Strategic Folder III-A

Rupak · Post by **Rupak** » 16 Oct 1999 00:09

This thread attempts to combine some of the discussions from threads on Pakistan's Coup and the CTBT and the implications for stability in South Asia.

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Why India Might Test Again

Two events these past few days have opened up the possibility that the India might embark upon a new series of nuclear tests. The first of these is the debate leading up to the US Senate’s rejection of the CTBT. The second is the military coup in Pakistan. While the two are discrete events, both together have serious implications for India’s (in)security and undermine the foundation of stability in South Asia. We deal with the former event first.

Opposition to the CTBT in the US Senate questioned the credibility of its verification system. In particular, much was made of the ability or lack thereof, of its monitoring stations to accurately detect the Shakti series of tests that India conducted in May 1998. While the monitoring stations were able to detect the tests on 11 May, they failed to detect the tests on 13 May. Furthermore, there were huge discrepancies between the various estimates for the tests on 11 May. The supporters CTBT, including people close to the US establishment, countered by stating that the Indian tests did not register because they were duds. The first set of tests fizzled out and the second never occurred. The CTBT’s verification system, they argued, was fine. In essence, therefore, the US establishment called into question the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent.

Back on the subcontinent, even as tempers had begun to cool following Pakistan’s Kargil misadventure earlier this year, a military coup in Pakistan now casts a long shadow over the possibility of a peace, albeit a cold one, between the India and Pakistan. General Musharraf, Pakistan’s new leader and architect of the Kargil affair, was an outspoken critic of Nawaz Sharif’s withdrawal from the height’s of Kargil and regarded Mr.Sharif's attempts to reach détente with India as treachery. Given the fact that General Musharraf, as a young army officer, took part in both the 1965 and 1971 conflicts against India, one can be sure that he bears a visceral animosity towards India, in common with all his brother officers who ended up on the losing side in two wars against an enemy that was held up as a weak and soft opponent. The military continues to remain openly hostile to India. Indeed, Pakistan’s Military Chiefs chose to disassociate themselves from the Lahore peace process by staying away from a reception for the Indian Prime Minster during his visit to Pakistan. Gen.Musharraf, and his Army, continue to regard Kargil as a great triumph of Pakistani arms that was interrupted by a treacherous civilian government. The campaign in Kashmir therefore remains incomplete.

The CTBT debate in the US has been very closely followed by both the Indians and Pakistanis. Rightly or wrongly, Pakistan’s views of the credibility of India’s nuclear deterrent have been greatly influenced by US views. By questioning the credibility of India’s deterrent, the US establishment appears (unwittingly, perhaps) to have reassured the Pakistani military that it can confront India with relative impunity. Perhaps even resort to nuclear blackmail, something that they have become rather adept at this decade. It would be unsurprising, therefore, if the conflict in Kashmir were renewed with vigor.

The Indian establishment is as cognizant of the above as it is sure of the robustness of its nuclear arsenal. However, nuclear weapons aimed a deterring an adversary are useless unless the adversary is convinced of its credibility. And American attempts to undermine the credibility of India’s nuclear capability may have created a situation where it has become almost essential for India to carry out an additional series of nuclear tests. Indeed, it should come as no surprise that Indian policy makers have recently been calling for a fresh round of nuclear tests. Any new tests would, at the very least, correct strategic misperceptions in the region by re-emphasizing the robustness of India’s deterrent. While the Indian moratorium on testing may remain intact in the short term, things will almost certainly change if the security situation deteriorates, or the current global moratorium on testing is broken by persistent reports of breaches by any of the P-5 countries.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 16 Oct 1999 00:18

The recent events in China with their tests and parade of the DF31 and reports of a DF41 are also bound to accelerate the user-trials and extensions of the Agni, SLCM and ICBM programs.

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 16 Oct 1999 00:28

However, nuclear weapons aimed a deterring an adversary are useless unless the adversary is convinced of its credibility. Good points rupak. I have been constantly astonished at the cross purposes with which the American foreign policy establishment seems to be working, when it simultaneously questions the credibility of the POK II tests while at the same time admonishing India not to test.They should know by now the 2 positions are incompatible. Either they accept the credibility of the Indian tests (unlike Sen.Moynihan, who publicly questioned them) or be resigned to the fact that sooner or later India will test to establish credibility which is essential for a deterrent posture. Kaushal[This message has been edited by Kaushal (edited 15-10-1999).]

Guest · Post by **Guest** » 16 Oct 1999 01:36

I just hope that this time around the output is in excess of 5 or even 10 megatonnes. No more 30kT H-bombs with people like Terry Wallace trashing us all over the place. When it comes to showing off our dhamaka, I firmly believe in bigger is betterWhat is the point of having a H-bomb that does not deter even RATS?Hope this is true.

Prakash · Post by **Prakash** » 16 Oct 1999 02:59

Well, I think that India has no choice but to test again. I realize that this is quite strong; here is the argument.Six recent events leave India with little choice but to conduct furthur nuclear tests. The most significant of these six events is the western, and especially US, skeptism, about the sucsess and yeild of the nuclear tests conducted by India in 1998 and especially the last, theormonuclear, test. This skeptism is important because it comes more than a year after the tests, is based on (presumably) rigorous analyses by the western scientific community, and is likely to be believed by many of India's enemies, both real and potential. That Indian scientists claim, and presumably truly believe, that the tests were successful is quite irrelevant. Given its democratic political structure, its open society, and its generally peaceful posture throughout its long history, India is not a serious candidate for using nuclear (or any other weapon of mass destruction) against anyone except perhaps in retaliation (if then). The purpose of holding nuclear weapons for countries like India is deterrence and deterrence only. But claims about holding nuclear weapons are not likely to deter any potential enemy if the enemy does not truly and completely believe that Indian nuclear tests in fact were successful and India in fact does possess enough nuclear weapons, along with delivery vehicles, so as to luaunch a retaliatory strike. The above-mentioned factor alone leaves India with little choice but to conduct additional theormonuclear tests and leave no doubt in anyones mind about their success and yield. But five other recent events furthru constrain India's options: the successful invasion of Yugoslavia by NATO forces with little human cost to NATO and especially the US - which opens new possibilities for western military intervention anywhere in the world; fresh evidence that firmly establishes the supply of nuclear and missile technologies from China to Pakistan and missile technology from North Korea to Pakistan - which indicates that while India may mantian its current nuclear technology, Pakistan may get more advanced technology; a series of new missile tests by China - which reenforces the point immediately above; the military coup in Pakistan - which brings to power a man with a proven record of hatred for India and military adventurism; and the defeat of CTBT in the US Senate - which is the least significant of the above factors, with its importance lying merely in that it lowers (without fully removing )a hurdle in front of India.In my opinion, the main issue still standing concerns timing: when should India conduct at least one additional nuclear test? Obviously India should conduct its next test only when it is fully ready to demonstrate the success of test beyond any scientific doubt. Beyond this, some factors pull towards conducting a test as soon as possible while other factors push towards waiting. The latter include the risk of new sanctions which may endanger a robustly growing economy - though it may be better to get new sanctions when old ones are still in place and to get all the sanctions imposed all over again; and the almost certainty that some other country will conduct nuclear tests giving India the excuse to conduct its own. The factors inviting a thermonuclear test sooner than later include the military coup in Pakistan which brings to power a military elite that is not only dangerous but apparently also irrational insofar as its hatred of India is concerned as proved by Kargil. This kind of military leadership is very likely to pursue armed confrontation with India. Also, it is unlikely to be swayed by any plea, promise or pressure. If India conducts a nuclear test now, then Pakistan has two rational choices: either it matches India's test with its own or it does not. Given the nature of the current Pakistan leadership, it almost surely will match India (even if it merely repeats one of its last years' tests and even if the new test is no more successful than last year's. These tests may bring new santions not only against India but also against Pakistan. While the large and robust Indian economy surely can withstand any new santions, the much smaller and collapsing Pakistani economy cannot. This probably is India's best weapon for the fighting Pakistan andquite possibly India's best opportunity for destabilising Pakistan. Therefore, I submit that (i) India has no choice but to conduct furthur (thermo)-nuclear tests and (ii) the sooner India conducts the tests, the better.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Oct 1999 03:44

Yes proofing delivery vehicles is essential before any further bangs. Also the final ones should be done with advance notice as their is a ned to demonstrate the SNW status. The tests should be such that there is ample signature otherwise might be confused with prinicpal actor's performance in Hum Dil De Chuke Sanam.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 16 Oct 1999 04:00

Shetty, I know and you know they work. But the RATS across the border and their cohorts look to uncle for guidance. Believing this stuff they may get adventurous. This puts honest, hard working common folk in India at risk. The main aim of GOI is to ensure the common man lives a peaceful life. The POK-2 were undertaken in that spirit. When Chagai happened the idea was further testing would do nothing to enhance the strategic balance. Subsequently these Western half baked scholars started creating doubts hoping the GOI could be press ganged into implementing UNSC Resolution 1172 as it was a slender majority. Didnt work. Now the considerations are different. Also consider that one school of thought thinks, that when confroted with aggressive challengers, a low yield strike is justified. Instead of that how about a warning test. This way intent is clear and no human lives are effected.

Roop · Post by **Roop** » 16 Oct 1999 09:25

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:<HR>Subsequently these Western half baked scholars started creating doubts hoping the GOI could be press ganged into implementing UNSC Resolution 1172 as it was a slender majority. Didnt work. Now the considerations are different. Also consider that one school of thought thinks, that when confroted with aggressive challengers, a low yield strike is justified. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>Some of these yahoo pro-CTBT cowboys in Washington, by pushing India too hard, may actually guarantee another series of tests before the new GoI signs the CTBT.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 16 Oct 1999 09:27

ramanna is right.Bigger and better bombs without perfecting the delivery systems are of little use and do not impress anyone.We have to demonstrate that we can reach any part of the globe with impunity if desired with our missiles,aircraft and subs.Once that fact is firmly drummed into the heads of the nuclear hypocracies and another demonstration that we also have an ABM system in place to protect our key centres,we should conduct another series of tests that should put at rest any questions.For the moment we have to deter pakistan and China as a first step.In the course of events I am sure that the rest of the world will also get the message.If clinton ever visits India we must ask him whether he would like a demonstration of our capabilitiers first hand ,or he should shut up and stop questioning our capabilities and treat us as a full fledged nuclear power.

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 16 Oct 1999 11:15

I just finished watching James Schlesinger on McLaughlin's one-on-one on PBS. JS was defense secretary under Nixon and energy secretary under Carter. Held various other high profile positions like director, LLNL and AEC chairman.Very interesting interview. Is totally opposed to the CTBT. Said US is not 'guiltless' when it comes to proliferation, something I have been crying myself hoarse in BR. Specifically mentioned that they proliferated to Britain, France and Israel. Is a strong proponent of maintaining a viable stockpile for the US. His point is that much of the stuff decays in 30 years and you need to test to see how to tweak the bomb. Basically his point is that the US should never agree to a treaty in perpetuity, but it is ok to agree to a treaty for specific periods such as 10 years. Feels that US will not be recognized as a superpower unless it has a nuclear stockpile to emphasize its manhood.I feel that India has been talking to the wrong kind of people in the US (such as John Holum, Cirincione, Cohen, Haass etc.) whose basic aim is a nuclear free world but at the same time do not have the guts to say that to the powers that be in the US. Much better to talk to people like James Schlesinger who makes no apologies about a nuclear deterrent for the US. India can take pretty much the same line, that a nuclear deterrent for India is non-negotiable, and all that is left to discuss is the kind of tests that are need to demonstrate deterrence. He (Schlesinger) felt that low yield tests would do the trick as far as the US is concerned.Kaushal[This message has been edited by Kaushal (edited 16-10-1999).]

JE Menon · Post by **JE Menon** » 16 Oct 1999 19:38

I agree with Ramana and Philip. I'd much rather see a series of Agni tests, of ICBM range, as a "technology demonstration" of course.

Best Regards JE Menon

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Oct 1999 01:37

A point to consider from a`strategic balance aspect. If the POK-2 is reputed to be low yield then more of them are needed to deter challengers. This would drive the arms race in an upward spiral. So in interests of global balance and stability it might be required to demonstrate that the tests were successful. Jay, China did something similar. When R. Venkatraman was visting they demoed a 1Mt warhead. Very undipolomatic and barbaric.[This message has been edited by ramana (edited 16-10-1999).]

Bharat · Post by **Bharat** » 19 Oct 1999 08:25

Foxbat,what you say is correct to an extent. But the US happens to be the biggest economic entity in the World.If US helps our economy then 15 yrs down the lane we will become an economic superpower. I would say that it would seem abssurd to test after calling a moratarium.It would lower the credibility of our PM and GOI. It also seems that many forum members tend to disregard our own scientists claims .In the US the CTBT debate gave rise to thee thought that Indian tests had faileed and India would test again if the Senate failed to ratify the treaty.This for me is hogwash . I would say that we must test again if China resumes massive testing.Tell the World that Chinese testing and improvement of design is dangerouss for us. The other reason is if our scientists claim that there is a huge discrepancy found in sub-critical tests and warhead design is not foolproof. Guys believe RC , if he says that tests are sufficient then it is true.After POK-2 based on initial data he said we can have a 200kt bomb and now after all data correlation as been done he said that any output can be acheived.

Vick · Post by **Vick** » 19 Oct 1999 10:28

if china gets bold enough to test again after the CTBT ratification failure, then india should test on a massive scale! test 3 5-10 megaton fission devices and one 15mt therm. all in the ocean as there is no suitable place on land to test except a few... karachi, lahore, pindi, islamabad

------------------ Vick, the purple dinosaur

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 19 Oct 1999 10:38

Looking at economic cooperation with the US and the west,another round of nuclear tests would anger them a lot.Testing of our delivery systems will not provoke such an angry response.Testing an ABM system cannot under any circumstances be considered dstabilising as the US is fervently engaged in a massive number of tests to protect itself and it's allies.Therefore we should accelerate pefection of our delivery systems.A concentrated effort at polishing up the already proven ones like Prithvi and Agni is the first step.The second will be the naval versions of Prithvi/Dhanush and any longer ranged missiles that are specuatively called by some "Surya" or "Agni-4".Acquiring TU-22M strategic bombers appears a fait accompli.Their range is not something that will unduly worry the US,but our ICBM when it appears will.Our planners must intelligently test,exploiting the situation-timing is most important both for symbolic and strategic reasons.Clinton's visit should be preceded with a series of missile tests,in rsponse to the coup, that would give the Indian govt a position of strength to talk from,both from the democratic viewpoint and the military viewpoint.Our govt has a clear mandate that was displayed by the reaction of the counytry during Kargil.It does not want to be at a disadvantage ever again from any quarter.

jarugn · Post by **jarugn** » 19 Oct 1999 11:09

It is a question whether India indeed can produce nuclear detonation of 30-50 megaton magnitude! Also in question is India's capability for a Thermonuclear device! No one in this forum or elsewhere are able to conclusive establish India's capability in this regard! There are more doubters of India's capability than believers both in India inlcuding this forum and the west.So there is no strategic advantage! The right approach indeed would be to detonate a powerful device a la US H-Bomb, then sign the CTBT in a week. Record it for the posterity like America's H-bomb. What so shocking about Pokharan II - if there is such a thing is, it is not captured on video properly! In fact the video India delivered could be done with 5 tons of TNT! It's joke!

bala · Post by **bala** » 19 Oct 1999 12:00

Kaushal: James Schlesinger's point that "Specifically mentioned that they proliferated to Britain, France and Israel."This clearly implies a Nuclear weapon heritage back to the US.With China the heritage points to erstwhile USSR. We all know TP is really a Chinese design NUKE.This clearly leaves India as an island of innovation as far as Nukes are concerned. Many authors point out the fact that India did not take help from either the US nor USSR for Nuke design.So we have the legions of so-called western experts deriding India's legitimate and bonafide Nuke design. They simply shake their head in disbelief as how could a country like India (viewed as poor) manage to come up with an independent NUKE design. We should salute our Nuclear scientist for this singular achievement.

Nishant Berlia · Post by **Nishant Berlia** » 19 Oct 1999 12:57

No, I doubt that it would happen for the next few years. One must take into view economics and politics.The NDA came into power not because of some large Hindu nationalist feeling surging through the country but because people wanted good governance and moreover economic emancipation. The BJP govt. has ton show some concrete steps in that direction and nuclear tests aren't exactly something which would help. The BJP leadership I am sure realises it.Another thing to ponder about is that it is better to let the CTBT (and if we are lucky the NPT) slowly die away and then test. Instead of doing it just now.I would recommend a period of atleast 3-4 years before the next test.

Peeyoosh · Post by **Peeyoosh** » 19 Oct 1999 15:45

I'll stick to my old hypothesis - test the delivery system - forget the warheads themselves - we must focus on GSLV and an effective, road/rail mobile 5000 km missile.As long as the delivery system exists the default option for enemy planners is that there are nukes to be mated along with it.PC

Tim · Post by **Tim** » 19 Oct 1999 20:07

Kaushal, I find it fascinating that you can lump people like Joe Cirincione and Steve Cohen/Richard Haass together as "peaceniks. Because they may appear on the same panel doesn't mean they support the same policies. Perhaps you should read their papers and books - there's a substantial difference.India should test if it needs to. Because some in the West don't believe India's tests, and put their arguments out in public, isn't sufficient. Tests are expensive and have political effects that may not help India.The argument, as near as I can tell, that Ramana and others are making is that because some Westerners questions the yields and methodology of Pokhran 2, that therefore both Western political leaders and Pakistan must believe that India's nuclear arsenal is not real.I can't speak for Pakistan, although I think their public statements (AQ Khan, etc.) implicitly demonstrate _some_ level of acceptance of Indian nuclear capability, even when cloaked in a mask of bravado.I can speak with some assurance about the US. The Pentagon believes India has nuclear weapons, and has believed it for years. I don't think there's a lot of real concern about warhead yield - there may be some disbelief, for example, about sub-kiloton explosions, but I simply don't have access to that kind of material. What has the US concentrated on over the past near-decade? Delivery systems. Since India's test in 1974 demonstrated a nuclear capability, the next best thing to work on is delivery. Why do you think pre-test the US was trying to work out a deal on missiles and dual-purpose aircraft (a deal that collapsed, in part, due to Ghauri)? Why the post-test concern over capping missiles R&D/deployment? The use of MTCR as a tool to stop cryogenic engine transfers?Even if I didn't know that the Pentagon believed India has nukes (which I do), this would suggest to me that the _assumption_ was that nukes were available, and that the focus had therefore shifted to delivery. In other words, that India's nuclear deterrent already existed as a "fact" in the minds of policymakers.Think about it.If that's the case, you can bet that the US is making that belief clear to both Pakistan and China (and the Chinese have their own ways of finding these things out). The Russians probably are too. The Gates mission in 1990 is reported to have included very blunt statements to Pakistan about India's nuclear capability.If that's the case, and I'm reasonably sure it is, additional tests may be unnecessary. A lot of that depends on Indian nuclear planning, Indian nuclear doctrine, and the accuracy of previous tests and availability of accurate computer simulations. Those are much more technical issues.Put bluntly, if Pakistan is not deterred by the US government response (as opposed to private citizens), which essentially accepts India as a de facto nuclear weapons state (but not de jure under the NPT), why would it be deterred by an additional round of tests? Isn't it equally possible that they are already deterred at some levels, but not at others (Low Intensity Conflict, like Kargil)? If that's the case, even an open-air 60 megaton nuke (like the Soviet test in the early 1960s) would have no appreciable impact for deterrence.I'd suggest that the political costs of testing at this time are much greater than the political benefits. Depending on who/what the arsenal is aimed at, there are much more efficient ways to get a message across, if one is actually needed. Missile testing is one of those. Another might be a supplementary to the defens budget. BOth of those will have political costs, but nothing like the costs of a test.Just my thoughts, Tim

Nishant Berlia · Post by **Nishant Berlia** » 19 Oct 1999 20:37

Cryogenic engines have a large significance. Since, India has succesfully lauched the PSLV-C2 (which requires cryogenic engines) it means that we have the technology as well as the means to make ICBMs.Cryogenic engines ae the key technology input here and because of that US opposed their export from Russia to India. Besides I doubt that 2 launches or less a year can offer any great competition to either NASA or ESA.[This message has been edited by Nishant Berlia (edited 19-10-1999).]

Peeyoosh · Post by **Peeyoosh** » 19 Oct 1999 20:48

Spinsteractually the transfer was for cryo engine design and manufacturing technolgy - to say that does not have BM uses is not on.What the hell, we'll do it anyways.PC

Tim · Post by **Tim** » 19 Oct 1999 20:48

And cryogenic engines were used in the first-generation ICBMs in Russia (SS-6, and maybe SS-7 - I don't remember for certain) and Atlas.Missile capabilities were a big concern.Tim

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 19 Oct 1999 21:45

Computer simulation: This is needed for new designs. New designs are based on old designs which have been updated- eg. conventional side or increase the boost. If India is satisfied with their designs they do not need to rely on computer simulation. That is why the three types of devices they are interested in were proofed in POK-2.For second strike doctrine this is good enough. US has other challenges and full spectrum of threats. JS means due to closure of industrial plants and obselesence of technology they cannot be replaced. Hence the SSP program. Also I think the arguement that not testing makes you loose the recipe is not fully correct. India went for POK-2 after 24 years and was able to reproduce the recipe. But when you are a super power there are troubling questions. I would argue that the 30~40 years are a good time to negotiate a more equitable world where these WMD are relegated to a teritary role. But I am a mere engineer.[This message has been edited by ramana (edited 19-10-1999).]

Arun_S · Post by **Arun_S** » 20 Oct 1999 02:46

>> Cryogenic engines have a large significance. Since, India has succesfully lauched the PSLV-C2 (which requires cryogenic engines) it means that we have the technology as well as the means to make ICBMs.Not correct. PSLV does use a Liquid Fuel stage(Vikas), but that stage is not cryogenic.Indian ICBMs (when they are made) would definitely not be using Cryogenic Engine. We have host of flight qualified (Solid & Liquid)rocket stages that we will choose from for our ICBM. US put spanner in the wheels of the Russian Cryo deal, primarily of their fear having yet another compititor in Space Launch market (Chinese were the last new comers). And yes, like it or not a commercially successful space launch buisness does have significant imputus to countrie's roketery capability. As a spinoff the IRBMs & ICMBs of that country get more and more robust/reliable and accurate. Now that starts to hurt the US even more.Enjoy the ride.Cheers - Arun Sharma [This message has been edited by Arun_S (edited 19-10-1999).]

Rupak · Post by **Rupak** » 20 Oct 1999 04:47

The Editorial from today' HINDU =================================Contradictory claims THE PROPER RESPONSE from India to the views expressed by U.S. scientists that the Pokhran nuclear tests of May 1998 were a failure would be to ignore them since no useful purpose would be served by trying to refute them. Western unwillingness to believe that the Pokhran test was a demonstration of India's success in making and triggering off a nuclear device could be seen from the New York Times report that what had failed on May 1998 ``was not the global monitoring system but the pair of explosive devices''. The unquestioning faith of the U.S. scientists in the global monitoring system had obviously ruled out the possibility of its having failed to record the Pokhran explosion. The non-recording of any ``blip or twitch of pen or meter suggesting releasing the power of the atom'' could only mean that there was no explosion and they could not believe that there was any chance of the monitoring device not having been as sensitive as it should have been. The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has done well in pointing out that its scientific data confirmed the nuclear yields of the Pokhran tests for making it known to the rest of the world that India has the capability to make and explode nuclear devices. This has nothing to do with the larger question of whether India should have carried out the explosion, which dismayed many within the country itself. This continues to remain a subject of debate. Of specific interest to us is the Western disinclination to credit Indian scientists with the competence which the making of a nuclear bomb requires, even after half a century since the dropping of the first atom bombs over Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Even if we believe that the monitoring device for the recording of an explosion had not failed, the question is whether a nuclear explosion should always set off a blip or a twitch of pen. The likelihood of shielding underground explosions should have been very much there in view of the fact that the Pokhran tests of 1998 were carried out nearly a quarter century after the 1974 explosion which could have become relatively primitive. Apart from this, the yield of the nuclear device for the Pokhran 1998 explosion was restricted to 45 kilotonnes to ensure that the seismic damage to the nearest village, which was five kilometres away, was minimal. The fission device with an estimated yield of 15 kilotonnes was also much smaller in size than the one tested in 1974, to ensure against any radioactive contamination on the ground. From what has so far been made known by the DAE, the refinements which had been carried out and incorporated into the devices since 1964 ruled out the possibility of any detection, prior to or after the explosion. If the testing of the other three devices with yields in the sub kilotonne range was carried out to facilitate collection of data for the verification of computer codes, it should give an indication of the technology leaps which India had taken since 1974. It will be recalled that the first disclosure about the Pokhran explosions was made only by the Government of India and there was an admission by the U.S. that New Delhi had successfully hoodwinked the large number of its orbiting spy satellites. The present belittling of Pokhran by the U.S. scientists by charging India with an exaggeration of the achievement, therefore, looks very much like an afterthought. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 20 Oct 1999 07:08

There are two issues here. One is the claim that S-1 did not achieve full yield. This the radio-chem analysis along with the radius of cavity calc took care of it. The other is the two explosions on May 13 did not register therefore they did not happen. The PIB site mirrored at fas.org shows crater pictures for May 13 events. During CTBT Senate hearings some expert noted that the system can monitor yields upto 1kt when the whole 130 stations get online. As the May 13 tests were less than this figure and the monitoring stations are less than 130, it is feasible that the system did not register. To argue that we didnt note it therefore it didnt happen is incorrect. The question should be what other signatures have you looked at? Any way the way out is increase the inventory to take care of the lower yields. That'll take care of the problem. Off course matter of adequate FM is still there.

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 20 Oct 1999 21:27

It is clear that any SNW with a small arsenal are designed for strategic, not tactical purposes. Deterrence by punishment, or existential deterrence is the most likely paradigm that will apply in conflicts with NWS or other SNW.Given this, the question to be asked is what deters, and what is required to achieve the state of deterrence.Numerous writers have suggested that the capability to destroy a single city may be considered the minimum requirement for deterrence. Further, it follows that it must be clear that (a) "city buster" capability; (b) survivable arsenal; (c) the will, command and control to nuclearize all exist.If we accept this, then clearly we can make a distinction between a credible thermonuclear arsenal. This is what is driving the Indian thought process. There is broad acceptance that India can build a reliable fission device -- the issue is not this. The issue is whether India can deploy a "City-buster" weapon. IF we accept the assumption that the ability to destroy a city is the minimum requirement for deterrence, then this follows.The second and third issues are, IMHO, as important. IOW, having two of the conditions without the third means that there is no credibility. However, developing an adequate delivery force and appropriate command and control system is far less visible.Given our faith in our devices, it is paramount that we pursue the second two alternatives while staving off any legality that prevents future testing. Credibility of nuclear device can be obtained at a later date. The Hindu article misses the point, by only discussing the first three tests. Ramana dismantles the argument in typical fashion.Further comment about nuclear testing in the US. Less than 1% of all US tests (which corresponds to fewer than 10 tests) were used to re-test old designs. So all the comments about losing faith in the weapons is bogus.Even the issue of improving the design is moot, because sub-critical tests are permitted and these are allthat is needed to enable development of new designs within the existing paradigm.The only concern pertains to the development of next paradigm nuclear weapons. This should be a valid concern for India as well.

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 23 Oct 1999 06:07

I did not find any other thread on the CTBT. But this thread may not be the right one for this, since it does not deal strictly with a strategic issue. But the reason i post it is, that Richardson has now officially accepted that India may consider these weapons necessary and that is a legitimate posture. This is a major victory for India, to get such an admission in so many words from a high administration official.KaushalIndia Urged To Lead Test Ban Pact By Tom Raum Associated Press Writer Friday, Oct. 22, 1999; 5:11 p.m. EDT WASHINGTON –– Failure of the United States to ratify a global nuclear test ban treaty gives India an opportunity to take the lead on the pact, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson suggested Friday. Richardson, who will visit India next week, told reporters that his trip will mainly deal with energy issues but that he's certain the subject of nuclear proliferation will also come up. Richardson said he was taking to Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee a letter from President Clinton that he described as very positive. Richardson is the first U.S. Cabinet member to visit India since a new government was formed on Oct. 3 and Vajpayee sworn in for the third time as prime minister. Clinton still intends to visit India and the region, Richardson said. He did not give a timetable, just saying "in the new year." The Oct. 12 coup in neighboring Pakistan will also likely be discussed, Richardson said. Part of Clinton's message conveys hope for a return to Pakistan of civilian democracy and encouragement for getting the Indian-Pakistani peace process back on track, Richardson indicated. Richardson conceded that the Senate's defeat earlier this month of the nuclear test-ban treaty made it harder to persuade other nuclear powers like India to ratify the pact. But, Richardson said, "the setback in the Senate gives India an opportunity to step forward and take the lead." why should India do that, when it does not believe in a discriminatory non-proliferation regime. Vajpayee has said he will seek a consensus among all parties on signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Republican-controlled U.S. Senate rejected the test ban treaty, a major Clinton administration foreign policy initiative, 51 to 48 on Oct. 13. Neither India nor Pakistan has signed or ratified the treaty. India carried out nuclear tests in May last year, and Pakistan later did the same. Richardson said the United States still feels India would be better off without nuclear weapons. Still, "we recognize that India feels it needs such a capacity," he said. what happened to all the statements saying they will never accept India as a nuclear power. Somebody should be eating crow in the state department The energy secretary, a former U.N. ambassador, said he will urge Indian officials to exercise restraint in both their nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Richardson's visit will focus on potential partnerships in developing clean energy technologies. © Copyright 1999 The Associated Press Back to the top

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 24 Oct 1999 19:42

abhischekcc · Post by **abhischekcc** » 26 Oct 1999 18:03

We don't need to test. We already have all the data necessary to maintain and upgrade our nukes . We'll only need to test if the politicians decide to develop a new generation of weapons. And that will come only if our security environment deteriorates excessively or they decide to turn expansionist and invade other countries.BTW , I read in India Today that the scientists were ready to test a sixth warhead on 13 May 1998 .It was probably a neutron bomb. But that would have really torn the backsides of the people both sides of the atlantic and pacific oceans.

Kaushal · Post by **Kaushal** » 26 Oct 1999 21:04

This argument of whether India needs to test will never be ended conclusively. Statistically, speaking a sample of six (including POK I) is kind of meager. If a country only needs 6 tests to establish credibility, why would the US and Russia test several hundred times. Even the Chinese have conducted about 45 tests, and so have the British and the French. But it is too late for India now. The door is almost shut now on testing. Unless China resumes testing and my feeling is they will not. The additional data and the credibility gained many not be worth the wrath of the entire world. Let's just hope the enemy has the element of doubt in their mind - that India just may have the capability to wipe out a number of cities. For now that will have to suffice.Kaushal[This message has been edited by Kaushal (edited 26-10-1999).]

Bharat Rakshak

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