where freely available.
6) Think tanks reports from different nations. etc, etc ..

My problem is that I don't have the time needed to put everything I have learnt on any topic on the page.

So your are welcome to hold your opinion. I know my reality.

[ShauryaT]

@Pratyush: Good you read but so do others. Let me put it to you, post a credible militarized or to be solution for non-acoustic detection of submersibles in realistic sea states, depths and assets used to do so and you will have an argument. Even if it were to be so, slow cannot be the answer!

[uddu]

1) Federation of Americas scientists.
2) Global security
3) Bulletin of Atomic scientists.
4) De classified reports from different nations parliamentary standing committees.
5) Scientific and academic papers dealing with the subject matter, where freely available.
6) Think tanks reports from different nations. etc, etc ..

These agencies and people are called Nuclear Ayatollah's in BR parlance. At some point in history, they used to run propaganda against our missile, space and nuclear programs. Including stories of ISROs PSLV rockets being used for carrying nuclear weapons and vouching for sanctioning India.

[Prem Kumar]

Coming back to one of my original points, Rakesh (great posts from you, btw):

If the S5 class & SSN are standardizing on the same 190 MW reactor, why is the latter's commissioning date (by present estimates) a good 6-7 years after the former?

I still suspect that there has been navel-gazing (pun intended) with regards to SSNs, just like with SSKs. The SSBNs got a lot of PMO level attention because of deterrent value. But the SSNs, not so much. Hence, the can-do attitude, urgency & oversight seems to be missing

Regarding SSNs using 83 MW, the point of doing that would be a tech-demonstrator with limited deployment & range of operations. Do & learn. Shadow a carrier group, fine-tune SOPs, play red-vs-blue teams etc. Even create follow-on boats like how we are doing with Arighat, Aridhaman etc. Lower power - yes, restricted to IOR - yes, smaller missile loadout - yes. No different than the first couple of Arigant boats having only paltry SLBM loadouts. But so many other techs like Nirbhay launch, VL-Brahmos etc could have been tried out.

If they had done that, I am pretty sure, we'd be well on our way to launch both the S5 & SSNs at the same time

The only *valid* reason for not doing so might be budgets, in which case its shame on MoD & the Nat-Sec establishment

[JTull]

Short summary from conversations with paanwalas over the last (nearly) 5 decades of ATV programme.

Reactor size is dependent on power requirements.
...Peak power output is not just a headline number, but a function how frequently it's needed, how consistently and with what intensity.
......This power function will determine size of cooling systems, safety system, thermal to electrical conversions systems, transmission systems and other electrical and mechanical equipment.
.........Then you iterate this with different fuel enrichments.

First thing administrators of such a programme will evaluate is enrichment capability (volume/capacity and cascade layers). Then they will evaluate known reserves in the ground and how much can be diverted to this programme. Our guys quickly found out that we severely lacked in both. That is the single biggest reason why first reactor was 'small'. It simplified the size of systems around the reactor too.

First lease helped us understand the power curve and how all the systems should work together, especially on a SSN. Arihant is a hybrid having BM capabilities essentially in a SSN core. It is everything a tech demonstrator should be. And it will always be used for such experimentation.

Only once MMS signed 'that' agreement, we designated which civilian reactors were to be under safeguards and which won't be. This allowed us to enter purchase agreements, and to start stockpiling large quantities of natural uranium for safeguarded reactors, with Kazaks, Aussies being key sources (initially).

Believe me when I say this, only once the civilian stockpile started growing, we were able to divert our own reserves to Arihant program. Arihant couldn't have come without it.

Without discovering new reserves, we'll never have as many SSBNs and SSNs as jingos want. And we aren't at the forefront of enrichment technology either. Improving this tech as well as capacity attracts lot of unwanted attention. Let us not delve too much into it.

Over next few years you'll observe that we're making every effort to get to those ultra-quiet 13k displacement subs asap with fewest possible numbers and with each iteration having significant improvements. Also, that's key reason why we started investing in MIRV tech. We'll continue to have a bastion approach of few lethal SSBNs. If you consider the number of diesel-electric subs IN is planning, there's just no need for too many SSNs to protect the bastion.

[Rakesh]

If the S5 class & SSN are standardizing on the same 190 MW reactor, why is the latter's commissioning date (by present estimates) a good 6-7 years after the former?

Great question. Go to the very top of this thread and check out the second post from the top.

You will see a news article that states that the proposal for two P-75A SSNs are before the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security). There is no mention anywhere in that article about a build schedule with regards to the S5 Class SSBN. It just states that there is a plan to "eventually" build the S5 Class. And you know - in India's political environment - what "eventually" actually means

The takeaway and the build schedule is therefore this;

1) Arihant Class SSBN: Will complete her build program FIRST, because that is where the greatest need is. An assured second-strike capability is vital for our military planners and one cannot really disagree with that line of thinking. We know of four Arihant Class SSBNs (S1 - Arihant; S2 - Arighaat, S3 - Aridhaman, S4 - Name Unknown), but there are rumours of a fifth vessel reportedly to keep the line active till the P-75A is ready.

S3 is now confirmed to be commissioned within the next 6 months and that is great news. And the reason why this is great news, is because when you look at the time spent between inductions, you will realize that the commissioning time (6 months) between INS Arighaat and INS Aridhaman is significantly smaller, than the commissioning time (8 years!) between INS Arihant and INS Arighaat. What this means is that confidence and (equally important) the knowledge base has grown to a point, where India is able to induct nuclear powered vessels at a much quicker pace. And this is very important for the construction of the P-75A SSN.

2) Project 75A SSN: Will start right after the Arihant Class SSBN program is complete. The CLWR-B2 reactor is presently under development and the rumours of a fifth Arihant Class vessel is likely for the development of this reactor to be complete, among other factors. But the fact that the proposal to build two such vessels is before the CCS, suggests that the P-75A development is on track. Where the issue lies is funding and more importantly, the shipyard. India has just one shipyard (at Vizag) to build nuclear powered vessels. Our other shipyard (MDL) that builds submarines has zero experience in the field.

The only two countries that I know of that has more than one shipyard - to build nuclear powered vessels - are;

USA ---> One shipyard is the General Dynamics' Electric Boat Division of Groton, CT and Quonset Point, RI. The other shipyard is Huntington Ingalls Industries' Newport News Shipbuilding, of Newport News, VA. Even the US - with all her economic prowess - has only two such yards. And these yards build not just submarines, but even surface vessels i.e. nuclear powered aircraft carriers.

France ---> One shipyard is the Brest naval shipyard in Brittany and the other shipyard is in Cherbourg. Both locations have built nuclear powered submarines and nuclear powered aircraft carriers.

There is no confirmed date of when the first S5 Class SSBN is supposed to enter service. If you have a source, I would be really interested in looking at it. I am not sure who started this rumour (that S5 is coming before P-75A), but AFAIK that is not true.

I still suspect that there has been navel-gazing (pun intended) with regards to SSNs, just like with SSKs. The SSBNs got a lot of PMO level attention because of deterrent value. But the SSNs, not so much. Hence, the can-do attitude, urgency & oversight seems to be missing.

SSBN vs SSN is not an attitude, urgency or oversight issue...it boils down to priorities. There is no value in prioritizing SSNs over SSBNs. The concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) will only work if both sides operate on an even playing field. It is always going to be that way, for as long as nuclear weapons exist on this planet. The SSBN will always win the day over the SSN. If you or me were part of the PMO, we too would make the exact same decision.

Do you remember when INS Chakra-II was inducted into the Indian Navy on 04 April 2012? Below is what the commissioning CO - Captain P Asokan - of INS Chakra-II said on that day...

INS Chakra inducted into Navy's eastern fleet
“I commanded a conventional submarine before this and we were restricted by battery power. But now, I have no restrictions. I can chase a vessel anywhere, overtake her, play games with her, and the nuclear plant never runs out of power.”

The part in red is the beauty of a modern SSN and this is why countries that build nuclear powered, multi-mission submarines need the kind of reactor output, to get the desired performance that they need to successfully execute the missions they are required to complete. Ask Captain Asokan if he could get the same level of performance from the CLWR-B1 reactor and see if he gives the same answer as above.

Regarding SSNs using 83 MW, the point of doing that would be a tech-demonstrator with limited deployment & range of operations. Do & learn. Shadow a carrier group, fine-tune SOPs, play red-vs-blue teams etc. Even create follow-on boats like how we are doing with Arighat, Aridhaman etc. Lower power - yes, restricted to IOR - yes, smaller missile loadout - yes. No different than the first couple of Arigant boats having only paltry SLBM loadouts. But so many other techs like Nirbhay launch, VL-Brahmos etc could have been tried out.

With the exception of the Nirbhay and BrahMos, the rest has already been validated and proven

* Fine Tune SOPs - DONE
* Shadow a carrier group - DONE
* Play red-vs-blue teams - DONE

That was the whole point of leasing INS Chakra-II. It is from this *VERY* experience of nearly 10 years, that the modern P-75A SSN program was born. And it is from this *SAME* experience that India wanted to lease a follow-on Akula boat which got stymied due to the war in Ukraine. In fact, the reactor output of the CLWR-B2 is identical to the reactor output of INS Chakra-II. They need this kind of power output, to successfully navigate through the scenarios that Captain Asokan is talking about above.

If they had done that, I am pretty sure, we'd be well on our way to launch both the S5 & SSNs at the same time.

As explained in the build schedule above, that is not true.

The only *valid* reason for not doing so might be budgets, in which case its shame on MoD & the Nat-Sec establishment.

The money pot is finite. Always has been and always will be.

The frustration - with the nuclear powered submarine program - lies not with the Navy, but with our political class' penchant for penny pinching. There are many areas where frustration can be vented on the Navy (i.e. super carrier program), but certainly not the P-75A SSN program.

[Rakesh]

Secondly, WRT, my learning or lack thereof, I have spent the last 35 years of my life reading through most defence trade publications. Going through published thesis of different services professionals published by respective staff collages where available and reputed sources, such as;

1) Federation of Americas scientists.
2) Global security
3) Bulletin of Atomic scientists.
4) De classified reports from different nations parliamentary standing committees.
5) Scientific and academic papers dealing with the subject matter, where freely available.
6) Think tanks reports from different nations. etc, etc ..

My problem is that I don't have the time needed to put everything I have learnt on any topic on the page.

No...your problem is that you are not just dumb, but that you are arrogantly dumb. Thank goodness you are not in the service, because not only will you die...but you will needlessly send everyone else under your command to their death. You are the rebirth of Captain Herbet Sobel, Easy Company, 2nd Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, US Army during World War II. Arrogant and Ignorant.

Only someone with your level of arrogance will shamelessly list all the publications that they read, to flaunt their level of knowledge. A humble and wise person will never do the above. The team that is part of India's nuclear submarine program are the best and brightest that the country has to offer. They have at least a Master's Degree (if not a PhD) in Nuclear Physics, Mechanical Engineering, etc. Many of them have decades of submarine operations and have know how / know why far beyond what you read in these two-bit publications you have listed above. You read some papers somewhere and you now know more than them? For you to say that they are looking for perfection - by not adopting the 83 MW reactor - onto a SSN, illustrates your utter cluelessness and even worse, your unchecked arrogance on the issue.

I don't see the point as to why you need to continue in this thread or in this forum. You are doing a disservice to everyone on this forum by your ignorance. You have earned a one month ban. Spend the next 30 days of your life, learning humility. It will serve you well. Go cool off. Goodbye.

[ShauryaT]

Believe me when I say this, only once the civilian stockpile started growing, we were able to divert our own reserves to Arihant program. Arihant couldn't have come without it.

Interesting JTull. Amongst other points you list as causes thereof, there was and is (less now) a disparity in power structures between civilian and military hierarchies with a say on nuclear resources available. The AEC director reports to the PM, without oversight of a ministry while the IN chief had to plead for ATV type of technological development within a budgetary and bureaucratic process with competing priorities. Unless there is a powerful RM and/or NSA to compel action, these type of projects simply do not get the attention of political masters and are mired forever with low budgets. One can trace this investment and prioritization issue for many crucial technologies. But I do feel, if our military and security planners had a better say on how AEC prioritized their competing priorities, things could been different?

PS: I am and have been a proponent of AEC coming under a ministry to drive accountability. While the direct PM access had its uses during formative years, it is time to change this setup and maybe the department of military affairs under the CDS to have oversight of the military parts of nuclear affairs.

[SRajesh]

^^Saar thats a 1954 Banditji act (reporting to PM)
Though digressing from the topic imagine the howling at the 'Moon' by all and sundry if you try to change!!

[JTull]

Believe me when I say this, only once the civilian stockpile started growing, we were able to divert our own reserves to Arihant program. Arihant couldn't have come without it.

Interesting JTull. Amongst other points you list as causes thereof, there was and is (less now) a disparity in power structures between civilian and military hierarchies with a say on nuclear resources available. The AEC director reports to the PM, without oversight of a ministry while the IN chief had to plead for ATV type of technological development within a budgetary and bureaucratic process with competing priorities. Unless there is a powerful RM and/or NSA to compel action, these type of projects simply do not get the attention of political masters and are mired forever with low budgets. One can trace this investment and prioritization issue for many crucial technologies. But I do feel, if our military and security planners had a better say on how AEC prioritized their competing priorities, things could been different?

PS: I am and have been a proponent of AEC coming under a ministry to drive accountability. While the direct PM access had its uses during formative years, it is time to change this setup and maybe the department of military affairs under the CDS to have oversight of the military parts of nuclear affairs.

At DAE, when ATV was conceptualised in mid-70's , it was as a miniaturised reactor project, i.e., a technology project. We just didn't have the engineering design and capabilities for a submarine project. It wasn't about prioritisation at DAE. They had a dedicated team, which would have grown if there was progress in other spheres. For example, IN never had a desi project for even diesel electric subs with decent displacement around 2-3000 tonnes. In fact we didn't even build a desi midget sub. Modi and his team are driving this. It will take another decade for real progress in numbers.

[ShauryaT]

At DAE, when ATV was conceptualised in mid-70's , it was as a miniaturised reactor project, i.e., a technology project. We just didn't have the engineering design and capabilities for a submarine project. It wasn't about prioritisation at DAE. They had a dedicated team, which would have grown if there was progress in other spheres. For example, IN never had a desi project for even diesel electric subs with decent displacement around 2-3000 tonnes. In fact we didn't even build a desi midget sub. Modi and his team are driving this. It will take another decade for real progress in numbers.

I am sure you are aware of the history of this project and from my limited understanding both BARC and IN had fledgling teams that went back and forth. So the IN did have some skills as documented by Subbarao and Raja Menon in their works.

His life started taking a new twist when, in June 1976, he was called in as second-in-command for a team of Naval officers and scientists working at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) at Trombay. The team was developing a nuclear submarine propulsion plant. Subbarao did not know at this point of time what BARC had in store for him or that his professionalism and commitment would bring him into stark conflict with the BARC hierarchy.

The BARC scientists had been working on the first design of a nuclear submarine propulsion plant since 1971. On the basis of Subbarao's technical findings, this design had to be dropped in 1976. The second design was also dropped in January 1978 after Subbarao showed that it was not viable for naval application. The BARC authorities were predictably peeved at Subbarao picking holes in their work and at their next go, decided to bypass the Naval team.

The third design was directly submitted by the BARC in March\April 1980 to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Not only this, but the scientists also wanted Rs. 150 crore to build a prototype of their third design. Indira Gandhi, however, directed the defence minister (R.Venkataraman, later President of India) to seek technical opinion from Subbarao.

Subbarao's report rejected BARC's third design. He specified that the design failed to meet the basic standards, such as safety, followed by the nuclear navies of the USA, Russia, Britain, France and China. Consequently, Indira Gandhi returned BARC'S proposal. However, she also said that she would reconsider her decision if the BARC scientists could disprove Subbarao's claim.

The BARC started work on the fourth design towards the end of 1980. Meanwhile, the Indian Navy instructed Subbarao to develop a design of his own. Subbarao'sdesign was ready by November 1982 and submitted to the Prime Minister's office.

Indira Gandhi asked the BARC scientists to examine the possibility of building a prototype based on Subbarao's nuclear submarine design. Dr Raja Ramanna, the BARC director (also scientific advisor to the defence minister) declined to consider Subbarao's design under a lame pretext that the work of a naval officer could not be pursued at BARC.

In fact, the BARC establishment was tired of Subbarao showing them up. Following the incident, Dr Ramanna allegedly exerted superior pressure upon the Naval authorities to withdraw Subbarao from the nuclear submarine project. He was called back into active naval service.

However, Subbarao pursued the special interests he had acquired through academics and wrote a doctorate thesis. In 1985, Subbarao was awarded a Ph.D by the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay for his thesis "Nuclear Power Plant Modelling and Design Multivariable Control Approach".

the Story of Dr B.K. Subbarao

I have no interest in pulling anyone down but the limited point of a structural approach to power discrepancy issues will go a long way to address prioritization of limited resource.

[Karan M]

That Manushi story needs to be taken with a heap of salt, incompetent BARC etc. The fact is a Khan ambassador was on record stating they'd convinced a rtd IN officer to come to the US to present ie leak his PhD which was based on the propulsion of the Charlie class. RAW got wind of it and he was detained at the airport. Which makes one wonder as to how long the cooperation existed prior.

[ShauryaT]

The ultimate fact is the man was acquitted and the Navy never gave up on him. The law and institutional green light should be enough to make his words stand on its own merit without disparaging his character, regardless of what a supposed foreign agent may have alluded to. People who are interested in the topic, attached is a short rundown of the history in open source and an excellent book by Adm. Raja Menon, which is a must read.

https://southasianvoices.org/indias-nuclear-submarine/

I will end this discourse here.

[Karan M]

The acquittal happened in part because reports at the time were clear classified information was not made public. For instance the Soviets at the time would hardly be overjoyed that an IN official had made a study of their sub leased to India & those details were on the way to the US.

However, when an ambassador to India openly states that an effort was carried out, was "almost" successful then it is worth being considered carefully.

[Karan M]

https://indianmavericks.blogspot.com/20 ... e.html?m=1

From the notes of Amb. John Dean - US Amb. to India at the time.

In 1987. the Indian Navy had leased a Soviet nuclear submarine. The purpose of the lease was to train the Indian navy in the use of such a technically advanced naval vessel. The reactor unit was sealed and the spent fuel was to be returned to the Soviet Union. Mr. Gandhi had assured President Reagan that "this specific submarine on lease from the Soviet Union would not be used in any manner in the event of any hostilities." Prime Minister Gandhi had assured President Reagan in writing that there was "no ground for any apprehension"

Naturally, our navy wanted to know more about the submarine leased from the Soviet Union to India, and this led to a covert operation to obtain detailed plans and drawings of this vessel. The incident occurred when an Indian Navy Captain was arrested at Bombay International Airport before boarding a flight for the United States in possession of detailed technical data on the Soviet nuclear submarine. Apparently, Indian Intelligence had tracked the Indian naval officer - or was he a double agent - and, in any case, I was asked to meet with the Prime Minister who confronted me with the facts. I did my best to smooth ruffled feathers, and fortunately Mr. Gandhi was sufficiently experienced in international relations to know that information on the Soviet vessel was a legitimate target for our Intelligence agencies. I urged that the apprehension of the Indian officer before leaving India with the drawings should not adversely impact on over-all U.S.-Indian relations. At the same time, I protected vis-a-vis Washington the American official who had been in charge of this case at the Embassy. He left the post quite rapidly, but has enjoyed an interesting career after his service in India.

Whether he was "in" on it or simply indiscreet and overenthusiastic is up for debate. What is known however was that he was stopped.

[Karan M]

This is not the only time we were targeted up as a conduit for Soviet tech by the west. A Khan op also went after the T-72s assembled at Avadi.