https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ve ... 025-12-12/
Russia attacks two Ukrainian ports, damaging three Turkish-owned vessels
https://x.com/shanaka86/status/1999980564343034231
he Black Sea Just Became a War Zone for Everyone
Hours after shaking Putin’s hand, Erdogan watched four of his nation’s ships burn.
Let that sink in.
December 12-13, 2025. Russia deliberately struck four Turkish civilian vessels in 48 hours. Three in Ukrainian ports. One in open international waters carrying sunflower oil to Egypt.
The CENK T. Engulfed in flames. Carrying food supplies. Hit while docked.
This is not collateral damage. This is calculated escalation.
Russian state media’s own words: “Sinking 10-15 ships in one port could paralyze operations.”
They are telling you the playbook.
What Changed:
For the first time since 1945, two state actors are simultaneously attacking commercial shipping in the same waters. Ukraine hits Russian tankers. Russia retaliates against neutral vessels.
The Black Sea grain corridor, feeding 400 million people across Africa and the Middle East, now operates under active fire.
The Math:
Turkish maritime insurance rates will spike 20-40% within weeks. Wheat futures already climbing. Every commercial vessel entering these waters now calculates whether cargo is worth the gamble.
The Silence:
NATO Article 5 covers armed attacks on members. Turkey is NATO. These were Turkish ships. Turkish crews. Turkish cargo.
Ankara’s response? A statement “reiterating the need for arrangements.”
What Comes Next:
Watch Turkish naval deployments. Watch Lloyd’s of London. Watch grain prices.
The moment a major insurer declares the Black Sea uninsurable, the food crisis metastasizes from regional to global.
Putin bet that commerce would bend before alliances would hold.
Eastern Europe/Ukraine [Feb 6th 2015]
Re: Eastern Europe/Ukraine [Feb 6th 2015]
Deans ji,
In your view, is Russia giving up on Odessa and transnistria? At least for now?
In your view, is Russia giving up on Odessa and transnistria? At least for now?
Re: Eastern Europe/Ukraine [Feb 6th 2015]
https://rpdeans.blogspot.com/2026/04/uk ... ussia.html
A deep dive into casualty figures gave me an interesting insight. Russian losses among its infantry is affecting their ability
to take territory at the rate they were expected to. My latest blog post analyses this.
A deep dive into casualty figures gave me an interesting insight. Russian losses among its infantry is affecting their ability
to take territory at the rate they were expected to. My latest blog post analyses this.
Re: Eastern Europe/Ukraine [Feb 6th 2015]
Yes. Odessa cannot be taken unless the Dnieper is crossed. If they have to cross it, retaking Kherson will be a first step - and I expected them to do it this winter, but they have not even attempted to take an island of Kherson on the Dnieper - logistically simpler for Russia and very difficult for Ukraine to defend.
They may find it difficult to hold Transnistra (they have 2000 peacekeepers) if Ukraine and Moldovia make determined bid for it.
Re: Eastern Europe/Ukraine [Feb 6th 2015]
https://sundayguardianlive.com/world/pu ... es-195942/
Putin Mirage: Why west keeps waiting for a fall that never comes
John Dobson, May 24, 2026
Every few months, like clockwork, waves of headlines sweep over Western media. Putin is sick. Putin is scared. Putin is one bad day away from a bullet or a coup. The Kremlin, sensing the narrative opportunity, swiftly counters with choreographed imagery, most recently, a video of a seemingly relaxed Putin driving himself through Moscow to visit a former schoolteacher, the picture of an untroubled man in command of his destiny. The pattern has become almost ritualistic. Western analysts and Ukrainian officials predict the Russian president’s imminent downfall, and Putin endures. This cycle tells us something important, not about Putin’s invincibility, but about the persistent failure to understand what kind of system he actually runs, and what it would actually take to displace him. Let’s be clear about one thing. The question of whether Putin is “about to be replaced” is almost certainly the wrong question. The right question is whether the system he has built can absorb mounting pressures without rupturing. So far, the answer is yes, but the cracks are becoming harder to ignore.
One of the most stubborn misconceptions about Putinism is that it is pure autocracy. In other words, one man, one will, one iron grip. The reality is more complicated and, in some ways, more durable. What Putin has presided over for 26 years is less a personal dictatorship than a kind of corporate oligarchy dominated by the Siloviki, comprising the security service veterans and former officers who form the backbone of the Russian state apparatus. This network of competing power-centres watches itself, quarrels internally, and advances rival agendas. But it coheres around a fundamental shared interest, one of mutual survival. The logic is brutal and simple, they either hang together, or risk being hanged separately. This is not loyalty born of admiration, but loyalty born of rational self-preservation. And it is far more stable than Western commentators typically appreciate, tending to project liberal democratic assumptions onto an entirely different political organism. This is why the recurring predictions of a palace coup have consistently failed to materialise, as such a coup requires a critical mass of elite actors who believe they would be better off with Putin gone than with him present. In Russia today, the calculus still runs in the other direction, as the system is the guarantee of their wealth, their impunity, and their lives. None of this means the system is healthy, of course. It isn’t. Western analysts and Ukrainian officials predict the Russian president’s imminent downfall, and Putin endures.
The recent arrest of half a dozen former top deputies of Sergei Shoigu, the defence minister Putin unceremoniously sacked in 2024, is significant. These were not fringe figures, they were senior men inside the security establishment. Their prosecution on charges of embezzlement and bribery delighted Russian ultranationalist bloggers who have long accused the military’s top echelon of battlefield ineptitude. Shoigu himself, once Putin’s holiday companion, has been reappointed to a lesser role and is visibly losing standing.
Then there is the embarrassing case of Denis Butsaev, a former deputy minister who reportedly slipped out of Russia entirely after his dismissal in a widening fraud probe. Butsaev was not a major player, but his exit was a reminder that the system’s walls have gaps, and that even those inside it are hedging their bets.
Top-level purges like these are rarely signs of confidence, as some Kremlin watchers have observed. They happen when the Kremlin feels nervous, and send a message intended to discipline the broader elite: “you are here on sufferance, and if the wind shifts, your vulnerability is only one decree away”. In this sense, the purges are a stabilising tool, one deployed by a leader who increasingly needs it.
......
Gautam
Putin Mirage: Why west keeps waiting for a fall that never comes
John Dobson, May 24, 2026
Every few months, like clockwork, waves of headlines sweep over Western media. Putin is sick. Putin is scared. Putin is one bad day away from a bullet or a coup. The Kremlin, sensing the narrative opportunity, swiftly counters with choreographed imagery, most recently, a video of a seemingly relaxed Putin driving himself through Moscow to visit a former schoolteacher, the picture of an untroubled man in command of his destiny. The pattern has become almost ritualistic. Western analysts and Ukrainian officials predict the Russian president’s imminent downfall, and Putin endures. This cycle tells us something important, not about Putin’s invincibility, but about the persistent failure to understand what kind of system he actually runs, and what it would actually take to displace him. Let’s be clear about one thing. The question of whether Putin is “about to be replaced” is almost certainly the wrong question. The right question is whether the system he has built can absorb mounting pressures without rupturing. So far, the answer is yes, but the cracks are becoming harder to ignore.
One of the most stubborn misconceptions about Putinism is that it is pure autocracy. In other words, one man, one will, one iron grip. The reality is more complicated and, in some ways, more durable. What Putin has presided over for 26 years is less a personal dictatorship than a kind of corporate oligarchy dominated by the Siloviki, comprising the security service veterans and former officers who form the backbone of the Russian state apparatus. This network of competing power-centres watches itself, quarrels internally, and advances rival agendas. But it coheres around a fundamental shared interest, one of mutual survival. The logic is brutal and simple, they either hang together, or risk being hanged separately. This is not loyalty born of admiration, but loyalty born of rational self-preservation. And it is far more stable than Western commentators typically appreciate, tending to project liberal democratic assumptions onto an entirely different political organism. This is why the recurring predictions of a palace coup have consistently failed to materialise, as such a coup requires a critical mass of elite actors who believe they would be better off with Putin gone than with him present. In Russia today, the calculus still runs in the other direction, as the system is the guarantee of their wealth, their impunity, and their lives. None of this means the system is healthy, of course. It isn’t. Western analysts and Ukrainian officials predict the Russian president’s imminent downfall, and Putin endures.
The recent arrest of half a dozen former top deputies of Sergei Shoigu, the defence minister Putin unceremoniously sacked in 2024, is significant. These were not fringe figures, they were senior men inside the security establishment. Their prosecution on charges of embezzlement and bribery delighted Russian ultranationalist bloggers who have long accused the military’s top echelon of battlefield ineptitude. Shoigu himself, once Putin’s holiday companion, has been reappointed to a lesser role and is visibly losing standing.
Then there is the embarrassing case of Denis Butsaev, a former deputy minister who reportedly slipped out of Russia entirely after his dismissal in a widening fraud probe. Butsaev was not a major player, but his exit was a reminder that the system’s walls have gaps, and that even those inside it are hedging their bets.
Top-level purges like these are rarely signs of confidence, as some Kremlin watchers have observed. They happen when the Kremlin feels nervous, and send a message intended to discipline the broader elite: “you are here on sufferance, and if the wind shifts, your vulnerability is only one decree away”. In this sense, the purges are a stabilising tool, one deployed by a leader who increasingly needs it.
......
Gautam