bala wrote: ↑14 May 2025 11:02
I find this interesting and in line with what I wrote on Pak land nukes.
Tom Cooper in
https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/pa ... btf-factor says the following:
In the case of Pakistan, the TBTF-factor is that country's nukes: all the threat assessements for Pakistan I know say, many of these nukes are most likely non-operational (so much so: the first test of a Pakistani nuke actually failed, and China had to rush and send several of its own, so the Pakistanis could arrange ‘successful’ nuclear tests). However, these nukes exist and one can never be sure.
<snip>
While the TBTF analogy is useful in framing the geopolitical calculus around Pakistan’s stability, some of the technical assertions in the quote lean into conspiracy or speculative territory.
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Operational Status of Pakistan's Nukes
The claim that many of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are "most likely non-operational" is speculative. While some uncertainty surrounded Pakistan’s capacity, credible evidence shows that:
- Pakistan conducted multiple nuclear tests in May 1998 that were widely recognized as successful.
- It has since developed some second-strike capability and somes delivery systems (missiles, aircraft,Jdam?) ).
- Intelligence agencies, while concerned about command and control, do not generally question the operational status
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Claim of Chinese Nukes in 1998
As said previously - the assertion that the “first test failed” and that China had to provide nuclear devices for Pakistan’s tests is a long-standing rumor, but there's no confirmed evidence to support it. It's known that China and Pakistan have cooperated closely on nuclear and missile technology. However, the idea that China “rushed in” nukes for Pakistan’s 1998 tests is highly unlikely logistically, technically and diplomatically.,
(Chinese assistance have occurred earlier, in terms of designs or enrichment technology, but not the literal loaning of bombs)
- "
These nukes exist, and one can never be sure"
This is a fair and realistic caveat. Nuclear deterrence operates on uncertainty and perception as much as capability. Even if doubts exist about reliability or control, the mere presence of a nuclear arsenal alters strategic calculations.
