CDS Appointment & Command Restructuring: News & Discussions

[SBajwa]

[Rakesh]

Modi govt sets timeline for theaterisation, work being sped up
https://theprint.in/defence/modi-govt-s ... p/2084552/
14 May 2024

Modi dispensation wants it rolled out within one year of the new govt's swearing-in. Comes after armed forces held a conference to review progress of plan.

[Kanoji]

The plan entails a three-stage process that includes among other things self-reliance, adapting to technology and defining what is integration.

India’s Biggest Military Reforms: Final Shape Given To Contours Of Theatre Commands, Proposal To Be Sent To Government Soon
https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/indi ... nment-soon
22 May 2024

[AkshaySG]

Has there been any info on the chain of command we finalized on?

Will it be PM - > RM - > Theatre Commanders or will the CDS role also be elevated with operational control.

[Rakesh]

CDS Calls For ‘Jointness 2.0’ For Integrated Theatre Commands
https://bharatshakti.in/cds-calls-for-j ... -commands/
21 May 2024

[VinodTK]

From: The WEEK

Brigadier-rank officers get posting orders for theatre commands

For sure, the theaterisation move is gathering traction even as Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan, of late, has been travelling the length and breadth of the country meeting the men in uniform, asking them to prepare for what has been called the Indian military’s biggest transformation move.

“And wherever he cannot go due to paucity of time and logistics, he is meeting the officers online in video conferences,” an official familiar with the developments told THE WEEK.

The office of the CDS was created on September 30, 2022, with the core mandate of theaterisation, promoting jointness and integration of the Indian military.

“In the meantime, military officials in the rank of brigadiers in the army and commodores in the air force and the navy have been asked to report to their new integrated postings in a few days from now,” the official added.

The new postings are mainly for Jaipur (Pakistan-centric command), Lucknow (China centric command) and Visakhapatnam (navy centric command).

With theaterisation, a single commander in a designated zone will command all the assets and resources of all forces be it from the army, the navy or the air force stationed in that zone.

The challenges are not just about amalgamation and integration of men but also of weapons systems and platforms that is made more difficult because of the possibility of non-compatability among the systems.

Colonel and below-ranked officers in the army, group captain and below-ranked officers in the air force, captain and below-ranked officers in the navy had already started moving to these commands from about a year back.

The move towards theatre commands encountered its initial hiccups in the IAF’s ‘reservations’ on certain issues. Since then, the ‘reservations’ are understood to have been hammered out.

Last week, CDS Gen Chauhan had said during a speech in an event in New Delhi that “as there were no major differences, there is an impetus to move towards the next level of jointness” among the armed services.

“The creation of such (theatre) commands will separate the ‘operational’ functions from the Raise-Train-Sustain (RTS) and other administrative functions, and will allow greater focus of the operational commander to matters of security”.

Saying that theatre commands will not be an end state but the beginning of the next set of reforms, the CDS said it will lead to the next set of reforms like “single to multi domain operations, fusing space and cyber space into traditional domains, digitisation of battlefield information and visualisation, net centric to data centric among others”.

On May 10 and 11, the CDS presided over a two day ‘Parivartan Chintan’ (transformative discussion) in South Block that was attended by the heads of all Tri-services Institutes and was “aimed at generating novel reformative ideas & initiatives”.

[VinodTK]

Fostering ti-service collabration at grassroots level: 40 trainee officers commence joint training at DSSC

[VinodTK]

Three Theatre Command bases identified, Military Affairs Dept working to integrate forces for future wars

New Delhi [India], July 3 (ANI): Even as Prime Minister Narendra Modi assured that the creation of Theatre Commands was on track, the Defence Ministry has identified three locations in Lucknow, Jaipur and Thiruvananthapuram as their headquarters.
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[ramana]

Background article for Indian defence organization

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/ ... dent-india

[chetak]

This is an old picture

Poignant


Looks like a regular photograph until you see it up close.

It’s a moving tribute.

Missing Man Formation as a mark of respect for India’s first CDS General Bipin Rawat.

[Rakesh]

First Defence Minister-led Joint Commanders' Conference to discuss security challenges, future warfare
https://aninews.in/news/national/genera ... 816185658/
16 August 2024

https://x.com/Duorope/status/1824456559935590906 ---> Lucknow based Central Command (Surya) will also be converted into the 1st Integrated Theater Command.

[Rakesh]

Integrated theatre commands plan ready for government nod
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ind ... 074831.cms
04 Sept 2024

[VinodTK]

India set for its biggest military reform as Integrated Theatre Commands await final govt nod

proposal is with the defence ministry to set up a China-focused Northern Theatre Command in Lucknow, a Pakistan-centric Western Theatre Command in Jaipur and a Maritime Theatre Command in Thiruvananthapuram, aligning with the 'one border, one force' concept
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[VinodTK]

Integrated command centers in Lucknow, Jaipur and Trivandrum; Here's how India plans to counter China-Pak threats

[VinodTK]

Six service chiefs back military theatre commands

New Delhi: India has taken a firm step towards the creation of military theatre commands by achieving a consensus between the chiefs of the three services, first in April, and then again in October (all three services got new chiefs in the intervening months), and the chief of defence staff (CDS) in favour of integrated formations and communications and the optimum utilization of resources, according to people familiar with the matter.

HT learns that the military theatre commands plan is ready and will be soon put up before the apex political leadership for approval. The first firm step towards theatre commands was taken on May 10 when the government notified the Inter-Services Organizations (Command, Control and Discipline) Act aimed at achieving synergy amongst the three services.

Rather than impose the military theatre commands on the three services, the government, through CDS Gen Anil Chauhan has adopted a bottom-up approach by discussing the entire proposal at every level of the services. The country will have three commands centered on the military threat from the West, North and in the maritime domain, which includes the island territories.

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and national security planners have been briefed about the recommendations of the CDS on military theatre commands, the people cited above added. They explained that India’s plan is granular , and that the services have agreed to centralise communications, intelligence, cyber-security and logistics. The three services currently operate on separate communication networks – this meant a higher resonse time as everything had to go through the respective service’s headquarters in Delhi. Nor was there a seamless sharing of intelligence between the services with the army, navy and air force working purely on a need-to-know basis.

Experts have long held that theatre commands are the future. The P-5 countries all have theatre command structures, and India cannot afford to have its armed forces working in silos and on security architecture based on the past, they add. The most important outcome of theatre commands will be rationalisation of costly military resources and integration of platforms. The government is also keen on the Indian armed forces cutting down on ceremonial events and crafting battle strategies that are suited to regional context rather than blindly aping western tactics.

The three military theatre commanders will be equivalent in rank to the three service chiefs and will directly report to the Defence Minister via CDS for operational purposes. This will also ensure that the Defence Minister is abreast with developments on the border and at sea and up to date on operational matters as is the case in the P-5 countries.

With the three chiefs agreeing to military reforms in favor of theatre commands, the ball is in the court of the political leadership on when the new security architecture will be unveiled.

HindustanTimes.com

[ramana]

"The three military theatre commanders will be equivalent in rank to the three service chiefs and will directly report to the Defence Minister via CDS for operational purposes. This will also ensure that the Defence Minister is abreast with developments on the border and at sea and up to date on operational matters as is the case in the P-5 countries.'

This is severe upgrading the rank of the theater commands to the level of the service chiefs and quite uncalled for in case of India.
The US theaters are vast continents and not a region of India.

Even China's Western Theater command area of responsibility is huge.

Looks like the political leadership is forced to accept this perk to enable theater commands.
Which have successfully been stalled for 24 years.
In case any one forgets Theater Commands were proposed by the KRC report formed after 199 Kargil War.

[ramana]

The contrary argument is the theater commanders can't afford to be bossed by service chiefs while they are fighting the enemy.
In fact Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh ignored Gen Chaudhri 's order to evacuate in 1965 as that would leave Amritsar defenceless.

I'm 1971 Lt Gen Sagat Singh saw the opportunity to capture Dacca and end the war and he did it despite orders from Delhi.

Future commanders might not be so bold.

Hence I agree it's more urgent to get the theater commands setup with appropriate authority to suit Indian conditions.
We shouldn't forget NSA Doval had to be given Cabinet rank in 2019 to deal with the Byzantine ways of Indian babucracy.
One general wrote that by 1955 Indian military had been transformed into a bureaucracy where seniority and branch matter.
So I take back my objections not that they matter!

[VinodTK]

Rajnath to get final integrated theater command file soon

[ShauryaT]

This is severe upgrading the rank of the theater commands to the level of the service chiefs and quite uncalled for in case of India.
The US theaters are vast continents and not a region of India.

Even China's Western Theater command area of responsibility is huge.

Looks like the political leadership is forced to accept this perk to enable theater commands.
Which have successfully been stalled for 24 years.
In case any one forgets Theater Commands were proposed by the KRC report formed after 199 Kargil War.

I think it is good to have this upgrade and have a direct connection between political and military operations. At the end of the day, executive decisions have to be vested in political authority, which I feel is the real achilles heal in our security setup, both in its non-specialized bureaucracy and largely non-interested in security affairs political masters.

[VinodTK]

The Print: Future Warfare Fund set up within the armed forces: Parliamentary panel on defence

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The ministry has also apprised the panel that theaterisation being a trailblazing reform, a large number of complex issues which have a direct bearing on the proposed force structure require to be “addressed comprehensively”.

The ‘Seventh Report on Demands for Grants of the Ministry of Defence for the year 2025-26 on General Defence Budget, Border Roads Organisation, Indian Coast Guard, Defence Estates Organisation, Welfare of Ex-Servicemen and Defence Research and Development Organisation (Demand Nos. 19, 20 and 21)’, was presented in Parliament on Monday.

The total outlay for the Ministry of Defence for Budget Estimates 2025-26 is Rs 6,81,210.27 crore and amounts to approximately 13.45 per cent of the total expenditure of the Government of India (Rs 50.65 lakh crore), which is the highest among ministries.

The committee, in its report, said that it has learned from the ministry’s submission that a Future Warfare Fund has also been set up within the armed forces. A Future Analysis Group, for studying future technologies and their impact, is also proposed to be set up.
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The ministry has further submitted that the integrated theatre commands will facilitate better coordination and integrated application of force which will enhance operational efficiency and optimise resource utilisation, the report said.

“It would also aid in the creation and integration of new war-fighting capabilities and faster assimilation of future technology and tactics. The concept of theaterisation seeks to mitigate the shortcomings of single service operations and support modern warfighting,” the panel added.

The committee said it has desired to be apprised about the strategic operational preparedness of the defence forces in view of the present security scenario and conceived threat perception.
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[vsunder]

Operation Sindoor is unique in the sense it has been prosecuted with a CDS in charge to advise the political establishment for the first time in the history of modern India. How did this work out? Furthermore there was already a process of transitioning to theater commands. There was a Western theater which was located at Jaipur and ranks upto Brigadier level and appropriate equivalent ranks from the Air Force that had moved to Jaipur preparatory to making the theaters operational. Most importantly there was an Air Defence Command with assets taken from all services What role did this new theatre have in the success of air defence operations in the current war? This year was the year of Defence Reforms as stated by Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh to implement Theatre commands. The implementation seems to be in an advanced stage with the Air Force being the main laggard and not being fully on board. What lessons were learned from Sindoor? Esp. since this was an Air war, was the Air force correct in its objections and how will it affect going forward? Will there be now more delays with setting up the theatre commands based on perceived shortcomings in this current war or will the war be perceived as an outstanding success even with the stage of partial transition to theater commands esp. with the Air Defence command? The following months will be very interesting to observe the effects of the war on the the setting up of the operational theatre commands.

[Hriday]

See the press information bureau news screenshot in the link.
https://x.com/alpha_defense/status/1927 ... TQ_tQ&s=19

Government has notified the Rules under Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control & Discipline) Act 2023. This marks the full operationalisation of the Act, empowering Commanders-in-Chief and Officers-in-Command of ISOs with authority over personnel from all three services under their command.

It ensures effective discipline, streamlined administration, and enhanced jointness—without altering individual service conditions.

Another explanation,
https://x.com/Neetivaan/status/19276087 ... mTxFw&s=19

For those who are confused, here's easy explanation:

> Army officers can give orders to all Army, Air Force, Navy and soldiers have to follow orders.

> Naval officers can give orders to all Army, Air Force, Navy and soldiers have to follow orders.

> AF officers can give orders to all Army, Air Force, Navy and soldiers have to follow orders.

A true step in Jointness among Tri-Services.

[VinodTK]

^^^^ From Devdiscourse
Rules Under Inter-Services Organisations Act Now in Force to Boost Jointness

India’s Armed Forces, the Government of India has officially notified the Rules under the Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control and Discipline) Act, 2023. These Rules, published via Gazette Notification, came into effect from May 27, 2025, marking the full operationalization of the Act and a transformative step in fostering greater integration and efficiency within the military establishment.

Legislative Journey and Timeline
The Inter-Services Organisations Act, 2023, was passed during the Monsoon Session of Parliament in 2023, underscoring the government’s resolve to establish a clear and unified chain of command across the tri-services framework. The legislation:

Received Presidential assent on August 15, 2023
Came into force on May 10, 2024, as per Gazette Notification dated May 08, 2024
Formally recognized Inter-Services Organisations (ISOs) through Notification No. SRO 72 on December 27, 2024

The recently notified Rules under Section 11 of the Act complete the legislative and regulatory architecture, enabling the practical implementation of the law across all designated ISOs.
Purpose and Scope of the Act

The Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control and Discipline) Act, 2023, is designed to facilitate efficient functioning, seamless coordination, and disciplinary harmony across military units that operate under an inter-services command structure. The Act specifically empowers:
Commanders-in-Chief andOfficers-in-Command of ISOs to exercise disciplinary authority over service personnel of all branches of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy, and Air Force) assigned to their command. This enables the streamlined administration of justice, expedites case resolutions, and prevents duplication of proceedings, while preserving the unique service conditions of each military wing.

Key Features of the Notified Rules
The newly framed Rules are integral to implementing the Act effectively. Their highlights include:
Procedures for disciplinary actions and administrative redressal mechanisms within ISOs
Defined jurisdictional authority for commanders of inter-services establishments Frameworks for integrated decision-making, ensuring functional and legal clarity Mechanisms for reporting, appeals, and oversight in line with the military justice system Safeguards to ensure no infringement of service-specific entitlements or legal rights These Rules not only operationalize the provisions of the Act but also lay the foundational principles for a unified chain of command, enhancing overall coordination and operational readiness.

Strengthening Jointness and Operational Synergy

The activation of this legal framework will have a profound impact on the functioning of key tri-service institutions such as:
Integrated Defence Staff (IDS)
Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC)
Defence Cyber Agency
Defence Space Agency
Defence Intelligence Agency

These organisations, comprising personnel from all three services, will now benefit from a clear legal and administrative hierarchy, removing ambiguities and delays in the chain of command.
This is particularly significant in the context of India’s evolving defence doctrine, which emphasizes jointness, theaterisation, and multi-domain operations. The Act and its supporting Rules are thus crucial enablers in the creation of joint theatre commands, which are currently under active consideration.

Benefits and Long-Term Impact
The implementation of the Inter-Services Organisations Act and its Rules is expected to:
Accelerate the unification of command structures
Promote accountability and quick disciplinary action
Enhance administrative coherence and legal clarity
Reduce inter-service frictions in joint organisations
Strengthen India’s ability to respond to multi-domain threats

Most importantly, this will foster a culture of seamless coordination, laying the groundwork for a modernized and agile Indian military capable of tackling emerging global and regional security challenges.

The full operationalization of the Inter-Services Organisations (Command, Control and Discipline) Act, 2023, is a milestone in India's military reforms. By empowering ISO leadership with the legal tools necessary for effective command and discipline, the Act not only enhances internal efficiency but also supports the broader strategic goals of jointness, readiness, and integration.

With these Rules in place, India takes a decisive step toward building a more unified, responsive, and modern defence force, aligned with the vision of Atmanirbhar Bharat and global security leadership.

[drnayar]

So a Indian army corps commander can call in a air strike starightaway without going through another chain of command ?

[pravula]

Thats the plan

[VinodTK]

Theaterisation gathers steam: CDS can now issue joint orders for three armed Services

Indian military’s historic but very complex reforms of overhauling the entire command structure by setting up theatre commands to replace the traditional system of functional commands got yet another fillip with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on Tuesday authorising the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to issue joint instructions and joint orders for the army, the navy and the air force.

The CDS is also the Secretary, Department of Military Affairs (DMA).

Earlier, instructions and orders pertaining to two or more Services were issued by each Service separately.

“The first Joint Order on ‘Approval, Promulgation and Numbering of Joint Instructions and Joint Orders’ released on June 24, 2025, emphasises the need to streamline procedures, eliminate redundancies and enhance cross-Service cooperation,” an official release said, marking the beginning of a new era of jointness and integration.
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[bala]

Defense Minister Rajnath Singh has approved a major upgrade to India’s military command structure by authorizing the Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) and the Secretary of the Department of Military Affairs to issue joint orders across the Army, Navy, and Air Force. This replaces the previous system where each service issued separate directives, often causing duplication and inefficiencies. The first joint order, issued on Tuesday, aims to standardize procedures and eliminate redundancies, marking a significant step toward enhancing operational integration and streamlining tri-service coordination.

Minister Rajnath Singh approves joint command system upgrade to streamline tri-service instructions

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jxWztdMVAI0

[VinodTK]

CDS Chauhan says covergence between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh has implications for regional stability

CDS Chauhan said over the past five years, Pakistan had acquired “almost 70% to 80% of its weapons and equipment from China”

A convergence of interests between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh may have implications for regional stability and security at a time when India faces several challenges in its neighbourhood, Chief of Defence Staff Gen Anil Chauhan said on Tuesday.

Unlike past conflicts between India and Pakistan, there was no activity along India’s borders with China during the four days of hostilities in May after the launch of Operation Sindoor, Chauhan said while delivering an address on the theme of “India’s evolving national security landscape” an at event organised by the Observer Research Foundation.

However, Chauhan listed other indications of the close military and security links between China and Pakistan, such as Islamabad acquiring almost 80% of its weaponry from Beijing in the past five years and the presence of representatives of Chinese original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in Pakistan.
Referring to challenges faced by India within the neighbourhood, Chauhan pointed to economic instability in countries such as Myanmar, economic distress in nations in the Indian Ocean region that has allowed “outside powers to leverage their influence”, and frequent shifts in government in South Asia.

In this context, he said: “There’s a possible convergence of interest…between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh which may have security implications for regional stability and security dynamics.”
Referring to Operation Sindoor, which was launched by India on May 7 to target terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan in retaliation for the Pahalgam terror attack in April, Chauhan said that “there was no unusual activity on the northern borders during the duration of this conflict”.
He added, “In past conflicts, there had been trouble on the [northern] borders…But that’s a fact that there was no activity on the northern borders.”
Over the past five years, he said, Pakistan had acquired “almost 70% to 80% of its weapons and equipment from China”. He added, “A reasonable assumption would be that Chinese OEMs will have commercial liabilities which they have to fulfill and will have people in Pakistan…That equipment has to be serviced, it has to function.”

Chauhan also alluded to sharing of information between China and Pakistan, such as commercially available satellite imagery from Chinese companies. “So that’s possible. How much state support will be there, it’s very difficult to define. When this information turns into intelligence, it’s also very difficult to define,” he said.
He further said that Operation Sindoor had shown that there is scope for “further expansion of space in conventional operations”. He noted that Operation Sindoor was unique as the “only example of a conflict between two nuclear weapon states”.
“I think that in this particular conflict, we thought that there was a lot of space for conventional operations,” Chauhan said, listing three reasons for his argument.
“First is India’s nuclear doctrine, that is no first use. I think that gives us strength and that contributes to creating this particular space between us and Pakistan.
Second is the way we responded actually…we destroyed terrorist camps in response to terror attacks as part of a prevention strategy,” he added.
While Pakistan escalated the conflict into a “fully conventional domain”, it reduced its option to “raise the threshold [to a] nuclear conflict”, Chauhan contended. “Thirdly, I think there is space because there was no capture of territory involved…I think that further expansion of space in conventional operations is possible in each ladder of that escalation, by taking it to newer domains of warfare like cyber, electromagnetic spectrum…So we can still expand space for conventional operations,” he said.
Chauhan, however, pointed to an evolving military challenge in the shape of vulnerability to long-range weapons and long-range precision strikes. “There is currently no full-proof defence mechanism against ballistic missiles, hypersonics, cruise missiles and large-scale attacks by drones or loiter ammunition, especially when they were all used in conjunction with one another,” he said.
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[uddu]

Sudarshan Chakra to Tech warfare: CDS General Anil Chauhan’s keynote address at ‘Ran Samvad’

Sudarshan Chakra to Tech warfare: CDS General Anil Chauhan’s keynote address at ‘Ran Samvad’. He emphasised on the role of technology in modern warfare and thus called for ‘Shastra & Shaastra’ approach. He further talked about India’s air defence system ‘Sudarshan Chakra’.

[Rakesh]

Op Sindoor lesson: IAF chief bats for joint planning & coordination centre in Delhi, not theaterisation
https://theprint.in/defence/op-sindoor- ... n/2729644/
26 August 2025

^^^Yesterday versus Today...

‘Committed to joint command, control, combat capability & theaterisation’— Navy Chief
https://theprint.in/defence/committed-t ... f/2730067/
27 August 2025

[VinodTK]

Hear we go

IAF Chief cautions against rolling out theaterisation plan in hurry; proposes joint planning, coordination centre

Air Chief Marshal A P Singh on Tuesday cautioned against the implementation of the theaterisation plan in a hurry and proposed the setting up of a joint planning and coordination centre in Delhi comprising top military brass to ensure tri-services synergy.

College, the Chief of Air Staff, referring to proposed theatre commands, said creating a new structure while disrupting everything is not a very good idea at this point of time.

The hugely significant remarks by the Air Chief Marshal came three-and-a-half months after India carried out Operation Sindoor that reflected various elements of synergy among the three services.:
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I guess he wants military brass sitting in the coordination center in Delhi to come up with actions/plans and pass the instructions down to each branch and ask the ground level folks to work jointly.

When is the chief going to retire? Better luck with the next one

***********************************************************************************

Theatreisation Is Our Ultimate Goal, Committed to Synergising Command: Navy Chief

[VinodTK]

India releases 3 joint doctrines for armed forces

India on Wednesday released three joint doctrines, including one for Special Forces (SF) operations, in what is being seen as a needed boost for the ongoing drive for jointness and integration of the armed forces as they take steps towards theaterisation.

The joint doctrine for SF operations, released by chief of defence staff General Anil Chauhan at the Ran Samwad military conclave, seeks to enhance common understanding, terminologies and basic procedures, paving the way for greater interoperability and synergy among the commandos of the three services (the army’s Para-SF, the navy’s Marine Commandos and IAF’s Garuds).

Chauhan released another joint doctrine for airborne and heliborne operations, and defence minister Rajnath Singh unveiled the doctrine for multi domain operations , putting the spotlight on the steps being taken towards jointness, which is an essential prerequisite to the creation of theatre commands.

The doctrine for SF operations covers a raft of subjects including joint training, future weapon profile, operational imperatives, and issues related to command, control and planning.

“To minimise duplication and enhance effectiveness, SF may be trained jointly on advanced skills. Existing Special Forces Training Schools of the three services need to be upgraded to Joint Service Training Institutes (JSTIs), each being a Centre of Excellence for a specific core competency. This can be done without transferring the command and control from lead service and by optimising existing infrastructure with assets and resources from all the services,” reads an excerpt from the doctrine.

Focus areas include training of SF and crew of platforms/assets (including aircraft and submarines) for insertion and extraction by night, in adverse weather, using night vision and other conventional methods; joint training of SF on electronic warfare assets of the three services, and training for terminal guidance of precision guided munitions launched from air, long-range artillery and NGFS (naval gun fire support).

SF provide support and punch to the field formations, and are employed under the command and control of regional commands. “When employed for joint operations, SF can be employed through Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS)/envisaged integrated structures,” the doctrine reads.
“When employed jointly, SF must have a high level of interoperability by way of common standard operating procedures, joint training and common means of communication. Joint training of Para (SF), MARCOS (marine commandos) and IAF SF Garud is vital for maintaining highly capable, adaptable and interoperable SF to address complex security challenges.”

In his foreword to the doctrine, Chauhan writes, “This doctrine articulates a unified philosophy encompassing principles, capabilities and employment strategies for SF across land, maritime and air domains. It is envisaged as a foundational reference to facilitate joint planning, execution and capacity building for Special Forces in consonance with emerging roles and missions of the 21st century.”

In the coming decade, a range of potentially revolutionary technologies and novel uses could change the character of Special Operations, the doctrine says. Advancements in weapon systems, new technologies and the methods for employing these weapons and equipment will revolutionise the battlefield, it adds.

“In the current and future battlefield milieu, the success of airborne/heliborne operations will hinge on the integration of advanced technologies, joint services cooperation and comprehensive training to facilitate technological absorption and synergy of tactics, techniques and procedures,” says the second doctrine.

“The principles and guidelines outlined in this document will ensure that India’s airborne/heliborne forces remain a credible and responsive element of our national military power, capable of decisive action across the full spectrum of military operations, from peacetime military engagement to high intensity conflicts,” Chauhan writes in his foreword to the doctrine.

The joint doctrine for multi domain operations charts the way forward for integrated and synergised employment of the armed forces across land, sea, air, space and cyber cognitive domains, strengthening jointness and future readiness, the defence ministry said.

The multi domain operations construct has the potential to create a resilient, responsive and agile force structure, capable of leveraging significantly augmented military power that actively accompanies the warfighter into the tactical battle area while empowering the decision makers in the operation centres, Chauhan writes in his foreword to the third doctrine.

“This document is the first step by the Indian armed forces to define and understand this new way of conducting operations. It broadly conceptualises how the three services will organise, plan and fight, to defeat the adversary in any domain, at any level of war.”

[VinodTK]

Differences over tri-services commands will be resolved considering national interest: CDS

Mhow (MP), Aug 27 (PTI) The "dissonance" in the military on the proposed tri-services commands will be addressed considering the "best national interest", Chief of Defence Staff Gen Anil Chauhan said on Wednesday after the fissures over the ambitious theaterisation plan came out in the open.

The divergent views on the proposed theater commands was visible at a two-day military conclave at the Army War College here with Air Chief Marshal AP Singh cautioning against implementing the plan in a hurry while Navy Chief Admiral Dinesh Tripathi asserted that his force is committed to it.

In his concluding address at the Ran Samwad, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)said discussion on "differences" and alternate points with an openness is a positive sign and that a final decision will be taken based on national interest.
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[ramana]

Differences over tri-services commands will be resolved considering national interest: CDS

Mhow (MP), Aug 27 (PTI) The "dissonance" in the military on the proposed tri-services commands will be addressed considering the "best national interest", Chief of Defence Staff Gen Anil Chauhan said on Wednesday after the fissures over the ambitious theaterisation plan came out in the open.

The divergent views on the proposed theater commands was visible at a two-day military conclave at the Army War College here with Air Chief Marshal AP Singh cautioning against implementing the plan in a hurry while Navy Chief Admiral Dinesh Tripathi asserted that his force is committed to it.

In his concluding address at the Ran Samwad, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)said discussion on "differences" and alternate points with an openness is a positive sign and that a final decision will be taken based on national interest.
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CD Gen Chauhan only job was to ensure the creation of Theatre Commands. Instead, he has been doing everything else.
Operation Sindoor is a retaliation for a terrorist strike and not a war.
To think that is the Alpha and Omega of future combat operations is erroneous, to put it mildly.
And IAF has been open since ACM P.C. Lal wrote in his memoirs.
Theatre commands were proposed in the KRC report and debated in committees and commissions for over twenty-five years.
Incidentally, the British Crown assumed control of the East India Company (EIC) in 1858. Yet it took fifty years for Lord Kitchener to integrate the three Presidency armies. We are only twenty-five years into the reforms.

The Indian military has not learned nor forgotten anything from the British.

[VinodTK]

Operation Sindoor model will not work in future wars. India must not delay theaterisation
From ThePrint

India’s armed forces stand at a crossroads. For the first time since Independence, the question of how the military fights is up for redesign. At stake is whether India remains locked in service silos or reorganises into integrated theatre commands capable of fighting a multi-front, multi-domain, and possibly prolonged war.

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Anil Chauhan, has described theatre commands as the “next orbit” of jointness. The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, has urged caution. Speaking at Ran Samvad in Mhow, Madhya Pradesh, last month, he argued that while joint planning and coordination are desirable, there is no need for new structures as theatre commands.

He added: “We cannot pick theatre command structures from the US or China. We have to think what we need here”. Instead, he proposed a Joint Planning and Coordination Centre (JPCC) in Delhi under the Chiefs of Staff Committee, offering centralised planning with decentralised execution while preserving core competencies.

Air Marshal Raghunath Nambiar (retd), in his essay ‘One Sky, One Force‘, warned that splitting the IAF’s 29 squadrons into theatres would be like “breaking a finely honed sword into three pieces.” The metaphor is striking but misleading. The IAF already functions through five operational commands under Air Officers Commanding-in-Chief, with squadrons routinely attached and detached to different commands as required. Theaterisation would not “break the sword” but embed air power under an Air Component Commander in each theatre, as already practised in the Andaman and Nicobar Command.

The debate has spilled into the public domain where commentators such as Force Magazine editor Pravin Sawhney have amplified the Air Force’s scepticism, arguing that theaterisation risks blunting air power, confusing domains, and imposing alien models. These anxieties deserve respect, but they must be weighed against history, doctrine, and India’s operational realities.

India already has integration mechanisms in Delhi, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS), and the CDS. These bodies coordinate planning and procurement, but they do not command forces in battle. Operational control still rests with the service chiefs. Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) in the field, who are the top-level operational commanders in the Indian system, issue orders to the forces under their command. The result is that unity exists at the very top, but not in the midst of operations. If all-service joint planning is confined to Delhi, inter-service unity exists only at the staff level, not at the level of the commander who must fight the battle. This is the structural gap that theaterisation seeks to address.

Wars can be usually understood through a typical three-level framework. At the strategic level, the government sets the political aim, such as restoring a border or deterring an adversary. At the operational level, senior military commanders design campaigns that link multiple battles so that cumulative tactical actions contribute to the strategic aim. At the tactical level, battles are fought by units on the ground, at sea, or in the air.

This framework is not just analytical but also organisational. It is a management tool that ensures political intent at the top is translated all the way down to the frontline. Strategic aims are first expressed as directives, then shaped into operational designs at the campaign level, and finally issued as tactical orders on the ground. Its value lies in coherence: tactical actions by dispersed units are fused into campaigns that advance national objectives, rather than drifting into disconnected battles. In practice, it is about coordinating disparate pieces across geographical boundaries and domains into a single whole.

During the Kargil War in 1999, the strategic aim was to evict intruders and restore the Line of Control. Initially, the operational design was Army-centric. The Air Force was brought in only later, once political approval came and after ground battles had begun. That delay revealed the weakness of a fragmented design: tactical brilliance at Tololing or Tiger Hill mattered, but without timely integration of air power, the campaign took longer and cost more lives.

The role of the Air Officer Commanding (AOC), J&K during Kargil is illustrative. Air Vice Marshal (later Air Marshal) Narayan ‘Nana’ Menon coordinated air support for Army formations in the valley among HQ Northern Command, HQ Western Air Command, and Air HQ in Delhi. Instead of one commander fusing Army and Air combat power in real time, coordination had to pass through parallel chains. This slowed decision-making and delayed the application of air power where it was most needed.

The structures that facilitate such coordination are precisely what is under debate today. Current arrangements are not designed for efficiency or effectiveness; they generate cooperation by negotiation rather than by command. Theaterisation seeks to correct this gap by vesting a single commander with authority to align land, air, maritime, and emerging domains of modern warfare within a theatre. Its purpose is to ensure that tactical actions, however dispersed, are fused into coherent campaigns that serve national objectives.

Unity of command is as old as war itself. But the ability to fuse dispersed battles into a campaign plan, what we today call the operational level of war, was institutionalised in Prussia after the Battle of Jena (1806) under Scharnhorst’s reforms, and perfected by Helmuth von Moltke. Modern military doctrine and staff systems worldwide descend from this tradition.

In India, the operational level was only formally introduced into professional military education in the 2000s. By then, many of today’s senior leaders had risen without systematic exposure to its nuts and bolts. They encountered the ideas at the Higher Command Course or at the National Defence College, but not through repeated doctrinal drill. This educational lag helps explain why debates today so often reduce to metaphors and turf anxieties, rather than grounded discussion of command architecture and campaign design.

Doctrinal boundaries

Modern military doctrine draws clear boundaries. Directives are issued by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), setting political intent, limits, and objectives; Operational instructions are issued by the CDS or service chiefs, translating directives into broad priorities; Operational orders are the responsibility of the commander in theatre, derived from his own Commander’s Estimate.

The Commander’s Estimate, central to modern operational art, is itself a relatively recent addition to Indian staff procedures. For decades, officers were trained in tactical appreciation, a method suited for battles but not for campaigns. It was only in the 2000s that the Estimate, with its focus on aligning dispersed forces to strategic intent, began to feature in Indian professional military education. By then, many of today’s senior leaders had already risen without systematic exposure to it. This gap explains why operational design often compresses into Delhi-level instructions and why the Estimate has yet to take root as the doctrinal safeguard it is meant to be.

Theaterisation is meant to restore that missing space. It would give operational commanders both the authority and the responsibility to prepare their own Estimates and issue operational orders, rather than leaving campaign design to service chiefs in Delhi. Most importantly, it would resource the operational commander with the forces and assets allotted to him, so that he can prosecute an all-services, all-arms, all-domain battle without having to look back to Delhi for constant support.

A model with limits

In May 2025, after the Pahalgam massacre, India launched calibrated air and missile strikes on nine terrorist sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Operation Sindoor was concise, targeted, and aimed at an adversary with few options.

The operation succeeded because the CDS, service chiefs, and the Cabinet Committee on Security under the Prime Minister achieved a forced synchronisation of thought. Operational direction appears to have flowed from Delhi straight to the commands, compressing the doctrinal boundary that should separate staff-level instructions from theatre-level orders. Visible naval deployments in the Arabian Sea and Army posturing along the LoC added deterrent weight, giving the operation a combined character.

This was unity by personality and circumstance, not by statute. It worked for a short and tightly defined campaign. The very fact that the service chiefs were in the ‘operational loop’ reflected doctrinal compression: a workaround that produced speed at the cost of resilience. In a larger war, simultaneity across Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh, and the Bay of Bengal would overwhelm such a Delhi-centric system. Forced harmony cannot substitute for institutional unity of command.

The model functioned for four days against Pakistan only because the objectives were narrow and the target sets were limited. It would not have sustained a full-fledged war, nor would it have endured weeks of simultaneous pressure from both China and Pakistan. The CAS issuing operational orders directly to CINCs cannot be evidence of institutional strength, but instead a doctrinal shortfall. War is not a staff college exercise. Battles are messy, losses mount, and the fog of war thickens. The safeguard is not temperament at the top but resilient institutions rooted in unity of command.

The Sawhney critique

Pravin Sawhney underscores real anxieties. He highlights the strategy–operations–tactics divide and cautions against jargon inflation: ‘multi-domain operations’, ‘informatised warfare’, ‘AI war’. He is right to warn that such terms are often used loosely in Indian discourse.

However, his analysis has several missteps. He conflates doctrine with organisation, treating coordination and theatre commands as mutually exclusive. He argues that cyber and space are merely multipliers, not distinct domains, unless contested by a peer. In fact, domains are defined by the medium of action and the need for dedicated command, not by whether parity exists. He treats platform speed as the test of which service should lead, ignoring that leadership at the operational level is about integration of effects, not velocity. He suggests India must build capabilities first and reform command later. In truth, unity of command is itself a capability. Theatre command reform is, in itself, a strategy. It is designed to ensure scarce resources are concentrated at decisive points. Waiting for abundance before reform is self-defeating, because unity of command is precisely what allows scarcity to be managed.

Lessons from history

History punishes disunity. At the Battle of Midway in 1942, Japan’s divided air and naval commands produced disaster. In North Africa the same year, US land-based and naval aviation clashed until General Dwight D Eisenhower imposed a single air commander. In the Falklands in 1982, Admiral Sandy Woodward’s unified control of both carrier aviation and RAF Harriers proved decisive, while Argentina’s fractured command was costly.

Marshal of the RAF Arthur Tedder, General Eisenhower’s deputy during the invasion of Normandy, consistently warned that unity of command was not optional. In his 1947 Lees Knowles Lectures, later published as Air Power in War, he argued that air power, and indeed any power, is wasted unless air, land, and sea are brought together under one commander in a single campaign design (also see General William W Momyer’s Air Power in Three Wars, USAF, 1978).

Britain institutionalised that lesson with the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) in 1996. China and Russia have done so with theatre commands. India remains the outlier.

Why the issue must not be deferred

Resistance to theaterisation is not only about doctrine; it is about authority, careers, and billets. The fear that one service, particularly the Army, might dominate postings is rarely voiced but deeply felt. Yet history shows reforms succeed only when political leadership enforces them. The Goldwater–Nichols reforms of 1986 in the US were imposed over service objections. India’s own Kargil Review Committee (1999), Group of Ministers (2000), and Naresh Chandra Task Force (2011) each identified the same ailment and prescribed theatre commands. The cure was deferred.

The way forward

General Henry H ‘Hap’ Arnold, the first five-star US Air Force officer, emphasised that unity of command alone is not enough; unity of planning, procurement, and doctrine is equally essential. This principle reflects his conviction that for air power to be effective, it must be integrated comprehensively under both structural and doctrinal alignment.

India’s answer lies in a hybrid model. Strategic missions, nuclear deterrence, long-range strike, and deep interdiction can be maintained under a national air command. Tactical air for close support, air defence, and surveillance should be embedded in theatres under Air Component Commanders. Chiefs would generate forces and set priorities. Theatre commanders would conduct Estimates and issue orders. Political leaders would give directives.

Such clarity would restore doctrinal boundaries and ensure that the unity of command principle endures by design, not by chance. Operation Sindoor showed that harmony can deliver success for four days. However, the next war could require unity across multiple fronts and weeks. Theaterisation is not about copying the US or China. It is about understanding why all major militaries do it, learning from the Red Army theory, and fixing India’s own doctrinal gap.

India cannot afford to delay the reform that makes that possible.

The author is a former Flag Officer Naval Aviation, Chief of Staff at the integrated HQ Andaman and Nicobar Command, and Chief Instructor (Navy) at DSSC Wellington. He tweets @sudhirpillai__

Views are personal.

(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)