Geopolitics/Geoeconomics Thread - June 2015

[ramana]

India gets observer status on the joint French, German and Spain fighter jet project.

This means bye bye to the UK, Japan and Italy project.

The workshare was going to be miniscule and expectation is Import Bahadurs will push for buying it!

[uddu]

Does the rapid rise of the populist AfD party and the inauguration of Donald Trump mark a perfect storm for Germany? Wolfgang Münchau, founder of Eurointelligence, joined UnHerd's Freddie Sayers to reflect on the upcoming German elections.

[ricky_v]

posting in this thread instead of its natural fit, understanding us, as the subject matter pertains to global repercussions
informative article, will encourage members to read it full, will encounter many names common to readers here


https://www.theamericanconservative.com ... war-party/

How the Democrats Became the War Party

On foreign affairs, the Democrats brook no dissent. Part of the reason for this is that the party has fallen prey to a kind of absolutist group-think with regard to America’s role in the world. Not content with, or even, frankly, interested in, traditional roles of the state, such as border security and diplomacy, the Democrats have conjured up a world of absolute good and absolute evil outside the supremely insular urban bubbles in which they live and work. As such, they seek to wage a cold culture war, whereby American power is exercised on behalf of their pet social causes.

During the 80 years following the end of the Second World War, there existed a healthy, sometimes fierce competition within the Democratic Party with regard to America and its role in the World: On one side there were what I would call the Rooseveltians; on the other side, the Achesonians.

The death of Franklin D. Roosevelt brought Harry Truman to the White House. In the space of only five years, Truman and his second secretary of state, Dean Acheson, with the help of the original coterie of cold warriors such as James Forrestal, Frank Wisner, and Paul Nitze engineered a radical break with Roosevelt’s postwar vision of Great Power reciprocity as embodied in the UN Charter. The launch of the modern national security state in 1947, followed by the adoption of National Security Council Memorandum 68, militarized George Kennan’s vision of containment and set the course for much of America’s conduct during the succeeding 40 years.


Following the debacle in Korea and Truman’s decision not to run for a second full term, the Rooseveltians made a comeback of sorts (within the party at least) by way of Governor Adlai Stevenson’s two bids for the White House. But by the 1960 election Stevenson was out and John F. Kennedy, touting a vision of an America that would “bear any burden and pay any price” was in. The 1960 election was ultimately a contest between two hawks, Kennedy and Nixon; but with Kennedy’s victory and the appointments of Acheson proteges such as Dean Rusk and other hardliners, the Achesonians were back in business—or so they thought.


To an extent, John F. Kennedy embodied both the Rooseveltian and Achesonian traditions. Until the near-catastrophe of October 1962, his administration governed in the Achesonian style. But after successive crises, in Berlin in 1961 and Cuba in 1962, Kennedy realized that a new approach was needed. This approach was announced at the American University commencement on June 10, 1963. This marked the end of Kennedy’s Achesonian period. And this rejection perhaps, as recent scholarship by James W. Douglass and David Talbot indicates, accounts for what unfolded in Dallas the following November.

There are parallels between what occurred after FDR died and what occurred after Kennedy was assassinated. What is clear is that Kennedy’s successor, the Texan Lyndon Johnson, expanded the disastrous war in Vietnam with the support of the Achesonian establishment Kennedy himself put in place. Ultimately, the pattern that was established in the early 1950s prevailed again the late 1960s: After unwise overreach in Asia, the Achesonians were once again challenged by the Rooseveltians for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Yet in 1968, that quest ended not just in electoral loss, but in tragedy.

From 1968 to 1992 the Republican Party held power for all but four years. This period saw the defeat of George McGovern (a Rooseveltian) in 1972, and, later, the internecine battles between President Jimmy Carter’s hardline Achesonian national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and his more cautious Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. It was during the wilderness years that the Achesonians, chief among them a Georgetown socialite and scholar named Madeleine Korbel Albright, began laying the groundwork for the Achesonians return to power. Albright, who was once a member of Brzezinski’s NSC, along with a former Assistant Secretary of State named Richard Holbrooke, went on to play a pivotal role in the formation and practice of American foreign policy under Bill Clinton.


The principal foreign policy power brokers under Clinton-Albright, Holbrooke and the former Time magazine Russia correspondent Strobe Talbott, helped mold the next generation of Achesonians. Talbott became an important patron and mentor to the future under-secretary of state, Victoria Nuland, and to the Russia policy adviser to Trump’s national security advisers H. R. McMaster, John Bolton, and Fiona Hill. Holbrooke was an important mentor to USAID administrator and selective humanitarian Samantha Power. Albright’s contributions in this area include former Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and the current Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James O’Brien.


During Clinton’s term the Achesonians consistently prevailed over the Rooseveltians—NATO expansion, intervention in the Balkans, and the 78-day bombing of Serbia were among their most lasting, and questionable, achievements.

The effort to oppose NATO expansion in these years, led by the likes of Kennan and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, marked what amounted to the Rooseveltians’ last stand. During the debate on the Senate floor over NATO expansion the learned Moynihan—the holder of a PhD from Tufts, a former U.S. ambassador to India, and a one-time aide to Averell Harriman—was hectored by none other than Senator Joseph R. Biden of Delaware.

By the turn of the century, the game was nearly up for the Rooseveltians. Congresswoman Barbara Lee was the sole dissenter from the Bush administration’s plan to invade Afghanistan. George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq won 29 Democratic votes in the Senate—among them three future Democratic nominees for president (2004, 2016, 2020). During this period the Rooseveltians put up token, ineffectual opposition to Bush’s wars of choice in the presidential candidacies of Howard Dean and Dennis Kucinich.

Again, the pattern of the early 1950s and the late 1960s repeated itself: After a period of presidential overreach, this time under the Republican Bush, the Rooseveltians offered a corrective in the person of Barack Obama. Yet their influence fizzled within mere days of Mr. Obama’s historic election. Hillary Clinton was named secretary of state; Robert Gates remained at his post at the Pentagon; and Leon Panetta was handed the reins at CIA. In terms of both personnel and policy, the Achesonians triumphed during the Obama years and set the stage for a new Cold War.

It was widely assumed that Obama would pick up the pieces of the Bush years and exorcise hegemonic fantasies from the body politic. Instead, over his two terms in office, the convergence of the neoconservative and Wilsonian interventionist creeds has solidified into orthodoxy. No better evidence of this exists than the fact that the neocons who served as the instigators and defenders of George W. Bush’s foreign policy have become devoted supporters of Hillary Clinton. Robert Kagan, Max Boot, and Eliot Cohen, among others, have all voiced their preference for [Hillary] Clinton over the Republican nominee, Donald Trump.

Our story ends where it began: With a perilous Cold War between nuclear armed powers. The difference this time is that the New Cold War involves the United States, Russia, and China in addition to, as of this writing, a proxy war between NATO and Russia in Eastern Europe. Under President Biden the Achesonian vision has triumphed: Last weekend the Ukrainians were handed long range missiles—missiles that require US servicemen to operate. And the Rooseveltians are nowhere to be found on the national stage. Even, sadly, Barbara Lee and the few progressives in Congress have joined the ranks of the new Cold Warriors.

Dissenters such as Tulsi Gabbard are now branded “Russian assets” by Democrats channeling Tailgunner Joe. There are now no elements within the Democratic Party who might serve as a brake on the U.S. foreign policy establishment’s dangerous delusions.

[chanakyaa]

Another Euro-maidan attempt in Georgia's Tbilisi. It is non-stop.

Thousands of Georgians march in Tbilisi to protest against suspension of EU bid

Thousands of protesters flooded the streets surrounding the Georgian Parliament to voice their objection to the ruling party's decision to suspend EU-accession talks...

[drnayar]

Another Euro-maidan attempt in Georgia's Tbilisi. It is non-stop.

Thousands of Georgians march in Tbilisi to protest against suspension of EU bid

Thousands of protesters flooded the streets surrounding the Georgian Parliament to voice their objection to the ruling party's decision to suspend EU-accession talks...

They should do what the paki army did ., block access to the capital city., shut down power and internet access, round them up in the night !! .. lol

[sanman]

They should do what the paki army did ., block access to the capital city., shut down power and internet access, round them up in the night !! .. lol

They should even hire Pak army for that

[sanman]

Trump's Tariff Threat is Just Negotiating Tactic to Get Other Countries' Attention

[drnayar]

https://x.com/DD_Geopolitics/status/1859784216214634975

[S_Madhukar]

Thought this online comment perfectly summarises EU dilemma right now. Mods please move it to the appropriate thread if necessary.

Article - https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfr ... -170141589

In present and prospective conditions Europe (including the UK) cannot transfer large amounts of capital from welfare or civilian investment to defence without risking a social and political explosion. Therefore that transfer will probably not happen. 'Military Keynesianism' is simply a regressive transfer to an essentially parasitical sector, and to the rich. All that perforce might mean the eventual recalibration of policy towards Eurasia and, paradoxically, the apparent attitude taken by Trump (assuming it will not wind up being akin to Nixon's escalation in 1969 in search of peace) makes space for that, and also might give Europe the chance (a final chance?) to escape its present plight by means of the investment in the civilian infrastructure and productive capacity necessary to escape its trap, as proposed by Draghi.

Europe (including the UK) was able to hold its own in international affairs because of high levels of production for export, especially in the automotive sector, and the returns from those exports offset the fact that it lacks sufficient mineral endowments for its manufacturers, which it had to import. Those mineral endowments can now only be bought at a premium because of the sea change in geopolitics, specifically the stunning collapse of European influence in Africa and the Middle East. It is this collapse of influence which, arguably more than any factor (including the failure of investment in Germany) which accounts for the implosion of Europe's strategic autonomy, and its subjection to the caprice of US policy. European - specifically French - policymakers in the 1940s and 1950s realised full well that the preservation of European influence/predation in Africa was essential if Europe was to escape from US tutelage. That is why West Germany was very happy for France to be given special arrangements in Africa which effectively folded much of French territory within Africa into the economic orbit of the then EC.

The risk is that the decline in German manufacturing will become self-reinforcing, regardless of whatever tariff regime will be adopted. At present the problem is not only manifesting itself with the leading marques but more especially (and consequentially) with the rapid decline of key suppliers of parts to those marques - the mittelstand - often family enterprises, who are now selling out in large numbers. In this way we are seeing the Anglicisation of German industry, after the fashion of the late 1970s and early/mid 1980s. In addition, European-owned mining enterprises, which were able to secure discounted metals and rare earths from the Global South (especially Africa) have also been selling out, especially to Chinese investors. These, often rather hidden developments, have also had a major impact upon the evisceration of Europe's strategic autonomy.

Big beasts often thrash about before they die, and it is possible that if German vehicles are barred from the US market or are priced out of the Chinese market then Germany will seek to conserve its surpluses at the expense of debtor nations within the EZ (and the UK), which will result in a further poisoning of intra-European relations.

[drnayar]

Uk is now officially sending military advisers to Ukraine, so end game seems to be a drawn out conflict

[sanman]

Uk is now officially sending military advisers to Ukraine, so end game seems to be a drawn out conflict

They've been sending advisors for awhile now -- maybe they're only just now admitting it

[vijayk]

Don't miss it

https://www.tabletmag.com/feature/rapid ... ightenment

It was Lippman, not Noam Chomsky, who coined the phrase “manufacturing consent,” and in doing so created the framework in which the American governing class would understand both its larger social role and the particular tools at its disposal. “We are told about the world before we see it,” Lippmann wrote. “We imagine most things before we experience them. And those preconceptions, unless education has made us acutely aware, govern deeply the whole process of perception.” Or as he put it even more succinctly: “The way in which the world is imagined determines at any particular moment what men will do.”

The collapse of the 20th-century media pyramid on which Lippmann’s assumptions rested, and its rapid replacement by monopoly social media platforms, made it possible for the Obama White House to sell policy—and reconfigure social attitudes and prejudices—in new ways. In fact, as Obama’s chief speechwriter and national security aide Ben Rhodes, a fiction writer by vocation, argued to me more than once in our conversations, the collapse of the world of print left Obama with little choice but to forge a new reality online.

When I wrote about Rhodes’ ambitious program to sell the Iran deal, I advanced the term “echo chambers” to describe the process by which the White House and its wider penumbra of think tanks and NGOs generated an entirely new class of experts who credentialed each other on social media in order to advance assertions that would formerly have been seen as marginal or not credible, thereby overwhelming the efforts of traditional subject-area gatekeepers and reporters to keep government spokespeople honest. In constructing these echo chambers, the White House created feedback loops that could be gamed out in advance by clever White House aides, thereby influencing and controlling the perceptions of reporters, editors and congressional staffers, and the elusive currents of “public opinion” they attempted to follow. If you saw how the game worked from the inside, you understood that the new common wisdom was not a true “reflection” of what anyone in particular necessarily believed, but rather the deliberate creation of a small class of operatives who used new technologies to create and control larger narratives that they messaged to target audiences on digital platforms, and which often presented themselves to their targets as their own naturally occurring thoughts and feelings, which they would then share with people like themselves.

Being physically inside the White House, it turned out, was a mere detail of power; even more substantial power lay in controlling the digital switchboard that Obama had built, and which it turned out he still controlled.

During the Trump years, Obama used the tools of the digital age to craft an entirely new type of power center for himself, one that revolved around his unique position as the titular, though pointedly never-named, head of a Democratic Party that he succeeded in refashioning in his own image—and which, after Hillary’s loss, had officially supplanted the “centrist” Clinton neoliberal machine of the 1990s.

The Obama Democratic Party (ODP) was a kind of balancing mechanism between the power and money of the Silicon Valley oligarchs and their New York bankers; the interests of bureaucratic and professional elites who shuttled between the banks and tech companies and the work of bureaucratic oversight; the ODP’s own sectarian constituencies, which were divided into racial and ethnic categories like “POC,” “MENA,” and “Latinx,” whose bizarre bureaucratic nomenclature signaled their inherent existence as top-down containers for the party’s new-age spoils system; and the world of billionaire-funded NGOs that provided foot-soldiers and enforcers for the party’s efforts at social transformation.

Actually this is same approach these guys are using to unravel and destroy India piece by piece ... Soros, Pappu, Jihadis, Commies, Zubairs, Indian media filth all built and aggregated by State Dept and NGO networks

[Cyrano]

They have been trying this for decades. Even under corrupt congi regimes they could not destroy India. What will they achieve now?

It will be interesting to see how things may change with Trump admin. I'm not overly optimistic. SD and CIA have their own sources of funding be it drug trade or all kinds of hidden investments in hedge funds etc. They will largely escape DOGE attack and survive.

Their first priority will be to secure their own power within the US system in the coming months and through the Trump term.

[sanman]

Judy Shelton, a former chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy , proposes the idea of a Gold-backed US Treasury security:

[Deans]

I blog on the Ukraine war and the feedback I often get when discussing it in forums is that India is siding with Russia, or financing Putin by buying Russian oil. My latest blog post looks at oil trade data and argues that India's actions are in the best interest of all oil importers. There are more egregious instances of sanctions busting and better ways to reduce Russia's energy export revenues without harming importers.

https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2024/12/in ... ality.html

For those who haven't read my blog - I blog on Indian national security, current wars and startups, with original data based analysis.
My blog is free and non commercial. I am retired and independent. I write to educate myself on subjects of interest to me and not covered
adequately in the mainstream media and generate a fact based discussion in the process.

[drnayar]

[sanman]

[sanman]

[sanman]

[Jay]

qvhmVJQXGZg

Another prediction about the end of US dollar...

I have been reading about this since 1999, no joke, and I guarantee that older maulanaus on this forum have been reading about this prediction back in the 70'S...

[sanman]

Another prediction about the end of US dollar...

I have been reading about this since 1999, no joke, and I guarantee that older maulanaus on this forum have been reading about this prediction back in the 70'S...

BRICS represents a larger share of the world economy than the United States, so they should have more economic clout.
The fact is that the US dollar is losing its credibility, due to increasingly being abused.

[sanman]

Is Trump Hungrily Eyeing the Arctic Region?

[ricky_v]

https://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/g ... ring-world

Global Summits to Watch in 2025: Priorities for a Splintering World

Five years away from the 2030 deadline, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are abysmally off target as the world witnesses growing wealth disparity, widespread hunger, and inadequate medical infrastructure, especially in conflict zones.

World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland (January 20–4)
Technology will once again be on the agenda at the World Economic Forum’s meeting in January. Global leaders in business, government, and civil society will meet in Davos to explore ways to ensure emerging technologies facilitate a more inclusive global economy, better adapt to geoeconomic shifts, increase development of human capital, spur a greener and more sustainable economy, and build a more reliable and equitable global economic order.

G7 Summit, Kananaskis, Alberta, Canada (June)
Meeting at a venue in the Canadian Rockies, the Group of Seven (G7) summit is slated to prioritize moving toward more inclusive economies, combating the growing negative effects of climate change, and regulating emerging technologies. Host Canada made contributions on each of those fronts at the 2024 G7 summit in Puglia, Italy, including leading funding and various initiatives for the International Fund for Agricultural Development, climate resiliency and finance, the transition to global clean energy, sustainable development in the Global South, and the AI for Development program. The G7 Apulia Leaders’ Communiqué from 2024 also emphasized their commitment to cooperation with Africa on global infrastructure and security, supporting Ukraine, and addressing the root causes of migration, which are issues of paramount importance for European G7 members.

UN Ocean Conference, Nice, France (June 9–13)
Ocean conservation efforts are taking on growing urgency with climate change’s effects felt increasingly around the world, especially by millions of people living in coastal regions and island nations. The ocean is absorbing an exorbitant amount of heat due to global warming, which poses a severe threat to biodiversity and can cause bleached coral reefs, reduced fish supply, rising sea levels, and increased natural disasters. Cohosted by France and Costa Rica on the Mediterranean coast, the 2025 UN Ocean Conference (UNOC3) will be the first since the 2022 conference in Lisbon, Portugal.

It will also be the first conference since the historic Agreement on Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction, also known as the High Seas Treaty, opened for signature; the treaty and its provisions will likely be a topic of discussion at the summit. The High Seas Treaty is the first international treaty focusing on governance measures for ocean conservation in waters beyond national boundaries. UNOC3 aims to support the implementation of the fourteenth SDG focused on conserving and sustainably using the oceans, seas, and marine resources. The conference’s Ocean Action Panels will bring together member states, UN agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private companies to encourage commitments to ocean conservation. The conference will culminate in adopting the Nice Ocean Action Plan as a voluntary declaration. Planned alongside UNOC3 will be three side events focusing high-level attention to rising sea levels, the ocean economy, and ocean health and sustainability.

NATO Summit, The Hague, Netherlands (June 24–6)
When the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meets this year in The Hague, Netherlands, defense spending commitments and continued Russian aggression will be on the minds of decision-makers. Moreover, the state of transatlantic relations under a new administration in Washington, DC, and other capitals will be closely watched.


Opening of the UN General Assembly New York, United States, (September 9–23)
This year marks the eightieth meeting of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), and the world’s largest annual convening of high-level leaders and civil society will have much to discuss. Displacement, conflict, poverty, and hunger are on the rise, and the SDGs set out by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development are woefully off-track.

The UN is taking steps to bolster multilateral cooperation on the SDGs and recommit member countries to meeting these goals. This year’s summit will be an opportunity to take stock of the impact of last year’s Pact of the Future, adopted to address issues of development, peace and security, technology, and youth empowerment. To further bolster momentum, the UN will be hosting a Second World Summit for Social Development in November. Hosted by Qatar, this convening will revisit commitments made at the first summit of the same name held thirty years ago.

COP30, Belém, Brazil, (November 10–21)
The thirtieth meeting of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, known as COP30, meets in Brazil’s Amazon Rainforest to put special emphasis on the threat rising greenhouse gas emissions pose to the crucial habitat. The host country’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has indicated he will expect state representatives to come into the conference with renewed plans for emissions reduction.


G20 Summit, Johannesburg, South Africa, (November 22–3)
The Group of Twenty (G20) summit will be held in an African nation for the first time and follows the admission of the African Union last year to this annual meeting of leading and emerging economies. Taking place in Johannesburg, this will be the fourth consecutive year that a country in the Global South has held the presidency. To that point, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa has put forth an agenda under the theme “Solidarity, Equality, and Sustainability” that builds on items addressed at recent G20 meetings in Brazil, India, and Indonesia.

South Africa’s G20 agenda seeks to address issues that are especially important to emerging economies and will focus on climate change–related disaster resilience, debt relief for developing countries, and the mobilization of finance for a just energy transition. There will also be task forces on inclusive economic growth, food security, and technology governance.

However, 2026’s agenda could look quite different for the bloc, whose economies account for around 75 percent of international trade, as the G20 presidency shifts to the United States. When asked about potential disruption if the new Trump administration brings an America First and climate skeptic agenda, Ramaphosa responded that there are sufficient shock absorbers put in place for the G20 to be able to function.

ASEAN and the East Asia Summit, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (Date TBD)
The 2025 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit will set in motion a twenty-year road map prioritizing sustainable development, climate change, digitalization, and gender equality—all urgent topics for the bloc. The summit is also expected to have an economic focus, with Malaysia announcing fifteen priority economic deliverables, as well as the expected conclusions to updated trade agreements, such as the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement.

The BRICS Summit, Brazil (Date TBD)
Brazil, which hosted the G20 summit in 2024, will host the BRICS summit in the next year. The summit will welcome its four newest members and thirteen partner countries for the second time and will likely look into further expanding the bloc. Over thirty other countries, such as Bangladesh and Venezuela, have expressed interest in joining, demonstrating the rapidly growing interest in the bloc from the Global South, which largely sees the group as an alternative to Western-dominated institutions. However the group continues to expand, it will be looking to further solidify its connections with Global South countries.


UN World Space Forum, TBD (December)
Despite widespread dependence on access to satellites, the world lacks the lacks the governance and international frameworks to protect those assets and access to them. The UN World Space Forum brings governments, companies, and nongovernmental organizations together for an opportunity to engage in much-needed dialogue on how to best integrate all stakeholders’ voices in an equitable and inclusive way. The 2025 UN World Space Forum is expected to build on the 2024 forum—“Sustainable Space for Sustainability on Earth”—and discuss implementing sections of the Pact of the Future pertaining to space. The 2025 forum will also likely feature the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space conducting its 2025 midterm review of the Space2030 Agenda, which lays out ways that space assets can be used to achieve the seventeen Sustainable Development Goals.

[ricky_v]

https://archive.is/m8tbu

Although few yet see it coming, humans are about to enter a new era of history. Call it “the age of depopulation.” For the first time since the Black Death in the 1300s, the planetary population will decline. But whereas the last implosion was caused by a deadly disease borne by fleas, the coming one will be entirely due to choices made by people.

Human beings have no collective memory of depopulation. Overall global numbers last declined about 700 years ago, in the wake of the bubonic plague that tore through much of Eurasia. In the following seven centuries, the world’s population surged almost 20-fold.

The last global depopulation was reversed by procreative power once the Black Death ran its course. This time around, a dearth of procreative power is the cause of humanity’s dwindling numbers, a first in the history of the species. A revolutionary force drives the impending depopulation: a worldwide reduction in the desire for children.

Global fertility has plunged since the population explosion in the 1960s. For over two generations, the world’s average childbearing levels have headed relentlessly downward, as one country after another joined in the decline. According to the UN Population Division, the total fertility rate for the planet was only half as high in 2015 as it was in 1965. By the UNPD’s reckoning, every country saw birthrates drop over that period.


In recent years, the birth plunge has not only continued but also seemingly quickened. According to the UNPD, at least two-thirds of the world’s population lived in sub-replacement countries in 2019, on the eve of the COVID-19 pandemic. The economist Jesús Fernández-­Villaverde has contended that the overall global fertility rate may have dropped below the replacement level since then. Rich and poor countries alike have witnessed record-breaking, jaw-dropping collapses in fertility. A quick spin of the globe offers a startling picture.
Start with East Asia. The UNPD has reported that the entire region tipped into depopulation in 2021. By 2022, every major population there—in China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—was shrinking. By 2023, fertility levels were 40 percent below replacement in Japan, over 50 percent below replacement in China, almost 60 percent below replacement in Taiwan, and an astonishing 65 percent below replacement in South Korea.

As for Southeast Asia, the UNPD has estimated that the region as a whole fell below the replacement level around 2018. Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam have been sub-replacement countries for years. Indonesia, the fourth most populous country in the world, joined the sub-replacement club in 2022, according to official figures. The Philippines now reports just 1.9 births per woman. The birthrate of impoverished, war-riven Myanmar is below replacement, too. In Thailand, deaths now exceed births and the population is declining.

In South Asia, sub-replacement fertility prevails not only in India—now the world’s most populous country—but also in Nepal and Sri Lanka; all three dropped below replacement before the pandemic. (Bangladesh is on the verge of falling below the replacement threshold.) In India, urban fertility levels have dropped markedly. In the vast metropolis of Kolkata, for instance, state health officials reported in 2021 that the fertility rate was down to an amazing one birth per woman, less than half the replacement level and lower than in any major city in Germany or Italy.


Dramatic declines are also sweeping Latin America and the Caribbean. The UNPD has calculated overall fertility for the region in 2024 at 1.8 births per woman—14 percent below the replacement rate. But that projection may understate the actual decline, given what the Costa Rican demographer Luis Rosero-Bixby has described as the “vertiginous” drop in birthrates in the region since 2015. In his country, total fertility rates are now down to 1.2 births per woman. Cuba reported a 2023 fertility rate of just over 1.1, half the replacement rate; since 2019, deaths there have exceeded births. Uruguay’s rate was close to 1.3 in 2023 and, as in Cuba, deaths exceeded births. In Chile, the figure in 2023 was just over 1.1 births per woman. Major Latin American cities, including Bogota and Mexico City, now report rates below one birth per woman.

Sub-replacement fertility has even come to North Africa and the greater Middle East, where demographers have long assumed that the Islamic faith served as a bulwark against precipitous fertility declines. Despite the pro-natal philosophy of its theocratic rulers, Iran has been a sub-replacement society for about a quarter century. Tunisia has also dipped below replacement. In sub-replacement Turkey, Istanbul’s 2023 birthrate was just 1.2 babies per woman—lower than Berlin’s.


Russian fertility first dropped below replacement in the 1960s, during the Brezhnev era, and since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has witnessed 17 million more deaths than births. Like Russia, the 27 countries of the current European Union are about 30 percent below replacement today. Together, they reported just under 3.7 million births in 2023—down from 6.8 million in 1964. Last year, France tallied fewer births than it did in 1806, the year Napoleon won the Battle of Jena; Italy reported the fewest births since its 1861 reunification; and Spain the fewest since 1859, when it started to compile modern birth figures. Poland had its fewest births in the postwar era in 2023; so did Germany. The EU has been a net-mortality zone since 2012, and in 2022 it registered four deaths for every three births.

The United States remains the main outlier among developed countries, resisting the trend of depopulation. With relatively high fertility levels for a rich country (although far below replacement—just over 1.6 births per woman in 2023) and steady inflows of immigrants, the United States has exhibited what I termed in these pages in 2019 “American demographic exceptionalism.” But even in the United States, depopulation is no longer unthinkable. Last year, the Census Bureau projected that the U.S. population would peak around 2080 and head into a continuous decline thereafter.

The only major remaining bastion against the global wave of sub-replacement levels of childbearing is sub-Saharan Africa. With its roughly 1.2 billion people and a UNPD-projected average fertility rate of 4.3 births per woman today, the region is the planet’s last consequential redoubt of the fertility patterns that characterized low-income countries during the population explosion of the middle half of the twentieth century.

Its latest medium variant projections—roughly, the median of projected outcomes—for 2024 have put global fertility at just three percent above replacement, and its low variant projections—the lower end of projected outcomes—have estimated that the planet is already eight percent below that level. It is possible that humanity has dropped below the planetary net-replacement rate already.

Nowadays, countries can veer into sub-replacement with low incomes, limited levels of education, little urbanization, and extreme poverty. Myanmar and Nepal are impoverished UN-designated Least Developed Countries, but they are now also sub-replacement societies.

The consensus among demographic authorities today is that the global population will peak later this century and then start to decline. Some estimates suggest that this might happen as soon as 2053, others as late as the 2070s or 2080s.


By 2040, national cohorts of people between the ages of 15 and 49 will decrease more or less everywhere outside sub-Saharan Africa. That group is already shrinking in the West and in East Asia. It is set to start dropping in Latin America by 2033 and will do so just a few years later in Southeast Asia (2034), India (2036), and Bangladesh (2043). By 2050, two-thirds of people around the world could see working-age populations (people between the ages of 20 and 64) diminish in their countries—a trend that stands to constrain economic potential in those countries in the absence of innovative adjustments and countermeasures.


South Korea provides the most stunning vision of a depopulating society just a generation away. Current projections have suggested that South Korea will mark three deaths for every birth by 2050. In some UNPD projections, the median age in South Korea will approach 60. More than 40 percent of the country’s population will be senior citizens; more than one in six South Koreans will be over the age of 80. South Korea will have just a fifth as many babies in 2050 as it did in 1961. It will have barely 1.2 working-age people for every senior citizen.
Should South Korea’s current fertility trends persist, the country’s population will continue to decline by over three percent per year—crashing by 95 percent over the course of a century. What is on track to happen in South Korea offers a foretaste of what lies in store for the rest of the world.

Consider Bangladesh: a poor country today that will be an elderly society tomorrow, with over 13 percent of its 2050 population projected to be seniors. The backbone of the Bangladeshi labor force in 2050 will be today’s youth. But standardized tests show that five in six members of this group fail to meet even the very lowest international skill standards deemed necessary for participation in a modern economy: the overwhelming majority of this rising cohort cannot “read and answer basic questions” or “add, subtract, and round whole numbers and decimals.”

The initial transition to depopulation will no doubt entail painful, wrenching changes. In depopulating societies, today’s “pay-as-you-go” social programs for national pension and old-age health care will fail as the working population shrinks and the number of elderly claimants balloons. If today’s age-specific labor and spending patterns continue, graying and depopulating countries will lack the savings to invest for growth or even to replace old infrastructure and equipment. Current incentives, in short, are seriously misaligned for the advent of depopulation. But policy reforms and private-sector responses can hasten necessary adjustments.

China’s birth crash—the next generation is on track to be only half as large as the preceding one—will unavoidably slash the workforce and turbocharge population aging, even as the Chinese extended family, heretofore the country’s main social safety net, atrophies and disintegrates. These impending realities presage unimagined new social welfare burdens for a no longer dazzling Chinese economy and may end up hamstringing the funding for Beijing’s international ambitions.

[Jay]

BRICS represents a larger share of the world economy than the United States, so they should have more economic clout.
The fact is that the US dollar is losing its credibility, due to increasingly being abused.

Not true Sanman ji. US Dollar has not shed any credibility in trade circles and has increased its share of the global trade. Compared to before pandemic, in 2024 USD accounted for more global trade.

https://www.statista.com/statistics/247 ... -currency/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Template: ... currencies

[AkshaySG]

BRICS Currency or any similar initiatives are dead in the water till it's 2 biggest members are in outright confrontation with each other.

Till China and India have better relations with each other than they do with US this is all fantasy. You can have as many conferences and sign as many "MOUs" as you want but with Indo-Chinese cooperation it won't work.

Russia has its own issues and both Brazil and South Africa have made nothing of the potential they showed in early 2000s.

BRICS will continue to have some say as the voice of the global south and providing a bulwark against Western hegemony but when it comes to finances and trade we will continue to live in a Bretton Woods world for another few decades

[drnayar]

Is India World's New Fulcrum? • Arakan Army v B'desh • Taliban v Pakistan • Maj Gen Rajiv Narayanan

where the leftists, sorrows , obammur etc are involved., using the radical islam as a tool etc

[ricky_v]

https://brusselssignal.eu/2025/01/domin ... -strategy/

In short, America’s new imperator has four types of choices in foreign affairs: détente, rollback, restraint, or dominion. The first two broadly correspond to the paths pursued by Nixon and Reagan; the third would conform to the “multipolarist” vision of so-called post-liberal “realists”; and the fourth would be a new departure. As always, none of these options are clear-cut, and in practice things always mix and cross over category definitions. But any effective policy must have a distinct and deliberate underlying strategic intent.

His 2017 National Security Strategy, expertly led by Nadia Schadlow, was a landmark document in that it recognised the return of great power competition in world affairs and the definitive end of the Fukuyama paradigm and America’s unipolar moment.

In these conditions, Donald Trump’s first grand-strategic option, as he resumes his duties as Commander in Chief, could be to reach for a détente process. As explained previously in these pages, the real purpose of détente – rather than the “appeasement” caricature drawn up by its critics, even back to Kissinger’s days – is “managed peaceful coexistence, not friendship”. The idea is to negotiate a reduction in tensions, from a position of strength, with a view to stabilising relations with adversaries and reducing the risk of war.

Rollback

Instead of détente, many in Trump’s team – especially his more “traditional” picks for key foreign policy and national security roles – would likely be inclined to advise the opposite course of action: an uncompromising, Reagan-style strategy of aggressively confronting and rolling back Russian and Chinese power from all key regions where they’ve been making inroads.

One inspiration could be Reagan’s 1983 National Security Decision Directive 75 which unambiguously tasked the US Government “to contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas—particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States.”

This was one of the most successful applications of strategy in history – from the formulation of the strategic concept to its complex implementation, including politically – as it did effectively lead to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The most obvious practical problem with attempting to replicate this approach today, however, is the sheer cost differential: the relative military-economic advantage the US holds over China today (leaving aside the problems of Russia and Iran, and other aspects related to the global balance) is significantly less than it was the case with respect to the USSR in the 1980s. Reagan’s strategy was based on a major military build-up – including the space-based Strategic Defence Initiative for missile defence – combined with much better technology, which the Soviets could not match.

Restraint

A grand strategy of restraint would be Trump’s third option at this point. The term is somewhat imprecise and it can be encountered under different meanings in defence and foreign policy debates. Here, it is used to capture what in recent years has been variously been described as the “isolationist” or Mearsheimer-style “realist” tendency on some of the new Right in US politics, and of many others elsewhere (including figures in allied countries) who embrace the “post-liberal” critique of the “American hegemony” in international affairs and its supposed ills.


These are often enthusiasts for a “multipolar” world order, who essentially believe that US power has been misused – certainly in practice, but also from a moral standpoint – and who would therefore welcome the end of American primacy, partly as a way to save the US from the costly mistakes of its own actions and interventions abroad.

Opinion among “restrainers” sits on a spectrum. Some prescribe a rather radical form of isolationism, complete with a withdrawal from alliances, or at least “mothballing” them – for example, the idea of a “dormant NATO”. Others accept the need for the US to be able to intervene militarily when its vital interests demand it, but reject the notion of any ideological or moral interference in such decisions. Their prescriptions centre on reducing America’s global military deployments and shifting a large part of the global security burden on to allies.

Implicit in almost all variations of the restraint argument is a readiness to accept the end of US primacy and the relative decline of US power – and thus a multipolar world – as a foregone conclusion. On this basis alone we may safely expect this view to have little traction with Trump, who has a strong, instinctive belief in America’s potential and indeed destiny.

Dominion


Despite its defiant tone and recalcitrant attitude, Europe is completely exposed and prostrate before American power. Under the Democrats, this mattered little because Biden, as a Trans-Atlanticist of the classic sort, held to the old post-WWII “allied spirit” that – despite the occasional rows – has guided America’s relationship with Europe for 80 years. But, technically, it doesn’t have to be like this, certainly not when European power has completely collapsed. A more irreverent and purely transactional president – say, one like Trump – will now be in a position to exact a heavy price for continued cooperation with Europe, and to push the “Old Lady” to the limit. Considering the insults he has had to endure from the across the “cradle of Western civilisation”, who can blame him.

Other allies are equally on or almost on their knees, and in the position of supplicants for US protection and help – including over economics and trade. These range from Canada; to the UK, with its economy now ruined by a combination of atrocious Tory and Labour policies; to Israel, which, its superb military accomplishments and bravery aside, depends heavily on US support and aid; and on to places like Australia, for whom AUKUS is now essential but, again, depends on US policy especially on tech cooperation and submarine deliveries; and, of course, the greatest dependent on US help – Ukraine.

Foes, too, now hang on what Trump might do next. Russia, economically vulnerable after three years of full-scale war, needs Trump’s cooperation to get some kind of deal done over Ukraine, and likely fears American economic pressure especially on the oil front. Certainly, Moscow is ready for the worst case scenario as well, and is likely able to push on with the war even under the harshest conditions, but that would carry much higher costs and would change the nature of the conflict.

In its turn, Iran, reeling from its multi-level defeats at Israel’s hands, must now be truly concerned about the real possibility of a US-Israeli strike on its nuclear programme. This would have been out of the question under the pro-Iran Democrats; but Trump’s arrival spells potential disaster for the ayatollahs.

As Trump takes office, then, it is only China that stands as an implacable and difficult strategic adversary. But even China is experiencing economic difficulties, and its interest, in the short term at least, is to avoid a mutually-destructive trade war.

In this context, Trump is now in an unparalleled position of strength towards allies, which would allow him to dictate new terms of business – but also towards opponents, which likewise present him with opportunities for advancing his America First foreign policy chiefly through diplomacy and trade.

Such a confluence of factors – leverage abroad, strength at home, despite all the domestic challenges and troubles – does not happen often, and certainly not in conjunction with a pattern- (and rule-)breaking character like Trump, and with a moment of such flux in international relations.

But perhaps we are not thinking big enough. Perhaps the world is reverting to older patterns of statecraft where expansion is once again becoming a legitimate objective of state action – in the classic sense of direct territorial acquisition, or in the form of protectorates and other kinds of dependencies, or indeed, most certainly, in the form of classic spheres of interests.

As regions continue to convulse under the geopolitical pressures and political associations like the EU head towards fragmentation, the great imperial-like powers like the US may well be in a position to offer hard-pressed polities a suzerainty deal they could not refuse. Rather than “great power competition”, a more appropriate framework for long-term US grand strategy, then, should be dominion. After all, the end of the Republic was only the beginning of half a millennium of imperial rule at Rome.

[ricky_v]

There seems to be a lot of momentum built up globally, trumps unleashing of big dollars into tech is doing the rounds, the Davis summit is happening and everyone is quoting draghi's recent work on supercharging European innovation and market very very religiously.

I believe that we are now poised towards a big evolution in human living as momentous as the shift from a lifestyle of hunter gatherer towards one of community farming, we have not progressed beyond that I don't think

[ricky_v]

ai stargate, crispr, tailored drugs, chinese fusion, other imminent fusion breakthroughs... the list of epoch-making announcements and initiatives have made the last couple of days as momentous as several decades
the country of india, as it stands, is primarily an instrument of social upliftment of the deprived.. anything we say otherwise has been proven wrong to our anguish; in this context, we will always remain the 4th country this and 5th country that for new technologies, as the majority of our monies is earmarked for the underprivileged, and not for r&d into tech, not saying that it is necessarily good or bad, but rather now is the time, without any feet dragging to enter into collaboration with other significant powers to try to get to whatever hoops the pure government-backed-capitalistic on steroids of us and china now unleashes and tries to monopolise it and or forms syndicates / cartels around it

in this instance, fourth or fifth country label will suffice, the only important thing being for us is to be able to be in these new, for the foreseeable tech oriented global groupings

the obvious grouping would be with japan and france (+other med) if the eu remains undecided, and whenever russia is allowed to become a non-maligned partner

[drnayar]

There seems to be a lot of momentum built up globally, trumps unleashing of big dollars into tech is doing the rounds, the Davis summit is happening and everyone is quoting draghi's recent work on supercharging European innovation and market very very religiously.

I believe that we are now poised towards a big evolution in human living as momentous as the shift from a lifestyle of hunter gatherer towards one of community farming, we have not progressed beyond that I don't think

as some "odd" people are saying, the shift has started, Kali yuga apparently over etc

[ricky_v]

China’s S&T development has accelerated enormously in the last few years.

Quantum communication. Far side lunar landing Mars landing. EV batteries. Highest fusion temperature. Desktop AI peer competitor to ChatGPT. Longest space walk. Own space station. Fastest train.
Some cities that make Canadian cities look like backwater dumps.

That’s what $ 1 trillion dollar surpluses can achieve.

By the time India approaches these accomplishments, they may have an insurmountable lead.

The best may be to ally unreservedly with the US. Not for military crumbs. But to grow rich. Like China and Japan and Korea and Taiwan. All without exception have had a deep alliance with the US.


Sincerely,

Worried.

Great White North.

Trump will do very little damage to China. China's manufacturing prowess in any sector is streets ahead of competition and no one has even begun to understand how far ahead the Chinese ecosystem is in every area of modern civilization from consumer products, civil engineering, food production, urban planning, computers, mobile phones, quantum computing, fusion energy you name it and there is a Chinese group of companies that commands 70% of the global manufacturing capacity. Apart from food and some amount of energy supplies that China has locked up from Russia they are essentially self sufficient. Japan emerged from the Meiji revolution as a massive modern economy and China has emerged from the cold war in 30 years due to the astute planning of the CPC as an even bigger and more efficient version. The country is running like an efficient corporate startup, able to take massive risks no democracy can take, make mistakes and correct those mistakes faster than most can comprehend, decisions at the top are scientific, data driven, relentless time bound, the people's culture work oriented and projects are outcome oriented.

the last couple of days have left me demoralised, when we talked about potential of india in 2000's, we would always say that the opportunity is being squandered, it would get better when a different government comes to the power, when the arrhythmic growth of 2010's was discussed, we would say, it is to clear the institutional issues, when firm laws take place, we would supercharge towards innovation, now it is mid 2020's, and the only comparison i can think of is 500bn dollar investment in futuristic technologies by allies, breakthrough in ai by foes, and 1000 rupees free monies every month for laadli behena schemes, vitriolic attacks on who can fatten the populate more on freebies, debates on secularism and bollywood, and all the maayajaal....
and i know, bitterly, we would never become first-mover innovators ever

how we came to this is i suppose a matter for scholarly discussion, maybe our land of plenty did move us towards a torpid lifestyle, with everything available easily, the only thing left was to indulge in meaningless prattle, and as a society we cast the glamour of maayajaal on our own selves.
I believe that in the annals of human history, indians would be classified under "also-rans", which would be better than "literal-whos", but we would never be of the countries that would innovate of be looked towards for breakthrough and progress

what we can do, is to play on our demographic strength and our market size, and reduce the timeframe between late adaptors and move swiftly towards early adaptors of new technologies; in this, i believe we should align ourselves with other "also-rans" and collaborate on funding and resources; its not that our public is not capable, but the choleric system reacts way too late for it to be meaningful, and now as the growth in techs is exponential, time is the main differentiating factor

in 2014, when modi first came into power, the first budget mentioned that new chip fabricating units would be setup in india, i remember because i was in college at that time, and there was quite an excitement among my cohort for this news, in 2019 also, i believe, sitharaman proposed in her budget that the same 2 fabricating units would be established, it was still late but then covid put paid to those plans, if there were any, its 2025, and now the momentum and window has left us quite diminished, with nary a fabricating unit in sight, though there are plenty on paper

[sanjaykumar]

Apparently fab plants were first discussed in the 1970s by American corporations. But the wisdom of the Indian political class prevailed.


Of course one has priorities. For Indians it seems to be to make YouTube videos with a garish smear of ash on the forehead.

The people who first joined this forum are resigned to dying off with no fundamental change on the ground. They are now also thinking things won’t be any different for the next generation.

It is cultural.

[Hriday]

^^
A single ruler with a no-nonsense approach will and can dramatically change everything. See the examples of rulers of Singapore, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Argentina and the latest example, Trump. They almost single-handedly brought the change. India is still awaiting such a ruler. Hopefully, he will come. IMHO culture of the nation matters little. Just imagine a Taliban or ISIS type leader in UAE and Saudi. He can easily win mass appeal. But somehow that didn't happen. More like destiny or luck.

[sanjaykumar]

Americans have an unshakeable faith in business. Regardless of who is in power, the economy and hence technology powers on. There is perfect congruence with evolutionary processes. Competion cooperation specialization and rewards for the fittest.

No prime minister in the Westminster style of governance can or should have strongman powers.

The American presidency is conferred with privilege akin to the communist politburo bosses. By design.

As China dominates, I will be firmly in the American camp. Trump by promoting Indians in spite of his MAGA constituency has made many who reviled his politics turn admirers of his vision.

[S_Madhukar]

Among this despair does anyone think that this 500B will be more of a Star Wars 80s style fiasco ? I mean don’t they have physical infrastructure that needs maintenance and renewal as well and who else after Chicoms to buy their toxic debt that keeps on ballooning? When you put the cart before the horse chances are you will be fleeced and every incremental outcome will be deemed revolutionary. Just look at the expensive MIC toys…

Also What I am wary of is us sending out our people to work across the world talking up mobility and on the flip side us needing BDs and Ro to work for us cheaply… already from some quarters there is displeasure for sending them back if it comes to that …

if I have to make a conspiracy theory we end up becoming a trained workforce that helps the West until AI becomes mature and then we are still not rich and older and becoming contributing sepoys of a new techno imperialism. Why would goras be happy to do our bidding if not otherwise

Will be interesting to see if this 500B leads to increased migration from EU to US…. Or may be it’s just a canard to suck in more talent from the rest of the world helping MAGA at their expense!

@Sanjayji it may well be that this generation will have to keep its head down, relearn dharma, work and play the classic middle overs game until 20 years later we find the pinch hitters that will win us the game in the last 10 years. After all we did the things that were done in space 60 years ago so hopefully we compress that time period now

[Vayutuvan]

No prime minister in the Westminster style of governance can or should have strongman powers.

The American presidency is conferred with privilege akin to the communist politburo bosses. By design.

That style of governance has only two arms of the government - Legislature (PM is part of the legislature) and Judiciary. Executive is under the Head of State which is hereditary in the UK and the true commonwealth - Canada, Aus and NZ. In India, the head of state is non-hereditary sort of elected. Executive, i.e. babudom, are unelected 99% of whom are also unelectable as well.

In the US, the buck stops with the POTUS but in India, the buck doesn't stop anywhere.

[ricky_v]

Among this despair does anyone think that this 500B will be more of a Star Wars 80s style fiasco ? I mean don’t they have physical infrastructure that needs maintenance and renewal as well and who else after Chicoms to buy their toxic debt that keeps on ballooning? When you put the cart before the horse chances are you will be fleeced and every incremental outcome will be deemed revolutionary. Just look at the expensive MIC toys…

if your question is can america scrounge up some cash for their physical infra, i believe that they have exited who which was costing them 500 mil usd a year, thats 2 billion right there, plus they have exited some other useless treaties and that frees up cash for them

so no, i dont believe that this will be a fiasco, the energy in america is very high right now, after a very long time they are throwing their weight about openly, and not in the sniveling, duplicitous way that we have been used to them behaving as, and fulfilling the adage that this is america's world, other nationalities simply live in it

if I have to make a conspiracy theory we end up becoming a trained workforce that helps the West until AI becomes mature and then we are still not rich and older and becoming contributing sepoys of a new techno imperialism. Why would goras be happy to do our bidding if not otherwise

i dont think thats a conspiracy theory, this may be one of the reasons why our school textbooks have not been changed for so long

[Vayutuvan]

so no, i dont believe that this will be a fiasco, the energy in america is very high right now,

The excitement is palpable. Let us see how long this lasts but folks are optimistic. But grocery prices are shocking.

[A_Gupta]

PM Modi said :

For the first time in 10 years, there has been no attempt from abroad to stoke any trouble ahead of Parliament session, said Prime Minister Narendra Modi in a dig at Opposition in his customary address ahead of the beginning of Budget Session on Friday, January 31.

Does anyone have the complete list of incidents by year?