<A HREF="http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/aug/corps.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/aug/corps.htm</A> <P>watch this space, it is an article by Agha Humanyun Amin. <P>have it backed up on my HDD. <BR>
What a wonderful compilation sunil!<BR>I have been following the thread ever since it kicked off more than a month ago. <BR>I notice you have started keeping tabs on 'new' recruits, a very solid way to ensure you dossier those who will lead later on. <P>Its a pleasure to see someone so hard at work when most of us (esp. myself), just read through for fun. Hope you have a warmer winter up north this year.<BR>Cheers and keep up your good work on this thread.<BR><P>------------------<BR><I>Jananee janmabhumishcha svargadapi gareeyasee</I>
From Dawn, 10/20<P> <BLOCKQUOTE><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><HR><BR>The chairman, National Database Registration Authority (NADRA), Maj-Gen Zahid Ehsan also briefed the participants regarding the pace of registration, progress on preparation of computerized national identity cards and other matters pertaining to the organization. <BR><HR></BLOCKQUOTE><P>Hope this adds to your list sunil.<P>------------------<BR><I>Jananee janmabhumishcha svargadapi gareeyasee</I>
Thanks sumant. <P>`Three Corps' who the hell is that? <BR>it 2 Multan, 4 Lahore and 5 Karachi.. who the F* is on the move? <BR> <A HREF="http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/oct/21pak.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.rediff.com/news/2000/oct/21pak.htm</A> <BR> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2000-daily/21-10-2000/main/main7.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2000-daily/21-10-2000/main/main7.htm</A> <P> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2000-daily/19-10-2000/main/main20.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2000-daily/19-10-2000/main/main20.htm</A> <P>Corps commanders conference begins today<P>By our correspondent<P>ISLAMABAD: The military commanders are set to discuss the prevailing security situation, the state of operational preparedness and threat perception from today, a senior official told The News on Wednesday. The corps commanders will discuss the defence and security matters and the regional scenario in the two-day conference, to be chaired by Chief Executive General Pervaiz Musharraf at the General Headquarters. It is learnt that Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz will brief the conference on the state of economy and the current phase of the survey for documentation of the economy. It would be the first conference of the corps commanders to be attended by newly appointed Corps Commander, Multan, Lt Gen Syed Mohammad Amjad, and Corps Commander, Bahawalpur, Lt Gen Munir Hafiez.<P> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2000-daily/21-10-2000/main/update.htm#15" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2000-daily/21-10-2000/main/update.htm#15</A> <BR> <A HREF="http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0010190005.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0010190005.htm</A> <P>and clearing my baffles. <P>Corps Commanders conference ends. <A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/10/21/top1.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/10/21/top1.htm</A> <P>The chairman, National Database Registration Authority (NADRA), Maj-Gen Zahid Ehsan also briefed the participants regarding the pace of registration, progress on preparation of computerized national identity cards and other matters pertaining to the organization. <P> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2000-daily/21-10-2000/metro/k6.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2000-daily/21-10-2000/metro/k6.htm</A> <P>AMT finds Rs 10m discrepancy in DMC West<P>By our correspondent<P>KARACHI: An army monitoring team (AMT) has located a discrepancy of Rs 10 million in the computer section of District Municipal Corporation West.<P>According to an ISPR press release issued on Friday, details of the scam were revealed when the army monitoring team, including Major Majid Ali and Major Muhammad Aamir, made a surprise visit to the computer section. <P> These teams, headed by Col Khalid Bajwa and Lt Col Zafar, have been given task to recover an outstanding amount of Rs 1.5 billion, stuck up with several industries in different parts of the city. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2000-daily/19-10-2000/national/n8.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2000-daily/19-10-2000/national/n8.htm</A> <P>Army team inspects desilting work<P> SUKKUR: Incharge Army Monitoring Team Khairpur Col Umar Khitab on Wednesday visited Ranipur and Hongorja and inspected work on desilting of canals being carried out by the Army. Accompanied by Cap Waseem Cheema, he inspected Gadeji Minor, Machhar Minor and Duhar Minor, which have been desilted. Speaking on the occasion, Col Khitab and Cap Cheema said that they would pay surprise visits to check water distribution.<P><BR>
Yet another paramilitary force identified. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/10/22/nat7.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/10/22/nat7.htm</A> <P> <P><BR> <P> <P> <P> <P> <P><BR> <BR>22 October 2000 Sunday 23 Rajab 1421 <P><BR>Please Visit our Sponsor (Ads open in separate window)<P>40kg drugs seized <P><BR>By Our Staff Correspondent <P>QUETTA, Oct 21: The Frontier Crops seized 40 kilograms of drugs and a good quantity of ammunition from the Zaro area of Chaghai district on Saturday. <P>Smugglers had dumped the drugs and ammunition at a place adjacent to the Afghanistan border. A patrolling team of FC's Chaghai Militia raided the place and seized 28kg heroin, 10kg opium, 2kg hashish, 400 rounds of 7mm rifle and two mortar fuse. <P> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2000-daily/22-10-2000/national/n1.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2000-daily/22-10-2000/national/n1.htm</A> <BR> <BR>Battalion Senior Under Officer Mirbaz Khan was awarded the coveted Sword of Honour for being best all rounder gentleman cadet. <P>Cadet Arshad Nazar was awarded President's gold medal for being the second best gentleman cadet. The chief of army staff cane was awarded to Haroon. <P>LB polls in Makran Division on Dec 28<P>QUETTA: The proposed local bodies elections process would commence in Balochistan on December 28 from Makran Division and later the polls would be held in other divisions, said Brigadier Pervaiz Akhtar Aziz, provincial chief of National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) . Brig Pervaiz Akhtar said mobile teams of the authority had issued national identity cards to the eligible voters from June 15 to August 14, in Turbat, Panjgur and Gwadar districts of Makran Division.<P> <P>
<A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/10/31/local24.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/10/31/local24.htm</A> <P>PAP scheme, Brigade commander's name and location released.<P>THATTA, Oct 30: The first phase of 41 development schemes in the Thatta and Badin districts under the Poverty Alleviation Programme, which began in February, would be completed by Dec 31, army and other officials here said. <P><BR> SUGAR CESS; The brigade commander of the Badin Garrison, Brig Haris Nawaz, said that an amount of Rs66.01 million had been released under the sugar cess for the district by the Sindh government, which was being spent on development schemes. <P>
19 Lancers are based at Kharian under 8(I) Armd Bde,stylishly called'the Brigade of Decision'!It's cl compn is 75% Punjabis and 25% Sindhis(actually Kaim Khanis and Ranghars).
REFERENCES FOR ZARB-E-MOMIN. <P>`Pakistan-India: Impending War Games will fuel Rivalry’, Rahul Bedi, Nov 18, 1998, IPS. (http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/nov98/09_44_024.html)<P>PAKISTAN-INDIA: Impending War Games Will Fuel Rivalry <BR>By Rahul Bedi <BR>NEW DELHI, Nov 18 (IPS) <P>In response to Brasstacks Pakistan then launched Zarb-e-Momin (the strike of the true believer), its first ever joint service exercise involving the army and air force concentrated against India's Punjab plains between the Indus and Chenab rivers. <BR>Around 200,000 troops from three corps headquarters were then deployed across terrain that included sandy tracts, canals and rivers to enable the Pakistani army to test its tank and river-crossing abilities<BR>---------------------------- <A HREF="http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19990210/iex10069.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.expressindia.com/ie/daily/19990210/iex10069.html</A> <P>Wednesday, February 10, 1999 <BR>Soldier of the mind <BR>Shekhar Gupta <P>This takes me to August 14, 1990, Pakistan’s Independence Day in Islamabad and just a week after the encounter with Sundar at Delhi’s military hospital. At the official reception I buttonholed General Mirza Aslam Beg, the controversial Pakistan army chief who had just held Exercise Zarb-e-Momin (the strike of the faithful). Or, more accurately, his counterstrike. The basic premise of the exercise was, that in the next war Foxland (as India is referred to in Pakistani wargames) breaks through in the initial phase and the Pakistanis then counterattack and envelope the invader. It was the first major Pakistani exercise that was so defensive in nature, where survival, rather than an all-out victory, or the ‘‘liberation’’ of Kashmir, was the main objective. Surely, Brasstacks andthe scary vision of 3,000 Indian tanks rolling down the desert, threatening to bisect Pakistan had changed a military mindset rooted in medieval history and thrust-and-parry purposelessness of India’s armoured strike forces in 1965 and 1971. <BR>‘‘So does your publication write a lot about defence and security?’’ Beg asked, making polite conversation. <BR>‘‘Yes,’’ I said, ‘‘and soon we will begin to run Sundarji’s column.’’ <BR>‘‘What is it called?’’ Beg asked. <BR>‘‘Brasstacks,’’ I said. <BR>The temperature dropped a few notches. This general’s eyes did not exactly light up in delight.<BR>----------------------------------------<BR> <A HREF="http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sasianuk.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sasianuk.htm</A> <P>Hagerty, Devin T., "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: the 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security, (v20 n3), Winter 1995<P>MILITARY MOVEMENTS<BR>The Indian Army's chief concern, according to then-COAS V.N. Sharma, was to stem the infiltration of Pakistan-backed Sikh and Kashmiri "terrorists," who threatened to overwhelm local Indian police forces. Sharma told an interviewer in 1993: "Terrorist groups backed by agencies in Pakistan were able to attack railway stations and vital installations which could affect any military movement on our side. . . . Therefore, there was need for the Indian army to go in there to take care of the communication lines and other bottlenecks so that if there was a military flare-up., we could conveniently move our fighting forces from locations deep in the country to the border areas."(52) Indian military planners were also concerned about residual deployments of Pakistan Army forces after a late 1989 military exercise called Zarb-i-Momin. According to Beg, these maneuvers tested a new Pakistani strategy: "In the past we were pursuing a defensive policy; now there is a big change since we are shifting to a policy of offensive defence. Should there be a war, the Pakistan Army plans to take the war into India, launching a sizeable offensive on Indian territory."(53) After the exercise was over, says Sharma, "we found that these troops were not going back to their peace stations, but they were staying on in the exercise area which is quite close to the international border and the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir." New Delhi believed "Pakistan was keeping troops ready as a back up support to the increased terrorist activities, in Indian territory, across the border and could take full advantage of terrorist successes to support military intervention."(54)<BR>Further south, according to Sharma, the Indian army in February sent two new tank units for training at its field firing range at Mahajan, in Rajasthan. With Brasstacks fresh in their minds, Pakistani planners grew alarmed that the Indian armored units at Mahajan were "ginning up another large exercise of that nature, or, indeed, preparing to launch an attack from the training range."(55) Sharma told U.S. Ambassador William Clark that the Indian Army could not launch an effective offensive against Pakistan from Mahajan, and the U.S. embassy staff concurred.(56) Clark's air attache, Colonel John Sandrock, remembers that "what was unusual from our perspective was the deployment of additional troops in Kashmir as a result of the reported cross-border infiltration from Pakistan into Kashmir and then along the border, south through the rest of Jammu and Kashmir and into the [Indian state of] Punjab." According to Sandrock, there was no evidence that this deployment included tanks and artillery, which appeared to corroborate Indian claims that the "buildup of forces on the border was to prevent cross-border infiltration and did not constitute a buildup of forces preparing for any hostile action against Pakistan." U.S. military attaches in New Delhi took the first of several reconnaissance trips in February, confirming their impression that Indian forces were not preparing for an offensive military thrust. U.S. attaches in Islamabad undertook a similar series of fact-finding missions on their side of the border in February, also finding little unusual military activity. Of special importance, one of the attaches noted, was that the two Pakistani strike corps were not on the move, and that the Pakistan Air Force's forward operating bases were not opened.(57)<P>-----------------------<BR> <A HREF="http://www.defencejournal.com/jul99/deterrence.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.defencejournal.com/jul99/deterrence.htm</A> <P>Mirza Aslam Beg. <P>5. The perceived capabilities of the Pakistani armed forces and their state of preparedness, serves as a strong deterrence.<BR>There is recurrent criticism that Pakistan is over spending on defence. This issue can not be seen in isolation. India, has imposed three wars upon us, since half a century of our existence. In the recent developments in Kargil, the Mujahideen have out maneuvered Indian troops by establishing commanding positions at higher altitudes, causing frustrations for India manifesting a typical sabre-rattling mentality, out of desperation. All pointing figures are towards Pakistan. However, with a perpetual state of confrontation, and the threat of an all out war, Pakistan can ill afford to reduce its defence budget. India spends about $ 9.8 billion on defence, which is about 2.8 percent of its Gross Domestic Product, while Pakistan spends 3.2 billion - almost 6% of its Gross Domestic Product, to be able to maintain a minimum level of operational balance. In 1992, India spent (in billions) $ 6.06; in 1993, $ 6.88; in 1994, $ 7.40; in 1995, $ 7.58; in 1996, $ 8.31; in 1997 $ 9.71 and in 1998 $ 9.81. As compared to this Pakistan spent in 1992 $ 3.60; in 1993 $ 3.30; in 1994 $ 3.50; in 1995 $ 3.60; in 1996 $ 3.70; in 1997 $ 3.30 and in 1998 $ 3.20 Analysis of these figures clearly testify to the fact that India has regularly enhanced the defence budget substantially, whereas in the case of Pakistan, it has remained more or less constant. In fact it does not even cater for the inflation.<BR>In the 1999-2000 budget, 45% would be spent on the repayment of debts, and 22% for defence, 15% on essential services, subsidies, grants etc., leaving only 18% for development purposes, which is far too meager a sum to sustain the economy which is really in distress. I do not recommend anything extra for the defence, but I would certainly demand that the armed forces level of reserves of ammunition, and POL (petrol, oil and lubricants) be raised to sixty days, if already not done so. Knowing the officers and men of the armed forces, their level of education, training and the qualities of head and heart to fight outnumbered, we have every chance of winning the war with India, if imposed on us.<BR>Without firm economic base the structure of security can not be sustained. Therefore, the need for our economic planners with vision to extricate the country from the economic chaos. Security is in good hands, let economists of the country come up to meet the challenge. With better economic resilience, Pakistan would be well poised to face the ordeal. the threat from India has induced a new spirit of national cohesion and unity, which is a valuable asset for the government, to use for this purpose. The Mujahideen have taken the decision to liberate Kashmir. They have occupied Kargil, Daras and batalik heights. Tomorrow they shall move forward to hold Zojila Pass, and Srinagar, and force India to negotiate peace. Pakistan must therefore act, under the Law of Intervention, as interpreted by United states and the allies. Pakistan has much at stake, in Kashmir. Now is the opportunity to settle, this core issue, which has maintained a climate of conflict and confrontation in south Asia, for over half a century.<P>--------------------------<BR> <A HREF="http://www.stimson.org/cbm/decade.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.stimson.org/cbm/decade.htm</A> <P>"The Decade for Confidence-building Measures," by Michael Krepon <BR>. In A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security, 2d ed., Michael Krepon, ed. (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1995). <BR>During the Spring of 1990, for example, tensions were fueled by large-scale violence in Kashmir, supported by Pakistan. The Indian government moved troops into Kashmir to contain disturbances, but the Indian army chief of staff, General V. N. Sharma, kept his tank deployments behind the Indira Gandhi Canal so as to signal an intention not to cross the Pakistani border. Moreover, to clarify their peaceful intentions, both countries allowed U.S. observers to monitor force deployments. For its part, Pakistan had permitted foreign defense attaches based in Islamabad to observe its 1989 Zarb-e-Momin exercises.<P> <A HREF="http://members.nbci.com/sabbi/pakarmy/armypics/wargame-3.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://members.nbci.com/sabbi/pakarmy/armypics/wargame-3.htm</A> <P>Photo of troops during ZeM. <BR> <A HREF="http://members.nbci.com/sabbi/pakarmy/articles/art_armoredge.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://members.nbci.com/sabbi/pakarmy/articles/art_armoredge.htm</A> <P>B.C's article on ZeM and PA armour. <P>Pak armour has edge over India<BR>Training is the overall responsibility of the Inspector-General, Training and Education, in GHQ. Unlike many armies in which complex training methods are embraced at great expense, the Pakistan Army has maintained tried and tested methods. It relies largely on the efficient regimental system whereby each infantry regiment has its own training centre, as have corps such as armour or signals. <BR>Initial training of officers (all male) of all arms and services is conducted mainly at the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul, Abbotabad. Standards are adequate, although emphasis has to be placed on instruction in the English language. <BR>The Army is short of officers. This is largely due to competition from more lucrative careers and because the social structure of the country is changing. The “old Army families” who supplied their sons as officers and soldiers can no longer be relied upon as a guaranteed source of recruits. The shortage is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, although the recent military takeover improved enlistments. Also, modern techniques of recruiting, with improvements in barrack living conditions, initiated by the previous Chief of Army Staff, General Karamat, and continued by the present chief, have had positive results. <BR>Regimental and corps training is of a high standard but there is much learning by rote, which tends to reduce initiative. Instruction at Army schools (such as the School of Infantry and Tactics) is impressive and courses are conducted efficiently. This applies to the Command and Staff College, with one caveat: too much time is spent on researching previous years’ questions and answers rather than attempting to break ground with original thought and novel proposals. <BR>Directing staff are high quality and the syllabus is sound. However, the culture of “chappa” - an anxiety to conform, resulting in emphasis on obtaining “correct” solutions from former students - produces uninspiring discussion and careful, but imitative papers. Despite this, the product is generally good. <BR>Advanced technical training and graduate/post graduate studies are carried out under the aegis of the National University of Sciences and Technology, which involves the Colleges of Medicine, Signals, Military Engineering, and Electrical and Mechanical Engineering. These are linked with civilian, naval and air force institutions, and with Michigan State (US) and Cranfield (UK) universities. <BR>Individual and collective training in units is conducted in an annual cycle, usually dictated by the timing of higher-level exercises. Sub-unit and unit exercises are generally held in summer, with brigade and divisional manoeuvres after the harvest and in winter. <BR>There has been emphasis on computer-based war-gaming, with consequent improvement in staff-work, especially in logistics. In the 1965 and 1971 wars few formations were far from base facilities and supply dumps, and it is only comparatively recently that battlefield recovery and practice in forward supply have been allotted the importance they demand. Much training focuses on obstacle-crossing, as there are extensive natural and man-made water barriers on both sides of the border, especially in Punjab. In the 1980s a river-crossing was often judged to have been successful when the force lodged on the far bank had only first-line ammunition and arrangements for its sustenance were at best sketchy. Following the 1989 Zarb-e-Momin exercise it was made clear to commanders that logistics mattered, that resupply was not to be treated as “out of exercise” or “notional,” and that all exercises were to have a credible logistics plan. <BR>The analysis of Zarb-e-Momin resulted in considerable restructuring, including the creation of the Air Defence Command and the Artillery Division. It was assessed that command, control and communication (C3I) had serious defects, especially in the passage of tactical information from higher HQ to unit level, but improvement in this aspect has been slower than desired, mainly because of financial constraints. Extensive use is made of satellite communications, and there have been notable advances in the development and production of secure systems, although these do not appear to be available other than in strike formations and independent forces. Subsequent exercises have tested the development matrix generated by Zarb-e-Momin, but budget limitations have precluded conduct of trials on the scale necessary to test, prove, and modify doctrine and procedures to the extent planned by GHQ. <BR>Cessation of overseas training arrangements by developed countries as a result of their disapproval of Pakistan’s nuclear tests has not seriously affected professional knowledge or standards, but officers are now denied exposure to the wider horizons offered by such nations. Western influence has been reduced to the point of creating significant resentment, especially at junior level. <BR>Increased anti-Western feelings have been manipulated by a small number of zealots within and outside the armed forces in an attempt to attract adherents to more rigid forms of Islam than is desired by senior officers, and the West<P>Equipment and mobility: US military cooperation and supply of equipment stopped in October 1990 after US President George Bush refused to sign an annual declaration that Pakistan was not involved in a nuclear programme. (The US was aware that Pakistan had such a programme for many years but after Russia’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War, Pakistan was less useful to the US as an ally. Sanctions followed.) After some relaxation, strictures were reimposed in totality following Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998. Results have been: The movement of Pakistan further towards China and North Korea as suppliers and, in the case of China, co-producer, of weapons systems. The clandestine acquisition of equipment and spare parts worldwide. An increased domestic production of spare parts and ammunition. Heightened anti-Americanism in all services, but mainly and markedly amongst junior Army officers. <BR>This is spilling-over into general anti-Western sentiment. Fortunately for the Army, Pakistan declined to purchase the US Abrams main battle tank when it was offered in 1988. (It was following a demonstration of the Abrams that Pakistan’s then ruler, Gen. Zia-ul Haq, left the firing range at Bahawalpur in a Pakistan Air Force C-130 that crashed in mysterious circumstances, killing him, the US ambassador, the US defence sales representative and 20 senior officers.) Had the Abrams been obtained, a large part of the Armoured Corps, including the strike corps, would now be facing grave difficulties. <BR>Reliance was placed on obtaining Chinese tanks, including the Norinco Type 85 (125mm smoothbore), of which over 400 are in service. Pakistan improved the current inventory by undertaking a major rebuild/upgrade programme at Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT, near Rawalpindi, improved and extended the tanks with significant Chinese assistance). There has also been gradual development, with China, of a new tank, the MBT 2000 or “Khalid”; and the acquisition, beginning in 1997, of 320 T-80UD tanks from Ukraine at a cost of $650m. The last of these were delivered at the end of 1999. <BR>The introduction of newer and rebuilt tanks has taken pressure off the Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, which was having difficulty maintaining older equipment for front-line use. Type 85s and T-80s form the major part of strike forces, with the work-horse Type 59 (105mm, upgraded), Type 69 (Centaur FCS), and M-48A5s in other units. Technology from the UK, Sweden and Belgium has resulted in improvement in advanced tank (and artillery) ammunition, which is produced in increasing quantities by Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) for domestic use and growing exports. <BR>The Khalid MBT (120mm) four-phase programme appears successful, if slow. Its measured pace results from a combination of policy, and non-availability of systems and sub-systems from Western nations. The power pack (UK Challenger) and transmission (French Leclerc) were deemed satisfactory, but the outcome of negotiations on long-term development is unknown as there is pressure within the British government to cease defence co-operation with Pakistan. The programme contrasts favourably with India’s Arjun MBT project. <BR>It appears that for the moment Pakistan could have a qualitative and even a quantitative edge over Indian armour, as Russian T-90 MBTs performed badly in trials last year in India, and acquisition is yet to be confirmed. Refurbishment of India’s 1,500 T-72s is well behind schedule, and there are critical maintenance and upgrading problems. The Arjun MBT has been ordered only in token number (124, with delivery to start in 2001). These problems, set against Pakistan’s novel armour tactics, improved air-to-ground cooperation, flexible command structure at corps and below, and a more structured approach to procurement and production, might point to a military balance less in India’s favour than bald inventories would seem to show. <BR>Pakistan has a deficiency in mobility. There are too few armoured personnel carriers and self-propelled guns, both medium (155mm) and air defence, to properly equip all formations. There are only 900 M113s available (most produced at HIT under licence). <BR>Both their production and armoured infantry fighting vehicle development have been affected by sanctions. The 155mm self-propelled artillery, essential for support in the fast-moving battles likely during the advance of the strike formations and in countering similar Indian thrust(s) into Pakistan, is limited to a dozen regiments-worth of US M-109s. In spite of US embargoes, spares are bought on the world market, with some manufactured at POF. As the barrels are well within their first quarter of life, there is no pressing need for replacement. The problem is in enlarging the holding, as the US is an unreliable supplier. There is no compatibility between the M-109 and the likely alternative, the Norinco 122mm SP gun. <BR>Air defence: Until the early 1990s the Army paid insufficient attention to cooperation with the Air Force. Joint exercises were few, and were more demonstrations than tests. During obstacle crossings, soldiers from divisional air defence regiments were used as guides, making far bank AD almost negligible as there were no procedures for marrying-up troops with equipments after lodgement. They would also be so tired as to make them ineffective at the very time of major air threat. <BR>Tactical liaison with the Pakistan Air Force was poor or nonexistent and the risk of mistaken engagement of own troops was unacceptably high. Procedures for weapons tight were not practiced. <BR>The creation of the Air Defence Command, consisting of three anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) Groups (8 brigades), and emphasis on joint cooperation and training has gone far to rectify the unsatisfactory position. However, much remains to be done. <BR>Unfortunately for the Army and the PAF, budget restrictions have cut the number of exercises that are necessary to practice and refine procedures to the required degree, although computer and dry training is conducted. Most equipments are towed guns, but study of AAA tactics worldwide has resulted in doctrine based on local airspace saturation. Hand-held/vehicle-mounted surface-to-air missiles, including Stinger, RBS-70 (180 launchers) and Chinese HN-5, are deployed mainly in strike units, and the cheaply produced Anza infra-red homing missile, a SA-7 “Grail” surface-to-air missile copy, is in wide service. <P>-------------------------------<P>Transition time in Pakistan's Army<BR>Having suspended the constitution and instituted military rule, the Pakistan Army continues to play a major role in its country's development. <BR>Brian Cloughley examines its training, leadership and equipment and evaluates its fitness for role. <BR>ON 12/13 October 1999 the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was placed in abeyance when the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), General Pervez Musharraf, dismissed the government of prime minister Nawaz Sharif and assumed the title of 'chief executive' of the nation. Although the president remained in office -- giving some legitimacy to the administration that is widely regarded as prepared to hand over to civilian governance once the economy and the political fabric of the country have been reconstituted -- the army is firmly in control. <BR>However, the role and tasks of the Pakistan Army are currently in flux as a result of recent events, and because Pakistan and India now possess a rudimentary but developing nuclear weapons capability. When the Sharif government was in power, the army -- and in theory the entire defence force -- was tasked to oversee (or actually run) a number of enterprises, including the Water and Power Development Agency. The structure of life in Pakistan had become so ridden with corruption that the armed forces were considered the only sound institutions in the country. <BR>The long term effects of undertaking non-military duties cannot be assessed, but in previous periods of military rule the cost was significant because high-grade officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were involved in civilian-related tasks to the detriment of planning, training, administration and operational readiness. <BR>Regional threats and relations <BR>The military threat to Pakistan is regarded as being presented solely by India, with whom relations vary from poor to actively hostile. Pakistan's defence posture and doctrine are almost entirely concerned with its eastern border, as is apparent from the location of the majority of its forces. The strength of the Indian Army is 980,000; Pakistan's is 520,000. <BR>There are no formal defence ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC), but Beijing is an active supporter of Pakistan, co-operating in the provision and development of weapons. There is a regular mutually beneficial and cordial exchange of technical expertise. However, this could be affected should Islamic extremists based in Pakistan and Afghanistan become involved in support of dissidents in the Chinese province of Xinjiang where there is growing Muslim militancy. The PRC has stopped short of giving unconditional support to Islamabad concerning the Kashmir dispute, but has itself unresolved border disagreements with India. In the event of war with Pakistan, India would have to take into account the possibility of Chinese pressure along their 4,000km border, and would need to maintain forces in some strength in the north, both forward and in reserve, in addition to lightly-armed paramilitary border troops. <BR>Neither Iran nor Afghanistan pose a military threat, but the borders with both countries are porous. Policing is conducted mainly by the Frontier Corps but many tribes straddle the Afghan border, making control of smuggling impossible. Guerrillas of various nationalities from camps in Afghanistan cross Pakistan with ease to move to Indian-administered Kashmir where they now form the main opposition in an insurrection that began in 1989. Pakistan has ambivalent relations with the government of Afghanistan, a deeply doctrinaire theistic autocracy, but is one of the few nations to have recognised its authority -- although it should be noted that this took place under a civilian government. <BR>Role of the army <BR>The national defence goal is to deter what is perceived by Pakistan as Indian aggressive intent. The army's role, and that of the other services, is to protect the nation by maintaining territorial integrity, while ensuring internal stability and advancing the country's external interests. <BR>Emphasis remains on territorial integrity, but there are shades of difference within it, in addition to varying degrees of emphasis on internal stability and external interests as regional circumstances change. In mid-1999 the army conducted offensive operations against Indian troops in northern Kashmir and moved units along the international border, as did India. Concurrently, the government continued to use the army in attempts to rescue public services from collapse by improving efficiency and revenue. Involvement with civilian enterprises continued after the army take-over, and has grown through the appointment of more military officers to senior management posts. <BR>Tension with India was high as a result of the fighting in Kashmir and grew following the December terrorist hijacking of an Indian airliner, a marked increase in activity by Pakistan-backed militants in Indian-administered Kashmir involving 'hard target' attacks on security forces' headquarters and patrols, and further exchanges of heavy weapons' fire across the Line of Control (LoC) dividing the disputed territory. <BR>There has been no formal alteration to the army's role, but its tasks now appear to include: <BR>· maintenance of a high level of confrontation with Indian forces along the LoC in Kashmir; <BR>· deterrence of Indian conventional operations along the international border; <BR>· preparedness to undertake limited but powerful strikes (probably two) into India in order to seize and hold territory (the concept of 'the Riposte'); <BR>· limited preparation for a nuclear engagement; and <BR>· contribution to the civil administration of the nation. <BR>Strategy and nuclear considerations <BR>In the late 1980s consideration was given to pre-emption, whereby there would be a political decision in Islamabad to attack before a declaration of war, denying India an initial advantage. This strategy still exists, but it is unlikely to be adopted if only because it would attract international condemnation. The problem for Pakistan is that the dichotomy between operations in Kashmir and 'general hostilities' along the international border has become blurred. This is largely because of its own aggressive actions in the north of the LoC in mid-1999 that almost led to wider conflict. A further major eruption of fighting along the LoC may not be confinable to Kashmir but could spread to the border, probably with very serious consequences. <BR>There is a danger that conventional war in the sub-continent could become nuclear, either in error or because of unstoppable nationalistic fervour. Neither country has sufficiently advanced intelligence systems to be able to estimate each other's preparedness for conflict or likely reaction should full-scale war break out, and there is a likelihood of grave errors in assessments. Furthermore, there is no enunciated nuclear doctrine, nor are there decision-making and communications systems adequate for either strategic or tactical command and control in the nuclear environment. Nuclear targeting information could not be passed in time to be of use in a rapidly changing situation, which would increase the probability of own-troop strikes by tactical missiles. There is not even the most basic civil defence system (construction of which would be prohibitively expensive), and in both countries a looming nuclear war would create widespread panic, causing flight of countless millions of people. <BR>Pakistan created a study cell, which in February recommended the formation of a National Command Authority to "be responsible for policy formulation and . . . exercise employment and development control over all strategic nuclear forces and strategic organisations". This body includes an "Employment Control Committee [chaired by the head of government], a Development Control Committee and a Strategic Plans Division, which will act as its secretariat". There is as yet no indication of the precise functions of these elements. <BR>Recognition that possession of nuclear weapons does not itself imply fully fledged nuclear war-fighting capability has been slow to dawn, but it is apparent that India and Pakistan have tacitly accepted the circumstantial limitations inherent in their nuclear programmes. It appears that the chance of a nuclear exchange is moderate, at least for the moment, in spite of exceptional tension between the nations. The threat of conventional war remains high, and Pakistan's strategy for this rests in its doctrine of 'the Riposte'. <BR>Pakistan has no strategic depth. One practical solution to this limitation is to concentrate on the eastern border with the intention of penetrating into India on, probably, two widely separated axes to swiftly take and hold comparatively small areas of territory. The advance would probably be limited to 80100km on single divisional fronts, with commanders refraining from flank exploitation, at least initially. This would tally with Western assessments of the ability of the logistics system to cope with movement forward from easily accessed border dumps. The political rationale for the Riposte is to seize territory irrespective of what Indian thrust(s) may have been made, to have bargaining counters when a cease-fire is declared or enforced by international intervention, which would probably be in two or three weeks. <BR>Since 1990 the force structure, organisation, training, deployment and tactics of the Pakistan Army have been developed and refined in accordance with the doctrine of the Riposte. There has been considerable success in improving war-fighting capability. There is a significant numerical paper disparity between Pakistan's forces and those of India, much in India's favour. However, the realities on the ground, especially in armour capabilities, forward air defence, troop morale and leadership, and basic equipment (such as radios, small arms and ancillary materiel) indicate severe defects in the Indian defence spectrum, to the extent there is near-parity between the armies. This also applies to the air forces. The quoted combat aircraft strength of over 700 in the Indian Air Force (IAF) is some half that number in effective strength. Lack of competent pilots is the most serious deficiency. There are, however, problems in higher command and control in the Pakistan Army. <BR>Command, tasks and grouping <BR>The army's General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, 24km from the capital, Islamabad, houses a confusing mix of old-fashioned command and control. GHQ commands nine corps (21 divisions and the equivalent of another eight in independent brigades) without any intermediate HQ. <BR>The army acknowledges the requirement for an 'HQ army group north' to command 1, 30 and 4 Corps, and a similar southern HQ to command 2, 31 and 5 Corps. However, their creation is impossible in light of present financial conditions. <BR>1 and 2 Corps are the 'strike' formations: 30, 4, 31 and 5 are essentially defensive, as their infantry and artillery mobility is mainly wheeled. Independent armoured, mechanised and infantry brigades are well-placed and well-enough equipped to exploit gains made by strike formations, and to mount diversions and counter-attacks. <BR>The western corps, 11 in North West Frontier Province and 12 in Balochistan, are direct command reinforcement elements, but would find movement east difficult after IAF interdiction of railways, combined with refugee-blocked roads. 10 Corps is responsible for operations in Kashmir, depth manoeuvre and counter-attack in Punjab. <BR>In practice there is considerable devolution to corps commanders whose directives give much latitude, with the exception of strike penetration and exploitation, which are as dependent on political factors as they are on logistics and success in battle. <BR>Command arrangements at lower levels are conventional and, from observation of several exercises, appear adequate and even expert. Regrouping of formations and subordinate elements cannot be practised often by any army but there is an apparent flexibility to a degree often preached but rarely permitted, especially in the pressurised atmosphere of assessed training, when personal efficiency reports loom large. <BR>There is an army reserve of about 500,000 whose members have a triennial attendance obligation to the age of 45. Refresher training is as adequate as might be expected from a three week period, but reserve service seems popular. The 180,000-strong National Guard would be useful in guarding vulnerable points. It consists of the Mujahid Force of 60,000, organised in battalions, some with light air defence capability; the Janbaz Force of 100,000, whose members are intended to serve close to their homes; and the National Cadet Corps in universities and colleges. These elements have some value in providing poorly-trained but enthusiastic reinforcements for rear area units. <BR>Paramilitary or civil armed forces are numerous and vary in efficiency. In peacetime most are subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, but commanders and most other officers are seconded from the army. <BR>Training <BR>Training is the overall responsibility of the Inspector General, Training and Education in GHQ. Unlike many armies in which complex training methods are embraced at great expense, the Pakistan Army has maintained tried and tested methods. It relies largely on the efficient regimental system whereby each infantry regiment has its own training centre, as have Corps such as armour or signals. <BR>Initial training of officers (all male) of all arms and services is conducted mainly at the Pakistan Military Academy at Kakul, Abbotabad. Standards are adequate, although emphasis has to be placed on instruction in the English language. The army is short of officers. This is largely due to competition from more lucrative careers and because the social structure of the country is changing. The 'old army families' who supplied their sons as officers and soldiers can no longer be relied upon as a guaranteed source of recruits. The shortage is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, although the recent military takeover improved enlistments. Also, modern techniques of recruiting, with improvements in barrack living conditions, initiated by the previous COAS, General Karamat, and continued by the present chief, have had positive results. <BR>Regimental and Corps training is of a high standard but there is much learning by rote, which tends to reduce initiative. Instruction at army schools (such as the School of Infantry and Tactics) is impressive and courses are conducted efficiently. This applies to the Command and Staff College, with one caveat: too much time is spent on researching previous years' questions and answers rather than attempting to break ground with original thought and novel proposals. Directing staff are high quality and the syllabus is sound. However, the culture of 'chappa' -- an anxiety to conform, resulting in emphasis on obtaining 'correct' solutions from former students -- produces uninspiring discussion and careful, but imitative papers. Despite this, the product is generally good. <BR>Advanced technical training and graduate/post graduate studies are carried out under the aegis of the National University of Sciences and Technology, which involves the Colleges of Medicine, Signals, Military Engineering, and Electrical and Mechanical Engineer ing. These are linked with civilian, naval and air force institutions, and with Michigan State (USA) and Cranfield (UK) universities. <BR>Individual and collective training in units is conducted in an annual cycle, usually dictated by the timing of higher-level exercises. Sub-unit and unit exercises are generally held in summer, with brigade and divisional manoeuvres after the harvest and in winter. <BR>There has been emphasis on computer-based war-gaming, with consequent improvement in staff-work, especially in logistics. In the 1965 and 1971 wars few formations were far from base facilities and supply dumps, and it is only comparatively recently that battlefield recovery and practise in forward supply have been allotted the importance they demand. Much training focuses on obstacle-crossing, as there are extensive natural and man-made water barriers on both sides of the border, especially in Punjab. In the 1980s a river-crossing was often judged to have been successful when the force lodged on the far bank had only first-line ammunition and arrangements for its sustenance were at best sketchy. Following the 1989 exercise 'Zarb-e-Momin' ('Believer's blow') it was made clear to commanders that logistics mattered, that resupply was not to be treated as 'out of exercise' or 'notional,' and that all exercises were to have a credible logistics plan. <BR>Analysis of 'Zarb-e-Momin' resulted in considerable restructuring, including the creation of the Air Defence Command and the Artillery Division. It was assessed that command, control and communication (C3I) had serious defects, especially in the passage of tactical information from higher HQ to unit level, but improvement in this aspect has been slower than desired, mainly because of financial constraints. Extensive use is made of satellite communications, and there have been notable advances in the development and production of secure systems, although these do not appear to be available other than in strike formations and independent forces. Subsequent exercises have tested the development matrix generated by 'Zarb-e-Momin', but budget limitations have precluded conduct of trials on the scale necessary to test, prove, and modify doctrine and procedures to the extent planned by GHQ. <BR>Cessation of overseas training arrangements by developed countries as a result of their disapproval of Pakistan's nuclear tests has not seriously affected professional knowledge or standards, but officers are now denied exposure to the wider horizons offered by such nations. Western influence has been reduced to the point of creating significant resentment, especially at junior level. Increased anti-Western feelings have been manipulated by a small number of zealots within and outside the armed forces in an attempt to attract adherents to more rigid forms of Islam than is desired by senior officers, and the West. <BR>Equipment and mobility <BR>US military co-operation and supply of equipment stopped in October 1990 after US President George Bush refused to sign an annual declaration that Pakistan was not involved in a nuclear programme. (The USA was aware that Pakistan had such a programme for many years but after Russia's withdrawal from Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War, Pakistan was less useful to the US as an ally. Sanctions followed.) After some relaxation, strictures were reimposed in totality following Pakistan's nuclear tests in May 1998. Results have been: <BR>· the movement of Pakistan further towards China and North Korea as suppliers and, in the case of the PRC, co-producer, of weapons systems; <BR>· the clandestine acquisition of equipment and spare parts worldwide; <BR>· an increased domestic production of spare parts and ammunition; and <BR>· heightened anti-Americanism in all services, but mainly and markedly amongst junior army officers. This is spilling-over into general anti-Western sentiment. <BR>Fortunately for the army, Pakistan declined to purchase the US Abrams main battle tank (MBT) when it was offered in 1988. (It was following a demonstration of the Abrams that Pakistan's ruler, General Zia ul Haq, left the firing range at Bahawalpur in a Pakistan Air Force C-130 that crashed in mysterious circumstances, killing him, the US ambassador, the US defence sales representative and 20 senior officers.) Had the Abrams been obtained, a large part of the Armoured Corps, including the strike corps, would now be facing grave difficulties. <BR>Reliance was placed on obtaining Chinese tanks, including the Norinco Type 85 (125mm smoothbore), of which over 400 are in service. Pakistan improved the current inventory by undertaking a major rebuild/ upgrade programme at Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT, near Rawalpindi, improved and extended the tanks with significant PRC assistance). There has also been gradual development, with China, of a new tank, the MBT 2000 or 'Khalid'; and the acquisition, beginning in 1997, of 320 T-80UD tanks from Ukraine at a cost of US$650m. The last of these were delivered at the end of 1999. <BR>The introduction of newer and rebuilt tanks has taken pressure off the Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME), which was having difficulty maintaining older equipment for front-line use. Type 85s and T-80s form the major part of strike forces, with the work-horse Type 59 (105mm, upgraded), Type 69 (Centaur FCS), and M-48A5s in other units. Technology from the UK, Sweden and Belgium has resulted in improvement in advanced tank (and artillery) ammunition, which is produced in increasing quantities by Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) for domestic use and growing exports. <BR>The Khalid MBT (120mm) four-phase programme appears successful, if slow. Its measured pace results from a combination of policy, and non-availability of systems and sub-systems from Western nations. The power pack (UK Challenger) and transmission (French Leclerc) were deemed satisfactory, but the outcome of negotiations on long-term development is unknown as there is pressure within the British government to cease defence co-operation with Pakistan. The programme contrasts favourably with the India's Arjun MBT project. <BR>It appears that for the moment Pakistan could have a qualitative and even a quantitative edge over Indian armour, as Russian T-90 MBTs performed badly in trials last year in India, and acquisition is yet to be confirmed. Refurbishment of India's 1,500 T-72s is well behind schedule, and there are critical maintenance and upgrading problems. The Arjun MBT has been ordered only in token number (124, with delivery to start in 2001). These problems, set against Pakistan's novel armour tactics, improved air-to-ground co-operation, flexible command structure at corps and below, and a more structured approach to procurement and production, might point to a military balance less in India's favour than bald inventories would seem to show. <BR>Pakistan has a deficiency in mobility. There are too few armoured personnel carriers and self-propelled guns, both medium (155mm) and air defence (AD), to properly equip all formations. There are only 900 M113s available (most produced at HIT under licence). Both their production and armoured infantry fighting vehicle development have been affected by sanctions. The 155mm self-propelled (SP) artillery, essential for support in the fast-moving battles likely during the advance of the strike formations and in countering similar Indian thrust(s) into Pakistan, is limited to a dozen regiments-worth of US M-109s. In spite of US embargoes, spares are bought on the world market, with some manufactured at POF. As the barrels are well within their first quarter of life, there is no pressing need for replacement. The problem is in enlarging the holding, as the USA is an unreliable supplier. There is no compatibility between the M-109 and the likely alternative, the Norinco 122mm SP gun. <BR>Air defence <BR>Until the early 1990s the army paid insufficient attention to co-operation with the air force. Joint exercises were few, and were more demonstrations than tests. During obstacle crossings, soldiers from divisional air defence regiments were used as guides, making far bank AD almost negligible as there were no procedures for marrying-up troops with equipments after lodgement. They would also be so tired as to make them ineffective at the very time of major air threat. <BR>Tactical liaison with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was poor or non-existent and the risk of mistaken engagement of own troops was unacceptably high. Procedures for 'weapons tight' were not practised. <BR>Creation of Air Defence Command, consisting of 3 anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) Groups (8 brigades), and emphasis on joint co-operation and training has gone far to rectify the unsatisfactory position. However, much remains to be done. Unfortunately for the army and the PAF, budget restrictions have cut the number of exercises that are necessary to practise and refine procedures to the required degree, although computer and dry training is conducted. Most equipments are towed guns, but study of AAA tactics worldwide has resulted in doctrine based on local airspace saturation. Hand-held/vehicle-mounted surface-to-air missiles, including Stinger, RBS-70 (180 launchers) and Chinese HN-5, are deployed mainly in strike units, and the cheaply produced Anza infra-red homing missile, a SA-7 'Grail' surface-to-air missile copy, is in wide service. <BR>-----------------------<BR>more from the same site. <BR>The Riposte is simple in concept: it is intended that the two strike corps conduct a limited advance along narrow fronts with the objective of occupying Indian territory near the border, probably to a depth of 40-50km. Pakistan considers that international pressure would result in a ceasefire after 3-4 weeks of conflict: enough time to gain some territory to be used in subsequent bargaining. There would be acceptance of Indian penetration, which would be inevitable given the lack of mobility within the infantry-heavy divisions. Independent armoured and mechanized brigades are intended for quick counter-attack and exploitation, and would add considerable weight to advances by the strike corps. <BR>The Riposte is practised at all levels. Major exercises involve the crossing of large obstacles at night with emphasis on subsequent breakout and rapid advance. So far as has been seen, the concept has been adequately translated into workable plans which are continuously being refined. However, total mechanization of the two strike corps has been slowed by the effects of the Pressler Amendment, and it will take some time for them to achieve desired mobility. <BR>The army's main weaknesses are poor co-operation with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and inadequate appreciation that Indian tactical air power is a serious threat. Some planning has been based on unrealistic assessment of achievement of local air superiority over the forward edge of the battle area. There is emphasis on ground air defense (AD) by surface-to-air missiles (such as the Swedish RBS70 and US Stinger) and gun systems. Both strike corps have considerable AD assets intended to be deployed rapidly during obstacle crossings and breakout, but few equipments are self-propelled which would be a disadvantage in the concept of the Riposte. <P>--------------------- <A HREF="http://members.tripod.com/SameenKhanOfSherpur/doctrine2.html" TARGET=_blank>http://members.tripod.com/SameenKhanOfSherpur/doctrine2.html</A> <BR>Sameen Khan <BR>Sherpur House, <BR>Nawab Ismail Khan Road, <BR>Karachi 5, <BR>January 23 1990. <P>Zarb-e-Momin <BR>Let met state categorically that it is a matter of supreme pride for me that the Pakistan Army in its planning and execution of its exercise Zarb-e-Momin has to a large extent accepted the concept of offense of my own strategic doctrine which I enunciated more than a year back. it is a matter of profound satisfaction that because of the adoption of my own 'offensive doctrine' the Pakistan Army has got rid of its 'defensive syndrome' and that the next war shall Insha Allah be fought not on Pakistani soil but on Indian territory. This is a great and revolutionary step as we shall go back to the offensive doctrine that was followed and practiced by the Muslims during the seven hundred year long Muslim rule of India. <BR>Moreover, the Muslim Armies during these seven hundred years of Muslim rule did not hold exercises as we do now but actually learnt the art of fighting in actual battles. A Muslim prince at the age fifteen years after learning the basics of fighting as a cadet was sent on actual campaigns with a senior general who was his guide and mentor. <BR>So it is a momentous and historical decision and development that the Pakistan Army has accepted my own offensive doctrine as enunciated by me in my article entitled 'A strategic Doctrine for Pakistan'. <BR>The Game of Numbers <BR>The second most important development is that the Pakistan Army by accepting my doctrine has impliedly got rid of what I call as the 'game of numbers'. Now the Pakistan Army shall not be overawed by the fact that the Indian Army is three or four times that of Pakistan and shall not suffer from an inferiority complex and from a defeatist demon even before the battle commences. Now it shall be a test of motivation and also a test of adopting a better strategy and tactics during the battle. <BR>However, there are certain defects or failings from my own point of view in the Zarb-e-Momin which are: <BR>1. Jihaad <BR>The great weakness of Zarb-e-Momin was that apart from its name it was not motivated to the extent that it should have been by and had not introduced the concept of Jihaad---- which has been the sheet- anchor of all the Muslim conquests during the last fourteen hundred years. <BR>It may be emphasized even at the cost of repetition that Islam at its advent defeated the two super-powers Iran and the Roman Empire only because of the spirit of Jihaad. Moreover, even in Afghanistan it was because of the spirit and practice of Jihaad that the Afghans-succeeded in defeating a super-power the USSR. And it is because of the inculcation of the spirit of Jihaad that the Intifada Movement in Palestine and the resurgence of the liberation struggle in Kashmir has been possible. <BR>I am of the considered opinion that without the inculcation of the spirit of Jihaad to the extent that it has been done in Afghanistan success in any war with any enemy country shall not be possible. <BR>2. Islam <BR>The second great weakness of Zarb-e-Momin was the absence of the practice of Islam to the extent that it should be. As mentioned in the first part of this article Ibn-e-Khaludun was of the considered opinion that the Muslims have achieved all their success when they were motivated by Islam. <BR>The present writer from his personal experience in Afghanistan is of the opinion that without the actual motivation and practice of Islam the Afghans could not have defeated the Russians. <BR>3. Colonial British Traditions <BR>The third most important weakness of the Pakistan Army is that it still follows the traditions that were laid down for it by the East India Company and the British Government. I think that we should get rid and bury all those traditions once and for all and revive both the glorious traditions of early Islam and of the 700 year Muslim rule of India when the Muslims won all their battles. <BR>Zarb-e-Momin--- Tactics <BR>Clausewitz had described "tactics Is the theory of the use of military forces in combat" <BR>I shall not elaborate or comment on the detailed tactics employed during the Zarb-e-Momin exercise but there are certain points that I want to emphasize. <BR>1. Mobility <BR>My experience of the Afghan Jihaad and the manner in which the Russians used the helicopters both for transport of troops and for attack on the guerrillas has convinced me that 'mobility' of troops is very essential for surprise in warfare. So like India we should also form and constitute 'mobile brigades'. It may be mentioned that it was primarily due to their mobile brigades that India was able to move its troops so quickly to the Maldives. But to organize these mobile brigades it is necessary to have a large number of helicopters only for this purpose--- which should be attached to these brigades. And it must also be pointed out that it is necessary for us to build these helicopters in Pakistan. It may be mentioned that India not only builds its own helicopters but has also acquired the right to build high altitude capability helicopters which are used in Siachin-from France. <BR>The APC--- the armored personnel carrier--- is useful for the normal transport of troops in a set-piece battle but it is not of any use if the objective is to give a surprise to the enemy. <BR>So it is extremely necessary for us to organize separate mobile brigades - separate from the general infantry and even from the SSG. <BR>2. Tanks <BR>Although after the successful use of anti-tank weapons by the Egyptians during the Ramazan War of 1973 the tanks are not as formidable as Rommel had made them in his first attack on France and later in North Africa, Yet since an armored brigade has to depend upon tanks for its attack it is absolutely necessary for us to introduce new and modern tanks--- which should be manufactured in Pakistan. <BR>Needless to mention that in the manufacture of modern military hardware it is necessary for us to either privatize some of our existing arms manufacturing factories or to encourage the private sector to enter the field of defense production. <BR>3. A Nation at war <BR>In a modern war it is necessary to mobilize the entire nation for warfare so that they can also share the burden of defense. So it is also necessary to mobilize the Nation and to mobilize all those persons like ex-servicemen, Rangers and National Cadet Corps students in such exercises and in an eventual war. It is also necessary to mobilize the Muslim Ummah as has been successfully done in the Afghan Jihaad<BR>---------------------------------------------------- <A HREF="http://www.angelfire.com/in/jalnews/28035.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.angelfire.com/in/jalnews/28035.html</A> <BR>It is reported that following the 1989 Zarb-e-Momin exercise it <BR>was made clear to commanders that logistics mattered, that <BR>re-supply was not to be treated as `out of exercise' or <BR>`notional' and that all exercises were to have a credible <BR>logistics plan. The analysis of Zarb-e-Momin resulted in <BR>considerable restructuring, including the creation of the Air <BR>Defence Command and the Artillery Division. <BR>Jane's Intelligence Review has also revealed that <P><BR>
<A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/03/local25.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/03/local25.htm</A> <P>FAISALABAD, Nov 2: The National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) has received at least 310,000 forms for the issue of National Identity Cards during the last two weeks in Faisalabad division. <P>This was stated by Col Muhammad Iqbal, in charge of Regional NADRA, at a meeting convened here on Tuesday to review the progress made in the issue of Identity Cards. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/02/local10.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/02/local10.htm</A> <P>KARACHI, Nov 1: The services of another batch of 56 officials of the District East Municipal Corporation (DMC-E) have been put at the disposal of the Army Engineering Wing 102, carrying out work on the Bagh-i-Quaid-i-Azam project. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/04-11-2000/national/n6.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/04-11-2000/national/n6.htm</A> <P>'Efforts for student-oriented syllabus underway'<P>By our correspondent<P>SUKKUR: Brig Shafiqur Rehman, Incharge Army Monitoring Team for Education Sukkur and Larkana Divisions has said efforts are underway to make the syllabus student-oriented.<BR> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/04-11-2000/metro/k2.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/04-11-2000/metro/k2.htm</A> <P>This is the second in a series of three questions e-mailed to us by Brig AQK from Chaklala, Rawalpindi "What is the ideal duration of exercise for efficient functioning of the heart and other vital body organs?"<P>(okay the previous one is vague but its there so i put it up.)<BR> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/03-11-2000/national/n2.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/03-11-2000/national/n2.htm</A> <P>Colonel Syed Moazzam, who guided a team of journalists during their visit to Badin district, said that a jail was planned at a site in Badin for 250 persons. <P>Major Javed Raza and Major Naeem of Umerkot Army Monitoring Team told the journalists from Karachi and Hyderabad that they learnt about the hospital project during an 'open Kuchehri' in August this year. <P>Col Moazzam said that under the directives of the GOC 18 division, army personnel took over the project some two months back, traced the contractors and arranged an ad hoc release of fund to the tune of Rs 6 million. "In the light of structure and funds available at our disposal, we have decided to first complete two barracks with a capacity of 50 prisoners each and make the jail functional by the end of the current fiscal year," he added.<P> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/02-11-2000/main/main13.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/02-11-2000/main/main13.htm</A> <P>. Col Allah Bux Rang, who is leading the Army team carrying out development works in the areas, was also present on the occasion.<P>HYDERABAD: Major General Khalid Munir, General Officer Commanding, Hyderabad, on Tuesday said there is need for constructing dams in Sindh to overcome water shortage in the province but it is not possible because of non-availability of natural terrain in the area.<P>Salman,<P>yes its something like that.<P>regards<BR>s./<P><BR>
a bit tangential but might be of some use. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/04/local13.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/04/local13.htm</A> <P>RAWALPINDI, Nov 3: Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD) has established an observatory at Babusir Top under the directives of Chief Executive Gen Pervez Musharraf. <P>The observatory will help facilitate regular air traffic to and from Northern Areas especially during the adverse weather conditions in the hilly terrain, defence ministry sources said here on Friday. <P>The flight regularity to and from Northern Areas has increased to 91 per cent during the current year as compared to 69 per cent during 1999, the sources added. <P> <A HREF="http://www.pakdefencenews.org/news/news2000sep.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.pakdefencenews.org/news/news2000sep.html</A> <P>Major General Syed Ali Hamid later visited Karachi Expo Centre and met officials of the Export Promotion Bureau, and discussed various points regarding the completion of the exhibition site. Commanders of 103 Air Defence and 21 Armoured Brigade, Commander Signals 5 Corps, Commanding Officer 102 Engineering Battalion and representatives from NESPAK and KMC also attended the meeting. During his visit to Karachi, representatives of Pegasus Consultancy (Pvt) Ltd., the organisers and sponsors of the event, accompanied the Chief Coordinator. Later, Major General Syed Ali Hamid met Sindh Home Secretary Brigadier Mukhtar Sheikh (Retd), and discussed various issues regarding IDEAS 2000. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.pakdefencenews.org/news/news2000oct.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.pakdefencenews.org/news/news2000oct.html</A> <P>Post of vice army chief likely to be created <P>ISLAMABAD: Corps Commander, Lahore, Lt General Aziz Khan is expected to be appointed as Vice Chief of the Army Staff (VCOAS) in near future. Major reshuffling in top leadership of Army is likely to take place in December this year. <P>"This slot (VCOAS) was created during General Ziaul Haq's long years of martial law. The sources close to decision-making circles said there is a possibility of appointing General Aziz as VCOAS in the near future," a weekly reported. <P>The VCOAS slot could be re-created given the fact that Chief Executive General Pervaiz Musharraf is very busy in handling government affairs. His second-in-command could help him share those responsibilities that are directly related to the armed forces affairs, the report suggested. During the rule of General Ziaul Haq, General (retd) Aslam Beg held the position of VCOAS and after the death of Zia took over as the army chief. The August this year reshuffling in the top leadership of the army is expected to be followed in December this year, the weekly said. <P>The reshuffling by end of year would be taken following the retirement of five three-star army generals. They are Commandant National Defence College Lt Gen Saeeduz Zafar (Oct 16), Master General Ordnance Lt Gen Saleem Haider (Dec 12), Quarter Master General Lt Gen Mohammad Akram (Dec 3), Corp Commander Bahawalpur Lt Gen Tahir Qureshi and Corps Commander Gujranwala Lt Gen Agha Jehangir would be the first to retire in January 2001. <P>The senior most majors-general include Maj Gen Zafar Abbas of Anti Narcotics Force, General Officer Commanding Kharian Maj Gen Rizwan Qureshi, National Defence College Maj Gen Ahsan Salim Hayat, Deputy Quarter Master General Maj Gen Tariq Kiani and Director General Ordnance Maj Gen Tasneem. <P>During the August this year reshuffling, Maj Gen Javed Hassan has already been promoted as lieutenant general and posted as Commandant NDC. Lt Gen Tahir Qureshi has been posted as Inspector General Training and Evaluation. Lt Gen Munir Hafiez, is another major general who was elevated to the three-star rank in August. <P>Major General Shaffatullah Shah is to replace outgoing Deputy Chief of Staff to the Chief Executive Major General Abdul Jabbar Bhatti on October 20, a senior official told The News on Friday. Shaffatullah Shah has been appointed as deputy chief of staff to the chief executive on his promotion from brigadier to 2-star general. He will assist Chief of Staff Lt Gen Ghulam Ahmed in the Chief Executive Secretariat. <P>Bhatti, who had replaced Maj Gen Anis Bajwa in the Chief Executive Secretariat, would be made GOC, said the official. Maj Gen Bajwa was posted in Georgia as head of a UN peacekeeping mission. "There is nothing serious, but a routine transfer," he said. Maj Gen Anis Bajwa was chief of staff when the military took over on October 12. However, when Bajwa was sent on an international assignment, Lt Gen Ghulam Ahmed, on his promotion as a 3-star general, was posted as chief of staff to <P><BR><p>[This message has been edited by sunil sainis (edited 05-11-2000).]
<A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/08/top8.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/08/top8.htm</A> <P>A spokesman of National Data Base and Registration Authority Col Jehanziab Aziz said efforts were being made to update the electoral rolls. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/07/top9.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/07/top9.htm</A> <P>Al-Khalid tank production to begin soon <P>ISLAMABAD, Nov 6: Pakistan is all set to start serial production of its main battle tank Al-Khalid. Al-Khalid, developed by Pakistan, underwent extended and extensive tests and trials by the army before it was approved for pilot production. <P> The chairman of Heavy Industry, Taxila, Lt-Gen Hamid Javaid, said on Monday:"For its design Pakistan has collaborated with major tank designers of the world, including China, the United Kingdom, France, Ukraine and a number of other countries." <P>Project director Brig Asaad said:"The tank is equipped with a modern weapons system. Al-Khalid is a result of the advanced technology that is available in the world today.-<P><BR>Army team rescues detenu <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/09-11-2000/national/n7.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/09-11-2000/national/n7.htm</A> <P>NAWABSHAH: Army Monitoring Team, headed by Maj Shahzad Nadeen visited the police check post Manehro and found one person detained illegally. The team referred the matter to Superintendent of Police. Later the team visited the Public Health Office of Manehro and enquired about the position of water supply and working of staff at the office.<BR>
i just ran across Brian Cloughley's article "Transition time in the PA" <P><BR>DATE: APRIL 01, 2000 <BR>EDITION: 2000 <BR>VOLUME/ISSUE: 012/004<P>some information about regimental training centers. <P>MAIN REGIMENTAL AND CORPS TRAINING CENTRES <P>infy. <P>Azad Kashmir Regiment Attock <BR>Baloch Regiment Abbotabad <BR>Frontier Force Regiment Abbotabad <BR>Punjab Regiment Mardan <BR>Sindh Regiment Petaro <BR>School of Infantry and Tactics Quetta <P>Armoured Corps Nowshera <P>Corps of Artillery(Artillery centre at Attock) Nowshera <P>Corps of Engineers Risalpur <P>Army Aviation Corps Rawalpindi <P>Corps of Signals(College, Rawalpindi) Kohat <P>Corps of Electrical & Mechanical Engineers Rawalpindi <P>Army Service Corps Nowshera <P>School of Logistics Murree <P>School of Army Education Murree <P>Command & Staff College Quetta <P>School of Mountain Warfare(also Skardu) Abbotabad <P>Special Services Group Cherat & Attock <P>Parachute School Peshawar <P>Corps of Military Police Dera Ismail Khan <P>There is also a map!!and i cant bleeding read it cause the print is TOO small!!!! f***.. <P>i'll go look up the hard copy in the library!!. <P>
<A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/10/nat16.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/10/nat16.htm</A> <P>QUETTA, Nov 9: The Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) handed over 8.425 metric tons of opium to the provincial Excise and Taxation Department on Thursday for distribution to government laboratories in Lahore. <P>The opium will be used for the preparation of life-saving drugs by the government-controlled labs in Lahore. It will make a saving of millions of rupees by those pharmaceutical companies with an official gift of 8.425 metric tons of opium. The value of the opium in the world market is around Rs. 2.52 billion, official sources estimated. <P>The opium was seized from dumps after hectic efforts, in most cases fighting prolonged gun-battles after massive intelligence gathering operations by the ANF throughout Balochistan. <P> <A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/10/local11.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/10/local11.htm</A> <P> Salahuddin Satti's replacement identified! <P> ISLAMABAD, Nov 9: The commander, 111 brigade and in charge of the army monitoring team for the police of the twin cities of Rawalpindi-Islamabad, Brig Shafqat Ahmad, visited the offices of capital SSP on Wednesday to review the performance of the police. <P>The SSP briefed the team about the measures taken by the police for prevention of crime in the federal capital during the past nine months. <P>The brigadier was told that there had been a 25 per cent decrease in the house thefts and burglaries. He added that the rate of car theft had been brought down to 60 per cent by adopting extraordinary measures. <P>The SSP also briefed the AMT chief about the people-friendly projects like "Rescue-15" and "Safe Home Scheme". <P>Brig Ahmed appreciated the efforts of the police in curbing crime. <P>He said that with the launching of the public-oriented projects, the department had succeeded in bringing the police force and the people closer. <P>Spokesman: A spokesman for the police said the army monitoring team had completed the inspection of the office of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Rawalpindi, on Tuesday. <P> The team was led by Major Nisar Mughal, Major Majeed Ahmed and Naib Subedar Mukhtar Ahmed. The team was briefed by heads of various sections on the working of their respective departments in the SSP Office. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.pakobserver.com/november/10/city/cnews05.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.pakobserver.com/november/10/city/cnews05.htm</A> <P>Convocation at Military College of Signals tomorrow<BR> <P>RAWALPINDI—Tenth convocation for awarding Bachelors Degrees in Telecommunications and Software Engineering will be held here in Military College of Signals tomorrow (November 11).<P>According to ISPR press release, students will be conferred degrees in their related fields of Information Technology.<P>Federal Minister for Science and Technology, Dr Atta-ur-Rehman will be the chief guest on the occasion.<P>This institution was established in 1947 as School of signals, with the purpose of educating army personnel on Telecommunication matters, the college has transformed itself as the country’s best Institution in Information Technology.<P>It may be mentioned here that Military College of Signals was made part of National University of Science and Technology and was recently rated among top IT Universities of Asia by the Asiaweek.<P>According to a solid critical analysis based on profound investigations by Asiaweek, Military College of Signals (NUST) stands at the 20th position in overall ranking of leading Asian Universities imparting training in the field of Information Technology.<P>The survey categories included academic reputation, student selectivity, faculty resources, research, financial resources etc.<P>The college produces Telecommunication Engineers and Its expertise capable of meeting the requirements of Pakistan Army there by saving foreign exchange that would be required for the maintenance of state-of-the- art telecomm equipment presently being used.<P>Military College of Signals not only provides IT professionals to Pakistan Army and officers from the Allied countries students from all over the country also attend the courses run by the college.—APP<BR> <A HREF="http://www.paknews.com/cgi-paknews/paknews.cgi?news=100/November/2-11-3&key=nadra" TARGET=_blank>http://www.paknews.com/cgi-paknews/paknews.cgi?news=100/November/2-11-3&key=nadra</A> <P>Representatives of the eleven banks and Development Financial Institutions, and NADRA Chairman Major-General Zahid Ihsan signed the agreement here, wherein the banks would invest in NADRA operations with an interest rate 2 percent below then their routine loans. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.paknews.com/cgi-paknews/paknews.cgi?news=100/June/11-6-2&key=nadra" TARGET=_blank>http://www.paknews.com/cgi-paknews/paknews.cgi?news=100/June/11-6-2&key=nadra</A> <P>8 senior Army officers inducted in NADRA <BR> <BR> ISLAMABAD. June 11 (Online) The government has inducted eight senior Army officers of the rank of Major General, Brigadiers and Colonels in NADRA. <BR>Those inducted in NADRA included Major General Zahid Ihsan Chairman NADRA, Brig; Munir Akbar director Islamabad, Brig; Anwar director Peshawar, Brig; Nadeem Qamar Lahore, Brig; Shahid Karachi, Brig; Pervez Quetta, Col. Iqbal Sargodha and Col. Fazal Multan. <P>These Army officers were given colossal task of creating a "workable system" leading to good governance in the country, in their capacity as head and directors of NADRA. <P>Meanwhile, first directors conference of NADRA was held here Saturday under the chairmanship of Maj Gen Zahid Ihsan. <P>Participants vowed to give helping hand to the election commission and interior ministry for preparation of new computerised electoral rolls and national identity cards respectively. <P> <BR> <P>
<A HREF="http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/oct/letter.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/oct/letter.htm</A> <BR>errata in Humayun Amin's earlier article. <P>The casualties of 13 Punjab i.e 24 killed were mistakenly written as casualties of 9 Punjab. Incidentally in the previous issue i.e July 2000 issue I had discussed these casualties in article Chillianwalla and had given the correct figures. <P>I may add that these errors are not as serious as many committed by 1000 times more illustrious personalities.i will quote four instances i.e one in which in a serving major general made Elphinstone a viceroy of India while in reality this was totally incorrect. another eminent author then a colonel, now a very senior officer, in a book sponsored by staff college quetta made humayun fight the second battle of panipat when he was already dead and also substituted the Hindu enemy for the suri enemy!, a third one in which there were many factual errors in the eaxminer report of 1992 Staff College entrance exams, a fourth one in which many factual errors were committed by illustrious personalities in the Green Book of Pakistan Army of the year 1992-93. I pointed these errors on all four occasions.only the first error was publicly acknowledged by the Staff College and that too after repeated letters written by me. On all other three occassions my parent formation headquarters 14 division was asked to warn me not to interfere with works of eminent personalities! Colonel Majid ex AQ 14 Division is a direct witness of this fact! He is retired and settled in Rawalpindi. <P>I also received certain complaints regarding casualties of units in Grand Slam. It was a pure military discussion meant not to let down any unit. 14 Punjab was commanded by uncle of a very close relative. Nothing offensive was implied!as far as 11 Cavalry is concerned, there is no doubt that the unit was mis employed and to date the scars remain. In 1971 the unit suffered more casualties i.e 24 killed in Chamb but the unit had no bitter feelings since they knew the GOC who had commanded the 6 armoured division earlier and the casualties occurred not because of incompetence but essentially because of the enemy factor in a situation in which someone had to make sacrifices to achieve a breakthrough. No wonder that the picture of General Eftikhar Janjua is the most pivotal part of 11 Cavalry’s tea bar. <P> <A HREF="http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/oct/handling.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/oct/handling.htm</A> <P>PART II of the earlier article on Armor. <P>start quote. <P>THE 1984 AND 1987 WAR SCARES <P>Pakistan concluded a major arms deal with the US in 1981 but the urgent need to modernise/upgrade the armour was not realised since the military junta was enjoying siphoning the fruits of massive US aid into private bank accounts. Thus once Indira Gandhi mobilised her forces in the wake of the Sikh Insurgency and concentrated them close to the border in mid-September Pakistani armour was in bad shape both technically as well as maintenance wise having the same old 1966-71 T-59 tanks. War looked imminent but the tension de-escalated after Indira Gandhi’s assassination. <P>In 1987 again Pakistani armour was qualitatively inferior having the same 1971 T-59’s albeit new or reconditioned vis-a-vis Indian T-72s. War looked imminent in January 1987 but did not break out due to sheer irresolution on Rajiv Gandhi’s part. Later much propaganda was done in Pakistan about some visionary soldiers but as this scribe wrote in a letter published in one of the most prestigious journals of the Pakistan Army “As far as BRASS TACKS is concerned, I beg to submit that there was no countermove with the deliberate intention to frighten the Indians.The move of the Strategic Reserve (Pakistan’s 2 Corps) from Cholistan to Ravi-Sutlej Corridor was a purely defensive move. If Sunderji lost his nerve then it was a matter of pure chance otherwise the Pakistani intention was never to unnerve Sunderji but to get its strategic reserve to a more central location which it occupied in both 1965 and 1971 wars. Later on with benefit of hindsight some people here did attempt to make the effort appear as a visionary soldier’s piece of military genius”.88 The readers may note that this assertion was not challenged by anyone which either means that the staff college magazine is either distributed in graveyards or no one has the time or energy to read or contest anything! <P>The situation in 1987 was most grave for Pakistani armour at least technically and numerically and the Indians due to sheer irresolution lost a golden chance to impose a military solution which in the post- Chaghi scenario is no longer possible. One explanation of the Pakistani armoured division’s withdrawal north of Sutlej lies in Pakistani governments desire not to provoke the Indians. Technically, however, Pakistan Armour was not in a reasonable shape to fight a war in January 1987. <P>NEW RAISINGS <BR> <BR>1971-1994 AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS <BR> <P> New raisings were done after the 1971 war but every new raising was based on milking of existing units and was matched by new raisings on the other side. Thus these new raisings did not produce any qualitative or quantitative situation in the overall comparative military balance. Some units were raised soon after the 1971 war while six units were raised as a result of the return of personnel of Tabuk Brigade in 1985 and 1988 respectively. Three more units were raised on the return of the armoured brigade despatched to the Gulf in 1991, while two more units were raised from the existing independent squadrons one of which was raised in 1971 and was commanded by this scribe till November 1993. Both these two units were raised in infantry divisions and thus deprived of the relatively far superior training environment that should have been available to them by virtue of being raised in an armoured division. This was done at a time when there were many senior armour officers in the General Headquarters and this simple truism could have been conveyed to the concerned authority. The sending of two batches of officers and men to Saudi Arabia in 1982 and 1985 seriously undermined armoured corps efficiency. Two classes were created in both within the officers and the rank and file. The incentive to somehow go to Saudi Arabia created unpleasant situation in many units in terms of class rivalry, favouritism and even further dilution of uprightness and soldierly forthrightness and simple approach towards regimental soldiering. Only individuals gained while the military spirit of the army described by Clausewitz as the most important foundation of an army was eroded. This was followed by other carrots that made people more money minded and calculating like secondments to Somalia, Bosnia etc. The net goodwill they brought can be gauged from the fact that Pakistan is on the borderline in the US State Department’s list of terrorist nations and is on the brink of financial default which will force its government, military or civil to finally bend to superpower dictation regardless of all rhetoric! <P>During the period 1977-88 the armoured corps got the best opportunity to benefit from the fact that an armour officer was the master of everything! Paradoxically professionally things deteriorated! Two messes were built in Nowshera and Rawalpindi which are not for armour officers, at least those below brigadier! The one in Rawalpindi is a personal fiefdom and is an excellent means of exercising patronage and enhancing contacts! The armour school during this period went on the same lines as in 1960s. No new building was built. It retained its unique distinction of being the final resting place of near superseded or superseded brigadiers at a time when from 1983-84 the infantry school was upgraded to a general rank headed institution, and some very fine officers (barring few exceptions!!!!) were posted to head that institution! The armoured corps suffered in terms of promotion since promotions became a far more personalised affair since those on top knew officers intimately and lavishly exercised their powers to promote or demote in a typical third world whimsical style.Thus many fine officers like Sher Azam Malik and Javed Hussain were sidelined while many officers reached the general rank despite the fact that at least one was not recommended for next rank by his infantry division commander and corps commander. It is true that some individuals gained four star rank without commanding a division or a corps or in other ways but the armoured corps as an arm suffered. It became a personal fiefdom from 1976 to 1988. It will take many years to recover from the negative effects of that “Darbari Era”. Perhaps the next war towards which the sub-continent is invariably being pushed into due to myopic vision and lack of statesmanship will be the final audit of the armoured corps of both sides since 1971! Our only hope is that our Indian friends I hear are almost as incompetent as we are beyond tank regiment or brigade level. At least their performance beyond unit level in both 1965 and 1971, provides a lot of solace and indicates that their commanders beyond unit level are as illustrious as ours! <P>**details of Zarb-e-Momin***<P>There is nothing much to write about Zarb-i-Momin as far as armour was concerned. This by all definitions, is ironic since it was supposed to be an armour dominated show supposedly designed to derive lessons which were special to armour. What happened in reality was a farce. The enemy armoured divisions reconnaissance teams were in the enemy territory some four months before the war broke out, conducting Recce and familiarising themselves with the area. Engineer units arrived months before to improve tracks to enhance mobility inside enemy territory! This scribe was then serving in 3rd Armoured Brigade Headquarters. The only redeeming feature of the exercise was the 3rd Armoured Brigade counter-attack, which succeeded by divine design since bad weather rendered the enemy air inoperational. Huge exercises in which millions are spent, however, cannot be justified simply because of attacks, which succeed, by divine design! There was no element of the fog of war for the advancing side, while the defenders final attack succeeded by Divine Design! The military objectives of the exercise, at least meaningful ones pertaining to higher direction of war, or inter corps co-ordination i.e holding and striking corps operating in the same area, were not achieved. If anyone claims that these were achieved then the fact that no co-ordinating headquarter was created to regulate the holding and striking corps between 1989 and 1998 proved that the lessons, that is if any, apart from those in the realm of propaganda and public relations, were learnt, were either not implemented (a serious command failing if true) or disregarded by the successors of the then chief. The second conclusion is also highly improbable since the then chief was in chair for more than one and half year after the exercise, and had ample time to incorporate the lessons, that is if any meaningful ones were learnt. Since this scribe does not have the power of ESP it is not possible to gauge whether the ulterior motives of that exercise, if any were achieved or not! <P>The problem with the army of 1984-90, at the top was that it was dominated by men who had not commanded armoured formations beyond unit level or brigade (and that too for few months) in case of armour and even had not commanded infantry formations in major general rank which held even a tank squadron on their order of battle! Zia who had commanded an armoured division in peace and a corps for an year had utilised bulk of his time in sycophancy with the PPP stalwarts in Multan and had nothing to do with any armoured battle in both the wars! The best product of this galaxy of talents was the bifurcation of the older corps into striking and holding formations as stated earlier, without earmarking any co-ordinating headquarter and would have been a recipe to diasaster in case a war had broken out! This Quixotic bifurcation as earlier stated was not tested in Zarb-e-Momin. <P>ANALYSIS <P>ARMOUR IN TRAINING MANOEUVRES <P>Various divisional level training manoeuvres were held after 1971 and many lessons were learnt. However, there is no organisational or institutional framework to scientifically evaluate the command abilities of officers beyond tank regiment level. This assertion is based on conviction and was pointed out in writing by this scribe in various army journals and is on record :— <P>“Evaluation of exercises which is one of the major peactime methods of judging resolution in a commander is an extremely rigorous and scientific affair. It is felt that this should be done by a select corps of officers who will be less biased in judging a man’s professional calibre. The present system, it is felt is less objective, less scientific and less profession oriented. Probably it is so because those who evaluate each other spend more time together in cantonments than in the field and thus go into the field with preconceived ideas further biased by personal likes and dislikes ............the present system of exercises are not aimed at testing the command qualities which are really decisive like resolution. Even if this is being done in certain cases then it is confined to lower command levels, which a study of military history illustrates is just not enough .........” We have got to train our commanders for adverse situations which demand unconventional audacious and imaginative planning. Presently we are afraid this is not being done. Rather exercises are demonstrations on a massive scale”.89 <P>“There are institutions (referring to one particular institution) which deliver a verdict on command qualities of an individual without a single exercise in the field”!90 ......... “ Commanders above unit level are rarely properly exercised” ........ “ The system is producing many whose tour of regimental soldiering is with the primary aim of getting a hole punched in the service record card”.91 <P>“Many military systems that this world saw were a conspiracy against originality and boldness”......“Create an ‘Evaluation Corps’ which will be a full time corps primarily designed/dedicated to test the professional competence of commanders at all levels (till divisional level)”.92 <P>“Establishment of training command, responsible for planning and monitoring Army’s training is an inescapable necessity”.93 <P> The rationale behind quoting all these observations which are on record is to prove that training manoeuvres as this scribe saw them while serving for four continuous years, without going on a single course or even a month’s leave in an armoured divison or later in other infantry formations, were not being held on a scientific basis. There were exceptions like Generals Hameed Gul, Sajjad or Brigadier Inayatullah Niazi (his other qualities/peculiarities apart) who took training manoeuvres religiously and conducted them brilliantly, but these men and particularly Hameed Gul (his so called fundamentalist political views aside) was an exception and the next two years after his departure from the armoured division as this scribe saw were the most barren years of training. The reason is simple, i.e procedural and institutional arrangements are longer lasting and more consistent and to a considerable extent compensate for individual human qualitative differences resulting from change of command from person “X” to person “Z”. <P>The problem is that lack of a neutral organisation which could give a second opinion on the command abilities of a commander beyond squadron unit or brigade level was missing. It was common to hear many brigade and unit commanders brag that it was their pen and not the performance of an officer on training manoeuvres which would decide the issue. This was true since it was common to see many excellent brigade commanders and unit commanders who handled their command outfits superbly in field training manoeuvres being sidelined to oblivion and obscurity while many relatively incompetent, as far performance in field was concerned, but “on paper good officers”, getting the best appointments and rising to general rank.This is as far as the armoured corps was concerned. The secondment to Saudi Arabia propelled another breed who had a good time in three years in Tabuk where exercises were a “hoax” and reached high ranks without commanding an armoured brigade (the Lahore armoured brigade being an exception since it hardly does any meaningful training at brigade level and performs other more important non training duties) or armoured division. There emerged during the period 1977-1994 a breed of essentially paper tiger commanders who had all the holes punched and had also mastered the techniques of conducting perfect armoured attacks (in reality, carefully rehearsed demonstrations) under conditions in which all the friction of war which that poor Prussian Clausewitz had written about had been eliminated through whiz kid techniques mastered in the process of hole punching and keeping the OEI high ! <P>HANDLING OF ARMOUR IN SCHOOLS OF INSTRUCTION <P>Handling of armour in schools of instruction also requires serious re-evaluation. During my stay in the School of Armour I observed that there were no fixed parameters or training guidelines at army level which regulated that institution. All depended on the commandant’s personality. If there was a hard taskmaster like Sher Azam Malik everything went well but everything would suddenly transform once person “Y” or “Z” came. As far as I know the school with few exceptions was a dumping ground for superseded or about to be superseded brigadiers, at least after 1971 with perhaps one or two odd exceptions. Naturally these commandants were on their way out and with few exceptions took more interest in preparing themselves for their future retired life! The same was true for instructors at Lieutenant Colonel level out of whom very few went beyond brigadier. Further the school’s location being far away from both the armoured divisions did not allow integration of students doing courses in major armour training manoeuvres as is done in the Infantry School in Quetta. This school should be re-located somewhere in the desert in Cholistan or perhaps its outer fringes or in the Potohar plateau! This scribe in May-June 1993 had made a similar recommendation for the independent armoured squadron that he was commanding and was then stationed in Okara (through an official written letter held on record) to be shifted to the desert in Tamewali or Bahawalnagar. The recommendation made as part of unit points for the divisional conference was approved by Major General Zia ul Haq the General Officer Commanding the infantry division and implemented much to the chagrin of officers who later joined the new tank regiment raised from the Phoenix ashes of that squadron! Coming back to the main line of discussion there was no system of grading in the school and the powers of the officers in charge course, the chief instructor and the higher appointment holders to alter a tactical grading done by an instructor of major or colonel rank were not limited by any margin of plus one or two as was the practice in Infantry School. I don’t know whether it has changed now from 1992. <P>The instructors posted after staff college to armour school were those majors who were not fit to be brigade majors or were there simply because no unit or other vacancy was available for them! This did not mean that these majors were not good since the system of assessment of staff college needs considerable revamping. The bad part was that these majors did not put up maximum hard work since they knew that the seal of relatively mediocre majors had been stamped on them and, however, hard they worked their chances for promotion beyond colonel rank were remote! Two buildings were completed in 1988-89 but these were hardly sufficient to meet the existing demands! The transparency of the system of grading could be gauged from the fact that the only two officers who got an alpha grade in tactical leg of the young officer’s basic course were sons of serving generals! This scribe had the opportunity to see one of them during the basic course and was perplexed and surprised as to how he was graded alpha. On the other hand a retired three star general’s son who had already managed a Bee Plus in the junior Staff Course (a far more tough affair than the mid career course) while his father was a serving three star general, was initially graded as Bee Minus in the Mid-Career Course whereas he certainly deserved a Bee! Later on I believe he was given a Bee, after much haggling as happened at Valtoha between 1 FF and 6 Lancers. <P>HIGHER ARMOUR OPERATIONAL COMMAND ORGANISATION <P>No major change in Pakistani higher armour command as earlier discussed in brief was made till 1987. In 1986-87 the older corps which contained both holding and striking formations were sub-divided into holding and striking corps. This arrangement although outwardly neat and superficially sound was essentially confusing and fallacious. It was regarding this change that this scribe pointed out in an article “It is felt that during conduct of operations two formation commanders of equal rank commanding a holding and strike formation respectively in the same area of operations, cannot function effectively. Even during Exercise Zarb-e-Momin this aspect was not put to trial. Training of holding and strike formations needs to be integrated thus meriting a unified operational command vested in the person of one officer of the rank of lieutenant general. The change may require creation of Army Headquarters in certain operational areas”.94 <P>The arrangement of holding and striking corps without any higher co-ordinating headquarter was a recipe for confusion and disaster as I witnessed while serving in a holding corps, once I personally saw the lack of communication and co-ordination in training and cooperation between the concerned strike and holding corps. Thus, I was motivated to write another article in which this scribe’s recommendations for establishing a co-ordinating headquarters for the holding and striking corps were seconded by the worthy editor of the Citadel Magazine as ones which “certainly merits consideration”.95 The rationale on which these recommendations were based were: “The concept of holding and striking formation also needs reappraisal....the bifurcation in terms of offensive and defensive role, while outwardly neat and theoretically sound is historically without a successful precedent. The issue could have been resolved in exercise Zarb-e-Momin in 1989 by subjecting it to the friction of a rigorous training manoeuvre”.96 “The shield and the spear or the hammer and the anvil can function effectively only if one head synchronises and co-ordinates their operational functions. As they say that too many cooks spoil the broth, the two formations fighting the same battle in the same operational area cannot fully realise their combat potential unless a headquarter regulates their operations.How can one main headquarters 200 or 400 miles in the rear, with loads of other matters to take care of, effectively co-ordinate the operations of a hammer and anvil”.97 “The need for an army headquarters to co-ordinate and effectively command the holding and strike corps is an indispensable necessity”.98 I believe that there has been some progress since these recommendations which are on record were made in 1998. All credit, however, goes to then commandant Major General Amjad and his team who published these two above quoted articles. Had these been written in 1987 or 1988 no editor would have dared to publish them. 99 <P>POOR INTER-ARM/INTER- UNIT COOPERATION AND LACK OF DIVISIONAL SPIRIT <P>Poor inter-arm cooperation seriously retarded the combat potential of the Pakistan Armoured Corps right from 1947. This was the worst British legacy that both the Indo-Pak armies inherited. A British observer in WW Two noted that “in the training of the armoured division, I stressed the need for co-operation of all arms in battle. One had to check a pernicious doctrine which had grown up in recent years, aided by certain civilian writers, that tank units were capable of winning an action without the assistance of other arms. The Chief agent in debunking this and many other fallacies of our pre-war pundits were the German”.100 The secret of the German Blitzkrieg tactics which revolutionised warfare lay in intimate inter-arm cooperation. The US concept of Combined Arms Teams is actually the old German inter-arm cooperation within the Panzer Division concept ‘wine in new bottles’. The British tanks in WW II on the other hand repeatedly failed to function effectively because of poor inter-arm cooperation based on inter-unit rivalry and excess of regimentation. The Pakistan Army inherited this disease and this disease instead of getting reduced became more pronounced after 1947. The army remained infantry dominated since all the chiefs from 1948 to 1972 were from infantry. From 1977 to 1988 the army remained armour dominated and preference in promotion was given to those close to Zia. Poor inter-arm cooperation led to serious operational failures in Khem Karan and in Grand Slam in 1965 and at Bara Pind in 1971. The similarity between the lack of infantry tank cooperation in Grand Slam and in Khem Karan and those of similar incidents in the case of British infantry and tanks at Gazala etc is remarkable. Even when I was commissioned in 11 Cavalry in March 1983, 29 Cavalry (in which this scribe later served for some time) being a new unit was regarded as second among equals, 7 FF the mechanised infantry unit of our brigade was viewed as an enemy and 15 SP the artillery unit was despised and considered too insignificant even to be considered an enemy. The Supply and Transport unit was regarded as a bunch of untouchables! The EME was not liked but feared, for their nuisance value in inspections, though secretly despised. It was out of question to visit the messes of these units and my friendship with an officer of 7 FF was viewed by many seniors as disloyalty to the regiment! Officers from armoured regiments were mostly friendly with officers from other armoured regiments. It was rare that any officer of the infantry division met any officer of the armoured division in Kharian. <P>Even within the very small armoured corps of the 1950s and 1960s there were glaring differences from regiment to regiment. There were regiments with a much higher representation in the top hierarchy dating from 1947 and there were fatherless regiments who had done well in war but had no patrons beyond the brigadier rank. The negative factor here for the armoured corps was the fact that while the regiment in infantry had a much larger number of units like the Punjab and FF group, each armoured regiment was as different from each other as France from Germany and an officer from any tank regiment only believed in patronising his very own regiment! <P>Parallels can be found in battle of Bir El Gubi in 1941 where the 22 Armoured Brigade frontally charged the Italians with the support of just one battery of 25 Pounders 101 and failed to capture it suffering in the process huge losses and in the Battle of Bara Pind where Pakistan’s 8 Armoured Brigade did a similar thing. The German tank general and illustrious staff officer Von Mellenthin noted this failing when he said, “their commanders would not concentrate tanks and guns for a co-ordinated battle”.102 <P>On the other hand notorious examples of non-cooperation in 1965 and 1971 wars can be compared with the conduct of the British armour at Gazala in 1942 when the 2nd Highland infantry was destroyed by German tanks while a superior British tank force merely looked on, or in the case of the 1/6th Rajputana Rifles who were abandoned to German Panzers simply because the British armour had to go into leaguer!103 <P>One of the most notorious examples of lack of inter-arm co-operation took place in Chawinda when first the Indian tanks withdrew from Jassoran-Buttur Dograndi-Sodreke area on their own104, and later when Indian tanks ordered to re-attack the same area later were not informed about the failure of the last night’s infantry attack!105 An Indian general frankly admitted this lack of inter arm cooperation when he said, “There were misunderstandings galore between the infantry and armour commanders in the second battle of Chawinda. A lack of rapport seems to be the only explanation..”.106 This lack of cooperation was something like 13th century inter-arm and individual rivalry which led to the failure of the Crusaders or the Mongols against the Mamelukes.Toynbee the great historian thus wrote, “the individual Mongol champion was promptly overcome by the disciplined heavy cavalry of the Egyptian Mamlukes (mostly kidnapped slaves of Slav/European origin converted to Islam after being bought by the Kurds etc). These had given warning of the supremacy of their technique at the Battle of Mansurah in AD 1250, when Frankish army of Saint Louis had paid a disastrous penalty for the thoughtless individualism of its knights, each anxious for personal honour at the expense of the disciplined formation”.107 I can state with confidence that as late as 1993 that almost each tank regiment (having seen five tank regiments and one tank squadron) or infantry regiment behaved at least symbolically like these thirteenth century knights described by Toynbee, at least in garrisons and on field manoeuvres! I am sure that the Indian army being the chip of the same block and led by as mediocre and orders oriented men is no different! At least in strength of reservoirs of mediocrity the subcontinent consists of men belonging to one nation! <P>THE CAVALRY CHARGE TRADITION <P>The Armoured Corps inherited a typically British cavalry charge tradition, an irrational urge of being “brave to the point of foolhardiness”.108 The Indians suffered from a similar malady and lost many tanks in attacks delivered in a cavalry charge manner at Gadgor, Phillora, Buttur, Dograndi, Sodreke, etc. Brigadier Riaz ul Karim who was sent as Deputy GOC of 6 Armoured Division described these encounters as “Kabbadi Matches”. Riaz thus observed “The normal practice on both sides was to despatch one armoured regiment at a time to probe and infiltrate (with infantry following) and the other side reacted with launching one of their own armoured regiments to stop and destroy that force. With this type of battle, there were heavy tank casualties on both sides”.109 Riaz states that “The first thing that I did was to stop the ‘Kabbadi Game’ i.e for one regiment sailing into the blues and coming back with a bloody nose”.110 <P>NATURE OF EMPLOYMENT IN WW TWO AND INFLUENCE OF CONSERVATIVE BRITISH DOCTRINE <P>In all fairness the nature of Indian Army’s employment as far as the armoured corps was concerned did not make things any easier for the armoured corps of both the countries. The Indian Armoured Corps was either employed in a screen/scout role or in conditions where their opponent as in Burma was vastly inferior both numerically and quantitatively in number of tanks. Indians were not groomed for higher ranks and even the British despite better education superior literacy level and technically and qualitatively superior position did not produce a single good tank commander at any level higher than tank regiment. No wonder that they failed the Germans in France and North Africa from 1940 till 1942 when finally the scales were turned, not because of better generalship but by virtue of overwhelming numerical superiority. Further the conservative British tank doctrine which both the armies inherited and made no effort to change that armour commanders beyond unit level remained as mediocre as they were on the British side in WW II. It is no credit to the quality of British armoured corps that General Mellenthin who saw the British Army as its direct opponent for some two years noted that “ The British Artillery was the best trained and best commanded element in the British Army”.111 <P>MISCELLANEOUS PSYCHOLOGICAL HANGUPS <P>The armoured corps of 1947 inherited many psychological hang-ups. The subconscious emphasis inherited from the British was on being an “arm of fashion and wealth” “affected carelessness” and worst of all “an arrogant non-chalance towards the duller aspects of their work”.112 During a winter collective which this scribes unit had to conduct for another armoured brigade, the other brigades units insisted that their tank commanders cannot advance unless there is a visible track going through the desert. In this case there was none! Finally the problem was resolved by asking for engineer support and a track was made with the help of earthmoving equipment! During my service I frequently heard many officers saying that a fourth tank troop in a squadron was good and added flexibility while many said that it was difficult to manage. These officers probably never understood that the Germans performed miracles with armoured divisions, which had just one Panzer Regiment (tank brigade). <P>LACK OF OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY AT BRIGADE/BEYOND AND DOCTRINAL AMBIGUITY AND CONFUSION AT SPECIAL TO ARM TACTICAL LEVEL <P>Firstly we shall discuss the leaguer concept which seriously jeopardised the success of Pakistani armour operations in Khem Karan. The British mostly withdrew from the final battle positions in North Africa because they feared the German 88 Anti-Tank Guns and wanted to have a peaceful next morning. In any case the operational situation in North Africa was not area oriented, as in Punjab but mobility oriented since any outflanked force could easily move in any direction and regain its equilibrium. In Punjab where defence was a relatively far more superior type of warfare than in the desert and holding every inch of captured territory was important, the operational situation was totally different from North Africa. Here every locality once captured had to be held since manoeuvre was far more difficult due to heavy terrain, friction and large number of artificial and natural obstacles and bottlenecks. This was a serious doctrinal failing which should have been resolved in the School of Armour. No one gave it a serious thought since it was thought that the Pattons were invincible. These pedants failed to realise that the British repeatedly failed to defeat Rommel despite possessing numerical and qualitative superiority as was admitted by Captain B.H Liddell Hart. <P>There was an inclination in some strike formations to use French terms in operational orders! On one occasion shortly before retirement while this scribe was an umpire with a strike infantry division, I read the term “Coup de Main” describing the division’s main attack. My knowledge of French was limited but as far as I then knew “Coup de Main” in the British military sense was a term used for a surprise attack launched in a manner which was not very deliberate or conventional. Once I pointed this out the majority was outraged and two colonels who had done the French Staff Course insisted that “Coup de Main” was the right word for describing “Main Attack or Effort”. <P>Then we come to brigade level. The Khem Karan failure was essentially the failure of 5 Armoured brigade. On the first day the brigade was dispersed without any coherent plan one tank regiment going for Assal Uttar from the centre and left, one tank regiment (some 19 tanks) going for Valtoha without any sizeable infantry support and the brigade headquarters sitting in Khem Karan as if it was the headquarters of Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command rather than a brigade tactical headquarter. It appears that there was no operational philosophy of handling armour at brigade level. The brigade was thus doing what a German Panzer Division could not do i.e attacking on some three axis instead of developing the operations on what the Germans called the “Schwerpunkt”.113 The concept of all arms cooperation was not understood and 6 Lancers was despatched to Valtoha on its own . Its Commanding Officer did make a request for infantry114 but this was brushed aside and mechanised infantry which was available that day did little, regardless of whatever they may claim now in their regimental histories. <P>Major failures in both Indian and Pakistan Armies in handling of armour occurred at brigade and division level. It appears that no lessons were derived from these failures. In my thirteen years service I witnessed changes in concept of employment of armoured brigade and division with change of brigade and divisional commanders. Thus what was executed by Brigadier Inayatullah Niazi for two years was disregarded in near totality once Inayat departed and was endorsed by the same commanding officers who had served earlier under Inayat as the Gospel truth! One i.e my second commanding officer, who had dissented under both the commanders albeit tactfully retired as a colonel! This is just one example out of innumerable examples. The School of Armour as far as I know till 1992 had no concrete or tangible set of recommendations about concept of employment or doctrine of employment of an armoured brigade or division in the various types of terrain/scenarios where employment was likely. I was in charge of all the scripts held in the Tactical Wing from December 1991 to December 1992 and did not find any such thing! Even in the School, concepts of employment changed with change of commandant or change of chief instructor! The Divisional Battle Schools of Armoured Divisions were dumping grounds of superseded or near superseded majors and colonels and their cardinal attribute was “silence of a graveyard” as I pointed out to a letter to editor of Citadel magazine in mid-1998. There was no specific to corps area of operations doctrine of operations of armour at least till 1994, at a time when the existence of a multiple number of formations like mechanised brigade, corps reserve, army reserve operating in the same area made a clarity of role/mission/doctrine of employment all the more necessary! Infantry lieutenant colonels who had done foreign staff college had rudimentary ideas about the non-linear armoured battle and the behaviour of enemy armour in the post-breakout stage! Armour after all in all three wars has failed to breakout successfully as far as both sides are concerned! <P>TRADITION OF LEADING FROM THE REAR AT BRIGADE AND BEYOND <P>One of the main reasons of slowness of British armour operations was the fact that brigade commanders with few exception like the great Jock Campbell, VC who was an artillery man, there was a tradition of leading from the rear and this certainly contributed to many failures in Grand Slam and in Khem Karan. Decision making was thus done at a snail’s pace. All sorts of false and exaggerated reports were accepted as the Gospel truth etc. The British tradition of leading from the rear had a deep connection with the level of esteem in which their staff officers were held by their field commanders. The layman reader may note that unlike the German General Staff the British never had a permanent cadre of general staff officers. In their army as in both the Indo-Pak armies attending the staff course was just a hole punching business and general staff was not a highly specialised corps in the British Army unlike the German Army where the staff officer with a crimson stripe on his uniform was a highly qualified man belonging to a corps d elite. Thus while German commanders of the rank of brigade, divisional and corps level could lead from the front staying close to the leading tank regiment, the British commanders could not do so, since they looked down on their staff officers as men who were incapable of manning their main headquarters. Thus the profound truth in Mellenthin’s observation that “the officers of the German General Staff were not mere clerks or mouthpieces of their higher commanders (Mellenthin hints without saying so that the British ones were!!!!), but were trained to accept responsibility to give grave decisions and were respected accordingly. In contrast the British fighting commanders tended to look down on the staff, and the British show a curious reluctance to appoint capable staff officers to operational commands”.115 <P>LACK OF OFFENSIVE SPIRIT <P>There was a serious lack of offensive spirit at all levels beyond unit level. Thus Ayub did not leave Rawalpindi throughout the war. As late as 1991 a Directing Staff of Command and Staff College observed this glaring lack of aggressiveness in the army in an article published in 1991.116 The writer then an instructor at the command and Staff College and now probably commanding a division somewhere thus noted, “The Battle of Chamb was cited as an instance; where the momentum of attack dissipated after the General Officer Commanding embraced Shahadat”. The readers may note that this man was one of the few generals who led from the front. Some of the many who saw him in that role, who this scribe knows/met are Majors Suleman Butt (11C), Iftikhar Chaudhry (11 C), Shujaat Ali Janjua (the indomitable Panther Janjua from (11C) and Lieutenant Colonel Zil ur Rehman who was commanding an R & S Company. <P>POOR GENERAL STAFF PROCEDURES AND PLANNING ABILITY AT HIGHER LEVELS <P>This factor played a serious role in the Pakistani armoured division’s failure at Khem Karan in 1965. At the GHQ level the failure to appreciate that the armoured division must get out of the bottleneck between Rohi and Nikasu Nala was not appreciated. Nothing in the orders given to the 1st Armoured Division indicates that the planners understood this problem. Nikasu Nala was a pre-1947 landmark while Rohi Nala was no common pin to have missed the eyes of the planners. Poor general staff procedures at brigade and division level led to failure to concentrate all three armoured brigades across the Rohi Nala and thus was the principal reason for failure of the armoured division’s effort. The GHQ vacillation and indecision on 6th, 7th and 8th September when it issued contradictory orders to the 1st Armoured Division, sometimes to send one of its brigades to Lahore and sometimes to Sialkot117 also played a major role in adding to the imperial confusion in the armoured division. <P>Correlli Barnett’s observations on the British Staffs of WW II fit well on the Pakistani Staff officers role in failure to handle armour. Barnett thus noted “The pace (referring to that of armoured operations) was too fast for the slow working staffs of lower formations (referringto corps/divisional/brigade staffs) ......(German staff work, because of greater experience and better training, was always faster and more lucid than British).....and detailed organisation for the offensive was poor and confused”.118 This observation fits well with the Military Operations Directorate of both sides and all staff officers down to armoured brigade level responsible for planning/executing the operations of both the Pakistani and the Indian 1st Armoured Divisions. The British perhaps were unlucky that their opponents were Germans and the Indians and Pakistanis were perhaps very lucky that their opponents were Pakistanis and Indians! <P>CONCLUSION <P>The Gul theory of failure because infantry officers were commanding the armoured division is not vindicated by actual facts of the 1965 war. Was the Indian 1st Armoured Division or its 1st Armoured Brigade commanded by an infantry officer and yet they proved as incompetent as Naseer. After all Rommel was from infantry, Macarthur, Mead and Lee were from Engineers and Napoleon was from artillery. The fault lay in the military clique of that time who made promotions on whims and on basis of personal likes and dislikes rather than on merit. After all the finest armoured commander that the sub- continent produced was Eftikhar who was an infantry man! <P>The Pakistan armoured corps with the exception of one unit of armoured cars was not employed in 1947-48 war. In 1965 Pakistan Armoured Corps failed to achieve a major breakthrough despite relative qualitative superiority in tanks as well as overwhelming numerical superiority in total available number of tanks in Khem Karan due to doctrinal leadership and essentially staff incompetence centred reasons. A breakthrough was possible and one Indian general was frank enough to recall as late as 1993 General Harbaksh Singh’s remarks that “A Blitzkrieg deep into our territory towards the Grand Trunk Road or the Beas Bridge would have found us in the helpless position of a commander paralysed into inaction for want of readily available reserves while the enemy was inexorably pushing deep into our vitals.It is a nightmarish feeling even when considered in retrospect at this stage”119. Long before 1965 and 1971 civilians on the board of the boundary commission had very high hopes from both the Indian and Pakistan Armies and thus one had said “If Pakistan manages in a counterattack to make a 40 miles advance, then the defence of India would be affected. True they would lose Bhatinda and Dhuri and Pakistan forces were within measurable distance of Ambala,but they (referring to the Indian Army) do not lose all. Their communications are not upset; they lose so much of the railway line up to the extent of forty miles, but they still have the main line bringing their supplies at right angles to their forces...”120. The same member went further and gave the Indians a capability of advancing 500 miles inside Pakistan!121 Compare these remarks with two Indian three star generals remarks:— “We penetrated only 11 miles (despite a five to one superiority in tanks on 8th September and a much larger one in infantry-this scribe’s remarks) into enemy territory beyond the bridgehead at our deepest stretch, when, but for the mishandling of our forces, especially armour, the completion of our mission appeared well within our grasp”.122 Another sadly noted “it ground to a halt just four miles ahead of the bridgehead”!123 This happened not as propagandists assert in Pakistan because of some superior martial race or ideological reasons but simply because the Indian brigade and division commander lost their nerve. The Indians, the lower ranks till battalion/regiment level fought as bravely at Chawinda as their Pakistani counterparts, tankman and infantry man alike, at Khem Karan where Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Division also failed to achieve a breakthrough despite a seven to one superiority in tanks in total number. Leave aside west or east of Rohi Nala which was entirely a command as well as staff planning failure. The Nikasu Nala was even clearly marked as a large water obstacle even on the maps of the Punjab Boundary Commission!124 So where do we go. The common man, the tax payer has been bled white on both sides with a very large percentage being spent on armoured corps which failed to advance pathetically beyond 4 miles on the first day of the war in face of nominal opposition or eleven miles in all 17 days or got stuck between a Nala and a canal in own territory! The generals on both sides should explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against them for strategic and operational incompetence despite being provided with superiority at the decisive point and why their command outfits which are too large for their intellectual/resolution capabilities to handle in war should not be cut to one fourth their present size! But who will bell the cat! Why not employ a good team of psychiatrists at one-fiftieth the cost spent on armour and other expensive hardware and cure the pathetic minds of the sick Indo Pak psyche! Alas! we forget what long ago Freud said, “The irrational forces in man’s nature are so strong that the rational forces have little chance of success against them. A small minority might be able to live a life of reason, but most men are comfortable living with their delusions and superstitions than with truth”. Freud thus sadly concluded “Society which has been fashioned by man reflects to a great extent man’s irrationality. As a consequence each new generation is corrupted by being born in an irrational society. The influence of man on society and of society on man is a vicious circle and only a few hardy souls can free themselves”. That was in the interwar years with Fascism rising and hatred gripping all Europe. Europe paid its price in million of lives in WW II. The Indo-Pak subcontinent has yet to learn. We saw one holocaust in 1947 but have learnt very little from it. The 1971 holocaust did not affect many in the West Wing.Brahmaputra and the tidal rivers had the capacity to take a huge load and disposal of anything was a simple operation! Had our higher leaders both civil and military or the armoured commanders been more competent, perhaps things may have been settled a bit less amicably albeit more swiftly in the 1947-48, 1965 or 1971 wars! In the post-nuclear scenario both sides sure do need psychiatric help! n <P>REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES <P>79 Interviews with a large number of participants including Major later Lieutenant Colonel Zil ur Rahman from 19 Baluch (R & S) residing in Lahore Cantt and one who I first met at the Lahore Cantt Polo Ground jogging track, Major Iftikhar a dear friend and senior from 11 Cavalry who commanded a tank troop in Chamb in 1971, Lieutenant Colonel Suleman Butt from 11 Cavalry who is a unit officer and a relative by family inter-marriages, who was a troop leader and was seriously wounded in Chamb and more than 100 other ranks of 11 Cavalry, 28 Cavalry and 26 Cavalry with whom I served in 11 Cavalry, 58 Cavalry and 5 Independent Armoured Squadron. <P>80Page-513 & 514-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. <P>81Page-188-The Pakistan Army-1966-1971- Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired)-Printed for Services Book Club by Wajid Alis (Private Limited) -Lahore-1990. Shaukat Riza the official historian of Pakistan Army noted this anti-artillery bias of Headquarter 1 Corps in the following words; “When Headquarter 1 Corps was established in Gujranwala, its artillery component was driven out nine miles away to Nadipur. Even for the capture of Dharam Enclave Headquarter Artillery I Corps was kept out of picture.” <P>82Page-194-Shaukat Riza-Pakistan Army-1966-71-Op Cit. Riza writes that “Brigadier Ahmad (armoured brigade commander) made approx 25 counter-attack plans. However, the artillery commander from 1 Corps and neighbouring divisions were neither consulted nor advised about these plans.This was to have unfortunate consequences as the battle unfolded.” <P>83Page-514-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. <P>84 Pages-531 & 532-Ibid. <P>85 Page-28-The Western Front-Indo Pakistan War 1971- Lt Gen P. Candeth -Allied Publishers-Madras-1984. General Candeth who was C in C Western Command states in his book that “the most critical period was between 8 and 26 October when 1 Corps and 1 Armoured Division were still outside Western Command. Had Pakistan put in a pre-emptive attack during that period the consequences would have been too dreadful to contemplate and all our efforts would have been trying to correct the adverse situation forced on us “ <P>86 Page-25-Article- The Armoured Thrust-An Operational Analysis- Major A.H Amin (Retired)- The Citadel -Issue Number - 1/98- Command and Staff College- Quetta-April 1998. <P>87Page-25-Article- Why I Lay down Arms-Lieutenant General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi (Retired) - Defence Journal-Issue Number -3-4-1979- Volume Number Five-Karachi-1979. <P>88 Page-8-Letter to the Editor from Major A.H Amin - Readers Forum- “The Citadel-No. 3/93”- Command and Staff College Quetta-November 1993. <P>89Pages-39 & 40-Article - Resolution -the Cardinal Command Virtue- Captain A.H Amin-Pakistan Army Journal-June 1992 Issue-Inspector General Training and Evaluations Branch-Training publication and Information Directorate-General Branch -Rawalpindi. <P>90 Page-14- Article- The Intangible Forces Behind a Military Manoeuvre- Major A.H Amin -Pakistan Army Journal-June 1993 Issue- Inspector General Training and Evaluations Branch-Training Publication and Information Directorate-General Headquarters -Rawalpindi. <P>91 Ibid. <P>92 Pages-32 & 35-Article-Plain as well as Subtle aspects of Military Decision Making- Major A.H Amin (Retired)-The Citadel-Issue Number 1/94- Command and Staff College -Quetta-April 1994. This article was submitted for publication while the author was in service commanding an independent tank squadron in September 1993 but published after retirement in April 1994. <P>93 Page-32-Citadel Issue 1/98-Op Cit. <P>94 Page-31-Ibid. <P>95Page-3- Editors Note-The Citadel-Issue Number 2/98- Command and Staff College Quetta-December 1998. <P>96Page-50-Article-The Relationship of Organisation to Doctrine and Conduct of War- Major A.H Amin (Retired)-Citadel Issue number 2/98-Op Cit. <P>97 Ibid. <P>98 Ibid. <P>99 The reader may note that the Glasnost/Perestroika of the Pakistan Army as far as military writing is concerned began from 1988-89 onwards once General Baig became the COAS and Major General Riazullah became the Director General of Inter Services Public Relations Directorate (ISPR). Riazullah essentially a fighting soldier and a career officer with a fine written expression was one of the most capable and brilliant heads of the ISPR. In addition Lieutenant Colonel I.D Hassan was particularly instrumental and decisive in improving the quality of the “Pakistan Army Journal”. Colonel I.D Hassan was succeeded in turn by two almost as brilliant editors i.e Lieutenant Colonel Syed Ishfaq and Lieutenant Colonel Syed Jawaid Ahmad both of whom raised the standard of the Pakistan Army Journal to a very high level. Unfortunately after Colonel Jawaid Ahmad’s departure in 1994 the magazine’s standard deteriorated and by 1997 its circulation despite the massive financial resources at its backing had been reduced from quarterly to six monthly. <P>100 Page-28-Eight Years Overseas-Field Marshal Henry.M. Wilson of Libya-Hutchinson Boks-London-1950. <P>101 Page-138-J.A.I Agar Hamilton-Op Cit and Page-40-The Mediterranean and Middle East-Volume Three-Major General I.S.O Playfair-Her Majesty’s Stationery Office-London-1960 <P>102Page-79-Panzer Battles-General Von Mellenthin-Corgi/Ballantine Books-New York-1977. <P>103 Page-243-The Crucible of War-Auchinleck’s Command- Barrie Pitt-Macmillan-London-1986. <P>104 Page-156-War Despatches-Op Cit. Page-404-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit. The reader may note that Indian armour withdrew north of the railway line at Chawinda on its own, but some units in Pakistan claim that it was they who attacked the Indians and drove them out ! <P>105 Page-405-Gurcharan Singh-Op Cit.This incident illustrates poor staff procedures too since the headquarter of 1st Armoured Division was also responsible for this lapse. <P>106 Page-496 - Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit <P>107 Page-197-A Study of History-The One Volume Edition- Arnold Toynbee-Thames and Hudson-Published with arrangement with Oxford University Press, London-1988. <P>108 Page-243-Correlli Barnett-Op Cit. <P>109 Pages-12 & 13-Brigadier Riazul Karim Khan, MC, LOM -Op Cit. <P>110 Page-13-Ibid. <P>111 Page-79-Von Mellenthin-Op Cit. <P>112 Page-243-Correlli Barnett-Op Cit. <P>113 Page-39-Tank Warfare-Richard Simpkin-Brasey’s Publishers Limited London-1979. <P>114 Page-232-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cited.Shaukat writes that although an infantry company was to go (which means that it was ordered to go) with 6 Lancers....after some haggling (as if 5 Armoured Brigade was a fish market!!!!) only one platoon was made available. Shaukat writes that later Sahibzada Gul (6 Lancers) asked for more infantry and an air strike on Valtoha but neither came. It appears that the gears of the 5 Armoured Brigade were completely jammed due to the friction of war and despite all this its commander was promoted after the war while Nisar the real hero of tank battles in both 1965 and 1971 did not go beyond a brigadier. The finest infantry brigade commander of the 1965 Brigadier Qayyum Sher who was praised by Shaukat Riza (Page-203-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit) was also retired as a brigadier while one who was on the sidelines in Chawinda (i.e Niazi) became a lieutenant general. The same happened in India to Harbaksh Singh since he was a Punjabi and a Sikh while Manekshaw who had played no role in 1948 and 1965 wars became a <P>C-in-C. The lesson is that in Indo-Pak armies as perhaps in all armies; actual on ground war performance is less important than PR! Thus a brigadier who absented himself from his headquarters in 1971 on pretext of martial law duty later became a four star general while another who was accused of many atrocities/plunder in East Pakistan became a lieutenant general ! On the other hand the brigade commander who was most openly praised by the Indians in East Pakistan i.e Tajammul Hussain Malik was superseded as a major general. The German General Staff identified talent and groomed and polished it.The Indo Pak armies identify mediocrity and take it to the highest limits ! <P>115 Pages-89 & 90-Von Mellenthin-Op Cit. <P>116 Page-56- Article- Do we Lack Aggressiveness-Lieutenant Colonel Javed Alam Khan- Citadel -Issue Number 1/91-Command and Staff College-Quetta-June 1991. The worthy writer who was one of the few genuinely professional officers who I served with while he was a major and I was a lieutenant in the adjacent unit/same division for four long years during the period 1985-89. His sense of humour at that time was a bit unconventional (as second in command he kept a special box in his drawer, with a scandalous creature, a kind of a puppet, that was enough to ensure that all JCOs, especially the Tabuk returned Hajis, asking for leave bolted out of room instantaneously and it was a folly to greet him by hugging him in the traditional manner on Eid. I have not met him since 1994 and I wonder whether he has succumbed to the genetic transformation that occurs once most officers reach general rank or has managed to retain his forthright resolute and intellectually honest approach which he possessed in abundance till at least brigadier rank in 1995. <P>117 Pages-236 , 237 & 238-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit. <P>118 Page-90-The Desert Generals -Correlli Barnett-London-1984. <P>119 Page-496 & 497-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit recalling General Harbaksh Singh’s remarks on page-161-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit. <P>120 Page-318-Remarks of Sir Mohammad Zafarullah Khan-The Partition of the Punjab-A Compilation of Official Documents-Volume Two- National Documentation Centre-Lahore -1983-Printed at Ferozsons. <P>121 Page-319-Ibid <P>122Page-496-Lieut Gen S.L Menezes-Op Cit. <P>123Page-160-Harbaksh Singh-Op Cit. <P>124 Map on page 6 Volume Four-The Partition of Punjab-Official Documents-Op Cit. <P>end quote.
of tangential relevance. <P>bishwa<BR>Member posted 03-11-2000 08:56 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Can I interest someone to comment on the pakistani DCB defences on the punjab and shakargarh bulge area.<BR>Especially on<BR>1. What goes into their DCB defences<BR>2. How extensive are they<BR>3. How far from the border are they<P>Also it will be great if somebody can post details about the Icchogil canal. Especially<BR>1. How wide is it<BR>2. How far from the border is it<BR>3. How long is it<P>Thanx<P><BR>[This message has been edited by bishwa (edited 03-11-2000).]<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>ramana<BR>Administrator posted 03-11-2000 11:42 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Biswhwa, The TOI site has the Official history of teh '65 war. On page 140-141 it describes some of the terrain facing the Indian advance in West Pakistan. The Ichogil Canal is stated to be 5m deep and 45m wide in places. It also gives an account of the other defences. Am sure they have improved since then but provide a baseline. Also an early ninteies India Today had an article abou these kind of features. Dont know if I still have it. The gist of it was that TSP had vastly increased its defences in that area making it difficult to execute a thrust.<BR>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>LNS<BR>Administrator posted 03-11-2000 12:14 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>One point to note. These will also impair the defender from carrying out offensive action. <BR>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>bishwa<BR>Member posted 03-11-2000 13:37 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Well the defender will know the gaps and can funnel any counter attack through it.<BR>Mandeep mentioned somewhere that the PA has put a no go area around the DCBs since they came to know that the Indians had been able to fret out quite a lot about it.<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>Guru Dronacharya<BR>Member posted 03-11-2000 16:19 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Well ok...its 50m wide and 5m deep and filled with water. There are minefields with heavy mines laid around all the usual crossing points next to roads, all bridges are blown up. enemy is alert.<BR>IAF has given an assurance of local air-superiority for 2 days with 24x7 Mig29 coverage and IA has Akash & Tunguska elements in the lead echelon. Bofors+UAVs in the 2nd echelon can pour saturation fire into any enemy buildup seeking to disrupt your crossing upto 20km behind the canal and IAF has devoted 30 Mig27s to clear Pak arty sites. 15 Mi-35s are also tasked with you.<P>If _you_ were the Panzer leader leading a column of 100 Arjuns (2 regiments), 100 BMP-2s on the east bank...what would you need to cross this canal ? would you make a dash straight for the Kotwali in Lahore or would you avoid entering Lahore altogether and seek to find and destroy the tsp armour outside the town while keeping the town busy with a 2-pronged pincer and a relentless and callous barrage from BM-21s ? <P>decide my friend...HH-Hour is 25 mins away and I hear the deep growl of MTU engines revving up and the whine of huge turrets being test traversed...in the sinister pre-dawn darkness <P>[This message has been edited by Guru Dronacharya (edited 03-11-2000).]<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>sbajwa<BR>Member posted 03-11-2000 16:35 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>If _you_ were the Panzer leader leading a column of 100 Arjuns (2 regiments), 100 BMP-2s on the east bank...what would you need to cross this canal ? would you make a dash straight for the Kotwali in Lahore or would you avoid entering Lahore altogether and seek to find and destroy the tsp armour outside the town while keeping the town busy with a 2-pronged pincer and a relentless and callous barrage from BM-21s ? <BR>Get the bridges made on river ravi little North of Harike (to avoid icchogil) and south of Lahore, and dash towards Lahore!!!! along with engineering regiment! (to clean up mines, make bridges, etc) avoid urban warfare and only engage armour., give their military option to surrender. <P>If possible, send some BMPs and arjuns with air cover of mi-35 into Lahore to destory LET, Hizbul, and other terrorist organizations!! as well as any pockets of resistance in city.<P>Once river ravi is crossed without detection rest is piece of cake....<P>Sandeep Singh Bajwa<P><BR>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>bishwa<BR>Member posted 03-11-2000 16:43 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Sandeep.<BR>Can you please tell me something more about the icchogil canal. Do you have any maps to pin down the geography etc.<P>Much appreciate your help.<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>shiv<BR>Administrator posted 03-11-2000 20:02 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>I was given the impression that the Indian side too is protected by the same DCB defences. Under the circumstances and armoured thrust would have to make use of choppers to ferry stuff across.<BR>When is the canal really full? <P>Can it be breached to flood some area - something that could be used by an attacker or defender?<P>The only map I have seen (on a link I had posted a few days ago)- the Ichogil canal is marked in letters not easy to read in this 100 dpi scan - the canal is on th eleft border of a grey shaded area. Look for Lahore and Amritsar on the map and further south look for Khem Karan and Raiwind in Pukistan - the canal is just inside the Paki border between these points on the map.<BR> <A HREF="http://www.geocities.com/thalsena/pages32.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.geocities.com/thalsena/pages32.htm</A> <P><BR>Photo of canal from 1965 (poor quality)<BR> <A HREF="http://www.geocities.com/thalsena/pages25.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.geocities.com/thalsena/pages25.htm</A> <P><BR>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>sbajwa<BR>Member posted 03-11-2000 21:08 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Harike is the place where Satluj merges in Beus as well as Lower Bari Doab canal (mostly indian side), i think Icchogil canal also merges at this point into river ravi (few KM down south on the river on Pakistani side ) river ravi goes on down south., and merges into Indus.<BR>Check out this map<P> <P>all the blue lines are rivers, international border is a line that divides ferozepur, khemkaran and kasur lahore. <P>Thanks<BR>Sandeep<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>Guru Dronacharya<BR>Member posted 03-11-2000 22:39 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Ok I am confused now...is the Ichogil that diagonal blue straight line that starts around Amritsar and goes down upto west of Chunian ? <BR>Its much worse than I thought. There seem to be a seething mass of layer upon layer of canals and rivers.<P>The most canal free routes seem to be the direct one from Amritsar to Lahore and a route swinging well south through Chunian.<BR>any other route apparently needs about 4 canal crossings.<P>Sbajwa, how full are these canals in winter ? If they are below 2.5m deep I think T-72s can simply seal themselves and ride through the bottom ? can floating 20m bridges be anchored to canal bottom and linked end to end 3 times to afford a crossing ? <P><BR>[This message has been edited by Guru Dronacharya (edited 03-11-2000).]<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>Aditya Vikram<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 00:04 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Anther Idea, since most of the Paki rivers flow through India we must first flood the se rivers a few days days before the war so the pakis open their flood gates and then dry them up ,this will probably wreack havoc on their defences <BR>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>sunil sainis<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 00:41 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>immediately behind the Zero Line are the OP/LPs, behind them is the pakistani primary/forward DCB starts a few hundred meters (100-300)meters behind the Zero Line in punjab and southern kashmir (Sectors Nowhsera, Poonch, Rajouri) and a few (about 5km)kilometers behind is another line called the secondary DCB. Usually during periods of tension, villages along the ZL are evacuated and the army moves a bunch of things upto within 10Km of the IB. <BR>LNS,<P>If you make the DCB, you also know exactly where it is easiest to bridge. The pakis practice a fair bit of it during their exercises. Fog of war will change that i suppose but even odds that they know what to do when they get their riposte going.. (i.e assuming they do manage to get it)... otherwise they will slug it out over that distance.. and chew on us from every nook and cranny they their people can slide themselves into. <P><BR>[This message has been edited by sunil sainis (edited 04-11-2000).]<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>ehsmang<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 01:51 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>there isnt anything like if you have built the DCB you know best where to cross it. <BR>The two armies in their battle plans have studied all this and have the points well marked out. However, the attacking force always will face more problems as evidenced in 1965. <BR>The Indragandhi canal in Rajasthan has a similar defensive purpose. Both India/Pakistan have built an extensive network of canals in the border regions to stop any massed attacks. <P>If you fly from Delhi to Europe, you can see numerous canals / water structures along the route. <P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>eklavya<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 04:39 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>A very intresting piece of information is that a certain Engineers General who was responsible for the opening of Harike Gates to flood the rivers going to into Pakistan was killed by Pakistani Terrorists as revenge for doing so.<BR>The opening of gates was done to relieve the water pressure in Punjab.<P>When it was done , I will find out and let you know tomorrow.<P>I am also trying to dig out my own pictures satnding next to DCB defences near (can't tell and won't tell).<P><BR>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>LNS<BR>Administrator posted 04-11-2000 08:34 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>I agree that the Pakis will know where to funnel their forces but that is the danger .if our surveillance is good we can hit them at the funnel points.<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>Mahadev<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 08:43 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Again, pardon this layman's question<BR>What is the relevance of MBTs in the short conflicts of the 1-2 week duration that we have. Especially when, thrusting through traditional gaps is going to be a lot trickier. Thrusting through fewer gaps also concentrates our forces (a bigger easier target) and decreases exit routes.<P>Better to concentrate on slow bombers that can have both armor killing abilities and bombing capabilities. Provided they are give adequate cover by fighters, our main focus should be on destroying their infrastructure (both civilian and military).<P>Armored brigades are slow and have too much contact with civilian centres. Today, you can bet on a good chunk of the paki mullahs having ak47s to greet us instead of just the latest galis.<P>Minimize contact, minimize our casualties and destroy their ability to live and make war.<P>Regards<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>sbajwa<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 11:05 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>There are only 3 big canals<BR>Lower Bari Doab Canal (TSP side), River Ravi is on western bank of Lahore, This canal is East of the Ravi.<P>Upper Bari Doab Canal (India starts from around Pathankote and merges into satlaj at harike.<P>I am not sure about icchogil canal, was it built by TSP? <P>Lower Bari Doab Canal is about 5 meters deep and about 20-100 yards wide , it is full in all of summer around winter it dries up but still the banks are so steep that it will be impossible for any tanks to cross this canal. This canal flows so fast that in its full flow animals (buffalos, cows) drown in it. I have seen it totally empty as well as totally full. I have also seen all the bridges heavily fortified as well as Indian army soldiers practicing crossing this river during full flow on boats, etc. From Harike to Gurdaspur this canal has about 1 bridge every 3 or so villages. (three bridges that I have seen close my my village are capable of withstanding lot of weight, since tractors, trolleys, trucks full of grain regularly cross these bridges). Harike to Gurdaspur = 120 km. I don't think that Pakistani side has that many bridges.<P>As another precaution on both sides of this canal, a smaller canal of about 5-15 feet wide and 5 feet deep also exists (water from the big canal comes to the small canals and from small canal you feed farms, villages, etc).<P>Most of the blue lines that you see probably won't even require a bridge and can be easily fixed by just one bulldozer if offense starts after October and before March-April.<P>Also check the roads! all roads have bridges! if we occupy these bridges than it will be easier for armour to crossover big rivers like Lower Bari and icchogil? (Is Lower bari doab canal also called Icchogil?).<P>also check in between Kasur and Indian border there is no canal, river whatsoever!! so occupying Kasur is much much easier than Lahore.<P>Sandeep<P><BR>[This message has been edited by sbajwa (edited 04-11-2000).]<P>[This message has been edited by sbajwa (edited 07-11-2000).]<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>Guru Dronacharya<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 11:15 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>a very interesting map. Note that our Firozpur is within a stone's throw from border. Probably will be abandoned to defend in flexible fashion in case of thrust.<BR>Did the Khem Karan battle take place in the chunk of pak territory that bulges into India ? <P>Amritsar and Firozpur being the road-hubs how about a "riposte" to attack through both and seeking to meet up at Kapurthala ? a lesser pincer flowing north through Kasur towards amritsar could attack the indian front while the pincers work their way behind...<P>If they can capture everything west of river Beas would be really good for them.<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>sunil sainis<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 11:25 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<P>The Defence Drain will slow you down. Unless they have no clue we are coming.. they will have also mined some of the easier approaches. <BR>also season is a major issue.. the rains can create natural barriers to armor movement. <P>might be easier to pick a road and travel up it.. anything else and we get bogged down really fast. <P>LNS, <P>they will keep changing their cross over points.. we will have to watch our flanks.. we move on the road .. our flanks will most probably lag behind us. <P>ehsmang,<P>i think you put it in a better way than my previous post, basically there is flexibility.. and the attacking force will allways come up against something they have not expected to see. Its even odds. <P><BR>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>sbajwa<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 11:33 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Did the Khem Karan battle take place in the chunk of pak territory that bulges into India ? <BR>Amritsar and Firozpur being the road-hubs how about a "riposte" to attack through both and seeking to meet up at<BR>Kapurthala ? a lesser pincer flowing north through Kasur towards amritsar could attack the indian front while the pincers<BR>work their way behind...<P>Yep! the Khemkaran battle took place in Indian territory.<P>Pakistani tanks started out from Kasur area and went all the way upto Bhikkiwind-Uttar (now assal uttar) area. Check out that there is no river/canal in between Kasur to Bhikkiwind. but that was in 1965 and now is 2000, with better and faster amphibious tanks/armour these small canals won't matter and you can expect to be totally different battle!<P>Sandeep<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>Guru Dronacharya<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 11:40 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>..there is a canal free path from Kasur right to Amritsar through Assal Uttar. and anything less than 20m wide will be bridges in 5 mins by bridgelayer tanks.<BR>Looks like they will teach us "infidels" a "fitting lesson" next time.<P>Sbajwa, if you have any more such maps please post them.<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>JohnSmith<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 11:50 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<P>quote:<BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Originally posted by sbajwa:<BR>Check out this map<P>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<P>Thanks for the map, Sandeep; it's very good.<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>sbajwa<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 13:05 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Here are the 12 maps in order of geographical area from north to south.<BR>Jammu - Sialkote 1 inch = 10 miles. <A HREF="http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/jammu-sialkote.gif" TARGET=_blank>http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/jammu-sialkote.gif</A> <P>chicken neck 1 inch = 10 miles. <A HREF="http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/chicken-neck.gif" TARGET=_blank>http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/chicken-neck.gif</A> <P><BR>narowal-shakargarh-kathua-gurdaspur 1 inch = 50 miles. <A HREF="http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/narowal-shakargarh-kathua-gurdaspur.gif" TARGET=_blank>http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/narowal-shakargarh-kathua-gurdaspur.gif</A> <P><BR>aliwal-narowal-dera baba nanak 1 inch = 10 miles - check out how river ravi is border between india and pakistan, with lots of indian enclaves on the other side as well as tsp enclaves on our side. <A HREF="http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/aliwal-narowal.gif" TARGET=_blank>http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/aliwal-narowal.gif</A> <P>Narowal-Sheikhupura 1 inch = 10 miles <A HREF="http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/narowal-south.gif" TARGET=_blank>http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/narowal-south.gif</A> <P><BR>lahore-amritsar - north 1 inch = 10 miles<BR>see how river ravi is on the west of lahore <A HREF="http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/lahore-amritsar-north.gif" TARGET=_blank>http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/lahore-amritsar-north.gif</A> <P>lahore-amritsar 1 inch = 10 miles <A HREF="http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/lahore-amritsar.gif" TARGET=_blank>http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/lahore-amritsar.gif</A> <P>lahore-kasur 1 inch = 10 miles <A HREF="http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/lahore-kasur.gif" TARGET=_blank>http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/lahore-kasur.gif</A> <P>kasur-ferozepur 1 inch = 10 miles <A HREF="http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/kasur-ferozepur.gif" TARGET=_blank>http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/kasur-ferozepur.gif</A> <P><BR>Pakpattan-sahiwal-fazilka-ferozepur 1 inch = 50 miles. <A HREF="http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/pakpattan-sahiwal-fazilka-ferozepur.gif" TARGET=_blank>http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/pakpattan-sahiwal-fazilka-ferozepur.gif</A> <P>South punjab 1 inch = 50 miles <A HREF="http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/south-punjab.gif" TARGET=_blank>http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/south-punjab.gif</A> <P>south punjab north rajasthan 1 inch = 50 miles <A HREF="http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/south-punjab-north-rajasthan.gif" TARGET=_blank>http://www.sikh-history.com/tsp/south-punjab-north-rajasthan.gif</A> <P>[This message has been edited by sbajwa (edited 04-11-2000).]<P>[This message has been edited by sbajwa (edited 04-11-2000).]<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>bishwa<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 14:25 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Sandeep,<BR>Thanx a lot.<BR>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>anilK<BR>Member posted 04-11-2000 15:23 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>I see a lot of roads criss-crossing the border in all these maps.. how much are they in use during these "peace" times.. and how wellare they maintained ?<BR>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>sbajwa<BR>Member posted 06-11-2000 10:59 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>anil,<BR>I have travelled on the roads from Jammu to PAthankote, to Gurdaspur to Batala to Amritsar to Patti to Ferozepur.<BR>This roads is fairly well maintained from Gurdaspur to Amritsar (single lane about 35 feet wide travelled in 1996). Road from Amritsar to Patti-Ferozepur travelled in 1978 is about 20 feet wide..<P>If you travel from Jalandhar (that is major major cannt close to the border, although Amritsar cantt is there but not as big) to Wagah Border it is about 40 feet wide single lane as well as there are double track of railway going to Amritsar and then single to wagah. (there are two-three roads from Jalandhar that go to Amritsar, Ferozepur, Gurdaspur-Jammu) .<P>Shutting down all the roads/rails will be very very tough! I remember in 1987 when there was deployment for brasstacks whole GT road from Ambala to Ludhiana was closed for 12+ hours for Indian army to be deployed in front. As I remember I was travelling towards Delhi that day and just sat there watching this caravan of engineering equipment first and then small armoured vehicles and then lots of howitzers, towed guns, etc (no tanks or APCs though , I guess those were moved by trains?). All cities in Punjab are also well connected by trains also. (Ferozepur, Gurdaspur, Pathankot, Amritsar, Wagah, etc, etc)<P>I am not sure about Pakistani roads! from the news that I heard is that their roads are in very bad shape in forward Punjab, only around cities are ok. <P>As you can see from these maps that in past wars an offense has always resulted in stalemate!! due to canals and DCB defenses!<P>T80 tanks I am sure will do better job these times of easily crossing these DCB defenses and I hope that Indian defenses already have anti-tank missiles in place for these T80 tanks all over Punjab and Rajasthan border (especially in chicken neck area).<P>If T80 can cross a ditch about 10 metres wide and 70 degrees steep (without engineering equipment, earth movers, etc) than they can reach any major border city(Amritsar,Ferozepur, Fazilka,Gurdaspur) in Punjab in less than a day.<P><BR>Sandeep Singh Bajwa<P><BR>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>dsandhu<BR>Member posted 06-11-2000 12:51 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>I guess everyone on this thread has talked about everything including the kitchen sink, but the canal itself.<BR>Ichhogil also known as BRB canal is a major anti tank defence set up for Pak in the Punjab sector. It starts at Bhani in Pak. (NW of Amritsar) from the river Ravi and goes all the way down to the Sutlej near Hussainiwalla. It passes both Bedin and Kasur. The banks are steep and the current flows in at a rate of 3 to 4 knots. Because of the steep banks tanks cannot get into the canal. The only way across is to capture the bridges or have your own bridge laying equipment (which IA lacked in 1965). Pak hav built up the western bank of the canal at a number of places. They hace concrete pill boxes with mechine guns etc. <P>Even if one attacks from Harrike etc and goes towards Lahore one has to cross the canal. One meets it in going from Khen Karan to kasur.<P>In fact the Ichhogil canal as a DCB defence was the model for the the DCB defences proposed by Lt. Gen P.S. Bhagat for the indian side.<P><BR>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>dsandhu<BR>Member posted 07-11-2000 08:47 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>More about the canal<BR>The Ichhogil is approx 110 ft wide at most places. The side walls slope at 45 degrees. The overall depth is about 30 ft and the Pakis generally keep about 20 ft of water flowing through it. Its a fast flowing current.<P>Those who are interrested in driving tanks through it, hope you load the tanks with some politicians and babus and enjoy the drive! <P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>bishwa<BR>Member posted 07-11-2000 09:07 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>DSandhu,<BR>Thanx for the nth time.<P>IP: Logged<BR> <P><BR>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>shiv<BR>Administrator posted 07-11-2000 10:09 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Looks like an eminently archivable thread. Please keep some back ups on personal HDDs just in case <BR>[This message has been edited by shiv (edited 07-11-2000).]<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>dsandhu<BR>Member posted 07-11-2000 10:26 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>GD<BR>You can built a pontoon bridge across it (current being in this case 3 to 3.5 knots). But I think you have to cut the sides because of the 45 degree slope for a more gradual approach to the pontoon. Pontoons were built by Corps of Engineers across a number of rivers/ streams in Bangladesh which had faster flowing current. The cannal is lined in some places where as in some the sides are not lined.<P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>Jay Prakash<BR>Member posted 07-11-2000 15:51 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>There R other ways to cross the ICHOGIL CANAL without BAILEY Bridges..<BR>Let me not go into details.. CHEERS<P> <BR>Jay Prakash<BR>Member posted 07-11-2000 20:53 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Bang Torps are like Pipe Bombs.They T used to breach defenses or undermine buildings..<BR>Tyhe one with the wire and fired like a mortar with multiple explosives that detonate upon impact R used to clear mines over a long length and swath..<P>Tanks like the T-90 can snorkel in 20 ft of water as long as the bed is firm..IT TAKES LESS THAN 30 Mts to prepare these tanks..I have worked on trucks that can ford 15 ft of water with after blowers..<P>AND THEN THERE R MORE.. Too<P><BR>IP: Logged<BR> <P>IP: Logged<BR> <BR>Mandeep Bajwa<BR>Member posted 08-11-2000 10:37 <BR>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------<BR>Before discussing the BRB/Ichhogill Canal we must first know all the facts about the Wagah Drain which is their primary DCB or first line of defence.<BR>After '65 the Pakistanis felt that though the BRB was a formidable obstacle basing their defence on it involved an initial loss of a large chunk of politically important territory. In the context of a short Indo-Pak war this became it became imperative not to lose too much land which would then become a bargaining chip at the inevitable peace talks which followed. <P>It was decided to construct a line of DCB defences in advance of the BRB ranging from 1 to 5 KMs from the border.This stretches from the Ravi to just short of Kasur. The construction was finished in 1971. <P><BR> <BR>
<A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/12/nat19.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/12/nat19.htm</A> <P>ISLAMABAD, Nov 11: The government has terminated the services of National Highway Authority chairman Maj-Gen (retd) Waqarul Haq Khan Khalid. <P> Maj-Gen Tariq Javed has been appointed the new NHA chairman. The outgoing chairman was working on the contract basis. <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/12-11-2000/national/n7.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/12-11-2000/national/n7.htm</A> <P>Maj-Gen Tariq Javed appointed NHA chief<P>ISLAMABAD: Maj-Gen Tariq Javed has been appointed as chairman National Highway Authority with immediate effect. Maj-Gen Tariq was serving as the director general engineer at GHQ, Rawalpindi as he belongs to Pakistan Army's Engineering Corps. Earlier, he has served as the commander Engineers Corps and the director general Housing and Combat Development Directorate. He also led a number of construction projects in Iraq. He will take charge of his new office next week. <P> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/12-11-2000/national/n2.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/12-11-2000/national/n2.htm</A> <P>The open court was also attended by Chief Executive Mepco Brig Abbas Ali Khan, SE Xen and other senior Wapda officials<BR>
<A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/13/top14.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/13/top14.htm</A> <P><BR>Pakistan builds Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) <P>ISLAMABAD, Nov 12: Pakistan has successfully manufactured American designed M113 Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) and its different variances from bolt to bolt and weld to weld. <P>Project Director, Brigadier Tanvir Tahir said on Sunday: "This has been a great experience for Heavy Industries Taxila, starting from a plate and ending up with a complete vehicle is a fascination in itself. Now we are in a position to compete with any other manufacturer in the world." <P>
<A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/15-11-2000/main/main5.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/15-11-2000/main/main5.htm</A> <P>***** CORPS LEVEL EXERCISES BEGIN *****<P>Pakistan launches annual military exercises<P>By Shakil Shaikh<P>ISLAMABAD: Pakistan launched annual integrated field military exercises in various zones which are being participated by all the key formations, a senior official told The News here Tuesday. The official said: "Normally, these are called winter exercises, which continue for two months." The importance of the integrated military exercises can be gauged from the fact that Chief Executive General Pervaiz Musharraf would visit the exercise areas to address the troops by spending almost a week. <P>The official said General Musharraf would visit Gujranwala, where the integrated exercises are being conducted, on November 24 before visiting Bahawalpur and Mangla Corps. He said the advance teams from the General Headquarters have already been sent to see the performance of the troops which are engaged in testing some new concepts. <P>Since May 1998 nuclear tests by India, which were responded by Pakistan by conducting its own nuclear tests, India had not only conducted army exercises but its forces also conducted joint exercises besides nuclear drill in Rajasthan as reported by international press. <P>India is continuing military, air force and naval exercises at different levels, though Pakistan has not conducted a joint military exercise since long, except annual winter and summer exercises at corps and divisional levels. <P>The official said: "Now integrated exercises involving all the key formations are being conducted to test new concepts and these exercises are not at such a large level. These exercises are being conducted well within Pakistani boundary and does not require any prior notification under 1991 agreement between Pakistan and India." <P>Under the agreement of 1991, prior notification is apparently required for exercises involving 10,000 or more troops in specified locations. Troop manoeuvres directed toward the international border are proscribed. Exercises at the corps level must be held 45 kilometres inside the border, while the division level exercises must be held 25 kilometres inside the border. No military activity is permitted within five kilometres of the border.<P>When Pakistan undertook its 1989 military exercise, Zarb-e-Momin, Indian and other foreign military attaches were invited to observe the manoeuvres in order to confirm non-hostile intent. The Pakistan military exercises are part of extensive training programme of the troops, though Pakistan certainly need to test post-nuclear environment and limited war concepts following the Kargil crisis, their planning, practice and validation.<P>The integrated field military exercises are preceded by planned war games. A military official said: "All this is called peacetime training of the troops." He said such peacetime training programmes emphasise that each of the formations must plan professional training and implement their respective training plans vigorously, ensuring maximum participation of the officers and men. <P>Explaining the concept of integrated field exercises, one officer said it means the exercises will involve the Pakistan Air Force and normally these are conducted by involving more than one corps so that the soldiers get tough training. In a related development, Pakistan-Turkey joint military exercises would also be conducted this month either at Cherat or some other place.<BR> <A HREF="http://www.frontierpost.com.pk/home.asp?id=11&date1=11/15/2000" TARGET=_blank>http://www.frontierpost.com.pk/home.asp?id=11&date1=11/15/2000</A> <P>Replying to a question relating to International Defence Exhibition (Ideas 2000) he said, this exhibition will disseminate a message that “we are in a position to stand on our feet and deserve equal treatment.” Member Production Heavy Industries Taxila, Brig Haleem Ahmed speaking in the programme said that country had been relying on US and Western nations till 1965. <P> <A HREF="http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/nov/mosaic.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/nov/mosaic.htm</A> <P>Pakistan Army’s Mosaic of Ideas <BR>(PART VII: Conclusion)<P><BR>
<A HREF="http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/nov/pak-army.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/nov/pak-army.htm</A> <P>A few actuarial bits from maj(R) agha humayun amin's article in DJ (part of the book titled “The Pakistan Army Since 1965”, the second volume of the Two Volume history of Pakistan Army and covers Pakistan Army from 1965 till 2000.<P>The post 1965 situation saw major organisational as well as technical changes in the Pakistan Army. Till 1965 it was thought that divisions could function effectively while getting orders directly from the army’s GHQ. This idea failed miserably in the 1965 war and the need to have intermediate corps headquarters in between the GHQ and the fighting combat divisions was recognised as a foremost operational necessity after the 1965 war. In 1965 war the Pakistan Army had only one corps headquarter i.e the 1 Corps Headquarters. Soon after the war had started the US had imposed an embargo on military aid on both India and Pakistan. This embargo did not affect the Indian Army but produced major changes in the Pakistan Army’s technical composition. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk well summed it up when he said, "Well if you are going to fight, go ahead and fight, but we’re not going to pay for it"!15 Pakistan now turned to China and for military aid and Chinese tank T-59 started replacing the US M-47/48 tanks as the Pakistan Army’s MBT (Main Battle Tank) from 1966. 80 tanks, the first batch of T-59s, a low-grade version of the Russian T-54/55 series were delivered to Pakistan in 1965-66. The first batch was displayed in the Joint Services Day Parade on 23 March 196616. The 1965 War had proved that Pakistan Army’s tank infantry ratio was lopsided and more infantry was required. Three more infantry divisions (9, 16 and 17 Divisions) largely equipped with Chinese equipment and popularly referred to by the rank and file as "The China Divisions" were raised by the beginning of 196817. Two more corps headquarters i.e. 2 Corps Headquarters (Jhelum-Ravi Corridor) and 4 Corps Headquarters (Ravi-Sutlej Corridor) were raised. <P>*HISTORICAL NOTE ABOUT DIVISIONAL RAISINGS- RAVI NOTE. <P>New Raisings – 1966-1971 and the army’s operational plans <P>New raisings as discussed earlier were done right from 1965-66 onwards. The Pakistani high command correctly assessed that lack of infantry played a major role in the failure of Pakistani armour to translate its convincing material and technical superiority into a major operational or strategic success. New raisings became more essential since US military aid, which had enabled Pakistan Army to function relatively more effectively as compared to the Indians, was no longer available because of the US ban on arms exports to both India and Pakistan. <P>EXISTING DIVISIONS AND NEW RAISINGS FROM 1965 TO DECEMBER 197162 <P>SER NO <BR> 1965 REMARKS 1966-1968 REMARKS 1968-1971 REMARKS <BR> 1 <BR> 7 DIV Peshawar Part of 2 Corps. Reserve Division to Support 1 Armd Div Operations in Bahawalnagar area. <BR> 2 <BR> 8 DIV Sialkot. 1 Corps Part of 1 Corps Defence of Shakargarh Bulge. Under 1 Corps <BR> 3 <BR> 10 DIV Lahore 1 Corps Part of 4 Corps. Defence of Ravi-Sutlej Corridor. Part of 4 Corps <BR> 4 <BR> 11 DIV Ditto Part of 4 Corps. <BR> 5 <BR> 12 DIV Headquarters In Murree Defence of Azad Kashmir <BR> 6 <BR> 14 DIV East Pakistan Defence of East Pakistan <BR> 7 <BR> 15 DIV Sialkot Part of 1 Corps. Defence of Sialkot Sector.Under 1 Corps <BR> 8 <BR> 1 ARMD DIV Multan 1 Corps Part of 2 Corps. Strategic Reserve.Stationed at Multan. Under 2 Corps. <BR> 9 <BR> 6 ARMD DIV Kharian 1 Corps Part of 1 Corps. Strategic Reserve.Stationed at Kharian. Under 1 Corps. <BR> 10 <BR> 9 DIV Reserve Div. Raising completed at Kharian by 1968. Airlifted to E.Pak in March 1971 <BR> 11 <BR> 16 DIV Reserve Div. Quetta. Raising complete by 1968. Ditto <BR> 12 <BR> 17 DIV Kharian. Raising complete by 1968. Reserve Division To support 6 Armoured Division operations <BR> 13 <BR> 18 DIV Raised at Hyderabad in June-July 1971 for defence of 560 miles area from Rahimyar Khan to Rann of Katch. <BR> 14 <BR> 23 DIV Raised at Jhelum in June-July 1971 for Chhamb-Dewa Sector previously in area of 12 Div. <BR> 15 <BR> 33 DIV Raised in December 1971.Reserve Division of 2 Corps later split between Shakargarh Bulge and Sindh in the war. <BR> 16 <BR> 37 DIV Raised in Dec- 71 Jan-72. <P>The table of raisings above is self-explanatory. The most important organisational changes which occurred in the army till the 1971 war were as following. Firstly the army was organised into three corps i.e the 1 Corps, 2 Corps and 4 Corps and 12 18 and 23 Divisions. The 1 corps headquarter was designated to command four divisions i.e 8, 15, 17 InfantryDivisions and 6 Armoured Division63. 15 and 8 Infantry Divisions were responsible for defence of Sialkot Sector and the Shakargarh Bulge respectively while 17 Infantry Division and 6 Armoured Division were the strike force of the corps and also part of Pakistan Army’s strategic reserves. In addition the 1 Corps also had an independent armoured brigade (8Armoured Brigade). 4 Corps consisting of 10 and 11 Infantry Divisions, 105 Independent Infantry Brigade and 3rd Independent Armoured Brigade was responsible for the area between Ravi River and Bahawalpur. The 2 Corps with its headquarters at Multan was a strategic reserve corps. This corps consisted of the 1st Armoured Division (Multan), 7 Infantry Division and later 33 Infantry Division. Three infantry divisions i.e the 12, 23 and 18 Infantry Divisions were directly under GHQ and responsible for defence of Azad Kashmir, Chhamb-Dewa Sector and Sind-Rahimyar Khan respectively. <P><BR>
<A HREF="http://www.stratmag.com/page05.htm#a06" TARGET=_blank>http://www.stratmag.com/page05.htm#a06</A> <P>All the General's men<BR> Amir Mir in Newsline <BR> AS MANY as 90 serving and retired military officers belonging to all<BR> the three services in Pakistan are presently holding key posts in<BR> government departments as diverse as politics, sports, diplomacy,<BR> intelligence, education, accountability and so on. <P> A detailed scrutiny of the Establishment Division's records, shows<BR> that presently one Chief of Army Staff, 15 serving and retired Lt.<BR> Gens, 16 serving and retired Maj. Gens, 40 serving and retired Brigadiers, six<BR> serving and retired Colonels, one retired Lt. Colonel, two retired Majors, one retired<BR> Captain, one retired Air Marshal, two serving Air Vice Marshals and one retired Air<BR> Commodore, one retired Vice-Admiral and three serving Rear Admirals are holding<BR> important positions in various govenrment departments. <P> Of the 15 Lt. Gens occupying vital offficial slots, seven are serving while 8 are<BR> retired. Of the 16 Maj Gens 12 are serving, while four are retired. Of the 40<BR> Brigadiers 32 are serving, 8 are retired. Two retired Lt. Gens are governors of the<BR> Punjab and the Frontier respectively while the other two are Vice Chancellors. A Lt.<BR> Gen. happens to be the Interior Minister. Another retired general is the Chairman of<BR> WAPDA.
Thanks for the reference, Sunil. Major Amin as usual writes in great detail and is fascinating as always in his assessments. I would only question raising of 9 Division post 1965. I do not have my notes, but distinctly recall references to its units fighting in Kashmir, 7, 8, 9 being the first divisions Pakistan raised after 1947. Also, in early 1971 I heard our chaps refer to 9 Division as the best in the Pakistan Army, and that would be strange if it was only 3 years old. <P>Conversely, I do not have any real reference as to where it was in the 1965 War, so perhaps it was raised and then deactivated, possibly for lack of resources. Pakistan raised and deactivated 6 Division, which used to be called 6 (Border) Division, well before the 1965 War.<P>If any Pakistanis are reading this thread, and have information regarding 9 Division, I will be happy to correct my Pakistan Orbats and give them the credit - that's if they beat Mandeep Bajwa to it!
<A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/19-11-2000/national/n1.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/19-11-2000/national/n1.htm</A> <P>NAWABSHAH: Incharge District Monitoring Team Col Furrukh Jamal has said special steps have been taken to improve the working of the municipal committee staff.<P><BR>As a result of the incident, five upcountry trains got stalled at the Hyderabad Railway Station and the passengers had to face great trouble. Late on Friday night, <B> Col Idrees Butt of Hyderabad Army Monitoring Cell </B> and SDM City Jamal Mustafa Kazi were asked by their high-ups to conduct an immediate inquiry into the incident. They heard <B> Col Afzal Bhatti </B> and ticket checker Ghulam Haider in the VIP lounge of the Hyderabad Railway Station<BR> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/19-11-2000/national/n9.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/19-11-2000/national/n9.htm</A> <P>ISLAMABAD: China will provide Rs 340 million loan for the construction and rehabilitation of Karakorum Highway (KKH). An agreement to this effect was signed between the two countries here on Saturday. Chairman National Highway Authority (NHA) Maj-Gen Tariq Javed and representative of Hanan Consulting Yan Changfing signed the agreement under which China will provide financial and technical assistance for the maintenance of seven bridges washed out by the flood. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/19-11-2000/metro/k15.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/19-11-2000/metro/k15.htm</A> <P>KARACHI: <B> Inspector General Training and Evaluation, Pakistan Army, Lieutenant General Tahir Ali Qureshi </B> awarded degrees among successful participants of the Gunnery Staff Course at a ceremony held at the School of Army Air Defence, on Saturday.<P>He was the chief guest at the ceremony, while <B> Major General Khateer Hasan Khan, Commander, Army Air Defence Command </B> and other officials also attended the ceremony. In all 24 officers, including one student each from allied countries like Bangladesh, Nepal and Mayanmar attended the course. <P>Speaking on the occasion, Lt Gen Tahir praised the operational excellence of Army Air Defence during Kargil conflict, where Air Defence employment tactics made enemy's Air Force almost ineffective, said an ISPR Army press release. <P>The chief guest also visited the recently developed state of the art training aids and simulator facilities and lauded the new additions and hoped that these would help in enhancing the training standards. Earlier, <B> Brigadier Sajjad Ahmad, Commandant School of Army Air Defence </B> highlighted the training objectives of the course and the instructional methodology adopted by the school. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/19-11-2000/metro/k17.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/19-11-2000/metro/k17.htm</A> <P>Special relief during Ramazan<P>By our correspondent<P>KARACHI: At a high level meeting, held with Major General Ehtesham Zamir, General Officer Commanding Corps Reserve, in the chair, representatives of traders and wholesalers agreed to give relief to general public, specially during the holy month of Ramadan. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.nation.com.pk/" TARGET=_blank>http://www.nation.com.pk/</A> <P>CE to open new bridge tomorrow <BR>GUJRAT-The Chief Executive, General Pervez Musharraf will inaugurate the overhead bridge of River Jehlum and will be chief guest at the Military College, Sarai Alamgir, on 20th.<BR>It is worth mentioning here that the new overhead bridge has been named after Major Akram Shaheed (Nishan-e-Haider) and is constructed by the military engineers wing.<P>MANDEEP.. which formation is the 326 Bde(stationed at Vehari) attached to? <P><p>[This message has been edited by sunil sainis (edited 20-11-2000).]
Maj AH Amin does write in great detail and with devastating frankness. The 9(Frontier)Div was raised in '48 with it's HQ at Peshawar under the command of Maj Gen Nazir Ahmed from the Brigades deployed on the Nort-West Frontier like the Razmak Bde,Gardai Bde, Zhob Bde. These were moved from the Frontier under Op Curzon and re-deployed in depth areas/Kashmir under the orders of Jinnah who wanted to put an end to the British Frontier policy.<P>This Div is listed in Riza's Pak Army OrBat '65 as commanded by Lt Gen (that's right)Altaf Qadir. But we find no trace of this formation during the war. That's not unusual since Tikka Khan's 8 Div fresh from it's minor successes in Kutch was also brpken up and parcelled out to other Divs,21 and 52 Bdes going to make up the newly raised 11 Div and the only the third Bde remainig with the original formation. So maybe 9 Div also met with the same fate. Their GOC Altaf Qadir who had been promoted as a Lt Gen while still in command, was tipped to take over the yet to be raised IV Corps whose Corps Arty Bde had already been raised at Attock. But Qadir's affair with the bottle led to his removal from command not because of any religious reasons but due to his physical condition on account of his alcoholism. Later we read about him as Military Adviser to the Hamoodur Rehman Commission. 9 Div of course did move to Bangla Desh with 2 of it's Bdes in Mar '71.It was later re-raised at Kohat after the repatriation of PsOW in '74. <P>I'm not too sure about the raising of 17 Inf Div in '68 also. I thought it was raised in Jun/Jul '71 as a replacement for 9 Div.
wow.. mandeep that is some post. <P>Rasheed's deputy in ISPR identified. <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/20-11-2000/main/main17.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/20-11-2000/main/main17.htm</A> <BR> <BR>ISPR chief off to Rome<P>ISLAMABAD: Press Secretary to Chief Executive and Director General Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) Major General Rashid Qureshi on Sunday proceeded to Rome, Italy to attend international exhibition of military documentaries. Pakistan has sent its two military documentaries to be screened in the exhibition. Major General Qureshi is to represent the country in the exhibition. In his absence, Col Saulat Raza will be the acting director general of ISPR. <P>Corps Level Exercises in Lahore area. <BR>GOC's under Aziz identified. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.syberwurx.com/nation/" TARGET=_blank>http://www.syberwurx.com/nation/</A> <P>Earlier, on his arrival in the exercise area, the Chief Executive General Musharraf was received by the Corps Commander Lahore Lt-Gen Muhammad Aziz Khan.<BR> After a detailed briefing, he saw the exercise and witnessed a counter attack spearheaded by armour integrating all arms.<BR>Accompanied by the Corps Commander the Chief Executive extensively toured the training area on an Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) and saw the tanks in action supported by the Infantry and other arms in the counter attack demonstration. <P>The Chief Executive highly appreciated the high standard of operational preparedness demonstrated by the troops in the collective military training.<BR>General Musharraf also expressed his satisfaction over the setting and the conduct of exercise and lauded the performance of the participating troops.<BR> Apart from the Corps Commander Lt-Gen. Muhammad Aziz Khan, Director General Military Training, Major-Gen. Muhammad Javed, General Officer Commanding Maj-Gen Tariq Majid and Maj-Gen Ahmed Nawaz Saleem Mela and other senior military officials were also present on the occasion.<P><BR>
aaj ki taaza khabar. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/21-11-2000/national/n3.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/21-11-2000/national/n3.htm</A> <P>Musharraf at Military College Jhelum.<BR> Earlier, College Commandant Brig Afzal Malik briefed the audience on the achievements of the college. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.pakobserver.com/" TARGET=_blank>http://www.pakobserver.com/</A> <P>BAHAWALPUR—Chief Executive General Pervez Musharraf said on Tuesday revival *** Governor Punjab, Lt Gen (Retd) Muhammad Safdar, Punjab Chief Secretary Imtiaz Masroor, IGP Punjab Asif Hayat Malik and Corps Commander Bahawalpur Lt Gen Munier Hafiez were also present on the occasion.<P><p>[This message has been edited by sunil sainis (edited 21-11-2000).]
For lack of a thread, and deciding a new thread wasnt worth it... heres a discussion of PA command structure from PakDeaf.<P>*********<BR>The Pakistan Army does not have command centers. Instead they have HQs. During 1965 and 1971, it was found that having one HQ was not efficient in controlling a large army and proposals were made to raise two more QHs to share workload for maintenance of the army and its logistics etc. However, cost was a large factor. So it was decided that two HQs would suffice as well. However, cost of raising another HQ is too great for Pak Army to meet right now. Another factor that came under scrutiny was that very competent officers are required to run the army HQs. Pakistan Army's officer standard has gradually decreased as more middle class families are moving away from military services. <BR>So it was finally decided that Pakistan Army will for now make-do with 1 HQ but in order to have things running smoothly during crisis, the individual Corps commanders are giving much levy into deicding their own course of actions. Thus, each Corp can perform individually without much direct interference from the HQ. This is not as effective but the best solution for now.<BR>*********<BR>and more...<BR>*********<BR>Another point is that the Corps HQ of V Corps in Karachi could act as the southern Command that would controlCorps of Karachi(V), Bahawalpur(XXXI), Multan (II) [Strike Corps] and Quetta (XII). And northern Command (GHQ) would control the remaining forces located in the north. ie. Gujaranwala(XXX), Lahore (IV), Mangla (I)[Strik Corps], Peshawar (XI), and Rawalpindi (X).<BR>*********<BR>Cheers<P>------------------<BR><I>Jananee janmabhumishcha svargadapi gareeyasee</I>
<A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/26/local9.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/11/26/local9.htm</A> <P>ISLAMABAD, Nov 25: An army monitoring team raided Barakahu police station on Saturday to check its performance and record.The AMT in charge, Brig Shafqat of the 111 Brigade with other army officials and personnel inspected all the rooms, Maal Khana and lock up as well as records and daily register of the police station. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/28-11-2000/metro/k8.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/28-11-2000/metro/k8.htm</A> <P>KARACHI: Special Army Monitoring Team (AMT) unearthed a fake Pakistan Wires and Cable factory in North Nazimabad on Monday, recovering plants and cables worth millions of rupees<P>Lt Col Shahid Mehboob Siddiqui had received a complaint from Shahpur Channa, managing director Pakistan Wires and Cable Ltd, SITE, that the company suffered huge losses due to the fake factories, which are supplying substandard electricity wires on cheap rates.<P>Major Zamir of Special AMT conducted raid on the factory along with the area magistrate, Rangers and Taimuria police, after taking permission from the Army Head Quarter of Five Corps Karachi.<P>NEW HIGHWAY.<BR> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/27-11-2000/metro/i2.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2000-daily/27-11-2000/metro/i2.htm</A> <P>construction of Abbottabad-Barian-Nathia Gali Highway project will link the Galiat region with the national highways network of Pakistan that will not only help promote tourism but will also enable Pakistan to earn a lot of foreign exchange. <P><p>[This message has been edited by sunil sainis (edited 28-11-2000).]
From Yawn to PakDeaf...<P>...<BR><I>Pak-Turkish commandos hold joint exercise</I> <P>RAWALPINDI Nov 28: <B>Lieutenant-General Mohammad Yousuf Khan, Chief of the General Staff</B>, witnessed a demonstration of joint exercise by the commandos of Turkey and Pakistan Army at Tarbela. <BR>...
Ravi, <P>you are going to love this one.. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2000-daily/02-12-2000/metro/k8.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2000-daily/02-12-2000/metro/k8.htm</A> <P>KARACHI: The army's 5 Corps is organising an unparalleled subsidised multipurpose Bachat bazaar to provide relief to the people. The Bachat bazaar will start from December 7 and continue up to December 16 at Korangi No 5 near Civic Centre.<P>The idea to organise this bachat bazaar under 5 Corps was mooted by Corps Commander Lt Gen Muzaffar Usmani who directed that a multipurpose Bachat bazaar be organised to pass on some relief to low income people.<P> Brig Abu Rashid of 5 Corps said on Friday that the bazaar was being organised in a big way to cater for some 20,000 visitors a day. He said it would be a bachat bazaar in the real sense as the people will get a relief of between 30 to 40 per cent and may be 50 per cent on certain items.<BR> <A HREF="http://www.nation.com.pk/" TARGET=_blank>http://www.nation.com.pk/</A> <P>Mily to monitor Information Dept <P>LAHORE-The military monitors have started to monitor the performance of the Provincial Information Department.<BR>The decision to this effect has been taken after some dissatisfaction shown by the top military brass towards the performance of the Provincial Information Departments. Brig Mushtaq Naveed will head the monitoring team. <P>
This is from the 'news update' section of Hindu (2nd December) and is sure to disappear soon. From an interview given by Ahmed Masood to Izvestia:<P><B>Masood vows to end Afghan war in Pakistan</B><BR>...``It is Pakistan, which is trying to hide its aggression with the talks of a civil war,'' Masood said. He said ``according to Intelligence reports, up to 1,700 servicemen of the Pakistani regular army including the 197th Regiment of the 9th Division, 117th Regiment with its elite commando unit and 625th Armoured Battalion were fighting in Afghanistan on the Taliban side.'' <BR>...<P>I see a 117 Inf Bde under 9 Div in Sainis' list (pg 1). Is 197 the Indep. Inf. Bde under 11 Corps (Peshawar)?<P><p>[This message has been edited by psmith (edited 02-12-2000).]
Aziz is being sidelined, and the PAF officer supercession is related to their closness with Aziz.<BR> <A HREF="http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper164.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.saag.org/papers2/paper164.htm</A> <P> <BLOCKQUOTE><font size="1" face="Verdana, Arial">quote:</font><HR>After the HM's ceasefire retreat under pressure from these elements, he shifted Lt.Gen.Aziz from the GHQ to Lahore and in the recent reshuffle in the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) he has superceded officers known for their proximity to Lt.Gen.Aziz, resulting in their exit.<P>These moves have not been resisted by these fundamentalist Army officers, who continue to give signs of solidarity with Gen. Musharraf. This should not, however, be misread to mean that his position has now been strengthened and that he could, therefore, be more assertive in relation to the J & K issue now than he was in July-August and break out of his past rigidities and strike out a new conciliatory path.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>
<A HREF="http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/</A> <P>7 Pak Major Generals superseded <P>ISLAMABAD, Dec 6: Seven senior most Pakistani Army officers have been superseded in the new phase of promotions of three Major Generals who would take up key command and staff positions, newspaper reports said today. <P>Air Marshal Mushaf Ali Mir was recently appointed new Air Chief by superseding five seniors who were all sent on pre-mature retirement. <P>Those who have been superseded in the new phase of promotion of general officers are Maj-Gen Zafar Abbas (Armoured), who was on the top of the senior list, Maj-Gen Rizwan Qureshi (Infantry), Maj-Gen Sarfraz Ahmed, Maj-Gen Tariq Kiyani, Director-General Ordnance Maj-Gen Tasneem Ahmed, DG IB, Maj-Gen Rafiullah Niazi and Maj-Gen Haider Javed. <P>"It’s a new trend to inject new blood, though the superseded officers would continue to work till their retirement in a normal course," The News daily quoted a senior army officer as saying. (PTI)<BR> <A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/12/05/local16.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/12/05/local16.htm</A> <P>ISLAMABAD, Dec 4: Price control centres have been established in Rawalpindi and Islamabad with immediate effect. These centres will be manned by army officers (duty officers) who will receive the complaints of price hike and adulteration directly from the complainants. <BR> <A HREF="http://www.dawn.com/2000/12/05/nat15.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.dawn.com/2000/12/05/nat15.htm</A> <P>ISLAMABAD, Dec 4: Three major generals of the Army have been promoted to the rank of lieutenant general, an ISPR spokesman said here on Monday. <P>Those promoted include Maj-Gen Ahsan Saleem Hayat, chief instructor of the National Defence College; Maj-Gen Abdul Qadir Baloch, director-general of the Pakistan Rangers, Sindh; and Maj-Gen Tariq Waseem Ghazi, commandant of the Command and Staff College, Quetta. <P>Maj-Gen Ahsan Saleem Hayat will replace Quarter Master-General Lt-Gen Mohammad Akram, who will retire on Dec 8. <P>Maj-Gen Abdul Qadir Baloch has been appointed the Corps Commander, Gujranwala, with effect from Feb 1, 2001. <P>The posting order of Maj-Gen Tariq Waseem Ghazi is expected in a couple of days.-APP <BR> <A HREF="http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2000-daily/06-12-2000/main/main6.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2000-daily/06-12-2000/main/main6.htm</A> <P><BR>Seven major generals superseded, three promoted<P>By Shakil Shaikh<P>ISLAMABAD: Seven senior most major generals have been superseded in the new phase of promotions of three major generals, who would take up key command and staff positions, a senior official told The News here on Tuesday. Three major generals--Ahsan Salim Hayat, Qadir Baloch and Tariq Waseem Ghazi--were promoted to lieutenant generals and they have been posted as Quarter-Master General (QMG) and Corps Commander Gujranwala on the dates when their predecessors retire from the Army, respectively. The posting of Lt-Gen Ghazi will be announced within this week. <P>Those who have been superseded in the new phase of promotion of general officers are Maj-Gen Zafar Abbas (Armoured), who was on the top of the senior list, Maj-Gen Rizwan Qureshi (Infantry), Deputy QMG Maj-Gen. Sarfraz Ahmed, Maj-Gen. Tariq Kiyani, Director-General Ordnance Maj-Gen Tasneem Ahmed, DG IB, Maj-Gen Rafiullah Niazi and Maj-Gen Haider Javed. <P>"It's a new trend to inject new blood, though in Army the superseded officers would continue to work till their retirement in a normal course," said the senior officer. Recently, in Pakistan Air Force Air Marshal Mushaf Ali Mir was appointed as new Air Chief by superseding five senior air marshals who were all sent on pre-mature retirement. <P>Though it would purely be a personal decision of the superseded major generals to continue working or seek pre-mature retirement from the Army, it is often a case that superseded officers continue. There are examples when the superseded officers like Ali Quli Khan and many others sought premature retirement. But there are also examples like Lt-Gen Farrukh Khan and many others who not only continued but given extension by the government as lieutenant generals in the past. <P>A highly-place source said that Maj-Gen Ashfaq Kiyani would soon assume the charge of Director-General Military Operations (DG MO), as Maj Gen Shahid Aziz, the present DG MO, would be sent to Murree as GOC. Maj-Gen Aziz was appointed DG MO on promotion of the then Maj-Gen Tauqir Zia in October 1999 and was appointed corps commander, Mangla. <P>Tauqir was brought as DG MO after he had served as GOC, but in the case of Maj-Gen Aziz he was appointed DG MO. Now he is being sent to a command posting as a requirement before he is promoted to the next rank. In a related development the promotion board for brigadier would meet in the third week of January next year as the board, to be chaired by Chief Executive General Pervaiz Musharraf, would finalise cases of several officers for their promotion to the next rank. <P>Lt-Gen Naeem Akbar will retire in March next year, while Lt-Gen Tahir Ali Qureshi would be retiring in April next year. So the cases of promotions would be decided much in advance of the retirement of these two lieutenant generals in a bid not to keep the matter pending for appointing their successors.<P>
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