@MinhazMerchant·Aug 11
Carving up of #Africa into colonies by European leaders at the infamous 1884 Berlin conference was the second atrocity on Africa by Europe after the 300-year-long transatlantic slave trade from Africa to North & South America.
Principal culprits: Britain, France, Spain & Portugal
This is the reason the Europeans are despised, they just view Africa as a big hole that provides them with "things"Cyrano wrote: ↑06 Sep 2023 19:05 Niger has declared the French ambassador PNG and asked him to leave in 48hrs. As per Vienna convention they have every right to do so. Macron comically refused to get him out saying he doesn't recognise the new regime and put the amb and his staff in danger, coz once declared as PNG he doesn't enjoy any diplomatic immunity or security from the host country.
Now Niger has increased price of uranium ore from 0.8 € to 200 € per kg.
Macron is fuming and wants ECOWAS to wage a war, while trying to pull out his own solders - there are at least several thousand stationed in Niger.
https://spectacle.com.ng/2023/09/03/nig ... o-e200-kg/
I hope someone talks some sense to him when he lands in India for G20.
In an attempt to counter this influence, the US is injecting millions into the Lobito Corridor project. Indeed, sourcing the metals to fuel the energy transition remains a headache for Western countries. The commodity trade consortium Trafigura asserts that the Lobito Atlantic Railway will “provide a quicker western route to market for metal and minerals produced in the Democratic Republic of Congo.” The project entails the construction of approximately 550 km of rail line in Zambia, from the Jimbe border to Chingola in the Zambian copper belt, along with 260 km of feeder roads within the corridor. Moving those valuable resources from the Central African copper belt to Western markets is key for the US and Europe, particularly as the energy transition unfolds.
Earlier this year, President Joe Biden’s administration unveiled plans to invest in a new railway project that will link the copper-rich regions of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the Angolan port of Lobito. With the 120-year-old Benguela railway, the US plans for the resources to go west (through the Lobito Corridor) rather than the traditional eastern route via the Dar El Salaam port. The railway hopes to connect to the port in Lobito, ensuring smooth traffic flow and establishing a significant trade route from the Congolese copper belt to the Atlantic Ocean. Additionally, the improved railway line will facilitate the transportation of essential goods and resources into the region, fostering business development and commercial activities. In September, on the margins of the G20 in India, the US and the EU teamed up to launch feasibility studies for a new greenfield rail line expansion between Zambia and Angola.
Global and regional organizations are also chipping in the project, as the push to secure the minerals key to the green transition grows. In October, the African Development Bank (AfDB) joined global partners to raise financing for the $16 billion Multinational Lobito Transportation Corridor Programme. The AfDB’s involvement underscores the importance of collaboration in securing funding for large-scale infrastructure projects that can drive economic development and regional integration in Africa. The World Bank also got involved through a $300 million “Accelerating Economic Diversification and Job Creation Project” which will directly link to the Lobito Corridor. Notably, the organization hadn’t financed an infrastructure project in Africa since 2002.
A year ago, Tigrayan and Ethiopian officials met in Pretoria to sign a cessation of hostilities agreement. The Pretoria Accords were supposed to end the Tigray War, which had claimed an estimated 600,000 lives.
However, Abiy Ahmed was, in fact, only establishing a regional alliance to consolidate a particular nationalistic and authoritarian model across the Horn of Africa. In Ethiopia, he allied with Ethiopian and Amhara nationalists. Regionally, Abiy Ahmed allied with Somalia’s President Mohamed Abdullahi and Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki, culminating in the signing of the Tripartite Agreement in September 2018. A central motivation behind the alliance was their shared opposition to multi-national federalism and ethno-nationalist politics in the region. They saw the growing assertiveness and the institutional recognition that ethno-national groups had attained across the Horn of Africa as a threat to their personal power as well as a recipe for weakening their states.
The Amhara and Ethiopian nationalists and Eritrea would help Abiy Ahmed consolidate his autocracy, and in return, it was expected that he would legalize Amhara conquest and annexation of Tigrayan territory, eliminate ethno-national groups in Oromia and Tigray, and eventually dismantle Ethiopia’s multi-national-federalism.
according to robert kaplan, modern day ethiopia is an empire successor, rather than the usual nation state, this means that the different regions are basically independent entities or used to be so, the tigrayans amassed a lot of wealth and patronage during the earlier ethiopian years, the other "kingdoms" and this includes the eritreans have now taken amongst themselves to cut a powerful rival to sizeAbiy Ahmed had until recently not publicly responded to Eritrea’s internal meddling and violations of Ethiopian sovereignty. However, in the past weeks, the Ethiopian government has been agitating the public to restore what the prime minister calls Ethiopia’s “historic and natural right” to a Red Sea outlet. In addition to documentaries and public statements propagating the message that Ethiopia had been deprived of an inalienable right to a sea outlet, a military parade was held in Addis Ababa recently where soldiers were chanting, “The sea is ours, and the ship is ours.” Although Eritrea has not been mentioned by name in these statements, it is implicitly understood that it—and specifically its Assab Port—is the target of the messaging.
Despite the rhetoric, several factors may still deter Ethiopia and Eritrea from escalating their conflict to a full-scale war. The Ethiopian army is bogged down in the Amhara region and is still recovering from the war in Tigray. The Eritrean military also lost many troops in the last war and would unlikely want to confront a well-resourced Ethiopian army under the leadership of experienced Tigrayan commanders.
On the other hand, a tit-for-tat escalation and a strategic culture characterized by deep suspicion may lead one of the parties to conduct a pre-emptive strike that escalates to a full-blown war. Moreover, beyond rhetoric, there are also indications of practical preparations for war. This includes increased shipments of weapons from the UAE and the export of new drones from Turkey to Ethiopia. Increased mobilization of troops on both sides of the border has also been reported. Both the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments have also been busy trying to appeal for the support of local leaders from the Afar people who reside on both sides of the common border.
America’s Global War on Terror has seen its share of stalemates, disasters, and outright defeats. During 20-plus years of armed interventions, the United States has watched its efforts implode in spectacular fashion, from Iraq in 2014 to Afghanistan in 2021. The greatest failure of its “Forever Wars,” however, may not be in the Middle East, but in Africa.
The raw numbers alone speak to the depths of the disaster. As the United States was beginning its Forever Wars in 2002 and 2003, the State Department counted a total of just nine terrorist attacks in Africa. This year, militant Islamist groups on that continent have, according to the Pentagon, already conducted 6,756 attacks. In other words, since the United States ramped up its counterterrorism operations in Africa, terrorism has spiked 75,000%.
In Africa, the U.S. launched a parallel campaign in the early 2000s, supporting and training African troops from Mali in the west to Somalia in the east and creating proxy forces that would fight alongside American commandos. To carry out its missions, the U.S. military set up a network of outposts across the northern tier of the continent, including significant drone bases – from Camp Lemonnier and its satellite outpost Chabelley Airfield in the sun-bleached nation of Djibouti to Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger — and tiny facilities with small contingents of American special operations troops in nations ranging from Libya and Niger to the Central African Republic and South Sudan.
“We came, we saw, he died,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton joked after a U.S.-led NATO air campaign helped overthrow Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, the longtime Libyan dictator, in 2011. President Barack Obama hailed the intervention as a success, but Libya slipped into near-failed-state status. Obama would later admit that “failing to plan for the day after” Qaddafi’s defeat was the “worst mistake” of his presidency.
As the Libyan leader fell, Tuareg fighters in his service looted his regime’s weapons caches, returned to their native Mali, and began to take over the northern part of that nation. Anger in Mali’s armed forces over the government’s ineffective response resulted in a 2012 military coup. It was led by Amadou Sanogo, an officer who learned English in Texas and underwent infantry-officer basic training in Georgia, military-intelligence instruction in Arizona, and was mentored by U.S. Marines in Virginia.
Having overthrown Mali’s democratic government, Sanogo and his junta proved hapless in battling terrorists. With the country in turmoil, those Tuareg fighters declared an independent state, only to be muscled aside by heavily armed Islamists who instituted a harsh brand of Shariah law, causing a humanitarian crisis. A joint Franco-American-African mission prevented Mali’s complete collapse but pushed the militants into areas near the borders of both Burkina Faso and Niger.
Such relentless attacks have destabilized Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger and are now affecting their southern neighbors along the Gulf of Guinea. Violence in Togo and Benin has, for example, jumped 633% and 718% over the last year, according to the Pentagon.
American-mentored military personnel in that region have had only one type of demonstrable “success”: overthrowing governments the United States trained them to protect. At least 15 officers who benefited from such assistance have been involved in 12 coups in West Africa and the greater Sahel during the war on terror. The list includes officers from Burkina Faso (2014, 2015, and twice in 2022); Chad (2021); Gambia (2014); Guinea (2021); Mali (2012, 2020, and 2021); Mauritania (2008); and Niger (2023). At least five leaders of a July coup in Niger, for example, received American assistance, according to a U.S. official. They, in turn, appointed five U.S.-trained members of the Nigerien security forces to serve as that country’s governors.
“Terrorists associated with Al Qaeda and indigenous terrorist groups have been and continue to be a presence in this region,” a senior Pentagon official claimed in 2002. “These terrorists will, of course, threaten U.S. personnel and facilities.” But when pressed about an actual spreading threat, the official admitted that even the most extreme Islamists “really have not engaged in acts of terrorism outside Somalia.” Despite that, U.S. Special Operations forces were dispatched there in 2002, followed by military aid, advisers, trainers, and private contractors.
More than 20 years later, U.S. troops are still conducting counterterrorism operations in Somalia, primarily against the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab. To this end, Washington has provided billions of dollars in counterterrorism assistance, according to a recent report by the Costs of War Project. Americans have also conducted more than 280 air strikes and commando raids there, while the CIA and special operators built up local proxy forces to conduct low-profile military operations.
While the 75,000% increase in terror attacks and 42,500% increase in fatalities over the last two decades are nothing less than astounding, the most recent increases are no less devastating. “A 50-percent spike in fatalities tied to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel and Somalia over the past year has eclipsed the previous high in 2015,” according to a July report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Defense Department research institution. “Africa has experienced a nearly four-fold increase in reported violent events linked to militant Islamist groups over the past decade… Almost half of that growth happened in the last 3 years.”
Earlier this year, General Michael Langley, the current AFRICOM commander, offered what may be the ultimate verdict on America’s Forever Wars on that continent. “Africa,” he declared, “is now the epicenter of international terrorism.”
The recent agreement struck between Ethiopia and Somaliland continues to reverberate across the region, while Somalia, which claims Somaliland as part of its territory, reaches out to regional countries to mobilize support.
Last week, landlocked Ethiopia and the breakaway region of Somaliland reached an agreement that would give Addis Ababa access to the Red Sea through the port of Berbera in exchange for their recognizing Somaliland’s independence.
The deal was widely condemned by Somalia, which deemed it a violation of its territorial integrity. Even within Somaliland, a split within the government has come to the open about the agreement. On Sunday, Somaliland’s defense minister Abdiqani Mohamud Ateye resigned to protest the deal.
“Ethiopia remains our number one enemy,” Ateye said in an interview.
Landlocked Ethiopia, for its part, defended the agreement.
“No party or country will be affected by this memorandum of understanding. There is neither a broken trust nor any laws infringed due to the memorandum of understanding,” the Ethiopian government said in a statement last week.
In 1960, the former British protectorate of Somaliland merged with the former Italian protectorate of Somalia to form the Republic of Somalia. In 1991, Somaliland declared its independence after years of civil war and the fall of Siad Barre's regime in Somalia.
Although not recognized internationally, Somaliland has a functional government and an elected parliament.
Ethiopia pays around $1.5 billion annually to Djibouti in port fees, proving costly for the country, one of the poorest in the world, with a per capita gross national income of $1,020, per the World Bank.
.... egypt also joined the brics recentlyOn Tuesday, Mohamud concluded a two-day visit to Eritrea, where he met with his Eritrean counterpart, Isaias Afwerki, to discuss regional developments.
Speaking to Eritrean state TV after his meeting with Afwerki, Mohamud said that “Eritrea has been in support of preserving the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Somalia.”
One day before embarking on his Eritrean visit, Mohamud hosted an Egyptian delegation dispatched by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in the capital of Mogadishu.
During the meeting on Sunday, the delegation reiterated Cairo’s unwavering support for Somalia's sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, a statement issued by the Somali presidency said.
The delegation also conveyed an official invitation to Mohamud to visit Egypt.
Egyptian-Somali relations have steadily grown since Mohamud’s election in June 2022. Cairo sought Mogadishu’s support in its dispute with Addis Ababa over the latter’s Grand Ethiopian Dam.
At the same time, Egypt has maintained balanced ties with Somaliland, and officials from both parties have exchanged visits in the past years.
Military takeovers have been a major source of concern in the region and beyond in the last few years. Since 2020, the region has had four successful coup d’états and three failed ones.
The coup in Niger particularly attracted attention. This is because Niger was seen as a “darling of the West” and a model for democratic governance in the region.
Despite the challenges facing the region, the scramble for the Sahel remains intense.
The main actors in this scramble are the European Union, France, Russia, China, and the United States.
The EU relies on Sahelian countries, especially Niger, to stop mass illegal immigration into the bloc. Niger is a major transit country in the region. Niger had security and defence partnerships with the EU until recently when the country unilaterally cancelled the deals. This is a source of concern to the EU.
France has the first right to buy any natural resources discovered in all its former colonies. Although the relationship between France and its former colonies appeared cordial, recent coups in Francophone countries and anti-France sentiments across Africa have revealed the opposite.
The coups have been followed by large demonstrations against France and in support of the putschists.
Despite these cracks, France is keen to maintain its grip on these countries, especially pertaining to military cooperation and resource extraction. France was reluctant to pull its military out of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger despite the countries severing military partnerships. It continues to extract natural resources in these countries.
Russia has openly backed military regimes in Mali and Burkina Faso and warned against any military intervention in Niger when the military took power. Furthermore, the Wagner group, the controversial private military company which is controlled by Russia, cooperates with some countries in the Sahel. Niger has canceled its defense agreement with the EU and switched to Russia. All of these factors explain Russia’s interest in the Sahel.
The Sahel region is rich in natural resources such as oil, uranium, natural gas, and lithium. Chinese state-owned enterprises operate in Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso.
For instance, Mali potentially has one of the largest lithium reserves in the world and China’s Ganfeng Lithium has invested heavily in the country. In addition, despite China’s development in military hardware, most of the weapons are untested. China is keen to use the conflicts in the Sahel to test its arms products.
In 2019, the U.S. opened its largest drone base in Africa in Agadez-Niger. A year before that, I had written about the security implications of the base for the region.
Unlike France and China, which both have extensive economic interests in the Sahel, the U.S. has a strong military interest. Niger, in particular, is strategically located and the U.S. can easily fly surveillance and reconnaissance drones from the country to cover the Sahel, west and central Africa.
As France is being militarily dislodged by its former colonies in the region, the U.S. has been trying to fill the void to prevent Russia and China from establishing further military presence.
The U.S. took several months to label the military takeover in Niger a coup so as not to lose strategic military cooperation and dominance.
more like it was the puppet organisation of the fdf, primarily france in this caseThe Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is arguably the most successful model of regional governance in Africa. Headquartered in Lagos, Nigeria, the bloc was established in 1975 to deepen economic integration across West Africa. Three decades ago, about 90 percent of trade in sub-Saharan Africa was dominated by non-African economies; today, the share of regional trade has more than doubled, largely due to regional organizations including ECOWAS. By 2024, the body consisted of fifteen members representing more than 400 million people in “all fields of economic activity, particularly industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, social and cultural matters,” as its mission states.
In a joint statement on January 28, the three countries [Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger], all founding members of ECOWAS who have seen military takeovers in the past three years, announced they were leaving the bloc because it had “drifted from the ideals of its founding fathers and the spirit of pan-Africanism.” They also claimed that, having fallen “under the influence of foreign powers,” ECOWAS has “betrayed its founding principles” and “become a threat to member states and peoples.” Finally, the three countries expressed disappointment that the organization had not helped them tackle the festering Islamist insurgencies in their countries.
The withdrawal does not bode well for the countries’ relationships with other ECOWAS states. It is the latest escalation in a growing fracture that has opened up in the wake of a series of military coups. Between 2020 and 2023, the three countries, along with Guinea, all experienced military takeovers. ECOWAS responded by suspending and then sanctioning all four countries, including a commercial no-fly zone and a freeze on all assets held in ECOWAS central banks. The United States, the European Union, and several other Western countries also suspended aid or applied sanctions. In retaliation, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger formed a breakaway “Alliance of Sahel States” in September 2023.
The move will likely deepen antagonism between the three states and Western countries, which have seen their influence diminish as various Sahelian states have sought diplomatic alternatives. France, the region’s former colonial overlord, was pressured into removing its troops from the three countries in 2022 and 2023 and, likewise, U.S. counterterrorism activity in the region has dwindled since Niger’s July 2023 coup.
question is whether a 10 year peacekeeping mission a success or a failure, but as africa is a forgotten continent, no one will be able to answer thisThe exit from ECOWAS does not augur well for democracy in the three countries. ECOWAS leadership had hoped that the countries’ suspension and diplomatic pressure to set a timeline for elections would pave the way for a return to democracy. Instead, leaving ECOWAS frees the countries from their obligations to the body and relieves them of the demand to transition to civilian rule, though technically they are mandated to abide by the group’s provisions one year after giving notice of withdrawal.
The security implications are more difficult to gauge. All three countries have been grappling with decades-long insurgencies and UN peacekeeping missions have yet to achieve stability. Last December marked the end of MINUSMA, an unsuccessful UN peacekeeping mission in Mali that spanned ten years. It remains to be seen whether collaboration with Russia, which has already deployed an initial contingent of troops to Ouagadougou, the Burkinabe capital, will be successful where UN peacekeepers and French troops have failed.
Cyranoji, let me preface by saying what I may have mentioned earlier before, all western journalists speak in the forked tongues of a bat's, that is not revelation but dogmatic axiom. All articles have some kernel of truth and varying proportions of histrionics, kite-flying and contempt, we all know this, the only thing to extract are the facts and punt the rest. In that conjunction, the only use of the article is the news and the inference:
independent foreign policy... an interesting phrase in this instance of what is clearly neo-colonialism of old colonies, by the by, france with their dirt cheap uranium had quite a racket going on with their exorbitant power selling price to other countries in the eu and their negligible production price purchased by corrupting national leaders, this was one of the major reasons that the coup occurred
What was France paying for yellow cake from Niger before and after the coup ? 15 cents a kilo vs 300x ie market price now. After AUKUS, France is being punished again for trying to pursue or even looking like it is trying to pursue an independent foreign policy.
and it does, nobody loots a setup alone, local lads with a thirst for fine things in life are not difficult to find, especially in africa, the old guard on the anvil of losing much which always involves the armed forces will have influenceFrance thinks it still has some influence in ecowas.
The African continent was carved up by competing colonial empires with little regard for people or geography and this has put multidimensionally diverse peoples into same countries leading to conflict which the former colonial powers again use as excuse to meddle and exploit the indigenous people, with Massa lording above them all.
The "countries" were carved up as long North to south strips by colonial powers to ensure access to sea to ship away produce, slaves and minerals.
But every country has the same force fitted composition of a multitude of tribes and people with dissimilar ethnicity, religions, lifestyle and traditions. Designed for perpetual conflict and strife, and therefore designed to be easily controlled and exploited by the white masters and MNCs using money, guns, NGOs, conversion zealots.
Its easy to blame Africans for all this instability in posh foreign policy journals and champagne soaked conférences.
However IMHO the best thing that can happen to 'save' Africa is that the western powers stay the hell out in all forms. And let them redraw the borders as they see fit, even if it may happen with considerable bloodshed.
yet no one seems to post any such african perspectives, curious. I have glanced over general african political/ir papers, they are without fail always a mixture of colonialism, handouts for global warming, tribal warfare, corruption, strong armed forces, a paper here or there might be different, but prima facie, i would say that they still lack maturity in such institutions, if you have the strength to correct the past, then by all means, crib about it, if not, find ways for the future
The opinion on French influence and even more powerful American influence in ecowas region and latest developments will be very different if you get an African perspective.
Cyrano ji, let me go in a round about way for this one, how do nations see themselves as: for eg india is bharat, pakistan's identity is that it is not-india, so in order to define the entity pakistan, you have to first define the entity india; in that sense, what is the definition of most of the african countries? they are an amalgamation of tribes, historically not much friendly, and so for further definition of what this or that african country is elicits a response that they are in a sense multicultural "nations" formed artificially and now forced to coexist for a shared prosperous future.Cyrano wrote: ↑06 Feb 2024 15:44
One can indeed make the argument that Africa as a whole has failed two evolve, preserve and sustain its own culture and civilisations in the post WW2 world. But does that justify their subjugation and brutal exploitation even now, saying its their fault?
They don't have as many published writers and blog posters so they deserve what they are getting ?! (actually you can find some decent content in French on YT and elsewhere on SM, though its a recent phenomenon set to grow)
many african countries have started adopting their civic pride as something more than tribal and or religious affiliation, and therein lies victory for these nations, imo, most have started steeling their handed-down framework however it may have been passed onto them, now its onto the definition of a nation for them and this is where they currently lag philosophically
IMO, its a period of opportunity for many African countries to find their own footing and strengthen the pursuit of their own national interests, as democracies or otherwise.
Niger’s military government announced that it has ended an accord with the US that allowed military personnel and civilian staff from the Department of Defense to operate in Niger – days after holding high-level talks with US diplomatic and military officials this week.
“The government of Niger, taking into account the aspirations and interests of its people, decides with full responsibility to denounce with immediate effect the agreement relating to the status of military personnel of the United States and civilian employees of the American Department of Defense in the territory of the Republic of Niger,” Niger military spokesman Colonel Major Amadou Abdramane said in a statement on national television announcing the change.
Abdramane added that the agreement between the two countries – signed in 2012, was imposed on Niger and had been in violation of the “constitutional and democratic rules” of the West African nation’s sovereignty.
Niger was once a key regional partner for the US, but relations have deteriorated since the military junta claimed power in July 2023 in what the US formally designated as a coup.
Since then, the US has withdrawn many of its 1,100 troops who were stationed in Niger.
The Gulf state is splashing out on a blockbuster $35 billion deal to help bail out Egypt, pledging billions of dollars more in investment in other countries and picking sides in some of the continent’s most brutal wars.
With Chinese infrastructure funding tapering off and Western engagement wavering, Abu Dhabi’s cash flows have been coupled with a concerted diplomatic push: an approach mirrored to a lesser extent by its neighbors Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
These ambitions have taken the UAE beyond the Gulf states’ historic North-African sphere of influence and from the nearby Horn of Africa into every corner of the continent.
Its investment pledges — totaling $44.5 billion last year, the top country for the second year running — focus on renewable power, logistics and technology, in better-developed economies such as Egypt, Morocco, South Africa and Kenya where strong infrastructure and economic expansion are stoking demand for energy. But its role in the continent’s wars are more parochial — largely focused on the regions closest to the Middle East.
The wealthy Gulf state backs Khalifa Haftar in the war for Libya, Ethiopian President Abiy Ahmed in his fight against Tigray rebels and reportedly the Rapid Support Forces militia in Sudan, where its battle against the army has created the world’s biggest population displacement crisis and drawn accusations of war crimes. The UAE denies supporting the RSF, while United Nations investigators have called allegations that it does “credible.”
From massive government bailouts and backing warlords to operating nine of the continent’s major ports via Dubai-based DP World and committing $4.5 billion in climate financing, the UAE is exerting influence at scale.
Indian Air Force Station Thoise and its gravity for India's deterrence against the Pakistan-China two-front threat is the focus of 'The Himalayan Frontier', Part X, our series of on-the-ground documentaries from Eastern Ladakh and Siachen. "Thoise lies in Shyok valley. It is a base at such a location that assets deployed can be useful for both fronts," Air Commodore D.S. Handa, Air Officer Commanding, Indian Air Force (IAF) Station, Leh told us. In this episode, we film the Indian Air Force's assets including the C-130, Il-76, Mi-17, ALH Rudra, Apache and, the Embraer at the strategically located base in Ladakh. The two IAF stations in Ladakh-Leh and Thoise are critical for the Indian Army's deployment at the Siachen Glacier. Critical IAF Bases in LadakhThe Thoise Air Force Station is an essential part of the military's deterrent all along the AGPL- the Actual Ground Position Line and the LOC- the Line of Control with Pakistan as well as along the LAC- the Line of Actual Control with China. Continuing our series on India's Pakistan-China two-front threat, 'The Himalayan Frontier', our team of Amitabh P. Revi, Rohit Pandita, and Karan Marwaha also visits the 'Siachen Healers' of the Army Medical Corps', who save lives and limbs in the sector.
The statistics are unequivocal: by 2050, Africa’s total population will increase to almost 2.5 billion, an impressive gain compared with 1.36 billion inhabitants in 2023. In less than 80 years, one out of every two newborns worldwide will be African.
The thing is that a growing population demands increased food production, something that many African nations may fail to achieve. As of today, four of the five countries in the world with the highest number of children suffering from malnutrition are in Africa, with Nigeria and Ethiopia topping the list.
Despite one fifth of Africa’s population being undernourished, the region is not any closer to achieving the goal of eradicating hunger. On average, African governments allocate only 3.8% of their budgets to agriculture, while some have cut their spending in recent years.
“To understand Africa, both relative and absolute figures matter, above all the relation to Europe. In 1950, Europe (excluding Ukraine and Turkey) had about 400 million people, Africa 100 million. Today, these figures read 500 million and 1.000 million. In 2050, they will be 500 million and about 2.500 million. That implies: A relationship of 4:1 is changing into 1:5 within one century. Migratory pressure is bound to rise,” he said.
“In 2050, Nigeria will have about 400 million people – more than the USA; in 2100, it could have 650 million, becoming the third most populous country after India and China with about 700 people per square km, resulting in a population density almost twice that of Haiti. Will this result in similar social and political conditions?
“Africa has both abject poverty and fabulous wealth. Income disparity is one of the chief problems in many countries,” the expert continued.
“Population growth is highly unevenly distributed. South Africa, accounting for about 40% of the productivity of the entire continent, has a shrinking population – a terrible consequence of AIDS (as has Botswana). The highest growth rates are in countries with weak economies and fragile environments, particularly in the Sahel zone,” Adam added.
Last year, the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo turned 30. It is a grim milestone, and one that received almost no global attention. The silence isn’t a surprise. Since its inception, the war in Congo has excelled at evading international recognition. Few people noticed when the M23 Movement, the region’s biggest militia, rounded up and executed 171 civilians, in November 2022. The world was quiet when Doctors Without Borders declared that they had treated 25,000 survivors of sexual violence in Congo last year. Almost no one outside Africa remembers that, in June, an armed Islamist group massacred 41 people in Congo’s northeast. Today, more than seven million Congolese are displaced, more than at any other time in history, and yet the war still barely features in global media. The New York Times has written 54 articles about Congo in the past twelve months, including ones on the environment and the country’s recent election. It has, by contrast, run 2,969 articles on Ukraine.
But the disregard is particularly inexcusable right now, when the conflict is escalating. In the past year, the M23 has increased its territory by 70 percent. It has surrounded Goma, one of eastern Congo’s largest cities, and taken control of key roads. The result has been a worrying deterioration in communal relations, as people mobilize along ethnic lines. Opportunistic politicians have piled on, further inflaming the region.
The war in Congo is overlooked, in part, because it is highly complex. There are more than 100 different armed actors fighting in the east, most of which are pursuing separate ends. The M23 itself, however, is easier to grapple with. The group is largely funded and trained by Rwanda, which sees the organization as a way to project power and gain access to Congo’s resources. Consequently, Congolese officials have responded to the M23’s success with escalating rhetorical attacks on Rwanda’s government and by backing an array of local militias, the wazalendo (or “patriots”). Congolese officials have also invited Burundi, Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania to send troops into its eastern region for assistance. The conflict, in other words, is transforming from a low-grade internal clash to an expanding interstate and communal war.
The real reason for Rwanda’s intervention is more complex. Given the centrality of the genocide in Rwandan memory and politics, the FDLR remains a symbolic threat that helps fuel a bunker mindset among security officials. As one Rwandan official put it to me, “What would the United States do if al Qaeda had a cell operating in Tijuana?” For Rwanda, eastern Congo is also an important arena for military competition with Burundi and Uganda.
But Rwanda is also driven by more debased motives. Congo is, almost literally, a gold mine for Rwandan businesses. Since 2016, Rwanda’s largest export has been gold, much of which is smuggled in from Congo. Rwanda also earns sizable sums exporting tin, tantalum, and niobium—much of it also mined in Congo, according to a UN expert group and Global Witness. Such profiteering is made possible by the M23, which keeps Congo’s state too weak to stop the theft.
Together, these dynamics make the Congolese-Rwandan conflict extremely hard to solve. One actor benefits politically from fighting. The other benefits materially. Such parties are unlikely to make peace on their own. If anything, their incentive is to ratchet the conflict up.
On June 18, thousands of Kenyan youths took to the streets to protest a controversial tax bill that threatened to raise the prices of basic commodities. While Ruto tried to make immediate, albeit small concessions, the protesters refused to give up on their objectives. Every day, more and more people joined the revolt and even the parliament was stormed.
The continuation of Kenya’s demonstrations after the withdrawal of the bill that triggered them shows clearly that these protests are much more than an over-the-top reaction to a single, ill-thought-out policy proposal. The proposed finance bill, it seems, was simply the last straw that broke the camel’s back. People have had enough of endemic corruption, chronic failures in governance, and a lack of socioeconomic support and opportunities for upward mobility. They have had enough of struggling to put food on their tables. They have had enough of inequality and poverty. They want systemic change, and they want it now.
The current situation in Kenya reminds me of the early days of the Tunisian uprising. In December 2010, a young Tunisian who sold vegetables from a barrow set himself on fire to protest against police harassment. He died a few days later, but not before his protest went viral, sparking demonstrations against the cost of living and the country’s authoritarian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.
With bad leadership rife across the continent, the determination of anti-government protests in Kenya could trigger a tide of protests and consequent political changes well beyond the country’s borders.
The successful demonstrations in Kenya already inspired similar actions in neighbouring countries.
Since August 1, thousands across Nigeria have been protesting under the banner “ #EndBadGovernanceInNigeria.” Just like their counterparts in Kenya, the protesters want an end to bad governance, corruption and the increasing cost of living that has left millions reeling. The government of President Bola Tinubu initially responded to their demands, like that of Ruto, with violence. Rights group Amnesty International has accused Nigerian security forces of killing at least 13 protesters and injuring many more. Hundreds were also arrested. The force denies the accusation.
When even the iron fist of the police did not put an end to the uprising, Tinubu began claiming that he “heard” the people’s demands and that he was “open to dialogue”.
In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni delivered a televised address to the nation on July 21, just a few days after the beginning of the protests in Kenya, where he warned protesters that they would be “playing with fire” if they pressed ahead with plans to stage an anti-corruption march to parliament a few days later.
When the protest went ahead regardless, on July 23, Ugandan security forces detained dozens of Ugandan youths for peacefully demonstrating against widespread corruption and alleged human rights abuses by the country’s leadership. The protesters were carrying signs that read “The Corrupt are Interfering with a Wrong Generation” and “This is our 1986”, alluding to Museveni’s ousting of former leader dictator Idi Amin.
During his nearly four decades in power, Museveni has consistently suppressed civil rights and crushed any attempted revolt against his rule with force. A brutal clampdown on anti-government protests triggered by the arrest of opposition leader Bobi Wine in November 2020, for example, left 50 people dead. The youths protesting against his regime today, inspired by the successes of their Kenyan counterparts, know they could face violence for taking to the streets, but they do it anyway because they are determined to trigger change. Thus if those in Kenya and Nigeria successfully oust their governments, or at least secure meaningful concessions, there is every reason to believe that spring will come next to Uganda.
Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa also appears concerned that the spark of revolution in the region could soon jump into his country.
Angola, Eswatini, Namibia, Mozambique, and South Africa have also witnessed protests in the recent past, and their own struggles with corruption, inequality and economic stagnation mean these countries too can soon be rocked by widespread protests demanding better governance, equality and stronger democracy.
The Kenyan demonstrations have clearly encouraged youths in the region to take bold actions towards securing socioeconomic and political change.
Across sub-Saharan Africa, young people disillusioned with their corrupt, inefficient and oppressive governments are taking to the streets to make their voices heard. Just like their forbearers did in the 1950s, they are being encouraged by each others’ successes and learning from their mistakes.
Young Africans from Kenya to Nigeria and from Uganda to Zimbabwe are taking a stance against corruption and inequality, demanding better accountability from their leaders as well as inclusive, responsive, and clean governance. They desire the advancement and protection of human rights and civil rights in their countries, along with equitable access to decent jobs, housing, and financial wellness.
Once it was fully under way, no amount of oppression, violence or concessions from leaders could convince Arab Spring protesters to give up on their dreams and return home.
The burgeoning protest movement in sub-Saharan Africa has also this point of no return. No amount of threats or policy adjustments can halt the overwhelming thirst for urgent sociopolitical transformation in Africa.
An African Spring appears to be on the horizon
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) could be to the 21st century what Saudi Arabia was to the 20th, if the White House has strategic vision and DRC can overcome its legacy of poor governance and dysfunctional corruption.
DRC mines account for more than 70 percent of the world’s cobalt, a metal necessary for lithium batteries, high-performance alloy, electric vehicles, and computers. For decades, the People’s Republic of China has wheedled and bribed its way into some of the DRC’s most lucrative cobalt mines.
CMOC, one of China’s largest mining interests, acquired the Tenke Fungurume Mine in November 2016. At the time, looming elections distracted many in the Obama administration. It was possible to block the deal. While U.S. companies cannot pay the bribes Congolese politicians expect, the White House might have leaned on Freeport-McMoRan, the Phoenix-based owner of the mine, not to sell to the Chinese concern.
Tshisekedi’s rise provided another opportunity to block Chinese efforts to corner the market. In 2022, Tshisekedi alleged that CMOC misreported reserves, failed to pay $7.6 billion in interest and royalties, and violated its pledge to build infrastructure. Tshisekedi suspended the contract and demanded renegotiation. Xi Jinping welcomed the Congolese leader to Beijing and gave him the red carpet treatment; Biden napped. CMOC kept its concession.
Today, there is a new opportunity but again, Washington sleeps. The Atlantic Council’s Joseph Mulala Nguramo, Congo’s first and only West Point graduate, and one of Washington’s most astute observers of the Great Lakes region of Africa points out to me that Kinshasa now says it opposes the sale by Chemaf SA, a Congolese company with offices in the United Arab Emirates, to China’s Norinco. Chemaf wants to cash out given decline in cobalt prices. Chinese mining companies enjoy state backing and so can whether downturns in the market in order to consolidate their positions. Beijing’s monopoly is not yet complete, but it is near. Nor is China only focused on Congo. Chinese investment also grows in Cuba, the world’s fifth largest supplier of the strategic metal.
To be fair, it is hard to do business in the DRC, and it is not clear Tshisekedi will play ball. In such a case, Washington should cease pretending Tshisekedi is either a democrat or legitimate and work with democratic forces who see Congo’s future in the West rather than as a Chinese vassal. Tshisekedi and his backers should understand personally and bluntly what it means for the the United States to consider them enemies.
The country, devastated by the anti-Tutsi genocide just three decades ago, has become independent and self-sufficient. President Paul Kagame has implemented a broad program of cultural change that today pays dividends, though it has come at the expense of electoral change. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, Belgian colonial administrators embraced eugenics as a means of classifying the local population. Before the Belgian administration, the difference between Hutus and Tutsis, for example, was less genetic and more a matter of class with the possibility of social mobility between groups. Prior to the 1994 genocide, militants took Hutu supremacism to an extreme to justify their actions. Kagame seeks stability by erasing any bureaucratic distinction between Hutu and Tutsi over a generation to return Rwanda to a time when such categories did not matter. Today, Hutus serve under Tutsis in the military and vice versa. Rwandan Christians serve alongside their Muslim compatriots, and churches and mosques dot the same streets.
Rwanda, meanwhile, contributes disproportionately to regional security. Its deployment to Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, almost singlehandedly defeated the Islamic State in the gas-rich province after the failure of both Russia’s Wagner Group and a South African-led Southern African Development Community deployment. It almost singlehandedly prevented the collapse of the Central African Republic into sectarian chaos when, in December 2020, rebels marched on the capital. Today, Rwandan UN peacekeepers are the last defense against the complete South Sudanese collapse. Rwandan security consultants informally advise Benin as it faces the risk of Sahel instability bleeding southward from Niger and Burkina Faso.
Rwanda not only acts as a modern-day Sparta but also as a modern Athens, at least in terms of trade. In Mozambique and the Central African Republic, the security Rwandans created enabled investment and trade, especially in the agricultural sector. Through it all, Rwanda has maintained a balanced policy. It has not fallen into the Chinese debt trap like Djibouti, nor has it sold its soul to Russia like Mali. Meanwhile, Kagame has doubled down on Rwanda’s domestic industry without becoming isolationist.
Turkey’s role in the Ethiopia-Somalia deal also reflects broader geopolitical shifts. The Horn of Africa has become a focal point for global competition, with countries like China, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia jostling for influence alongside Turkey. By successfully mediating this agreement, Ankara has demonstrated its ability to compete with these players, showcasing a model of engagement that blends diplomacy, economic investment, and cultural outreach.
While the agreement marks a significant win for Turkey, it also comes with risks. Balancing its ambitions in Africa with the sensitivities of regional and global players will be no small task. Powers like Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia may view Ankara’s growing role with unease, and managing these relationships will require careful diplomacy. At the same time, Turkey must ensure that its engagement is sustainable and viewed positively by the nations it seeks to influence. This means continuing to invest in infrastructure, development, and humanitarian initiatives to reinforce its position as a constructive partner.
The Horn of Africa, long plagued by geopolitical tensions and territorial disputes, has witnessed a significant development with the recent agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia to address Ethiopia’s maritime access. Brokered by Turkey, this agreement is a cornerstone in de-escalating the nearly decade-long rivalry between the two nations and signifies Ankara’s growing diplomatic clout in the region. However, the agreement’s ambiguities and the region’s complex dynamics underscore challenges that lie ahead.
Historical Rivalries and Geopolitical Stakes
Ethiopia’s search for reliable access to the sea has been a critical part of its national strategy ever since it became landlocked following Eritrea’s independence in 1993. Losing its coastline profoundly impacted Ethiopia’s economy and security, forcing the country to rely heavily on Djibouti for maritime trade. While Djibouti has served as a crucial lifeline, this dependency also left Ethiopia vulnerable to higher costs, logistical bottlenecks, and geopolitical leverage in dealings with its smaller neighbor.
Determined to reduce its reliance on Djibouti, Ethiopia began exploring alternative options. This pursuit took a dramatic turn in January 2024, when Addis Ababa signed an agreement with Somaliland, the self-declared independent region of Somalia. Somaliland, which has sought international recognition for decades, controls the strategic port of Berbera—a key asset along major global shipping routes. The memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland suggested that Ethiopia might consider formally recognizing Somaliland in exchange for privileged access to the port. While this promised to diversify Ethiopia’s trade routes, it sparked a fierce backlash from Somalia, which sees Somaliland as an integral part of its sovereign territory.
Mogadishu’s objections were swift and unequivocal. Somalia viewed the agreement as a direct threat to its territorial integrity and a dangerous precedent that could embolden separatist movements across the region. In response, Somalia ramped up its military preparedness and launched an aggressive diplomatic campaign, appealing to both regional partners and the international community to oppose Ethiopia’s actions.
As tensions mounted, it became clear that a prolonged conflict would be disastrous—not just for Ethiopia and Somalia, but for the Horn of Africa as a whole. Such a conflict risked worsening humanitarian crises, destabilizing trade routes, and creating opportunities for extremist groups to exploit the chaos. Recognizing these risks, both nations eventually pivoted to de-escalation. Their efforts were bolstered by Turkey, which stepped in to mediate. With longstanding ties to both countries, Turkey played a crucial role in bringing them to the negotiating table, helping to shift the focus from confrontation to dialogue.
Turkey as Mediator: A Strategic Victory
Turkey, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, played a pivotal role in resolving the escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, hosting three rounds of negotiations. The talks culminated in a breakthrough agreement that reaffirmed the territorial integrity of both nations while outlining a plan for Ethiopia to gain secure maritime access under Somalia’s sovereign framework. This compromise aims to address Ethiopia’s need for trade routes without undermining Somalia’s national unity.
The agreement, slated for finalization by April 2025, is a crucial step toward reducing the immediate threat of military conflict between the two countries. For Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, it also provides much-needed breathing room to address pressing challenges at home. In Ethiopia, these include ongoing ethnic tensions, economic instability following a controversial currency devaluation, and efforts to rebuild trust after years of internal strife. In Somalia, the focus now shifts to consolidating central authority in a politically fragmented landscape and combating the persistent threat posed by Al Shabaab, whose insurgency remains a destabilizing force across the country.
Regional Implications: Winners & Losers
Ethiopia-Somalia Relations
The agreement has partially thawed Ethiopia-Somalia relations and reduced the immediate risk of military escalation. For Ethiopia, it offers a pathway to explore new maritime access options, which could ease its reliance on Djibouti for trade. Somalia, meanwhile, has secured a notable diplomatic win by reinforcing its sovereignty over maritime negotiations. By ensuring that any Ethiopian access to ports falls under Somali authority, Mogadishu has strengthened its territorial claims and asserted itself as a key player in the Horn of Africa’s geopolitics.
Somaliland’s Position
For Somaliland, the agreement is a significant blow to its ambitions for international recognition. While Ethiopia has not explicitly abandoned its previous deal with Somaliland, the renewed focus on Somalia’s sovereignty undermines Somaliland’s negotiating leverage. This setback highlights a larger challenge for Somaliland: its bid for independence is often sidelined by the geopolitical priorities of larger powers, who prioritize regional stability over altering borders.
Egypt’s Setback
The Ethiopia-Somalia agreement also represents a strategic loss for Egypt, which has long sought to counter Ethiopia’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa. For years, Egypt has backed Somalia as part of a broader strategy to isolate Ethiopia and challenge its unilateral actions on the Nile, particularly regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). By aligning itself with Somalia, Egypt hoped to curtail Ethiopia’s ability to expand its regional reach.
Turkey’s successful mediation has now disrupted this strategy. The agreement paves the way for Ethiopia to establish maritime access, potentially enabling it to develop naval and economic capabilities that reduce its reliance on traditional partners like Djibouti. This shift strengthens Ethiopia’s hand in the Horn of Africa and weakens Egypt’s ability to pressure Addis Ababa through its alliances in the region. Furthermore, Turkey’s growing influence, at Egypt’s expense, underscores Cairo’s declining leverage in a part of the world where it once held significant sway.
Finally, it's South Africa's turn. The country took the G20 chair in December, the last remaining member to hold the presidency.
After granting the African Union membership in 2023, the G20 will now finally arrive on African soil. South Africa will host around 130 meetings and forums, leading up to the summit of the heads of state and governments in November 2025 in Johannesburg.
"While this is a first African presidency, it really builds on many of the issues that the Indonesians, the Indians and Brazilians identified as priorities. And many of these overlap with what our priorities for Africa are," she said. "Clearly there'll be a distinct African flavor."
Climate, debt, justice — and some other African priorities
South Africa's G20 agenda puts emphasis on a number of issues that also matter to the whole continent.
"The climate change crisis is worsening," Ramaphosa said in early December, when he unveiled his G20 priorities. "Across the world, billions of people are affected by underdevelopment, inequality, poverty, hunger and unemployment. The outlook for global economic growth remains subdued, and many economies carry the burden of unsustainable levels of debt."
Critical minerals a motor for development
The economic transformation also brings a surge in demand for specialist mineral resources, many of which can be found in African locations.
The largest deposit of cobalt, for example, lies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most is being refined in China, even as the EU and US seek to increase their share of the resource, which is used in batteries for electric vehicles, electronic devices and clean energy technologies.
"We have a very interesting situation developing in some countries," said SWP's Müller, who also researches supply chains. "That is, they're increasingly able to choose their trading partners and are not necessarily dependent only on Chinese agreements."
South Africa sees its job as one of creating consensus, she continued. "It's about weaving the narrative around priorities in such a way that individual blocs in the G20 are brought together, rather than lost along the way," she said.
This means preventing different members' views on wars in Ukraine or in the Middle East from derailing progress. There's no doubt these conflicts will be discussed at every meeting and will certainly end up, likely in more broad terms, in the final G20 declaration next November, Sidiropoulos predicted.
"But South Africa will certainly not want a situation in which one of the two conflicts becomes the predominant issue on the agenda and overshadows all other issues, ones that are much more important for developing economies," she said.
Since he became president in 2018, Ramaphosa has gained plenty of foreign policy and diplomacy experience, for example, when South Africa hosted the 2023 BRICS summit.
He maintains good relations with Russia despite that country's war in Ukraine. This approach has caused some irritation among European allies. Nonetheless, Ramaphosa is still seen as a reliable partner. Earlier in December. Ramaphosa met with Germany's own president to discuss the G20 agenda.
Dealing with Trump will also be a more personal challenge for Ramaphosa. During his G20 presidency, the US will be more closely involved than most other member states because the Americans will take on the presidency after South Africa.
Trump II: An Opportunity to Create a Strategic Economic Partnership with Africa
Support AfCFTA: The AfCFTA is a landmark agreement in the scope of sectors it includes (such as digital trade) as well as its ambition to cover the entire continent, facilitating regional and continental value chains, including in priority sectors of automotive, pharmaceuticals, agribusiness and transportation. The Trump administration should reiterate U.S. support for AfCFTA while increasing engagement on specific AfCFTA protocols as needed to open trade and investment. At the same time, Trump’s second presidency should articulate a clear vision for how it would like to engage African countries on trade and investment issues, spelling out whether it foresees concluding free trade agreements with individual countries (like Kenya, with which Trump’s first presidency began FTA negotiations).
Renew the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): The AGOA has been the centerpiece of U.S. economic engagement with Africa since it was passed in 2000. This unilateral trade preference program offers Africa duty-free access to the U.S. market for 1,800 goods not available to other regions under other programs (like the Generalized System of Preferences). The most important step Trump’s second presidency can take to support engagement with Africa is to encourage Congress to renew the AGOA by Easter, well before its expiry in September 2025. Renewing the AGOA for at least 10 years (ideally longer), with some practical improvements like addressing graduation once countries attain middle-income status, is the single most important support the United States can provide to realize AfCFTA’s potential.
Develop specific tools tailored to realize the potential of specific sectors: There have been a number of proposals to increase U.S. engagement with African countries on issues like critical minerals, investment, and Information and Communication Technology by adding provisions to the AGOA. Each of these sectors is important, but realizing the potential of increased partnership extends far beyond the scope of a unilateral trade preference program. Each merits detailed discussions and coming up with a menu of tailored engagement (e.g., for better resource mapping and investment codes or engagement on digital taxation); several can be supplemented by engagement with international forums (like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or World Trade Organization). In some cases, it may make sense for the United States to pursue specific bilateral agreements with countries, either on a specific sector or as part of a broader free trade agreement.
Update U.S. trade and investment tools: African institutions have proven agile and innovative in coming up with programs to support industrialization and trade under AfCFTA. U.S. trade and investment support agencies (the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, the United States Trade and Development Agency, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation) should make Africa a case study of how to develop similarly agile tools that can match the best of our competitors, particularly in Europe, who deliver results in weeks, not months. Reaching out to private sector financing and providing support for trade associations would also be an effective way to get more U.S. companies to focus on opportunities in Africa.
interesting that both the routes go through zambia, the western one to the west via angola, the chinese one east via tanzaniaSupport African Green Industrialization
Waking up from its slumber, the United States and Europe are developing a logistics corridor to ferry unprocessed battery minerals from mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia to the Port of Lobito in Angola, with the Chinese similarly reviving the Tanzanian railway route from Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam.
The preference for bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) by successive administrations at the White House, has thus far hobbled the potential of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) for most African countries bar Morocco, which has an FTA with the United States, must be jettisoned for a continental approach, one that fits with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), as should the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) when it comes up for review and extension in 2025.
Prepare for Uncertain African Transitions
Of Africa’s 54 heads of state, 9 are currently older than President Trump.
Four stand out in particular where both their age, time in office, and the potential for unstable, and even violent, transitions should create cause for concern for Trump’s Africa team. Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, and Uganda all have presidents aged from 80 to 91 years old. Their collective 157 years in office have contributed to a hollowing out of their countries’ institutions to the point where serious questions exist surrounding what will transpire when these presidents pass on—for some, perhaps on President Trump’s watch.
Sudan, Africa’s third-largest nation by area, is engulfed in a brutal war that has catapulted its 50 million citizens into extreme despair. While the world is focused on Ukraine and the Middle East, the devastating conflict in Sudan struggles to capture global attention. Since April 2023, a ferocious power struggle between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces has plunged the country into an acute humanitarian crisis.
This war traces its roots to 2021 when the army and Rapid Support Forces jointly toppled a civilian-led government. However, mutual distrust between the two factions eventually flared into open conflict. Rapid Support Forces commander Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” seeks to claim Sudan’s leadership, whereas army generals insist on maintaining military rule. This relentless quest for power has plunged Sudan into chaos, with both sides showing little regard for the devastating toll on civilians.
Sudan’s unfolding crisis is not just a violent power struggle — it’s a deeper reckoning with governance, legitimacy and the country’s precarious future. At the heart of this chaos lies a pivotal question: Who, if anyone, can guide Sudan toward stability? Is it the Sudanese Armed Forces, steeped in its self-proclaimed role as guardian of national sovereignty? Could it be the Rapid Support Forces, positioning itself as a champion of the people? Or might a third force — likely external — become the broker of an elusive peace?
With a history of recurrent coups and heavy-handed governance, the Sudanese Armed Forces have traditionally dominated Sudanese politics and carry a legacy profusely tainted by corruption, mismanagement and egregious human rights violations. Despite such shortcomings, being the recognized military force, it has a central command system, but its credibility is fraying. Decades of authoritarianism have eroded public trust, and internal divisions within the army have exposed vulnerabilities. Civilian groups, striving for democracy, view the army as an impediment rather than a solution.
On the other side, the Rapid Support Forces wield power through its decentralized structure and aggressive tactics, bolstered by economic resources and a populist narrative. Its leader, Hemedti, has sought to rebrand it as a protector of marginalized communities, particularly in Darfur. Yet this veneer of populism masks a brutal reality.
Sudan’s trajectory hinges on unraveling these competing narratives — a task as complex as the country’s own troubled history.
Inside Sudan, the situation is dire. The health care system is on the brink of collapse, with up to 80 percent of hospitals in conflict zones rendered nonfunctional. Critical medical supplies are alarmingly scarce, leaving millions without access to life-saving care. Compounding this is an escalating food crisis that threatens the survival of nearly 25 million, half of the country’s population. Agricultural disruptions, soaring food prices and ongoing violence have pushed some regions toward famine-like conditions, according to the UN World Food Program.
Sudan deserves the same global resolve that has been mobilized in other conflict zones. Anything less would be a profound failure of international solidarity and a betrayal of the Sudanese people.
Sudan’s descent into chaos demands sustained and unified global action. Diplomatic pressure must be applied to ensure the warring factions adhere to ceasefires and commit to genuine negotiations. Countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE have signaled interest in mediation, offering a glimmer of hope for dialogue. These efforts, however, need reinforcement through robust support from the United Nations, the European Union and other international stakeholders.
