Comparative Failures of Chinese Systems in Operation Sindoor and Absolute Resolve

[Amber G.]

@BRF Admins - I am starting a new thread, on a topic due to recent event. Please take a look at it's - it can be a temporary thread or can be be merged into an existing appropriate thread - now or later.

Following the total operational failure of the JY-27A and HQ-9 networks in both Operation Sindoor (2025) and Operation Absolute Resolve (2026), I want to open a technical discussion on the specific failure points of these Chinese-made systems.
I want to start a conversation about what just happened in Venezuela (Operation Absolute Resolve) and how it mirrors what India did during Operation Sindoor last year.

We all heard the hype about Chinese 'stealth-killer' radars like the JY-27A and how the HQ-9 was supposed to be a 'no-fly zone' for all. But look at the scoreboard:

In Pakistan : The IAF sent in BrahMos and SCALP missiles, and the Chinese-made grid didn't just miss—it basically didn't even wake up. The LY-80 batteries were found sitting ducks because their data links got fried by Indian electronic warfare.

In Venezuela (2026): It was also same. The U.S. flew F-35s and Growlers right over Caracas. The Chinese 'integrated' network didn't just fail; it totally collapsed. The radars were 'blind' and the missile batteries never even got a target lock.

The question for the technical folks here: Is Chinese gear just 'Export-Grade' junk, or is their entire command-and-control (C2) architecture fundamentally broken? It seems like as soon as you hit them with high-end EW (like India’s SPECTRA or the U.S. Growlers), the whole 'brain' of their defense system freezes up.

Of course, let's keep it professional —anything classified, not per BRF guidelines or not prudent to discuss in an open forum is off-limits. Let’s stick to the open-source data and scientific basics which is know to all.

[Amber G.]

(Re) Posting:
This video provides a detailed breakdown of the HQ-9 system's technical claims versus its actual performance during the Indian strikes, which is central to understanding the "Export-Grade" failures discussed.

[Amber G.]

Few starting points:
(Operation Sindoor):

• BrahMos vs. HQ-9 Chinese Integrated Air Defenses Collapsed.
  The SCALP How IAF 'Stealth-Killer' Radars in Punjab"
  Operation Sindoor Post-Mortem: Technical Lessons from the Failure JY-27A .. LY-80 Networks"
  Balakot to Bahawalpur: The Persistent Failure of Chinese Radar Algorithms Against Indian Strikes"

(Operation Absolute Resolve) -- 5th-gen stealth, electronic suppression, and the "decapitation" strike.

• Total Blindness: JY-27’s Failure Against 5th-Gen Stealth in Operation Absolute Resolve.
  The EA-18G Effect: U.S. Electronic Warfare Paralyzed Caracas’s Chinese-Made Command Hubs.
  Operation Absolute Resolve - A Technical Deep-Dive into the Fragility of CETC Defense Architecture.
  Why Venezuela’s 'Anti-Stealth' Shield Remained Silent During the Maduro Raid"

Comparative Failures of Chinese Systems in Operation Sindoor and Absolute Resolve
Network-Centric Warfare vs. Chinese Hardware: Lessons from the 2025/26 Air Defense Collapses
The Myth of the Stealth-Killer: Why Chinese VHF Radars Failed (both times)

[Aditya_V]

Can we add PL-15, a few were recovered completely intact, Paki Auzrangazeb etc where showing PPT with no real military detail

[Amber G.]

HOW THE U.S. NEUTRALIZED VENEZUELA'S RUSSIAN AND CHINESE AIR DEFENSES IN MINUTES

While the world watched Maduro's extraction, the real battle was fought in the electromagnetic spectrum and high-altitude stealth corridors.

The U.S. reportedly bypassed its F-16 fleet entirely, opting for the F-35 Lightning II to lead the operation.

Why?

Venezuela wasn't a simple target.

It was a fortress of integrated Russian S-300VM systems, Chinese radar networks, and Iranian-sourced Shahed drones.

A "highly lethal" environment where non-stealth aircraft go to die.

With S-300V systems backed by Buk-M2 units and dense radar grids, an F-16 would have been lit up like a Christmas tree miles from the coast.

Instead, the U.S. deployed a command and control juggernaut: 8 destroyers and 3 amphibious assault ships turning the Caribbean into a floating headquarters.

F-35s launched from Puerto Rico and sea-based platforms used sensor fusion to target mobile air defense sites in real-time, clearing the path for Special Forces heading to the palace.

By the time Venezuela's aging Su-30MK2s could scramble, the digital war was already over.

Venezuelan targets were reached within 15 minutes of the order. Russia's S-300s.

China's radar networks.

Expensive lawn ornaments.

Source:
@AITELLY1

[Vayutuvan]

Does Venezuela have Chinese ADS? The thread started by @Rudradev ji has details. As per his information, there is no indication that Chinese supplied radars to the Venezuelan defense establishment.

[Jay]

HOW THE U.S. NEUTRALIZED VENEZUELA'S RUSSIAN AND CHINESE AIR DEFENSES IN MINUTES

While the world watched Maduro's extraction, the real battle was fought in the electromagnetic spectrum and high-altitude stealth corridors.


Venezuela wasn't a simple target.

It was a fortress of integrated Russian S-300VM systems, Chinese radar networks, and Iranian-sourced Shahed drones.

A "highly lethal" environment where non-stealth aircraft go to die.

Source:
@AITELLY1

Somehow that statement does not ring true. Venezuela does not even have an adequate payroll to cover its armed forces and the desertion rate is very high. On top that they have a very piss poor morale and competency so much so that maduro's inner security circle is full of cubans.

It has a grand total of ONCE S300 battalion and less than 10 working units of Buk. On top that their military does not want to fight for maduro and did not take any weapons. This was an easy operation, as easy as it comes and the bombast is just that. Not saying this is not impressive, but there was nothing from their opponent to cast them as a "fortress".

https://brendonbeebe.substack.com/p/ven ... pabilities

[Amber G.]

Does Venezuela have Chinese ADS? The thread started by @Rudradev ji has details. As per his information, there is no indication that Chinese supplied radars to the Venezuelan defense establishment.

Yes, Venezuela heavily relies on Chinese-made Air Defense Systems (ADS) and radars, which were central to the reports of failure during the recent U.S. raid.  

Recent reports - confirm that Venezuela’s "integrated" defense was almost entirely built around sensors and systems from the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC).  

Specific Chinese Equipment in Venezuela:
JY-27A "Skywatch-V" Radar: This is the most famous piece of equipment in their inventory. It is a long-range, meter-wave radar marketed as a "stealth-killer."
JYL-1 3D Surveillance Radar: An S-band long-range radar used for general air surveillance and providing data to missile batteries.  
JY-11B Low-Altitude Radar: Designed to detect low-flying targets (like the US helicopters used in the raid).
FK-3 (Export version of HQ-12): A medium-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. Several batteries were deployed specifically to protect the capital, Caracas.

(Would be interesting to know why these systems failed so spectacularly in both Venezuela (2026) and Pakistan (2025). The failures were not just about "old tech," but about a fundamental collapse of the Chinese Command-and-Control (C2) architecture)

Guru logs contirbute..

[Amber G.]

About PL-15
IMO- One of the greatest intelligence "bonanzas" for IAF & DRDO i.

It wasn't just that they were recovered; it was the condition they were in and the location where they were found that tells the real technical story.

- Several PL-15s were found almost entirely intact in fields in Hoshiarpur and Bathinda.

- The fact that they landed "softly" and didn't explode indicates a failure of the self-destruct mechanism.
- Most modern Western and Indian missiles have failsafes to destroy the missile if it misses its target, The Chinese export version (PL-15E) either lacked this or the software crashed under heavy Indian jamming)

- Why did they miss?
- Data-Link Severance - A key part of the PL-15's long-range accuracy is the mid-course update from a Pakistani Erieye AWACS. as many have said here ..Indian jamming effectively cut the "conversation" between the AWACS and the missile,

By recovering these intact, we can know lot about software and hardware too ( eg heat-resistant composites and the radome quality.)

[Amber G.]

Summary of the "Venezuelan Shield"

JY-27A Radar - (China) - Anti-Stealth / Early Warning - Failed: Blinded by EW; failed to detect F-35s.

JYL-1 Radar – (China) - 3D Long-Range Tracking - Failed: Neutralized by electronic suppression.

FK-3 (HQ-12) – (China) - Medium-Range SAM - Inactive: Never fired; lacked targeting data.

S-300VM - (Russia) = Long-Range SAM - Inactive: Remained silent due to Chinese radar failure.

@Jay Thanks- The link give there has nice summary.

--- FWIW Some stories/articles:
The Failure of Chinese Defense Systems: From Operation Sindoor to Venezuela

From “Stealth Killers” to Silent Screens: How Chinese Military Systems Failed the Ultimate Battlefield Test

Beijing Systems Put To The Test: How US Forces Crushed Venezuela’s Chinese Air Defences

India’s Operation Sindoor: A Battlefield Verdict on Chinese Weapons

[saumitra_j]

In order to understand what IAF/IA had to do, let us dig into the details of the HQ9P/HQ9B system that were employed by Pakistan. From this blog where brochures were uploaded, we see that:

• HQ 9/FD 2000 is a pretty capable system on paper,with the HQ9 P being customised to deal with cruise missiles as well

• Has a range of about 125 km against aircraft, less against munitions, ballistic missiles etc

• Single shot kill probability of 0.85 against CM, must be much better against aircrafts

• Has a range of about 125 km against aircraft, less against munitions, ballistic missiles etc

• The JYL 1 radar has a range of 400+ km against targets with RCS of 2m^2

• Seems to have a pretty decent ECM system, something one would expect for a sophisticated and complex system

The system was inducted post Balakot, in 2021. So the system is quite modern yet the Pakistani's have had about 3 years to hone their skills on it. The question then is if the brochure capabilities are false or if extremely superior IA and IAF tactics and equally Pakistani incompetence made these systems to fail! Given that the Chinese have built it based on their experience with S300 PMU and given their overall experience in rocketry and electronics, I doubt that systems are inherently bad, unless they have massive reliability issues! My own view is that it is finally down to skills and tactics and I strongly feel that while Op Sindoor was overwhelmingly successful for India, we were mostly matched on equipment quality, especially on radars, missiles and aircrafts . The big game changers IMHO for India then were:

• IACCS, Akashteer and overall networked warfare

• Brahmos

• Training, tactics and discipline i.e. the men who fought for us

I think for us as Indians, the Chinese equipment as incapable is incorrect and we will end up underestimating them.

[saumitra_j]

Amber G madam, from the first link you have posted,

But when Indian forces attacked, the Chinese systems failed completely. Not a single Indian missile was shot down. The HQ-9 air defense batteries couldn’t stop the BrahMos and SCALP cruise missiles that struck their targets. The problem was that the HQ-9 system had a serious design weakness – its semi-active radar made it easy for Indian forces to locate and destroy the batteries. Indian forces knew exactly where the Chinese systems were and destroyed them before they could be effective.

This is not a very accurate analysis IMHO - IAF would have located the missile as part of its recce/EW missions and not because the missile is semi-active - a semi active missile is flying towards its target, so it can get jammed. The author is underestimating the missile's capabilities by not fully understanding IAF/IA's discipline and tactics.

Even the Chinese PL-15 air-to-air missiles, which were supposed to be advanced weapons, didn’t work properly. Some failed to hit their targets, and others malfunctioned in mid-air. India even recovered pieces of a PL-15 missile that had simply fallen from the sky without hitting anything.

This is again dangerously wrong analysis about the weapon system itself. IAF's tactics in manoeuvring and EW would have made them fail. Even in Balakot, we had found AMRAAM debris but that does not make AMRAAM a bad missile. I agree that reliability is something that the Chinese weapons may lack in, given that missiles did not self destruct but when it works, the missile *is capable*!

The bottom line is: We have a massive issue of under funding our armed forces, especially equipment and that is evident in a capability match up with Bhikaristan. Superior training, discipline and men along with a few game changers like Brahmos/Akashteer/IACCS got us through last time but we cannot rest on that success - we need more, better and overwhelming superiority across all dimensions through acquisitions and continuous development of new weapons. Calling Chinese weapons as failed weapons is a dangerously wrong analysis IMHO.

[Jay]

This is again dangerously wrong analysis about the weapon system itself. IAF's tactics in manoeuvring and EW would have made them fail. Even in Balakot, we had found AMRAAM debris but that does not make AMRAAM a bad missile.

The difference is we found AMRAAM's "Debris" but not the full intact missiles like the chinese ones during OP sindoor and I think that's what amber ji was referring to. Recovering a fully intact missile and that too multiple's of it(if true) point to something seriously not working in this type of missiles.

[saip]

Just curious, what happens to a missile if it is not successful in acquiring the intended target (a fighter jet, for instance). Does it automatically disarm itself or try to acquire another target? Few years ago it happened in Europe (Ukrainian missile trial?). After failing to hit the intended target it re-acquired a civilian airliner with disastrous result.

[Amber G.]

^^^ From what I know - Most missiles don’t go “looking” for a new target. If they lose lock, they usually self-destruct or just fly ballistic and fall. Retargeting is not normal behavior.

The European case you’re thinking of (Ukraine, 2001) involved an old Soviet S-200 SAM (1960's model). It missed a drone, didn’t self-destruct, and its powerful radar seeker later locked onto a civilian airliner — failure of outdated design and safety procedures.
( The missile missed, continued flying, and later locked onto a civilian Tu-154 airliner ~250 km away.
The aircraft was destroyed; 78 people died)
Modern missiles ( I would think) have much tighter self-destruct timers and seeker limits, so this risk is far lower today, though never zero.

[pravula]

Just curious, what happens to a missile if it is not successful in acquiring the intended target (a fighter jet, for instance). Does it automatically disarm itself or try to acquire another target? Few years ago it happened in Europe (Ukrainian missile trial?). After failing to hit the intended target it re-acquired a civilian airliner with disastrous result.

Depending on the missile, it will try to reacquire the target or can be targeted to a new bogey by a data link. Meteor for example...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meteor_(missile)#Control

[sudhan]

^^^ From what I know - Most missiles don’t go “looking” for a new target. If they lose lock, they usually self-destruct or just fly ballistic and fall. Retargeting is not normal behavior.

The European case you’re thinking of (Ukraine, 2001) involved an old Soviet S-200 SAM (1960's model). It missed a drone, didn’t self-destruct, and its powerful radar seeker later locked onto a civilian airliner — failure of outdated design and safety procedures.
( The missile missed, continued flying, and later locked onto a civilian Tu-154 airliner ~250 km away.
The aircraft was destroyed; 78 people died)
Modern missiles ( I would think) have much tighter self-destruct timers and seeker limits, so this risk is far lower today, though never zero.

Modern A2A missiles have many fallbacks and fail safes. Overall, many new features are being added in modern missiles.. When taking about locking on to a target For eg: (all as per Open sources)

1. If the missile loses lock immediately after firing it usually flies without mothership guidance to the last known location of the bogey and searches the area for a target to lock on and rundown. Here the missile has ample energy left as the lock was lost close to firing time. Of course, the missile will not fly the most efficient flight path, so the probability of kill is very low in this mode.
2. If the mothership does not achieve a lock, the pilot could choose to fire without a lock, where the missile simply flies a straight line in the direction it was fires while following a similar algorithm to the above point, basically looking for targets.
3. Missile loses lock during the end game maneuvering, missile will most likely not look for new targets as the missile is low on kinetic energy and low onboard battery powering the radar. The missile will (or rather should) self destruct.
4. Some Close range missiles have an advance re-targetting algorithm where they can be fired with or without lock, and if the missile detects that the targets has slipped behind it, it can turn around and look for the missed target. I have seen a video of a Python5 do this. Apparently ASRAAM, AIM9x and other new CCMs can do this too. This can only happen immediately after firing (as CCMs have very short burn times)
5. Guidance for medium and long range missile no longer is the sole responsibility of the firing aircraft, but can be done by buddy fighter or AWACS (not a modern feature)

Reg PL 15 in Op sindoor

Multiple PL15s recovered intact, could mean not all the alternate flows of the algorithms were fully tested. The missile should have an impact and a proximity fuse. The impact fuse is usually triggered by a sudden deceleration. Hitting the ground should have easily created the condition. Another reason could be the missile's onboard battery ran out of juice during the end game phase, making the onboard computer to shut off, making the missile a harmless flying lamp pole.. A last reason that I could think of (low chance of it happening) is that the missile somehow overshot its pylon life making the electronics unreliable.

[rkirankr]

How do Indian RADAR protect itself. When on, it would also be "visible" to enemy systems. Looking at how US is behaving, how could we counter their EW capabilities

[Amber G.]

How do Indian RADAR protect itself. When on, it would also be "visible" to enemy systems. Looking at how US is behaving, how could we counter their EW capabilities

Not a military expert - just my take from basics and reading etc..

A classic paradox in modern warfare: to see the enemy, you must shine a light (radar), but that light also tells the enemy exactly where you are standing.

For what I know - India uses Uttam AESA or the Rajendra etc - involves a mix of high-tech "stealth" for the signals themselves and aggressive physical protection.

-Counter enemy Electronic Warfare (EW):

1. Radar Stays "Invisible" (LPI Tech)
Use Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) techniques - (Instead of sending out one massive, loud "shout" of energy,)

Frequency Hopping - The radar jumps between thousands of different frequencies every second. - By the time an enemy's RWR)detects a signal on one frequency, the radar has already moved to another.), Very low power (whispers), complex wave forms etc..
receiver.

2. Countering Enemy Electronic Warfare (ECCM)
When the enemy tries to jam Indian radars (EW), Indian radars use ECCM

Try try to "leak" noise into the sides of a radar antenna.

Is designed to recognize its own "stolen" pulses. (If a jammer records an Indian radar pulse and sends it back to create a "ghost target,"), Or use burn through - in intense jamming environment, the radar can concentrate all its energy into a tiny, pencil-thin beam to "burn through" the noise and see the target anyway)

3. Physical Protection from Anti-Radiation Missiles (ARMs)

- Decoy Emitters: India deploys small, cheap "dummy" transmitters near the real radar.
- Blinking - : If a missile launch is detected, two or three Indian radar units can work together, switching their signals on and off in turns. The missile gets confused as the "source" keeps jumping from one location to another.

4. The "Rudram"
India’s Rudram-1 is a "New Generation Anti-Radiation Missile" (NGARM).
(Jamming actually turns them into a glowing beacon for a Rudram missile to track and destroy .