Nuclear Discussion - Nukkad Thread

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shiv
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Post by shiv »

CRamS wrote:Rye:

I noticed that you are refering to the deal in quotes: "deal" as I have been doing. Also, you've been pretty vitriolic of late on MMS/Sonia, wonder why? The admins banned me in my previous avatar for exactly the same concerns you raise about MMS, namely, his desire to walk hand in hand with Mush down a red carpet in Stockholm Sweeden to a rousing reception from the white knights for a job well done.

Everyone expresses an opinion. Some stupid, some not so stupid - but that is often a personal judgement. When opinions are disputed, it gets personal. Once it gets personal, there is more than one person who is involved and admins are forced into a situation in which any action is wrong.

Why not let opinions stay as opinions, stupid or not without disputing them or trying to change the opinion staters mind? Errant posters can more easily be cautioned.
Last edited by shiv on 23 Sep 2007 16:28, edited 1 time in total.
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Post by Satya_anveshi »

shiv wrote: Nobody's opinions are going to be heard with this kind of tamasha let alone changed.

JMO
After about 35 avatars of this thread I saw a remarkable shift in atleast one major contributor's opinion about this deal and I see hope.

But..I got your cue...whatever that gives you the kick....Peace.
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Post by sraj »

Reposting in order to complete response to ldev. Pls note this relates to a discussion on what is appropriate language for the NSG Waiver, which is in some ways more important than Hyde/123 as it will govern a multilateral commitment India will enter into with 45 NSG countries.

ldev wrote:
As far as I can see, those references are not binding commitments being made by India. The very mention of those references and India's ability to negotiate them is nothing more than a reflection of India's bargaining strength as of today.

Here we go again.......what is binding and what is non-binding (shades of Hyde)!!!

What is the purpose of references to an Indian test moratorium or to FMCT in a waiver document that is restricted to purely civil nuclear cooperation under appropriate safeguards? Why have non-civilian references in a civilian document at all?
One will have to wait and see the shape of the NSG waiver. But if its scope does not exceed that of the 123 clauses what is wrong with that position besides the reasons already stated?

Does 123 mention test moratorium or FMCT?
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Post by SaiK »

mmm i am seeing various opinions..
NRIs go to hell...
Left go to hell...
Parivar go to hell...
Upavasis go to hell..
Bhanias go to hell..
Babooze go to hell..
Firangis go to hell..
Aam junta go to hell..
BARCkings go to hell..
who remains?
people like me ...:wink:
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Post by NRao »

China not to veto India-US N-deal at NSG: Report

Suspect Chicom has her own 123 in mind ad just needed some time to "study" the Indo-US 123, so that she can out do it. Would expect her not to veto on condition that she can spearhead her own similar efforts. Else, expect a veto.
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Post by vsudhir »

N-submarines will make India’s deterrence credible: Indian Navy (TOI)
NEW DELHI: Only nuclear-powered submarines armed with nuclear-tipped missiles can provide real muscle to India’s strategic deterrence posture, which revolves around the no-first use (NFU) policy.

"The most credible of all arsenals in a second-strike is the nuclear-armed missile submarine," holds the Navy’s new strategy document titled ‘Freedom to Use the Seas: India’s Maritime Military Strategy (IMMS)’. Supposed to "complement" Navy’s war doctrine, a reading of IMMS shows the absence of "a credible nuclear weapon triad" in India’s arsenal, or the capability to launch nuclear-tipped missiles from air, land and sea, continues to haunt the force. Nuclear-powered submari-nes have higher speeds and can stay submerged much longer than conventional diesel-electric submarines since they do not have to surface or snorkel frequently to get oxygen to rec-harge batteries. Consequently, they provide a much more stealthier launchpad for nuclear weapons.

But, at present, India neither has nuclear submarines, nor SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile) capabilities. It makes do with only the rail and road-mobile Agni family of missiles and fighters like Mirage-2000s and Sukhoi-30MKIs, which can deliver nuclear weapons. As reported earlier, India is taking strides towards having its own nuclear submarines under the hush-hush Rs 14,000-crore ATV (advanced technology vessel) programme at Vishakapatnam.
But even as India gears up to lease an Akula-II nuclear submarine from Russia by mid-2008, sources say the first of the five long-delayed ATVs will become fully-operational only by 2010 at the earliest.

There is also hectic activity underway to develop SLBMs and SLCMs (cruise missiles) under the equally-secretive ‘Sagarika’ project. But only four-five tests have been carried out from "submersible pontoon launchers" so far. It will take another three-four years for an integrated SLBM or SLCM capability to be ready.

"Our NFU policy amply illustrates India’s intentions of using the nuclear deterrent only as a retaliatory measure of last resort. The sea-based leg of the nuclear triad enables a survivable second-strike capability and is, therefore, a critical enabler for the NFU nuclear doctrine to attain credibility," says the IMMS.

The IMMS points out that the "nuclear submarine option" is the "preferred arsenal" for "small nuclear forces" since it is both stealthy and cost-effective. Deterrence, after all, can be achieved with a lesser number of missiles at sea than if they are land-based. China, the only Asian country with SLBM capability, of course, has forged ahead in this area, with a very active SSBN (nuclear submarines with long-range strategic missiles) programme.

The IMMS, in fact, says the Chinese navy has an "ambitious modernisation programme", to go along with its "attempts" to gain a "strategic toehold" in the Indian Ocean region. The importance of the sea-based leg can be gauged from the fact that even the US and Russia will ensure that two-thirds of the strategic warheads they eventually retain, under arms reduction agreements, will be in the shape of SLBMs.
[email protected]
Well, the first requirement of a good deterrent is a TN bomb that works. IMVHOs and all that.
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Post by ramana »

vsudhir, I beg to differ. There was no TN weapons till mid 1950s. Was the US or SU deterrent any less credible.

For a deterrent to be credible there has to be weapons, deployment, and the will to use it. The will to use it is stated by the doctrine. India has all three aspects. MMS has moved from MND to CMD where C stands from credible. Means he will use what he has and not any unobtanium powered stuff.

What this Navy deployment does is to make it more survivable and that adds to the credibility picture.
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Post by mandrake »

vsudhir wrote: Well, the first requirement of a good deterrent is a TN bomb that works. IMVHOs and all that.
And it already does for the payload we want as of now, there are other options as well though number of MIRV will be then less.

Remember 3*1000 KG RV :wink: The TN would be 6*500 KG (Approx) + decoys + chaffs etc etc.
Last edited by mandrake on 24 Sep 2007 05:08, edited 1 time in total.
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Post by sunilUpa »

ramana wrote:vsudhir, I beg to differ. There was no TN weapons till mid 1950s. Was the US or SU deterrent any less credible.

What this Navy deployment does is to make it more survivable and that adds to the credibility picture.
Well US and SU deterrent was then credible because both of them didn't possess TN weapons.

Now with ATV about to make it's entry, nuclear command and control will have to undergo major changes. Till now AFAIK war heads are kept separate from delivery systems. But that's not an option with submarine based deterrent. Massive investments need to be done to develop C&C systems, perhaps our own version of Dead Man's Hand. Interesting times ahead.

All IMVHO etc.
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Post by ramana »

So now folks want to go after the IN to seek credibility! I guess one will never win with arguments like this.
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Post by sunilUpa »

ramana wrote:So now folks want to go after the IN to seek credibility! I guess one will never win with arguments like this.
No..it was an observation that while submarine based deterrent gives a credible, survivable second strike capability, it also calls for major investment to ensure control over that capability. As I understand, GoI currently ensures that control is always in civilian/political hand by separating the warhead from delivery system (this is based on open source material, I may be wrong and I am open to correction). With submarine based deerrent, GoI has to invest in much more extensive control mechanisms to ensure control as well as deployebility.

I am not sure how this can be construed as 'going after IN' to seek credibility.
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Post by vsudhir »

Fair enough.

We've some workable bomb designs (but at the 200kt level?) and our credible deterrent is more or less set. So even in the worst case if we somehow get caught in the CTBT, FMCT kinda web, we'd still be ok?

That is all I wanna know.

Jai Maharashtra
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Post by Calvin »

US and SU deterrent was then credible because both of them didn't possess TN weapons.
Not at all. A TN weapon does not change the deterrence equation.

We've some workable bomb designs (but at the 200kt level?)
Yes
So even in the worst case if we somehow get caught in the CTBT, FMCT kinda web, we'd still be ok?
Yes.
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Post by ramana »

Yes. Second Calvin.
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Post by Sanku »

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Post by Shankar »

We've some workable bomb designs (but at the 200kt level?) and our credible deterrent is more or less set. So even in the worst case if we somehow get caught in the CTBT, FMCT kinda web, we'd still be ok?
-No it may not be ok for us .The weapon design we have is surely much better than Russian /us in sixties may be but far behind what is on top of the line they have today and that may include some of china designs too

That goes for the delivery system too and then actual system test with warhead mated to delivery systems .

That is the reason why one govt after another did not sign the NPT/FMCT and likes which the present govt under US pressure is about to do thru back door

We may have a perfect TN weapon only once tested but that is not credible enough to assure a true deterance .we need it demonstrated and need them in large numbers.

So when you sign the 123 you slowly leak out your deterance out of public view .

That is why the 123 is so utter crap today .

China in its own way knows it and that is why they are not vetoing the deal

I wish Russia uses its veto this time to stop the deal going thru .problem is they may not do so for the MRCA deal comming up and may more such in the pipe line

LEFT is our only salvation -you like it or not
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Post by abhischekcc »

NRao wrote:China not to veto India-US N-deal at NSG: Report

Suspect Chicom has her own 123 in mind ad just needed some time to "study" the Indo-US 123, so that she can out do it. Would expect her not to veto on condition that she can spearhead her own similar efforts. Else, expect a veto.
That may or may not be the reason for this apparent show of friendship.

China has a strategic culture which can be very approximately described as 'Guerilla'. They do not resist larger trends. Recall that they had shipped heavy water to us in the 80s when the yanks as usual were behaving like a obnoxious girlfriend.

The last thing they wanna do is see India in the yank camp. and Indo-US joint strategy on Tibet. If they oppose this deal openly, they risk antagonising India.
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Post by Calvin »

-No it may not be ok for us .The weapon design we have is surely much better than Russian /us in sixties may be but far behind what is on top of the line they have today and that may include some of china designs too
Shankar - In the unique calculus of nuclear deterrence, weapons that kill >100,000 people in a single attack are all equivalent. Is there a reason why you feel that all of the other nuclear deterrence theorists are wrong?
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Post by ShauryaT »

Calvin wrote:
-No it may not be ok for us .The weapon design we have is surely much better than Russian /us in sixties may be but far behind what is on top of the line they have today and that may include some of china designs too
Shankar - In the unique calculus of nuclear deterrence, weapons that kill >100,000 people in a single attack are all equivalent. Is there a reason why you feel that all of the other nuclear deterrence theorists are wrong?
The concept of deterrence is larger than the biggest bum in your inventory or how many, it can kill. It is a dynamic concept. The last I checked, there was a lack of consensus among nuclear deterrence theorists, in India on, what constitutes adequate deterrence level thresholds, in terms of quantity and even the mix of weaponry.

There seems to be consensus on the various types of weapons to be deployed and there is consensus, on the delivery mechanisms to be employed, that is, deployment across the three services.

There seems to be a lack of involvement of the armed forces, to decide these deterrence levels. The political leadership should be formulating these things with all the stake holders, as our stock pile and delivery options, perceived threat levels change and most importantly as the various 3/4 letter regimes, seek to lock us in.

If this lack of involvement of the armed forces, the ultimate users, translates to lower confidence levels, due to the limited testing of the TN option, then that is a real problem as there will be a lack of consensus, again, on force levels.

Another area, that we should not confuse ourselves with is that deterrence, does not automatically mean that the arsenal is not for nuclear war fighting. It is NFU that makes the arsenal deterrent, once this is breached by the enemy, the arsenal needs to be available for full scale nuclear war fighting, against potential future enemies. Also, this arsenal needs to survive a first strike. So, CMD, if anything, needs to retain a capability to have, deploy and use force levels, in quantity, quality and mix along with flexible and diverse delivery options - as in our peceived and changing levels of threat scenarios, in the eyes of Indian stake holders, at higher levels than, what the enemy shall possess.
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Post by ramana »

ShauryaT, Those who need to know know. The military has by and large the conventional posture. However when required they will bring in the other posture.
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Post by Arun_S »

ramana wrote:Yes. Second Calvin.
Fully Agree.
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Post by Rudradev »

Arun_S wrote:
ramana wrote:Yes. Second Calvin.
Fully Agree.
I'm afraid I don't understand.

Calvin says:
Quote:
We've some workable bomb designs (but at the 200kt level?)


Yes

Quote:
So even in the worst case if we somehow get caught in the CTBT, FMCT kinda web, we'd still be ok?


Yes.
Eh?

As far as I know, "credible minimum deterrence" is NOT a concept that makes any sense devoid of context. It is only credible with respect to a particular foe or foes. If Y_P is the minimum guaranteed yield our arsenal must have in order to deter Pakistan, and Y_C similarly for China, then assuming that China and Pakistan are the only powers we want to deter, our total arsenal must be = Y_P + Y_C.

However, even assuming that our number of 200kt devices is enough to meet Y_P + Y_C; if we allow ourselves to be caught in the CTBT/FMCT web, we are effectively allowing our nuclear deterrent to be frozen at the point where it is credible for China and Pakistan as of DD/MM/YY when the cap was placed.

So unless we are (1) guaranteed that China and Pakistan will never require more than Y_C + Y_P as of DD/MM/YY to deter and (2) guaranteed that we will never have to think about deterring anybody else... which seem like extremely static assumptions to base the continuance of our national security upon...

In what sense does our deterrent retain any credibility whatsoever, under the circumstances Calvin has asserted we would "still be ok"?
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Post by Shankar »

Shankar - In the unique calculus of nuclear deterrence, weapons that kill >100,000 people in a single attack are all equivalent. Is there a reason why you feel that all of the other nuclear deterrence theorists are wrong?
Cavin -the concept of nuclear deterance is flexible and graded response with fully assured weapons and systems at your disposal from day 1

That is why we need the full spectrum form fractional KT to MT because any nuclear conflict is not likely to be a mega ton exchange from the day one unless everyone turns insane

It is likely to be a stage wise process with the option to back off/stop whenever the objective has been achieved

Now in Pakistan specific scenario it may stop at KT level with China it may or may not and may escalate to MT level before the leaders gain back their sanity

With US if it comes to a nuclear showdown -knowing how they behaved in a past a huge inventory of all three types of triad and the political will may become essential to make the deterance effective and meaningful,like China is doing today or Soviet Union did and doing .

The MAD concept is not an outdated concept as most US think tanks would make us believe ,Soviet union knows that only too well and as such rebuilding and modernizing their entire gamut of nuke weapons and delivery systems

The biggest nuclear blackmail/threat to our country is not pakistan or china who have as much to to loose as we in an all out nuclear conflict .It is US who will chllange us some day as we try to get into the military/economic superpower league and then will come the real challenge to our very silly NFU doctrine because in all probability we will not enough second strike capability to prevent them taking a massive first strike
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Post by ShauryaT »

ramana wrote:ShauryaT, Those who need to know know. The military has by and large the conventional posture. However when required they will bring in the other posture.
Just like that! Are capabilities and doctrines built over night? Is the enemy going to wait? If we are going to be a real nuclear power of any kind, we need to have these doctrines well articulated. Takes time to build capabilities. Takes time to build consensus, for doctrines. Especially, in India, where the political entities, do not share a common view, of the capabilities and doctrines, needed.

Example: Will we be in a state to develop a future replacable war head program, along with an 8 MIRV SLBM capability - with a Congress government in power, for the next 20 years? Will we retain the potential capability to deter the largest, nuclear stock piles, that exist?

There is a fundamental difficulty in practising minimums, in a world, where the partners seek to lock you, into those practised minimums, while they always enjoy the upper hand and the adversaries see the minimums, as a weakness. In effect, we are at the mercy of a sane leadership, of our adversaries, not to be willing to loose half their population and rely on partners today that will NEVER convert, to adversaries tomorrow. Fine - as long as we know for sure, that, it will not always be the case, and we will retain the capability to go MAD, if needed. In time frames, that can beat any plans of potential adversaries.
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Post by ramana »

Basu clarifies:

Jyoti Basu hits out at media

Santanu Banerjee | New Delhi

Embarrassed by the media interpretation of the recent 'pro-nuclear energy' statement of Marxist patriarch Jyoti Basu and West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, the CPI(M) has undertaken a damage control exercise and said the support for nuclear energy was not same as favouring the India-US nuclear deal.

Coinciding with CPI(M) general secretary Prakash Karat's clarification on Saturday that the party was "not averse to self-reliance in nuclear power but against any pact with the US on this issue," party's mouthpiece Ganashakti began an aggressive campaign against media for trying to portray that the CPI(M) was a house divided on the India-US nuclear deal.

"The party will not function by newspaper directives," was the lead in Ganashakti of September 22, quoting Basu.

Interestingly, in the report Jyoti Basu himself refuted the argument that support for nuclear power was same support of the India-US civil nuclear agreement.

"The support for nuclear energy self-reliance should not equate with the support for nuclear deal with US," he said.

Another report in the paper questioned media's alleged closeness with the policy-makers of Capitol Hill.

The paper quoted an India-based former CIA agent Johan Smith's memoirs which said: "American officials or CIA representatives decide what they (most of the Indian newspapers and reporters) should write. There are several newspapers and reporters in India who abide by US officials' directives."

Bhattacharjee's loud thinking with the business leaders in Kolkata has caused deep embarrassment to the State party leadership.

Left insiders feel Bhattacharjee's 'pro-nuclear statements and his remarks that he did not approve of blind Americanism,' may come up for discussion in the Politburo and central committee meeting, which will begin in Kolkata from September 28.

Importantly, some of the Left leaders had sought clarifications on Bhattacharjee's statements from Karat when they recently had had a brief meeting the day they confabulated together before the UPA-Left committee on nuclear deal met last week

While both the Politburo and the Central committee are expected to examine the prospect of a strategy for a mid-term general elections and how to dissociate the party from the Congress-led UPA's 'anti-poor policies' besides strategies to combat Government imposed polls when not many, particularly West Bengal Government, are not exactly ready for an election.
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Post by svinayak »

ramana wrote:
The paper quoted an India-based former CIA agent Johan Smith's memoirs which said: "American officials or CIA representatives decide what they (most of the Indian newspapers and reporters) should write. There are several newspapers and reporters in India who abide by US officials' directives."
There was information that such things happens but this is the first time we have direct connection between what is written in Indian newspapers and CIA/foriegn agencies.


But how would CPI know about this things? Were they party to this and knew about this for several decades since it helped them making their commie ideology public friendly? Only now they feel that this needs to be exposed.
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Post by ramana »

The CPI et al should reveal what updated info they have so that the public can judge for themselves. Otherwise its just a lot of bull.

John Smith's book is very old and outdated.
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Post by svinayak »

ramana wrote:
John Smith's book is very old and outdated.
What is the book title?
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Post by ramana »

Try google.
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Post by svinayak »

Cannot identify
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Post by bala »

Looks like the BJP gamble of announcing mid-term polls has paid off. The Left is cornerned and blurts out - nah, not possible we will duke it out until 2009, we know a good thing when we are in the driver's seat.

So, sit back and relax. the US-Indo nuke deal will be passed by the left clowns.

BJP ridicules Karat's remarks on mid-term polls

The BJP yesterday ridiculed the remarks of CPI(M) leader Prakash Karat that there will be no mid-term polls, saying the people were watching the "drama and tamasha" being played by the Congress and the Left Parties.

"We want to know how long this drama and tamasha will go on," senior BJP leader M Venkaiah Naidu said, reacting to Karat's statement that the next Lok Sabha electons will be held in 2009 as per schedule.

He said BJP will be happy if "this lame duck government" continues, "as they (UPA) will give us some more points by making more mistakes. We have the patience to wait till 2009".

Karat had on Sunday said in Chandigarh that despite tensions between the UPA government and CPI-M, which gives it outside support, on the Indo-US nuclear deal, the next general elections will be held as per schedule in 2009.
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Post by Tilak »

Future India N-plants to come under IAEA safeguard
Press Trust Of India

[quote]Vienna: All future Indian nuclear plants under civilian domain could be placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguard mechanism that could be on par with the mechanism for the five declared nuclear powers.

Without creating a separate India specific safeguards, IAEA sources indicated that in all probability, all the future Indian nuclear plants under civilian domain could be placed under the agency's safeguards system of 1965, as provisionally extended in 1966 and 1968.

That means, India can benefit the safeguard mechanisms (campaign safeguards) which are reactor specific and utility specific and would be closer to the five nuclear weapon (P-5) countries and not as a non-weapon state (country), the sources said.

This could be essentially on the same lines as that of safeguard arrangement made between India and IAEA for two units of Tarapur atomic power plants set up in 1969 (by General Electric, US) and two units Rajasthan (from Canada) in 1971.

“The provisionally extended safeguard system of 1966 is a revised system with additional provisions for reprocessing plants,â€
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Post by Nandu »

Acharya wrote:Cannot identify
This is the best my google search could return.

In 1967 a curious little book appeared in India, entitled I Was a CIA Agent in India, by John Discoe Smith, an American. Published by the Communist Party of India, it was based on articles written by Smith for Literaturnaya Gazeta in Moscow after he had defected to the Soviet Union around 1960. Smith, born in Quincy, Mass. in 1926, wrote that he had been a communications technician and code clerk at the US Embassy in New Delhi in 1955, performing tasks for the CIA as well.
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Post by Gerard »

svinayak
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Post by svinayak »

Nandu wrote:
In 1967 a curious little book appeared in India, entitled I Was a CIA Agent in India, by John Discoe Smith, an American. Published by the Communist Party of India, it was based on articles written by Smith for Literaturnaya Gazeta in Moscow after he had defected to the Soviet Union around 1960. Smith, born in Quincy, Mass. in 1926, wrote that he had been a communications technician and code clerk at the US Embassy in New Delhi in 1955, performing tasks for the CIA as well.
Smith, John D. I Was a CIA Agent in India. New Delhi: New Age Printing, 1967. Pamphlet No.5, 36 pages. (Compiled from three articles in the Moscow weekly "Literaturnaya Gazeta" in 1967, and published by D.P. Sinha for the Communist Party of India.)
John Discoe Smith joined the State Department as a communications code clerk in 1950. This memoir details his involvement in CIA operations in India from 1954-1959. In 1955 he married Mary London, whom he names as a CIA employee based in New Delhi. This link lured Smith into a variety of operations. He goes on to name numerous CIA officers and Indian agents, and briefly describes their activities. One disturbing reference is the bombing of the Air India plane carrying the Chinese delegation to the Bandung Conference in 1955. Smith is asked by Jack Curran, his wife's boss, to deliver a bag to a KMT agent in New Delhi, and is told later by his wife that it contained the bomb which destroyed the plane. (This may have been one of the CIA's plots to kill Zhou En-lai, who was scheduled to be on the flight; see New York Times, 1967-11-22, p.23). In 1960 Smith resigned and wandered around Europe. He later defected to the Soviet Union and emerged with his story. Smith states that he sent a letter to Indian officials detailing CIA activities, which may have helped lead to the expulsion of CIA station chief Harry Rositzke. Despite the obvious propaganda jargon, this booklet appears to be a reliable account of CIA activities in India in the 1950s. -- Wendell Minnick
ISBN unavailable
http://www.namebase.org/sources/CA.html

http://www.namebase.org/books79.html

U.S. Policy / India

Galiullin, Rustem. The CIA in Asia: Covert Operations Against India and Afghanistan. Translated from the Russian by Gayane Chalyan. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1988. 144 pages.
Published prior to the Soviet coup, this book is primarily a collection of essays on CIA misdeeds in India and Afghanistan -- although Galiullin manages to comment on everything from the OSS to Watergate and the Contras. His sources vary from the writings of Lenin to the Washington Post. The book is peppered with the names of CIA officers, "victims" of U.S. foreign policy, and agents working for the CIA. Despite the anti-imperialist slant, the chapters on India and Afghanistan are worth reading. He seems to have gleaned from both Indian and U.S. periodicals what evidence there is of CIA activities in the region. Though his conclusions are subjective, they are based on actual events. However, some of Galiullin's accusations parrot the party line -- he manages to tie the CIA in with the Society of Krishna Consciousness and describes the Peace Corps as a CIA front. Given the sponsorship of the publication, the reader should consult other sources before making a judgment.

-- Wendell Minnick
Nair, Kunhanandan. Devil and His Dart: How the CIA is Plotting in the Third World. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1986. 156 pages.
Parakal, Pauly V. Secret Wars of CIA. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1984. 132 pages.
These slim books are typical of the Third World and Soviet press on the topic of the CIA, a half-dozen of which are in NameBase. They are the sort of broad anti-CIA polemic that would be considered propagandistic and anti-intellectual by "sophisticated" Western publishers. The facts presented in these books can rarely be disputed, since they are frequently compiled from accepted U.S. sources, but the shotgun approach preferred by the authors leaves no doubt as to where the real evil empire can be found. Occasional tidbits on CIA activities that appeared only in the foreign press make these volumes worthwhile. One criticism might be that the term "CIA" is sometimes used too loosely, and thereby understates the pluralism that may exist among U.S. foreign policy elites.

Kunhanandan Nair is the European correspondent of "Blitz" in Bombay; the dust jacket states that he has "extensive contacts in Western and European countries, and at the European headquarters of the CIA in Frankfurt." His book includes an appendix of 150 alleged CIA personnel, with the years and countries where they were posted (pp. 116-132). One of these is Matthew Gannon, who was deputy station chief in Beirut when he was killed in the mysterious Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am 103 in December, 1988. Several other U.S. intelligence officers were on board as well.

Pauly Parakal is the assistant editor of the New Delhi weekly New Age. His chapters on the CIA in Afghanistan and Poland during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and in India generally, contain information not readily available. One story claims that the Pakistani Medical Research Center in Lahore was breeding infected mosquitoes in 1981, paying over 300 Pakistanis for use as guinea pigs. PMRC was a University of Maryland project with funding from AID and allegedly from the CIA, which was presumably interested in developing new capabilities for covert biological warfare.
Smith, John D. I Was a CIA Agent in India. New Delhi: New Age Printing, 1967. Pamphlet No.5, 36 pages. (Compiled from three articles in the Moscow weekly "Literaturnaya Gazeta" in 1967, and published by D.P. Sinha for the Communist Party of India.)
John Discoe Smith joined the State Department as a communications code clerk in 1950. This memoir details his involvement in CIA operations in India from 1954-1959. In 1955 he married Mary London, whom he names as a CIA employee based in New Delhi. This link lured Smith into a variety of operations. He goes on to name numerous CIA officers and Indian agents, and briefly describes their activities. One disturbing reference is the bombing of the Air India plane carrying the Chinese delegation to the Bandung Conference in 1955. Smith is asked by Jack Curran, his wife's boss, to deliver a bag to a KMT agent in New Delhi, and is told later by his wife that it contained the bomb which destroyed the plane. (This may have been one of the CIA's plots to kill Zhou En-lai, who was scheduled to be on the flight; see the New York Times, 11/22/67, p.23). In 1960 Smith resigned and wandered around Europe. He later defected to the Soviet Union and emerged with his story. Smith states that he sent a letter to Indian officials detailing CIA activities, which may have helped lead to the expulsion of CIA station chief Harry Rositzke. Despite the obvious propaganda jargon, this booklet appears to be a reliable account of CIA activities in India in the 1950s. -- Wendell Minnick

Here are the names most frequently mentioned in the above books:
Manny
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Post by Manny »

Acharya,

Do you have anything on the Chinese communists infiltration in India via the Indian Communist parties and the left?

I would be interested to know about that.

In the post cold war world, The Communist Chinese infiltration in India is more relevant. Don't you think? After all..even the eastern Europeans are westward looking and pro America post Cold war...with the exception of the few anachronistic old bags.

A country that has managed to feed its population instead of pontificating and being just humanitarians in the abstract must be doing something right...and we could be humble enough to learn from them.

Manny
NRao
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Post by NRao »


Rahul Gandhi gets Congress post

Mr Gandhi, 37, is the son of Congress party president Sonia Gandhi and is tipped as a future prime minister
SaiK
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Post by SaiK »

do we have more about India specific safeguards? in details and in difference with general IAEA safeguards?
svinayak
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Post by svinayak »

Manny wrote:Acharya,

Do you have anything on the Chinese communists infiltration in India via the Indian Communist parties and the left?

I would be interested to know about that.

In the post cold war world, The Communist Chinese infiltration in India is more relevant. Don't you think? After all..even the eastern Europeans are westward looking and pro America post Cold war...with the exception of the few anachronistic old bags.

A country that has managed to feed its population instead of pontificating and being just humanitarians in the abstract must be doing something right...and we could be humble enough to learn from them.

Manny
The communist party of China is a unique one only for its country after 1975. It does not have global role after the cold war but uses its old internationalist connections to keep the ideology going worldwide.

But all the links to Indian commie movements including the naxalites have been influenced by the western liberal/leftist academic world after 1980s. This is very critical to understand. There is this deep links to western world that people get shocked.
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Post by Calvin »

With US if it comes to a nuclear showdown -knowing how they behaved in a past a huge inventory of all three types of triad and the political will may become essential to make the deterance effective and meaningful,like China is doing today or Soviet Union did and doing .
Shankar: This is absolutely untrue. The US will be deterred by a single nuclear weapon falling on a single moderately sized city (~100,000 people). Have you read anything on deterrence at all?
Now in Pakistan specific scenario it may stop at KT level with China it may or may not and may escalate to MT level before the leaders gain back their sanity
Shankar: It is not clear that you understand deterrence at all.
the concept of nuclear deterance is flexible and graded response with fully assured weapons and systems at your disposal from day 1. That is why we need the full spectrum form fractional KT to MT because any nuclear conflict is not likely to be a mega ton exchange from the day one unless everyone turns insane
Shankar: Again, you are letting your opinions cloud the facts that exist.

India's doctrine is clear. The only thing dynamic about this is, centers around the concept of what is, and what is not "acceptable" to the agressor ("any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor."). Unacceptable Damage is pretty well understood among those that have studied this. The only remaining question is that of will, not capability.
we need to have these doctrines well articulated.
ShauryaT: India has about the best articulated doctrine in the business. Everyone elses doctrine is shaded in ambiguity. There is no ambiguity about the indian doctine.

A WBC attack on India, or Indian troops will invite massive nuclear retaliation on the attacker, or any coalition ally. This is about as clear as they get. India includes Indian territory claimed by others, and Indian Embassies overseas. Indian troops covers a Pakistani FU on Indian troops in Pakistan (crossing Paki redlines), and dismantles the concept of an escalatory ladder.
Will we retain the potential capability to deter the largest, nuclear stock piles, that exist?
Yes.

This is not a simple game of equality in numbers. One weapon deters ten thousand (or more). The asymmetry of nuclear deterrence is awesome and troublesome at the same time.
In effect, we are at the mercy of a sane leadership, of our adversaries, not to be willing to loose half their population and rely on partners today that will NEVER convert, to adversaries tomorrow.
If your enemy is irrational, all the nukes in the world will do nothing to deter them. The counterargument that you are trying to set up is still born.
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