Operation Sindoor - Post Conflict Analysis

[g.sarkar]

https://www.rediff.com/news/report/how- ... 251007.htm
How AI Led the Charge in Op Sindoor
Bhaswar Kumar, October 07, 2025
'Threat assessment, intelligence analysis, (battlefield) situation review -- what has transpired in the last three hours -- was conducted with the help of AI.'
Home-grown military software applications and artificial intelligence tools were extensively employed by the Indian Army during Operation Sindoor to accelerate decision-making and enhance battlefield awareness, a senior officer said on Monday, adding that these capabilities will be further upgraded with a military-specific large language model (LLM) expected to become functional within six months.
Clarifying that the tools were not directed at any specific country but developed to give the army specific capabilities, Lieutenant General Rajiv Kumar Sahni, Director General, Electronics and Mechanical Engineers (DG EME), added that they are meant to be deployed along all of the nation's borders.
"That capability, in equal measure and when required, will be deployed along all our borders," Sahni said.
Speaking at a briefing in the national capital, the DG EME also underlined that these tools were indigenously developed and trained using data provided by the army to meet its operational and doctrinal requirements.
Underscoring that both the army and the nation are steadily upgrading their capabilities, General Sahni, who served as DG Information Systems before taking charge as DG EME, said, "Our military LLM will be fully functional, post testing and validation, in six months' time."
Revealing that a common operational, intelligence, and logistics picture was created for the army during Operation Sindoor using around 23 applications, General Sahni explained that this required collecting and processing a significant volume of information in real time.
"AI was used for multi-sensor and multi-source data fusion," he added.
Indigenous AI tools, including small language models, were used to collate and analyse the data.
"Threat assessment, intelligence analysis, and (battlefield) situation review -- what has transpired in the last three hours -- was conducted with the help of AI," General Sahni said, adding that heat maps were also generated at the joint operational control centre to support resource prioritisation during the May 7-10 conflict with Pakistan.
AI tools were also used in precision targeting during Operation Sindoor, with General Sahni citing one app -- developed by the army's Directorate General of Information Systems (DGIS) in collaboration with the India Meteorological Department -- that provided 72-hour meteorological forecasts covering areas deep into adversary territory.
"This helped artillery engage with precision at extended ranges," he said.
An electronic intelligence collation application, also developed by the DGIS, was employed during Operation Sindoor.
General Sahni explained that the AI model was trained using about 26 years of data collected by Indian agencies and armed services.
......
Gautam

[sanjaykumar]

Yeah but they had halal doorbin.

[Prem Kumar]

Also please note that US has included Pakistan in the Amraam C8/D3 Contract, so we need to start production and induction of Astra Mk2, Astra Mk3 along with other countermeasures otherwise this will bite us in 2028-30 timeframe.

This will continue as long as PAF exists. So, its our duty to ensure that when the next Op Sindoor ends, they don't have one

[V_Raman]

we are Kichidi AF anyways - we can ask for AMRAAM and get it. What is in a name - we have all alphabet missiles from all over the world anyway! As always - Rafale can fire it with its god fearing radar as well. and when those get old - we will invent domestic NASAMS for fire them like what happened with R73 - we are the perfect kichidi defense force in the world!

[Sumeet]

Also please note that US has included Pakistan in the Amraam C8/D3 Contract, so we need to start production and induction of Astra Mk2, Astra Mk3 along with other countermeasures otherwise this will bite us in 2028-30 timeframe.

This will continue as long as PAF exists. So, its our duty to ensure that when the next Op Sindoor ends, they don't have one

Ain't military sales need to go through Congress approval ?

Besides Astra Mk2 & Mk3, we should qualify R-37M + Virupakhsa combo on Super Sukhoi. Even induction of Rafael Sky Sting could help us out in this situation.

We should lobby in DC that AMARAAM C8/D3 can be shown to China, given TSP virtually lives off Chinese support. Also, TSP won't be able to get Bagram air base for US in Afghanistan as that will be a big redline for China. It will be interesting to see how this situation evolves.

[Aditya_V]

[

We should lobby in DC that AMARAAM C8/D3 can be shown to China, given TSP virtually lives off Chinese support. Also, TSP won't be able to get Bagram air base for US in Afghanistan as that will be a big redline for China. It will be interesting to see how this situation evolves.

The US would have definitely considered it before approving the Sale, this Lobbying thing is done behind the scenes but has little impact.
USA probably needs Pakistan
1) to Contain India
2) Pakistani Bases and logistics to Attack Iran, good luck lobbying against that, India concerns are not their priority.

The Best way we have found in the last 30 years is have our stuff which gives volumes and capability beyond the dumbed down versions(any export especially at discount Prices) will always be.

[brvarsh]

India's best lobbying is not to engage in such fruitless activity. Washington wants Indians to be in the same line standing like Aurangzeb wanted Shiva ji to stand. Operation Sindoor not only exposed Pakistan, it has also exposed American double game and India should play smiles but not shake hands with hands that have always been dirty.

[Prem Kumar]

Time for MEA to take its gloves off. Should make it clear that India condemns US supplying missiles to a terrorist-state, to be used against India. That this is especially galling, considering the recency of the Pahalgam massacre. And that if the US considers India as a partner with so-called *shared civilizational/democratic values*, then it should walk the talk

Tariffs, hosting Munir, Amraam sales, H1B fee, overt racism against Hindus/Indians --> India should say enough-is-enough

[chetak]

IAF celebrates it 93rd year — with pakistan on the menu

[Cyrano]

How many F16s are left in paf? Take them out and then they can buy all the AMRAAMs in the world

[Amber G.]

Also please note that US has included Pakistan in the Amraam C8/D3 Contract, so we need to start production and induction of Astra Mk2, Astra Mk3 along with other countermeasures otherwise this will bite us in 2028-30 timeframe.

US denies reports that Pakistan will get the new AMRAAM missiles. US Embassy in India has dismissed the news as false reports.

[Aditya_V]

That's good news bit I hope IAF gets Astra 2, Astra 3 inducted without Pakis knowledge and Pakis get much worser surprise than Operation Sindoor

[A_Gupta]

On paper, the AMRAAM D3 is inferior to the Chinese PL15 which Pakistan has. However, PL15 I guess cannot be used from F-16. The D3 has double the range of what Pakistan has. The Raytheon contract amendment is $41.x million dollars; the D3 costs 1+ million a piece. Lastly the US has said it is not supplying these to Pakistan.

[drnayar]

Also please note that US has included Pakistan in the Amraam C8/D3 Contract, so we need to start production and induction of Astra Mk2, Astra Mk3 along with other countermeasures otherwise this will bite us in 2028-30 timeframe.

US denies reports that Pakistan will get the new AMRAAM missiles. US Embassy in India has dismissed the news as false reports.
[img]https://pbs.twimg.com/media/G23pZsRXkAAw6hR?format=jpg[/img

US embassy will say what they want . No one wants to find the truth at the time of war

I remember asking whether the Chinese PL 15s with PAF were the "export" version in the early days of operation Sindhoor. it wasn't.

When it comes to India both China and US are more than likely to provide the latest versions of their weapons to the porkis.

We need to fast track our Astra 2 and 3 and build up our SAM bubbles

[bala]

Who Gave Pakistan its NUKES, Pakistan Army USA & China, Khan Network, India Israel Plan I Aadi

Aadi Achint recounts the entire history of Pak's attempt at nuclear bomb making since Bhutto said they would eat grass and build one. By 1984 the Paks were conducting cold tests, one in Kirana hills which was bombed in Operation Sindhoor by IAF in 2025. National security archive docs of the US reveal a lot more information. The US fingered the chinese periodically whether there was collusion between china and pak in the nuclear bomb making field. The Chinese gave highly enriched uranium to the Paks in 70s-80s time period and the Paks attempted cold testing on such material. The chinese did not give missile tech to the paks. Benazir Bhutto took chinese nuclear data to North Korea. In return she brought North Korea's missile tech to Pak, the North Koreans were given missile tech by the chinese. Parts of the Nodung missile were carted back to Pak in her aircraft back home.

The US knew all this but they looked away from the whole deal. Proliferation by the Chinese was condoned by the US. American General Wesley Clark's account of a Pentagon memo listing Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Somalia, Iran after 9/11 correlates with Pak's attempt to proliferate nuclear stuff to these nations. By 2004 A Q Khan's network was busted and he was removed and he apologized. Pressler amendament (1985) required Pak to certify to US President every year that they were not making nuclear bomb. American CIA is right within Pak and they are helping Pak drill/mine nuclear stuff, in Kirana hills project Saffire South. Electronic equipment, nuclear safety equipment, access control systems, radiation detection and many more were provided by the US.

Who built Nur Khan - GE built a C&C center for the Paks which was used to monitor India.

There is more stuff revealed which requires your involvement.

[Amber G.]

^^^ I have decided to share my perspective on a few technical and historical points raised in this high-stakes post above. My Basic reason is, there are some important points which are important for people to know here.

A Physicist's Hot Takes on "Who Gave Pakistan its NUKE"

IMO this post is a wild ride through the whole history! Aadi Achint packs a lot of sensational claims in there, but from a technical/historical view, a few points could use a quick reality check:

1. The "Cold Test" Error

By 1984 the Paks were conducting cold tests, one in Kirana hills which was bombed in Operation Sindhoor by IAF in 2025.

This is a classic technical mix-up. A 'cold test' means testing the conventional explosives and the triggering mechanism on a dummy, non-fissile core (like depleted uranium or tungsten). You do this precisely because you don't have enough HEU or Pu yet, or because you want to practice the final assembly without a nuclear yield.

You cannot conduct a cold test on "highly enriched uranium" or any fissile material. If they used HEU, it would be a full-yield nuclear test. The whole point of a cold test is that it's not nuclear. This strongly suggests that by 1984, they were likely testing the implosion mechanism they got from China, which is highly credible.

2. The HEU Transfer vs. HEU Production

"The Chinese gave highly enriched uranium to the Paks in 70s-80s time period..."

This is the big historical debate. The strongest evidence is for China giving Pakistan the design of the weapon (the blueprint for how to make the HEU go boom). Whether China actually gave them a starter batch of HEU is an unconfirmed, albeit highly credible, report that often comes from the writings of A.Q. Khan himself (a highly biased source).

My Take: Pakistan's whole effort since the 70s (Khan's network) was to make their own HEU at Kahuta. China giving them the material is a significant escalation from giving them the know-how (which is proven). Most of Pakistan's final arsenal is based on their domestic production, not foreign gifts.

3. The Missile Tech Exchange is Factual, but the Chinese Role is Murky

"The chinese did not give missile tech to the paks. Benazir Bhutto took chinese nuclear data to North Korea. In return she brought North Korea's missile tech to Pak, the North Koreans were given missile tech by the chinese."

The core missile-for-nuke-tech exchange between Pakistan and North Korea is widely documented (Khan's network was at the center). The part where Benazir Bhutto allegedly smuggled the data is a famous, sensational claim from a biography, but the event itself (an exchange) is accepted history.

The claim that "China did not give missile tech" but that "North Koreans were given missile tech by the Chinese" is a distinction without much practical difference. China's transfer of M-11 missile technology to Pakistan in the early 90s is actually well-documented in US intelligence. The whole Pakistan-North Korea-China connection is a complex, three-way proliferation web, not just a simple exchange between Pak and NK

4. "Project Saffire South" and the Kirana Hills
"

American CIA is right within Pak and they are helping Pak drill/mine nuclear stuff, in Kirana hills project Saffire South.

"

This is a major conflation of different operations.

Project Sapphire (note the spelling) was a 1994 U.S. operation to safely secure and remove highly enriched uranium from a decaying nuclear research reactor in Kazakhstan (a former Soviet state). It had nothing to do with Pakistan, mining, the CIA, or Kirana Hills. ( It was more like stopping proliferation)

Combining these names and locations (CIA, Kirana, Project Saffire) creates a dramatic but factually inaccurate picture. Kirana Hills is widely believed to be an underground Pakistani nuclear weapon storage or testing site, but the idea of a US-Pakistani joint mining/drilling operation called "Project Saffire South" is a complete misunderstanding of the actual Project Sapphire.

5. The Command and Control (C&C) Center

"Who built Nur Khan - GE built a C&C center for the Paks which was used to monitor India."

This claim is vague and likely misidentifies the nature of the facility.

In what way 'monitor India'? A nuclear C&C center's primary function is internal: securing the nuclear arsenal, ensuring the chain of command is followed, and preventing unauthorized use (a major US non-proliferation objective). It manages the operational status of the weapons and the launch process. It does not typically "monitor India" in the sense of surveillance or intelligence collection.

The US did cooperate with Pakistan on nuclear safety and security (known as the "Nuclear Security Cooperation Program") after 9/11. This cooperation often involved providing electronic equipment, access control systems, and security protocols to prevent weapons from falling into the wrong hands. The C&C center built by GE was almost certainly part of these efforts, aimed at enhancing the security and stability of the arsenal, which the US views as a global safety measure.

6. Declassified Docs and the HEU Question
"National security archive docs of the ... period..."

This is the central point of evidence for the HEU claim.

Non-Classified Reality: Declassified US intelligence documents strongly confirm the transfer of nuclear weapon design information and critical material/technology (like UF
6-feedstock for centrifuges) from China to Pakistan. They confirm the technology transfer that allowed the "Paks to make HEU."

The Big Question Mark - However, the 50 kg question—a single bulk transfer of ready-to-use HEU—is not publicly confirmed in the declassified National Security Archive or US government files. This specific claim is most often attributed to the writings and recollections of A.Q. Khan. The US intelligence community may have known the information, but it remains heavily classified, leaving the public HEU transfer story reliant on a source (Khan) whose reliability is extremely low due to his history of proliferation. — And yes, Indian intelligence probably knows the real story… but of course, I can’t tell you that. (I’ve already said too much )

In short, there’s a solid basis in historical fact (Chinese help, US turning a blind eye, Khan's proliferation), but the narrative uses highly specific, dramatic claims that sometimes muddle the technical details (like the cold test confusion) or rely on the most sensational sources (like the Benazir story).

Anyway this deep drive may be helpful for some.

[SSridhar]

. . .
The US knew all this but they looked away from the whole deal.

The truth is that the US also actively helped TSP in bomb making. This is neither hearsay nor heresy.
All very well documented in Adrian Levy's book, "Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy"

[bala]

A 'cold test' means testing the conventional explosives and the triggering mechanism on a dummy, non-fissile core (like depleted uranium or tungsten). You do this precisely because you don't have enough HEU or Pu yet, or because you want to practice the final assembly without a nuclear yield.

You cannot conduct a cold test on "highly enriched uranium" or any fissile material. If they used HEU, it would be a full-yield nuclear test. The whole point of a cold test is that it's not nuclear. This strongly suggests that by 1984, they were likely testing the implosion mechanism they got from China, which is highly credible.

I think the bolded part is the key. The implications of this is that Pak did not have their own nuke device which was exploded in 1998 after India did. So whose devices were those pretending to be Pak own. India perhaps knows precisely whose devices were exploded. These were not existing seasoned devices but experimental ones (with dialed down yields) that required actual test and found a willing client's land to conduct them on their behalf.

[bala]

The truth is that the US also actively helped TSP in bomb making.

That is precisely the point Sridhar! The US wasn't interested in anti-proliferation like some say in this forum. Remember mass-destruction weapons of Iraq and how the US devasted Iraq based on such claims. The US CIA had such grand designs on the Indian sub-continent. Anti proliferation was just a cover for their diabolic plans.

[Amber G.]

1. The "Cold Test" Error
Bala Wrote: >>>By 1984 the Paks were conducting cold tests, one in Kirana hills which was bombed in Operation Sindhoor by IAF in 2025.<<<


This is a classic technical mix-up. A 'cold test' means testing the conventional explosives and the triggering mechanism on a dummy, non-fissile core (like depleted uranium or tungsten). You do this precisely because you don't have enough HEU or Pu yet, or because you want to practice the final assembly without a nuclear yield.

You cannot conduct a cold test on "highly enriched uranium" or any fissile material. If they used HEU, it would be a full-yield nuclear test. The whole point of a cold test is that it's not nuclear. This strongly suggests that by 1984, they were likely testing the implosion mechanism they got from China, which is highly credible.

I think the bolded part is the key. The implications of this is that Pak did not have their own nuke device which was exploded in 1998 after India did. So whose devices were those pretending to be Pak own. India perhaps knows precisely whose devices were exploded. These were not existing seasoned devices but experimental ones (with dialed down yields) that required actual test and found a willing client's land to conduct them on their behalf.

Bala — please read my post in full. The main issue I pointed out was the incorrect use of the term “cold test.” A “cold test” by definition uses a non-fissile core, precisely because there is no nuclear yield. Using the term as if HEU were involved is not only wrong — and lends ZERO credibility to anything that follow..it’s like saying :

“a dry swim in the ocean.”

Also, just to be clear — I never said or implied that Pakistan didn’t have its own device in 1998. What I said was that by 1984, they were likely testing the implosion mechanism they obtained from China — that’s a very different point.


As for the repeated claim that “Pakistan did not have its own device in 1998,” there is no credible evidence to support that. Every reputable technical source — including open analyses by US labs and post-1998 seismic and isotopic data — attributes those tests to Pakistan’s own designs (with known Chinese lineage, yes, but not foreign detonations).

Let’s keep the discussion grounded in facts and correct terminology — otherwise, we’re just building castles on sand.

Amber G.
(And truth, as ever, prefers clarity over echo..)

[Aditya_V]

To add one thing after getting nukes from China/US and bombs capable of dropping them F16 , Pakistan started the Kashmir insurgency with US Aid Pakistan was richer than us in 1989. A Paki minister even flew down told FM IK Gujral that they have the bomb and will use it if we did not hand over Kashmir. Only a last minute Jugaad developed bomb and once the CIA informed the Pakis did the Pakis change some of thier plans.

[bala]

Bala — please read my post in full.

Sir/Madam, please understand that i provided a transcript of what Aadi was saying. If you have issues please take it up with him. I fully understood the gist of what he was saying and the perfidy of the US / China comes through very clearly, which was known to me in 1998 after India exploded nuke bombs, i commented upon it in BRF way back.

Let’s keep the discussion grounded in facts and correct terminology

Problem is that no side will ever reveal the exact truth or facts. You are chasing a chimera at best. What Pak did was screw driver tech of China maal and the chinese relented to giving them the final clearance in 1998 to explode China's own devices. Pieces and parts were surreptiously provided. It does not take too much to deduce such things, cold test notwithstanding. As Op Sindoor revealed the US was blatantly lying about its role in Pak and Nur Khan.

[RCase]

As for the repeated claim that “Pakistan did not have its own device in 1998,” there is no credible evidence to support that. Every reputable technical source — including open analyses by US labs and post-1998 seismic and isotopic data — attributes those tests to Pakistan’s own designs (with known Chinese lineage, yes, but not foreign detonations).

Let’s keep the discussion grounded in facts and correct terminology — otherwise, we’re just building castles on sand.

Amber G.
(And truth, as ever, prefers clarity over echo..)

Amber G. - I think you might have significant theoretical scientific knowledge about nuclear stuff. However, I would like a simple YES/ NO answer as to whether you have been involved in the actual design/ manufacture of a nuclear device or have deep connections within the intelligence agencies to have inside information.

To my simple mind, Pakistan doesn't have the significant technical/ manufacturing capability for precision engineering. None of their 'scientists', including A.Q.Khan inspire any confidence in their scientific ability. Probably the one exception that I would make is Goodboy, but he too is a theoretical guy with no actual manufacturing expertise. When a country cannot even make a commercial grade bicycle, precision equipment, heavy machinery etc. it baffles the mind as to how they can put together the capability to make centrifuges and other complex parts. Else, I will have to believe in Lal Topi's - allah ke fazl o karam se hum ne atim bum banaya.

Right after Op Sindoor there were mysterious mini-earthquakes in suspected nuclear sites in Pakistan - Kirana hills, Malir cantt. etc. You maintained that those were due to natural causes and Pakistan as a whole is endemic to quakes. However, now post Op Sindoor, we don't hear about any quakes. Most of the Indian army folks maintained that the quakes were triggered by radioactive cook offs.

The narratives peddled by US have been disingenuous in the past and their credibility is low - WMD, Lab leak coverup for COVID, F-16s to fight terrorism, GWOT, Human rights, Democracy, Freedom of Speech etc.

Did Pakistan design and build it's own nuke? My gut instinct says NAH! It is one more of Pakistani's bombastic lies.

[Amber G.]

^^^ RCase: Thank you for raising some valid, interesting, and clearly articulated points. Give me some time to respond. Meanwhile, you may want to look up this , ⟨link⟩, and see if you have additional points to note. I may post individual points (my be in different order) in separate posts for clarity.
Amber G.

[Amber G.]

Right after Op Sindoor there were mysterious mini-earthquakes in suspected nuclear sites in Pakistan - Kirana hills, Malir cantt. etc. You maintained that those were due to natural causes and Pakistan as a whole is endemic to quakes. However, now post Op Sindoor, we don't hear about any quakes. Most of the Indian army folks maintained that the quakes were triggered by radioactive cook offs.

Actually, those “mini-earthquakes” around Kirana Hills, Malir Cantt., etc., were studied quite carefully — Not only by me , but by both Indian and international seismological networks — and all the analyses showed they were natural local tremors, not related to any nuclear or explosive activity. Pakistan, like north and western India, lies in a moderately active seismic zone, so small quakes are common. Nothing unusual or “radioactive” was ever detected.

It’s not that we no longer have such quakes after Op Sindhoor — they still occur, but people just don’t notice unless someone connects them to a dramatic story. You can easily check current and past events on global and regional earthquake databases such as the

- USGS Earthquake Catalog


National Center for Seismology (India)


Both maintain continuous records. ( Go to the area, date etc)

Importantly, any nuclear explosion leaves a very specific seismic “signature.” Natural quakes produce shear (S) and compressional (P) waves of different ratios and patterns, while an underground explosion produces mostly P-waves and a distinctly sharp onset. With the dense network of seismometers in India and worldwide — including the International Monitoring System (IMS) under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) — even a sub-kiloton test would be detected and analyzed within minutes.

So far, no waveform from those episodes has ever matched a nuclear event. The data are consistent with ordinary tectonic tremors — not “radioactive cook-offs.”

(I have posted several detail post about the data in the forum - please see for example this post and several before/after with analysis)

The link above says . and I explain why,,,

...And it’s worth noting that India—and the rest of the world—has a dense network of seismic stations constantly monitoring this stuff. If there were anything suspicious going on, especially something as serious as a nuclear-related event (or anything related), we’d almost certainly detect it. (And it will not remain secret)....

Best analysis, IMO is this post from June .. :

-Amber G,

— The earth, after all, has its own ways of rumbling; not every tremor carries a secret.

[S_Madhukar]

The shameless part is how the AQ Khan network was able to proliferate to Libya, NoKo etc giving US the target list of Axis of Evil who they would hit and make money for their MIC. A game perfectly setup for the world to be fooled and that was possible because of unipolarity and institutional capture. I think Aadi Achint covers this in one of his latest videos. A country that was building Space Wars could not find OBL and loose nukes

Reminds me of the Predator vs. Alien movie… while the Aliens were used just as targets for hunting games they devastated the planet or ships where they were roosting in. Unkil is the Predator and equally responsible like the Alien

[Amber G.]

To my simple mind, Pakistan doesn't have the significant technical/ manufacturing capability for precision engineering. None of their 'scientists', including A.Q.Khan inspire any confidence in their scientific ability. Probably the one exception that I would make is Goodboy, but he too is a theoretical guy with no actual manufacturing expertise. When a country cannot even make a commercial grade bicycle, precision equipment, heavy machinery etc. it baffles the mind as to how they can put together the capability to make centrifuges and other complex parts. Else, I will have to believe in Lal Topi's - allah ke fazl o karam se hum ne atim bum banaya.

Okay, it is hard to overestimate any kind of capabilities in Pak.. but..

With respect — The above is a little oversimplification...that caricature, may be a little to mean:) ..

But seriously ... A caricature, is not an argument.

I say this as someone who’s spent my life around nuclear science: the road to a functioning weapon is primarily about concentrated engineering, access to materials, and political will — not some mystical genius that only a handful of nations possess. The teams that built the first bomb in 1945 understood this plainly: once you know the basic physics, the rest is engineering and production. In other words, what the United States could do, with time and resources, almost any country could do too. (The same theme is presented in any nuclear physics lecture -- once you know basic physics and data etc..)

Pakistan’s program shows exactly that pattern: transfer of design knowledge, procurement of machine tools and materials, and focused on-site engineering work. That combination — steady resources plus a few competent machinists and engineers — can produce remarkably precise hardware. Mocking a country for not manufacturing top-range consumer goods is irrelevant; precision components for weapons are made by concentrating talent, money and machines where needed.

And let’s be blunt: not every nuclear route requires exotic science. (As I , and others, have said many times) A gun-type device is conceptually simple — once you have sufficient fissile material the engineering challenge is far more industrial than theoretical. You don’t need to be a Nobel laureate to understand that; good metalworkers and competent machinists — the sort of people who make and fix heavy equipment in any industrial town (eg gun makes in Peshawar)— can carry out the necessary work under direction.

Dismissing entire communities as incapable is lazy thinking. If you want to understand how such programs succeed, look at procurement networks, state support, and on-the-ground engineering — not remarks about bicycles.

---- Some good links for details

For details check out any reputable sources:

Pakistan did have relevant industrial and machining capability long before its weapons program matured. Defence firms and state-owned heavy industries (e.g., Heavy Industries Taxila, Pakistan Steel, Karachi Shipyard) provide real metal-working, casting and CNC skills — (See < Link?>


A.Q. Khan didn’t conjure centrifuges out of thin air. He brought knowledge from Urenco and then built a procurement and technical network that acquired specialized machine tools, materials and components (often via front companies and foreign suppliers), and developed local machining and assembly skills at Kahuta (KRL). That combination — stolen/borrowed design + covert procurement + on-site engineering — is how relatively modest industrial bases can produce highly precise hardware.
See. <link>

Precision parts for centrifuges are not the same as consumer goods like bicycles. They require specialized machining, balancing, vacuum and metallurgy work — all achievable by trained engineers and a small number of good machine tools. see <link>



Finally, dismissing entire technical communities as “no confidence” is not helpful especially when our security is concerned.. Technical capability is not a magic property you either wholly possess or lack — it develops (and can be augmented quickly) when a state prioritizes it and buys the right machines or know-how.

- Amber G.

[Amber G.]

Answering one more point - substantial post long post- ignore if not interested..

Did Pakistan design and build it's own nuke? My gut instinct says NAH! It is one more of Pakistani's bombastic lies.

“Gut instinct” is charming, but in physics we usually prefer data

Yes — Pakistan did build and test its own nuclear devices. The core design lineage traces back to China (as is well documented), but by the 1990s, the engineering, machining, and assembly were very much done in Pakistan — using their own HEU, their own test site, and their own technicians. Think of it as a licensed design, locally manufactured — hardly unique in the world of weapons.

By the time of the 1998 tests, the seismic and isotopic signatures were unmistakable. The yield, depth, and waveform were all consistent with genuine nuclear detonations on Pakistani soil — not imagination, not “Allah ke fazl,” just successful engineering of a borrowed blueprint.

So, yes — the physics was real, even if the poetry around it wasn’t.
— and gut feeling some times make poor seismographs.

------
(Added later few details)
- Pakistan’s program was national: the state owned, directed, and executed the project, relying on its own laboratories and personnel to produce the final product. But it also relied on significant foreign assistance, technology acquisition, and blueprints.

1) Indigenous execution.
The program was started as a national project (Bhutto’s 1972 decision) and Pakistan’s scientists, engineers and metallurgists did the hard work: producing fissile material (HEU and plutonium) and fabricating weapon components. The production chain — enrichment at Kahuta, reactors at Khushab, and on-site assembly and testing — was built and operated inside Pakistan.

Foreign assistance and acquisition.
The crucial accelerant was foreign know-how. A.Q. Khan’s access to URENCO experience, networks and procurement channels brought centrifuge technology and supplier networks that Pakistan lacked domestically. Likewise, implosion design knowledge was materially influenced by China. In short: acquired designs + covert procurement + focused local engineering = a working arsenal.

By the 1990s the result was clear: locally manufactured devices, local HEU, local test signatures. It registers in seismic records and isotopic analyses.

So: Chinese roots in design, Pakistani hands in manufacture and testing. Not magic, not myth

.. and if we prefer our evidence in the form of bangs and waveforms, the earth and the detectors will - unfortunately oblige.

-Amber G.

(see also the Previous summary in this dhaga )

[SRajesh]

AmberGji/Balaji/RCaseji and others
Why are we arguing on a point that a country that could not produce a scooty has gone on to produce and assemble a 'Bum'!!
Who said what?? Who supplied What?? Who stole what?? Who photocopied what??
It is all now like water in the Sindhu long flow down into the Arabian Sea
What we need to disucss is what and how we are going to counter them and stop them going up the 'Ladder'
We have now proved that conventional 'Skimrishes', 'Limited Engagement', 'Lighinting Strike' , yada yada is possible under the shadow of 'Nuclear Conflict'
The bogey or rather the 'Ambiguity of First Strike' has been called out!!
As I posted in one of the other threads :
Their option now hangs on the tenous thread of 'Tactical Weapons' as the other options as expalined by Gen Shankar are now in tatters and set back at least for 5-10 years unless Unkil or Emperor rapidly supplies capabilities!!
And that is unlikely given the 'Trump's new axis of Evil'
Trump will not go that far to pick a fight with us and nor would Emperor supply them given their recent perfidy!!
Hence in all this the recent bonhomie between India and Taliban takes whole new meaning!!
Anything on the Western Border of the Jihadis completely negates the third option as we will also give us ' Plausible Denialability' !!
{Add to this 'Eyeran' ( as that would be Trump's next target given Hamas capitulation. Please see the Sunni Control and victory in Syrian elections recently)
With Eyeran gone, both KSA and Egypt will breathe easy!! All that Red Sea traffic loss will be recouped.
Sorry digressed a bit here}

[Amber G.]

Thanks RCase. Just the last one...

Amber G. - I think you might have significant theoretical scientific knowledge about nuclear stuff. However, I would like a simple YES/ NO answer as to whether you have been involved in the actual design/ manufacture of a nuclear device or have deep connections within the intelligence agencies to have inside information.

Short answer: No — and no.

Longer, but still plain: I’m a scientist, not an operator or an intelligence officer. I have not been involved in designing or manufacturing a nuclear device, and I do not possess secret inside links to intelligence agencies. My commentary is based on open technical literature, declassified records, public seismic/isotopic data, and decades of working with the underlying physics — not on classified briefings or covert participation.

If you want the quickest test of credibility: ask for the data and methods behind a claim. Experts point to evidence;
operators hand you secrets. I deal with evidence.

[SSridhar]

French Army chief keen on Indian long-range weapons - ET

France has noted the performance of Indian weapon systems during Operation Sindoor and is interested in looking at long-range rockets, loitering munitions and counter-drone systems, French Army chief General Pierre Schill told ET.

The senior officer, who is in the national capital for the UN Troop Contributing Countries Chiefs conference, said the two nations can look at co-developing capabilities for the emerging battlefield, including in the areas of artificial intelligence and electronic warfare.

"I'm interested in looking at what are the systems used by the Indian Army because it is a time when I'm renewing my own long-range artillery systems," the general said, referring to the possible acquisition of long-range Pinaka rocket systems by French forces

It may be noted that France has expressed interest in acquiring a longer-range version of the indigenous Pinaka rocket systems that have proven to be accurate and cost effective. Demonstrations of the system have already been made to France in the past.

Gen Schill said while India and France can cooperate in all new domains of warfare, long-range systems and loitering munitions are of specific interest. "The Indian Army is using those systems very accurately because of your industry and because of the way they are able to adapt them to operations. And what we have seen in Operation Sindoor is very important," he said.

The officer, who met Army chief General Upendra Dwivedi on Monday, also identified counter-drone capabilities as an area for cooperation. "Perhaps electronic warfare, artificial intelligence are domains in which cooperation could be very efficient because of the ability of our two armies," Gen Schill said.

The French general shared that India and France are looking to institutionalise annual army training exercises, building on the Shakti series. He said the two sides are not only looking at increasing the number of training exercises but also the complexity of the joint training to include UAV training, counter-drone operations and electronic warfare.

[RCase]

Thanks RCase. Just the last one...

Amber G. - I think you might have significant theoretical scientific knowledge about nuclear stuff. However, I would like a simple YES/ NO answer as to whether you have been involved in the actual design/ manufacture of a nuclear device or have deep connections within the intelligence agencies to have inside information.

Short answer: No — and no.

Longer, but still plain: I’m a scientist, not an operator or an intelligence officer. I have not been involved in designing or manufacturing a nuclear device, and I do not possess secret inside links to intelligence agencies. My commentary is based on open technical literature, declassified records, public seismic/isotopic data, and decades of working with the underlying physics — not on classified briefings or covert participation.

If you want the quickest test of credibility: ask for the data and methods behind a claim. Experts point to evidence;
operators hand you secrets. I deal with evidence.

say this as someone who’s spent my life around nuclear science: the road to a functioning weapon is primarily about concentrated engineering, access to materials, and political will — not some mystical genius that only a handful of nations possess. The teams that built the first bomb in 1945 understood this plainly: once you know the basic physics, the rest is engineering and production. In other words, what the United States could do, with time and resources, almost any country could do too. (The same theme is presented in any nuclear physics lecture -- once you know basic physics and data etc..)

Appreciate the responses.

the rest is engineering and production ...

That is a pretty big handwave! There is a big difference between the science and manufacturing. The science and engineering equations are pretty much known. The ability to manufacture things that will ultimately perform as designed is another. I have worked with various A&D and automotive companies and am speaking from practical experience.

Based on India's technological journey as well as comparing other nuclear aspiring nations, if the process was so simple as to follow the science, we would have had far more nuclear countries. Also, it is not just about putting together a crude bomb, but also the ability to deliver and get the expected outcome (yield, accuracy etc.). So, I tend to think there are some very nuanced aspects in the design and manufacture of a nuclear device, similar to the design and manufacture of a turbofan engine. The science and engineering for a turbofan is readily available, but the devil is in the details of materials, high temperature management, fluid dynamics, performance, reliability etc. Mastering these are non-trivial and is almost an art!

[vonkabra]

French Army chief keen on Indian long-range weapons

Let the Rafale/Scorpene contracts get signed, bet all the interest in acquiring Indian weapons will disappear immediately afterwards..

[A_Gupta]

A. Why did the engineering expertise gained in nuclear bomb making not spill over into Pakistan’s civilian sector?

B. To RCase’s point - just how good is Pakistan’s arsenal (i.e., to perform as designed)? These certainly aren’t mass produced items.

C. How is Pakistan retaining the technical skills needed? And equipment? Are the supplier networks still in place?

[Aditya_V]

Based on India's technological journey as well as comparing other nuclear aspiring nations, if the process was so simple as to follow the science, we would have had far more nuclear countries. Also, it is not just about putting together a crude bomb, but also the ability to deliver and get the expected outcome (yield, accuracy etc.). So, I tend to think there are some very nuanced aspects in the design and manufacture of a nuclear device, similar to the design and manufacture of a turbofan engine. The science and engineering for a turbofan is readily available, but the devil is in the details of materials, high temperature management, fluid dynamics, performance, reliability etc. Mastering these are non-trivial and is almost an art!

Remember Pakis developed Nuke Delivery Bombs which fitted on F-16 - surely its aerodynamics/weight dimensions etc designed by Pakistan/China will not exactly match a MK82/MK83/Mk84- and F-16 FBW worked with it perfectly.

Similarly Pakistan always had ready to Fire Missiles with TEL etc- straight solid fuel, no going through endless Prithvi tests- then basic Agni config etc which we went through. All this when they cannot Manufacture thier Army Trucks or designed a 100 CC Motorbike?

[Tanaji]

A. Why did the engineering expertise gained in nuclear bomb making not spill over into Pakistan’s civilian sector?

B. To RCase’s point - just how good is Pakistan’s arsenal (i.e., to perform as designed)? These certainly aren’t mass produced items.

C. How is Pakistan retaining the technical skills needed? And equipment? Are the supplier networks still in place?

A. The engineering disciplines required between bomb making and a power plant are completely different. It is relatively easy to make a bomb: all one needs is to either fire a high velocity slug into a hemispherical radioactive material or rig explosives to compress a sphere to criticality. The latter is even easier these days due to modern explosives available that are stable and whose characteristics are well documented. The rest is conventional bomb making. Some expertise is required for miniaturising it , but that’s about it. Pakistani nukes are not fancy dial a yield warheads or very small .. all they need to be is to go boom when the momin yells jeeeehard…
Nuclear power plants on the other hand require expertise on a lot of disciplines:
Neutron moderating techniques: one needs to reliably control the flow of neutrons in the chain reaction to prevent it from going boom and yet provide enough output to generate power
Cooling techniques: Multiple redundant independent systems need to be devised that require someone to visualise all possible failure scenarios - which comes from experience
Metallurgy - One needs the metallurgy and casting ability to create the reactor vessel
Electrical , hydraulic and piping design- this is an art in itself
Power engineering…
Exposure control - Hundreds of workers will work in a power plant. Monitoring radiation dosage and their access is another skill

In other words, the skill required to make the thing go boom has little practical value in the civilian sector. The reverse is true though: it will take little effort for a competent civilian program to come up with the boom.

B. They have shown that they have something that can explode. At this point, I would submit that it is immaterial if it is reliable or not. No Indian planner will be able to discount the existence of a Pak nuke and will have to make plans and expense assuming their arsenal works. They would be criminally negligent if they don’t. But if one were to guess: given the Chinese nature of the design , there is no reason to suspect that a basic design would be unreliable.

C. Refer to A. If all one wants is to go boom - then a small team of scientists can easily maintain the skills.

I am not sure if Pak still uses centrifuges or their Kushab reactors to get the required weapons grade radioactive material. Regardless, given the nature of their program it is possible easily.

[A_Gupta]

Just to highlight the challenges facing the US, according to The Heritage Foundation:

https://www.heritage.org/military-stren ... ar-weapons

The United States has not designed or built a nuclear warhead since the end of the Cold War. Instead, the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) uses life-extension programs (LEPs) to extend the service lives of existing nuclear warheads in the stockpile, some of which date back to the 1960s. While LEPs replace or upgrade most components in a nuclear warhead, all warheads will eventually need to be replaced because their nuclear components—specifically, plutonium pits that comprise the cores of warheads—are also subject to aging.

The United States is the only nuclear state that lacks the capability to produce plutonium pits in quantity. The NNSA’s fiscal year (FY) 2024 budget request notes a 10 percent increase for “Weapons Activities” to “continue restoring production capability, including the capability to produce 80 plutonium pits per year (ppy) as close to 2030 as possible.”

Demographic challenges within the nuclear weapons labs also affect the ability of the U.S. to modernize its warhead stockpile. Because most scientists and engineers with practical hands-on experience in nuclear weapons design and testing are retired, the certification of weapons that were designed and tested as far back as the 1960s depends on the scientific judgment of designers and engineers who have never been involved in either the testing or the design and development of nuclear weapons. In recent years, the NNSA has invested in enabling its workforce to exercise critical nuclear weapons design and development skills—skills that have not been fully exercised since the end of the Cold War—through the Stockpile Readiness Program. These skills must be available when needed to support modern warhead development programs for SLBMs and ICBMs.

The shift in emphasis away from the nuclear weapons mission after the end of the Cold War led to a diminished ability to conduct key activities at the nuclear laboratories. According to NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby, “workforce recruiting and retention programs have helped us turn the tide of attrition post-Covid,” and the budget request reflects the Administration’s commitment to a “safe, secure, and reliable stockpile.”

The NNSA continues to struggle with infrastructure recapitalization, as “[m]ore than 60 percent [of its facilities] are beyond their life expectancy, with some of the most important dating back to the Manhattan Project.”

Because of this neglect, NNSA must now recapitalize the nuclear weapons complex at the same time the nation faces the need to modernize its aging nuclear warheads.

[A_Gupta]

@Tanaji, that Pakistan can explode a nuke on Indian territory has to enter any strategic calculation. While that fact may diminish the relevance of my questions, but it doesn’t answer them.

When someone on Hoodbhoy’s The Black Hole says that Pakistan lacks the means to train crane-operators for its ports, one wonders just how it functions.

[Tanaji]

A_Guptaji,

No doubt you have read the saying that “Most states have an army, In Pakistan, the army has a state”. Everything can be traced to this. The army does not care much about the State - it’s self preservation that is the priority. So the awaam can have shocking railways, its ports run down and the state of education such that basic skilled jobs are difficult to source. But as long as the Army remains it is all good.

The Army gets its legitimacy by “appearing” to stand up to the kaffir and being a true momeen. For this, any cost is not too high. Nuclear weapons are just a means to this end. So the best of resources go to this venture to keep it in working order. It is not as if they lack brains: they seem perfectly capable to keep their Fizayya planes flying and Agostas in working order. Surely that is more complicated than the crane operator….

Their bums will work - maybe they will explode with 20% of their designed yield or maybe not - but it’s immaterial. We still have to assume it all works. That’s the beauty of nuclear weapons unfortunately , unless you are a mad man willing to risk it all on an assumption.

[Amber G.]

I am not sure if Pak still uses centrifuges or their Kushab reactors to get the required weapons grade radioactive material. Regardless, given the nature of their program it is possible easily.

Yes. Pakistan utilizes both gas centrifuges and the heavy-water reactors to produce weapons-grade radioactive materials.

-Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU): Produced using gas centrifuges primarily at the A.Q. Khan's - KRL at Kahuta (and likely other facilities).
(Stock pile ~ 5 tons, ~70 Kg/ year - estimate)

-Weapons-Grade Plutonium: Produced in the Khushab nuclear complex in Punjab province, which houses four heavy-water-moderated reactors. Spent fuel from these reactors is reprocessed (at facilities like the "New Labs" near Rawalpindi) to extract the weapons-grade Pu-239
(Stock pile ~ .6 tons , 44 Kg/ Year - estimate)

Amber G. -Working with declassified data, gamma-spectrometry and spent-fuel isotopic analyses — no clearance required.