http://www.usiofindia.org/frame.htm
This is from a link of USI where its eminent members visited Russia and below is their assessment of Russian Posture
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[b]Other issues that were raised included :
(a) how far the US policies in Afghanistan were facilitating the reassertion of Pakistani interests in Afghanistan.
(b) The possibility of Pakistan and Afghanistan becoming bases for the US to pursue long-term goals to gain a foothold in Central Asia.
(c) The degree to which the US regional policies are being conditioned by efforts to contain China.
(d) The nature of American, Chinese and Russian competing interests to control Central Asian gas and oil resources.
(e) The security role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
(f) The role other economic and security organisations, promoted by Russia would play in stabilising the Region.
(g) Why Russia wants Central Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) to cooperate with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).
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This was an interesting session which highlighted the Russian military perceptions of the direction in which Indo-Russian security and defence ties were shaping, their particular concern related to the military dimension of the Indo-US relations, in particular US emerging as the main armament supplier to India. It was clarified that India will take an independent decision on arms procurement in relation to its technological and strategic requirements. Other issues included the following :-
(a) SCO appears to be the vehicle through which Russia wants to keep an economically strong China engaged. Russia has a huge border with China but does not have the capacity and capability to defend it.
(b) Russia's own economic might rests only on three pillars namely energy reserves, natural and raw materials and military hardware itself. It does not have any industry and infrastructure to boast of. Its transition from Soviet days to market economy and globalisation has ensured that most of its consumer goods requirements have to be met through imports. China did not shed its communistic hold while opening its markets and got into a massive manufacturing potential and creation of infrastructure in industrial belts along the eastern seaboard. Russia is yet to gain direction and be in a position to boast of any fresh infrastructure or manufacturing capacity.
(c) Exploration of oil and natural gas particularly in Western Siberia is very capital intensive and it needs investment which the Chinese are very eager to provide. Going whole hog with China would, however, be foolhardy. It finds that equal investment from India will provide a safeguard against loosing major control to the Chinese.
(d) Russia perceives numerous pressures from China in the not too distant future, be it population influx or Chinese influence in CAR.
(e) On the issue of arms supply and joint design and development, Russia was keen to maintain existing relationships but continued to harp on Intellectual Property Rights (IPP) related constraints.
Session IV: "Challenges to Peace and Stability in Central Asia-Afghanistan Region in the Coming Decade
This session was devoted to dealing with regional security issues of common concern. The Russians laid great stress on the SCO as a model for multilateral cooperation particularly from the point of view of maintaining military and political stability in Central Asia. Some of the important perspectives emerging out of this session are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.
First and foremost there was a three way power play underway in Central Asia. The American foothold in Central Asia has helped accentuate Western soft power through colour revolutions, friendship for peace programmes etc. Russia, on the other hand has always seen the region as a strategic buffer against outside threats. Consequently, many strategic interests compel Russia to retain Central Asia within its sphere of influence. Further, Russia was attempting to regain its leverages through both bilateral and multilateral instrumentalities such as CSTO and the SCO, apart from a plethora of economic cooperative arrangements. There are four major strategic interests driving Russian interests in CAR. One, transform Central Asia into a politically and economically viable entity that is friendly towards Russia. Second, secure Russian economic interest in the region particularly the regional energy resources including transportation corridors. Third, to counter the threat of religious extremism while encouraging the prevention of drug trafficking and arms smuggling. Fourth, secure the rights of the large Russian diaspora living in the region. China believes that the region holds the key to maintaining momentum of its economic growth as also security of its troubled periphery. Development of economic, political and security relations remain an important construct of its "Look West" policy, for which SCO remains its principal instrument.
Second, there was a growing strategic convergence between China and Russia and increasing isolation of the US – made imminent in the withdrawal of troops from bases in CAR. Nonetheless, the consequence of unease was being felt, both, by political elites of CAR as also Russia and China over the inroads and democratisation drive being made by the US and NATO. Interestingly, despite the utility of the US forces being limited in local political conflicts, the US was in no mood to downgrade its engagement. It was in fact impervious to such involvement.
In contrast, the growing Russian engagement promised investment and creation of a collective security force to deal with internal security issues. This was seen in the attempts at resurrection of CSTO and creation of a standing force to deal with regional conflicts.
China is clearly attempting to enhance its strategic influence, through military cooperation, and infrastructural and trade linkages. It is the leading force in pushing the SCO agenda, transcending to full fledged security outfit with military connotations. It was also seeking bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
1. Russians are counting clearly on China to counterweight US in its expansion in CAR . The recent dip in Indo-Russia relations didnt happen overnite .They started well over 2 years ago as can be gauged from this report since the above visit happend in 2005 !Some interesting facets of our interaction are discussed below:-
(a) There appeared to be an apprehension in the mind of Russians that growing Indo-US bilateral relations could in the long run impact bilateral arms sale relationship. This correlation is looked upon as the major plank of overall defence relationship. For the Russian military, sustenance of strong buyer and seller relationship appeared important even if these were subsumed within joint production or design and development like the fifth generation transport plane programmes.
(b) Strengthening of bilateral trade and economic relationship was something that was not discussed. They remain Eurocentric in their thinking on trade and related issues. However, in private interaction our Ambassador remained upbeat about the inevitable growth of Indo-Russian trade relations from its present level of close to just over two billion dollars.
(c) On joint exercises and greater military to military interaction, certain amount of reticence was noticed. They appear to be quite impressed by Chinese technological and force modernisation strategies. In private, they acknowledged that while major wars were unlikely, border and regional conflicts are a distinct possibility. Therefore, the current military transformation effort is linked to developing capabilities to fight such wars.
(d) In private conversation they acknowledged the declining edge of their conventional capabilities, which is something they are looking forward to address through structured modernisation programme. Interestingly, great emphasis was placed on nuclear deterrence which was being maintained at relatively advanced levels, inspite of financial constraints.
(e) Prominance was accorded to the SCO as a model of regional cooperation, where the interests of all the three major Asian powers coincide. It appeared that Russia was keen on India coming on board in the regional framework essentially to contain growing Chinese influence.
(f) On the issue of joint Indo-Russian-Chinese interaction, often speculated by media, Russians were categorical that these were unlikely in the near future. However, they were keen to promote such interaction within the framework of the SCO.
Note : For Russians arm exports ,its imp. to export arms manufactured in Russia ( Chinese realize this much earlier hence less stress on deep ToT ) unlike India .
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IL15Ad01.html
China has never been a player in Afghanistan in modern history. Indeed, it is a needless provocation on the part of the Chinese to be so utterly fearless of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. While India prides itself as a major donor for Afghan reconstruction - building roads, bridges, hospitals, a Parliament building and even, intriguingly, public toilets - China marches ahead and wins the tender for the Aynak cooper deposit in Afghanistan's Logar province bordering Kabul, which is billed as one of the world's largest copper mines.
The project involves US$4 billion in investment by China Metallurgical Group, which will be by far the biggest foreign investment in Afghanistan and is estimated to provide employment for 10,000 people. Significantly, the project includes the development of a railway system linking Afghanistan to China. (Nepal also has sought the extension of China's railway system from Lhasa to Kathmandu.)
2. Enter Dragon in Afghanistan and Iran opens its doorsBeijing-Tehran oil deal
These audacious Chinese are pole-vaulting across the impenetrable Himalayan ranges with merry abandon in their zest to globalize and integrate.
But the mother of all Chinese encirclement of India still remains largely unnoticed in Delhi - the Beijing-Tehran axis. There is wide recognition that if the United States hasn't been able to push through another tougher United Nations Security Council resolution against Iran over its nuclear program, that has been largely because of China's reluctance to concur.
But what happened last Sunday still came as a bolt from the blue. China Petroleum Corporation, better known as the Sinopec Group, signed a contract with the Iranian Oil Ministry for the development of the Yadavaran oil and gas fields in southwestern Iran.
The current estimation is that the project cost will be $2 billion. Under the contract, China will make the entire investment necessary to develop the fields. The first phase is to produce 85,000 barrels of oil per day and the second phase will add another 100,000 barrels. According to Iranian estimates, Yadavaran has in place oil reserves of 18.3 billion barrels and gas reserves amounting to 12.5 trillion cubic feet.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JA03Df02.html
3. US loses a vital card to keep TSP in check against ChinaBhutto's death a blow to 'war on terror'
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JA05Df02.html
4. Pawns are being positionedA commentator for Stratfor, a think-tank closely linked to the security establishment, says, "In this endgame, all that the Americans want is the status quo in Pakistan. It is all they can get. And given the way US luck is running, they might not even get that."
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JA19Df06.html
5. Too late .When the blame-game begins in an indeterminate war, it is time to sit up and take note. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' interview with the Los Angeles Times on Wednesday rings alarm bells.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JA29Df02.html
6. Fall back option ?He will be justified in estimating that Washington is desperately keen to regain influence in Tashkent so it can effectively counter Russian and Chinese influence in Central Asia. He sizes up that the medium-term US objective will also be to consolidate a permanent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) presence in Central Asia. In short, the Bush administration has learnt the hard way that Uzbekistan is a key country in Central Asia.
But in immediate terms, US Central Command is badly in need of Tashkent's cooperation for operating a second air corridor to Afghanistan so that the heavy dependence on Islamabad gets somewhat reduced.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JB06Df01.html
Dostum, who leads the political party Junbish-i-Milli and holds the symbolic post of chief of staff to the commander in chief, has an uncanny knack for appearing on the center stage whenever Afghan politics is at a crossroads. Of course, the most famous instance was in 1990.
That was also in Kabul in another extraordinary tension-filled time when the blame game had already begun, the Soviet Union was on the wane as a superpower, Mohammad Najibullah's regime was on its last legs and the Afghan mujahideen forces were stealthily advancing on their capital city - like the Taliban today. In the summer of that fateful year, Dostum, who was the Praetorian Guard of Najibullah's regime, began negotiating with Ahmad Shah Massoud, blurring enemy lines, possibly with Soviet encouragement, and paved the way for the mujahideen takeover in Kabul. The rest, as they say, is history.
If i am not wrong trying to connect all these dots plus a few others :The protagonists of the erstwhile Northern Alliance are coming out of the woodwork. But are they being encouraged to do so? Even though the presidential election is due only in end-2009, an element of uncertainty has gradually come to envelop the Afghan political landscape - the sort of haze that one associates with long sunsets. Former Afghan Interior minister Ali Ahmad Jalali, who fell out with Karzai, is also being lionized in Western capitals as a potential candidate in the presidential race.
The friends of Zalmay Khalilzad, the US ambassador to the United Nations and an ethnic Pashtun, have launched an altogether independent campaign sponsoring his candidacy to the post of president. From all appearances, the search has begun for a worthy successor to Karzai.
1. Russian supply of nuclear fuel to Iran ( Nov.-Dec )
2. Insurgency in NWFP / Pasthun war of independence
There's a tectonic shift happening in Great Game with far reaching consequences for US , China & Russia . Should Russian-Chinese alliance succeed , it will kick the Anglo-US alliance out of not only CAR but also change the power equation in Persian Gulf with Iranians as major card .
All these reports of Brits talking and training Tailbunnies in Afghanistan is a desparate act not to loose its foothold in Afghtanistan .
If Pasthuns play their card rite , they may alter alter balance in either Chinese or US way ( there was a recent sacking of a Tailbunny commander by one eye Omar )
So far Bear-Dragon have a clear upperhand .