Iran News and Discussions
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Not only that. He railing on women for their lifestyles while his regime actively want to push them into stone age and punishing those who opposed these measures with sexual abuse and ultimately death is not just ironic, but deceptive and makes his look like an incel asshole, which he is.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Could the Artesh, the regular Army be the force being groomed to take over the regime, once the bombing steps - primarily targeted on the IRGC?
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Incel? He had a wife and three children.Jay wrote: ↑10 Mar 2026 23:56 Not only that. He railing on women for their lifestyles while his regime actively want to push them into stone age and punishing those who opposed these measures with sexual abuse and ultimately death is not just ironic, but deceptive and makes his look like an incel asshole, which he is.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
https://x.com/i/status/2031324990717702582
@shanaka86
Iran is not on a suicide mission. It is on autopilot. And nobody in Tehran can reach the controls.
In 2003, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari watched the United States decapitate Saddam Hussein’s centralised command structure in three weeks. He spent the next four years at the IRGC Strategic Studies Centre designing a military architecture that could never be decapitated. In September 2007, he was appointed IRGC Commander and immediately restructured Iran’s entire military into 31 autonomous provincial commands, one per province, each with independent headquarters, command and control, missile and drone arsenals, fast-attack boat flotillas, integrated Basij militias, pre-delegated launch authority, stockpiled munitions, and sealed contingency orders. The doctrine was built for one scenario: the death of the Supreme Leader.
That scenario arrived on 28 February 2026. The doctrine activated within hours. It has been running ever since.
The question nobody has asked is whether anyone inside the Islamic Republic can turn it off.
No. The reason is constitutional.
Article 110 of Iran’s 1979 Constitution vests sole command authority over all armed forces exclusively in the Supreme Leader. He alone is commander-in-chief. He alone appoints and dismisses military leadership. No other institution, not the President, not the Parliament, not the Guardian Council, not the judiciary, possesses constitutional power to issue military orders or rescind the Supreme Leader’s directives.
Ali Khamenei issued the pre-delegation orders. Ali Khamenei is dead. Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed successor on 8th March. He has not spoken. He has not appeared. He has issued no verifiable order. He was wounded in an airstrike and has never addressed his nation in his life. The sole constitutional authority that could override 31 autonomous commands exists in an office occupied by a man who may not be capable of exercising it.
Ghalibaf can reject ceasefires. He cannot order the IRGC to stop. Pezeshkian can issue statements. He cannot countermand a provincial commander in Bushehr launching anti-ship missiles at a tanker. The Guardian Council can vet legislation. It cannot revoke firing authority issued by a dead commander-in-chief whose orders remain legally binding until a living one explicitly rescinds them. No living one has.
The 31 commands are not disobeying. They are obeying. The last orders said: fight independently, with whatever you have, for as long as it takes, without waiting for instructions that may never come. Those orders were designed to survive the death of the man who issued them. That was the entire purpose of Jafari’s twenty-year project.
For insurers: no counterparty can guarantee cessation across 31 independent actors.
For diplomats: no signatory can bind commands they do not control.
For military planners: no single headquarters whose destruction ends the campaign.
For Gulf states: each faces localised harassment from the adjacent Iranian province’s fast-attack boats, drones, and coastal missiles without any central coordination to intercept or negotiate with.
For markets: seven P&I clubs modelled the probability that all 31 commands would simultaneously honour any agreement and concluded near zero. That calculation has not changed because the constitutional mechanism that could compel compliance does not functionally exist.
The doctrine was not designed to win. It was designed to make losing impossible. Jafari studied how centralised armies die. He built one that cannot.
The machine runs without a pilot. The pilot is dead. And the constitution says only the pilot could have turned it off.
Full analysis in the link.
https://x.com/shanaka86/status/2031316363424444554
@shanaka86
BREAKING: Iran’s Parliament Speaker just killed the ceasefire.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, March 10: “We are certainly not seeking a ceasefire. We believe the aggressor must be struck in the mouth. We will break this cycle of war, negotiation, ceasefire, war.”
This arrives the same day the Wall Street Journal reports Trump’s advisers privately urging an exit. Oil crashed from $119.50 to below $91. The market exhaled. Iran’s second most powerful elected official just told the world the exhale was premature.
Here is what every actor is actually doing while the ceasefire dies.
The IRGC launched Wave 33 this morning. One-ton warheads on Kheibar Shekan missiles targeting Tel Aviv and the Fifth Fleet. Codenamed “Labbayk ya Khamenei” for a Supreme Leader who has not spoken and may not be conscious. General Mousavi announced no warhead below one ton from this point forward. Thirty-one autonomous provincial commands continue firing without central orders. The doctrine does not need a ceasefire because it was built to function without one.
Seven P&I clubs, Gard, Skuld, NorthStandard, Steamship Mutual, American Club, Swedish Club, London P&I, covering 90% of global tonnage, cancelled war-risk cover on 5 March under Solvency II. Zero have reinstated. Hormuz crossings collapsed from 138 daily vessels to approximately 2. Premiums surged from 0.05% to 1-3% of hull value. The DFC’s $20 billion backstop has produced zero confirmed large-scale VLCC transits. Force majeures have cascaded from QatarEnergy to Saudi Aramco to Kuwait Petroleum to Bapco to Aluminium Bahrain to Yeochun NCC Korea to Formosa Taiwan to PCS Singapore to SCC Rayong Thailand. The naphtha-to-polyethylene chain feeding Asian manufacturing is broken. Ghalibaf’s rejection ensures it stays broken.
China is not intervening. It is collecting. MizarVision publishes AI-labelled satellite imagery of every US asset in theatre. Shadow fleet vessels deliver drone components at night. The PLA is learning American reaction times, electronic warfare effectiveness, and interceptor depletion economics in the most comprehensive live-fire intelligence collection it has ever observed. Beijing does not need the war to end. It needs the war to teach.
Russia is harvesting. Urals at yearly highs. Power of Siberia delivering 38.8 billion cubic metres to China. Putin evaluating a preemptive halt of European energy to redirect at Hormuz-inflated prices. The war finances Ukraine without Moscow firing a shot.
The Houthis have resumed selective Red Sea strikes. If Bab al-Mandab activates alongside Hormuz, both chokepoints bracketing the Arabian Peninsula close simultaneously. Ghalibaf’s rejection extends the timeline in which that can happen.
Twelve days. One Supreme Leader dead. One invisible. Thirty-three waves. Seven clubs withdrawn. 138 daily transits reduced to 2. Five navies deployed. Zero commercial transits restored. Zero insurance reinstated. Zero ceasefires. Zero negotiations.
The war has no political exit because Ghalibaf closed it. No commercial exit because the actuaries closed it five days earlier. No military exit because the doctrine was designed to outlast every strategy conceived by the adversaries it was built to fight.
The market priced a quick war. The doctrine priced a long one. Ghalibaf just told you which.
Full analysis in the link.
@shanaka86
Iran is not on a suicide mission. It is on autopilot. And nobody in Tehran can reach the controls.
In 2003, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari watched the United States decapitate Saddam Hussein’s centralised command structure in three weeks. He spent the next four years at the IRGC Strategic Studies Centre designing a military architecture that could never be decapitated. In September 2007, he was appointed IRGC Commander and immediately restructured Iran’s entire military into 31 autonomous provincial commands, one per province, each with independent headquarters, command and control, missile and drone arsenals, fast-attack boat flotillas, integrated Basij militias, pre-delegated launch authority, stockpiled munitions, and sealed contingency orders. The doctrine was built for one scenario: the death of the Supreme Leader.
That scenario arrived on 28 February 2026. The doctrine activated within hours. It has been running ever since.
The question nobody has asked is whether anyone inside the Islamic Republic can turn it off.
No. The reason is constitutional.
Article 110 of Iran’s 1979 Constitution vests sole command authority over all armed forces exclusively in the Supreme Leader. He alone is commander-in-chief. He alone appoints and dismisses military leadership. No other institution, not the President, not the Parliament, not the Guardian Council, not the judiciary, possesses constitutional power to issue military orders or rescind the Supreme Leader’s directives.
Ali Khamenei issued the pre-delegation orders. Ali Khamenei is dead. Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed successor on 8th March. He has not spoken. He has not appeared. He has issued no verifiable order. He was wounded in an airstrike and has never addressed his nation in his life. The sole constitutional authority that could override 31 autonomous commands exists in an office occupied by a man who may not be capable of exercising it.
Ghalibaf can reject ceasefires. He cannot order the IRGC to stop. Pezeshkian can issue statements. He cannot countermand a provincial commander in Bushehr launching anti-ship missiles at a tanker. The Guardian Council can vet legislation. It cannot revoke firing authority issued by a dead commander-in-chief whose orders remain legally binding until a living one explicitly rescinds them. No living one has.
The 31 commands are not disobeying. They are obeying. The last orders said: fight independently, with whatever you have, for as long as it takes, without waiting for instructions that may never come. Those orders were designed to survive the death of the man who issued them. That was the entire purpose of Jafari’s twenty-year project.
For insurers: no counterparty can guarantee cessation across 31 independent actors.
For diplomats: no signatory can bind commands they do not control.
For military planners: no single headquarters whose destruction ends the campaign.
For Gulf states: each faces localised harassment from the adjacent Iranian province’s fast-attack boats, drones, and coastal missiles without any central coordination to intercept or negotiate with.
For markets: seven P&I clubs modelled the probability that all 31 commands would simultaneously honour any agreement and concluded near zero. That calculation has not changed because the constitutional mechanism that could compel compliance does not functionally exist.
The doctrine was not designed to win. It was designed to make losing impossible. Jafari studied how centralised armies die. He built one that cannot.
The machine runs without a pilot. The pilot is dead. And the constitution says only the pilot could have turned it off.
Full analysis in the link.
https://x.com/shanaka86/status/2031316363424444554
@shanaka86
BREAKING: Iran’s Parliament Speaker just killed the ceasefire.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, March 10: “We are certainly not seeking a ceasefire. We believe the aggressor must be struck in the mouth. We will break this cycle of war, negotiation, ceasefire, war.”
This arrives the same day the Wall Street Journal reports Trump’s advisers privately urging an exit. Oil crashed from $119.50 to below $91. The market exhaled. Iran’s second most powerful elected official just told the world the exhale was premature.
Here is what every actor is actually doing while the ceasefire dies.
The IRGC launched Wave 33 this morning. One-ton warheads on Kheibar Shekan missiles targeting Tel Aviv and the Fifth Fleet. Codenamed “Labbayk ya Khamenei” for a Supreme Leader who has not spoken and may not be conscious. General Mousavi announced no warhead below one ton from this point forward. Thirty-one autonomous provincial commands continue firing without central orders. The doctrine does not need a ceasefire because it was built to function without one.
Seven P&I clubs, Gard, Skuld, NorthStandard, Steamship Mutual, American Club, Swedish Club, London P&I, covering 90% of global tonnage, cancelled war-risk cover on 5 March under Solvency II. Zero have reinstated. Hormuz crossings collapsed from 138 daily vessels to approximately 2. Premiums surged from 0.05% to 1-3% of hull value. The DFC’s $20 billion backstop has produced zero confirmed large-scale VLCC transits. Force majeures have cascaded from QatarEnergy to Saudi Aramco to Kuwait Petroleum to Bapco to Aluminium Bahrain to Yeochun NCC Korea to Formosa Taiwan to PCS Singapore to SCC Rayong Thailand. The naphtha-to-polyethylene chain feeding Asian manufacturing is broken. Ghalibaf’s rejection ensures it stays broken.
China is not intervening. It is collecting. MizarVision publishes AI-labelled satellite imagery of every US asset in theatre. Shadow fleet vessels deliver drone components at night. The PLA is learning American reaction times, electronic warfare effectiveness, and interceptor depletion economics in the most comprehensive live-fire intelligence collection it has ever observed. Beijing does not need the war to end. It needs the war to teach.
Russia is harvesting. Urals at yearly highs. Power of Siberia delivering 38.8 billion cubic metres to China. Putin evaluating a preemptive halt of European energy to redirect at Hormuz-inflated prices. The war finances Ukraine without Moscow firing a shot.
The Houthis have resumed selective Red Sea strikes. If Bab al-Mandab activates alongside Hormuz, both chokepoints bracketing the Arabian Peninsula close simultaneously. Ghalibaf’s rejection extends the timeline in which that can happen.
Twelve days. One Supreme Leader dead. One invisible. Thirty-three waves. Seven clubs withdrawn. 138 daily transits reduced to 2. Five navies deployed. Zero commercial transits restored. Zero insurance reinstated. Zero ceasefires. Zero negotiations.
The war has no political exit because Ghalibaf closed it. No commercial exit because the actuaries closed it five days earlier. No military exit because the doctrine was designed to outlast every strategy conceived by the adversaries it was built to fight.
The market priced a quick war. The doctrine priced a long one. Ghalibaf just told you which.
Full analysis in the link.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Ship coming to India targetted
BREAKING: Thai-Flagged Vessel Attacked Near Strait of Hormuz, Three Crew Reported Missing
BREAKING: Thai-Flagged Vessel Attacked Near Strait of Hormuz, Three Crew Reported Missing
Re: Iran News and Discussions
https://responsiblestatecraft.org/iran-war-drones/
Why Tehran may have time on its side
We're in an era where the simplicity of Iran’s weapons allows them to compete not on the level of technology, but on the level of persistence.
Steven Simon, Mar 09, 2026
A provocative calculus by Anusar Farrouqui (“policytensor”) has been circulating on X and in more exhaustive form on the author’s Substack. It purports to demonstrate a sobering reality: in a high-intensity U.S.-Iran conflict, the United States may be unable to suppress Iranian drone production quickly enough to prevent a strategically consequential period of regional devastation.
The argument is framed through a quantitative lens, carrying the seductive appeal of mathematical precision. It arranges variables—such as U.S. sortie rates and degradation efficiency against Iranian repair cycles and rebuild speeds—to suggest a "sustainable firing rate." The implication is that Iran could maintain a persistent strike capability long enough to exhaust American political patience, forcing Washington toward a premature declaration of success or an unfavorable ceasefire.
There are, of course, valid reasons to approach this analysis with a healthy grain of salt. The model is structurally narrow, its empirical foundations regarding Iranian industrial recovery are speculative, and its strategic conclusions often leap further than the raw numbers can strictly justify. However, focusing solely on the mathematical flaws misses the broader point.
The most significant takeaway is that the analysis may be directionally accurate, even if specific data points are off-target. Its core assessment suggests that Iran may have time on its side. This is a serious proposition—one that deserves closer attention than the dismissive reactions of traditional defense circles would suggest.
The primary claim is straightforward: if the United States cannot achieve a "rapid collapse" of the Iranian drone infrastructure, Tehran can sustain a campaign of attrition against global shipping lanes, Gulf energy facilities, regional U.S. bases, and American partners. At some point, the cumulative economic and political costs of Iranian persistence become so visible that the domestic pressure in Washington to exit the conflict outweighs the strategic desire to stay.
In its most distilled form, the model reduces the entire contest to a mathematical relationship between two opposing forces: the rate of U.S. suppression and the rate of Iranian reconstitution. If the "regeneration constant"—the speed at which Iran can repair a bombed workshop or move assembly to a new basement—remains high relative to the "attrition constant" imposed by U.S. strikes, a functional portion of the production base survives. This surviving base acts as a floor for continued attacks. From this mechanical premise, the author moves to a political conclusion: continued attacks lead to prolonged disruption, which eventually results in a politically unfavorable outcome for the United States.
As a stylized exercise, this is far more useful than it might initially appear to those who prefer traditional "order of battle" analysis. It identifies a critical variable often obscured in grand strategy: the industrial contest. A war of this nature would not be decided solely by tactical successes. It would be a trial of industrial resilience. If Iranian one-way attack drones can be manufactured through a network of relatively simple, dispersed, and easily repairable facilities, then the standard assumption that Western airpower can "solve" the problem in a matter of days is dangerously optimistic. The model performs a service by directing our gaze away from slogans of "overwhelming force" and toward the slower mechanics of suppression, reconstitution, and sustained coercion.
The shift in emphasis toward industrial resilience is backed by recent history. The experience of the Russia-Ukraine war has fundamentally altered our understanding of Shahed-type systems. They are not "boutique" weapons requiring delicate, high-tech cleanrooms. Instead, they belong to a new category of "attritable" systems that can be produced in massive quantities and expanded rapidly under wartime duress.
Their strategic significance lies precisely in their lack of sophistication. They do not need the performance of a fifth-generation fighter to create a strategic crisis; they only need to be available in sufficient volume to saturate defenses and keep the global energy market in a state of perpetual anxiety. For decades, the U.S. military has thought in terms of "target sets": identify the factory, hit it hard, and watch the enemy’s capability collapse. This logic fails against a modular, dispersed, and industrially "flat" production ecosystem. If Iranian drone production is indeed an adaptive, decentralized network, the suppression problem becomes less like knocking out a building and more like trying to keep a biological organism below a certain threshold of activity. This is a repetitive, costly, and time-consuming endeavor.
This is where the analysis pulls its true weight. The real insight is not the exact ratio of drones produced per week, but the warning that even a "successful" military campaign might take longer than Washington’s political timetable allows. We can illustrate this with a medium-case scenario. Iran does not need to sustain a maximal, high-intensity attack indefinitely. It only needs to demonstrate that, for a period measured in months rather than days, it can keep the conflict "active" and "costly."
If Tehran can do this, it creates a classic asymmetry: long-term U.S. military superiority does not guarantee short-term, politically usable success. This distinction is vital. Iran cannot defeat the U.S. military in a head-to-head clash, but it can likely keep the conflict inside the "American political pain window." A four-month delay in achieving total suppression might seem like a minor tactical hiccup to a general, but to a politician, four months of rising oil prices, skyrocketing shipping insurance, and daily headlines about "failed" strikes is a catastrophe.
.....
Gautam
Why Tehran may have time on its side
We're in an era where the simplicity of Iran’s weapons allows them to compete not on the level of technology, but on the level of persistence.
Steven Simon, Mar 09, 2026
A provocative calculus by Anusar Farrouqui (“policytensor”) has been circulating on X and in more exhaustive form on the author’s Substack. It purports to demonstrate a sobering reality: in a high-intensity U.S.-Iran conflict, the United States may be unable to suppress Iranian drone production quickly enough to prevent a strategically consequential period of regional devastation.
The argument is framed through a quantitative lens, carrying the seductive appeal of mathematical precision. It arranges variables—such as U.S. sortie rates and degradation efficiency against Iranian repair cycles and rebuild speeds—to suggest a "sustainable firing rate." The implication is that Iran could maintain a persistent strike capability long enough to exhaust American political patience, forcing Washington toward a premature declaration of success or an unfavorable ceasefire.
There are, of course, valid reasons to approach this analysis with a healthy grain of salt. The model is structurally narrow, its empirical foundations regarding Iranian industrial recovery are speculative, and its strategic conclusions often leap further than the raw numbers can strictly justify. However, focusing solely on the mathematical flaws misses the broader point.
The most significant takeaway is that the analysis may be directionally accurate, even if specific data points are off-target. Its core assessment suggests that Iran may have time on its side. This is a serious proposition—one that deserves closer attention than the dismissive reactions of traditional defense circles would suggest.
The primary claim is straightforward: if the United States cannot achieve a "rapid collapse" of the Iranian drone infrastructure, Tehran can sustain a campaign of attrition against global shipping lanes, Gulf energy facilities, regional U.S. bases, and American partners. At some point, the cumulative economic and political costs of Iranian persistence become so visible that the domestic pressure in Washington to exit the conflict outweighs the strategic desire to stay.
In its most distilled form, the model reduces the entire contest to a mathematical relationship between two opposing forces: the rate of U.S. suppression and the rate of Iranian reconstitution. If the "regeneration constant"—the speed at which Iran can repair a bombed workshop or move assembly to a new basement—remains high relative to the "attrition constant" imposed by U.S. strikes, a functional portion of the production base survives. This surviving base acts as a floor for continued attacks. From this mechanical premise, the author moves to a political conclusion: continued attacks lead to prolonged disruption, which eventually results in a politically unfavorable outcome for the United States.
As a stylized exercise, this is far more useful than it might initially appear to those who prefer traditional "order of battle" analysis. It identifies a critical variable often obscured in grand strategy: the industrial contest. A war of this nature would not be decided solely by tactical successes. It would be a trial of industrial resilience. If Iranian one-way attack drones can be manufactured through a network of relatively simple, dispersed, and easily repairable facilities, then the standard assumption that Western airpower can "solve" the problem in a matter of days is dangerously optimistic. The model performs a service by directing our gaze away from slogans of "overwhelming force" and toward the slower mechanics of suppression, reconstitution, and sustained coercion.
The shift in emphasis toward industrial resilience is backed by recent history. The experience of the Russia-Ukraine war has fundamentally altered our understanding of Shahed-type systems. They are not "boutique" weapons requiring delicate, high-tech cleanrooms. Instead, they belong to a new category of "attritable" systems that can be produced in massive quantities and expanded rapidly under wartime duress.
Their strategic significance lies precisely in their lack of sophistication. They do not need the performance of a fifth-generation fighter to create a strategic crisis; they only need to be available in sufficient volume to saturate defenses and keep the global energy market in a state of perpetual anxiety. For decades, the U.S. military has thought in terms of "target sets": identify the factory, hit it hard, and watch the enemy’s capability collapse. This logic fails against a modular, dispersed, and industrially "flat" production ecosystem. If Iranian drone production is indeed an adaptive, decentralized network, the suppression problem becomes less like knocking out a building and more like trying to keep a biological organism below a certain threshold of activity. This is a repetitive, costly, and time-consuming endeavor.
This is where the analysis pulls its true weight. The real insight is not the exact ratio of drones produced per week, but the warning that even a "successful" military campaign might take longer than Washington’s political timetable allows. We can illustrate this with a medium-case scenario. Iran does not need to sustain a maximal, high-intensity attack indefinitely. It only needs to demonstrate that, for a period measured in months rather than days, it can keep the conflict "active" and "costly."
If Tehran can do this, it creates a classic asymmetry: long-term U.S. military superiority does not guarantee short-term, politically usable success. This distinction is vital. Iran cannot defeat the U.S. military in a head-to-head clash, but it can likely keep the conflict inside the "American political pain window." A four-month delay in achieving total suppression might seem like a minor tactical hiccup to a general, but to a politician, four months of rising oil prices, skyrocketing shipping insurance, and daily headlines about "failed" strikes is a catastrophe.
.....
Gautam
Re: Iran News and Discussions
https://sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/ ... er-174660/
What the Iran war reveals about the limits of Chinese power
Beijing’s defenders will note that intervening militarily was never a realistic option. China is not going to fight the US over Iran.
Daniel Wagner, March 8, 2026
Within hours of the start of the Iran War, Beijing issued a statement condemning the operation as a violation of international law and calling for an immediate ceasefire. As Iran began to burn, China did nothing else. That gap—between the rhetoric and the reality—is perhaps the most important story emerging from the ruins of the Islamic Republic. Not the oil disruption, not the regionalization of the War, not the unknown unknowns about the future. What may matter the most in the long-term is that China has lost its most important Middle Eastern partner while Beijing watched.
Iran supplied about 13% of all the crude oil China imported by sea last year, with more than 80% of Iran’s total oil exports flowing to Chinese refineries—most of it to smaller “teapot” operations along the coast that had quietly built their business models around sanctioned, discounted barrels. That ecosystem has now collapsed. Chinese refiners have been pushed into global spot markets where they must compete for replacement oil at war-inflated prices, settling transactions in US dollars under close international scrutiny. The yuan-denominated shadow trade that sustained both Iran’s economy and Beijing’s de-dollarization ambitions is gone, possibly forever.
Beijing spent the better part of a decade preparing for precisely this kind of disruption—diversifying suppliers, building strategic reserves, accelerating its domestic renewables buildout, and establishing alternative pipeline routes through Central Asia and Russia. China will absorb this, but what it cannot so easily absorb is the lesson that the war broadcasts to every country that has built its security around a partnership with Beijing.
The 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Iran, signed in 2021, was supposed to be the flagship of Beijing’s alternative world order—proof that countries could anchor their futures to China rather than to Washington’s alliance system. Iran was to receive investment, integration into Chinese-led institutions such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and de facto diplomatic cover through its association with Beijing. In exchange, Beijing took advantage of cheap oil, a critical node in the Belt and Road Initiative’s overland corridors, and a geopolitical buffer against American power projection in the Gulf.
The problem is that China’s version of partnership comes without a security guarantee. True to form, this has always been Beijing’s calculated position—no entangling alliances, no forward military commitments, no meaningful positions that are not skewed to Beijing’s advantage, and no risk of being dragged into someone else’s war. Chinese analysts defend this as strategic wisdom, arguing it gives Beijing maximum flexibility and avoids the type of overstretch that has degraded American power. In practice, it means that when the US and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury, China’s comprehensive “strategic partner” had no one to call.
Beijing’s defenders will note that intervening militarily was never a realistic option. China is not going to fight the US over Iran. The issue is whether Beijing’s entire framework for challenging American dominance—the Global Security Initiative, proclamations about a multipolar world order that China is prominent in, the solemn declarations that “the East is rising” and that China stands for peace—means anything when tested by violence. The answer is no.
There is also the question of what China may have inadvertently contributed to the war’s timing. Reports that Beijing was supplying Iran with carrier-killer missiles—weapons that would have taken months to deploy but whose transfer narrowed the window for any diplomatic resolution—suggest that China’s deliberate ratcheting up the heat may have accelerated the crisis it sought to avoid. It was a profound strategic miscalculation: China helped make the war more likely while lacking either the will or the means to prevent it.
.......
Gautam
What the Iran war reveals about the limits of Chinese power
Beijing’s defenders will note that intervening militarily was never a realistic option. China is not going to fight the US over Iran.
Daniel Wagner, March 8, 2026
Within hours of the start of the Iran War, Beijing issued a statement condemning the operation as a violation of international law and calling for an immediate ceasefire. As Iran began to burn, China did nothing else. That gap—between the rhetoric and the reality—is perhaps the most important story emerging from the ruins of the Islamic Republic. Not the oil disruption, not the regionalization of the War, not the unknown unknowns about the future. What may matter the most in the long-term is that China has lost its most important Middle Eastern partner while Beijing watched.
Iran supplied about 13% of all the crude oil China imported by sea last year, with more than 80% of Iran’s total oil exports flowing to Chinese refineries—most of it to smaller “teapot” operations along the coast that had quietly built their business models around sanctioned, discounted barrels. That ecosystem has now collapsed. Chinese refiners have been pushed into global spot markets where they must compete for replacement oil at war-inflated prices, settling transactions in US dollars under close international scrutiny. The yuan-denominated shadow trade that sustained both Iran’s economy and Beijing’s de-dollarization ambitions is gone, possibly forever.
Beijing spent the better part of a decade preparing for precisely this kind of disruption—diversifying suppliers, building strategic reserves, accelerating its domestic renewables buildout, and establishing alternative pipeline routes through Central Asia and Russia. China will absorb this, but what it cannot so easily absorb is the lesson that the war broadcasts to every country that has built its security around a partnership with Beijing.
The 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Iran, signed in 2021, was supposed to be the flagship of Beijing’s alternative world order—proof that countries could anchor their futures to China rather than to Washington’s alliance system. Iran was to receive investment, integration into Chinese-led institutions such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and de facto diplomatic cover through its association with Beijing. In exchange, Beijing took advantage of cheap oil, a critical node in the Belt and Road Initiative’s overland corridors, and a geopolitical buffer against American power projection in the Gulf.
The problem is that China’s version of partnership comes without a security guarantee. True to form, this has always been Beijing’s calculated position—no entangling alliances, no forward military commitments, no meaningful positions that are not skewed to Beijing’s advantage, and no risk of being dragged into someone else’s war. Chinese analysts defend this as strategic wisdom, arguing it gives Beijing maximum flexibility and avoids the type of overstretch that has degraded American power. In practice, it means that when the US and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury, China’s comprehensive “strategic partner” had no one to call.
Beijing’s defenders will note that intervening militarily was never a realistic option. China is not going to fight the US over Iran. The issue is whether Beijing’s entire framework for challenging American dominance—the Global Security Initiative, proclamations about a multipolar world order that China is prominent in, the solemn declarations that “the East is rising” and that China stands for peace—means anything when tested by violence. The answer is no.
There is also the question of what China may have inadvertently contributed to the war’s timing. Reports that Beijing was supplying Iran with carrier-killer missiles—weapons that would have taken months to deploy but whose transfer narrowed the window for any diplomatic resolution—suggest that China’s deliberate ratcheting up the heat may have accelerated the crisis it sought to avoid. It was a profound strategic miscalculation: China helped make the war more likely while lacking either the will or the means to prevent it.
.......
Gautam
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Sea mines deployed via ballistic missiles like cluster munitions. Are they a thing?
https://youtu.be/ilsZizToB60?si=VXNOg0Ho3eaD_ni-
https://youtu.be/ilsZizToB60?si=VXNOg0Ho3eaD_ni-
Re: Iran News and Discussions
How US Navy Strikes Mine-Laying Ships in the Strait of Hormuz?
How The Strait of Hormuz turned into a minefield.
Well, the threats hiding in the water range from your classic, old-school contact mines—the kind designed to violently rip through the hulls of commercial ships—to highly advanced bottom mines that actually listen for the acoustic signatures of passing Vessels."
But To Enforce a Blockade right in the middle of a vital global shipping lane.
The IRGC is basically rolling the clock back to World War 2 attack boats.
They're dropping massive anti-ship mines to create a dead-zone blockade.
So... how do you fight a weapon you can't even see
Well, if you're US Central Command, you don't fight them in the water at all.
You use preemptive strikes.
The tactical play here is to take out the mine laying ships while they're sitting ducks at the dock, and completely level the factories storing the munitions.
Just look at this battle footage.
Here are The Mine Laying Vessels getting Hit by Hellfire missiles—long before they ever get the chance to pose a threat."
How The Strait of Hormuz turned into a minefield.
Well, the threats hiding in the water range from your classic, old-school contact mines—the kind designed to violently rip through the hulls of commercial ships—to highly advanced bottom mines that actually listen for the acoustic signatures of passing Vessels."
But To Enforce a Blockade right in the middle of a vital global shipping lane.
The IRGC is basically rolling the clock back to World War 2 attack boats.
They're dropping massive anti-ship mines to create a dead-zone blockade.
So... how do you fight a weapon you can't even see
Well, if you're US Central Command, you don't fight them in the water at all.
You use preemptive strikes.
The tactical play here is to take out the mine laying ships while they're sitting ducks at the dock, and completely level the factories storing the munitions.
Just look at this battle footage.
Here are The Mine Laying Vessels getting Hit by Hellfire missiles—long before they ever get the chance to pose a threat."
Re: Iran News and Discussions
There was an interesting post on X by an ex USN veteran sailor.uddu wrote: ↑12 Mar 2026 07:21 How US Navy Strikes Mine-Laying Ships in the Strait of Hormuz?
.....
So... how do you fight a weapon you can't even see
Well, if you're US Central Command, you don't fight them in the water at all.
You use preemptive strikes.
The tactical play here is to take out the mine laying ships while they're sitting ducks at the dock, and completely level the factories storing the munitions.
...
He said part of this strategy came from the learning of the Tanker Wars of the 1980s. In one operation 3 USN vessels were deployed to protect two super large oil carriers through the mined region. One oil carrier was hit with a mine leading to a huge hole in it's front side after which the protection group actually got behind the tanker till they were out of the danger zone. The tanker thus became the escort for the USN ships which were sent to protect it
He ended on a sombre note saying the US Navy had at that time more minesweepers than it has now and even then they felt it was inadequate. He also mentioned that the US tried blowing up the mines from helicopters but found it challenging at that time as there were no purpose-built attack helicopters stationed in the area . He felt that now with armed drones it might be more feasible, especially if they can develop a rotor drone with a 20 mm gun, which can be launched from non AC ships like destroyers, cruisers, frigates etc.
He concludes by saying the pre-emptive striking of the mine layers is one of the best options. A counter tactic by a capable opponent would be laying of mines using submarines/UUVs
Added - so lot's of lessons for us here. although our ocean geography is vastly different from that of Iran
-
S_Madhukar
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Re: Iran News and Discussions
F-16 firing missile at Shahed drone over a Dubai beach!
https://youtube.com/shorts/cvzPewhtRaQ? ... U6Le33-NHP
https://youtube.com/shorts/cvzPewhtRaQ? ... U6Le33-NHP
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Iranian warplanes WIPED OUT as US retaliates after Tel Aviv attack
This is the moment US forces blitz multiple Iranian aircraft in an attack on an airbase in Kerman province.
The US and Israel continue to destroy Iranian aircraft, missiles and weapons capabilities during ‘Operation Epic Fury’.
US Central Command said: “Forces remain centered on very clear military objectives for eliminating Iran’s ability to project power against America and its neighbours.”
Meanwhile, Iran launched a volley of missiles at Tel Aviv last night. Israel said the attacks were thwarted after its defences intercepted the missiles.
This is the moment US forces blitz multiple Iranian aircraft in an attack on an airbase in Kerman province.
The US and Israel continue to destroy Iranian aircraft, missiles and weapons capabilities during ‘Operation Epic Fury’.
US Central Command said: “Forces remain centered on very clear military objectives for eliminating Iran’s ability to project power against America and its neighbours.”
Meanwhile, Iran launched a volley of missiles at Tel Aviv last night. Israel said the attacks were thwarted after its defences intercepted the missiles.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Yes, Gupta ji. As long as he's parroting incel ideology, he will be an incel, regardless of the fact he procured a women someone to copulate with him.A_Gupta wrote: ↑11 Mar 2026 07:02Incel? He had a wife and three children.Jay wrote: ↑10 Mar 2026 23:56 Not only that. He railing on women for their lifestyles while his regime actively want to push them into stone age and punishing those who opposed these measures with sexual abuse and ultimately death is not just ironic, but deceptive and makes his look like an incel asshole, which he is.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
US Uses ‘Bunker Busters’ to Hit Iran’s Taleghan-2 Nuclear Site? Scrambles B-1, B-52s to UK Base | 4K
Satellite imagery and reports suggest that U.S. and allied forces have struck Iran’s Taleghan‑2 site, a facility long linked to Tehran’s nuclear program, using powerful bunker‑buster bombs as part of escalating military operations. This follows the deployment of U.S. long‑range bombers like B‑1s and B‑52s to bases in the UK, highlighting a shift toward deeper, precision strikes against hardened underground targets in Iran amid the ongoing conflict.
Satellite imagery and reports suggest that U.S. and allied forces have struck Iran’s Taleghan‑2 site, a facility long linked to Tehran’s nuclear program, using powerful bunker‑buster bombs as part of escalating military operations. This follows the deployment of U.S. long‑range bombers like B‑1s and B‑52s to bases in the UK, highlighting a shift toward deeper, precision strikes against hardened underground targets in Iran amid the ongoing conflict.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Two tankers set ablaze by Iranian strikes in Iraqi waters, Trump’s victory claim defied
Two oil tankers were reportedly set ablaze following Iranian strikes in Iraqi waters, escalating tensions in the Middle East. The incident has raised fresh concerns over maritime security and global oil supply routes in the region. The attack comes amid conflicting political claims and growing geopolitical friction. The development challenges claims of stability as the conflict continues to impact global energy markets.
Two oil tankers were reportedly set ablaze following Iranian strikes in Iraqi waters, escalating tensions in the Middle East. The incident has raised fresh concerns over maritime security and global oil supply routes in the region. The attack comes amid conflicting political claims and growing geopolitical friction. The development challenges claims of stability as the conflict continues to impact global energy markets.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Breaking: India Reviews Naval Protection for Tankers Near Strait of Hormuz
Amid rising regional tensions, India is reviewing urgent requests from shipowners seeking naval protection for Indian-linked oil tankers stranded near the strategic Strait of Hormuz. The move comes as the conflict threatens global shipping routes and energy supply chains.
West Asia Crisis: 20+ Indian Tankers Stranded Near Hormuz; India In Talks With Iran | WATCH
India is in talks with Iran to secure safe passage for more than 20 Indian vessels stranded near the Strait of Hormuz amid the ongoing Gulf conflict. A final call is yet to be taken as diplomatic efforts continue to ensure the safety of ships and crew.
Amid rising regional tensions, India is reviewing urgent requests from shipowners seeking naval protection for Indian-linked oil tankers stranded near the strategic Strait of Hormuz. The move comes as the conflict threatens global shipping routes and energy supply chains.
West Asia Crisis: 20+ Indian Tankers Stranded Near Hormuz; India In Talks With Iran | WATCH
India is in talks with Iran to secure safe passage for more than 20 Indian vessels stranded near the Strait of Hormuz amid the ongoing Gulf conflict. A final call is yet to be taken as diplomatic efforts continue to ensure the safety of ships and crew.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Iran’s Secret Underground Airbase Revealed | Military Analyst Maps Hidden Base | Israel Iran War
Military analyst Tom Cooper and open‑source intelligence have highlighted Iran’s secret underground airbase infrastructure, including facilities like Oghab 44 — a hidden airbase capable of sheltering fighter jets, drones, and command operations beneath mountains to protect against attacks. These underground bases are part of Iran’s strategic plan to safeguard its air power and enhance its long‑range strike capabilities amid rising regional tensions.
Satellite footage and map analysis show how these hardened facilities are carved deep beneath the surface, making them difficult to detect or destroy with conventional strikes. In this video, we walk through top‑secret maps, what these bases are designed for, how they fit into Iran’s defense strategy, and what analysts like Tom Cooper say about their importance in modern warfare.
Military analyst Tom Cooper and open‑source intelligence have highlighted Iran’s secret underground airbase infrastructure, including facilities like Oghab 44 — a hidden airbase capable of sheltering fighter jets, drones, and command operations beneath mountains to protect against attacks. These underground bases are part of Iran’s strategic plan to safeguard its air power and enhance its long‑range strike capabilities amid rising regional tensions.
Satellite footage and map analysis show how these hardened facilities are carved deep beneath the surface, making them difficult to detect or destroy with conventional strikes. In this video, we walk through top‑secret maps, what these bases are designed for, how they fit into Iran’s defense strategy, and what analysts like Tom Cooper say about their importance in modern warfare.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-e ... -weak-iran
The Dangers of a Weak Iran
How a Wounded Islamic Republic Can Still Threaten the World
Afshon Ostovar, March 12, 2026
After nearly two weeks of withering attacks, the Islamic Republic is weaker than it has been at any point in its history. U.S. and Israeli strikes have killed much of its leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, destroyed much of its navy, heavily degraded its missile program, and buried its nuclear facilities. Bombings have cratered government ministries, police stations, and military buildings. Even the headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—or the IRGC, the country’s most powerful institution—has been reduced to ruins.
But although the Islamic Republic is down, it is not out. The regime selected Khamenei’s hard-liner son, Mojtaba, to succeed him as its leader, opting for continuity in the theocracy’s most important position. Government officials are united behind the retaliatory campaign Iran is now carrying out against the United States and its partners, and the IRGC remains functional. The Islamic Republic is still very capable of inflicting violence on its adversaries, neighbors, and people.
If the regime holds on to power, it will, no doubt, be in an extremely difficult position. The strategic programs it had spent decades developing (such as its missile and nuclear enrichment infrastructure) have been severely weakened. Its relations with its neighbors are in crisis, and its economy is bleeding. But even with a bad hand, officials are likely to stick with what they know: resistance and aggression. Defenseless and with dwindling capabilities, they will probably fall back on old habits and take new risks. That means they could retaliate by carrying out more acts of terrorism, which is a low-cost tool the regime has already mastered. In the long term, Iranian officials may finally dash for and build a nuclear weapon. A weak Iran, in other words, will remain very dangerous.
REAPING AND SOWING
Ever since its 1979 founding, the Islamic Republic has worked to become the Middle East’s predominant power. Its leaders have poured billions of dollars into proxy militias, ballistic missile programs, naval forces, and nuclear facilities in hopes of overturning the region’s United States–centered order and remaking the Middle East into a bastion of Islamist resistance.
To pursue the regime’s ambitions, its leaders created a series of often overlapping institutions—most important, the IRGC. Under the authority of Ali Khamenei, the IRGC was empowered to build Iran’s proxy network, establish the country’s missile and drone forces, and hone its naval capabilities in the Persian Gulf. The IRGC also gained outsize influence over Iran’s foreign policy and internal security. Eventually, the organization came to dominate even Iran’s domestic political scene. It commands the country’s Basij paramilitary force, which is charged with ensuring that Iranians stay loyal to the regime. To do so, the Basij have built bases across Iranian cities and towns, sometimes embedding them in mosques or other religious buildings. Basij members are routinely deployed in times of popular unrest, serving as a frontline force in combating dissent.
For decades, these efforts were broadly successful. The IRGC seized on the chaos created by the Middle East’s wars to cultivate armed groups across the region. It used missiles and drones to coerce its Arab neighbors and to threaten Israel and U.S. forces. Ordinary Iranians did not benefit from these programs; in fact, military spending and sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear program immiserated the country’s people. Yet the IRGC’s approach transformed the Islamic Republic into a power player that, by 2023, effectively controlled a broad swath of the Middle East—from Lebanon to Iraq.
The Islamic Republic has adopted simple and achievable goal: survival.
The regime’s tenacity and risk-taking, however, proved to be a double-edged sword. The constant aggression may have expanded Iran’s influence, but it sank Iran’s economy and provoked a fight with Israel. The October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel by Hamas, an Iranian client in Gaza, were the inflection point. Israel not only turned its guns on Hamas; it also decimated Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and the IRGC’s positions in Syria. Tehran countered that aggression with massive missile and drone strikes against Israel’s territory in April and October of 2024. But Israel intercepted most of these attacks and used its superior military to knock out Iran’s air defenses. In June, Israel conducted a 12-day war against Iran, culminating in a U.S. bombing operation that destroyed Iran’s most fortified underground nuclear enrichment sites.
In the following months, Tehran repaired as many of these capabilities as it could. With the help of China, the regime got its missile industry back online. Iran also began constructing new sites that could be used for nuclear activities. But these activities sent the wrong message to its adversaries, and by the end of February 2026, U.S. and Israeli forces began an onslaught to finish what they had started: the complete destruction of Iran’s key nuclear and military capabilities.
Because Tehran can’t defend its skies (thanks to the decimation of its air defenses), it has been unable to stop these strikes. As a result, the regime has chosen to draw the entire region into the war in hopes that attacks on Gulf Arab countries and disruptions to the oil industry will pressure Washington to back down. But Tehran will not be able to keep striking its neighbors indefinitely because it has only a fixed number of drones and missiles. And even if its strategy succeeds, the damage will still have debilitated the Islamic Republic.
,,,,,,,
Gautam
This is a "free" article.
Also see:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/why ... avors-iran
The Dangers of a Weak Iran
How a Wounded Islamic Republic Can Still Threaten the World
Afshon Ostovar, March 12, 2026
After nearly two weeks of withering attacks, the Islamic Republic is weaker than it has been at any point in its history. U.S. and Israeli strikes have killed much of its leadership, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, destroyed much of its navy, heavily degraded its missile program, and buried its nuclear facilities. Bombings have cratered government ministries, police stations, and military buildings. Even the headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—or the IRGC, the country’s most powerful institution—has been reduced to ruins.
But although the Islamic Republic is down, it is not out. The regime selected Khamenei’s hard-liner son, Mojtaba, to succeed him as its leader, opting for continuity in the theocracy’s most important position. Government officials are united behind the retaliatory campaign Iran is now carrying out against the United States and its partners, and the IRGC remains functional. The Islamic Republic is still very capable of inflicting violence on its adversaries, neighbors, and people.
If the regime holds on to power, it will, no doubt, be in an extremely difficult position. The strategic programs it had spent decades developing (such as its missile and nuclear enrichment infrastructure) have been severely weakened. Its relations with its neighbors are in crisis, and its economy is bleeding. But even with a bad hand, officials are likely to stick with what they know: resistance and aggression. Defenseless and with dwindling capabilities, they will probably fall back on old habits and take new risks. That means they could retaliate by carrying out more acts of terrorism, which is a low-cost tool the regime has already mastered. In the long term, Iranian officials may finally dash for and build a nuclear weapon. A weak Iran, in other words, will remain very dangerous.
REAPING AND SOWING
Ever since its 1979 founding, the Islamic Republic has worked to become the Middle East’s predominant power. Its leaders have poured billions of dollars into proxy militias, ballistic missile programs, naval forces, and nuclear facilities in hopes of overturning the region’s United States–centered order and remaking the Middle East into a bastion of Islamist resistance.
To pursue the regime’s ambitions, its leaders created a series of often overlapping institutions—most important, the IRGC. Under the authority of Ali Khamenei, the IRGC was empowered to build Iran’s proxy network, establish the country’s missile and drone forces, and hone its naval capabilities in the Persian Gulf. The IRGC also gained outsize influence over Iran’s foreign policy and internal security. Eventually, the organization came to dominate even Iran’s domestic political scene. It commands the country’s Basij paramilitary force, which is charged with ensuring that Iranians stay loyal to the regime. To do so, the Basij have built bases across Iranian cities and towns, sometimes embedding them in mosques or other religious buildings. Basij members are routinely deployed in times of popular unrest, serving as a frontline force in combating dissent.
For decades, these efforts were broadly successful. The IRGC seized on the chaos created by the Middle East’s wars to cultivate armed groups across the region. It used missiles and drones to coerce its Arab neighbors and to threaten Israel and U.S. forces. Ordinary Iranians did not benefit from these programs; in fact, military spending and sanctions targeting Iran’s nuclear program immiserated the country’s people. Yet the IRGC’s approach transformed the Islamic Republic into a power player that, by 2023, effectively controlled a broad swath of the Middle East—from Lebanon to Iraq.
The Islamic Republic has adopted simple and achievable goal: survival.
The regime’s tenacity and risk-taking, however, proved to be a double-edged sword. The constant aggression may have expanded Iran’s influence, but it sank Iran’s economy and provoked a fight with Israel. The October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel by Hamas, an Iranian client in Gaza, were the inflection point. Israel not only turned its guns on Hamas; it also decimated Iran’s proxies in Lebanon and the IRGC’s positions in Syria. Tehran countered that aggression with massive missile and drone strikes against Israel’s territory in April and October of 2024. But Israel intercepted most of these attacks and used its superior military to knock out Iran’s air defenses. In June, Israel conducted a 12-day war against Iran, culminating in a U.S. bombing operation that destroyed Iran’s most fortified underground nuclear enrichment sites.
In the following months, Tehran repaired as many of these capabilities as it could. With the help of China, the regime got its missile industry back online. Iran also began constructing new sites that could be used for nuclear activities. But these activities sent the wrong message to its adversaries, and by the end of February 2026, U.S. and Israeli forces began an onslaught to finish what they had started: the complete destruction of Iran’s key nuclear and military capabilities.
Because Tehran can’t defend its skies (thanks to the decimation of its air defenses), it has been unable to stop these strikes. As a result, the regime has chosen to draw the entire region into the war in hopes that attacks on Gulf Arab countries and disruptions to the oil industry will pressure Washington to back down. But Tehran will not be able to keep striking its neighbors indefinitely because it has only a fixed number of drones and missiles. And even if its strategy succeeds, the damage will still have debilitated the Islamic Republic.
,,,,,,,
Gautam
This is a "free" article.
Also see:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/why ... avors-iran
Re: Iran News and Discussions
https://x.com/TrulyMonica/status/2031942405029757216
@TrulyMonica
Even Muslim-dominated countries in the subcontinent such as Pakistan and Bangladesh are backing resolution to condemn Iran at the UN. But our opposition driven by Vote-Bank appeasement wants India to do otherwise.
@TrulyMonica
Even Muslim-dominated countries in the subcontinent such as Pakistan and Bangladesh are backing resolution to condemn Iran at the UN. But our opposition driven by Vote-Bank appeasement wants India to do otherwise.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
https://www.rediff.com/news/special/ira ... 260313.htm
Iran Plays Hardball With India's Hormuz Requests
PREM PANICKER, March 13, 2026
War is the ultimate stress test, not only for armies and governments but equally for the institutions that are supposed to help citizens make sense of what is happening.
Yesterday, the Indian media failed that test in a fashion that was instructive.
Early morning Thursday, a story began circulating that Iran had given India-flagged vessels special permission to transit the Strait of Hormuz.
The sourcing was anonymous, unidentified by name and/or designation.
Within hours, the story was everywhere. Regime-adjacent journalists and commentators used it to celebrate the omnipotence of Prime Minister Modi and the triumph of Indian diplomacy.
And, crucially, serious journalists -- people who have spent decades in this profession and know the difference between what a source whispers and what a government confirms -- gave it further oxygen without pausing to ask the most basic question: Has anyone actually verified this?
It is easy enough for a journalist to do: If the story is that Iran has permitted India-flagged ships to transit the Gulf of Hormuz, surely some authorized official attached to the Iran regime would have said so?
Three days ago, for instance, Iran officially permitted Bangladesh-flagged ships to transit Hormuz.
The waiver was first put out by Iran itself, and in response to queries, Iran confirmed that such permission had been given. (In passing, I suspect that Bangladesh being given permission stuck in India's official craw, and this story was an attempt to balance the scales by giving the impression that a similar waiver had been given to India as well.)
Reuters, for its part, straddled both sides.
It initially put out a story, citing 'Indian sources', to the effect that India had been given a waiver.
Shortly thereafter, it put out another story, this time citing an Iran source (also unidentified) to the effect that no such waiver had been given.
Journalist Sidhant Sibal became the poster boy of this incident when he said, in successive posts on X (external link), that Iran had given permission and also that Iran had not given permission -- the two posts were separated by a mere three minutes. [The Hindu quotes MEA Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal as saying (external link) that while the issue of the safety of Indian shipping was discussed in calls between the foreign ministers of India and Iran, it is 'premature' to say that Iran has permitted Indian tankers to transit Hormuz. The MEA spokesperson, mind -- not 'sources'.]
......
Gautam
Iran Plays Hardball With India's Hormuz Requests
PREM PANICKER, March 13, 2026
War is the ultimate stress test, not only for armies and governments but equally for the institutions that are supposed to help citizens make sense of what is happening.
Yesterday, the Indian media failed that test in a fashion that was instructive.
Early morning Thursday, a story began circulating that Iran had given India-flagged vessels special permission to transit the Strait of Hormuz.
The sourcing was anonymous, unidentified by name and/or designation.
Within hours, the story was everywhere. Regime-adjacent journalists and commentators used it to celebrate the omnipotence of Prime Minister Modi and the triumph of Indian diplomacy.
And, crucially, serious journalists -- people who have spent decades in this profession and know the difference between what a source whispers and what a government confirms -- gave it further oxygen without pausing to ask the most basic question: Has anyone actually verified this?
It is easy enough for a journalist to do: If the story is that Iran has permitted India-flagged ships to transit the Gulf of Hormuz, surely some authorized official attached to the Iran regime would have said so?
Three days ago, for instance, Iran officially permitted Bangladesh-flagged ships to transit Hormuz.
The waiver was first put out by Iran itself, and in response to queries, Iran confirmed that such permission had been given. (In passing, I suspect that Bangladesh being given permission stuck in India's official craw, and this story was an attempt to balance the scales by giving the impression that a similar waiver had been given to India as well.)
Reuters, for its part, straddled both sides.
It initially put out a story, citing 'Indian sources', to the effect that India had been given a waiver.
Shortly thereafter, it put out another story, this time citing an Iran source (also unidentified) to the effect that no such waiver had been given.
Journalist Sidhant Sibal became the poster boy of this incident when he said, in successive posts on X (external link), that Iran had given permission and also that Iran had not given permission -- the two posts were separated by a mere three minutes. [The Hindu quotes MEA Spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal as saying (external link) that while the issue of the safety of Indian shipping was discussed in calls between the foreign ministers of India and Iran, it is 'premature' to say that Iran has permitted Indian tankers to transit Hormuz. The MEA spokesperson, mind -- not 'sources'.]
......
Gautam
Re: Iran News and Discussions
https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/u ... 260313.htm
'US Bombings Have United All Of Iran'
SYED FIRDAUS ASHRAF, March 13, 2026
.....
What about the anti-hijab protestors? Are they also backing the Iranian government in times of war?
Anti-hijab protestors are a miniscule population of Iran.
Exiled Iranian prince Reza Pahalvi gave a very different picture to US President Donald Trump about his support in Tehran.
Trump was made to believe that these anti-hijab protestors will overthrow the Islamic regime of Iran. They did come on the roads to protest against the Iranian regime, but they did not come on the streets to support Iran's monarchy.
The US landed in this war without planning. The US felt that if they kill Ayatollah Khamenei the people of Iran will come out on the roads and do a regime change. On the contrary, the US bombings on Iran has united the entire nation.
.....
Gautam
'US Bombings Have United All Of Iran'
SYED FIRDAUS ASHRAF, March 13, 2026
.....
What about the anti-hijab protestors? Are they also backing the Iranian government in times of war?
Anti-hijab protestors are a miniscule population of Iran.
Exiled Iranian prince Reza Pahalvi gave a very different picture to US President Donald Trump about his support in Tehran.
Trump was made to believe that these anti-hijab protestors will overthrow the Islamic regime of Iran. They did come on the roads to protest against the Iranian regime, but they did not come on the streets to support Iran's monarchy.
The US landed in this war without planning. The US felt that if they kill Ayatollah Khamenei the people of Iran will come out on the roads and do a regime change. On the contrary, the US bombings on Iran has united the entire nation.
.....
Gautam
Re: Iran News and Discussions
https://www.rediff.com/news/report/we-a ... 260314.htm
'We are friends': Iran envoy assures Hormuz passage for Indian ships
Senjo M R, March 14, 2026
Iran's ambassador to India, Mohammad Fathali, on Friday confirmed that Tehran will provide safe passage to vessels bound for India through the Strait of Hormuz amid the ongoing conflict in West Asia, citing the longstanding friendship and shared interests between the two countries.
Answering a question on whether Iran would allow Indian-bound ships safe transit through the Strait, which is one of the critical routes for global energy trade, Fathali said, "Yes. Because India and I are friends. You can see the future and I think that after two or three hours. Because we believe that. We believe that Iran and India are friends. We have common interests; we have a common fate."
He emphasised the mutual responsibility between the two nations, adding, "Suffering of the people of India is our suffering and vice versa. And for this reason, the government of India helps us, and we should help the government of India because we have a common fate and common interest."
Fathali further stated that Tehran has instructed its embassy in India to facilitate the Indian government, ensuring smooth operations amid the ongoing regional conflict.
"We believe as ambassadors in India that we have a common fate in the region and for this reason all the high-ranking officials from Iran instructed the embassy of Iran in India to pave the way for the Indian government," he added.
Earlier on Friday, Abdul Majid Hakeem Ilahi, Representative of Iran's supreme leader in India, said that his country never wanted the Strait to be blocked, but "some ships are still passing".
.......
Gautam
'We are friends': Iran envoy assures Hormuz passage for Indian ships
Senjo M R, March 14, 2026
Iran's ambassador to India, Mohammad Fathali, on Friday confirmed that Tehran will provide safe passage to vessels bound for India through the Strait of Hormuz amid the ongoing conflict in West Asia, citing the longstanding friendship and shared interests between the two countries.
Answering a question on whether Iran would allow Indian-bound ships safe transit through the Strait, which is one of the critical routes for global energy trade, Fathali said, "Yes. Because India and I are friends. You can see the future and I think that after two or three hours. Because we believe that. We believe that Iran and India are friends. We have common interests; we have a common fate."
He emphasised the mutual responsibility between the two nations, adding, "Suffering of the people of India is our suffering and vice versa. And for this reason, the government of India helps us, and we should help the government of India because we have a common fate and common interest."
Fathali further stated that Tehran has instructed its embassy in India to facilitate the Indian government, ensuring smooth operations amid the ongoing regional conflict.
"We believe as ambassadors in India that we have a common fate in the region and for this reason all the high-ranking officials from Iran instructed the embassy of Iran in India to pave the way for the Indian government," he added.
Earlier on Friday, Abdul Majid Hakeem Ilahi, Representative of Iran's supreme leader in India, said that his country never wanted the Strait to be blocked, but "some ships are still passing".
.......
Gautam
Re: Iran News and Discussions
India was a co-sponsor of the resolutionuddu wrote: ↑13 Mar 2026 12:56 https://x.com/TrulyMonica/status/2031942405029757216
@TrulyMonica
Even Muslim-dominated countries in the subcontinent such as Pakistan and Bangladesh are backing resolution to condemn Iran at the UN. But our opposition driven by Vote-Bank appeasement wants India to do otherwise.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
X-post
The US 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit is being deployed to the Gulf.
https://www.timesnownews.com/world/us/u ... 830117/amp
The US 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit is being deployed to the Gulf.
https://www.timesnownews.com/world/us/u ... 830117/amp
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Israel’s Next Move: The 4 High-Value Targets That Could Cripple Iran
This is escalating to more killing of high value targets/people. Already Mojtaba is reported to be in serious condition due to some shrapnel hit. Israeli planners and analysts believe could dramatically affect Iran’s military strategy if four high-value individuals are targeted. Iran is targeting some companies of the US like google, palantir, etc.
A pguru YT.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MQv6B-finuU
The US Drops a 30,000-Pound Bomb on Taleghan-2 Site
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y2-SMl2EaSk
Today's strikes in the Tehran area and the Zagros Mountains were aimed at deep-buried bunkers believed to be housing the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and his top IRGC commanders.
This is escalating to more killing of high value targets/people. Already Mojtaba is reported to be in serious condition due to some shrapnel hit. Israeli planners and analysts believe could dramatically affect Iran’s military strategy if four high-value individuals are targeted. Iran is targeting some companies of the US like google, palantir, etc.
A pguru YT.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MQv6B-finuU
The US Drops a 30,000-Pound Bomb on Taleghan-2 Site
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y2-SMl2EaSk
Today's strikes in the Tehran area and the Zagros Mountains were aimed at deep-buried bunkers believed to be housing the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and his top IRGC commanders.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
This plus the bombing of Kharg Island suggests that they are preparing to take over some of the Iranian shores and Islands to secure the strait and choke Iranian oil export hubs. They have 3 such units and I would say the other ones are already transiting for deployment. Hence they will come to a point where congress will be forced to allocate more money for a limited ground invasion (say 5 divisions). I think the favorite field marshals services will be demanded in the east and Kurdish forces will move from the west. Question is can Iran sustain the escalation pressure to keep the oil economy chocking for few more weeks. Already price in the pump is hitting 3.6 dollars. 50 more cents and US economy will be pinched to a point where Trump admin would lose the political backing. Whoever is master minding this has moved the pieces last year itself. Did they even game op Sindoor to get Paki support for this operation? ...makes me wonderA_Gupta wrote: ↑14 Mar 2026 02:09 X-post
The US 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit is being deployed to the Gulf.
https://www.timesnownews.com/world/us/u ... 830117/amp
Re: Iran News and Discussions
https://x.com/detresfa_/status/2032779538992664983
Three Indian Navy warships appear to have arrived in the Gulf of Oman likely to escort merchant vessels amid the tense security situation in the region - Indian flagged LPG Tanker SHIVALIK, IMO 9356892 is currently being escorted as per tracking data
Three Indian Navy warships appear to have arrived in the Gulf of Oman likely to escort merchant vessels amid the tense security situation in the region - Indian flagged LPG Tanker SHIVALIK, IMO 9356892 is currently being escorted as per tracking data
Re: Iran News and Discussions
https://x.com/i/status/2032776599221973097
@sidhant
Break up of India flagged vessels in Hormuz:
6 LPG
1 LNG
4 crude oil
1 Chemical/products
3 Container
2 Bulk
1 Dredger
1 Empty vessel
3 Dry dock
@sidhant
Break up of India flagged vessels in Hormuz:
6 LPG
1 LNG
4 crude oil
1 Chemical/products
3 Container
2 Bulk
1 Dredger
1 Empty vessel
3 Dry dock
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Looks like Iran blew up Citi office in Dubai
Re: Iran News and Discussions
https://sundayguardianlive.com/world/wh ... es-176224/
Who is Mohammad Ali Jafari? How the IRGC General Built Iran’s Decentralised ‘Mosaic Defence’ System Designed to Survive Intense Strikes
Mohammad Ali Jafari designed Iran’s Mosaic Defence doctrine, a decentralised military strategy that helps the IRGC continue fighting even if top leadership is targeted in war.
Neerja Mishra, March 14, 2026
Rising military tensions in the Middle East have drawn attention to a little-known but influential Iranian military strategy known as “Mosaic Defence.” Despite facing heavy airstrikes and losing senior leadership figures in the ongoing conflict, Iran has continued to launch counterattacks across the region.
Security analysts say this resilience is partly linked to a military doctrine designed to keep the country’s defence system functioning even if key command centres are destroyed. The strategy spreads authority across multiple regional units rather than relying on a single command structure.
At the centre of this doctrine is Mohammad Ali Jafari, a senior Iranian military strategist and former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who spent years reshaping Iran’s defence planning.
Who is Mohammad Ali Jafari?
Mohammad Ali Jafari is a former Iranian military officer best known for leading the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps between 2007 and 2019. During his tenure, he played a major role in shaping Iran’s modern defence doctrine.
Jafari joined the IRGC shortly after the Iranian Revolution and initially served in intelligence operations in Iran’s Kurdistan region. Over time, he rose through the ranks and became one of the most influential figures within Iran’s military establishment.
He also participated in the Iran‑Iraq War, a conflict that lasted nearly a decade and deeply influenced Iran’s strategic thinking. Military analysts say the lessons from that war later shaped Jafari’s approach to national defence.
In 1992, he was appointed commander of the IRGC’s ground forces and also led Sarallah, an elite security unit tasked with protecting Tehran. His leadership roles gave him significant influence over the development of Iran’s military structure.
What is Iran’s Mosaic Defence Doctrine?
The Mosaic Defence doctrine is a decentralised military strategy designed to ensure that Iran’s defence system continues functioning even if central leadership or major military installations are destroyed.
Instead of concentrating power in a single command chain, the strategy divides the country’s defence network into multiple regional and semi-independent units. Each unit operates with its own command structure, intelligence systems, and military resources.
Under this model, different components of Iran’s military—including the IRGC, regular army forces, missile units, naval assets, and the Basij militia—form a distributed defence network. If one unit is attacked or destroyed, other units can continue operating independently.
This approach reduces the risk that a single strike against top leadership could cripple the entire military system.
How Mosaic Defence Makes Iran’s Military Harder to Defeat?
One of the key features of the Mosaic Defence model is its emphasis on regional autonomy. The IRGC is organised into 31 provincial commands, each functioning as a self-contained military unit.
These provincial units maintain their own weapons stockpiles, intelligence networks, and command structures. If communication with national leadership breaks down during a conflict, the units still have the authority to act independently.
......
Gautam
Who is Mohammad Ali Jafari? How the IRGC General Built Iran’s Decentralised ‘Mosaic Defence’ System Designed to Survive Intense Strikes
Mohammad Ali Jafari designed Iran’s Mosaic Defence doctrine, a decentralised military strategy that helps the IRGC continue fighting even if top leadership is targeted in war.
Neerja Mishra, March 14, 2026
Rising military tensions in the Middle East have drawn attention to a little-known but influential Iranian military strategy known as “Mosaic Defence.” Despite facing heavy airstrikes and losing senior leadership figures in the ongoing conflict, Iran has continued to launch counterattacks across the region.
Security analysts say this resilience is partly linked to a military doctrine designed to keep the country’s defence system functioning even if key command centres are destroyed. The strategy spreads authority across multiple regional units rather than relying on a single command structure.
At the centre of this doctrine is Mohammad Ali Jafari, a senior Iranian military strategist and former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who spent years reshaping Iran’s defence planning.
Who is Mohammad Ali Jafari?
Mohammad Ali Jafari is a former Iranian military officer best known for leading the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps between 2007 and 2019. During his tenure, he played a major role in shaping Iran’s modern defence doctrine.
Jafari joined the IRGC shortly after the Iranian Revolution and initially served in intelligence operations in Iran’s Kurdistan region. Over time, he rose through the ranks and became one of the most influential figures within Iran’s military establishment.
He also participated in the Iran‑Iraq War, a conflict that lasted nearly a decade and deeply influenced Iran’s strategic thinking. Military analysts say the lessons from that war later shaped Jafari’s approach to national defence.
In 1992, he was appointed commander of the IRGC’s ground forces and also led Sarallah, an elite security unit tasked with protecting Tehran. His leadership roles gave him significant influence over the development of Iran’s military structure.
What is Iran’s Mosaic Defence Doctrine?
The Mosaic Defence doctrine is a decentralised military strategy designed to ensure that Iran’s defence system continues functioning even if central leadership or major military installations are destroyed.
Instead of concentrating power in a single command chain, the strategy divides the country’s defence network into multiple regional and semi-independent units. Each unit operates with its own command structure, intelligence systems, and military resources.
Under this model, different components of Iran’s military—including the IRGC, regular army forces, missile units, naval assets, and the Basij militia—form a distributed defence network. If one unit is attacked or destroyed, other units can continue operating independently.
This approach reduces the risk that a single strike against top leadership could cripple the entire military system.
How Mosaic Defence Makes Iran’s Military Harder to Defeat?
One of the key features of the Mosaic Defence model is its emphasis on regional autonomy. The IRGC is organised into 31 provincial commands, each functioning as a self-contained military unit.
These provincial units maintain their own weapons stockpiles, intelligence networks, and command structures. If communication with national leadership breaks down during a conflict, the units still have the authority to act independently.
......
Gautam
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Why wasn't Iran's oil infrastructure hit by US strikes? | Iran War briefing Day 15 with Sean Bell
Donald Trump has said US forces carried out a bombing raid on Kharg, a small island in the north of the Persian Gulf, but why wasn't its oil infrastructure hit by the strikes?
Donald Trump has said US forces carried out a bombing raid on Kharg, a small island in the north of the Persian Gulf, but why wasn't its oil infrastructure hit by the strikes?
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Japan will also join and every country that need oil and gas and imports from West Asia will be there eventually.
South Korea Considers Naval Deployment To Strait Of Hormuz Amid Global Fuel Scarcity | News18
South Korea is reportedly considering deploying naval assets to the Strait of Hormuz to safeguard critical oil shipments from the Gulf. The move comes as tensions rise across the Middle East, threatening one of the world’s most vital energy corridors. With the country heavily reliant on Gulf crude imports, officials in Seoul are exploring measures to protect maritime trade routes and ensure stable energy supplies.
South Korea Considers Naval Deployment To Strait Of Hormuz Amid Global Fuel Scarcity | News18
South Korea is reportedly considering deploying naval assets to the Strait of Hormuz to safeguard critical oil shipments from the Gulf. The move comes as tensions rise across the Middle East, threatening one of the world’s most vital energy corridors. With the country heavily reliant on Gulf crude imports, officials in Seoul are exploring measures to protect maritime trade routes and ensure stable energy supplies.
-
sanjaykumar
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 6795
- Joined: 16 Oct 2005 05:51
Re: Iran News and Discussions
https://mronline.org/2026/03/12/i-am-as ... r-on-iran/
I’m not sure how the west Asia war is India’s problem.
If it had been, Hindutva fascism would have been responsible.
But since it’s Christian nationalism, Ms Roy is studiously silent on the religious aspects of this matter. A scholar and a commentator who offers nothing but illusions.
Hegseth is not apologetic about the crusade. But Ms. Roy sees nothing to report. At least hegseth is not hypocritical and sanctimonious. Eh, Ms Roy?
And of course nothing on the regime’s killing of several thousand Iranians. Or the fact that many Iranians disown Islam and most certainly this Islamic regime.
I’m not sure how the west Asia war is India’s problem.
If it had been, Hindutva fascism would have been responsible.
But since it’s Christian nationalism, Ms Roy is studiously silent on the religious aspects of this matter. A scholar and a commentator who offers nothing but illusions.
Hegseth is not apologetic about the crusade. But Ms. Roy sees nothing to report. At least hegseth is not hypocritical and sanctimonious. Eh, Ms Roy?
And of course nothing on the regime’s killing of several thousand Iranians. Or the fact that many Iranians disown Islam and most certainly this Islamic regime.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Sirjee, you have a remarkable trait to suppress the pharyngeal reflex…. Us normal people would have thrown up after the first paragraph of the article itself…sanjaykumar wrote: ↑15 Mar 2026 21:39
But since it’s Christian nationalism, Ms Roy is studiously silent on the religious aspects of this matter. A scholar and a commentator who offers nothing but illusions.
Hegseth is not apologetic about the crusade. But Ms. Roy sees nothing to report. At least hegseth is not hypocritical and sanctimonious. Eh, Ms Roy?
And of course nothing on the regime’s killing of several thousand Iranians. Or the fact that many Iranians disown Islam and most certainly this Islamic regime.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
India hails talks with Iran to open Strait of Hormuz
Foreign minister S Jaishankar tells FT diplomacy ‘is yielding results’ as Trump touts sending warships
https://www.ft.com/content/c8ef2abd-964 ... 7a25055f53
From the comments section in response to a peaceful,
"Why is Imran Khan unable to walk? Is it true he drops the soap daily in jail?"
Foreign minister S Jaishankar tells FT diplomacy ‘is yielding results’ as Trump touts sending warships
https://www.ft.com/content/c8ef2abd-964 ... 7a25055f53
From the comments section in response to a peaceful,
"Why is Imran Khan unable to walk? Is it true he drops the soap daily in jail?"
Re: Iran News and Discussions
Oil rich South Western and central Iran including strait of Hormuz will become Democratic Iran if the American's ever land there.
Iran's main oil and gas production and infrastructure
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-ea ... 026-02-28/
January 23, 20267:19 PM GMT+5:30Updated February 28, 2026
OIL PRODUCTION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Iran, the third largest producer in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, pumps about 4.5% of global oil supplies. Iran's output is about 3.3 million barrels per day of crude, plus 1.3 million bpd of condensate and other liquids.
Iran's domestic refineries have a capacity of 2.6 million bpd, according to the consultancy FGE.
In 2025, it exported nearly 820,000 bpd of fuel, including LPG, according to Kpler, slightly below 2024 levels.
Iran's oil and gas production facilities are concentrated in southwestern provinces: Khuzestan for oil and Bushehr for gas and condensate from South Pars.
Iran's main oil and gas production and infrastructure
https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-ea ... 026-02-28/
January 23, 20267:19 PM GMT+5:30Updated February 28, 2026
OIL PRODUCTION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Iran, the third largest producer in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, pumps about 4.5% of global oil supplies. Iran's output is about 3.3 million barrels per day of crude, plus 1.3 million bpd of condensate and other liquids.
Iran's domestic refineries have a capacity of 2.6 million bpd, according to the consultancy FGE.
In 2025, it exported nearly 820,000 bpd of fuel, including LPG, according to Kpler, slightly below 2024 levels.
Iran's oil and gas production facilities are concentrated in southwestern provinces: Khuzestan for oil and Bushehr for gas and condensate from South Pars.
Re: Iran News and Discussions
No one want to keep their Navy under U.S Navy and under Trump. Eventually they have to come, to patrol and protect their assets and they will do it independently.
Japan, Australia Reject Donald Trump's Strait Of Hormuz Escort Plan
Japanese are trying their best to cut their reliance on petroleum. The 2035 plan could get a boost with the current war.
Need for Vehicle Electrification
https://japan.influencemap.org/policy/2 ... arget-5357
Current Automotive Policies, Targets, and Regulations
2035 Electrification Target
In the Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures approved by the Cabinet in February 2025, the promotion of decarbonization efforts across industry is emphasized, and the following targets are reaffirmed under vehicle specific measures in the automotive sector.
1. For passenger vehicles, the goal is for electrified vehicles to account for 100% of new vehicle sales by 2035.
2. For commercial vehicles, the aim is for electrified vehicles to account for 20-30% of new light vehicles sales by 2030 and for electrified vehicles and decarbonized fuel vehicles to reach 100% by 2040. For heavy vehicles, the aim is to achieve early adoption of 5,000 vehicles in the 2020s and set a target for 2040 electrified vehicle penetration by 2030.
Japan, Australia Reject Donald Trump's Strait Of Hormuz Escort Plan
Japanese are trying their best to cut their reliance on petroleum. The 2035 plan could get a boost with the current war.
Need for Vehicle Electrification
https://japan.influencemap.org/policy/2 ... arget-5357
Current Automotive Policies, Targets, and Regulations
2035 Electrification Target
In the Plan for Global Warming Countermeasures approved by the Cabinet in February 2025, the promotion of decarbonization efforts across industry is emphasized, and the following targets are reaffirmed under vehicle specific measures in the automotive sector.
1. For passenger vehicles, the goal is for electrified vehicles to account for 100% of new vehicle sales by 2035.
2. For commercial vehicles, the aim is for electrified vehicles to account for 20-30% of new light vehicles sales by 2030 and for electrified vehicles and decarbonized fuel vehicles to reach 100% by 2040. For heavy vehicles, the aim is to achieve early adoption of 5,000 vehicles in the 2020s and set a target for 2040 electrified vehicle penetration by 2030.