Strategic Affairs - III

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 15 Oct 1999 22:58

A very good article by Rajesh Rajgoplan in IDSA's Strategic Analysis, Oct. '99. Tim Hoyt you should look at this. It is very pertinent to the strategic blance debate going on. --------- Nuclear Strategy and Small Nuclear Forces: The Conceptual Components Rajesh Rajagopalan, Research Fellow, IDSA <A HREF="http://www.idsa-india.org/an-oct9-5.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.idsa-india.org/an-oct9-5.html</A>

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 15 Oct 1999 23:06

Kargil ops in retrospect by IDSA's Vinod Anand. <A HREF="http://www.idsa-india.org/an-oct9-1.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.idsa-india.org/an-oct9-1.html</A> --------- Need to layoff the Mushy spectacle and look at more important things in the coming new year/millenium.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Oct 1999 02:26

Comments on IDSA paper- Nuclear Strategy and small nuclear forces(SNF) by R. Rajgopalan. Strategic Analysis Oct. 99. <A HREF="http://www.idsa-india.org.an-oct9-5.html" TARGET=_blank>www.idsa-india.org.an-oct9-5.html</A> The paper examines the basic question of what deters in order to develop strategies of deterrence for small nuclear forces (SNF). Three deterrence strategies are examined. The first is deterrence by punishment first formulated by Bernard Brodie. This seeks to inflict the fear of punishing retaliation to deter adversaries. It implies robust nuclear forces and a second strike capablity. The second is deterrence by denial of victory. This was formulated Borden. It seeks to deny victory for the adversary if it resorts to first strike. It needs very high capabilities in the forces. The third way is existential deterrence. This owes its orgins in the writings of McGeorge Bundy. At its core it seeks survivable forces to deter the adversary by creating uncertainity of the final outcome. The paper examines each of these in detail and the relevance to SNF. It comes to the conclusion that the last theory with emphasis on survivable force is most affordable to SNFs and thus suitable. Missing from these scholarly presentation of what constitutes deterrence are the political factors and global strategic balance. The political nature of the challenger has some bearing on the relevant deterrence theory. For instance democratic challengers need less to deter than totalitarian/authoritarian challengers. Democratic states, as they are answerable to their citizens, have a lower threshold of pain. Totalitarian states, as they are not answerable, have a higher threshold of pain. Also targetting doctrine is different. For the later states, the assets which are important for its functioning have to be put at risk. This means a different mix of weapons. The question of global strategic balance is not considered. The global balance can be considered as comprising a number of regional balances - European, Pacific, Asian, and Mid-East. The European balance consists of US, France and UK,and Russia. This balance at the end of the Cold War is in equilibrium. This has led to force rationalization by France and UK who have chosen to deploy their psture undersea. In a sense they are adopting an existential deterrence posture by emphasizing survivablity. The Pacific balance is comprised of US, Russia, and China. This is in state of potential disequilibrium due to tensions in South China Sea, proposed theater missile defences in Japan, S. Korea and possibly Taiwan. The Chinese drive for force modernization as a response is potential concern. North Korean belligerence as a means to extract concessions from the US is another source of disequilibrium. The Asian balance is impacted by US, Russia, CHina, India and Pakistan at macro level and China, India and Paksitan at micro level. The potential for disequilibrium is large due to China's modernization and Pakistani belligerence and the consequent Indian response to these two. The macro level balanceshould not be affected by this. Th eMid-East balance is affected by the US, Israel and Paksitan. The later two are formally or informaly linked to the US. The Soviet Unon used to be linked to this area but the end of the Cold war and the dissolution of Soviet Union this link. There is a threat of 'loose' nukes from CIS states and rogue nations here. The robust US and Israelis postures should keep this in check. The common factor in all the regional balances is the US. Its posture and prespectives have great impact on which strategy to adopt. For instance if the advertised range of its undersea forces is overlaid on a map of its principal challenger Soviet Union/Russia, it gives an idea of of potential deployment patterns of its submarines. One is struck by how much of the Asain landmass is covered by htis pattern. Hence it is blinkered vision to argue that Diego Garcia represents th esum total of theUS challenge to South Asia. On the contray it probably is the basis of conventional challenge only. The intent of this is to argue that South Asia has deepand abiding interst in the global balance between the US and Russia. Hence when a state has mixed challengers its doctrine will have elements of each concept. And as the political situation transtions it also has to evolve. The paper would have been enhanced if it were to examine the Indian doctrine from the prespective of which theories it is based on. It is significant addition to the literature as it summarizes in one place the various theories and examines the relevance to small nuclear forces.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 16 Oct 1999 03:41

Note the importance of a credible thermonuclear deterrent. This is probably why the Americans are discounting our TN test.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Oct 1999 09:33

From Hindu, 10/17/99 Opinion section. Raja MOhan is troubled by deeper implications of Senate rejection of CTBT. Please think over what he is saying and also not saying. Does this mean arms control is dead or moribund? Tim? ------ Senate dumps arms control? Even more troubling is the trend reflected by the Senate - the U.S. is not only unwilling to accept new limits on its capabilities, but is determined to tear apart past arms control agreements and treaties. C. RAJA MOHAN analyses. YIELDING TO the forces of unilateralism and isolationism, the U.S. Senate has put a knife into the heart of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. But India would be unwise to rejoice. New Delhi might have had its own reservations about the CTBT. But it needs to look at the longer-term international consequences of the Senate's action. The American dumping of the treaty delivers a body blow to the already declining credibility of multilateral negotiations in the age of American pre-eminence over world affairs. If treaties and agreements negotiated painstakingly in the international arena are dismissed without even due consideration in the U.S. Senate, it will be extremely difficult for other nations to conduct any serious business in international organisations. The Senate decision was driven by the notion in America that ``all politics is local''. The rest of the world can go to hell! Also implicit in the vote is a weakening of the so-called ``imperial presidency'' that demanded and got the acquiescence of the Congress on national security issues during the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, the American legislature has increasingly challenged the authority of the President to conduct foreign policy. The Senate's `no' is the first refusal to ratify a treaty since 1919, when the American legislature voted down the Treaty of Versailles that set up the League of Nations. Underlying the negative vote is the assumption that the U.S. can take care of its security concerns on the strength of its own military capabilities and that there is no real need for it to accept multilaterally negotiated restraints on its capabilities. Much of the world knows that the CTBT imposes only a very small restraint on the American ability to build and maintain a nuclear arsenal. And the treaty has been a consistent demand of the entire world on the nuclear weapon powers for the last few decades. The signal from the conservatives in the Senate is that even the limited constraints imposed by the treaty are unacceptable. Even more troubling is the trend reflected by the Senate - the U.S. is not only unwilling to accept new limits on its capabilities, but is determined to tear apart past arms control agreements and treaties. The conservatives have long targeted the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that put some limits on building ``Star Wars'' weapons. The ABM treaty was signed by the U.S. and Russia in 1972 and was for an unlimited duration. The pressure from the Senate to scrap the ABM treaty has introduced tensions into the U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations, and there is a danger that the previous agreements between the two countries on the reduction of nuclear weapons will now be undermined. The U.S. plans to develop and build missile defences in Asia has also begun to hobble Sino-U.S. relations. American refusal to join the CTBT and its decision to deploy missile defences all around China could force the latter to resume testing of its nuclear weapons and expand its nuclear arsenal. This is the surest recipe for unravelling the existing fabric of global arms control. The approach being adopted by the Senate is also likely to exacerbate the current tensions in Washington's relations with both Moscow and Beijing and destabilise the global security environment. India must look beyond the narrow and immediate considerations on the CTBT - that it will ease the pressure from the Clinton Administration to join the treaty. It is time India begins to see the question not just in terms of an argument with the U.S. but in terms of global security. If India wants the world to accept it as a responsible nuclear power that is ready to make a contribution to global affairs, it needs to reconsider its own approach. And looking beyond the CTBT, India must begin to think through the new challenges to global arms control from the unilateralist policies being adopted by sections of the American establishment.

Rupak · Post by **Rupak** » 17 Oct 1999 10:33

Ramana,More on the wider implications of nature of the CTBT's defeat.Here is Anupam's article on the ABM treaty. =======================================Return to List of Contents A Russian Re-Evaluation of the ABM Treaty? Implications for US-Russia Relations and Arms Control in Asia By Anupam Srivastava Disarmament Diplomacy -- Issue No 39 Introduction At the G-8 summit in Cologne (Germany) in June, President Yeltsin agreed to the request of President Clinton for Russia to "reconsider" its opposition to modifications of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. An elated Sandy Berger, Clinton’s National Security Advisor (NSA), told reporters that this means the two countries have put aside their differences stemming from the Kosovo crisis and are now "back in business." (1) Russian unease over the future of the ABM Treaty has constituted a major obstacle to the ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) II Treaty by the Duma. Although the Yeltsin Administration advocates START II ratification, it does so despite its own severe reservations about possible US deployment of major ballistic missile defenses, which it fears could lend the US a strategic advantage defeating the object of moving towards ever lower levels of nuclear weapons. As reported elsewhere in this issue of Disarmament Diplomacy, bilateral meetings held in Moscow from 17-19 August failed to produce any breakthroughs on the subject. Indeed, the stated Russian willingness to consider any changes seemed conspicuously absent. A joint statement conceded that specific proposals to "strengthen" the ABM Treaty and "ensure its viability in the future" were not discussed. The Statement also reaffirmed the Treaty as "the cornerstone of strategic stability." This retrenchment of the Russian stance is understandable, given the preoccupation with elections to the Duma in December, and for the Presidency in June 2000. However, the willingness to discuss the issue, set out in Cologne, is not likely to have disappeared so quickly. At the very least, there is clearly a debate within the Russian Government about how best to proceed over the issue. If the new office-bearers of the Russian Federation agree to the modifications of the ABM Treaty envisaged in Washington, it will pave the way for the United States to deploy the National Missile Defense (NMD) system as early as 2003, and the Theater Missile Defense (TMD) variant soon after. By then, of course, a new US President will be in office. If the new Commander-in-Chief is a Republican, the US stance over the ABM Treaty - reviled as anachronistic and counter-productive to US national security interests by large segments of the Party - is likely to have hardened considerably. In its essence, the US NMD system currently in its research and development (R&D) stage seeks to create an impregnable anti-missile fortification to defend the continental United States (CONUS). TMD deployment, on the other hand, currently envisaged for East and Southeast Asia (mainly Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), aims to provide an additional tier of defense for US troops and allies in regional theaters of war against in-coming missiles. In the US-Russian context, a range of technical as well as politico-strategic issues stemming from this prospect deserve greater examination. Further, the wider implications of the NMD-TMD deployment on the fluid Asian strategic landscape also deserve closer examination. The subsequent analysis hopes to shed some light on the principal variables in this disturbing equation. A central focus of this analysis will be the seeming contradiction in current US policy toward these issues. On the one hand, the US seeks to justify circumventing politico-legal obligations to safeguard national security and larger national interests. On the other hand, it seeks to lead the effort to consolidate multilateral institutions to deal with collective problems. This apparent contradiction could seriously constrain US policy effectiveness in dealing with related arms control issues in the future. The US-Russia Case It may be recalled that in late January 1999, Clinton had sent a letter to Yeltsin proposing modifications to the ABM Treaty signed between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1972. As affirmed by Alexander Pikayev, Director of the Moscow branch of the Non-Proliferation Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Russian Federation had vehemently rejected any amendment to the original terms of the ABM treaty. (2) The Russian Duma, debating START II, recalled that when the Soviet Union had signed START I it had issued a unilateral declaration that if the United States withdrew from the ABM, it reserved the right to withdraw from the Treaty. Indeed, Article 9 of the Russian federal law expressly prohibits the entry into force of START II unless the US Senate ratifies the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) pertaining to the ABM, signed in September 1997. The MOU provides for the legal succession of Russia to all the treaty obligations of the former Soviet Union. Russia alleges that opponents of the MOU in the US Senate want to block its ratification so that Russia’s legal obligations as the Successor State to the Soviet Union are rendered null and void. This will enable the United States to circumvent its legal constraints surrounding the ABM treaty, and implement the NMD/TMD systems. It is certainly the view of Senator Jesse Helms (Republican - North Carolina), Chair of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that the 1997 MOU should be rejected, preferably bringing down the whole ABM Treaty with it. Furthermore, Helms is unwilling to see his Committee submit any arms control accords, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to which he is also opposed, to the full Senate until the MOU is dealt with. No doubt partly in reaction to Helms’ violent antipathy to arms control in general, and the ABM Treaty in particular, the Clinton Administration has stated it will submit the MOU following Duma ratification of START II. When the ABM Treaty was originally negotiated, it differentiated between "strategic" ABM systems and other systems (e.g. tactical missile defense and air-defense) that were not limited except to the extent that they would not have "strategic" capabilities. But aside from the lack of technical clarity on some provisions of the ABM treaty, the need to reconcile this differentiation in the implementation of the US missile defense plans was not adequately resolved by the Nixon, Reagan or Bush administrations. It was the Clinton administration that reached an accord (the MOU) which formally distinguishes between prohibited strategic defense systems and permissible TMD systems. The ABM Treaty’s Standing Consultative Committee (SCC) produced a draft phase-one demarcation agreement (in 1996) that covers lower-velocity TMD systems, with missile interceptor speeds of 3 kms a second (km/s) or less. These systems can be tested and deployed on any platform except space-based interceptors, provided the interceptor is not tested against a target missile with a velocity exceeding 5 km/s or range exceeding 3,500 km. (3) Phase-two agreement, resolved in the September 1997 accord, covers higher-velocity TMD systems, with interceptor speeds in excess of 3 km/s. This is in addition to the proposal (in the September 1997 accord) to "multilateralize" the ABM by including Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. (4) However, both these 1996 and 1997 agreements prohibit the development, testing and deployment of space-based TMD interceptors or similar systems. In this sense, current US TMD deployment plans - and also the use of space-based launchers under the NMD plan - constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty. Recent developments indicate a growing convergence of technical and political imperatives for an early deployment of the NMD as well as the TMD systems. Over a period spanning three decades and more, the total US budget dedicated to fielding a robust missile defense now exceeds $100 billion. (5) The principal systems being developed include the Army’s THAAD (Theater High Altitude Area Defense) and the Navy’s NTWD (Navy Theater-Wide Defense). Aside from the financial dimension of the enormity of the task, technical impediments have continued to dog the effort to field such a system. Until recently, the Pentagon and the research laboratories had failed to demonstrate that this system might actually work in outdoor battle conditions. Under simulated conditions, these programs had managed a 45% strike rate against short-range missiles, and 15% against longer-range missiles, particularly those that had crossed the "boost phase" of their flights. Then a breakthrough was reported on 10 June, 1999, when the first long-range missile was successfully intercepted by the THAAD system in outdoor conditions, followed by another success in early August (see this issue for details and reaction). This breakthrough has provided added ammunition to the proponents of the NMD system in Washington. The political fate of the program had languished following the conclusion of the US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in 1995 that the United States would face no direct ballistic missile threat before 2010. (6) Overturning that prognosis, the Congress-sanctioned Rumsfeld Commission Report (released on 15 July, 1998) warned that such a threat is imminent and could come with little or no warning. (7) Buoyed by this report, the proponents of the NMD succeeded in getting the US House of Representatives to adopt the final version of the legislation (H.R. 4) on 20 May, 1999 that authorizes establishing an NMD as soon as it becomes technologically possible, with two provisos: such deployment must be commensurate with the US objective of seeking to negotiate nuclear arms reductions with Russia; and funding for the system must be secured through the usual authorization procedures. In March, the US Senate approved a companion measure, the Cochran-Inouye National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (S. 269). On 23 July, President Clinton signed H.R. 4 into law. In a statement obviously intended to reassure Moscow, Clinton stressed the importance of the to provisos: "By specifying that any NMD deployment must be subject to [authorization procedures]...the legislation makes clear that no decision on deployment has been made. ... [The legislation also reaffirms] my Administration’s position that our national missile defense policy must take into account our arms control and nuclear non-proliferation objectives." (See this issue for the full text of Clinton’s statement.) Russia, however, expressed itself appalled by Clinton’s signing of the Act, and expressed grave reservations about the rush of developments towards deployment. The Clinton Administration has set itself a deadline of no later than the end of June next year to decide whether to proceed with an NMD system. In effect, as a decision to proceed is highly likely, June 2000 is also the deadline for seeking to agree ABM Treaty modifications with Russia. While technical obstacles to establishing a robust NMD-TMD system have by no means been overcome by a couple of missile interceptions, the politico-legal challenge would be substantially overcome if Russia were to agree to the proposed amendments to the Treaty. As we have seen, given the opposition to Yeltsin in the Duma such an outcome appears remote in the near term. However, the issue has to be seen in the broader context of a blunt and unpalatable fact: Russia’s continued economic difficulties are greatly increasing its dependence on external financial assistance. It desperately needs the next tranche of the $4.56 billion loan from the IMF. On 23 June, former Prime Minister Stepashin (since replaced by Vladimir Putin, former Secretary of the Security Council) announced the Russian defense budget for FY 1999-2000. In constant US dollars, this comes to $6.7 billion, and comprises 28% of the total budgetary outlay. That means the aggregate Russian budget (FY 1999-2000) is only about $24 billion, a paltry sum by the standards of even some developing economies - the amount requested in the US FY 2000 Defense Authorization Bill is $289 billion. Clearly then, continued economic woes progressively constrain Russian ability to assert itself either within the "post-Soviet" space or in its relations with the West and the rest. Beyond the financial constraints, if Russia agrees to proceed with further arms reduction envisaged under START III (assuming the ratification of START II), it will have to reduce its stockpile of strategic nuclear arsenal to between 2,000-2,500 warheads - the preferred US target - and between 1,000-1,500 warheads - the reported Russian target. (8) In deployment terms - to take the 2,000-2,500 level - this will mean fielding no more than about 600 MIRV-ed ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple, independently-targetable warheads) for the entire Russian nuclear force. (9) Given Russia’s inability to commit adequate financial resources, even this reduced force appears difficult to maintain at adequate operational readiness standards. (10) In the near- to medium- term, this is likely to worsen Russian power asymmetry against not only the United States but also China. On a broader plane, Russia’s inability to impede the eastward expansion of NATO has forced it to turn its attention southward, consolidating its strategic relationship with China and with India. Wider Implications for Asia On August 13, 1999, Japan’s cabinet endorsed a plan to jointly research a missile defense system with the United States, further energizing the TMD debate. (10) This decision closely followed, though was not necessarily spurred by, China’s flight test on August 3rd of its Dong Feng (East Wind) series surface-to-surface missile (DF-31). The missile, which was launched from Wuzhai test range in Shanxi and landed in Taklimakan desert in Xinjiang region, has a maximum range of 8,000 km, but was tested up to 3,000 km. Although the official Xinhua news agency declined to give details, a pro-Beijing newspaper in Hong Kong (Wen Wei Po) claimed that "to date, there is no weapon in the world that can intercept such a missile, …[and] the NMD and TMD systems developed by the US were merely low-altitude missile defense systems." (11) Further, as the Cox Commission report released on 25 May reported, China has already acquired the designs of the latest US nuclear device, the W-88, whose small size and compact design makes it immeasurably easier in mounting on the cone of the ICBMs. Presumably then, China will soon acquire diversified (including MIRV-ed) delivery capability to strike strategic targets in the United States, and establish critical operational advantages over the Russian nuclear force. Although China has no locus standii on the issue, it has vociferously supported preservation of the ABM treaty in its present form, and opposed deployment of TMD systems in Asia, particularly in Taiwan. (12) The current strain in Beijing-Washington ties is not limited to the charges leveled in the Cox report. China remained opposed to the NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, and calibrated its domestic protest against the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade for maximum leverage. The spectre of NATO enlarging its mission beyond the territory of its members makes China very uneasy about possible US/NATO intervention in Taiwan or Tibet. Equally significant as its hardening stance in its immediate neighbourhood, China’s relations with South Asia are exhibiting considerable finesse. During the May-July conflict in Kashmir, it quietly cautioned Pakistan against escalation and assured India of continued peace, enabling Indian troops to be re-deployed away from the Chinese border to the Pakistani border. The 14-15 June meeting between India’s Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and his counterpart Tang Xiaquan resulted in the agreement to set up a formal "security mechanism" for speedy implementation of the confidence-building measures (CBMs) envisaged in the Peace and Tranquillity Agreement of 1993. Soon after, the 28-30 June visit of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif resulted in the Sino-Pakistan decision to jointly develop the Chinese Super-7 fighter aircraft. Similarly, Beijing has thus far elected to withhold comment on the 17 August release of India’s "Draft Nuclear Doctrine" which seeks to establish a "survivable" second strike capability. (13) Conclusion Beijing’s policies toward South Asia are clearly geared toward emerging as an alternate interlocutor, in addition to constraining Washington’s latitude for politico-diplomatic manoeuvring. While this finesse might augment Beijing’s leverage in its myriad dealings with Washington, China’s relentless ascension in the Asian strategic calculus is triggering warning signals across the region. The United States needs to better understand this dynamic equilibrium in Asia. At a minimum, until China has become a significant stakeholder in the stability of the international system, precipitous moves such as the proposed TMD deployment might undermine the fragile Asian balance of power. Further, "defensive" deployments such as a TMD system will worsen the existing power asymmetry in the region and lead to a new round of arms racing. It will also undermine the US ability to constrain Russia, for instance, from delivering anti-missile systems (the S-300PMU-1 and S-300V) to India, in turn precipitating missile build-up by Pakistan. In a larger sense, the United States should recognize that its policies, especially toward Asia, need to be cast in more holistic terms. Decisions such as NMD-TMD deployment, even at the cost of amending the ABM, will progressively worsen its relationship with Russia and China, two countries that are vital to the evolving security architecture of Asia. Since Asia is likely to remain the locus of economic dynamism in the coming decades, US interests in the region go well beyond the traditional notions of security. As such, basing its defense policy on worst case assessment of threats will precipitate a reactive dynamic in Asia that will ultimately inhibit US strategic relevance in the region. If the United States wishes to restore credibility to the concept of multilateralism, it must strive to lead by example. Notes and References Jane Perlez, "US and Russians Strive to Repair Frayed Relations," The New York Times, 21 June, 1999. For an incisive account of steps necessary for US/Russian nuclear arms reduction and ABM-compliant anti-missile deployments, see Thomas W. Graham Jr. and Alexander S. Yereskovsky, "Viewpoint," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 12 July, 1999. Alexander Pikayev, "A New Low in US-Russian Relations," Proliferation Brief, [Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace], vol.2, no.1, 3 February, 1999. John Pike, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Is the US `Rushing to Failure?’, Arms Control Today, April 1998, p.10. See, for instance, James H. Anderson, "The Senate’s Opportunity to Get Serious About Missile Defense," Executive Memorandum [Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation], no.551, 8 September, 1998. By 1996, the budget for NMD alone, in its various dispensations, exceeded $99b since its inception in 1963. See, for instance, Joseph Cirincione and Frank von Hippel, eds., The Last Fifteen Minutes: Ballistic Missile Defense in Perspective [Washington, DC: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, May 1996], and later Proliferation Briefs by Joe Cirincione. This is in addition to the vast amounts spent on the various TMD systems now being developed. For a critique of the NIE and subsequent developments, see Baker Spring, "Maintaining Momentum for Missile Defense," Backgrounder [The Heritage Foundation], No. 1288, 1 June, 1999. Report of the Commission To Assess The Ballistic Missile Threat To The United States (15 July, 1998) [Pursuant to Public Law 104-201, the National Defense Authorization Act, FY 1997, Section 1321(g), 104th Congress, US Government]. "US and Soviet/Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces," Arms Control Today, March 1999. For a comprehensive review of recent Russian nuclear policy developments, see PIR Arms Control Letters [Moscow: Center for Policy Studies in Russia], 9 June, 1999. See, for instance, "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, End of 1998" [NRDC Nuclear Notebook], The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol.55, no.2, March/April 1999. "Japan, US to develop joint missile defense," The Times of India, New Delhi, 14 August, 1999. "China tests new ballistic missile," reported by Press Trust of India, 3 August, 1999. For an official account of the Chinese position, see "Some Thoughts on Non-Proliferation", Statement of Ambassador Sha Zukang, Director-General, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, Seventh Annual Non-Proliferation Conference [Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace], January 12, 1999. Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on Indian Nuclear Doctrine, August 17, 1999 <A HREF="http://www.indiagov.org/govt/nucl.htm." TARGET=_blank>http://www.indiagov.org/govt/nucl.htm.</A> Dr. Anupam Srivastava is the Director of the South Asia Program and Senior Research Associate at the Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, USA. © 1999 The Acronym Institute. Return to top of page Return to List of Contents Return to Acronym Main Page

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 18 Oct 1999 04:14

FWIW: <A HREF="http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv ... 9-idx.html" TARGET=_blank>http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv ... dx.html</A> Dubious Detours In Nuclear Politics By Steve Coll Sunday, October 17, 1999; Page B01 From bad to worse: On one side of the border now stands Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf, an aggrieved ex-commando who strikes boldly. The coup he led Wednesday against Pakistan's democratically elected government is only his latest attempt to force the action in South Asia: Last spring, he authored a failed, embarrassing incursion against India in the mountains of Kashmir. While no neophyte, the Pakistani army chief of staff appears to know little about world politics, yet is convinced that he is central to his country's destiny. On the other side of the border is India's newly emboldened political force, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Fresh from an electoral victory forged in part from its religious-toned pursuit of great-power status for India, the BJP's leaders are unifying the country with a claim that only they are strong enough to defend India from Pakistan's nefarious designs. On both sides of the border are fervently nationalistic teams of nuclear and missile scientists who have already assembled small stores of nuclear weapons components and fissile material for up to several dozen bombs. Each side announced successful nuclear weapons tests in May 1998, and while doubts remain about how much technical progress these rival Manhattan Projects have made, each certainly can crudely deliver a nuclear bomb to the other's soil. The risk of such a cataclysm is now greater than ever. Musharraf's coup and India's expanding embrace of Hindu nationalist leadership are mutually reinforcing events. They loosen restraints on the subcontinent's nuclear arms race, providing each side with confirmation of its worst fears about the other and ample rationale for more rapid weapons development and deployment. Just eight months ago, the subcontinent rejoiced when Indian Prime Minister Atal ihari Vajpayee staged a Nixon-to-China trip to the Pakistani city of Lahore.Now hopes of reconciliation lie in tatters. The deposed Pakistani prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, was Vajpayee's partner in that quixotic, back-channel peace effort. American influence in the region, weak to begin with, is in free fall. Washington's argument that Pakistan should pressure India diplomatically by capping its nuclear program and signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty now echoes hollowly, after the U.S. Senate's emphatic rejection of the pact. The Pakistani coup and the Senate's vote--defiant, inward turns in capitals half a world apart--are seen abroad as related events that hasten the prospect of the world's first nuclear detonation in anger since Nagasaki. That threat, while hardly imminent, lies in the coming interaction between Pakistan's now openly militaristic government and India's governing Hindu nationalists. As Musharraf staged his takeover, tens of millions of middle-class Indians with satellite hookups could toggle between scenes of Pakistani soldiers clambering over the walls of government compounds in Islamabad and the televised installation of their own theatrical BJP-led coalition in New Delhi. With the coup only hours old, the Hindu leaders described Musharraf's intentions darkly and placed their armed forces on immediate alert. That interplay forecasts a larger pattern. The main political narrative in India today is the BJP's bid to succeed the discredited, fractured Congress Party as the country's source of national unity. Developing a nuclear doctrine, testing nuclear weapons and rattling sabers along the Kashmir border have been key elements of this domestic political calculus. Musharraf's coup propels the BJP's strategy forward. His takeover ends the recent pretense of unresolved tension between civilian and military goals in Pakistan's posture toward India. Islamabad's new face of aggression makes it easier for the BJP to pursue openly--and in defiance of outside pressure, if necessary--the country's announced rough-draft strategy of a nuclear triad, meaning the development of nuclear weapons that can be delivered via missiles, aircraft and submarines. Alarms are already sounding in the hushed offices of security analysts and nonproliferation specialists. After Musharraf's takeover, "The BJP is basically going to give a blank check to the [nuclear] scientists," says Sumit Ganguly, a visiting fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a specialist on Indian nuclear policy. "They're going to say to the scientists, 'Go ahead with your missile program. Start thinking about how to miniaturize [nuclear] weapons and put them on warheads.' " The pace of Indian deployment will remain slow; the country's military scientists face significant technical problems. But any acceleration will spook and spur on the Pakistanis. On that side of the border, Musharraf's track record does not inspire confidence. After a year as army chief, he has provided few signs that he will use the military's power responsibly. "The personality of the army chief is a non-trivial matter," as Michael Krepon, a close student of the Pakistani army at the Henry L. Stimson Center, puts it wryly. Krepon spent time with Musharraf during the last year and finds him "not terrible thoughtful. He's a guy who is not all that bright. But he's highly decorated. Doesn't know much about the world . . . . His sense of international politics and strategy were on display in Kargil," the site of his army's springtime disaster in Kashmir. Yet, almost unimaginably, some Pentagon officials and other policymakers in the United States are nostalgic for an army leader in Pakistan. They remember the salad days of partnership during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, and leap to the conclusion that Musharraf is like Pakistani generals of old--a man with whom they can do business. What they are overlooking is that Musharraf belongs to a generation of generals who rose to power during the 1990s, when U.S. sanctions enforced the generals' physical, intellectual and ideological isolation. Nor do the U.S. and Pakistani militaries today have any meaningful agenda to bind them together--not to mention that such interaction is heavily constrained by U.S. law. After several days of silence, Musharraf has again delayed a major political speech that would outline his plans. His only appearance before his countrymen to date--a four-minute speech on national television immediately after the coup--was oddly devoid of political or foreign policy goals. Instead, he recounted personal grievance--how the prime minister had tried to send him into exile by diverting his [...] land and stage his coup. He complained that Sharif had insulted the Pakistani army, "the last remaining viable institution in which all of you take so much pride and look up to at all times" (a claim that may underestimate the popularity of the national cricket team). Yet having taken power and pledged national salvation, Musharraf has now placed the army's most vital interest--itself--at grave risk. After more than a decade of mostly standing aside from politics, the army must now deliver on the credibility Musharraf bragged about awkwardly on Wednesday. That means tackling intractable problems such as corruption, poverty and sectarian violence. The army is poorly equipped for these challenges, but even to attempt a credible reconstruction of civil society, it needs two things: foreign money and breathing space from serious conflict with India. Neither will be easily acquired. Reacting to Musharraf's takeover, Pakistan's elite sounded astonishingly exhausted--even disgusted--by its 15-year, hard-won experiment with constitutional democracy. Sharif's attempts to smash centers of opposition to his rule--the press, the Supreme Court, the National Assembly--have left little but a shell of constitutionalism. Former prime minister Benazir Bhutto is discredited, in exile in London from a corruption indictment. Even liberal newspaper editors openly invite Musharraf to rule for a prolonged period. This appetite for army-led stability is delusional. Not only is the army unlikely to "save" Pakistan, its attempts to assert itself threaten to accelerate a cycle of nuclear risk on the subcontinent. In the end, the United States, India and Pakistan all share a profound interest in the development--however difficult, however gradual--of a deeply rooted, democratic civic society in Pakistan. This is what India's Vajpayee, perhaps alone in the BJP's leadership, understood when he made his historic bus trip to Lahore. What a long, long time ago that February day now seems. Steve Coll, managing editor of The Washington Post, served as the newspaper's South Asia bureau chief from 1989 to 1992, based in New Delhi. He is the author of "On the Grand Trunk Road: A Journey Into South Asia" (Times Books). [This message has been edited by Calvin (edited 17-10-1999).]

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 18 Oct 1999 22:34

Apropos Rajesh Rajagoplan's article on Nuclear strategy and SNF. It would enhance the article's value if he had examined the fact that the doctrine of choice is ever evolving one and is dependent on political factors. For instance the UK and France were able to move from a doctrine of denial(although on a smaller scale than the super powers) to a version of Existential doctrine with the end of Cold war and the consequent threat reduction. China on the other hand seems to be moving in the other direction. SNF also have to change and adapt their doctrines based on the technological level of their challengers. For instance ABM and TMD tend to greatly reduce the assured destruction aspect of small forces. In the long run unless overtaken by events the choice of doctrine depends on the political climate of prevailing times. A mutually balanced world would mean the widespread adoption of Existential doctrine. A departure from this would lead to either of the two other doctrines being adopted based on economics.

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 19 Oct 1999 00:08

Apropos of RajaMohan's article on US rejection of the CTBT. He misreads the US completely. This is a nation that was carved out of a continent with blood. The Americans are extremely hardboiled, and certainly I am not the one to argue they should not be, when it comes to defense and always will be. There never has been any support for international treaties such as the ABM or the CTBT especially when they realize it means curtailing of america's strategic strength. This is not a knee jerk reaction on the part of the US Senate. It was in fact completely predictable and the only reason the Clinton administration never brought it to a vote in the last 3 years is because they did not have a hope of getting the 67 votes needed at any time in between. Universal disarmament will not get a single vote in the US Congress , not now and not in the next several decades. The only proponents of the CTBT in the US are those who believe that they can pass it off as a treaty that will keep India from improving its arsenal while doing nothing to degrade the American stockpile. In fact that is the prime argument by the proponents of the CTBT.Of course many like James Schlesinger do not buy this argument at all and consider it a non-sequitor.India should be forthright to the US. India will observe the moratorium, which is conditional on none of the other P5 testing. India should also point out to the US, that the positions of the 2 countries on this issue are remarkably identical. Both have moratoriums in place and neither has signed or ratified which amounts to the same thing. Let us leave it at that , that is the best that can be hoped for in the world of today.Kaushal

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 19 Oct 1999 09:03

"...a blank check..".Frankly,I disagree.Our govt has been very cautitious with respect to displaying our nuclear deterrent,it's development, in comparison with pakistan and China.Looking back carefully,it has had to test in order to check the runaway braggadacio of our martial neighbour.A blank check implies a blank check monetarily also!The govt is quite well aware of the urgent economic needs of the population,which could not be accomplished in full last time round due to the coalition partners.It will be under considerable pressure from it's regional partners for a share of the cake in order that economic development can occur across the nation as equally as is possible.Raising the defence spending to about 3% of the GNP friom 2.5%, sorely desired, is a first step.What is earmarked for the deterrent,which has other sources of funding it is alleged,depends upon regional factors.The actions of the nuclear powers is another factor that will determine India's nuxclear response.The US Senate rejection of the CTBT indicates the way in which the most powerful nation wants to go-It is the US Senate that has actually given a blank check to it's scientists and military planners.The rest of the independent world will sadly ,in order to survive with dignity,have to follow suit.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 20 Oct 1999 02:28

Sidhu in IE... INDIAN EXPRESS FRONT PAGE Politics Business Expressions General World Sports Leisure States Wednesday, October 20, 1999 The Indian agenda in Washington WPS Sidhu Four unrelated events are likely to determine the course of India's relations with the United States. The first episode was the defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's (CTBT) ratification in the US Senate. The second incident was the military coup in Pakistan. The third happening was the election results in India, which brought back the same leadership line-up (at least in the key ministries of external affairs, defence and finance) as existed before the elections. Finally, the Bill Clinton administration begins the final year of its tenure. For years Indo-US relations have been dominated by the non-proliferation agenda: Washington asking New Delhi to sign the various treaties of the non-proliferation regime, including the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the CTBT and India defending its right not to. However, the defeat of the CTBT in the Senate has clearly weakened the Clinton administration's position on one of the primary strands of Indo-US relations. Although the CTBT issue is still likely to be raised by the US, it is unlikely to have a great impact on India's own policy. While it may be instinctive for New Delhi to gloat, it would be worthwhile to recognise that the debacle of the CTBT in the Senate provides a rare opportunity to both the Clinton and Vajpayee governments to think beyond the non-proliferation arena and broaden the scope of their estranged bilateral relationship. This calls for innovative thinking in both capitals to focus on other areas of common interest. Similarly, because Washington's policy towards New Delhi was primarily driven by non-proliferation concerns this policy was also extended to Islamabad, which linked its own proliferation behaviour to India's. Coupled with this was the ability of Islamabad to successfully raise the ante over Kashmir. Consequently, the US policy towards India (when not confined to proliferation issues) was seen in the narrow context of India and Pakistan. However, in the recent past there has been recognition in Washington that Indian concerns are not confined to Pakistan and extend at the very least to China. In addition, even in the restricted India-Pakistan context, there is now some understanding that these two countries cannot be treated as equals. This perception was strengthened by Kargil, which Washington squarely blamed on Islamabad. The knowledge that the Pakistan army was the principal actor behind the Kargil actions also made Washington aware of the frailty of Pakistan's democracy. The coup has merely reaffirmed that apprehension. Thus in the post-Kargil, post-coup era it is clear that while Washington may be willing to deal with the new dispensation in Islamabad it is keen to engage with India at all levels. With the return of Jaswant Singh as foreign minister, this engagement policy will not only continue as before but is likely to move into high gear. Neither side will have to spend valuable time to assess the intentions and motives of the other; both parties are well acquainted and comfortable working with each other. In contrast, even if Washington were keen on engaging with Islamabad, it would have to familiarise itself with the new regime in Pakistan, a time-consuming task under any circumstances, but more so when there are contradictory reports about the new incumbent. This increases the possibility that the US administration will give priority to an India specific agenda which aims at widening and deepening the level of engagement between the world's two largest democracies. There is another reason for this urgency. As the Clinton administration enters its final year the window of opportunity for a presidential visit to the region is fast closing. It is becoming a now-or-never situation. Hence, it is quite likely that the US president will visit India even if he does not go to Pakistan. Moreover, given President Clinton's personal interest in India and given the alignment of the above-mentioned issues, he will also be keen on establishing a new level of strategic cooperation between Washington and New Delhi. The writer is a research scholar at the Centre for International Studies, Oxford

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 20 Oct 1999 08:45

Well,Clinton is coming as a Tourist-to-be.His role in world affairs is ending pretty soon.There is no popint in negotiating with a failing bank.What India should do is to strengthen it's position during the run up to the US elections and then negotiate from a considerable position of strength wiht the future establishment on global disarmament.It would also be prudent after the Senate vote on the CTBT.There's no [point in doing any deal with Bill,except to emphasise yet again in peerson our grave apprehensions about pakistan and China.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 20 Oct 1999 21:42

Chellaney on Defense of India in HT -10/2/99. <A HREF="http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/2 ... tOPI01.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.hindustantimes.com/nonfram/2 ... I01.htm</A>

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 20 Oct 1999 21:56

An article I am in general agreement with:The Asian “tigers”, for example, emerged on the back of high levels of defence spending. This is a mischaracterization of what happened in Asia.What is important is that India emulate other major democracies and commit funds for defence on a multi-year basis rather than annually. The annual practice has undermined defence planning. Good point.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 21 Oct 1999 21:17

ramana: This thread has mutated into a discussion on BMD. BMD might, further, be considered to be a post-deterrent doctrine. BMD has the potential to upset the apple cart by holding out the possibility of deterrence by denial. For a SNW, BMD has tremendous relevance because it greatly discounts the credibility of its deterrent against a NWS with BMD.BMD can clearly jeopardize the Disarmament process (if one exists). And there is the possibility of pre-emptive attacks, as Bruce Blair has discussed elsewhere. This is an appropriate time for India to think about the impact of BMD on its posture, and the future role for itself on the global stage.

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 23 Oct 1999 11:54

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 23 Oct 1999 14:13

Chellaney's article in HT (Oct.20) reinforces what some of us have been saying in BR several times about Defense spending in India. India is one of the lowest spenders, among the top ten countries in the world, on defense both in absolute terms as well as any other representative measure (% of GDP, per capita expenditure etc.). India needs a sustained period of peace to develop economically and become once again a strong confident nation, instead of the current situation where the Ashok Mitra's are craven enough to talk about 'senior patrons' for India. India does not need senior patrons. what it needs is a strong defense, so that every two bit tin horn dictator that comes along will not feel compelled to issue threats.Again the end goal is not necessarily to become a militay superpower so much as to become an economic giant like Japan. But a minimum level of defense spending is essential to deter would be aggressors and convince the superpower and his cohorts that India means business.Kaushal

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 27 Oct 1999 00:15

<A HREF="http://www.latimes.com/news/comment/199 ... 95200.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.latimes.com/news/comment/199 ... 00.html</A> The Real Story: We Rejected a Bad Treaty Nuclear test ban:It wasn't politics; the pact would have jeopardized U.S. security. By JON KYL In the aftermath of the Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, some in Washington have tried to delve deeply into the psyche of senators who voted against the treaty, searching for hidden political motives to explain its defeat. Various diagnoses have been proffered as the cause of the treaty's demise, ranging from an urge to embarrass the president to an isolationist tendency to withdraw the United States from international affairs. The whole spectacle reminds me of the admonition, attributed to Sigmund Freud, about the dangers of looking too deeply for hidden meaning: "Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar." Simply put, the Senate rejected the treaty because it was a bad treaty that would have jeopardized America's security. Opponents of the treaty never appealed to senators to vote against it for reasons of party loyalty. Rather, senators were persuaded to reject the treaty based on the facts about its effect on our security. Six former secretaries of Defense, led by James R. Schlesinger, as well as many other foreign policy experts like Henry Kissinger, opposed the treaty, pointing out that it would have undermined the U.S. nuclear deterrent that has been crucial to guaranteeing America's security for more than 50 years. Our nuclear weapons are sophisticated devices with thousands of parts that must function together with split-second timing. As these weapons age, they corrode and deteriorate. Testing has been essential to maintaining our arsenal. One-third of all U.S. weapon designs fielded since 1958 have required testing to fix problems arising after deployment. In three-fourths of these cases, the problems were only discovered because of nuclear testing. With only nine types of weapons in our post-Cold War arsenal, a serious problem affecting several designs would be of grave concern. Computer simulations and laboratory experiments are valuable tools in maintaining our nuclear arsenal, but they are no substitute for an actual test. Furthermore, this treaty would not have any meaningful effect on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; 182 nations, including Iran, Iraq and North Korea, promised never to possess nuclear weapons when they ratified the nonproliferation treaty. Under the test ban treaty, these nations would have been promising not to test the weapons they already promised never to have. And finally, as many experts pointed out, the treaty was not verifiable or enforceable. Nations would have been able to cheat with little worry about being caught or punished. Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), hardly a partisan or isolationist, said the treaty was "not of the same caliber as the arms control treaties that have come before the Senate in recent decades." Under our constitutional system, the Senate's role in treaty-making is of equal stature with the president's. The Senate's role is quality control, not rubber stamp. The treaty's rejection will strengthen the hands of U.S. diplomats in future arms-control negotiations. When they insist on more effective provisions to satisfy a rigorous Senate, their warnings will be credible and influential. Current complaints from abroad will be minor and transitory, especially in light of the permanent harm the treaty would have done to U.S. national security. - - -Jon Kyl (R-ariz.) Is a Member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Oct 1999 02:43

Under what set of side agreements would the Senate have approved the treaty?1) An agreement putting seismic monitors in China and Russia's test sites similar to the Nevada test station. 2) A certification from US agency/community that they can verify test incidents independent of the CTBT monitoring system. 3) The SSP being online for a period of five years and the results of such monitoring program. 4)A national legislation making it imperative for the US president to test, if the SSP provides results to the contrary. This would be resisted by White House as infriging on authority but there is precedent- Pressler, Glenn Amendment etc. Tim, How about running these by your contacts and give us a response?

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Oct 1999 03:14

The US is a superpower with first strike doctrine. It has also more challenging demands on its capabilities. Hence they need a higher standard of reliability and confidence in what they have. It is interesting that they have nine types in inventory now. Very diverse and subject to problems. The more you have more chances of things going wrong. OTH, you are not grounded by a single type of failure. The Indian tests are for different reason. Due to second strike nature, the mission is in ensuring definite retaliation. The Indians have three types per RC. So less diverse. Also I think they are overdesigned to make sure they go off at first go. This is due to limited oppurtunities to test, therefore they better work first time around.Of the five tests or six including POK-1, the certainity of a fission device going of is very high. To ensure the others go of they need to have a stockpile stewardship/management program need to check the gas is full and topped off, the conventional stuff is tested repeatedly and have a damn good quality control program. And have periodic delivery vehicle tests.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 27 Oct 1999 03:35

I posted this in the Indonesia thread.... I think to kick-off the new millenium they should have a seminar where all participants from GOI and outside in India can get together and share what they know about China and come up with focus areas where there is limited knowledge. This should be conducted by the NSC. We in BRF can gather all links about China focusing on different aspects that impinge on security. Any takers?

Bharat Rakshak

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