There is no perfect agreement but an agreement for a time and a generationRye wrote:
Isn't waiting for the "perfect 123 agreement" a little bit like waiting for "the perfect mate to procreate"...it could happen, but if it doesn't, there's going to be no procreation.
India Nuclear News & Discussion - 07 Aug 2007
Arrite folks,
Hawa mein yeh baat hai....
The moon mission chandrayan has a detachable warhead payload. Its set to detach from the main craft and detonate in Deep Space, so no earthly forces or concerns can stop it. It'll also provide wonderful validations/ confirmations of designs, material mix etc.
All our commitments etc related to lonely planet earth alone. And we can always claim the explosion was some system screwup on board the booster stage that fell off in space etc etc....
/sarc off.
Was just kiddin' in case somebody insists on misunderstandin'
Hawa mein yeh baat hai....
The moon mission chandrayan has a detachable warhead payload. Its set to detach from the main craft and detonate in Deep Space, so no earthly forces or concerns can stop it. It'll also provide wonderful validations/ confirmations of designs, material mix etc.
All our commitments etc related to lonely planet earth alone. And we can always claim the explosion was some system screwup on board the booster stage that fell off in space etc etc....
/sarc off.
Was just kiddin' in case somebody insists on misunderstandin'
Replied to Rye about the sameenqyoob wrote:Very simple. Circumstance will change and testing will resume.
123 will be renegotiated.
Please elaborate. If u were CPI(M) I would be scared at that, because maybe the Comlades in Beijing can plomise to stalt something that folces India to test. Or Musharraf might, except he has no golas. But otherwise, what are these changed circumstances?
.
just throwing the towel.. convergence of common interest does not work from being on a non equal terms viz. military power. we can be mocked at with just one sail by USS nimitz., while we struggle to build one ADS (non nuke) and one ATV.
just throwing the towel.. convergence of common interest does not work from being on a non equal terms viz. military power. we can be mocked at with just one sail by USS nimitz., while we struggle to build one ADS (non nuke) and one ATV.
Last edited by SaiK on 08 Aug 2007 23:52, edited 1 time in total.
Acharya wrote:
Is there only one such thing that can be called common interest? Why can't we create "common interests" by forcing circumstances such that US pushing its interests will end up serving our Interests? I don't think the logic to be used here is all binary....there seems to be a range of options for engagement, and it is up to India to be careful as to how the US is engaged.That is called common interest
Absolutely when US attacks Pakistan for proper reason then there will be common interest between India and US. Will it happen.Rye wrote:
Is there only one such thing that can be called common interest? Why can't we create "common interests" by forcing circumstances such that US pushing its interests will end up serving our Interests?
Acharya wrote:
So either India can try to change America to align with India, or India can change Pakistan, so that American interests in pakistan align with Indian interests in pakistan.
So demanding the US attack pakistan is just one of many possibilities, though this one is particularly unrealistic.....India can also force Pakistan further down the path of anti-american jihadism to force a convergence of interests w.r.t. pakistan eventually, yes?
Why should the US act against its own interests for its interests to converge with India? Also, convergence is multi-dimensional, i.e., India and US can converge on issue X but not issue Y.Absolutely when US attacks Pakistan for proper reason then there will be common interest between India and US. Will it happen.
So either India can try to change America to align with India, or India can change Pakistan, so that American interests in pakistan align with Indian interests in pakistan.
So demanding the US attack pakistan is just one of many possibilities, though this one is particularly unrealistic.....India can also force Pakistan further down the path of anti-american jihadism to force a convergence of interests w.r.t. pakistan eventually, yes?
Yes, This is the right strategyRye wrote:
So demanding the US attack pakistan is just one of many possibilities, though this one is particularly unrealistic.....India can also force Pakistan further down the path of anti-american jihadism to force a convergence of interests w.r.t. pakistan eventually, yes?
From Pioneer, 8 August 2007
Using his FP experience I expect him to tell us why did the US skirt the Hyde act? What were its compulsions and what were India's levers?
To me and I am only trend watcher the 123 agreement is the result of the 'long boom' setoff by PVNR with his strategic insight. The deal had to happen because of the tests that were initiated in 1995(PVNR), 1996(13 day govt of ABV) and finally in 1998. The deal happened because Jaswant Singh was able to convince the US that India was not a challenger but a peer power. The great strategic restraint that ABV showed at Kargil and in Operation Parakram also showed the maturity of India as a world power despite the just cause that TSP provided. All these factors combined to bring about this deal which is a black swan event in modern Asian history.
It goes against the grain of normal events that were predicted for India and its place in the world in the aftermath of the Independence and the rise of PRC since 1962.
I expected a better article from a former DNSA. This is the writing of a partisan. I expect from him, due to his insight of five years at the helm, to explain how India will benefit from the agreement despite whatever pitfalls and landmines are there in the Hyde bound act. To say there is nothing but trouble with this agreement is not right.123 rolls back N-arms programme
Satish Chandra
If and when operationalised, the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement will emasculate our nuclear weapons programme. Our weapons programme will face 30 per cent and 65 per cent reduction in annual accretion of weapons grade fissile material and tritium respectively. Plus, our weapons programme will come under American scrutiny
Any realistic assessment of the 123 Agreement must note that it flows from the civil-military nuclear separation plan agreed to by India and that it will be governed by US laws, in particular, the India specific Hyde Act. The separation plan, envisaging the closure of the recently refurbished Cirus reactor and the placement of as many as 35 nuclear facilities under safeguards, including 14 of our 22 nuclear reactors, will emasculate our nuclear weapons programme.
{The assumption is that tritium from all the plants is going to the weapons program. So taking out 14 out of 22 will reduce it by 64% say 65%. The very fact that the sep plan had the 8 plants out of the civil sector shows that some of them might be producing all the tritium in India. So there might not be any reduction in the material at all. Besides as tritium is not fissile it will be out of the potential FMCO. Same logic for the 30% reduction.
The 35 (minus the 14 reactors) facilities were civilianized in order to keep them out of the sanctions regime.}
Apart from losing the hitherto enjoyed benefits of synergy, our weapons programme will face 30 per cent and 65 per cent reduction in annual accretion of weapons grade fissile material and tritium respectively. The Hyde Act, similarly, openly aims at capping our nuclear weapons capabilities. Hence its provisions against testing and requirement that India work alongside the US for early conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT). It is, therefore, less than honest to argue, as is being done by the spinmasters, that the nuclear deal does not adversely affect India's nuclear weapons programme.
{Not true. All the facilities do not contribute to the weapons programs.}
Protagonists of the nuclear deal have argued that since India is signatory to only the 123 Agreement, it is only bound by it and not by US laws like the Hyde Act. This is a specious argument, particularly, as Article 2.1 of the agreement expressly provides that in implementing it each party shall be governed by its "national laws, regulations, and licence requirements". It is clear, therefore, that in operationalising the agreement, the US will invoke its laws and India can avoid taking cognisance thereof only at its own peril.
{This is correct. Unless the NPT is revised and it could be in future the US has to have some legislation to support its accession to the NPT. India has to take note of what ever others could and would do whether there is Hyde or skin act.}
The agreement, as evident from Articles 2.2d and 5.2, contemplates less than full civil nuclear cooperation. Cooperation is debarred in the areas of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water plants. Article 5.2, of course, leaves open the possibility of cooperation in these areas "pursuant to an amendment" to the agreement. Given the firm position in the Hyde Act against cooperation in these areas, such an amendment stands no chance of success and this provision serves no purpose other than that of optics.
{Yes the 123 is one small step in a series of steps. The amendment could happen based on the atmospherics at that time. I think if an FMCO is achieved then reprocessing etc are open as there is no chances of leakage augmenting the inventory.}
The agreement is liberally plastered with assertions to the effect that the US would seek to amend its laws and work with friends to obtain for India "reliable, uninterrupted and continual access" to nuclear fuel supplies as well as support an Indian effort to develop a strategic fuel reserve. Regrettably, these assertions have not been translated into a legally binding arrangement, providing India with assured fuel supplies during the lifetime of its civil nuclear reactors. Moreover, as has been pointed out by Dr A Gopalakrishnan, the former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, has pointed out, the prospects of an amendment to US law on this issue is "highly remote", because during discussions on the Hyde Act, the US Congress not only rejected the idea of fuel assurances but went on to stipulate that the US would "seek to prevent" fuel transfers from other sources in the event of suspension of cooperation.
Under the Hyde Act all that the US can provide India at a time is at best two to three years of reactor operating supplies. In these circumstances, India's commitment, vide Article 5.6c, to place its civil nuclear facilities under in perpetuity safeguards does not reflect well on our negotiators. They have traded a legally binding commitment for in perpetuity safeguards, against highly dubious assertions of good intent about trying to obtain assured lifetime fuel supplies for India that are neither legally enforceable nor likely to yield the desired result.
{No matter what the 123 or 456 says if the fuel supply is cut-off India is free to do what it wants to do. PERIOD. Cant have onesided compliance- Read the Vienna Convention on Treaties that is invoked in the premable of the agreement.}
Much has been made by the Government of the right to reprocess, conceded under Article 6iii of the agreement. This is, however, contingent upon India first building a dedicated IAEA safeguarded national reprocessing facility for this purpose and, thereafter, working out with the US the modalities and arrangements for such reprocessing. As Under Secretary Burns has subsequently clarified, this would need a fresh agreement as well as Congressional approval. Accordingly, the "success" of our negotiators in wresting the right to reprocess from the US loses much of its sheen, as we will be able to actually exercise it only several years hence, and that too after having gone to great expense in constructing a new facility. Moreover, the US, vide Article 14.9, can suspend this right "in exceptional circumstances".
{Again there cant be one-sided compliance. All these stem form the NPT power structure. What Hyde and 123 do is draw a cricle around the discontinuity and integrate along the contour to sue language of complex variables.}
The agreement clearly envisages fallback safeguards, end use inspections, and in perpetuity safeguards even after its termination, vide Articles 10.4, 12.3 and 16.3 respectively. To add insult to injury, the agreement, vide Article 10.5, requires India "to maintain and facilitate" application of IAEA safeguards. It is, therefore, on the cards that India would have to host and pay for a large IAEA inspectorate based in New Delhi.
Whereas under the US Atomic Energy Act, the right of return can only be invoked for breach of IAEA safeguards and for testing, under Article 14.4 of the agreement, the US can exercise right of return even when there is cessation of cooperation. Moreover, under Article 14.2, notwithstanding all the much-trumpeted layered consultation procedures built into the agreement, cessation of cooperation can be instantaneous, following notice of termination. Termination of the agreement can also be for reasons other than its violation, lending further credence to the view that if India runs afoul of the Hyde Act, the US could cite it as reason for termination.
It is clear from the foregoing that the agreement in no way insulates India from the malign impact of the Hyde Act. It is, therefore, no surprise that Under Secretary Burns has termed as "absolutely false" the contention that the US would help India find other sources of fuel if it tests, and asserted that it would invoke the right of return in the event of an Indian nuclear test.
The deficiencies in the agreement are amply reflected in the fact that it does not meet the concerns voiced by the Prime Minister in Parliament on August 17, 2006. The agreement neither secures full civil nuclear cooperation for India nor ensures the "irreversible removal of restrictions" on civil nuclear cooperation. It fails to ensure lifetime supplies of nuclear fuel for our reactors and in no way mitigates US legislation making civil nuclear cooperation conditional on our foregoing our right to test.
It does not eliminate the Hyde Act mandated scrutiny of India's nuclear weapons programme, annual Presidential assessments of India's good behaviour and fall back safeguards or end use inspections which will lead to US officials roaming about our nuclear facilities. It also does nothing to attenuate the innumerable conditionalities imposed by the Hyde Act on India on issues like Iran, the FMCT, the PSI etc which impinge on India's foreign policy independence.
{Consider Hyde Act as Samudra manthan. A lot of halahal cameout which was accumulated over years of 'bengin neglect'. Now that the Hyde Act is there, the 123 can go around the halalhal and work with India. Beofre the Hyde no such work could occur as it was part of the numerous three and four letter laws of the US and the world community. The one reason for the 123 to breakdown and Hyde get invoked is if India were to test. And India will test only when there is an absolute need(PRC and TSP joint strike) and then there is much more to worry then a few billion dollars sunk in reactors.}
It is ironical that while, on the one hand, the nuclear deal is being justified, albeit quite dubiously, on grounds that it is essential for our economic well being, on the other hand, in concretising it all norms of fiscal prudence have been jettisoned. No thought appears to have, for instance, been given to the cost of separation. Indeed, so far-reaching a decision should only have been made following a detailed cost benefit analysis and the results should have been shared with the nation.
{Satish Chandra is forgetting the core principal of reciprocity in diplomacy. When one party stands to gain, the gaining party has to compensate the exisitng parties. Consider this as blood money to pay for the price of emerging from the decolonised world.}
Similarly, in its anxiety to somehow quickly tie up the nuclear deal, the Government has shown no hesitation in committing the nation to huge expenditures which would have to be incurred for building a strategic nuclear fuel reserve, and constructing a new state-of-the-art reprocessing facility, not to speak of payments for in perpetuity IAEA inspections.
The writer is former Deputy National Security Adviser.
Using his FP experience I expect him to tell us why did the US skirt the Hyde act? What were its compulsions and what were India's levers?
To me and I am only trend watcher the 123 agreement is the result of the 'long boom' setoff by PVNR with his strategic insight. The deal had to happen because of the tests that were initiated in 1995(PVNR), 1996(13 day govt of ABV) and finally in 1998. The deal happened because Jaswant Singh was able to convince the US that India was not a challenger but a peer power. The great strategic restraint that ABV showed at Kargil and in Operation Parakram also showed the maturity of India as a world power despite the just cause that TSP provided. All these factors combined to bring about this deal which is a black swan event in modern Asian history.
It goes against the grain of normal events that were predicted for India and its place in the world in the aftermath of the Independence and the rise of PRC since 1962.
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Ah! Many thanks for the elaboration of your reasoning for renegotiating the 123 agreement, Acharya.
So the reason to renegotiate the 123 agreement today, is the sure projection that in 5-20 years' time, India's security environment will completely change, with TSP and PRC no longer feeling unstable or insecure, and hence not trying any more to retain what is not theirs.
Under those circumstances, what exactly would be India's purpose in conducting nuclear explosions? Impress the Mauritians?
ANybody who has read history will be able to recognise the current times with unstable TSP and an insecure PRC leadership trying to retain what is not theirs.
This will breakout and the global economic and strategic circumstance will change. It could be in 5-20 years time.
So the reason to renegotiate the 123 agreement today, is the sure projection that in 5-20 years' time, India's security environment will completely change, with TSP and PRC no longer feeling unstable or insecure, and hence not trying any more to retain what is not theirs.
Under those circumstances, what exactly would be India's purpose in conducting nuclear explosions? Impress the Mauritians?
Why wait later. Why not now?enqyoob wrote:
Under those circumstances, what exactly would be India's purpose in conducting nuclear explosions? Impress the Mauritians?
They are revisionist state by creation and hence will always feel insecure.with TSP and PRC no longer feeling unstable or insecure, and hence not trying any more to retain what is not theirs.
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Because that will be the end of India's rise, for the next 30 years. When all the dust has settled, and the economy gone down the tubes, we will have gained... what exactly?
Most probably, a 456 agreement, like what North Korea got. Dismantle all the reactors and hand over all the fissile material, and get 3 oil-fired thermal plants and 5 tanker trucks full of fuel oil.
One can mix that with the Party Manifesto as fertilizer, and make uber-powerful deterrents.
Most probably, a 456 agreement, like what North Korea got. Dismantle all the reactors and hand over all the fissile material, and get 3 oil-fired thermal plants and 5 tanker trucks full of fuel oil.
One can mix that with the Party Manifesto as fertilizer, and make uber-powerful deterrents.
War will take back India by more than 10 year.You are OK with it?enqyoob wrote:Because that will be the end of India's rise, for the next 30 years. When all the dust has settled, and the economy gone down the tubes, we will have gained... what exactly?
Agreement dont stop wars. But a test has psy ops value with RAPE kind of people.
Acharya wrote:
1) Lay a roadmap for current and future interaction.
2) Lay down the conditions under which the agreement becomes null and void
3) The stated commitments of either side --- either side has no obligation to follow through on their commitments if they don't want to (unless one side consists of weak-kneed ninnies that crap in their pants at the thought of violating an agreement)
4) all of the above
5) none of the above
War with who? China? Pakistan? If China, what does china gain by going to overt hostility mode? If Pakistan, then since the US has economic interests in India and Pakistan depends on US largesse and thus has to behave to US diktats, so why would Pakistan start a war with India without US support....the Pakis can continue their Kashmir terrorism with US support...just like today...but that is not the overt war scenario.War will take back India by more than 10 year.You are OK with it?
So what does an agreement do?Agreement dont stop wars.
1) Lay a roadmap for current and future interaction.
2) Lay down the conditions under which the agreement becomes null and void
3) The stated commitments of either side --- either side has no obligation to follow through on their commitments if they don't want to (unless one side consists of weak-kneed ninnies that crap in their pants at the thought of violating an agreement)
4) all of the above
5) none of the above
And why do we care what the RAPE nitwits say or do? They do not have any power within Pakistan, and whatever power they do have is being eroded with the increasing pro-jihad hordes in Pakistan. What will such an expensive exercise to commit psy-ops on Pakis achieve? Isn't it easier and less expensive to just explain to the world Pakistan's goat fetish and the many young, virile pakistani men who are into long-term caprine relationships?But a test has psy ops value with RAPE kind of people.
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Guys, this discussion is increasingly slipping into the realm of the surreal... is there a point to it? We should test, no we should not, we can't, but yes we can if we want... why not? why not today? why not tomorrow?
This deal is done. Move on. The implications of it are what we make it. If we need to test, we will. Of course, the price will be higher for us. It will also be high for those who will consider sanctioning us. Not many, if any will, at present and even less so in the future. The question is whether we want to create that disruption and whether it is worth it? What we do has global implications already nowadays. We have to act with the responsibility that comes with that. It might be worth it at some point. Not now though - unless someone can show why...
We are in a phase where everyone wants to be our ally, and no one - not publicly anyways - our enemy, including the Muskrat who has been making all the right noises in recent months. Our economy is doing superfine, and social conditions are stabilising and improving in general - give or take the odd bit of crap here and there. We need to sustain this as long as possible, as it will also allow ourselves to strengthen our economic and military sinews in the meantime.
We have no interest in a disruption of the status quo at present do we? When we do, we will do what is needed and we will prevail... have some confidence please. It is easier to call our elected leaders and appointed bureaucrats traitors and what not, but maybe they are no more traitors than the posters on BRF - as a general sample. It is quite possible that there is a direction to things, even if it is not explicitly articulated - and it never will be.
This deal is done. Move on. The implications of it are what we make it. If we need to test, we will. Of course, the price will be higher for us. It will also be high for those who will consider sanctioning us. Not many, if any will, at present and even less so in the future. The question is whether we want to create that disruption and whether it is worth it? What we do has global implications already nowadays. We have to act with the responsibility that comes with that. It might be worth it at some point. Not now though - unless someone can show why...
We are in a phase where everyone wants to be our ally, and no one - not publicly anyways - our enemy, including the Muskrat who has been making all the right noises in recent months. Our economy is doing superfine, and social conditions are stabilising and improving in general - give or take the odd bit of crap here and there. We need to sustain this as long as possible, as it will also allow ourselves to strengthen our economic and military sinews in the meantime.
We have no interest in a disruption of the status quo at present do we? When we do, we will do what is needed and we will prevail... have some confidence please. It is easier to call our elected leaders and appointed bureaucrats traitors and what not, but maybe they are no more traitors than the posters on BRF - as a general sample. It is quite possible that there is a direction to things, even if it is not explicitly articulated - and it never will be.
I was wondering whether a good contract/treaty lawyer preferably unbiased Indian has read the 123 text/verbiage can point to the potential legal loopholes and pitfalls. Everyone reading Article 2 "Scope of Cooperation" are ignoring Article 16 "Scope of Force and Duration".
ARTICLE 2 - SCOPE OF COOPERATION
1. The Parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Each Party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
ARTICLE 16 - ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION
4. This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the principles of international law.
Looking at Article 2 scope of cooperation clearly spells out as "concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" whereas Article 16 has nothing but international law. How is Hyde Act to be invoked when a strategic weapon (non-peaceful purposes) is exploded i.e. Nuke Test. Beats me. The brunt of Hyde Act is hidden by the clever use of use clause. Can some lawyer clarify the semantics.
Of course we are dealing with the US and can't go into argument such as "Your honor, the clause for invoking Hyde is not valid because it is out of scope", but the Indian Babus and world opinion can point out the fallacy if US were to bully India, that India is right per wording of the treaty.
ARTICLE 2 - SCOPE OF COOPERATION
1. The Parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Each Party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
ARTICLE 16 - ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION
4. This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the principles of international law.
Looking at Article 2 scope of cooperation clearly spells out as "concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" whereas Article 16 has nothing but international law. How is Hyde Act to be invoked when a strategic weapon (non-peaceful purposes) is exploded i.e. Nuke Test. Beats me. The brunt of Hyde Act is hidden by the clever use of use clause. Can some lawyer clarify the semantics.
Of course we are dealing with the US and can't go into argument such as "Your honor, the clause for invoking Hyde is not valid because it is out of scope", but the Indian Babus and world opinion can point out the fallacy if US were to bully India, that India is right per wording of the treaty.
SaiK wrote:
In the absence of effective means of enforcement, what good is ANY law?
Who is going to enforce these "international laws" you speak of? If the answer is "international sanctions"....then what is the best way to counter any such move to enforce these inconvenient "international laws"?
Which part of "there is no such thing as international law" didn't you understand?then what is [international law]? [keep in context: indo-us nuclear deal]
In the absence of effective means of enforcement, what good is ANY law?
Who is going to enforce these "international laws" you speak of? If the answer is "international sanctions"....then what is the best way to counter any such move to enforce these inconvenient "international laws"?
Here is another GEM about scope ... Hyde have been given the boot.
ARTICLE 2 - SCOPE OF COOPERATION
4. The Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded
nuclear activities of either Party. Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes.
ARTICLE 2 - SCOPE OF COOPERATION
4. The Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded
nuclear activities of either Party. Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes.
SaiK wrote:
"International law" does exist in the eyes of those who want to enforce "international laws" (that were written by them) -- if third parties think that they can get India to follow their "international laws" to its own detriment, I think they are in for a surprise.
SaiK,I did not understand "international law" per the agreement. why did they mention it?
"International law" does exist in the eyes of those who want to enforce "international laws" (that were written by them) -- if third parties think that they can get India to follow their "international laws" to its own detriment, I think they are in for a surprise.
Rye, the parties in the agreement (legally speaking) are India and the USA. Now, "they, them", are all references to the parties here, and if any international laws, then respective parties' international laws apply. In yankees case, the most probable would be hyde., and in our case.. we can keep it aside for now.
I was just taking off from where Calvin left., when he asked to get a grip., that is not so easy on this slippery international lines. Sounds like there could be an oil slick that we would miss to notice.
I was just taking off from where Calvin left., when he asked to get a grip., that is not so easy on this slippery international lines. Sounds like there could be an oil slick that we would miss to notice.
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I think the definition of international law would imply that the same law holds for both sides, so the phrase "respective parties' intl. laws" does not make sense to me.Rye, the parties in the agreement (legally speaking) are India and the USA. Now, "they, them", are all references to the parties here, and any international laws, then respective parties' international laws apply.
I only read the whole "international laws" part as the laws that dictate how bilateral agreements like 123 need to be adhered to. We all know how Pakistan adheres to bilateral treaties, so this all sounds like gas to me.
One of the unexpected benefits of this agreement is that it will expose BARC and NPCIL to competition. Absent this agreement, fuel for loading up the AHWRs (other than an odd experimental reactor) would have been available some 25-35 years down the road in large enough quantities.NRao wrote:I do see a great +ve.
Indian politicians have again placed the Indian Scicom where they have to be really inventive.
I can see in some 50 years the US wondering how to cap the new inventiveness.
I only wonder if India will take advantage of this situation to become a viable economic power.
The scientists working on AHWR designs thought that they had 30 more years to get their design right. Now suddenly, fuel is no longer a constraint. They no longer have to wait for the FBRs to generate the fuel (sorry for the FBRs to be built themselves and then produce the fuel) but it can be imported immediately on operationalizing this agreement. They will certainly be under pressure to produce a working AHWR asap now.
So folks like Dr. Prasad who have been talking about the AHWR becoming operational in 2037 should be asked some hard questions about the reasons for that kind of lengthy time frame? You could now have an Areva or a GE constructing a LWR (or variations of it) and BARC/NPCIL constructing an AHWR, both simultanously. Funding and fuel available in plenty for both.
Similarly the scientists who are working on the yet unsolved issues relating to reprocessing spent AHWR fuel will also have to work the midnight shift to get their technology mature in time for operationalizing the AHWR.
If construction for the first AHWR can begin in 2008, this agreement will have saved 30 years (at least) in implementing the 3 stage Indian plan if the scientists can now deliver. Not bad at all.
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Looks like the whole Iran pressure using 123 is backfiring. Tom Casey of State Dept clarifies that India is big boy now. NPT Ayatollahs are gnashing their teeths and applying to monster.com for alternate jobs.
US cannot determine India's policy towards Iran: State Dept
Days after asking India and others to "diminish" its economic ties with Iran, the US has said it cannot determine New Delhi's foreign policy, but hoped that latter would support the efforts to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
"... India, like any other country in the world, is free to establish diplomatic relations with whatever countries they want and the US is not going to be in a position to make those determinations for others. We have some unique issues in terms of Iran," State Department's Deputy Spokesman Tom Casey said Tuesday.
US cannot determine India's policy towards Iran: State Dept
Days after asking India and others to "diminish" its economic ties with Iran, the US has said it cannot determine New Delhi's foreign policy, but hoped that latter would support the efforts to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
"... India, like any other country in the world, is free to establish diplomatic relations with whatever countries they want and the US is not going to be in a position to make those determinations for others. We have some unique issues in terms of Iran," State Department's Deputy Spokesman Tom Casey said Tuesday.
ldev,
Nice post.
However, is it possible that the competition could be controlled?
I already see a Turkey-Greece or Saudi-Israel situation here. All that has to happen is Iran needs to elect a "moderate" and we can all see Big-B movie re-runs.
BTW, I think your post shows one way Uncle could (emphasis) control Indian progress. IF import is much cheaper than an Indian effort, look for Nayi Deli to cut off support. Possible?
However, like I said this should given Scicom better opps to compete on the military side.
I hope I am dead wrong, but I can see Indian beaches still having the same sand in 40 years.
Nice post.
However, is it possible that the competition could be controlled?
I already see a Turkey-Greece or Saudi-Israel situation here. All that has to happen is Iran needs to elect a "moderate" and we can all see Big-B movie re-runs.
BTW, I think your post shows one way Uncle could (emphasis) control Indian progress. IF import is much cheaper than an Indian effort, look for Nayi Deli to cut off support. Possible?
However, like I said this should given Scicom better opps to compete on the military side.
I hope I am dead wrong, but I can see Indian beaches still having the same sand in 40 years.