West Asia Crisis — Discussion, Developments, and Bharat’s Strategy

[KL Dubey]

Meanwhile: He’s not doing anything to stave off the anti-Christ allegations.

Is that Apestein, about to be revived ? Sure looks a lot like him.

There are lots of rumors (nothing substantiated) that he is still alive somewhere in Israel.

[vera_k]

Hearing that the dust-up between the pope/Trump arose after a trial balloon of taxing the pope and potentially the Vatican as the pope is a US citizen. Should be fun.

[Amber G.]

Is that Apestein, about to be revived ? Sure looks a lot like him.

But many people (By far) saying so... so much so that person who made the art has reportedly clarify that it was 'uncle sam' (not Apestein)..and our stable genius has deleted the post..

In the meanwhile ..wrt "The Hormuz strait has gone to the US ."
CHINA has issued a strong warning to US reinstating that China has an energy agreement with IRAN and it ships will not be intercepted.

Chinese Defense Ministry:

‘Chinese ships continue to move in and out of the waters of the Strait of Hormuz. We have trade and energy agreements with Iran, which we will respect and abide by.

We expect others not to interfere in our affairs. Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, and has opened it to us.

’

[Vayutuvan]

Chinese stance is correct. That said, would they go to war with the US over Iran?

[drnayar]

Chinese stance is correct. That said, would they go to war with the US over Iran?

For themselves!..for eg., let US try and seize Chinese oil tankers or goods carriers like they did with the Russians..

[bala]

The Chinese have trade and energy agreements with Iran in return for giving them "knowledge" on nuclear stuff including how to get purer Uranium using better centrifuge tech. They also transfered many other secret designs of nuclear weapons in exchange for cheaper oil from Iran. All of these were in deep hidden mountain secret tunnels/passageways away from IAEA/JCPOA and other assorted monitoring. Similar to the Pukes who essentially exploded chinese weapon(s) after India's Pok-II tests. The Chinese guys are the anti-christ of the world.

[A_Gupta]

Rhetoric vs. Reality: Claims regarding "Obummer" or secret "deep mountain hide-outs" are old techniques designed to sway those already convinced of a conspiracy. From a technical standpoint, the deal's physical constraints—such as limiting Uranium Hexafluoride UF_6 and concrete-plugging the Arak reactor—created high-visibility bottlenecks that made any actual "breakout" easily detectable by monitors.

If you go back to the 2017 hearings in Congress, it is mostly about ballistic missiles, militias and terrorism. That is, Iran's regional behavior plus the time limit on the treaty made it not worth keeping. Overlooked is that the US did not keep its side of the treaty - it could not, as the treaty was not ratified. But I guess the value of it being a joint agreement is that Iran found it useful to keep its commitments to the other members of the JCPOA. Also ignored was that the treaty was meant to address solely the nuclear issue; and nothing else.

I am not a diplomat, so I don't know whether it is worth trying to build on the JCPOA and have additional issues covered by additional agreements; or whether to tear up the whole thing.

[ShauryaT]

1. You Can’t Bomb Knowledge:
The JCPOA didn't pretend Iran was naive; it just made sure they didn't have the physical materials to execute the "code."

2. The "Overnight" Jump Proves the Point:

The moment the U.S. walked out, it gave them the green light to use the "advanced code" they’d had all along.

4. The "Grease" vs. The "Hammer"

If you’re the guy holding the "hammer," would you rather have a year to see a threat coming, or six days? In 2026, we’re finding out the hard way that "Maximum Pressure" just resulted in "Maximum Enrichment."

--
Netanyahu and the hawks might want a world where Iran forgets nuclear physics, but that world doesn't exist.

Quick question for the room: If the goal is truly "denuclearization," how do we plan to address the enriched stockpile we have right now in 2026 without a technical agreement to down-blend it back to 3.67%? Hammering the infrastructure doesn't make the gas disappear.

-- Amber G.

I will just say what my view is on the matter. The issue is not one of rolling knowledge back, it is about intent, threat and capabilities. While JCPOA did not change intent, it did restrict capabilities in exchange for "grease". The question is what did the regime do with this grease? Their actions fundamentally sought to destabilize Israel through its proxies and from an Israeli perspective after Oct 7, the patience to "manage" is no longer there.

If this action had been initiated with Iran NOT acting on its intent, then there was a case against this war. In a way, it proved Netanyahu's point that the JCPOA would only delay the inevitable as the mullahs will act on their intent - a threat that Israel cannot afford. If the mullahs chose to act, then they should have known what are its consequences. A mullah regime with Islamic revolutionary objectives with a nuclear weapon (the capability) is simply a non-negotiable and vital for Israel.

JCPOA was a good deal or not is drained water now. No one is going back there. The question for me from here on now is what happens if the regime does manage to stay - one can almost guarantee a sprint to the breakout line and hence a constant pressure and kinetic action in the area. There is no way out but through a regime change, which an air campaign alone cannot achieve.

[Amber G.]

Rhetoric vs. Reality: Claims regarding "Obummer" or secret "deep mountain hide-outs" are old techniques designed to sway those already convinced of a conspiracy. From a technical standpoint, the deal's physical constraints—such as limiting Uranium Hexafluoride UF_6 and concrete-plugging the Arak reactor—created high-visibility bottlenecks that made any actual "breakout" easily detectable by monitors.

If you go back to the 2017 hearings in Congress, it is mostly about ballistic missiles, militias and terrorism. That is, Iran's regional behavior plus the time limit on the treaty made it not worth keeping. Overlooked is that the US did not keep its side of the treaty - it could not, as the treaty was not ratified. But I guess the value of it being a joint agreement is that Iran found it useful to keep its commitments to the other members of the JCPOA. Also ignored was that the treaty was meant to address solely the nuclear issue; and nothing else.

I am not a diplomat, so I don't know whether it is worth trying to build on the JCPOA and have additional issues covered by additional agreements; or whether to tear up the whole thing.

I am not a diplomat either, but as a nuclear physicist who followed the work of Ernest Moniz closely, it is truly a shame the deal broke down (or did not became a better deal).

There was a profound level of mutual professional respect between Moniz and Ali Akbar Salehi—two MIT-trained scientists who spoke the same language of physics. They often talked between themselves, without any advisers (both were top class experts), hours at a time, with nothing else than a black-board. Moniz reported directly to Kerry/Obama. That technical trust was the backbone of the agreement; it allowed the US leadership (Kerry and Obama who had tremendous trust in Moniz ) to rely on verified physical constraints rather than just political promises.

The 'physics-related brilliance' they brought to the table solved issues that seemed insurmountable, like the redesign of the Arak reactor. It’s a tragedy that this masterpiece of scientific diplomacy was sidelined for political theater. Without that level of expert-led, technical problem-solving—and relying instead on 'stunt' diplomacy like Witkoff and 'stable genious'—we lose the very tools needed to prevent a breakout. If we can't get back to any level of technical rigor, any future agreement will be built on shaky ground.
-Amber G.

[Amber G.]

[<snip>

If you’re the guy holding the "hammer," would you rather have a year to see a threat coming, or six days? In 2026, we’re finding out the hard way that "Maximum Pressure" just resulted in "Maximum Enrichment."

--
Netanyahu and the hawks might want a world where Iran forgets nuclear physics, but that world doesn't exist.

Quick question for the room: If the goal is truly "denuclearization," how do we plan to address the enriched stockpile we have right now in 2026 without a technical agreement to down-blend it back to 3.67%? Hammering the infrastructure doesn't make the gas disappear.

-- Amber G.

I will just say what my view is on the matter. The issue is not one of rolling knowledge back, it is about intent, threat and capabilities. While JCPOA did not change intent, it did restrict capabilities in exchange for "grease". The question is what did the regime do with this grease? Their actions fundamentally sought to destabilize Israel through its proxies and from an Israeli perspective after Oct 7, the patience to "manage" is no longer there.

If this action had been initiated with Iran NOT acting on its intent, then there was a case against this war. In a way, it proved Netanyahu's point that the JCPOA would only delay the inevitable as the mullahs will act on their intent - a threat that Israel cannot afford. If the mullahs chose to act, then they should have known what are its consequences. A mullah regime with Islamic revolutionary objectives with a nuclear weapon (the capability) is simply a non-negotiable and vital for Israel.

JCPOA was a good deal or not is drained water now. No one is going back there. The question for me from here on now is what happens if the regime does manage to stay - one can almost guarantee a sprint to the breakout line and hence a constant pressure and kinetic action in the area. There is no way out but through a regime change, which an air campaign alone cannot achieve.

I appreciate the perspective on 'intent'—Oct 7 certainly shifted the 'management' calculus. But I noticed you didn't quite address the technical reality I raised earlier.

f the goal is truly "denuclearization," how do we plan to address the enriched stockpile we have right now in 2026 without a technical agreement to down-blend it back to 3.67%? Hammering the infrastructure doesn't make the gas disappear

Even if we accept the premise that 'regime change' is the only way forward, we are still left with a massive, immediate physical problem in 2026. As I asked: If the goal is truly 'denuclearization,' how do we plan to address the enriched stockpile we have right now without a technical agreement to down-blend it? >

Kinetic action or an air campaign might stall infrastructure, but as any physicist will tell you, hammering the facility doesn't make the Enriched Uranium (UF6) gas disappear. In fact, doing so without a technical plan for disposal or down-blending risks a secondary environmental and proliferation disaster. (I will post about this - but senseless bombing of Heavy water reactor (IR-40) and coming close to real disaster of bombing water pool of used fuel in a online nuclear power plant(Bushehr) was *very* risky (first time in last 70 years it came that close) not just to Iran but lot of its neighbors.

(Hint: Even with all the claims of 'stable genius' of June 2025 (where they 'completely obligated' their nuke designs) and now 2026 campaign - about 400 Kg of 60% enriched U is still with Iran.

You say the JCPOA is 'drained water,' but what is the alternative technical plan for the material already on the ground? Without a Moniz-style framework of technical rigor, how do we ensure a 'sprint to the breakout line' doesn't happen during the chaos of a regime transition? I’m curious what the 'hawk' plan is for the actual isotopes, not just the politics.

[ShauryaT]

You say the JCPOA is 'drained water,' but what is the alternative technical plan for the material already on the ground? Without a Moniz-style framework of technical rigor, how do we ensure a 'sprint to the breakout line' doesn't happen during the chaos of a regime transition? I’m curious what the 'hawk' plan is for the actual isotopes, not just the politics.

I guess there are three options. Extraction and hand over, in-situ dilution or entombment. The first two if the regime acquiesces and if not entombment with a series of GBU-57 deep penetration bombs is the only other realistic option left. The sites would have to be under surveillance and any attempt to get to the materials would need kinetic action to deny access. I guess we rule out a forced entry option to the locations.

[A_Gupta]

AI: "The Israel–Iran conflict isn’t about Palestine, but Palestine is the moral and political fuel Iran uses to justify its posture.

If there were a serious, visible political horizon for Palestinians—statehood, rights, end of open-ended occupation:

* Iran’s narrative of “we are the only real defenders of Palestine” would weaken.
* Arab states would have more legitimacy in pressing Iran to dial back confrontation with Israel.

Without any movement on the Palestinian front:
* Iran can keep framing its confrontation with Israel as righteous and necessary.
* Any Arab–Israeli normalization will look, to many, like betrayal—pushing some actors closer to Iran’s camp.

So while the Israel–Iran conflict is not reducible to the Palestinian issue, no serious de-escalation is likely if that file stays completely frozen."

[srin]

Remember when US used to conduct Freedom of Navigation patrols just to poke other countries? Remember they did this in our EEZ in Lakshadweep without bothering to inform us ?

I know India won't do it, but it'd be delightful for others to do it in the SoH.

[Amber G.]

I guess there are three options. Extraction and hand over, in-situ dilution or entombment. The first two if the regime acquiesces and if not entombment with a series of GBU-57 deep penetration bombs is the only other realistic option left. The sites would have to be under surveillance and any attempt to get to the materials would need kinetic action to deny access. I guess we rule out a forced entry option to the locations.

Thanks.

To your point regarding the three options (extraction, dilution, entombment), they run into some very harsh physical and historical realities that I think are being overlooked:

Inventory - Under the JCPOA, the total enriched uranium was capped at 300 kg of 3.6%. Today, the inventory is measured in several tons, including roughly 400 kg of 60% material. To put that in perspective, 400 kg of that high-grade material is roughly 20 liters in volume. It fits in a carry-on suitcase. You cannot 'search' and "entomb" a suitcase with a GBU-57. (BTW These things - even with shielding - can be moved in the back of a standard SUV in an hour.)

The "Bunker Buster" Myth: Has any serious military strategist recommended "entombment" as a permanent solution over technical diplomacy? Kinetic action doesn't destroy the isotopes; it just creates an environmental hazard and guarantees we go from "monitored" to "blind." Most of these sites were under strict inspection until the political framework was broken. - IOW before this war (And Trump started this getting fooled by Bibi - Which no president since Bush was stupid enough to be convinced by Bibi)

The Expertise Gap: My primary concern is that if we don't have expert advisors at the table (replacing the Moniz/Salehi level of rigor with "stunts" from the likes of Witkoff, and 'stable genious' who think Munir is the greatest field Marshal ), we are in bad shape. "Hammering" infrastructure doesn't make the gas disappear.

If the goal is truly "denuclearization," how do we plan to address the tons of enriched material and the suitcase-sized 60% stockpile without a technical agreement to down-blend it? If the regime feels its survival is at issue, the incentive for a clandestine device—which is easily hidden—skyrockets. I’m curious: what is the actual plan for the material already on the ground, other than bravado?

---
PS - There are strong indications (via Qatar and other reputable sources) that a return to a reasonable technical deal was already agreed or still reachable. The barrier right now isn't the physics; it’s the lack of technical insight within the current advisory circle (Witkoff etc.) and the influence of Netanyahu’s 'all-or-nothing' stance. We are trading a verifiable scientific solution for a high-risk military gamble that doesn't actually make the material disappear.

[Amber G.]

Putting my nuclear physics teaching hat on for a moment—there are a few technical realities that every informed person in this discussion ought to know. I haven't seen these mentioned here yet, and I suspect some of the current advisors of the 'stable genious' in Washington may not be fully weighing them either. This isn't about politics; it’s about the physics of the material on the ground. It is a bit dense, but important for those interested in what "denuclearization" actually looks like in practice.


Iran has Nuclear Power Plant, Nuclear Reactor (some small research type too, which I know), and other facilities (Like heavy water plant etc).. Many of these sites are hit (IMO, little impact, big risks). Let me just talk about one of the (only) nuclear power plant in Iran.

Bushehr is a Light Water Reactor (VVER-1000) that runs on Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU), typically enriched to 2-3%.

• Under the 2005 agreement (and subsequent extensions), Russia’s Rosatom supplies the fresh fuel assemblies.

• Crucially, the contract includes a mandatory "take-back" clause. Iran is required to return all spent fuel to Russia for reprocessing or storage. This was the specific technical safeguard designed to prevent Iran from extracting plutonium from the spent fuel rods.

The Current 2026 Situation.

While the contract is clear, the physical reality on the ground as of April 2026 has become much more precarious:
Despite the agreement, significant amounts of material are still on-site. As of last month, Rosatom reported approximately 70 tons of fresh fuel in the core and 210 tons of spent nuclear fuel stored in cooling ponds at Bushehr.
Following the projectile strikes near the plant in March 2026 (the one that hit 350 meters from the reactor), Russia has evacuated almost all its technical staff. As of today, only about 20 top managers remain to oversee safety.
(It's cooling pool (From I know) is build above the ground and explosion there is *very* risky)

My Point on "Clandestine" Risks

If the "Russia-Return" bridge breaks down due to the current conflict or a total pull-out by Rosatom, that 210 tons of spent fuel becomes a massive liability.

While it is "reactor-grade" plutonium (not ideal for weapons), in a "survival" scenario where inspections have ceased, it represents a path that the JCPOA was specifically designed to monitor and close.

Without the Russian "bridge" or the Moniz-style technical oversight, we are essentially hoping that a "gentleman's agreement" holds while the experts are fleeing the site.

The "Bushehr Model" was supposed to be the proof that Iran didn't need its own enrichment (since Russia provides and takes back the fuel). But when the "technical bridge" is replaced by "kinetic action," the physics of those 210 tons of spent fuel doesn't just go away.

(Russia would not be too happy either - those 210 tons of spent fuels are real hazard - bomb fell few hundred meters away .. caused a 'red zone' alert )

(Not overstating the danger - this is the *first* time, I can remember that any running nuclear power plant was actually bombed that closely. ( In Russia - Ukrain and other cases the plant was shutdown/ was not operational)

[Jay]

The Chinese have trade and energy agreements with Iran in return for giving them "knowledge" on nuclear stuff including how to get purer Uranium using better centrifuge tech. They also transfered many other secret designs of nuclear weapons in exchange for cheaper oil from Iran.

Source please!

[bala]

The simple fact that 400+kg of highly enriched uranium cannot be located with all the monitoring means that such safeguards are bogus in claims. The JCPOA supposedly claimed they had good control over Iran's enrichment and there was monitoring. But pray tell that was over known things in Iran, but what about the secret underground stuff hidden from the rest (like kirana hills of the pukes). Monitoring is a red herring. Currently no one knows where Iran is hiding 400+kg of highly enriched uranium and that quantity is simply a guess-estimate. All the physics/math/sensors/monitoring have not worked one bit. Only Iran can tell us where things are hiding but for that the regime has to fall and people in control have to be removed. Once Iran abrogates nuclear ambitions then the uranium can be carted of and things can be handled. Until then nothing else can be done. But one thing is for sure - the US and Israel will not allow Iran to have a nuke bomb.

[A_Gupta]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has faced multiple stages of losing its ability to track Iran’s enriched uranium, with the process beginning in early 2021 and culminating in a total verification blackout in mid-2025.

Timeline of the Monitoring Gap

February 2021: The "Blind Spot" Begins
Iran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol, which had granted inspectors snap access to undeclared sites. A "temporary technical understanding" was reached where Iran continued to record data on surveillance cameras but refused to share the footage with the IAEA, creating a "continuity of knowledge" gap.

June 2022: Physical Removal of Equipment
Following a censure by the IAEA Board of Governors, Iran removed 27 surveillance cameras and other monitoring equipment installed under the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA). Director General Rafael Grossi warned at the time that this move dealt a "fatal blow" to the chances of reviving the nuclear deal because the agency could no longer accurately verify the size and enrichment level of the uranium stockpile.

June 2025: Termination of Cooperation
Following military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities (including Natanz and Fordow) in June 2025, Iran officially ended all cooperation with the IAEA. It removed all remaining monitoring devices and barred inspectors from the country.

Late 2025 – Early 2026: Total Loss of Verification
By November 2025, the IAEA reported it was no longer able to verify the status or location of Iran’s high-level enriched uranium (specifically 60% purity material). While satellite imagery has detected movement at nuclear sites, the agency has had no on-the-ground verification for nearly a year.

Current Status (April 2026)

As of early 2026, the IAEA remains in a state of total monitoring "blackout." While the agency continues to use satellite surveillance, it has officially stated that it cannot confirm if uranium has been diverted for weaponization or moved to secret locations since the 2025 conflict.

[Amber G.]

Last post of today:

t’s odd that we focus so much on the 400 kg of enriched gas while ignoring the 210 tons of spent fuel at Bushehr. For any logical person, the latter is the far greater radiological threat.

As I noted, Rosatom’s CEO and many of the scientists and reputable folks have already raised the alarm: those cooling ponds are outside the main containment. One stray strike—like the one that landed 75 meters away last week—could ignite a zirconium fire that no GBU-57 can 'entomb.' We are focusing on the 'suitcase' and ignoring the 'mountain' of radioactive material that is currently under-guarded and thermally hot."

One more data point just Nucler Physis 101: Consider the 210 tons of spent fuel currently in the cooling ponds at Bushehr. This material must sit in water for 5 to 10 years before it is cool enough to be moved or returned to Russia. If the technicians flee and the cooling pumps fail—whether by 'stunt' diplomacy or kinetic strikes—we aren't just looking at a 'broken plant.' We are looking at over 2,000 kg of reactor-grade plutonium (enough to make about 100 or so crude devices)and enough Cesium-137 to render the entire region uninhabitable (about 10x Chernobyl). You cannot 'bomb' this problem away; you can only manage it with the kind of technical rigor and mutual respect that Moniz and Salehi once championed.
(I see people in academic circle (in India, US, Israel) are obviously aware of this, but very little news/warning/etc outside)

[Amber G.]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has faced multiple stages of losing its ability to track Iran’s enriched uranium, with the process beginning in early 2021 and culminating in a total verification blackout in mid-2025.

Timeline of the Monitoring Gap

February 2021: The "Blind Spot" Begins
Iran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol, which had granted inspectors snap access to undeclared sites. A "temporary technical understanding" was reached where Iran continued to record data on surveillance cameras but refused to share the footage with the IAEA, creating a "continuity of knowledge" gap.

<snip>

Before February 2021: Blind spot ( The Monitoring started in 1970 - I am starting from 2015)

- The JCPOA "Golden Era" (2015–2021)
JCPOA, implemented in January 2016, established the most robust monitoring regime in history.

- 24/7 Monitoring: The IAEA installed online enrichment monitors and electronic seals. They had access to the entire nuclear supply chain, including uranium mines and centrifuge workshops.

- Continuity of Knowledge: From 2016 to early 2021, the IAEA repeatedly verified that Iran was adhering to its nuclear limits. (see note ***)

The Slide: Even after the U.S. withdrew in 2018, Iran continued to allow full inspections for nearly three years to maintain the deal with European partners.


Why 2021 was the Turning Point

The system was "ok" (stable and verified) primarily from 2016 to February 2021.

- In February 2021, following the assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and the passage of a new law by the Iranian Parliament, Iran officially ended its implementation of the Additional Protocol. This ended "snap" inspections and began the "Blind Spot" phase where cameras remained on but the IAEA could no longer see the footage

—a decline that ultimately led to the total 2025 blackout.

(Note: Again putting my teaching hat:I want to mention that uranium monitored is not only "bought"—it's often "moved." too.. Moniz method - you track the "Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6)" production. If the amount of UF6 being fed into centrifuges exceeds what the domestic mines can produce, it is a "smoking gun" for clandestine imports)

[ShauryaT]

So while the Israel–Iran conflict is not reducible to the Palestinian issue, no serious de-escalation is likely if that file stays completely frozen."

True, but Israel has no incentive to resolve, especially as it has demonstrated its ability to severely degrade threats stemming from Iran and its proxies furthering Israel's dominance on the escalation ladder. Israel's beta tests both in the West Bank and Gaza to "live" in peace with a Palestinian government have failed. I will posit, the Iranian regime uses Palestine as a ruse to further its regime's agenda - which are preservation, state power expansion, strengthening Shia sect participants and expansion of Islamism - in that order. It promotes Its goals in opposition to the Judeo-Christian order and its power equations are poor. Asymmetric techniques is its only game with nuclear blackmail.

Such a power should not be allowed to exist and fellow Aryans need to be liberated from a state with such a "Causa futilis".

[Lisa]

+1^

[uddu]

Jihadi's infiltrating Garbage Trucks
https://x.com/MeghUpdates/status/2043871682876846363
@MeghUpdates
Major Infltration bid foiled!

Israeli security forces find SIXTY Palestinians hiding INSIDE GARBAGE TRUCK attempting to infiltrate into Israel.

Driver detained for questioning; suspects taken into custody by police and IDF

[uddu]

Gen Keane: This is a WARNING
Fox News senior strategic analyst Ret. Gen. Jack Keane assesses President Donald Trump’s naval blockade on Iran on ‘Hannity.’


US-sanctioned ships pass Strait of Hormuz as China calls Trump's blockade 'dangerous' | BBC News


'A Blockade Is An Act Of War': GD Bakshi On Trump’s Hormuz Blockade And Chinese Tanker Passage
'A Blockade Is An Act Of War': GD Bakshi On Trump’s Hormuz Blockade And Chinese Tanker Passage


Major General (Retd) G.D. Bakshi says the Trump blockade has been tested after a Chinese tanker passed through Hormuz unchallenged, arguing that “a blockade is an act of war” and that the move has already fallen flat. Saurabh Shukla of Newsmobile also breaks down the key takeaways from the 40-minute PM Modi–Trump call and why it matters for India.

[uddu]

https://x.com/narendramodi/status/2036433142815523128
@narendramodi
Received a call from my friend President Donald Trump. We reviewed the substantial progress achieved in our bilateral cooperation in various sectors. We are committed to further strengthening our Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership in all areas. We also discussed the situation in West Asia and stressed the importance of keeping the Strait of Hormuz open and secure.

[SRajesh]

^^ Plus he has announced furhter talks in two days.
Will the Toll charges be the bargaining chip??
Eyeran feigning ignorance of the exact placement of the mines.
This kind of forces tankers to take the route between the islands controlled by Eyeran.
And unless US or others can clear the mines regular channel unsafe for travel.
Bypass by saudi east west can only do so much.
Alternative route via UAE/Oman yet to be built.
Soo, whats the truce all about??
My guess is:
Interim toll for Eyeran or joint US/Eyeran as the first step.
Stop war rebuild
Further negotiations for stoppage of U-enrichment (provided existing facility have been disrupted)
And leave the Mullahs to do what they want with the local populace.
But the main sticking point would be the Isreali actions
How does Gaza, Hezbollah, Lebanon, Houthis fit into this??
SM reports circulating Isrealis catching 60 Palestinians hiding in a garbage removal van entering Isreal
If there is another October type attack to grab headlines, this could all blow over and end badly for everyone concerned.

[Rudradev]

My thoughts below.

SOME KEY LEARNINGS FROM THE US/ISRAEL-IRAN WAR FOR INDIA

FROM THE IRANIAN PERSPECTIVE

1) DECAPITATION IS ALMOST INEVITABLE. In a war against the US or China, decapitation strikes against top leadership will be attempted at the very outset. In the Indian context, we know exactly who this means. We have to plan while taking into account that it WILL be accomplished successfully, if not in the first wave then within the next few subsequent waves. There is definitely enough intel penetration of Indian governing institutions to assure this much.

So after a week or two, we must assume India will be fighting without any of the individual leaders whose praises we sing daily on BRF and elsewhere. If we are going to be defeated by the mere fact of their deaths, it's better to surrender right at the outset and let them live longer

2) IDEOLOGY IS PARAMOUNT. To mount a successful "Mosaic Defense", there is no substitute for the complete saturation of India with Hindutva ideology. Can you imagine a "Mosaic Defense" in today's India? What would Kerala, TN, WB do? Would they present Achilles' Heels or worse yet, join hands with the enemy to allow footholds within Indian territory? The entire point of a Mosaic is that it is decentralized-- there is no tangible (and hence, vulnerable) centralized network of C&C that unifies the entire structure of national defence. Every autonomous node works relentlessly and with total commitment towards a common mission.

In this light the IRGC should be studied as a model. It has been immensely, unprecedentedly successful in defending the Iranian nation against unprecedented odds (against which no other power since Vietnam has been able to stand up). I have heard that the Basij, Pasdaran etc. operate at every level, including "Shakha" type cells in every urban neighbourhood and rural village. This is defence from the ground up, at the level of individual homes, streets, communities, mohallas, and onwards.

Besides political/ideological organization, it must be ensured that every "Tile" in India's Mosaic Defence grid is self-sufficient in terms of food, water, sanitation, and power generation. These systems must be completely localized and importantly, capable of being serviced and repaired locally without dependence on a central regime.

Given how India's governing structure and bureaucracy have been set up to actually foster greater dependence of local communities on Mai-Baap central nodes (whether in State Capitals or the NCR), this is going to be a huge institutional shift to make. And without the unifying cloak of ideology-- the all-pervasive commitment to Bharat as the paramount cause-- such a shift will not be possible.

3) SEA DENIAL IS THE BEST INVESTMENT INDIA CAN MAKE. Instead of tired old Twentieth-Century models of power projection, centered on Aircraft Carrier battlegroups carrying concentrated (and hence vulnerable) massings of firepower to distant areas, it is far less expensive and far more effective to guarantee that nobody can enter or leave one's maritime backyard without one's say so. And India's maritime backyard is the greatest geographical asset it has. It is the entire Indian Ocean, from Suez to Malacca to (virtually) Antarctica. It subsumes the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz entirely. If the Iranians can chop a hand off the global economic engine by locking down Hormuz, India must develop the capacity to cut off legs, arms, or the head itself with options for calibrated escalation.

This means a lot of subs, including vast numbers of UCSVs. Aerial drones of course are essential, and we have to not only be the best at UCAV combat technology but lean into manufacturing them on a scale unmatched even by China. Ballistic and cruise missiles are vitally important of course, but even more important is to locate manufacturing and launch infrastructure beyond the reach of powerful munitions our enemy will fire at long range.

4) PROXIES ARE A BEAUTIFUL THING. We already have the BLA and Taliban against Pakistan. But the BLA could be so much more. Positioned where they are, they could serve the same role for us vis-a-vis the eastern Persian Gulf as the Houthis do for Iran vis-a-vis the Bab-el-Mandeb and Suez canal route. Similarly, armed proxies need to be cultivated for use against China in multiple theatres-- Xinjiang, Tibet, and Southeastern China (Yunnan and other Myanmar/Thailand-adjacent provinces).

FROM THE US/ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE:

5) THERE ARE LIMITS TO WHAT ADS AND MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEMS CAN ACHIEVE. When fighting against a more serious foe than Pakistan, we WILL take a beating. Everyone involved in the Iran war has taken a beating-- the Israelis (despite their much vaunted Iron Dome/Arrow systems), the Gulf States (despite whatever THAAD and Patriot systems were given to them), the USN and CENTCOM bases throughout the area, and of course Iran itself. It isn't practically feasible to neutralize more than a fraction of incoming ordinance or to even neutralize an acceptable fraction of it outside very limited zones of key strategic importance.

The fight will necessarily devolve on how much pain you are capable of inflicting on the enemy and capable of withstanding yourself-- NOT on how many incoming blows you can block.

THEREFORE:
5A) INDIA NEEDS MORE CONVENTIONAL STANDOFF WEAPONS. Vastly more. Of multiple types and ranges. With launcher systems beyond the enemy's reach.

5B) INDIA NEEDS MORE NUKES. Many, many more. And many more delivery mechanisms.

6) PASSIVE ADS IS A THREAT. Even the Pakistanis are going to be able to figure this out and operationalize it. HARM-type missiles no longer guarantee air dominance. This isn't a very major lesson because our doctrine (as during Op Sindoor) is to hammer the Pakistanis from within our own airspace, not dominate theirs. But in future scenarios where e.g. we attempt to take back Gilgit Baltistan or Sind, it is something to take into account.

I wish India had more to learn from the US perspective, but the stunning idiocy with which Resident Chump is conducting this war beggars belief. In fact, having this sort of 'leadership' on the opponent's side is the greatest gift the Iranians could have asked for in any US-Iran war scenario. Maybe that's the key lesson. If you're going to fight a war against the US, fight it now while Resident Chump is in charge of the US.

[Amber G.]

IRI Embassy in Armenia: @iraninyerevan

If we confirm that you have won, if we confirm that you are the greatest and most victorious blocker in the entire world, will you put down the phone for half an hour, just half an hour, and attend to your main duties?

To the 30 million Americans who have no health insurance, to the 800000 Americans who are homeless, to America's infrastructure that is dilapidated. To the 38 trillion dollars of United States national debt....

[A_Gupta]

The Israel-Iran conflict is no more solvable than the India-Pakistan conflict. The best one can hope for is a cold peace.

I don’t think that Israel can achieve that on its current path. It might get a temporary respite, but a blink of an eye in the life of a nation.

[Rudradev]

If Iran succeeds at the multi-pronged campaign it has been waging since Oct 7, 2023-- including an astonishingly successful campaign of influence ops directed at Western media, educational institutions, and political factions (both left and right)-- it will severely degrade the support Israel has traditionally received in US public opinion and the US government.

This would be very unfortunate from Israel's point of view. It would also be a bad thing for India, because many of these anti-Israel influence ops have ended up further empowering and enriching nodes of Islamist political influence in the US (e.g. CAIR, ICNA) that have always been inimical towards India. But that's beside the point for now.

When parties realise that a conflict is not "solvable" they work at the next best thing. Which is to alter the existing equilibrium of support for yourself and your enemy in such a way that the new dynamics favor you (and undermine the enemy) relative to the status quo.

India has not been able to do this either w.r.t China or Pakistan. Our traditional response (here at BRF and elsewhere) has been to whine about why it's not possible, the world is unfair, all Abrahamics hate us, no one wants the new Brown Hindu Super Power to rise, everyone colludes against us Dharmics etc. There is some truth to all that, but nonetheless, Iran's success w.r.t. Israel is an eye-opener as to what is possible with sustained and focused effort. Few countries have been as hated in the West as post-1979 Iran, or enjoyed the kind of exceptional support (particularly in Washington) that Israel has.

>I don’t think that Israel can achieve that on its current path. It might get a temporary respite, but a blink of an eye in the life of a nation.

How much worse has Israel's current path been, from any objective standpoint, than the actions of Pakistan in Balochistan, KPK, or Afghanistan— or those of China in Xinjiang or Tibet? Perception management makes all the difference.

[SRajesh]

^^^
Two reasons:
1. For 2-3 decades Palestinian Iranian Lebanese immigrants have settled in the western countries and reached certain levels of influence to locally and politically to influence the sympathetic communities. And in times like this they have not only provided covering fires but also helped mobilise local support
2. Lot funding to the western universities have been provided over the years by the Islamic states to again provide support for their cause
We are yet to make that kind of contribution
In the west any Sanatana support invites strictures not only from the locals but our own deracinated community
And funding again in universities is to people inimical to Indic cause

[skumar]

The US blockade in the relative safety of the Gulf of Oman constitutes a deviation from the cease fire.

Iran's non-response, at least so far, is an indication of their need to negotiate while possessing an option to activate the Houthis wrt Bab al Mandeb. Iran cannot respond and US is not ready to accept losses. It is an attrition of patience.

There was fake news earlier about one Chinese tanker making through. Currently it is heading back to the strait unless https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/ho ... 5.8/zoom:9 is incorrect.

[A_Gupta]

Relying on AI again, not for the accuracy of its answer but all the various facets that it throws up, and to have a framework.

Question: In 1973, after a war, Egypt and Israel came to an enduring peace. Is it possible in 2026 for Iran and Israel to come to such a peace?

A durable Egypt–Israel‑style peace between Iran and Israel in 2026 is not impossible, but every structural condition that made the 1979 Egypt–Israel peace achievable is either missing or reversed today. The comparison is useful precisely because it shows how different the two situations are.

Below is a clear, structured look at what made the Egypt–Israel peace possible, what the Iran–Israel relationship looks like today, and what would have to change for a real peace to emerge.

1. Why Egypt and Israel could make peace in the 1970s

The Egypt–Israel peace treaty (1979) followed the 1973 war, but it wasn’t the war alone that produced peace. Three enabling conditions existed:

A. Egypt had a unified, secular state making strategic decisions: President Sadat could negotiate, sign, and enforce a treaty. Egypt’s military and political institutions were centralized.

B. Egypt’s goal was territorial, not ideological: Egypt wanted the Sinai back. Once Israel agreed to withdraw, the core dispute was solvable.

C. The U.S. acted as a committed guarantor: Washington provided:
* Security guarantees
* Massive economic aid
* Diplomatic pressure on both sides

This created a stable framework for peace.

D. Neither side sought the other’s destruction: They were enemies, but not existential enemies.

2. The Iran–Israel situation in 2025–2026 is a radically different environment:

A. Direct war and leadership decapitation: The 2026 conflict began with U.S.–Israeli strikes that killed Iran’s supreme leader and destroyed major military and government targets. This is not a post‑war environment conducive to diplomacy; it is one of profound trauma and instability.

B. Iran’s political system is fragmented: Reports describe:

* A “command vacuum” after the loss of senior leadership
* Semi‑autonomous militias acting independently

This is the opposite of Egypt’s centralized state in the 1970s.

C. Iran’s conflict with Israel is ideological, not territorial

Iran’s doctrine of “forward defense” and its support for Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and others is framed as existential resistance to Israel. This is not a dispute that can be solved by returning land.

D. The 2026 ceasefire is fragile and not bilateral

The ceasefire was:
* Mediated by Pakistan
* Between the U.S. and Iran
* Israel and Iran did not negotiate directly, and Israel continued operations in Lebanon even during the ceasefire.

E. Both sides still see the other as an existential threat

* Iran’s missile and drone retaliation continued even after massive losses.
* Israel, for its part, views Iran’s regional network as a long‑term strategic threat.

3. So is an Egypt–Israel‑style peace possible in 2026?

Short answer:

* Not under current conditions.
* The structural prerequisites for a durable peace simply do not exist.

Longer answer:

Peace becomes possible only if multiple deep transformations occur:

A. Iran would need a stable, unified government: A fragmented system with competing militias cannot negotiate or enforce a treaty.

B. Iran’s regional strategy would have to change: Its “Axis of Resistance” model is built on perpetual confrontation with Israel.

C. Israel would need security guarantees that Iran cannot currently provide: Especially after the 2026 missile and drone barrages.

D. A major external guarantor would be required: In 1979, the U.S. played this role. In 2026, no actor has the leverage or trust to do the same.

E. Both sides would need to shift from existential framing to strategic pragmatism
This is the hardest part. Egypt and Israel could do this in the 1970s. Iran and Israel are not there today.

4. Could it happen eventually?

Yes — history is full of “impossible” reconciliations:
* U.S.–Vietnam
* France–Germany
* Saudi Arabia–Iran (2023)

But those required:
* Leadership changes
* Strategic exhaustion
* External mediation
* Internal political shifts

For Iran and Israel, such shifts would likely take years, not months.

5. The real question for 2026

The more realistic near‑term goal is not a full peace treaty but:
* A stable ceasefire
* De‑escalation mechanisms
* Regional security arrangements
* Indirect communication channels

These are achievable even when full peace is not.
[/quote]

[A_Gupta]

How much worse has Israel's current path been, from any objective standpoint, than the actions of Pakistan in Balochistan, KPK, or Afghanistan— or those of China in Xinjiang or Tibet? Perception management makes all the difference.

The strategy that works with a domestic cat may not work with a tiger. Even with the US on its side, the power differential between Israel and Iran is much smaller than that between Pakistan and Balochistan, KPK or China and Xinjiang, Tibet.

Please do understand, I'm trying to to approach this with a "moral" hat on; this is rather an attempt at an objective assessment of whether a strategy can achieve its objectives. Of course, Iranian and Israeli perceptions based on morality are relevant here - but not mine.

Can Israel and the US bomb Iran into permanent submission -- I don't think so. The previous post went into why a detente like Egypt-Israel is also not on the cards. Of course, the joker in the pack are the Iranian people. If they rather than the theocratic elite call the shots, then maybe something will be possible.

I should add that Pakistan seeks a military solution to a problem that could be addressed via democratic politics, and it might have now crossed the line of no return that no political solution is ever going to be viable. That is a product of their extreme stupidity and putrid ideologies.

[Rudradev]

How much worse has Israel's current path been, from any objective standpoint, than the actions of Pakistan in Balochistan, KPK, or Afghanistan— or those of China in Xinjiang or Tibet? Perception management makes all the difference.

The strategy that works with a domestic cat may not work with a tiger. Even with the US on its side, the power differential between Israel and Iran is much smaller than that between Pakistan and Balochistan, KPK or China and Xinjiang, Tibet.

Not the appropriate comparison. The perception of Israel among the US & western public (the context of my original post) was targeted using the actions of Israel against Palestinians, specifically in Gaza/West Bank, as a pretext for atrocity literature. This narrative building had been going on for years before the current Iran war.

Israel was presented by Islamist propaganda networks as the "big bad villain" for its actions in Gaza— a narrative that has been extended to its current actions in Lebanon to justify questioning US support for "Israeli aggression" among American (and more broadly, Western) electorates.

[Amber G.]

If it starts, a nuclear arms race will be unstoppable
A sobering interview with the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency

>>>As tensions around Iran’s nuclear program escalate—from U.S. naval blockades to strikes on nuclear facilities and stalled negotiations—the risks described in this piece feel increasingly immediate. The ongoing conflict has already been framed as an effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, yet analysts warn it could have the opposite effect: pushing Iran, and potentially other regional powers, toward nuclearization as the ultimate security guarantee . With global powers simultaneously modernizing arsenals and regional actors reconsidering their own deterrence strategies, today’s crisis may not be an isolated confrontation—but the kind of trigger that could set off the broader, self-reinforcing nuclear arms race the article warns may become impossible to stop.

- see my post about Iran's nuclear plant with 210 tons of used fuel (~200 Kg of reactor grade Pu - enough for a 10-20 Nagasaki type amount of Pu))- is with Iran

[Amber G.]

"MEDIATOR" TO "DEFAULTER"
Unbelievably embarrassing:
PAK government failed to clear bills at the Serena Hotel that it booked for the US–Iran talks in Islamabad beteeen April 10–12. The Aga Khan-linked owner had to step in and cover costs days later. A summit meant to project power of Pak's diplomacy ends up exposing the nation's economic dysfunction.

[williams]

"MEDIATOR" TO "DEFAULTER"
Unbelievably embarrassing:
PAK government failed to clear bills at the Serena Hotel that it booked for the US–Iran talks in Islamabad beteeen April 10–12. The Aga Khan-linked owner had to step in and cover costs days later. A summit meant to project power of Pak's diplomacy ends up exposing the nation's economic dysfunction.

Good one. But we need to start pushing this kind of News to International outlets.

[Amber G.]

OTOH He claims He is a doctor (Not kidding.. please see this clip -- can't even makes such things up -
"Trump says his AI picture was not he as Jesus Christ but as a doctor since 'he makes people better'."
"
As cardiologist :""I found 3 blockages in your heart's arteries. My plan is to create 3 more blockages to treat the exisiting blockages."
[img]https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HFy_8fmbMAA ... me=360x360[/img

Who knew watching the news can be so entertaining but seriously ., if only lives were not at stake !

Could it be that Trump told to tell the press that the image was "doctored," but misunderstood and told everyone that he was depicted as a "doctor"????

Karoline Leavitt:

“President Trump’s Truth Social post depicting him as Jesus was a doctored image.”

[williams]

If it starts, a nuclear arms race will be unstoppable
A sobering interview with the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency

>>>As tensions around Iran’s nuclear program escalate—from U.S. naval blockades to strikes on nuclear facilities and stalled negotiations—the risks described in this piece feel increasingly immediate. The ongoing conflict has already been framed as an effort to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, yet analysts warn it could have the opposite effect: pushing Iran, and potentially other regional powers, toward nuclearization as the ultimate security guarantee . With global powers simultaneously modernizing arsenals and regional actors reconsidering their own deterrence strategies, today’s crisis may not be an isolated confrontation—but the kind of trigger that could set off the broader, self-reinforcing nuclear arms race the article warns may become impossible to stop.

- see my post about Iran's nuclear plant with 210 tons of used fuel (~200 Kg of reactor grade Pu - enough for a 10-20 Nagasaki type amount of Pu))- is with Iran

https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-shee ... -programs/

Came across this while researching your post. I think the Americans and the Israelis know this. IMO the moment they could not induce a regime change in the first few days of the war, they are kind of struck and don't know how to get out of the entanglement. Naval blockade is a costly affair wrt to Iran compared to Venezuela and that is not going to induce a regime change. Especially if Iran secures her supplies through the Caspian sea route. Regime should have made enough money to induce the Russian oligarchs to help them.